--- Page 1 --- FMFRP 12-13 Maneuver In War (Repuintof 1939 EditIon) U.S. Marine Corps PCN 140 12130000 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited --- Page 2 --- DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, D.C.20380-0001 21 December 1990 FOREWORD 1. PURPOSE Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-13, Ma- neuverin War, ispublished to ensure the retention and dissem- ination of useful information which is not intended to become doctrine or to be published in Fleet Marine Force manuals. FMFRP's in the 12 series are a special category of publications: reprints of historical works which are no longer in print. 2. SCOPE Formerly published as NAVMC 2796, this reference publication was originally written by Charles Andrew Willoughby. An ex- cellent study on the theory of maneuver with many historical il- lustrations, it is as applicable today as it was when published in 1939. 3. CERTIFICATION Reviewed and approved this date. BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS 7/f.KLaAM.P. CAULFIE Major General, U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Commander for Warfighting Marine Corps Combat Development COmmand Quantico, Virginia DISTRIBUTION: 14012130000 --- Page 4 --- LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Page i.olenso, i5December i8gg4 2.Bull Run, i8-tg July i86,5 . Bull Run, 21 July i86i6 4.Bull Run, A Modern Solution7 5.3d Division Infantry Dispositions, Manic J)efense, 15.18 July 19188 6.Defense of the Sava, Initial Austrian Dispositions, ag August 19149 7.Defenseof the Sava, Austrian Dispositions, i-6 September 191410 8.Defense of the Sava, Austrian Concentrations and Counterattack, 6 September 1914II g.Defense of the Suez Canal, 191512 to.Position Defense13 ii.Lines of Resistance in a Defense Position14 12.3d Division, A.E.F., Marne 1918.Lines of Resistance55 13.Organization of a Defensive Sector 14.3d Div., A.E.F., Marne, 1918.Organization of Defensive Sectors, 7th and 3oth Inf.17 15.Composite Diagram:Defense of River LinesiS .6.A Turning Movement19 17.The Battle of Beersheba, 31 October 191720 iS.The o6thU.S. lnf., St. Juvin, 14 October igi821 ig.The 4thBn., 65th Fr.lnf.,Cuisy-en.Almont, 20 August igi822 20.Co. C, to3d U. S. Inf.,A.E.F.; Hilligo, 20 July 191823 21.The Maxims of Napoleon29 22.The Historical Continuity of the Principles of War: 505 B.C. .936 A.D36 23.Maneuver of the First Army:Montdidier, 8.12 August tgi8 24.First Army Plan.Montdidier, 8 August 191837 25.The Battle of Meggido, 19 September igi8 s6.The Campaigns of Simon Bolivar, 1813-182440 27.Cantigny, 28 May igi841 28.Structure and Physiognomy of Maneuver43 29.The Battle of Montdidier, 8-12 August igi847 30.The Attack of the French Tenth Army:Villers-Cotteret, igiS48 31.The Meuse-Argonne Operations, U. S. Forces, igt849 32.The Battle of La Fere Champenoise, g Septemler igi50 33.Operations of the French Fourth Army, 21-22 August I9.4 34.Montdidier, 8 August 1918.First Army Plan51 First Phase, Second Battle of Guise. i' October iqi852 36.Frontages.Combat Density.Historical Evolution 37.Frontages, World War:Allied and German Attacks 38.Summary of Frontages:Allied and German Attacks57 g. The Battle of St. Privat, i8 August 187061 40.The Maneuver of Eylau, i8o763 41.Battle of Castiglione, 179665 42.Battle of Lutzen, i8t66 4. March of the German Second Army on Le Mans. 187166 . March of the German First Army to the Ourcq, ig,.67 45.Reversal of Corps Columns 46.Crossing of Supply Columns 47.The Corps in.a Flank March70 48.A Movement by Echelon71 49.Routes of the German First Army, -8 September 19147'o. The 4th Bavarian Division.Longueval. t October 'g'i72 i. Schematic Chart:Types of Maneuver74 52.The Campaign of Italy, 179676 5. Tannenberg, August igi:First and Second Phases77 The Battle of the Sha.Ho, igo78 . The Battle of the Ardennes, 191479 6. Situation:German First and Second Armies, 4- September i9i8o 7. The Capture of Cantigny, 28 May 19188* 58. The Attack of the lit and 2d U. S. Divisions, 18-22 July 191884 59.West Front. 1914:The Race to the Sea 60.Characteristics of Breakthrough Operations91 --- Page 5 --- LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS—(Continued) Page 6i.The Breakthrough at Gorlice—Tarnow:2-9 May 191593 62.The Arras—Soissons Salient, 191794 63.The Verdun Salient, igi696 64.The Battle of Cambrai:November-December 1917 65.The Battle of Fleurus,1794 66.The Battle of Le Mans, 1871101 67.The.Turco.Bulgarian Campaign, '913102 68.Cannac and the Marne104 6g.Battle of Cannae:InitialSituation105 7o.Battle of Cannae:The Collisionio6 71.The Battle of the Cowpens, 1781107 72.The Engagement at Tafila, 24 January igiSto8 73.Tannenberg, 1914:First Phase109 74.The Battle of Leuthen,December 1757110 .TheNapoleonic Maneuver:Orientation.Location of Battles and Classification of Types ill 76.The Battle of Carabobo, 24 june 1821113 77a. Army Concentrations: Austro-Prussian War, 1866115 77b. General Situation to include 27 June i866 78.Location and Plan of Prussian Armies, 1-2 July i866117 g. The Battle of Koniggratz, 3 July i866ii8 8o.The Defense of Petersburg. 1864120 8i.Orientation Map:France, 191412* 82.The German Advance, 1914123 83.General Situation:Chancellorsville, 27 April to May 1863125 84.The Battle of Chancellorsville, 2 May r863126 85.The Battle of Wachau, ,6 October i8i127 86.Distribution of Forces. The Schlieffen Plan, '905..129 8.Offensive-Defensive:Comparative Evaluation153 88.Casualties in Attack and Defense, 1915-18134 8g.Napoleonic Wars, 1796-1815i6 go.Orientation Map:The Napoleonic Maneuveri8 91.Schematic Diagram:Maneuver Against the Rear of the Enemy139 92.Theater of War, Lombardy, 1796140 93.Austrian Lines of Communications, Lombardy, 1796141 94.Italy, 1796:Operations 2 April to 8 May'43 Theaterof War:Northwestern Europe, 1805 g6.The Campaign of Ulm, 1805145 97.General Situation of the French Armies, a8o6146 g8.The Advance on Jena, i8u6 gg.Eugene in Italy, i8i148 ioo.Campaign of Italy, 1796149 ioi.Campaign of 1815 102.The Maneuver of Eylau, 1807152 ,o. The Campaign of Ulm, 1805155 104.The Battle of Ulm154 ion.The Structure of Battle155 io6.Battle of Allenstein, iSo'-157 107.Battleof Wagram. 1809158 io8.Wagram, i8og: MacDonald's Assault159 log.The Structure of Battlei6o no. The Strategic Advance on Bautzen, i8i iii.The Battle of Bautzen, 21 May i8i162 ii*.The Battle of Bautzen: Schematic u. The Battle of Ulm, 18o5164 114.The Advance on Jena. i8o6164 115.The Battle of Jena, iSo6165 ii6.The Maneuver of Eylau, 1807i66 117.The Battle of Eylau. 1807166 ii8.Progress of Civil War in Spain, 1936-1939'73 119.The Drive to the Sea. March g8 to February 1939174 120. The Operations Against the Sierra Palomera, -7 February 1938175 --- Page 6 --- LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS—(Contjngcd) Page 121.The OperationsAgainst theSierraDe SanJust, 23April-5 May 1938'77122.The Reduction of the Albentosa Sector,i to 22 June igS178 123.The Operations inEstremadura, 19-24JUly1938 179 124.TheMotorized Advanceon Guadalajara184 125.Conflict of Empire1961*6.TheProgressof Japanese Expansionin China from 1895 to1938200 1*7.Sino-Japanese Theater of War201 128.The War of the Railroads. A Parallel to the Sino-Japanese Conflict202 i*g.Operations on the North Front, 1937.Sequence of Events203 '3°.Initial Offensive in Hopei, August-September1937205 131.Operations on the South Front, Shanghai Nanking,1937*06 132.The War of the Railroads. A Parallel to the Sino-Japanese Conflict*08 133.Operations Against the Lunghai Corridor, 1938209 134.The Hsuchou-Tayerchwang Area April 1938210 135.Tayerchwang, 3 April 1938211 136.The Japanese Major Offensive:Hsuchow, May 1938212 137.The Battle of Hsuchow, 15-18 May 1938213 138.The Advance on Hankow215 139.'rhe Capture of Hankow216 140.The Capture of Canton*17 141Lines of Communications, 1939 142.The "Life Line": Lashio-Yunnan219 '43.The 142d Chinese Division, 26 September-i6 October 1938222 144.i'he i4*d Chinese Division 26 September-i6 October 1938223 145.Aviation Performance and Comparative Theaters of War224 146.The Operations at Nankow Pass, 3-24 August 19372*6 147.Relative Distances in Various Sino-Japanese Campaigns, 1937-1939227 148.The Partition of Africa, 1880-1930231 ,9. The Advance on Adua, 29 February i8g6233 150.Adua, Situation at io:oo A.M., 29 February i8g6234 151.Relati%e Colonial Acquisitions. 1880-1914236 152.Orientation Map, Abyssinia240 153.Roadnet, Northern Theater of Operations, 1936*42 154.Roadnet, Southern Theater of Operations, 1936243 155.Organization of Theaters of Operation, 1935244 156.The Initial Italian Concentration, i October 1935*47 157.The Initial Italian Advance, 3-6 October 1935248 158.The Italian Advance, 26 October-ti November 1935249 159.Mai Timchet and the Dembeguina Pass, 14-16 December 1935250 i6o.General Situation, Northern Theater of Operations. 15 December 1935251 s6s.The First Battle of the Tembien, 19-23 January 1936251 i62.MarshalBadoglio's Decisive Maneuver, io February-3 March 1936252 163.The Battle ofAmbaAradam, 10-15 February 1936253 164.The Capture of Amba Alagi, 27, February 1936254 i6. The Second Battle of the Tembien, 27-29 February 1936255 166.The Attack onCoietzaand Al Gaga Pass, 2-3 March 1936*56 167.Starace's Advance onGondar,10-31 March 1936257 z68.Ruggero's Advance on Sardo, 6-is March 1936259 s6g.The General Advance on Dessie, 5-14 April 1936*60 170.The Battle of Mai Cieu, 1-3 April 1936 171.The Advance on Addis Ababa, 24 April-5 May ig6262 172.Graziani's Initial Operations, October-November '935264 173.The Battle of Ganale Doria, 11-13 January 1936 174.The Advance on Neghelli, 15-20 January 1936266 175.The Advance on Sassabaneh, April 1936267 176.The Battle of Gianagobo, 15-17 April 1936268 i. Sassabaneh, Situation 24-25 April 1936270 178.Sassabaneh, Situation 29.50 April 1936271 ig.ThePursuit to Harrar, 5 May 1936273 i8o.MilitaryRoads, Northern Abyssinia'79 *8,.Fig. 1.Military Roads. Abyssinia, Profiles282 i8i.Fig. 2.Military Roads,Abyssinia,Profiles --- Page 8 --- CONTENTS Chapter Page I.THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF MODERN TACTICS z.The Value of Military History1 *.Science.Doctrine.Proof 3.The Role of the Historical Examplea 4.Historical Examples:Five Concrete Cases 5.The Evolution of Modern Tacticsis II. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR 6.The Codification of Military Knowledge 7.The Historical Continuity of the Principles*6 8.The Practical Application of the Principles of War35 III.MASS AND DIRECTION 9.Definition of Maneuver so.The Basic Factors46 ii.Combination of Directions46 'a.Preliminary Conditions Affecting Direction48 '3.Direction in Offensive Combatso 14.Distribution of Forces.Frontagesso 15.Frontages.Combat Density.Historical Evolution i6.Interpretation of Density Table53 I'. THEORY OF MANEUVER 17.The Structure' of Battle i8.Decisive Action.Point.Place.TimeSo 19.The Preconceived Maneuver64 *0.Adaptation of the Preconceived Maneuver67 V. CENTRAL MANEUVER a,. A Schematic Classification of Maneuver74 u.Operationon Interior Lines75 s.Dislocation:Fragmentation of the Front77 *4.The Penetration *5.The Breakthrough VI. FLANK MANEUVER *6.The Convergrng Attacktoo 27.The Envelopment503 s8.The Defensive Maneuver1*4 *9.Attack or Defense:Relative Tactical Values5*9 VII. THE NAPOLEONIC CONCEPT OF MANEUVER o. A Modern Organization,.136 31.Napoleon's System of Operations537 3*.The Maneuver against Flank and Rear TheManeuver on Interior Lines148 VIII. THE NAPOLEONIC CONCEPT OF BATTLE 34.The Transition from Maneuver to Battle TheInternal Structure of Battle 36.The Execution of the Main Attack 7. The Coordination of the Main and Secondary Attack 38.The Exploitation of the Main Attack 39.Examples of the Napoleonic Method 40.Summary and Condusions IX. THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936.5939 41.A Political Impasse17* 4*.Chronology of Operations*7* 4.Characteristic Types of Maneuver .TheEffect of Foreign kervention58. 5. Tactics and Technique of the Separate Arms18* --- Page 9 --- CONTENTS—(Continued) Chapter X.THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR 46.The Politico-Economic Background 47.Chronology of Operation'99 48.The Problem of Chinese Supply*57 ATug-of-War.Guerrillas against Regulars*19 50.Statistic of Conquestno 51.Characteristic Types of Maneuver2*1 5*.Tactia and Technique of Separate Arms*13 53.Future Developments*27 XI. THE ITALO-ETHIOPIAN WAR .TheEvolution of an Aggressor*30 55Chronology of Operations237 6. The Organization of an Overseas Expedition*39 7. The Campaign in the North:Dc Bono and Badoglio247 58. The Campaign in the South:Graziana263 9. Characteristic Types of Maneuver271 6o.The Tacties and Technique of the Separate Arms*72 XII.EPILOGUE: THE WAR OF THE FUTURE*86 --- Page 10 --- I THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF MODERN TACTICS 1. THE VALUE OF Miizr.&y HISTORY. Napoleon once defined recorded history as "a collection of lies men have agreed upon," but he was quick to make an ex- ception in favor of military history: "..tactics,evolutions, the technique of engineers and artillery can be learned from textbooks, but a knowledge of the higher elements of war can only be acquired through a study of military history and through experience itself." The professional value of military historical studies is now so universally acknowledged that army service schools, in this country as well as abroad, habitu- ally maintain extensive courses in military history. A perfect definition of this value is contained in the "Annual Report of the Chief of Staff,U.S. Army, i5": "More than most professions, the military is forced to depend upon intelligent interpret tation of the past for signposts charting the future. Devoid of opportunity, in peace, for self- instruction through actual practice of his profession, the soldier makes maximum use of his- torical record in assuring the readiness of himself and his command to function efficiently in emergency. "The facts derived from historical analysis, he applies to conditions of the present and the proximate future, thus developing a synthesis of appropriate method, organization and doctrine. "But the military student does not seek to learn from history the minutia of method and technique. In every age, these are decisively influenced by the characteristics of weapons currently available and by the means at hand, for maneuvering, supplying and controlling combat forces. But research does bring to liiht those fundamental principles and their combination and application which, in the past, have been productive of success. "These rindples know no limitation of time.' Consequently, the Army extends its analytical interest to the dust-buried accounts of wars long past as well as to those still reeking with the scent of battle. It is the object of the search that dictates the field for its pursuit. Those callow critics who hold that only in the most recent battles are there to be found truths applicable to our present problems have failed utterly to see this. "They apparently ding to the fatuous hope that in historical study is to be found a com- plete digest of the science of war rather than simply the basic and inviolable laws of the art of war. . Itis significant, indeed, that our highest military authority should devotespace and thought to the field of military historical study in an annual report dealing with the activities of the American Anny as a whole! The views of General MacArthur in 1935 are supported by a similar idea ex- pressed by a foreign Chief of Staff, Count Schlieffen, Imperial German Army, in 1905: For anyone who aspires to become a great commander, there is an open book, called military history, which begins with the hand-to-hand struggle between Cain and Abel and which did not end with the Napoleonic Campaigns. "Its reading, I must admit, is not always exciting.One has to plow through a mass ofuninteresting details!But—one accumulates facts, often encouraging facts! and at the bot- tom of it all, one arrives at the final realization how it all came about, how it had to happen and may happen again." The American and German opinions of the professional value of military his- tory are amply confirmed by the current practice in foreign armies to make pro- motion in grade contingent upon examinations in which military history is a required subject; in the British army, promotion examinations include historical topics, viz: The American Civil War, 1861-1864; The Campaign in M"sopotamia, 1915-1917; The Russo-Japanese War, 19o4; Gallipoli, 1915; etc. 1Napoleon,Ci,,,e,Pondence,Vol. XXX. . 315.a These principles are traceablefromSun.Tzu (506-496 B. C.), the oldest military treatise on record, tothe U. S. War Department T,ainin Rsgulat:o,u, No. 10-5, serIes of 1921. 1 --- Page 11 --- MANEUVER IN WAR There are no promotion examinations in the American service, but it is sug- gestive that a foreign army should list the American Civil War concurrently with purely national subjects. One can afford to acknowledge the wisdom of Bismarck's cynical comment: "Fools say they learn by experience. I prefer to learn by other people's experi. ence." This experience, far wider than the average individual can hope to accumulate for himself, is dearly contained in military history. It is significant that great military thinkers like Napoleon, Clausewitz, Moltke and Foch did not consider the tactical schooling of leaders as the most important item of their professional equipment; they esteemed above all an intellectual training derived from a corn parative study of the past. a. SCIENCE. DoCTRINE. PáoOF. Throughout a military career one is confronted with dogmatic statements, in training, in tactics, in instructional texts. In the professions, and especially in the sciences, a statement of principle is ordinarily based on a long record of laboratory experimentation. No science worthy of the name would undertake to announce a doctrine without furnishing proof of it by submitting laboratory tests or observations which had led to definite conclusions. This is recognized scientific approach! The military profession, if it lays claim to scientific character, should certainly not be exempted from this procedure. This thought is by no means original! It is expressed in the Reveries or Memoirs upon the Art of War by Count Maurice de Saxe, Field-Marshal of France, 1756. This brilliant eighteenth century commander has this to say: • War is a science so obscure and Imperfect that in general norules of conduct can be given, reducible to absolute certainties, and custom and prejudice, confirmed by ignorance, are its sole foundation and support...Allother sciences are established upon fixed principles and rules, while this alone remains desdtute. ..Thequestion whether war ought to be styled a trade or a science is very properly thus decided (by the Chevalier Folard): it is a trade for the ignordnt and a science for men of genius." Marshal Saxe's sarcastic comments, one hundred and eighty years ago, have an uncomfortable, modern application. Throughout his career, the soldier-student is confronted with mandatory statements in tactics, training and doctrine, often without explanation of their origin; the dicta are repeated parrot-like and fol- lowed as a matter of discipline. Now, when a statement of doctrine, principle or method is combined with an analysis of battle experience, ordinary scientific pro- cedure is observed since the conclusion is supported by proof. It is in this direction that military history, i.e., the professional analysis of operations, can render definite, practical service. Military history represents the laboratory of military science. Field service regulations are the record of battlefield experience expressed in brief terms. 8 THE Rotz OF ThE HIsTolucAt EXAMPLE. If one accepts this generalpremise, then the entire field of military instruction is immediately affected, and one can expect that tactical doctrine is susceptible of historical proof; this reasoning lends a special importance to the so-called historical example. The historical example is a narrative of events of a tactical operation in a con- iñuous analysis of cause and effect in order to deduce definite, tactical lessons. 1though the field of general historical investigation is enormous and touches ipon an immense variety of elements, military history is essentially limited to the ievelopment of military factors. •Centuries before Bismarck.keen observers have known this: "There are two roadi—one rough the mis. ortuneoftheir ownthe other throughthose ofothers; the formeris the most unmistakable,thelatter the upalcful."(Polyf,ius.Ni,:ori,sBook 1, p. 41. --- Page 12 --- THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF MODERN TACTICS The historical example is now generally regarded as an indispensable tool of tactical instruction. Tactical instruction in our service schools roughly follows a certain sequence: a. Outline of principles: lecture or conference. b. Application of principles: map exercise. c.Applicationof principles on the terrain: field exercise The pedagogic process is such that military situations under "b" are manipu lated, if not forced, to produce certain. time-and-space factors; consequently, the conditions are somewhat artificial. The author of the problem is judge, jury, prosecuting attorney and defendant, all in one; the resulting military situation, while smoothly adequate for the particular pedagogic objective ofthemoment, is rarely true to life; it lacks the vital, rugged characteristics of battlefield situations. It is obvious that somewhere in the average cycle of instruction, there is a place for battlefield situations, for historical examples demonstrating the application of principles in concrete cases in combat, since a statement of principle is incom- plete without proof in the form of its historical employment. A general lecture, conference or map exercise is not wholly convincing unless it is based on the realities of the battlefield; this is simply the inescapable relation- ship between theory and practice. The element that will bridge the gap is the historical example, which accompanies the presentation of theoretical principles, methods and procedure in tactics. Military history becomes a most effective vehide of tactical instruction. At one of our important, service schools military history is an established subject and takes the form of "historical examples accompanying selected faculty conferences."' The following study on defense of river lines is designed to show the practical application of historical examples in support of current tactical doctrine. The battle action is proof of a principle, applied or violated. Note the organization and sequence of this material, the constant cross reference to established regulations, the continuous study of cause and effect: i.Definition of principles; grouping by "type of actions'. .Briefoutline of selected military operations. .Theapplication of 'principles" in each operation. 4.Analysis.Deductions. Condusions. 4. HISTORIcAL ExAMPLEs: FIVE CONCRETE CASES. a. River defense: Principles. Methods. Classification. The basic principles of river defense, including practical methods of execution, are contained in current War Department publications and service-school instructional textsand permit a broad classification of several types of river defense which involve certain definite tactical dispositions, viz: 4AtThe InfantrySchool.PostBenning, Georgia,the academiccommittees presentbasic conferences foreach tactical category,viz:"TheRifle Platoon in Attack." "Forms of Attack." "Night Marches." etc.;this typeof pneral conference lends itself peculiarlytotheinsertion of appropriate historical examples, illustrating the particular type of militaryoperation,viz: RiftsPliiioo ,i, Ausch: 1.Co B 47th Us Inf: SergyJuly29-30, 1918.2. 1stP1stCo B 38th lnf: Aisne.Marne July 19-22. 1918.3. 4th Plat Co C 31st lnf: Kazanka, Sit,eria. July 3, 1919.Form: of Attack: 1.Envelopment: 157th British Regt:Wad, ci Hesi, Nov.8, 1917. 2. Double envelopment:ArabIrreSulars: Taflla. Jan. 23. 1918. 3. Penetration:28thUS ml: Cantigny, May 28-30. 1918. 1.'ght soentsofunitsof4th and 7th US Inf' Cierges and Nantillols, Oct. 3,1918. 2. Night march 2d En 28th US Inf: Aisne.Marne Odensive. July 17.1918. 3. a.'British and Ansac Ens: Sari BairAug. 6.7, 1913. 5. British and Anzac Ens: hanuk air, Au. 8, 1915.It should be noted that in view of the special mission of The Infantry School, the military historical studiesare heldwithin thelimitsof operations of theinfantryregiment (and lesserincludedunits)and su000rting armsratherthangeneralbattle studies,as inthepast.Thisimportantmodi6cationwasaccom. lis)ied in the eriodof 1936 (Cal. Walter C. Short. Asst. Comdt.) •1937(Cal. Charles F. Thompson, Asst. omdt.)1938 (Col. Courtney H. Hodges, Asst. Comdt.). 'F. S. R.. 1939, Pars. 602.628.Part 0, 'Defense"pamphlet,C. & G. 5.S.,1935.Special Text No. 13, Chap.8,Army Extension Courses, 1937.The "Digest of Infantry Doctrine," Ft. Benning, Ga..1936. Training Notes, Infantry School. 1939. Vol. II, Chap.13. --- Page 13 --- MANEUVER IN WAR Cose1:Defense at the water'sedge. The method:(a) The main line of resistance is placed on or near the river bank. The purpose:(b) The opposite bank and its approaches are held under fire, and the enemy's attempts to aoss are frustrated in their beginnings. The means:(c) To hold the river line, in force, with insufficient reserves destroys the flexibility of defense. The effect:(d) Holding the river line with inadequate forces leads to a general over. extension with consequent weakness. Case2:Defense at the water's edge. Defense:(a) A river line may be employed as an obstade in front of a defensive position. L of R. (b) A river line can be employed as a line of resistance only when its course con• forms to the strategical and tactical situation. Strength:(c) Sufficient forces are available for a strong defense at the river's edge. Reserve:(d) Sufficient forces for the usual defensive requirements in reserve. PLATE 1.COLENSO,'5 DECEMBER 1899. 8oer Positions_..____ --- Page 14 --- THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF MODERN TACTICS5 Case 3:Position in Readiness. Central reserve: (a) It is usually best to hold the mass of the forces in a position in readiness at such distance to the rear that they can intervene at any point where a crossing may be at. tempted. Surveillance:(b) The river line is held by relatively weak detachments. Detachments:(c) Stronger detachments are posted at the most probable points of crobslng Mission:(d) The mission of the detachments is to discover hostile crossings and prevent the enemy from establishing bridgeheads before the arrival of the main friendly forces. Case 4:Defense in advance of the river line. To secure bridgeheads, usually in preparation of a counter-offensive by larger units, or when the river itself must be protected as a line of communications. b. The application of tactical principles. Example 1: There are favorable possibilities of "defense at the water's edge" if the point of crossing of the enemy is definitely known or if the local topography clearly limits the points of crossing and the terrain favors the defense. The British attempt to cross the Tugela River in the battle of Colenso,15 De- cember, i8gg, broke down under the deadly fire of the Boers delivered from a tier of fire trenches along the steep bluffs that dominate the plain of Colenso (Case z b). The Boer War was an eye-opener as regards the effect of small-arms fire com- bined with concealment. This situation affords a remarkable example of hasty field fortifications, organization of the ground and the employment of tactical localities along the immediate river front. REINFORCEMENTS FROM WEST PLATE 2.BULLRUN, i8.ig JULY 1861. The defensive dispositions of the Boers were practically linear, a hastily organized though shallow position defense as it is understood today.It was effective: the British "attempts to cross were frustrated in their beginning," exactly as indicated in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), Case i. The question presents itself at once: why did the British not go around this formidable position? The reason is also a --- Page 15 --- MANEUVER IN WAR justification for the linear defense employed here: the Colenso area, astride the British advance for the urgent relief of Ladysmith, was the only locality suitable for a crossing of the Tugela. Here was that rare situation when the point of hostile crossing could be definitely anticipated. Such clear advance information, however, will probably remain the exception rather than the rule. While the dispositions of the Boer appear to have the sanction of an official text, paragraphs (c) and (d), Case 1, inject an element of doubt and certain limitations. The inherent weakness of the close-in, linear defense, under Case i, is strikingly evident in the next example: Example 2: The first battle of Bull Run, 21 July, i86i, is an illustration of a river line improperly held. General Beauregard, the Confederate commander, decided to defend the line of Bull Run Creek; his dispositions fall into the category of "defense at the water's edge" (Case i). Beauregard placed ,ofhis 7'/2 brigades along the river, thereby committing the bulk of his forces. His line was seven miles long and had a density of 1.8 men per yard of frontage. This is the "cordon" or linear type of defense, which can obviously be pierced or enveloped. On the twenty-first, under cover of feint attacks, the bulk of the Federals made a turning movement against the Confederate north flank via Sudley's Springs; the crossing was unopposed, since the bulk of the Confederates was committed else- where: 13,ooo men lay idle along the creek. The main battle, which developed as a consequence of the Federal envelopment, was fought by Confederate reinforce- ments which had arrived from the Shenandoah Valley, as a fortunate coincidence. If the fords had been observed by small detachments while the mass of the Con- federate Army was held in a position in readiness (Case ),aFederal advance via PLATE 3.BULL RUN, * JULY i86i. --- Page 16 --- THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF MODERN TACTICS7 Sudley's Springs could have been opposed by superior forces, while an advance on the south could have been taken in flank. Beauregard's dispositions failed in recognizing the point of major crossing of the enemy and opposing it initially. The period prior to a hostile crossing, when the real intentions of the enemy are not fully disclosed, must be regarded as a readiness phase in which the tactical means at hand should not be fully com- mitted; when the enemy intentions become unmistakable, then the readiness phase merges into a defense phase—which is simply a form of combat. Beauregard com- mitted the bulk of his forces during the readiness phase (Case i c, d), disregarding the essential requirement of ample reserves (Case 2 c, d). PLATE 4.BULL RUN, A MODERN SOLUTION. Example 3: The factors that primarily favor defense at the water's edge are shown in Case a; it may be argued that there is only one real factor (Case 2 c), ample strength. The defense of a sector of the Marne River by the 3d U. S. Division, i July, 1918, is often quoted as an example of the successful defense of a river line, as an element of a tactical position. While the river line was actually occupied, the general dispositions of this force followed the prescribed pattern of a heavily organized, defensive sector as practiced on the West Front during 1918; the river became merely an additional obstade; the whole scheme of defense was influenced by stabilized warfare. As an interior division, there was no necessity for large centralized reserves in readiness; ample reserves were available in corps and army; there were g divisions on a compara- tively narrow front of i81/ miles. Example 4: The principles and methods listed under Case : "Position in readi- ness," present a type of defense which many authorities regard as practicable for --- Page 17 --- MANEUVER IN WAR most situations. In the development of historical examples, proof is sometimes precarious, particularly as regards smaller units. The World War, with its enor• mous masses on restricted fronts, shows very few instances in which regiments or battalions operated alone; there is a record, however, of a numerically weak in. fantry division which was employed with such superb skill that it has become a PLATE .DDIVISION INFNTRY DISPOSITIONS, MARNE DEFENSE. 15-18 JULY 1918. veritabledassic, in the actual application of every important factor, under Case:The defense of the Sava River by the Austrian 29th Infantry Division, 6 Septem- ber, 1914. Thesituation on 29 August showed the bulk of the regular-army units scattered in small detachments along the river, on a front of about20 miles; this initial dis- position falls into the category of "defense at the water's edge." Anew commander, --- Page 18 --- THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF MODERN TACTICS9 Lt. General Krauss, who arrived at this period, ordered the immediate relief from river duty of all regular-army units and their concentration in a central locality, replacing the river detachments by several battalions of landsturm (3d dass troops). PLATE 6.DEFENSE OF THE SAVA, INITIAL AUSTRIAN DISPOSITIONS. 29AUGUST 1914. Thedivision had barely completed its concentration, in a position of readiness, when the Serbians forced a crossing east of Mitrowitz on 6 September; their axis of advance ran straight into the Austrian billeting areas! The Austrian com- mander employed one infantry regiment to hold the enemy frontally, while he made a double envelopment: on the east with one brigade (less one regiment) and on the west with an entire brigade. Counter-attacked on three sides, with a wide river in back, the situation of the Serbians became desperate and finally resulted in their complete defeat that night. It is important to note that this extraordinary success was made possible only through the prior and timely concentration of the 29th division; only five days before the Serbian crossing, this unit was widely dispersed along the river front. What would have been a likely outcome had the Serbian crossing struck an initially weak sector, on 29 August, composed of only one or two battalions? In this connection, note the fundamental difference between the dispositions of the Austrians, on the Sava, and the Americans, on the Manic; the former, an independent division, in open warfare, with plenty of elbow room; the other an interior division, with restricted maneuver space, in stabilized warfare. Example 5: The defense on the enemy's side of the river is regarded as excep- / — / iSERBIANS I S. / / '4 AUSTRIANS AUSTRIAN DISPOSITIONS AUG.29. 1914 / / 010KM. --- Page 19 --- MANEUVER IN WAR tional, under the special conditions stated in Case : The British defense of the Suez Canal, in 1915 and 19i6, is a characteristic example. The British defended, initially, along the west bank of the canal; with this method of "defense at the water's edge," the British repulsed a Turkish crossing, in February 2915. When Kitchener visited this front, he criticized the British dispositions as a tac- tical error; he pointed out to the local commander "that instead of defending the canal, the canal was defending him." This left the canal open to raids, destruction or interruptions; a river line, ordinarily, is incidental to defense, merely an additional obstacle, while the canal represented an important link of. British Empire communication and a vulnerable defile. Consequently, the defensive works were pushed to the east, on the Turkish side, at a distance of 12 miles in a series of fortified bridgeheads. PLATE .DEFENSEOF THE SAVA. AUSTRIAN DISPOSITIONS, 1-6 SEPTEMBER 1914. In summing up lessons, the characteristics of each type of dçfense are dearly defined ih current regulations; the key to a choice between various forms can be found in the extent of front to be covered and the number of troops available, i.e., the ratio of strength to task; an equally important element is the mission: the pur- pose of the defense. The problem is not new; it has been neatly stated by two great historical corn- manders who require neither introduction nor apology—one defines the problem of river defense, while the other suggests a solution: •1 / AUSTQ TANS 0OKm. --- Page 20 --- THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF MODERN TACTICSIi Frederick the Great: "... Nothingis more difficult, almost Impossible, than to prevent the passage of a river line, especially if the front is too extended.I should not care to be charged with such a mission." Napoleon I: "... Ariver is an obstacle which can only delay the enemy for a few days. If you decide to defend it, the only solution is to assemble your troops as a mass and fall upon the enemy before his crossing is completed." 5. THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN TACTICS. a. The historical origin of tactical prin- ciples. In tracing the application of field service regulations, i.e., "modern doc- AUSTRAN Austrian Concentrations endCounter-Attacks £ept 6-1914 trifle,"in comparatively recent operations, and furnishing unmistakable proof of a natural relationship and interdependence, we have merely applied a common laboratory procedure: the process of analysis and synthesis. The use of "river defense" as a vehide is unimportant; the same method can be employed with all tactical categories. There is nothing complicated or far-fetched in linking the craftsmanship of the soldier with the intellectual process of formulating rules: human knowledge has been empirical in most branches; experience has always been the road to ultimate efficiency. The intensely practical nature of the military art demands that its methods rest on realities and rational function. It is equally obvious that military engagements are not fought to establish the accuracy of regulations, but rather that these regulations are an echo of battle experience. In accepting this truism, we have also established the historical basis of modern tactics, in the sense of General MacArthur's dassical definition. Utilizing the known factors in river defense, this relationship can be shown in Mitrowitz 29 o SERBIANS PLATE 8. DEFENSE OF THE SAVA. AUSTRIAN CONCENTRATIONS AND COUNTERATTACK, 6 SEPTEMBER 1914. --- Page 21 --- MANEUVER IN WAR comparatively recent military texts.6 The generally approved ptttern of an or- ganized, defensive position is represented in the following schematic diagrams. PLATE g.DEFENSEOF THE SUEZ CANAL, 19t5. Note the depth and sequence of the various successive defensive lines, viz: Outpost line of resistance. Battle positionMain line of resistance. Regimental reserve line. Rear areasSuccessive lines. 1 Special TextNo. 26s. Army Extension Course. Infantry in Def ensive Cemkt, 1936. Figs. 6 .nd 8.pp.18.20. Chap. H.Training Notes. Infantry School. 1939, Vol. II, Chap. I. --- Page 22 --- pOsmoN DEFENSE 25 YDS LOCAL OUTPOST 50 YDS TO eoo Yos THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF MODERN TACTICS P1GURES GIVEN ARE GUIDES ONLYANDARE NOT TO BE CON$tDERED AS UNITS PLATEto.POSITIONDEFENSE. --- Page 23 --- MANEUVER IN WAR OUTPOSTLiNE OF RESISTANCE IMAIN LINE OF RESISTANCE _...,_..._,e_.'l'Im000fu1u'hh'h'tuhtth1_hhuh1m_h1_U_uU.1_fh0h1,1_1Uh'_'*th'.I'l_ SUPPORT LINE .__.p...___ll_Ip__,.— — PLATE ii.LINESOF RESISTANCE IN A DEFENSIVE POSITION. What is this scheme of defense based on? Where was it derived from? Is it a local and recent development? Does it represent the private views of a military instructor? Is it an expression of theory or practical experience? Is it directly derived from battle experience? These are purely rhetorical questions; the answer is inescapable! This tactical scheme of defense, like all military doctrine, rests on the solid basis of history and has stood the test of battle. Compare the infantry dispositions of the 5d Division on the Marne, the frame- work of this defense, the skeleton of successive defensive lines, with the schematic pattern of this modern text; they are obviously similar and become identical if we adjust the lines of the instructional diagram to the topography of the Marne River; clearly, the schematic figures of the text were influenced by this historical action. To continue and complete the professional pattern, all that remains is to fill in a regimental sector with combat groups, strongpoints and centers of resistance. The currently accepted design, for a regimental sector, is contained in Fig. g, S.T. 265, Chap. II, Par. 15. If this design is transposed to fill in a regimental sector of the 3d Division, one arrives at the actual dispositions of that unit, in its historical defense of the Marne D115July, 1918. The broad concept of defense of river lines is susceptible of similar proof. The 'Plate 5. Pu. 4i. • While obsolescent, the salient featuresofthi,textare not likely to disappear. --- Page 24 --- THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF MODERN TACTICS 3RDDIVISION INFANTRV DISPOSITIONS 45 KMS PLATE ia.3DDIVISION, A.E.F., MARNE igi8. LINES OF RESISTANCE. OUTPOST LINE POSON LINE P / --- Page 25 --- MANEUVER IN WAR sharp demarcation between "defense on the water's edge" and.a "position in readi- ness" has already been developed (Cases 2 and ). Thehistorical basis is easily recognizable in a composite diagram: the upper half is based on a diagrammatic figure (Case ),containedin a comparatively recent instructional text; ° the lower half represents the 3d Division on the Marne (Case 2). Note companies: Conference 1.107-A: Forwardarea:rifle companies (i Bn ist ml) Intermediate position: 3d Bn 1st ml. & Regtl Hqrs. Brigade Reserve: ad Bn 1st ml; one Bn ad ml. Dwssion Reserve: the 4th ml. 3d Division A.E.F. Marne 1918: 30th inf Sector. Forward area:ist Bn 3oth ml Intermediate position: ad Bn oth ml Brigade Reserve: d Bn 30th ml; ist Bn 7th Inf. At first glance, strength and dispositions appear quite similar—except for a highly important circumstance: It is the relative width of the sector, the factors of troop density and of frontage! The composite diagram is drawn to a common scale, a front (width) of 6 miles applies to both halves! In Conference 1-107-A (Case s)theregiment occupies a front of 6 miles, with one battalion along the river front, while in the 3d Division A.E.F. (Case 2), there are four regiments abreast on approximately the same frontage, with regimental sectors varying in width from 1to2 miles each. On the Marne, there is an application of mass, power and depth, with regiments in column of battalions, while the scheme of 1-107-A represents a linear disposition, stretched to the limit, a string of detachments in observation along the river front, while relatively heavy reserves are held back in a position of readiness. • Mmeogzapb 1407-A. Def cpu, of River Line,, The Infantry School, Pt. Benning. Ga., 1938, and Miinco. 1-87, 1939. and compare the strength and disposition of regiments, battalions and --- Page 26 --- THE HISTORICALBASIS OF MODERN TACTICS 3RDDIVISION INFANTRY DISPOSITIOr.J5 TiONJ OF REGIMISECTORS PLATE14.DDIV.. AEF. MARNE, igi!.ORGANIZATIONOF DEFENSIVE SECTORS, 7TH AND 3oTH INF. --- Page 28 --- THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF MODERN TACTICS service regulations are primarily concerned with the teamwork of combined arms, within the division or brigade; it can hardly be denied that tactical concepts are not complete except through combined arms; the moment they are limited to a single arm, they become distorted, fragmentary. An isolated infantry garrison, without associated arms, cannot fully realize the potentialities of their armament. The larger unit operation determines the broad tactical concept; the small unit becomes a cog in a complex machinery with a fixed and monotonous function. The division defends the river line, in a position of readiness; a battalion may find itself along the river, in surveillance or in rear areas as reserve. Military thought is continually troubled by an apparent conflict in the tactical concepts of "large" and "small" units or a twilight zone between them. Perhaps this is based on an understandable antagonism between "theoretical" and 'prac- tical" ideas, engendered by a vague feeling that the average officer, in a peace-time career, will be limited to the workaday problems of small garrisons, in contradis- tinction to the "highbrows" in staff or large-unit assignments. This feeling is accentuated in the baffling experience of junior officers, in our service schools, who graauate from the exalted map-command of large units to very subordinate assign- ments, on reporting for duty. with troops. A narrow academic viewpoint will sometimes add to the general confusion, in applying such broad concepts as "principles of war" to small-scale operations: a platoon engaged in enveloping a hostile machine gun which has pinned down a part of it, may conceivably practice "economy of force" with the men who PLATE i6. A TURNING MOVEMENT. --- Page 29 --- MANEUVER IN WAR are immobilized, apply "offensive" and "mass," through the enveloping group and eventually reach the "objective," i.e., the hostile machine gun nest. While intrin- sically correct, this phraseology is slightly absurd and strident, as if a discreet whisper were inadvertently magnified by a loudspeaker. PLATE i7. THEBATTLE OF BEERSHEBA, s OCTOBER 1957. c. The historical origin of tactical forms. There can be no real discrepancy in tactical concept between large and small units: the differences, if any, are in execution rather than in principle. There is, in fact, a remarkable coincidence even in tactical form.In the conduct of attack, there is ordinarily no difference predicated on size of unit: a straight left to the jaw, by a flyweight, is delivered in the same manner and for the same purpose as that of a heavyweight, except that the latter carries more force. The envelopment, for example, is essentially the same for the battalion as for the platoon. This reasoning is applied in four concrete cases, based on a comparatively recent instructional text,'° in a discussion of the "turning movement": Turning movements are operations involving the separation of a command into two forces, one of which engages and holds the enemy while the other, operating beyond 1*SpecialText No. 266, Chap. 7.Par. 28. Army Extension Courses, InJaairyiN Off cmiv. ComhJ, Tb.Infantry School. Ft. Beaning, Ga.. 1936.Fig. 33 is shown as Plate 16. BATTLE OP BEERSHEBA MILES S .. S S S 53 BRIT ALIST r s_g - - S S S.5 Sl• --- Page 30 --- THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF MODERN TACTICSa' supporting distance, makes a detour so as to strike the hostile flank or rear ,Fig. 35). The turning movement should be made over terrain favoring the attacker... Comparethis "schematic pattern" in Plate i6 and the underlying tactical ideas and dispositions with the following concrete battle situations; it will be seen that regardless of size of Unit or total numbers engaged, the procedure is identical, from the corps to the company.12 ST JL)VINOCT 4. 1918 050010002000 I I I Y4ARD$ (i) The operation at Beersheba represents a combination of frontal or hold- ing attack, with a turning movement or envelopment, by cavalry, both coordi- nated and accurately timed; the attack jumped off, as ordered, on the morning of 31 October. UThedistinction betweenturning movements and envelopments is more academic than real; the so.called wide envelopment" isa turning movement, to altpractical purposes. *1 A comparison of the scheme of maneuver in Pig. 33. i.e. Plate 16. with the troop dispositions and routes at Beersheba indicates a remarkable degree of coincidence.Note the lengthy approach march of some 40 miles by the units charged with the envelopment and surprise attack from the east; in view of the distances involved, an envelopment of this kind could have been executed an the time allotted only bt horse cavalry; a modem solution would ptobably employ mechanized cavalry or motorized infantry. STJUVIN 5, 31 %IItI,.'/ 6 Ai '.'I,I_— -I,I_ — 82 PLATE iS. THE 306TH U. S. INF., ST. JUVIN, tjOCTOBERagiB. --- Page 31 --- MANEUVER IN WAR The frontal attack gained certain objectives by mid.afternoon but slowed down thereafter; the enveloping force also ran into tough going initially and developed, in turn, into a holding attack by dismounted elements with mobile reserves wait- ing for an opportunity to envelop Beersheba itself. The frontal attack had not succeeded in reaching Beersheba, and it was feared that the retreating Turks would damage the water supply; time was precious; speed became essential; at 3:30 PM the order came: "Take the town before dark. Put Grant straight at it." The 4th Cavalry Brigade, commanded by General Grant, was nearest Beersheba; racing against daylight, Grant decided to attack mounted; he made it; two squad. rons of the 12th galloped straight into Beersheba, while the remainder of the attacking force dismounted to clean up isolated Turkish resistance. -(1ST PHASE -* 4TH BN.365FR,INF. CUISY—EN- ALMON1 PLATE '9. THE 4TH BN, 365TH FR. INF., CUISY•EN.ALMONT, oAUGUST1918. (2)On 11 October, the o6th Infantry, a part of the 77th Division, held a line south of the Aire River, in front of St. Juvin. In the continuation of the attack, on the morning of 14October,this regiment formed initially in column of bat- talions in the order: ist Bn., 2d Bn., 3d Bn. The advance of the 1st Battalion was promptly stopped under a withering enemy fire. In view of the failure of his frontal effort, the resourceful regimental commander ordered an envelopment or turning movement; both remaining battalionswere designated as the enveloping force. The immediately available companies, H, K and L, crossed the river and moved north; the leading company entered thetown, the others attacked from the hills east of St. Juvin; theenemy was completely surprised. The action of the leading companies had been so successful that the remaining battalion did not have to attack. It is obvious that the schematic pattern of the "turning movement"was followed in this situation in quite the same manner as at Beersheba; the strength ofthe ) I. 2DPHASE- * .x I,,, CLJISY- E-A ,% 'TI • S lIsi. 4:————————.——lI_...,.,.. 9 1Q00 --- Page 32 --- THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF MODERN TACTICS participating units, however, was different—4 divisions,a total of a,goo on the one hand and a depleted American regiment at St. Juvin of less than3,ooo officers and men.1' Sizedid not affect the tactical idea or method. In themaneuver concept, we find no difference between "large" and "small" units; the factors ofsurprise, secrecy of movement and objective operated in both irstances; the British Corps proceeded on an identical maneuver as this American regiment, and in the condud- ing examples it will be shown that the analogy can be traced down to still smaller units, i.e., the battalion, company, and platoon. ''93\\.,,- "Ill'COMPANY C. 1030 INFAEE III 103 103 102 5)—5' PLATE so.CO. C io3D U. S. INF, AEF; HILL iso, so JULY igi8. (Firstphase: On 20 August, igi8, the 4th Battalion, 365th French In- fantry, an interior assault battalion, received orders to attack, in direction of Cuisy- en-Almont; an enemy strongpoint containing machine guns was located in the battalion zone of action. The artillery preparation failed to neutralize the enemy. Rather than risk a frontal attack in the face of machine-gun fire, the battalion commander employed the i5th Company (with one platoon M. G., attached) against the flank and rear of the German position; this was an envelopment or turning movement, under cover of a ravine and woods, and was in the zone of II Byisi,bssrsngih:Desert Mounted Corps: Anzac Mounted Division, 900; Australian Mounted Division,4900. XX corps:60th Division. 11,600; 74th Division. 11,400.Ttrhisb ,tr,,,gth:Approximately 6000 men, 60 machine guns and 28 ñeId pieces. --- Page 33 --- MANEUVER IN WAR the adjacent unit. The enveloping force suffered some casualties but captured the enemy position. Second phase: After this operation, the village of Cuisy-en-Almont became the next objective; the terrain, however, was fiat, open country without cover. The i5th Company followed by the i4th Company was launched on another envelopment under cover of a draw and woods to the north of Cuisy; the i3th Company was to attack Cuisy from the south, while the Machine Gun Company would operate in the gap, straight to the front, in a combination of fire and movement. All units moved forward simultaneously; the i4th Company gained contact with the enemy in a holding attack which enabled the i5th Company to continue the envelopment and attack the German right decisively. The attack was entirely successful. ()Inthe afternoon of 20 July, 198, the ist Battalion, lo3d Infantry, A.E.F., received orders to continue the attack and take Hill 190 northeast of Bouresehes; formation: Companies C and D in assault, Companies B and A in support.14 At 3:oo P. M. the leading companies deployed and started to advance without any artillery preparation, in their particular zone of advance. Hostile fire from the north (Hill ig) and east (Hill igo) stopped the companies on the left. Company C continued to advance under difficulty and was losing men rapidly. A rear platoon of the company was sent around the right flank to put out of commission a particularly obnoxious machine gun on Hill 190 directly in front. After this gun was eliminated, the advance became easier. UCapt.Arthur E. Bump,inf..Perannal Experience Repost. --- Page 34 --- U THEPRINCIPLES OFWAR 6.THE CODIFICATION OF MILITAItY KNOWLEDGE. When General Nathan Bed- ford Forrest, C.S.A., coined the immortal phrase as his recipe for military success: •.togit thar fustest with the mostest men," he also furnished a classical definition of the principles of concentration, objective and movement. When a subordinate asked him what to do in a certain tactical situation and he replied: •. Fitum!"he gave an equally clear definition of the principle of the offensive. With apology to the shades of a very gallant soldier, it is recorded that the General was a trifle careless in orthography and diction; his formal education was lacking, since he early became the sole support of his mother and a large family of children; fortunately, orthography and diction have little to do with ability and character: the poor youth eventually became a successful planter. He grew iooo bales of cotton in i86i; in 1857 he stopped a lynching and cut down the victim in the face of an angry mob; they knew their man, since he had been tested in several shooting aifrays when the odds were heavily against him. He en- listed as a private on 14 June, i86i. In July, he raised a regiment of cavalry, arm- ing and equipping it largely at his own expense; the rest is history: he rose from Colonel to Lieutenant General, C.S.A., to become known as one of the boldest and most resourceful cavalry commanders of the Civil War period; he was wounded four times and had i8 horses killed and io others wounded under him. Here is a first-class soldier who was probably never once conscious of the ap- plication of a principle of war, who never attended a military service school but graduated summa-cum-laude from a hundred battlefields. This comment is no argument against the codification of military science but rather an affirmation of the fact that doctrine is developed on the battlefield by soldiers and reduced to formulas later on; the so-called principles of war are the codification of the methods of the gfeat practitioners of the art of war; one of the greatest, Napoleon I, has expressed this thought repeatedly: -. Theprinciples of war are those which have regulated the great captains whose deeds have been handed down to us by history: Alexander. Hannibal, Caesar, Gustaphus Adoiphus. Turenne, Prince Eugene and Frederick the Great. The history of these eighty-eight cam- paigns. carefully written, would be a complete treatise on the art of war; the principles which ought to be followed in offensive and defensive war, would flow from it spontaneously."1 --.Readand re-read the Campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustaphus Adoiphus. Turenne. Eugene and Ferderick; takc them as your model; that is the only way of becoming a great captain, to obtain the secrets of the art of war." Caesar's principles were the- same as those of Alexander and Hannibal: (a) to keep his forces in junction, (b) not to be vulnerable in any direction, (c) to advance rapidly on important points, to calculate on moral means, the reputation of his army and the fear he inspired and also political means for the preservation of the fidelity of his allies and the obedience of the conquered nation." In this quotation one can hardly fail to recognize (a) the principle of concen- tration, (b) the principle of security and (c) the principle of the objective. We may as well accept the fact that these "principles" are not recent develop- ments: at the battle of Leuktra (371 B.c.) the Theban Epaminondas applied the principle of mass when he concentrated the bulk of his forces against the enemy's weak point; the retreat of Xenophon's ten thousand (401 B.C.) is a classical dem- onstration of rear-guard action; at Arbela (iB.C.) OflC finds tactical penetration, INa,oleon: M,moi,,,Vol. II, p.2. 'Nao!eo's"78th Maxim."'Napoleon: Memos,:, Vol. U, p.26. '5 --- Page 35 --- MANEUVER IN WAR envelopmentsandturning movements; the crossing of the Hydaspes by Alexander (326 B.c.) in a wide turning movement bears a close resemblance to Hooker's cross. ing of the Rappahannock at Chancellorsville (1863), the movement of Heintzel- man's Corps at the first battle of Bull Run (1861) or Napoleon's crossing at the Island of Lobau (1805); Cannae (2 i6 B.c.), as a strategical double envelopment and battle of annihilation, is a model that is recognizable in the structure of Konigratz (i866), of Tannenberg (1914) and in the initial phases of the Marne Campaign (1914). What are these principles? Evidence ranging from Sun-Tzu (505.496 B.c.), the oldest military treatise in the world, to the annual "Report of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army" (1935), apparently indicates that they have always existed and are recognizable and applicable today. Major General Fuller, British Army, an able military critic, then slightly be- wildered, was looking for them in 1909; he found a tell-tale reference in the current edition of British Field Service Regulations: -thefundamental principles of war are neither very numerous nor in themselves abstruse, but the application of them is difficult He complains, however, that the principles were not listed or defined in these regulations. An American student would have had a similar experience had he turned to his own Field Service Regulations; in the edition of 1923, he would have found a reference that was practically an echo of the earlier British regulations: -whilethe fundamental principles of war are neither very numerous nor complex, their application may be difficult and must not he limited by set rules As in the British regulations, the principles were not listed or defined in this par- ticular American text. On further research, however, the student eventually would have encountered the first official American codification of the principles of war in War Department Training Regulations 10.5 of 23 December, igi; the prin- ciples, for some obscure reason, have not reappeared in training regulations, but local instructional texts in service schools, particularly the Command and General Staff School, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, have kept them alive though not entirely intact; a late (ig6) Leavenworth version is shown in a later paragraph. 7. THE HISTORICAL CONTINUITY OF THE PRINCIPLES, a. The American Version of the Principles of War. In Training Regulations No. 10.5, 23 December, 1921, the U. S. War Department lists nine fundamental principles of war deduced from the study of military history. They are: The Principle of the Objective. The Principle of the Offensive. The Principle of Mass. The Principle of Economy of Force. The Principle of Movement. The Principle of Surprise. The Principle of Security. The Principle of Simplicity. The Principle of Cooperation. These principles are basic and immutable. The great commanders have been guided by them, and success or failure has depended upon the extent and manner of their use. Tiey are not subject to exception. Their proper application con- stitutes the true measure of military art. The official character of this list has naturally given great weight to the inter- --- Page 36 --- THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR*7 pretation of these principles in our times; extracts from the official "definitions" follow: s.Disctassion.—a. The principle of the objective.—Thepurpose of a military operation Is the attainment of the objective assigned a designated force. (i)Theselection of objectives depends on political, military, and economic conditions, whIch vary in force and effect; but the following general rules apply: (a)First, the neutralization or destruction of the opposing military forces. This usually implies the defeat of the enemy's main forces. b) Second, the possession of localities which will attain the objective, or contribute thereto. (a)The objective assigned military forces must be in consonance with the national ob- jective. b.The principleof the offensive.—Offensiveaction Is the only means by which a decision Is gained. When successful, the offensive brings victory, while the defensive can only avoid deIeat. The only effective way to wage war is to act on the offensive for the purpose of de- livering a main blow in a decisive direction. The defensive should be assumed only to assist offensive action elsewhere. Although the offensive confers great advantages, these advantages can be utilized only when the means available are sufficient to provide reasonable chances for success. c.The principle ofmass.—Theterm mass as used here means combat power. Numbers weapons. tactical skill, fighting ability, resolution, discipline, morale, and Leadership alL contribute to this power. Success in war is attained by the employment of mass in a main effort. d.The principle of economy offorce.—Thetime and place of the main effort having been determined, men and means are conserved by reducing their employment in other directions. e.The principle ofmovement.—The term movement as here employed means the maneuver of combat elements. Movement Is most effective when concealed.In many situations movement Is made possible only by the effective employment of fire. In applying this principle, time, distance, and means available must be considered. f.The principle of surprise.—Surprlse in some form Is essential in order to obtain the maximum effect with the minimum loss.Secrecy, rapidity, and preparation are the main factors. g.The principleofsecurity.—Securlty embracesall measures taken to guard against oh servatlon and surprise, to prevent effective hostile interference, and to maintain the power of free action. h.The principle of :implicity.—Simplicity Is a relative term. As here used it means that military plans should not provide for complicated movements, that orders should be direct and free from contingencies, that frequent changes of plan are to be avoided, and that unity of command is to be observed. I..The principle of cooperation.—By cooperation is meant the "team-work" of all military persons, towards the accomplishment of a common mission; It can only be attained through coordination. This principle applies to everything that Is done In the military service. .Application.—a.These nine principles comprise the whole art of war. Their applica. ilon to the preparation for war and the direction of war is called strategy. Their application to specific battles and operations Is called tactica. Like all things monumental in art, in architecture or history, great simplicity of design is the product of evolution; the artless common sense of the principles of war must have been the intellectual property of military leaders of all ages. The most casual review of historical antecedents will support this assumption. The following quotations from important military writers, ranging from Sun-Tm to Fuller, by no means cover the entire field, but they represent random selections with the sole purpose of establishing an unmistakable historical continuity. Great names were omitted, like Turenne, Wallenstein, Prince Eugene, Comte de Saxe, Montecucculi, Frederick H, merely because other celebrities like Napoleon left more accessible information in their military writings. b. Sun-Tzu: The Art of War (505.496 B. C.). This work is regarded as one of the oldest military treatises in the world. Consisting of thirteen chapters on the art of war, it became the greatest military classic in the Chinese language and was much esteemed by the Japanese. The exact date of Sun-Tzu's book is uncertain, but it was apparently written during the period 505-496 B.C.Sun-Tzuwas a native es lbs ArtofW,. The oldest treatise in the world.Translated by Lionel Giles, M. A. Luzac Co., London, 1910.There as also another version, by Captain B. F. Caltbrop.John Murray. London. 1908. --- Page 37 --- MANEUVER IN WAR of the state of Chi.Hebecame involved in revolutionary activities and fled to the state of Wu; he became the military adviser to Ho-Lu, king of Wu,in whose service he commanded armies and conducted successful campaigns. Sun-Tzu's work is arranged in thirteen chapters with a very modern phraseology: I.Laying Plans.VIII.Variations of Tactics. II.Waging War.IX. The Army on the March. III.Attack by Stratagem.X.Terrain. IV.Tactical Dispositions.XI. The Nine Situations. V.Energy.XII. The Attack by Fire. Vi. Weak Points and Strong.Xlii. The Use of Spies. VII.Maneuvering. There is some evidence that Napoleon was familiar with Sun-Tzu; at any rate, he had access to de Guignes' translations of the five holy war books of the Chinese; this collection contains the maxims of the leading Chinese commanders who lived between the twelfth century, B.C. and the fifth century, A.D.,—maxims, which even as late as the eighteenth century of our era, every Chinese scholar and officer had to memorize; the "Maxims of Lou-tao" (i 150 B.C.) are contained in this collection. From extracts of Chapters I, II, IV, V and VI of this work, it is easily apparent that several of the so-called principles of war are present in their most characteristic form, viz: The Principle of the Objective. s. In war let your great objective be victory and not a lengthy campaign.' 13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim.' 55. Energy may be likened to the bending of a cross-bow; decision to the release of the trigger.'The Principle of the Offensive.' 5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics: ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive. The Principle of Concentration.' 14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split Into fractions; hence, there will be a whole pitted against seperate parts, which means that we shall be many against the enemy's few. i. And if we are thus able to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be In dire straits. *9. Military tactics are like unto water: water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downward. So in war, the way to avoid what Is strong is to strike what is weak.' The Principle of Mobility. g.If the campaign is protracted, the resoiwoes of the state will not be equal to the strain.' 5. Through we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been associated with long delays.' 6. There is no instance of a country having been benefited by prolonged warfare.' io.In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack: direct and indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers.' 19. Rapidity is the essence of war; take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness.1'ThePrincipleof Surprise. i8. All warfare is based on deception. so. Hold out baits to entice the enemy; feign disorder and crush him.U 14. Attack when he is unprepared; appear when you are not expected." g. Oh divine art of subtlety and secrecy! through you we learn to be invisible—and hence, hold the enemy's fate in our hands.5 The Principle of Coordination." 1. To control a large force is the same in principle as the control of a few men; It ismerely a question of subdivision. a. Fighting with a larger army under your command l nowise different from fightingwith a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals. a,. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combinea energy and does not requiretoo much from individuals. 'Sun-Tan: Chap. I!: WagingWar.'ibid., Chap.V: Energy. 'ibid., Chap. IV: TacticalDispositions. • ibid.. Chap.VI:Weak Points and Sttong'Par 29 as dearlyadefinationof "soft-spot tactics." bailed asa greattactical innoeatio,, in 1915. Uibid.Chap. lLaying Plans."Tun.'Tan: Chap. V: anergy. --- Page 38 --- THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR29 c. Napoleon I (1759.1822). For dear definitions and striking applications of the principles of war, one does not ordinarily need to go back further than the days of Napoleon I. In the immense literature on the Napoleonic epoch, nearly every tide contains references to the master's precepts; the memoirs of his marshals and dose collaborators are a rich mine of information; the most direct and inti- mate glimpse into the Emperor's workshop, however, is afforded by his Maxims and his official and private Correspondence; there are 32 volumes of the general correspondence and a reduced edition of i 2 volumes, containing selected papers; the preface of the publisher is significant: CorrespondenceMilutairede Napoleon 1ev, Paris, Plon et Cie, 1876. "... Thereare plenty of books dealing with the art of war. Butthereis none that can compare in wealth of instruction, in darityanddepth of thought with the masterly wrrespondence of Napoleon. It contains in- numerable lessons;there is not a vague or pointless word; this is the mostperfecttreatise, intheworld, on the science of war and thesecretof leading armies to victory ..." Thefollowing is a tabulation of the Maxims in a brief military characterization of their contents: 1. Topographical obstaclesterrain. 2. Planofcampaign.neinyinformationandcapabilities. 3.Flank protection,strategicadvance. 4.Concentration.Armies. 5. Objectiveinwar. 6. Offensive.Advance. 7. Combat readiness.8. Plans, alternative, based on enemy capabilities. 9. March velocity.Maneuver. 10. Maneuver.11. Dispersion,effectof,columnswithin mutual supporting distance. 12.Line of operation.Line of communication. 13. Distance between corps, in advance.14. Mountain warfare. 13. Objective.Honor.Morale. 16. Frontal attaca.Envelopment.Choice of battle area. 18. Counterattack.Offensive. 19. Transit from offensive to defensive.20. Line of communications (operation,, change of.21. Line of communications.Trains. 22. Camp site,selection of; position of readiness. 23. Counterattack.Envelopin$ attack.24. Cantonments.Concentration.23. Retrograde movements.26. Dispersion, effect of.27, Retrograde movements, withdrawal.28. Dispersion5 effect of. concentration. 29. Concentration.Mass. 30. Flank march.Defile. 31. Plan of battle.Planning. 32. Covering force.Security. 33. Defile, passage of.Trains. 34. Intervals.Gaps in the line. 35. Camps.Bivouacsmutual supporting distance.36. River crossing, aJvance to.37. River crossing,effect of terrain,artillery cov erisig fires. 38. Defense of river line. 39. Turenne. Campaigfl of 1643.Bridgeheads. 40. Fortresses.41. Siege operations.42. Siege operations.Fonquieres theory. 43. Field fortification.44. Fortresses, derense of.45. Fortresses, duration of defense.46. Fortresses, capitulation. 47. Combined arms.48. Infantry formations.49. Infantry and cavalry.50. Cavalry charges.51. Cavalry in pursuit.32. Artillery and cavalry; horse artillery.33. Artillery and infantry.54. Artillery, battery positions. 35. Supply. 56. Organization, effect of; morale. 57Officers' corps, lack of. 38. Soldier, qualities of. 39. Soldier, accoutrements.60. Soldier, pay; length of service.61. Msnifetos.Order of the day. 62. Bivouacs.Tents. 63. Enemy information; evaluation.64. Unity of command.63. Councils of war. 66. Commander.in-chief. 67. Capitulation, authorizationof. 68. Capitulation, effect of. 69. Surrenderconditions of.70. Conquere territory,administration. 71. Traitor, generalofficers. 72. Command responsibilitiesC. in C. 73. Cominander.in.chief, qualities.74. Chief of staff, qualities. 73. Chief of artilleryqualities. 76. Outpost commanjer. 77. Grand tactics,generalshipand principles of war, historical.78. Military history, study of campaigns.79. Task and means, analysis of.80. Advance ffuard, rear guard, duties.91. Generalship, qualifications.82. Generalship, source. 83. Generalship, energy.84. Generalship, effect of hesitancy.85. Chief of engineers, qualities.86. Chief of cavalry, qualities.87. General officer, captured.88. Dragoons, dispositions. 89. Cavalry, employment of. 90. Cavalry, characteristics. 91. Cavalry, component, variable according to T.of w.92. Artillery, concentration. 93. Infantry-artillery team.94. Army, in defensive position.95. War and opportunity. 96. Reserves, employment of.97. Uetachment, limitations.98. Siege operations. 99. Fortifications, defense of.100. Capitularions. rules o'. 101. Defensive.ofIensive, relations of.102. Turning movement, army. 103. Fieldfortifications, efficacy of. 104. Passage of armies, no obstacles. 103. Order of battle, circumstances.106. Flank marches.107. Pillage, effectof.108. Enemy praises. 109. Prisoners of war.110. Conquered territories,administration of.111. Geography, influence of.112. Principles of war, historical appliiation.113. Naval tactics.114. Soldier and sailor, comparison.113. Naval warfare and land operations, compati.son of. PLATE ii. THE MAXIMS OF NAPOLEON. --- Page 39 --- MANEUVER IN WAR As to his maxims, the first 78 were published in Paris in i8o and were trans- lated into English shortly thereafter; the Maxims from 79 tO 115,indusive,were published at a later date. A popular edition of the first 78 Maxims is that with annotations and historical examples by General Burnod, in the translation of Lieut. General Sir G. C. d'Aguilar, C. B.; it should be noted that there are slight discrepancies in the sequence of the Maxims, between Burnod's and other editions; e.g., the fifth edi- tion of the Maxims, published by the Librairie Militaire, T. Dumain, Pans, 1874. The relative frequency of Napoleon's precepts, analogous to the main headings of the W.D. principles' list, would indicate that he regarded the factors of 'mass and "movement" (direction) as the most important: Objective:Maxims i,5,15.and35. Offensive:Maxims 6, i8, and ig. Mass (Concentration):Maxims 4, *6, *8, 29, 34, 97. Surprise:Maxims 2, 8, and 6. Security:Maxims 3, ii, 32, and . Movement(Direction):Maxims g, 10, 12,i6,so, t. The,subsequent, detailed chapters on the Napoleonic concept of maneuver and conduct of battle dearly show the prevalence and decisive importance of "mass" and "direction," when it is considered that his campaigns contain at least twenty. seven dear-cut maneuvers against the flank and rear of his opponents. These principles run through his correspondence like the "leitmotif" through a Wagnerian opera, viz: Mass. The first principle of war is never to give battle except with all the troops that can be collected on the field of operations.1' When you intend to fight a battle collect all your forces; do not omit any of them; a battalion sometimes decides a victory.1' Large detachments should not be made on the eve of battle.1' Direction. An Army ought to have but one line of operations which it must guard carefully and never abandon except from over.ruling necessity.1' Attack vigorously after having observed well where to strike." Menace your enemy's flanks, protect your own and be ready to concentrate on the importantpoints." Instead of opposing the march of the assailant, front to front, the army ought to place Itselfon his flanks, ready to cut his line of operations." d.Clausewitz (1780.1831). Acontemporary of Napoleon, who fought both for and against the Emperor, this Prussian officer wrote a monumental treatiseon the theory of war, Vom Kriege. Its significance lies in the philosophical character of his views and an extraordinary brilliancy of analysis; he exerciseda strong in. fluence upon military literature. In general terms, Clausewitz dissects the phenom- ena of war, in strategy and tactics, without being quite able or willing to develop a system; his close coordination of theory with battlefield experience as atest, how. ever, is scientifically sound and his influence on German military education has been far-reaching and profound. While he is reluctant to elevate themto the role of "principles," he defines important military "factors,"as follows: Moral ForceVol. III, Chap.Superiority of NumbersVol. III. Chap.8The SurpriseVol. Ill, Chap. gAssembly of Forces In TimeVol. III, Chap. iiAssemblyof Forces in SpaceVol. III, Chap. isEconomyof ForcesVol. III, Chap. 14Plan of Battle and ObjectiveApp. 2 InVol. III, Appendix 2,"Summaryof Instruction of H. R. H. The Crown "Napoleon, Mssiai,,, Vol. III, p. 2. :: O'&p.6.1'Napoleon.Msxi,,u."Letter to Masiena.Peninsular War."Napoleon, Peninsulu War Vol. IV, p. 75."Napoleon, M,orn, Vol. I, p. 23. --- Page 40 --- THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR31 Prince," Clausewitz finally articulates several principles much as they appear in their current, modern phraseology: I. General Principles to be observed in war: Objectivea.In forming a plan of battle we should have a great objective in view. Offensive2.Employall the forces which we can make available with the utmost energy. Concentration.Concentrateforce as much as possible at the point where the decisive blows are to be struck; run the risk of being at a Economy of forcedisadvantage at other points; the success at that point will compensate for all defeats at secondary points. Mobility4. By rapidity, many measures of the enemy are nipped in the bud; do not lose tune. Clausewitz was definitely under the influence of the Napoleonic period: he reflects fairly accurately the views of the great master, although many of his critics do not credit him with a complete understanding of the Napoleonic method. It is apparent that the principles of the objective, concentration and economy of force are fully represented in his writings. e. MacDou gall (1858).Characteristic of the mediocre writings of the post. Napoleonic period, the superintendent of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, England, published a strategical and tactical textwhich is nothing more or less than a feeble echo of the views of the great military writers of that age: Napoleon, Jomini, Clausewitz, Archduke Charles of Austria and Napier. The recurrence of the basic principles is unmistakable: Mass a. The whole science of war may be briefly defined as the art of placing in the right position. at the right time, a mass of troops greater than your enemy can there oppose to you. *.Toplace masses of your army in contact with fractions of your enemy. Direction .Tooperate as much as possible on the communications of your enemy without exposing your own. 4. To operate always on interior lines. f. Townshend, 1920: The extraordinary biographical record of the Mesopota- mian Campaign,21 1914-1915,bythe commander of the ill4ated British-Indian Expeditionary Force must be regarded as an interesting item in the literature on principles of war. He traces the application of the principles in his own troop dispositions in the pitched battles of Kut-al-Amara and Ctesiphon. He derived the principles from Napoleon, Clausewitz, von Moltke, Foch, Frederick, and Jomini. The coincidence of date with the principles listed in Fuller's Science of War is interesting. It is difficult to determine who influenced the other. Fuller's article was published in the British Army Quarterly of January 1921, while Townshend's book was also printed in the same year. It is a reasonable presumption that the manuscript was in the hands of the publishers for some time. Townsbend articulates certain principles in direct application to his personal conduct of military operations, viz: i.Theprincipal objective in strategyObjective 2.Economyof forceEconomy .Themass Mass .Thestrategic offensiveOffensive .kapidityor economy of directionDirection 6.SecuritySecurity The factors of mass () and direction () can well be singled out from this list as basic and the others as corollaries; economy of force (2) is merely a means to Tbse,y ofWay,Lt. Col. P. L. MacDougal!, Longman. Brown, Green, Longmans and Robert,, London, My Casnfraiga. Major General Charles V. F. Townahend, BrItish Army.The James A. McCann Co., New York. 1920. --- Page 41 --- MANEUVER IN WAR create mass (3); offensive () is meaningless without effectivedirection (5) and security (6) is an incident of the advance; since security (6) is necessaryfor all military operations. it might be elevated to the dignity of a principle, viz: mass, direction, security. Other British commentators regard this list as "over-codified" and prefer the trinity: concentration, offensive action and security as "really worthy of the title of principles; all others -.. areonly elements in these three.. g.The British version of the principles of war: Fuller, 1912-1925. There is con- siderable evidence that a British military writer, Major General J. F. C. Fuller, is the father of the currently accepted, modern version of the principles of war or at any rate gave them articulate form and wide publicity. 191219211925 iPrinciple of the objectivei ObjectiveDirection 2Principleof mass2 Offensive2 Offensive Principle of the offensive3 SurpriseSurprise 4 Principle of securityConcentrationConcentration 5 Principle of surprise5 Economy of force... . Distribution 6 Principle of movement6 Security6 Security 7 Movement7 Mobility 8 Cooperation8 Endurance 9 Determination Fuller, who writes with vigor and is a respected name in British military circles, established his professional reputation as the indefatigable proponent of tank em- ployment in the World War, and was Chief of Staff of the initial British tank forces at Cambrai, 1917.Ina series of articles and special studies on the "science of war," he attempted to apply the methods of science to the study of war, to discover its elements, its conditions and "principles" and deduce controlling laws of war. This analysis makes Fuller a sort of nineteenth century Clausewitz. In his The Foundations of the Science of War (Hutchinson & Co., London, 1926) and in an article of the same title in the British Army Quarterly (Vol. I, January 192 i),Fullertraces the evolution of his ideas. He took a paragraph of the British field service regulations (igog) as his point of departure: "... thefunda- mental principles of war are neither very numerous nor in themselves very abstruse but the application of them is difficult... ";hisown statements are quoted, at some length, since their influence on private and officialtextsis easily demonstrable: This idea was excellent, but what were these fundamental principles? I turned to the correspondence of Napoleon and studied it closely and during igis I had come to the conclusion that the principles which had uided Napoleon were as follows: -.- ThePrindle of the Objective—the true objective being that point at which the enemy may be most decisively defeated; generally this point is to be found along the line of least resistance. The Principle of Mass—that is, concentration of strength and effort at the decisive point The Principle of the Offensive; the Principles of Security, Surprise and Movement, I.e.,Rapidity.- Ihad now got six(6) working principles.Whilst at the Staff College (igi), I applied my principles and found them a great help; in the summer of 1917,theC. 0. of Aldershot askedme to lecture on the principles; in igi8, my lectures were published. In igig, a committee began to rewrite the British Field Service Regulations and the chairman said to me: "I believe you have written something on the principles of war. May I have it?" In igso the principles I had laid down were, in a slightly modified form, included in the new edition of the Field Service Regulations. Between August 1922andJanuary 1923 I wrote a series of fifty lectures on "The Science of War":theywere given to the 1923 batch of Staff College students and were based on the following theory We start with man, and from man extract four () elements: sMental powerMindControl *ProtectivepowerProtectionStabilityOffensive powerWeaponsActivity Mobile powerMovementCooperation --- Page 42 --- THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR33 From these elements, I evolved four elementary principles, namely: i.From mind: the principle of the objective. s.From protection: the principle of security. .Fromweapons: the principle of the offensive. 4.From movement: the principle of mobility. I next postulated a law, which I called the "law or the conservation of military energy" and from it extracted four accentuating principles of war, namely: i.The principle of surprise. 2.The principle of economy of force. .Theprinciple of concentration of force. 4.The principle of cooperation. These principles were of great assistance to me, to work out problems in the physical sphere of war but it was difficult to apply them to mental and moral action; as regards mental action, I devised a coefficient for each and as regards moral action, from 'will, morale and fear," I de- cided three moral principles, namely: s.The principle of determination. s.The principle of endurance. .Theprinciple of demoralization. In igs, having set these lectures together in book form, I submitted them to my friend, Captain B. H. Liddell Hart.I spent such time as I had in 1924 in reconsidering each step in my system.A, difficulty I could not avoid was changing the names of some of my old principles which appeared in Vol. II, Field Service Regulations, edition of 1924. .Maintenanceof the objectiveDirection z.Offensive action. 3.Surprise. 4.Concentration. 5.Economy of forceDistribution 6.Security. 7.Mobility. 8.Cooperation. Endurance Determination I substituted the principle of direction (for objective), which is both more accurate and moregeneral. For economy of force, I substituted the principle of distribution and exalted economy offorce to the ppsition of the law of war. I scrapped cooperation and introduced two new principles: endurance (8) and determina. tion (g, Though the principles have grown from eight to nine, they can be reduced to three groups, namely, control, resistance and pressure and, finally, to one law: the law of economy of force.Thusthe system evolved from six(6) principles in 1912, rose to eight(8) in 1915, tovirtually nineteen (19) ifl1923, and then descended to nine (9) fl1925, withthe added ad-vantage that these nine (9) can be merged into three (3) and these three () into one (I) law-.." Itis curious to note that in his erudite meandering, this able soldier finally emerged with a single law: economy of force, which is pointless taken by itself but becomes rational as the sole means of producing mass at some point. This law is a stilted, codified paraphrase of Forrest's salty comment "..-toget thar fustest with the mostest men." Fuller's work as an Anglo-Saxon Clausewitz is obviously meritorious; the nearest American counterpart is a brilliant, abbreviated study by Major Edward S. Johnston, Infantry: "A Science of War," Vol. XIV, June 1934' The Command and General Staff School Quarterly, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. h.TheC. & G.S.S.version,Ft. Leavenworth, Kas. (1936). The Comninqd and General Staff School Press has published a pamphlet, The Principles of Strategy, (1936) intended to serve as an instructional text; this is the latest chronological version of the famous principles. A comparison of the Leavenworth version with the initial list, TR 10-5, War Department, 1921, reveals that the principles of the objective and simplicity were omitted and that the term: importance of, was substituted for the definitive one of: principle. --- Page 43 --- MANEUVER IN WAR EVOLUTION OF PRINCIPLES: 19~1-1936 TR 10.1, W.D. 1921 C&CSS, 1936 The Prinddu of War The Principles of Strategy ............................................................................. I. Objective .......................... a. Offensive 1. The importance of oKensive action 3. Mass ............................. .n. The importance of concentration of combat powrer 4. Economy of force ................. .g. The importance of economy of force ........................ 5. Movement .4. The importance of mobility 6. Surprise .......................... .5. The importance of surprise .......................... 7. &~~rity .6. The importance of security 8. Simplicity ............................................................................ ...................... 9. Cooperation .7. The importance of cooperation Following are extracts from the explanatory comments for each principle. There is nothing new or startling in them; as proof of the historical continuity of the principles of war, the Leavenworth version is briefly compared with analogous historical opinions by great captains; the coincidence is striking: Offensive Action. a. The advantages in the strategic offensive are primarily that the initiative will generally be secured and that surprise will be facilitated ... ... b. Only by the offensive may the initiative be retained and a definite plan followed In war let your eat objective be victory and not a lengthy campaign. Sun.Tzu' 4g6 B' C' (Chap. IV, Par. ig!f Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive. (Chap. IV. Par. 5.) Frederick Ir, 1756 TO make war was always to attack. Attack vigorously after having observed well when to strike. (Letter .Napo1eon' '809 to Masnena.) ~eLce iour enemy's Banks; protect your own and be ready to con- centrate on the important points. (Memoirs, Vol. IV, p. 75.) The true art of defense consists in knowing how to attack. (Thiers. Vol. VII, p. 361.) Foch, 19'0 A decisron by amw is the only judgment that counts, because it is the only one that createa a vanquished or a victor. (Principles of War.) Concentration of Combat Power. a. The largest pmsible combat power should be concen- trated in the area where it can inflict the jireatest harm on the enemy; where success i$ most probable and where, if victorious, suaesc will bring the greatest advantages. Strategically the weakest points of an army are its flanks and rear ... c. It must be nmembered that the main operation is all important. Success in the main operation will more than compensate for small defeats elsewhere ... d. As to the principle of striking an enemy as hard a8 one can and in the most vulnerable place there can be no question. Napoleon, 1809 Sun-Tzu, 496 B. C. When a commander intends to give battle, he should collect all his fororccs and overlook none; a battalion sometimes decides the day. (Maxim: xxrx 1 . - . - - . - . , The fint principle of war is never to give battle except with all the troops that can k collected on the €ield of operations. (Memoirs, Vd. 111, p. 295. No detadment should be made on the eve of battle. (Maxim: XXVIII. Memoirs, Vol. 11, p. 56.) We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split into fractions; hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts. which meana that we .&tall be many against the enemy'a few. (Chap. VI, Par. ld.) ~nd-ik we are thus able to attack an inferior force with a superior one. our opponents will be. in dire straits. (Cha . VI, Par. 15.) Economy of Force. a. In order to insure the concentration of combat power the greatat mnomy of this power must k practiced in carrying out subsidiary missions ... There are many goal generals in Europe, but they see too many thin Napo1eon. '809 I see only one; m-. I seek to destroy them, knowing well that tf; afassoriea will then fall of their own accord. Grant. 186~ If the main objects of war are ined the lesser ones are sure to follow. (Badeau: Military History of U. FCront, Vol. I, p. 41s.) Mobility. a. To a large extent war ifl an affair of movement. The power of rapid movement and of profiting fmm movement is gscntial for succearful strategy ... --- Page 44 --- THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR35 c. The power to effect more rapid movements than those of the enemy has always been an index of great military leadership and a high standard of efficiency in the troops Rapidity Is the essence of war; take advantage of the enemy's unreadi.Sun.Tzu,496 B. C.ness,make your way by unexpected routes and attack unguarded spots. Though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been associated with long delays.(Chap. II, Par. .) The strength of an army, like the power in mechanics, is estimated byNapoleon,multiplying the mass by rapidity; a rapid march augments the morale of an army and increases its means of victory.Press onl(Maxim: IX.)The secret of war is to march twelve leagues, fight a battle, and march twelve more in pursuit.(Napier, Vol. V. p. 155.) Surbrise.a. Surprise is the most deadly of all weapons.The commander is vitally con- cerneà with the problem of bringing it about.Surprise has been the foundation of almost all the grand tactical and strategic combinations of the past as it will be of those to come b. Surprise is effected by doing the unexpected and thereby creating a situation for which the enemy is unprepared Sun-Tzu "BCAll warfare is based on deception. Hold out baits to the enemy; feign4rdisorder and crush him. Attack him when he is unprepared; appear when you are not expected. Ve etiusooDDispositions for action must be carefully concealed from the enemy,g•4lest they should counteract them.(Maxim: 33)It is better to overcome the enemy by surprise than by general actions. (Maxim: 4.)Those designs are best which the enemy is entirely ignorant of till the moment of execution.(Maxim: 3) Security,a. Security insures freedom of action.It consists in making provision to guard against surprise, and in disposing protective detachments to guard what is vital in order to allow troops to move or rest undisturbed. b. Protection from the air and mechanized forces are of the utmost importance. NI°The several camps of an army should be placed in such a manner thatapo eon, 1W5they may be able to support each other.(Memoirs. Vol. III, p.An army should keep its columns so united as to prevent an enemy from passing between them with impunity...ifcorps are detached,every precaution should be taken to prevent an attack upon them, in detail.(Maxim: XI) Cooperation.a. The full power of an army can be exerted only when all its parts combine in action. b. Cooperation is obtained by clear and well-considered instructions, by constant communica- tion between units, by the intelligence of subordinate leaders in grasping and executing the commander's plans. Sun-TzuB CTo control a large force is the same in principle as to control a few men; it is merely a question of subdivision.(Chap. VI, Par, a.) Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.(Chap. VI, Par. 2.) 8. THE PRcrIcAL APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR. a. Application to large units. The approach to this subject is through a process of synthesis: one examines the finished product; i.e., a battle or campaign that was won or lost, and attempts to trace the progressive effect of "principles" through reconstruction; this procedure comes very close to the modern, so-called "case method"; the recurrence or omission of certain factors may eventually attain the force of law. The majority of situations, in the entire text, are easily susceptible to this treatment, viz: Principle of the Offensive: On 8 August, the French First Army attacked in conjunction with the British.Note theattack directions of the French and Canadian Corps. Principle of the Objective (Direction): AThe capture of the Mezieres plateau. BContinue the attack to seize the Hangest plateau. CAttack and capture of Assainvillers. B.C Complete encirclement of Montdidier. • VegetiusaRomanmilitary writer of the fourth century, believed to havebeena Christian; his principalwork, infive ,ooks, is entitled EDiSoiws IIIIl,laliSNamRdMi/limi, and is dedicated to ValentinianII.Ittreats of the organization of annies, the training of soldiers. etc., and is written in aclearand graceful style.T,anilatzona of it have been published an English, French and German. --- Page 45 --- I., 0 U .;.).CF ;o. , a ; C . ) JIJ1I I0 - 1r— C . a— • •: — I. :J 3a zI E 2 — • — • E.E :•o..0• 0 010IxI .10—;— .2 : I •;• .. o. S ..;.!10oIx ; .h•• z •-••!C ;!:I60 S SI 4.16 f x-' 3 S•• .!•.tCtS .0 . &•2 •• t0 00 ;I U.S0 II IxIx I 20 I1 m 1.1 I, 00 I S .U4•g 5 •0 C •.! t.p I( f4II --- Page 46 --- MASS x,ocvc THE PRIN.JCIPLES OF WAR PLATE2.MANEUVEROF THE FIRST ARMY: MONTDIDIER, 8-12 AUGUST igi8. fj,DivcF/rnc • 9 Bc##er,ès o1 75 o9 BaHerlés oF/55 J 9Dch'er,es eFGPF THE PRINCIPLES O WAR PLATE24.FIRSTARMY PLAN. MONTDID[ER. 8 AUGUST agi8. '1I"lrC&fC7VE 'xc --- Page 47 --- MANEUVER IN WAR Principle of Economyof Force: In the zone of action of the IX Corps: 3 DIvisions. In the zone of action of the X Corps: 2Divisions. Principle of Concentration (Mass):In the zone of action of the XXXI Corps: 5 Divisions, reinforced. In the zone of action of the XXXV Corps: 3 Divisions, reinforced. Principle of Surprise: The entry into action of the XXXV Corps was initially slated for io August;it was launched a day ahead; the enemy was completely surprised. The application of certain principles, in the same operation,is further accentu- ated if distribution of forces and relative density of weapons areconsidered, viz: Principle of Concentration (Mass.): On the front of Moreuil, representing about one-third of the Army zoneof action, there is a massing of one-half of the infantry and two-thirds of the artillery.I.e.. 9 divisions, 126 batteries F.A., 72batteriesHowz., and 72 batteries G.P.F. Principle of Economy of Force: On the front west of Montdidier, 3 divisions, 27 batteries F.A.. ISbatteriesHowz., and g batteries of G.P.F. only. THEPRINCIPLES OF WAR BRITVIVIVHCD8.Z SABERS(2000(000(0002000 RIFLES570008000900090006000 GUNS54018662480 RELATIVE TURI'JSH AND BRITISH STRENGTH PLATE*5. THE BATTLE OF MEGGIDO,ujSEPTEMBER igiB. lv --- Page 48 --- THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR39 The operation against the Montdidier salient was probably the turning-point of the war on the West Front; Ludendorif states: "... theeighth of August was the black day of the war for the Germany Army." Mass, direction and surprise were admittedly the deciding factors or principles. These factors are recognizable in every major operation of the world-war period; there is another "turning-point" on another front, the battle of Meggido, 19 September, 1918, in the campaign of Palestine. The principles of mass, direction and surprise contributed to the decisive success of the British Expeditionary Force against the remnants of the Turkish army, viz: Principle of surprise: The concentrations on the decisive coastal front were made under cover of darkness; the old camps. in the Jordan valley, remained standing; 15,ooo dummy horses were placed along the deserted picket lines; headquarters were maintained and the wireless traffic continued, as usual. Principle of Concentration(Mass.): Notethe concentration on the prospective "break.through" front: every small dot repre- sents: iooo infantry; every large dot: 50 field pieces.Allenby concentrated 35,000infantry and 383 guns on a narrow front of about 15 miles. Principle of Economy of Force: The remaining front of about 40 miles was held by only ss,ooo rifles and 157 guns. Principle of the Offensive—Movement—Surprise. Surprise, or placing the attack where it is not expected, or enemy preparations are inadequate, is obviously de- pendent on speed, i.e., the result of movement. The American classic, under this heading, is Jackson's Valley Campaign, 1862; it compares easily with the best European pattern. Range of movement, i.e., distance, is an important factor: the Napoleonic marches have become justly famous in this respect, especially the concentric move ment on UIm, 1805, and the initial advance into Russia, 1812. However, once again there is a brilliant American counterpart to the Napoleonic model—if it does not surpass it, in the vastness of its actual territorial extent—the campaigns of liberation, waged by Simon Bolivarin the period i8 i to 1824, from Vene- zuela on the Atlantic, to Peru on the Pacific. The incredible extent of these offensive operations is realized if one compares the size of the United States, superimposed on a map of South America, to the same scale; the net-work of the Bolivarian operations would have covered the United States from New York to San Francisco, approximately 2800 miles as the crow flies—and this took place in 1821, when the area west of the Mississippi was still unexplored territory! The Campaign of 1818: Tachira—Caracas The Campaign in Western Venezuela, 1813 The Expeditions of Los Cayos, 1814.1815 The Campaign in Central Venezuela, i8i8 The Campaign of Nueva Granada (Colombia), 1819 The Campaign of Carabobo, 1821 The Campaign of Pasto, 1823 The Campaign in Southern Peru, 1824. b. Application of principles to smaller units. At first glance, it would appear as if the inherent characteristics of the principles of war tend to limit their applica- General E. Lopez-Contreras:Simon Be1iv,: Cej,iarrtoy doTyopa,.csracas, Venezuela, 1925. --- Page 49 --- 40 MANEUVER IN WAR PLATE *6. THE CAMPAIGNS OF SIMON BOLIVER. t813-1824. THE CAMPAIGNS OP SIMON BOLIVAR ISI 3—824. --- Page 50 --- THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR41 tion to large units; by dictionary definition, however, a principle is supposed to be of universal application. It must.be recognized that the "principles" remain in force regardless of size of units, but their application, of course, takes a definite tactical form in small-unit operations." In this respect, we are naturally influenced by our own war experiences; the stabilized fronts of the World War period accentuated the tactical forms of pene- tration and breakthrough in which limited objectives, large troop concentrations, rigid boundaries and zones of action became characteristic features; it may as well be recognized that these features are not favorable to free maneuver but rather tend to "corridor fighting." The historically famous attack on Cantigny, 28 May, igi8, by the 28th Infantry, A.E.F., is a characteristic example of a penetration, in a limited objective attack, as practiced on the West Front on innumerable similar occasions. 1 SeeChip.I.Par. b. CANTIGNY 0— —COOM PLATE 27.CANTIGNY,28 MAY igi8. IMASSI Ic CORRIDOR FIGHTING --- Page 51 --- MANEUVER IN WAR The peculiar tension surrounding this first American attack lent asignificance to this operation far beyond its relative military value. The attack front was about 2200yards;an entire regiment at war strength (250 menper company) was employed in the assault echelon;the force engaged was probably too large for the mission. The formation of the regiment was with three battalions abreast, each battalion with three companies in line and one in reserve; one machine gun company had been attached to each battalion; a section of flame throwers and a group of 12 Schneidertanks were furnished by the French. The artillery support for the attack was markedly strong and consisted of the organic divisional artillery, reinforced by one hundred thirty.two 75.mm guns, thirty-six 155-mm guns, one hundred seventy-eight heavy guns and howitzers and forty trench mortars; two hundred thousand rounds were accumulated for this concentration. The application of "principles" is recognizable but not as obvious as in the case of larger units. Concentration—Mass: The relatively narrow front, for an attack with battalions abreast and the density of artillery support (6 guns per yard of front) are ex- pressions of mass. Economy of Force: The sectors assigned to Cos. A and K, flank companies, are relatively wider than the narrower fronts assigned to Cos. E, F and H, interior companies, which were expected to meet stiffer resistance. It may be argued, of course, that this formation and type of attack were pre- scribed in minute detail, by high authority, that there was no opportunity for "maneuver" or scheme of maneuver, or direction other than a head-long collision and that, consequently, it is gratuitous to search for principles. In this more or less academic dilemma, it is of course desirable to trace a sharp line of demarcation; this is entirely practicable. At present the Army is regarded as the "fundamental unit of strategic maneuver,"i.e., a conception which in- volves primarily the displacement of large units. Within the Army, corps and divisions become units of execution of the strategic maneuver; their radii of action are more limited than the Army. In the framework of larger Units, the brigade and regiment become mere tools of execution, as combat units of relatively limited powers: the radius of action of a division, ie., its immediate combat effectiveness, is limited in width from 6 to 12 milesand in depth to the extreme range of its organic artillery. This view is confirmed in a recent address" by the Chief of Infantry: "... The larger features of divisional organization lie outside the province of my office Suffice it to say that the general consensus of authoritative opinion seems to favor the organization of the army corps as a unit of definite composition embody. ing that degree of sufficiency for independent action at present attributed to the division; and the restriction of the division to the role of a purely combat unit. A number of consequences follow from the generalization of motor trans- port-..thearmy corps of two or three divisions will definitely displace the divisions as the tactically and administratively self.contained unit, capable of in- dependent action. The division becomes a purely tactical unit." A differentiation between "large" and "small" units is derived from a distinction Mi,,a4for command4-, of Large Unit:, Par.30.NAddreuatC.& G. S. S.. Ft. Leavenworth.5May 1938. --- Page 52 --- z 0 0z 0 --- Page 53 --- 44 MANEUVER IN WAR between "strategical" and "tactical" maneuver: 27onebeing maneuver involving displacement of forces, the other concentration of fires; such a distinction leads to a ready transfer of ideas and terms, viz: a'Definition of Tactics: Therehave been many definitions of"tactics," but allofthem have failedtoinclude collateralcon- ceptions (supply, sanitation, morale) ;whenthe many facets of a military action are considered, we nnd thattactics cannot be exclusive, but is a compositite thing.itapossible, by historical agreement, to define"tactics"as distinguished from "strategy" andinthisproacbso I:rnus,on, wemay develop the characteristics of tactics, much asin an equation; - 'x"isde- termined by eliminations. • Von Bulow 1789Gels:des neneren Kriegjyjsem, definesas 'strateic movements those beyond the enemyintelligence"; von 'illisen talks of "strategy as the art of combinations and concentrations,tacticstheart of combat," Von Clausewits defines strategy as "employment of combat for war objectives," tactics as "emSployment of units in combat"; this agrees with Jomini:'l'art de diriger les armees sur lea theatres dopera.tions," and "l'art de driger les troupes sur les champs de battaille,"This presents an important distinction:theater of operations and battlefield respectively, as proper spheres for strategy and tactics. More rece,Dt writers like Blume appear to agree in general: "The field of tactics• embraces the employmentof military units,in combat, and their control dictated by combat requirements, while strategyislimited to command activities,exclusive of tactics,"Von Scherff:'Strategytell why—tactics bowtofight.':Grand-Duke Karl always speaks of "science of war"(strategy) and "art of war"(tactics).Napoleon and Frederick always refer to strategy as "last do guerre." A very modernscientific writer, Prof, Dr. Delbruck, has probably exhausted the sublect, when he defines"strategy involves t}le employment of all military means toward reaching a general war objective, while tacticsconcerns the conduct of troops to and during combat." Balck: "Strategy is conduct of war; tacticsis conduct of troops," Closely interwoven areideas (Lemoine, Tactique Generale)that strategy,or grand tactics,involvedis- placement of units, and tactics displacement of fire. - - Apparently,tactics is limited to battlefield situations which, in turn, affect troops and units more directly. than high command.- inspeaking of the tactical employment of troops, tactics appears to be limited to (a)troop leading, to and in combat (b)dispositions to combine fire and movement (c)displacements to produce fire effect.-- - itis obvious, however, that a successful activity, under each heading,is dependent of many factors, such as (a) morale and physical condition,(b) ammunition supply,(c)leadership, PrinciplesStrategicalTactical Objective1 Target OffensiveFDirectionFire MovementI Movement ConcentrationM Relative Frontages Economy of ForceassTroop Density CooperationPlanOrders SurpriseSurpriseSurprise SecuritySecuritySecurity SimplicitySimplicity ...........Simplicity The analysis of military operations, in subsequent chapters, is predicated on the basic conception that it is primarily "mass" and "direction" that determine the physiognomy and structure ofmaneuver, i.e., military action. --- Page 54 --- "I MASS AND DIRECTION 9. DEFINITION OF MANEUVER, a. Introduction. In the appraisal of the "maneu- ver chart," it is well to recall General MacArthur's brilliant views on the real purpose of military historical studies;' his main idea and phraseology are re- peated in the framework of this study. Note the column analysis, i.e., analysis of "those fundamental principles which, in the past, have been productive pf success" and synthesis, i.e., "facts derived from analysis are applied to the present and future, thus developing a synthesis of appropriate method, organization and doctrine." As to application in concrete historical cases, the whole range of situations, from 213 B. C. tO 1914, is a test of yet another precept—that "these principles know no limitation of time." Consequently, this series involves: (i)Aprogressive analysis of maneuver with a view to the definition of basic factors, types, procedure and execution. (2) A study of maneuver in the principal campaigns of the nineteenth century. (5) A demonstration of the historical continuity of maneuver forms, with emphasis on the efficacy of flank operations. b. An elusive idea. The preliminary inquiries into this subject have estab- lished considerable authority for the predominance of mass and direction as major elements in the structure of maneuver.2 Earlier American military textsgenerally began with a definition of the military terms involved. The sequence of stepsin the ordinary process of military instruction provide for (i) Preparation,(2) Explanation, () Demonstration and () Application. There is not a service school in the country, in generally following this sequence, that does not virtuously feel that it has reached the acme in pedagogy. These steps are mutually dependent; if one is omitted or unduly enlarged at the ex- pense of another, the educational balance is disturbed. In most military systems, the element of explanation is not always adequate. The military have a professional tendency toward the dogmatic; they bridle at persuasion when coercion is so much simpler. It is somewhat difficult to develop a clearcut definition of maneuver in our military texts. The word "maneuver"—and presumably the idea behind it—flit elusively through the pages of certain War Department texts: Par. 14: 'The formofconcentrationdepends upon ...thesubsequentstrategicmaneuver." Par. 17:'... Heuses strategical reserves to influence the situation by maneuver ..." Par.ss:"...askillful commander will maneuver the enemy out of his position... Hemust keep his command, as a whole, free to maneuver .. Par.o: "... TheArmy is the fundamental unit of strategical maneuver Par. 37:'...Theinitialdisposition of the Army should conform to the projected maneuver." Immediately the question suggests itself: What kind of maneuver? How, where and why is it applied? iChap.I.Par. I.'In the considerableliterature onmodernstrategyand tactics,certain authors and titlesare outstanding.Von Schlieffens Cannes, C. & G. S.S.,Pt. Leavenworth. Ku., 1931; Balck's Tactics, translztio by Brig.General Walter Krueger. U. S. Army, C. & G. S. S., Ft. 2.eavenworth, Xis.. 1911.Balck has added an isa.poitant supplementary volume to his originalseries: Devslopm,nt of Tacuct—Worid War, C. & 0. S.S..Pt. Leavenworth. Ku.. 1922.Of post.war analysis,in French, the brilliant studies of Lemoine and Touchonmust be mentioned,inparticularLemoine'sTactiqusG,nreale,PartIII;theimportantpartsofthis.-sluable work are covered in, this chapter.a Infantry Drill Riptetion;I). S. Army, edition of 1911; one of the best publications of ts kind and time.''SR104, Sec. IV,Par. 14. War Department.• Mansal for Coma,aadsr.t of Large Ui,is,. 45 --- Page 55 --- 46 MANEUVER IN WAR In Field Service Regulations,there are many references of a general character: Par. 382:"... Theeffect of surprise Is dependent upon rapidity of maneuver . Par.393:"...indicatethe points the seizure of which is of especial importance to the maneuver." Par. 426:"...terrainoften creates advantages for the development of a maneuver One may presumably be accused of carrying coal to Newcastle in calling for such a definition, but it makes for clear thinking. Lord Gray, the. famous British statesman, once said: "...Discussionwithout definition is useless." The only alternative to dear thinking is intellectual arrogance or a sort of semi-religious faith, expecting to pick ideas from nowhere, a naive hope that at the last moment inspiration will descend like the fluttering of Biblical doves. 10. THE BA.sIc FAcTORS. a. Direction or combination of directions. Now and then we catch a glimpse of the "type and form" of maneuver, but it is largely a matter of interpretation. There is the tedious job to trace the various factors and component elements that make up the complexity of maneuver—like a mosaic, in which small fragments are assembled until, suddenly,, the final pattern is revealed. In Field Service Regulations, we have an important beginning, a prime initial factor, the factor of direction: Par. 434:"... Theoffensive action of every unit Is given its direction with reference to an axis of attack." This point is generally confirmed in the Manual for Commanders of Large Units: Par. 36:...TheArmy Commander receives a general direction of advance...if corps are diverted from their axis...headopts measures to maintain the mass of the army on its general direction." This factor can be accepted provisionally as "direction or combination of directions in which the different elements of a unit will act." b. Distribution of forces. The next factors to examine will be distribution of forces, frontages and depth of formation; under this heading our official language is pretty dear: Par."Units are distributed for combat in width and in depth.Units assigned to decisive missions are ...assignedrelatively narrow frontages." Par. 385:"... Thenecessity for concentrating the greatest possible force at the point of decisive action requiresstrict economy in the strength of forces assigned to secondary missions.. Theidea is variable and could be expressed in still another form, such as: The ratio of offensive effort to the defensive; the. sequence and degree of effort during combat; combat or troop density per yard of front; the proportion between troops engaged and troops in reserve. In its final meaning, it aims at the creation of mass. The so-called plan of maneuver is essentially the synthesis of these basic ele- ments: direction and distribution of forces. In analyzing possible combinations and the conditions governing their use, they are examined in three general situa- tions: (i) Offensive against an enemy in position; (2) Offensive against an enemy in movement; ()Defensive. ii. COMBINATION OF DIRECTIONS. We find a very dear example of "Combina- tion of Direction" against an enemy in position in the Battle of Montdidier, 8 August igi8. On 8 August, the French First Army attacked in conjunction with the British Army. The plan of the army commander provided for: i—A First Phase: To push at top speed toward the Mezieres—Genonville Pla- teau, force the passage of the Avre, and obtain a bridgehead for the army. 'Edition of 1923. Chap. IX: Coabat. Vhas already been identified as a "principle." Chap. I. Par. 7. --- Page 56 --- MASS AND DIRECTION47 a—A Second Phase: To seize the Hangest•en.Santerre Plateau as a threat of encircling Montdidier. 3—A Third Phase: To complete the encirclement of Montdidier by an attack of the XXXVCorpsin direction: Assainvillers, and to progress rapidly to the east. At 5:05 A. M., 8 August, the XXXI Corps advanced to the attack to the south- cast. Four hours later, the IX Corps attacked due east. The entrance into action of the XXXV Corps depended on the capture of the Hangest Plateau; it was initially slated for so August. With the attack in the north succeeding beyond expectation, the XXXV Corps was launched a day ahead. The enemy was com- pletely surprised; the "pincers attack" had a decisive success. During the night of so August, the Germans evacuated the Montdidier pocket. Examined from 'the viewpoint of "combination of direction," the scheme of maneuver of this battle of Montdidier may be considered as a series of attacks practically at right angles: combined attack of the 37th and 66th Divisions at 7:oo A. M., combined attack of the XXXI and IX Corps at 9:00 A. M., combined attack of the XXXI and XXXV Corps at 4:oo P. M. This maneuver is an example of the combination of directions in the domain of an army. However, one frequently finds similar combinations in lower eche- Ions; there are several examples in this same battle of Montdidier, particularly in the maneuver of the 66th and 37th Divisions, or of the i5ad and i66th Dij- sion$. #mJJhJpRoNr #.'"',OBJECTIVE DCC xc x,oCvc PLATE sg.THEBATTLE OP MONTOIDIER, 8-12 AUGUST 1g18. --- Page 57 --- 48 MANEUVER IN WAR In this situation a very important point is raised: the continuity of maneuver forms regardless of the size of the unit. It is as if one applied a magnifying glass to the maneuver procedure of a division, like the 66th for instance (these divi- sions rarely contained more than io,00o men). The procedure is thus enlarged to an identical picture representing a corps, such as the IX or XXXI; inversely, the maneuver of the corps is duplicated by divisions and brigades. 12. PRELIMINARY CONDITIONS AFFECrING DIRECTION. As one reflects on the example just shown, two conditions appear to be neces- sary in order to affect "combinations of directions";(i) The enemy front must have sinuosities, and (2) The terrain must have a sufficient number of corn part- ments. If the enemy's front were absolutely straight, one would first have to make a breach in it, before attempting a "combination of directions." As to terrain, it should have a sufficient number of compartments so that con- verging attacks do not develop on terrain subject to the same system of fires, since one of the movements would come under enfilading fires. Now, it is quite possible that the enemy may present a comparatively straight (rectilinear) front; in that case, combination of directions are held in abeyance, in the beginning, but may be used later on. They appear, therefore, in the form PLATE o.THEATTACK OF THE FRENCH TENTH ARMY: VILLERS-COTTERET, 1918. --- Page 58 --- MASS AND DIRECTION49 of direct actions of the troops in first line, combined with encircling movements effected by the troops in rear. Note the scheme of maneuver of Mangin's Army in the region of Villers- Cotterets, in which the American 1st and ad Divisions formed the bulk of the forces engaged and distinguished themselves conspicuously. It is quite obvious that the front-line divisions are intended to drive straight ahead into open terrain, while the divisions in second line are making envelop- ing maneuvers around wooded areas or particularly difficult terrain. This is a valuable procedure because these enveloping maneuvers, i.e., true "combinations of directions," apply not only to woods or localities but to any terrain, area or zone which presents difficulties of a tactical nature. —— — — — Double p.'netretion ordered toreduce the center before nel penetratIon. PLATEi. THE MEUSE-ARCONNE OPERATIONS, U. S. FORCES, 1918. The initial conception of the American Meuse-Argonne Offensive was base1 on this same idea, and the general procedure is identical with the operations at Villers-Cotteret: A drive into "open terrain," initially avoiding the difficult Montfaucon area, to be taken by subsequent encircling actions. This offensive, while treated here from the viewpoint of combinationof direction,can be viewed from other equally important angles: concentration of mass on a decisive front, embody- ing the principles of objective, offensive and concentration.The strategical importance of the American sector was second to none on the entire Western Front: "...thedanger confronting the enemy made it imperative that he should hold in front of the American Army to the limit of his resources."(Pershing) Only fourteen days elapsed between St. Mihiel and the Meuse- Argonne—two major operations; the bulk of the troops and services employed in the St. Mihiel attack were again used on the Argonne front; at the end of the first day, at St. Mihiel, the transfer of combat units from the battlefield was begun.This concentration involved the withdrawal of eleven French and Italian divisions and the entrance of three American corps. About 220,ooo men were moved out of the sector and 6oo,ooo men into it,in addition to enormous quantities of supplies and ammunition.All movements were made under cover of darkness, by rail, truck transportation and marching.This was unquestionably the greatest, single concentration in American military history, to date; it is obvious that the most competent staff coordination was required; the task was executed with smoothness and precision and without the knowledge of the enemy. "... Thedetails of the movements of troops connected with this concentration were worked out and their execution conducted under the able direction Army objective showing finalsinglepenetration. --- Page 59 --- 50 MANEUVER IN WAR of Colonel George C. Marshall, Jr., of the Operations Section, General Staff, First Army." (Pershing)This brilliant officer has since risen to the highest post in the American service,that of Chief of Staff. 13. DIRECTION IN OFFENsIvE COMBAT. To make a summary at this point: the previous situations are examples of the offensive against an enemy in position, to show the presence and the effect of the factor of "direction" or "combination of direction." We shall now take up direction in the offensive against an enemy in movement; it presents a situation which ordinarily favors "combination of directions." When two adversaries attack simultaneously in open warfare situations,spon- taneous breaks or gaps develop frequently in the front of combat. The Battle of La Fere Champenoise,9 September 1914, offers a good example. On the evening ofSeptember 1914, the front of the IX and XI Corps passed through Oyes—Sommesous. During the 8th and 9th, the Germans pushed their lines as far as the Maurinne Creek; agap develops between Connantere (C) and Oeuvry (OE). General Foch placed the 42d Division in army reserve in the vicinity of Pleurs. He decided to counterattack with the 42d Division through the gap between Connantere and Oeuvry. The attack direction of this division was northeast. He ordered this attack to be supported on the right by the XI Corps and on the left by all available elements of the IX Corps; the axis of attack for the divisions in the XI Corps ran practically north; there you have a combination of directions made possible by a gap in the line. This phenomenon of breaks or gaps in the combat front is frequent in occur- rence and of special importance when two armies meet each other obliquely. This is what occurred in the Battle of the Ardennes, in August1914. The French and German armies collided at nearly right angles and from this resulted a fragmentation of the battle into several isOlated combats, in the course of which one can dearly see combination of directions come into spectacular play. Stripped of all details, the axes of attack in all examples shown are corn bina- Lions of direction and variations of that simplest and most elementary of maneu- vers, the pincers attack, the combination of frontal and flank attacks. 14. DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES. FRONTAGES. In examining the second basic factor, that is distribution of forces, the official language of Field Seniice Regulations, is perfectly dear: PLATE s. THE BATTLE OF LA FER.E CHAMPENOISE,9 SEPTEMBER '9'1• --- Page 60 --- PLATE 33. OPERATIONS OF THE FRENCH FOURTH ARMY, i-*AUGUST1914. ( .ROYE XVffl4 GERMAN FRENCH 1xxx11 J iD/v oF/an • 9 Bci9er,ès oF75 o g Bat/erie, oFISS 9 8ct/er,s of GPP PLATE.MONTDIDIER.8 AUGUST 19*8.FIRST ARMY PLAN. --- Page 61 --- MANEUVER IN WAR Par. 385:"... Thenecessity for concentrating the greatest possible force at the point of decisive action requires strict economy in the strength of forces assigned to secondary missions..." Thatis a relatively recent idea. We find little of it in the combats of ancient time. Napoleon gave it a place on the battlefield, although it was chiefly in the domain of strategy that he made use of concentration of forces. However, the procedure became of current use during the World War; under existing conditions the execution of an attack required so great a development of means and fires that it had to be strictly localized; there was never enough of materiel and man power to maintain offensive strength over the enoruous fronts. The thought is still behind the present conception of a "main effort" or "main and secondary attack." The distribution of forces along the front of the First French Army, on 8 August '9 i8, is typical of World War practices. PLATE 35. FIRST PHASE, SECOND BATTLE OF GUISE,i7 OCTOBER igi8. In the Moreuil sector, along the left wing of the army, representing about one- third of its front, the Army Commander concentrated one.half of his infantry and two-thirds of his artillery: g infantry divisions, 126 batteries of72 batteries of howitzers and 72 batteries of heavier calibers (G.P.F.'s). This is cer- GUISE 15 8 --- Page 62 --- MASS AND DIRECTION55 tainly strict economy on secondary missions as well as concentration at the point of decisive action. There are any number of similar, convincing examples. The same economy in the strength of forces assigned to secondary missions, in the clear language of Field Service Regulations, is very strikingly carried out in this operation. The VIII Corps held on a front of'9 miles with only four divisions, while the army massed three times that number of divisions behind an attack front of only 13 miles. 15. FRONTAGES. COMBAT DENSITY. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION. In reflecting on the examples, distribution of troops on variable frontages appears to be the practical application of the principle of economy of force with a view of creating mass at important points or sectors; once more one is confronted with the transfer of this principle to the modest scale of smaller units; the situations at Guise, Montdidier, Villers-Cotterets and the Argonne, applied to armies but within each army, corps and division, simply take a proportional part of the front. Within the division, regiments and battalions in turn, occupy fragments of the common front. Concentration as a term applied to larger units, in the field of strategy, becomes combat or troop density, in the field of tactics. Distribution in depth and frontage are inter-dependent. In every deployment for action a decision will have to be made regarding depth of formation and extension of front. Extended formations have great initial combat power(fire) and facilitate enveloping maneuver, but their energy is not constant without means to replace casualties. Distribution in depth makes it possible to initiate the combat with a part of the force, develop the situation and fight the action with another part in accord with the information obtained by the leading echelon and force a deci- sion with the remainder. A formation in depth enables the commander to exercise a constant influence on the course of action. In this connection, it is very natural to seek an expression of frontages in yards. It is difficult, and sometimes undesirable, to establish rigid standards; a recent authoritative statement, in one of our service schools, is very pertinent: $ Thedetermination of frontages depends upon many considerations.The mission, strength, terrain, supporting forces, communication, condition of troops and characteristics of the enemy are some of the many factors that affect this determination. The variables involved are, to a lare extent, local in their application and are of such a nature as to render it difficult and in some respects undesirabLe to set definite figures for maximum and minimum frontages; on the other hand, guide figures are desirable in order to effect economy of per- sonnel, as well as to give higher commanders a gauge that may be used in assigning tasks to front-line units.For the purpose of establishing guide figures only, the following frontages for the war-strength battalion in the attack are used in the instruction at The Infantry School: Strong attack: 8oo to goo yards.Sccondasy attack: Usually not to exceed iwo yards." As usual, the historical approach will throw light on any controversy and, in this case, it does furnish a competent basis of comparison and guide figures that are directly traceable, in origin, to battle conditions. i6. INTERPRETATION OF DENSITY TABLE, a. Any comparison requires a definite yardstick in order to avoid distortion; regardless of merit, a uniform yardstick will usually develop salient features. The yardstick employed here is density per yard of front, i.e., the actual battlefield frontage and total infantry employed thereon. Both line and depth (i.e., area) are implied in this scheme. This line of thought is common to all foreign military literature. For example: The ist Division, A. E. F., Soissons, i8 July i 918, attacked on a front of 2900 yards, with a rifle strength of 1 3,5oo; the troop density per yard of • Mimeo Circular,"Frontages: The Infantry Battalion." 1939, The Infantry School, Ft. Benning. Ga., Col. CourtneyHodges.Assistant-Commandant. --- Page 63 --- 54 MANEUVER IN WAR Battle of YearEngagement Density Per Yard BelligerentsInf.Art.Remarks PRE.NAPOLEONIC PERIOD 1757PragPrussians11.0Muzzle.loader NAPOL!ONIC PERIOD 1805AusterlitzFrench7.1Muzzle.loader Allies6.1 1807FriedlandFrench9.5Muzzle.loader 1807WagramFrench7.7Muzzle.loader 1809BautzenFrench9.5 Allies 1815Waterloo • French10.846Muzzle.loader (Musket) British9.025 POST.NAPOLEONIC PERIOD 1859SolferinoFranco.Sardinian6.319Muzzle.loader (Musket) Austrian6.321 1866CustozzaAustrian7.217Muzzle.loader (Musket) 1866KoniggratzPrussian8.439Large caliber. Breechloader Austrian & Saxon9.043 1870WorthGerman8.137Large caliber, Breechloader 1870Gravelotte- St.Privat German12.346Large caliber. Breechloader French7.232 1899Colenso: Dec 151stBattle British1.34Small caliber. Magazine rifle 1900Colenso: Feb272d Battle British2.27.3Small caliber. Magazine rifle 1905MukdenRussian.937.6.mm Magazine rifle opposed to 6.5.mm Feb 202.715.3 Japanese3.111.5 WestRussisn4.518 FrontJapanese3.111.6 SouthRussian1.56 FrontJapanese1.95.6 WestRussian4.115.6 FrontJapanese3.610.5 AEF: AMERICAN OPERATIONS (QUIET FRONT) 1905Mukdea Mar 3 1905Mukden Mar 7 1918St Die Sect.Aug 195th Div.37Front of32.500yds.Riflestrengthsapprox: 12,000. 1918Baccarat .Iuly 26Sect. 77th Div.69Front of 18,500 yds.Rifle strength:12,800. 1918LuceySect. Aug 2389th Div..68Front of 17,500ycls.Rifle strength:12,000. 1918Alsace: EastAug 24of Belfort 29thDiv.83Front of 15,500 yds.Rifle strength:12.800. 1918Sazerais Aug 16Sector 1st Div1.13Frontof11.500yds.Riflestrength:13.000. Took overexactsectorofaweaker French Division. AEF: AMERICAN OPERATIONS (ACTIVE FRONT) 1918Cantigny June 4 1st Div1.71Front of 7,600 yda.atifle strength: 13,000. G&. man offensive anticipated. 1918Aisne.MarneAug 16(Fismes) 3d Corps1.75Two Divs..28th and 77th.Front of12,000. Riflestrength:21,000.Germanreactioncx pected and further advance planned. 1918ThiaucourtSept 2178th Div1.62Frontof7,600yds.Riflestrength:12.300. Division was holdingagainst possible enemy reaction. AEF: AMERICAN OPERATIONS (ATTACK) 1918Soissons July 181st Div4.65Front of 2.900 yds.Rifle strength:13.500. 1918St. MihielSept 125th Div5.16Frontof2,500yds.Riflestrength:12,900. Division attacking over open ground in centreof main attack of First Army. 1918Argonne .Sept 265th Corps3.21Front of 11.500 yds.79th. 37th. and 91st Divs. inline.Riflestrength:37.300.Centreof main sttack. 1918Le CateauOct 112d Corps4.08Front of 4.000yds.27thand30thDivs.in line.Riflestrength:16.300.— AEF:AMERICAN OPERATIONS (OPEN WARFARE) 1918: Argonne: EastNov 11of Meuse3d Corps.85ThreeDiva,inline.Riflestrength:25,000. Front of 29,300 yds. 1918Argonne Nov 115th Corps.90Two Divs.inline.Riflestrength:18,000. Front of 20.000 yds. Sources:Balck, "Taktik." Vol. V Sec. III and Vol. I, Sec. V4, General Minarelli.Fitzgerald"Infanterie Reflexiones."Col.F. 4. Maude. "Evolution of Infantry Tactics."Monograph i4o.4. W.P.Div.. 1919. "Troop Frontages." PLATE 36. FRONTAGES. COMBAT DENSITY. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION. --- Page 64 --- MASS AND DIRECTION55 front was consequently 4.65; this coefficient, of course, does not mean that over four men were clustered on a single yard; it reveals, at once, a formation in depth for a sustained effort in attack. OrganizationUnitStrengthFrontageDensity ist.flivisionBattalioniioo7251.5A. E. F.,Regiment33007254.6'i8 July 1918Division13,50029004.65 *Thedivision attacked with four regiments in line, the regiments in column of battalions. On another occasion, Sazerais Sector, i6 August igi8, this same division oc- cupied a front four times as large, or 11,500 yards, with a rifle strength of13,ooo and a density coefficient of 1.13, or one-fourth the Soissons figure; this reveals, at once, occupation of a quiet sector for defense. b. It is apparent that densities were not greatly dimished, in the period 1757 to 1905, although the breechloader appeared as early as i866. The Russo-Japanese and Boer War may not be conclusive, since defensive and offensive fluctuated markedly within a single engagement (Mukden). c. World War densities, 12 September igi8, while lower, rise to 5.16(St. Mihiel), which was the Russian density onMarch 1904, Mukden, West Front. d. A direct comparison between frontages of the 1st Division, A. E. F., at Soissons and the proposed Infantry School frontages (1939) with identical attack formations is rather interesting. OrganizationUnitStrengthFrontageDensity ist DivisionBattalioniioo7251.5 A. E.F.,Regiment33007254.6 igi8Division53,50029004.65 T. O 7-Lito77Battalion6g685o•o.8 War Dept..Regiment24118502.8 1939Division723325502.5 It is apparent that the resulting combat densities fall below World War coeffi- cients for sustained efforts in attack against organized positions, but they are probably adequate in view of the possession of an increase in armament and fire power through the adoption of the M-i rifle, improved light machine gun, medium and small-caliber mortars and improved antitank guns. To test the validity of any comparison, one may ask if the type of action, as at Soissons, is obsolete. In its larger aspects, this is a challenge of World War experience. It should be noted that the German defensive position at Soissons was rela- tively shallow; it was not organized to the degree of other fronts, such as the Siegfried Stellungen. The offensive operation was still in progress elsewhere in the Marne salient. Spain and China have shown the eventual appearance of organized resistance on stabilized fronts. With all of Spain to fight over, the principal efforts settled on the Madrid, Teruel and Ebro fronts, requiring "breakthrough" measures of the pattern of 1918. In China, organized defensive lines had to be broken at Shanghai and in the Lung-hai. In the Civil War, with all of Virginia to roam over, the contestants settled on the Richmond-Petersburg defensive front. The problem of frontages is closely connected with the depletion in rifle strength, noted by General Lynch °asan undesirable characteristic of the latest (1939) organization. Frontage and combat-density are expressions of combat strength; the average A. E. F division had a very considerable rifle strength, far superior to the pro- *Averageof: 800.900 yards; the formation is identical with thelit Division, A. E.F.,i.e., regiments 3abreast, regiments in column of battalion. --- Page 65 --- 56 MANEUVER IN WAR 0 . .: 'o 0 .9 0.101 ..I.. o t0 U U .— — o z ' — z ( ggoo ,. i:'2E. CO . n;.•CJC0 . •.c' ,Z0 V COU 8 E- CO 0. V CO 0:— .0—cO 0) E.0VUI. E —' o#010.1 0)0) ._I_&s 0) 0 00 - ————00— 000.-•1—— 0) .—.—..t—e0 (00 0(00000(0(0.44CX01 o0 00 0('00 ——— V 00000 (Z— 000'400—0.—00000 ——O0Cl I.0 --- Page 66 --- MASS AND DIRECTION57 portional infantry(rifle) strength of the modern organization: 12,8ooagainst 7223. The "breakthrough" of the West Front in 1918 literally consumed infantry; the 1st Division at Soissons had to endure three days of consecutive combat. This lasting power can be recognized in the density figure of 4.65. Can greater or equal staying power be expected with reduced man power which is reflected in the shrunken densities of .8 to 2.8? PlaceDate Number ofDivs. in frontline Frontage erDiv. in yards Somme(British)Arras(British) igi6 1917 13 i6 1,7oo i,Boo Messines(British) 3d Ypres (British) sgt7 1917 March 12 15 1,700 1,600 Somme (German) Lys (German) Aisne (German) Noyon-Montdidier (German) Champagne East of Rheims (German) Champagne West of Rheims (German) igi8 April igi8 May 1918 Juneigi8 July igi8 July 1918 33 13 i8 11 15 17 2,400 2,300 3,20o 3,500 3,050 3,000 Somme (British) August 19189 2,933 Note change in organization, from four (4) to three (3) battalions per regiment in this period, viz:(4) Somme, Arras, Messines, 3d Ypres; all others (3). PLATE 38. SUMMARY OF FRONTAGES: ALLIED AND GERMAN ATTACKS. General Lynch's brilliant article 10 on the new infantry regiment "expressed concern over the reduced proportion of riflemen not only in the infantry regi- ment but in the whole army... thereduction in regimental strength has fallen almost wholly on the riflemen; a division of 12,000 men will have less than ooo riflemen in rifle companies; a division of this strength will have little power to carry the fight to the enmy and the depletion incident to even minor combat will quickly reduce it to a wholly ineffective level." 'Major General George A. Lynch. Chief of Infantey (1938).His administration will become known for a complete modernization of infantry,in organization, armament and equipment; not since the World War has American infantry had the benefit of such far-seeing and constructive leadership. 10TheInfantry Journal, March-April. 1939. --- Page 67 --- IV THEORY OF MANEUVER 17. THE Smuc'ruai OF BATTLE. The process of analysis is the isolation of ele- ments; the process of synthesis is their fusion. In dismantling the structure of maneuver, as in previous paragraphs, there remains the obligation to assemble it again. It is evident that the military action at Montdidier, Guise or La Fere Champenoise consisted essentially in the application of the factors of direction and mass; mass was shown to be dependent on frontages and for the general purpose of "concentrating the greatest possible force at the point of decisive action." 1 Applicationimplies control, unity of combat, and unity of direction, which is a function of the commander; "...thearmy commander himself conducts the battle... hegives the operation... unityof direction." 2 Itis desirable, at this point, to examine the structure of battle. Battle in the broadest sense should mean the ensemble of operations; the operation of a large unit is not a single act; it is an aggregate of smaller, individual operations. This thought has not always been accepted. There are, consequently, several theories on maneuver. At the base of each is found a special theory on the nature of decisive action. One school of thought a divides the battle into two acts: a period of prepara- tion, with the object of wearing out the enemy; then, an act of force, due to the intervention of fresh troops reserved until that moment. It is this act of force which constitutes the decisive period of battle. In the opinion of another schoolthere is no single important issue in battle. The battle is the aggregate of a series of separate combats. the sum of which produces success. In the first system, there seems to be a denial of the "preconceived maneuver" which will be shown presently as entirely workable; furthermore, the theory is predicated on the so-called decisive action, time and place, and it will be shown that decisive time and place are elusive and hard to fix. The second system would seem to imply that the essential decision of the com- mander will be made in advance. The high command must adopt a positive solution, in advance, °inorder not to be led astray by events. Our own regula- tions appear to stress anticipation: "To command is to foresee"; consequently, in large units, the principal mission of the commander is to prepare the battle rather than to conduct it on the ground. 1Par.385, F. S. R. Manual /Or Commanderi of LargeUnit,,Par.42. France. 'Germany.Franco.Pruj,ianWay, 1870. Atthebeginning ofthe campaign of 1870 the French never decided definitely whether •attack,to awaitattack, or maneuver in order to gain time." The initial collisions,in the Franco.Prusaian War, leading to thebattles of Saarbruck, Weissenburg, Worth and Spicheren are very characteristic.In every case, the French wereacting without general plan. On the German side also, engagements which were intended for reconnaissance only.often developed into major operations,inspiteof orders ofthe high command.The Battle of Worthis characteristic of this tendency: during the entire morning of August 6th the German diviaions. arriving succeasively in the battle area, delivered a series of uncoordinated attacks. This tendencyis probably unavoidable inthe so.called meeting eiigsgements; forty.four years afterwards, similar phenomena could be observedin the Battles of the Frontiers, August 22, 1914, and at Ethe, Virton. Rossigriol, Tintigny. etc.. Asto the opening moves of the French. in 1870. the general dispositions of the troops were ordered before a general plan of action was decided on.'... absenceof any scheme was the only characteristic of the French leadership at this time."(German Official History.)"From the beginning of affairs, the mental attitude of the French leaders was defensive and they were ready to follow the German leader rather than to impose on them their will."(Bird: Strategyofthe F,anro.Ge,roan We,.) Russo.JafraneseWar, 1904. TheRussian High Command operated just about like the French in 1870; they were vague and vacillating about a general plan. On the Yalu, Zasulich received contradictory orders as to his role. 58 --- Page 68 --- THEORY OF MANEUVER It may be argued that the final conclusion in this theory implies a loss of con- trol after the units are launched in their respective directions. That happens to be a fact! There is nothing startling in this conclusion. It has already been officially conceded.8 the leader can materially influence the course of an action, once begun, only through the employment of his reserves..." Tobe consistent, the principal differentiation in the features of each system or theory of maneuver might be summarized as follows: 1 11 III a. The battle must be con•a. Thebattlecannotbea. The battle may be con-ducted in its entirety, onconducted in its entirety,ducted,primarilywiththe ground.on the ground.'theinterventionofre- serves. b. The decisionis held Inb. The decisionisalwaysb. The decision is generallyabeyance until the enemymade in advance,made in advance. is engaged' c.Theengagement of thec.Theengagement ofthec. The engagement of theforces is gradual; it cornSforce is'°anditsforcesisgradual,com- prises a period of prepa-broadlinesarefixedprising a period of prep-ration and a period offrom the beginning; afteraration and a period of decisive action,that, there can be onlydecisive action. changes in details. •F. S.L,par.397. 'TbeFirst Bat:!. oj Gaza, 1917.The command arrangements for this important battle and the position of headquarterswere defective: Dobell.whocommanded allthe troopsin the field, was preoccupied and remained with the frontal attack(53dDivision), Chetwode was with the mounted force and Murray.the C.in C., who had come uptoElArish,had a command post on his train.He became a mere spectator, since he had no troops directly under his orders and could consequently exercise little control over the fight. During the first two battles of Gaza, the headquarters of the British force was still at Cairo, some 2O miles away. When Allenby tookovercommand, he moved headquarters to the vicinity of Rafa. The command situation and possibilities of command control as developed in the first battle of Gaza are very significant: they have a direct bearing on this business of "the battle can (or cannot) be conducted inits entirety on the ground." • Note the difficulties in "conduct of battle" that arose in Gallipoli.The C. in C. was continually separated from his administrative staffs with undesirable, almost disastrous results. In the landing at W-Beach, Genetal Hare and some of his staff moved up with the leading troops; the gen- eral was wounded no one knew where he was and there was consequently a great deal of confusion, At the first attle of Krithia, General Hunter Weston sent forward Brig. General Marshall with a more or less roving commission to superintend the advance.Marshall took with him a few officers to act as a temporary staff;havingnofixedheadquarters and telephone it was impossible for him to exercise adequate control over a two.mile front, and this delegation of divisional authority lead to delay and confusion in the issue of orders and despatch of messengers.(Official History, Vol. I, p. 289.)•French Doch:ne, 1914:TheFrench Army had absorbed the theory of the offensive to a_point where it had become a disease; it was theoffensiveineverycaseandregardless of situation, the blind offensive—loffensive a l'outrance; as a result, no attention was paid to effect oF fire;. the French army was thrown into battle with superb eaprit but with a disdain of fire for which it had to pay dearly. FrenchDec tent,, 1938:Thiswar experience has had its effect on modern practices; the keynote of the modern regulations istactical prudence"; the brat item is a Strict centralized control; corps move from phase line to phase line; there isfre. quent interference in the business of lower headquarters; corps, for example, may prescribe the number of bat- talions to be used in the front line,, 15 In Ic and If c,thereis a definite conflict in assumption:Is the engagement gradual or Is it sudden? Histori- cal experience tends to suddenness, as in meeting engagements.There is a feeling that this type of action has becomeimpossiblebecause of theefficiencyof modern aerial reconnaissance. The ao.called meeting engagement.i.e.,acollisionof forces on the march, requires deployment from march column and is characterized by relative lack of information.Not all armies recognize this type of en- gagement officially and prescribe certain combat procedures. While itis obvious that premature or piece-meal attacks of the ieading echelon may result in partial or local defeatsand possibly force the hand of the commander,unduecaution or a desire to refrain from the offensive until tise development is complete may mean the loss of important tactical opportunities: 4uer,iadt,1806:Prussiansand French collided frontally, in march columns; the action developed through piece-meal employment of units as they arrived.Davout was finally successful, through a more rapid deploy- ment of his forces and the skillful parry of all enemy movements. Ka:zbacb,1813:TheFrench crossed the atzbach in several columns; the impressionprevailedthat no en- counter would take place on that day; visibility was poor on account of rain and fog.The Allies, however, were ready for combat and vigorously attacked the heads of the French columns.Delayed and time-consuming de- velopment of the French march columns, failure to coordinate an attack, etc.brought on a French defeat. Vionvill,,1870:TheGerman th Division emerged from the defile of ôorze, to collide with the French II Corps en route via Gravelotte.The division deployed from march columnandattacked vigorously; thisbrisk. energetic action eventually slowed down the movement of the entire French army. Bib.,Augars: 22,1914: In the dense fog that prevailed in the early morning hours, elements of the IV French Corps, advancing in two columns, ran into the Germans—a typical meeting engagement. The cavalry encountered early German machine-gun fire and was practically annihilated; the scattered remnants fell back through the village where they interfered with the passage of infantry. The infantry of the advance guard andleadingbrigade was fed --- Page 69 --- 6o MANEUVER IN WAR While not entirely outspoken, our own military literature seems generally to favor the third system (which is really a blend of the first and second theories) with the implication that the decision is made in advance, by grouping large units in accord with a preconceived maneuver idea but with the possibility of its modification and adaptation, according to the terrain and the reactions of the enemy. These systems are the echo of the Napoleonic maneuver, which in its intel- lectual quality remains unchallenged to this day. It is covered in great detail in subsequent chapters. A comparison of this brief tabulation of theories of maneuvers reveals certain controversial, even contradictory features, particularly as regards the "decision made in advance" or "held in abeyance," and the subject of "decisive action." i8. DEcIsIVE AcTIoN. POINT. PLACE. TIME. The inherent logic of a subject de- termines its own sequence. In touching on controversial features of the decision, i.e., scheme or plan of maneuver or the "broad lines of an engagement," we are brought face to face with the items "point, time and place of decisive action." These important terms (F.S.R.) have appeared previously: Par. 379: "Concentration of superior forces, both on the ground and in the air, at the deci- sive place and time, creates the conditions most essential to decisive victory Par. 385:"...concentratingthe greatest possible force at the point of decisive action requires economy in... secondarymissions." The implications in Pars. g and 385 are that such concentrations are planned a priori; one cannot practice economy on secondary missions without having previously selected the decisive point for the assembly of superior forces. Obvi- ously, this reasoning has a direct bearing on whether the decision is held in abey- ance or made in advance. What is meant by decisive place and time? By what signs can one recognize the point of decisive action and the right moment? We may as well accept, without argument, that there is a decisive time and place in every battle—a moment when the balance swings decidedly to one side; this is an ordinary fact of experience. Without this feature, by its very definition, the battle would remain indecisive. Therefore, there is a decisive moment. If an important act has been accomplished at this moment, the point at which it occurred is, evidently, the point of decisive action. As to this decisive action, we must regard it as the resultant of other actions that preceded it. Eliminate one of the events that occurred before it, and the decisive moment will be affected. And when the act that is considered as decisive is reduced to a simple tactical incident, such as the capturing of a crest by one or two companies, as at Nanshan,or a distant flanking fire, as at Wafangou, is it not self-evident that this moment derives all of its importance from the general situation in which it was produced? Let us suppose that a battle was stopped at the precise point we now consider "decisive," for example, at Austerlitz, at the moment of the capture of the Prat- piece-mealinto combat; the division staff was cut off in the village; for a long time no reports got through to the rear brigade or corps headquarters. Belle/onlaine, August 22. 1914: At 6:00 A.M., the 11th and 12th German Divisions advanced south; at the same hour, the 3d French Colonial Division moved north: a meeting engagement was inevitable.(Plate 33).Since the corps advanced in echelon, the right flank of this division appeared covered by the neighboring column of the II Corps; sn reality,it could not be effectively protected since the head of that column was eight miles in rear. At 8:30 AM, the west column made contact, arid a sharp advance guard action developed. On the east, however, the German 11th Division advanced on a clear road.Until then, the valley of the Semoy was covered by a dense fog; when it lifted at 9:00 A.M., the Germans from the height of Ansard saw at their feet an entire French division in march column. The German advance guard artillery opened fire at 1300 yards; by detaching a flank guard to delay the leading units of the French II Corps, the Germans threw their full strength against the flank of the French 3d Division. ' Russo-Japanese War, 1904. --- Page 70 --- THEORY OF MANEUVER6i zen plateau, or at Castiglione, at the moment of the entrance into line of Serrurier, or at the Ourcq on Sept. 8, 1914. There is nothing to prevent the enemy from retiring in complete liberty; there is no victory, no decision, no decisive moment. While it is certain that there is a decisive moment, it results from the antecedents of combat; for that reason, we have only an indirect grasp on it; it is an elusive quantity. On the other hand, there may be the possibility of creating tactical conditions, through maneuver, that may shape themselves to a crisis, to create a general setting that will eventually produce a decisive action. This point is demonstrable by reference to a spectacular historical incident. •BRIEY IETZ PLATE g.THEBATTLE OF ST. PRIVAT. i8 AUGUST 1870. Examine the situation at St. Privat, at about 7:oo A. M.The German Army engaged the French Army on a front of 12 '/ miles. Near St. Privat, a German division was engaged frontally against the French VI Corps; another division, the 12th Saxon Division, executed a flank attack against the right of this French Corps. Today, we know that the attack of this division decided the fate of the battle; here then was the decisive time and place and the point of decisive action! How did this come about? Had the German commander previously chosen the time and place? Not at all! On the contrary, the German High Command at first believed the French right to be at Amanvillers, then at St. Privat and, finally, found it to be at Roncourt! What results could have been expected had a plan of attack been based on the initial erroneous information? Perhaps nothing. But the general maneuver was so elastic and supple that these errors were of no importance. Routes and zone of advance of corps were merely modified to enlarge the front of attack. FRENCH GERMAN --- Page 71 --- 62 MANEUVER IN WAR The plan of the commander-in-chief was not a decisive flank attack ata fixed, predetermined point, like St. Privat, but a general maneuver of his entire force, the normal evolution of which was to be an attack on the French right, wherever this right might be found. If we take the example of St. Privat literally—many others could be quoted— it would appear that the commander cannot forsee the decisivemoment, nor does he necessarily have to act upon it. In the light of this reasoning, what is the precise meaning of Par.579? As a matter of fact, it only states that superior forces, i.e., mass, applied at the right time and place, create conditions essential for victory. While the language is more formal, this wishful statement is only a modern paraphrase of Forrest's pungent "...gittha fustest with the mostest men." The paragraph unfortu- nately does not state when place and time become decisive, and it has just been shown (St. Privat) that, as such, decisiveness has an elusive quality, that theso- called decisive moment or action is the result of all events that occurred before it, that it was generated by them, that it has become decisive only through its place in the ensemble of the action; in other words, that it is the product or resultant of the general maneuver. Since the creation of mass at the decisive point requires preliminaryarrange- ments, i.e., planning, the question immediately presents itself: How far in advance can the commander forecast his action or project his maneuver, and what effect will the projected maneuver have upon the form of its tactical execution?U They are obviously interdependent; decisive action is merely another phase for tactical effect and, as shown, only one of a chain of preliminary acts that consti- tute the general framework of maneuver. There is a border line somewhere and the line of demarcation lies in that twilight zone between strategy and tactics.1' What is the American doctrine? Our official texts as a rule do not evade the issue but sometimes leave open a fatal avenue of interpretation and possible con- flict. 14 PremiseConclusion Par. 13."... Thecommander-in-chief mustSuggests projects in advance. foresee far in advance..-futureprojects must be foreshadowed Par. 27."... Theinitial disposition of theSuggests maneuver project in advance. army should conform to the projected maneuver." Par. 41."... Engagingthe enemy permits theSuggests plan of action depends on engaging army commander to decide on his plan of action,the enemy. Is this a contradiction? Involved, of course, is the general concept of maneuver; in one place, the commander conceives a maneuver far in advance; in another place, he apparently waits until the enemy is engaged. This discrepancy is more apparent than real. Par. 41 represents the local tactical application of the general plan contained in Par. 27.Pars. i and 27 probably fall into the category of strategy and deal with movements prior to battle, while Par. 41 is a function of tactics and pertains, to conduct of battle. However, it can hardly be questioned that maneuver dispositions, under Pars. iand27, will influence tactical action, under Par. 41, to a marked extent; it is not argued that tactical details can be fully decided at a distance from the battle- field but that the maneuver idea (concept) is bound to affect the broad lines of tactical action. This is demonstrable, as a historical fact, in a number of "See Chap. 1, Par. 5 B."Chap.IiPar. S B. Ia Maiuai Jo, Commandn, of I4r, U,,,U. --- Page 72 --- THEORY OF MANEUVER6 examples.15 There is no real conflict in this thought, but, from the viewpoint of command function it marks the line of demarcation between large (corps) and small (division) units; a line has already been drawn between tactical and strate- gical maneuver—one involving concentration of fires, the other displacement of units. Obviously the project (forecast) of maneuver is the special problem and respon- sibility of the commander of large units and is probably a distinguishing mark compared with lesser responsibilities involved in the command of smaller units. JNA?d LDLU .uI' Bernadotte PLATE 40.THEMANEUVER OF EYLAU, 1807 If this distinction could be reduced to a key-word, the slogan for the division (and smaller units) might be "execution" and for the corps (army) "anticipation." Granted that this business of concept of maneuver primarily concerns larger units, interior units in the prescribed zones of action are practically fighting in narrow corridors; however, the moment they are placed on a flank or on independ- ent mission they are compelled to plan ahead and decide on a maneuver procedure. With modern equipment in motorization or mechanization, in which displace. ments of troops are made at high speeds, independent missions may become more and more frequent and speed of decision and maneuver concept will be de- manded of so-called smaller units; there must be a "project of maneuver" regard- less of the size of the unit. 'Chap.IV. Par. 19, EyIau 1807.Castiglione. 1196. Lutzen. 1813. &vo— 0 --- Page 73 --- 64 MANEUVER IN WAR g. THE PRECONCEIVED MANEUVER. History from start to finish shows that passivity of mind is the greatest single military menace; we must make at least a preliminary decision. As an example, the operations of the French Imperial Army against the Rus- sians, in the maneuver of Eylau, 1807, are characteristic of 'the relation between the maneuver idea and its execution. While more recent historical examples are possibly preferable, there will be frequent reference to the Napoleonic period. The stabilized conditions of the World War represent a field comparatively limited in type. Toone primarily interested in the war of movement and the mechanics ofmaneuver, the Napoleonic workmanship is unsurpassed. The great master operated with numbers, fluctuat- ing between 125,000 and250,000, which is approximately the strength of a rein- forced American corps and field army, dealt with in certain of our courses. The march began in January 1807; the final battle took place on 8 February 1807. On the battlefield of Eylau, Napoleon brought about a double envelopment in conjunction with a frontal attack. If you study the general march dispositions of the French with corps abreast, two flank groups, and a central mass, it is easy to see that the underlying idea of maneuver is preconceived from the beginning of the operations, namely: a central column to fix the enemy when found and two wing columns intended to close in on his flanks. It is this maneuver idea that governed all movements of the army. The maneuver was attempted on three separate occasions in distinct localities: first at Bergfried, then at Landsberg and finally at Eylau. As soon as the enemy made a stand, the flank columns began to close in on the probable field of battle. In two instances, the enemy refused to fight or recognized the threatening envelop- ment. The reaction of the enemy, in this historical example, is highly interesting. It may be argued that there is no use in having a preconceived form of maneuver as long as the enemy is able to slip away. This is tantamount to dropping any plan. Furthermore, the problem was solved and a correct procedure formulated by a recognized master of his profession. When the French columns closed in on Bergfried, and later on Landsberg, only to find that the bird had flown the cage, the "sheaf of the corps" was opened and the march resumed in the old formation, with all the tactical possibilities inherent in the initial disposition. One must acknowledge the enormous suppleness of this systemt The maneuver idea is independent of the zone in which it will be effected; whether the battlefield be Bergfried, Landsberg, or Eylau—there would still be a frontal attack aided by two flank attacks. It is the idea only, which was preconceived by Napoleon; its materialization took form later and upon the latest information. It has been demonstrated that the maneuver can be elastic and, up to a certain point, is adaptable to modifications in the situation, introduced by the enemy. As one reflects upon this classical campaign, one has a perfect interpretation of Par. 37,16andcan see that there is no real contradiction in Par. 4 i—one repre- sents the march disposition of the French army, dictated by a maneuver idea; the other the tactical application of the idea on the battle localities of Landsberg, Bergfried, and Eylau, or any other locality on which the Russians might have elected to make a stand. The factor of anticipation, implied in high command, is of sufficient importance to trace it in an additional example: the well-known case of Castiglione. This battle consisted of(a) a frontal combat by Augereau's and Massena's 1ManualfeCommanders of Large Unit,. --- Page 74 --- THEORY OF MANEUVER65 Divisions, to force the enemy to engage all his troops, and (b) an attack in flank by Serrurier's Division, initially kept 22 miles from the battlefield. The battle, in its entirety, was conceived from the beginning. Serrurier's attack was not an inspiration of the moment after having seen the results of the pre- paratory combat; it was decided upon, in advance, and as an indispensable accom- paniment and sequence of the preparatory combat itself. CASTIGL.IONE Thequestion might be asked: When shall one formulate a plan of maneuver? The answer is: The sooner the bettert What made commanders great was the fact that they always had an initial plan and did not rely on improvisations of the moment. There are numerous examples showing the suppleness of dispositions that are based on an initial maneuver idea, instead of a march into the unknown; for example, the situation at Lutzen, i8i. In this situation Napoleon made a decision of extraordinary rapidity, the speed of which was remarked upon by many observers. As soon as his opponent's presence was reported in the vicinity of Pegau, he apparentlydid not even take time to reflect. He dictated his orders without hesitation, and the French Corps promptly changed direction to attack the Prussians in front and flank. IL4SSENA I BORGHETTO IICDOLE PLATE 41.BATTLEOF CASTIGLIONE, g6. --- Page 75 --- o OFRENcH GERMANS MANEUVER IN WAR PLATE 43. MARCH OF THE GERMAN SECOND ARMY ON LE MANS, i8lz. V PLATE a.BATTLEOF LUTZEN, 2813. --- Page 76 --- THEORY OF MANEUVER Does this look like an improvised decision? Are formations of sixcorps changed on the spur of the moment? It was evidently not through chance that these corps were echeloned so that they could face easily to the right. Nor was it by chance that a general direction was maintained in such a way that the enemy remained to the right of the general formation—a detail which is significant because the echelonment of the army would have been of no value had it been necessary to face towards the left instead. As a matter of fact, the French army had been marching in this formation for several days. Napoleon was merely watching for a favorable opportunity. The whole secret of his rapidity lay in anticipation. 20. ADAPTATION OF THE PRECONCEIVED MANEUVER: The campaign of Eylau was selected because the enemy refused to stay put; the preconceived maneuver had to be started all over again. When confronted by an active enemy, there may be considerable difficulty in carrying through a maneuver from start to finish, without making modifications; this consideration can be reduced to simplest terms: either the maneuver can be modified and adapted or not; either the initial plan can be changed or it cannot be changed; then it is abandoned and a new plan is initiated. The procedure in changing or adapting a maneuver is evident in the next historical examples. 2 n FR.SIXTHA1SAY PARIS 5 . 'P..30KM.BRITISH PLATEMARCHOF THE GERMANFIRSTARMY TO THE OURCQ.1914. a.Application to large units. In the advance of the German Second Army on Le Mans, 1871, the initial direc- tions of the German Corps had been: XIII Corps: St. Mars le Briere IX Corps: Ardenay III Corps: Parigny l'Eveque The initial idea of the Germans was a converging maneuver on the area east of Le Mans. In the meantime, the French commander completely evacuated this area and placed himself astride the Huisme River. Consequently, on arrival the Germans had to modify their initial march directions. They opened the sheaf of --- Page 77 --- 68 MANEUVER IN WAR their corps and developed a new and entirely different maneuver: a frontal attack by the two right corps and a flank attack by the left corps. The operation was possible because they had been informed in time and the initial dispositions were flexible; but if the situation had demanded an envelop- ment of the French left wing, this would have been impracticable because the general convergence of the German column was too fully oriented toward the south. These examples of preconceived maneuvers and their modification are merely a prelude to the common sense statement that the commander is not absolutely tied to an initial plan if it has become obviously unsuitable. One of the most spectacular instances of the lightning-like adaptation of a pre- conceived maneuver to a changed tactical situation is found in the operations of the German First Army, in the period of 4-7 September, 1914.17 The relative positions held by the opposing forces on the eve of the Battle of the Marne appear on Plate 44. The German First Army, with corps abreast, was sharply oriented to the south, in roughly parallel columns and had crossed the Grand Morin; its IV Reserve Corps, echeloned to the right rear, was observing against Paris. Early onSeptember, this corps became heavily engaged with the newly formed French Sixth Army, which had debouched from Paris in a serious surprise attack against the German right flank.It became necessary during the night of 5-6 September to rush the II Corps to the support of the hard-pressed IV Reserve Corps. During the following day, the remaining corps were conducted, by forced marches, to the Ourcq; it was impossible to preserve the original order in line; each corps was directed by the shortest route to the most threatening portion of the new front; units became mixed; temporary groupings were resorted to, named after the corps commander on the spot. The march performances in this situation were extraordinary; the IX Corps and the rear elements of the III Corps were shifted from the left wing of the army to the right, passing in rear of the entire new front; the IX Corps started from Esternay, at dawn of the 7th, and by midnight had covered a distance of 38 miles;18 on the next day, the 8th, the two corps were started again at 2:oo A. M. and except for a brief halt at noon covered again a distance of approximately 40 miles; on the morning of 9 September, this corps entered the battle, in a decisive manner, by enveloping Manoury's left wing and forcing it back. The German army commander, von Kiuck, fell a victim to the disillusionment following the first Battle of the Marne, but the maneuver of the Ourcq has the unmistakable touch of genius, the Napoleonic manner: a gigantic stream of supply and troop columns was pouring in a fixed direction; a strategic crisis of the first order stopped this movement and then reversed it; by a remarkable exertion of every intellectual, moral and physical force on the partof staffs and troops, the stream was made to flow again in an orderly fashion;1° in the midst of a highly complicated logistic problem, a new maneuver was conceived and initiated: a new front was created with the II, IV and III Corps along the Ourcq, to stop the French Sixth Army in conjunction with an enveloping attack against the French left by the IX Corps, which was progressing satisfactorily when G.H.Q. suspended the operations. This extraordinary operations replete with every conceivable lesson in the field of tactics and strategy, contains still another element of proof of the peremptory 3?VonKuhi: Movementiand Sapply ofshe German Fir:: Army, August andSeptember. 1914. II VonlUuck: The March en Par,,, Chap.IV. lbComparethis movement with the transfer of the American First Army from the St. Mihiel to the new Argonne frontthese operations are similar in importance, size and logistic achievement; thereis no better proof of the adequacy of the American staff work in 1918. Chap. III. Par. 12. --- Page 78 --- THEORY OF MANEUVER6g quality of the preconceived maneuver: the factors of time andspace, and the bearing they have on the relation of small and large units. Small unitsare manip- ulated with comparative ease; errors can be adjusted or dispositions changedas speedily as the arrival of messengers that carry the order. Large units, however, once set in motion, do not conform readily to later modifications. There must be the fullest realization that any adaptation of means cannot be immediate or instantaneous: the change in plan of the First German Army was formulated as early as the evening of 5 September; it was not until three days later that the tactical dispositions of the IX Corps could become really effective. The maneuver of large Units 1S not a single act; it is an aggregate of individual maneuvers and a succession of efforts.2° The faculty of anticipation, which is expected in the commander of large units, must come into play and may assume the greatest importance. In this precarious situation, the German First Army was confronted with the difficult task of executing a retrograde turning movement, from the old front facing south to a new front facing southwest. Such a movement can be executed in several ways.2' The entire army may be faced to the rear and then execute a left turn; in that solution, the various corps would consequently occupy the new front in reverse order. SOUTH WEST INITIAL ROUTES TRAINS FOLLOWING CORPS I I I I t1'+ I I I I FACE The reversal of more or less compact troop columns is a difficult enough staff problem, in itself;its effect on the stream of trains, ammunition and supply columns, which ordinarily follow the corps routes from depots in the communi- cations zone, will bring on endless logistic complications: the shift can be accomp- lished only by a crossing of columns, with all the friction attending such a move- ment. If a new front were established by means of a flank march, the movement of troops and trains would be simplified, though slower; the army faces to the right See: Chap. 1V Par. 17. "VonKuhi: Movement: Pint Army, chap. 11. Sec. b. + I I I * I I LEFT TURN SOUTH PLATE45. REVERSAL OF CORPS COLUMNS. --- Page 79 --- 70 MANEUVERIN WAR HNEWjOUTES Iv. — 4r- INITIALROUTES DC SOUTH PLATE46.CROSSING OF SUPPLY COLUMNS. ROUTESOF SUPPLY COLUMNS 'HI I 'C I I Vrp< INITIALROUTES I I '1' tflTVIIITX è< 1< I( MARCHES OF THE CORPS PLATE47. THE CORPS IN A FLANK MARCH. --- Page 80 --- THEORY OF MANEUVER71 and then changes direction to the right; the order of corps, in line, will remain the same, the IX Corps still occupying its position on the left flank as before. The initial supply lines and zones of advance can be retained; it is merely necessary to select new routes leading to the right, in the initial relative order. 11<- MARCHES PLANNED SEPT.7 IV( IIt(I— IMARCHES PLANNED SEPT.6 I $ I I I I I iilitIX I I I I PLATE48. A MOVEMENT BY ECHELON. SCALC 1300000 0502030MS. PLATE49. ROUTES OF THE GERMAN FIRST ARMY, 5-8 SEPTEMBER 1914. Thissolution is objectionable because it is time consuming and involves a flank march along the enemy front. A movement, by echelon, pivoting on the initial left unit, represented a com- promise solution and was adopted. --- Page 81 --- MANEUVER IN WAR It was the intention of the army commander on 6 September to conduct the II Corps as far as the region northeast of Meaux, the IV Corps as far as Bout, the III Corps to La Ferte Gaudier, while the IX Corps remained in place, until the echelonment was completed. It was hoped to continue the maneuver on the fol- lowing day, 7 September, have all corps change direction to the west and thus change the echelonment to a new front; as regards trains, it was only necessary to withdraw their columns a sufficient distance to the north, along their original routes, to clear them for the northward movements of the combat troopsand then conform to the westerly movement of their corps. PLATE 50.THE4TH BAVARIAN DIVISION. LONGUEVAL.OCTOBER 1914. Thismaneuver was never executed; events moved too fast. The flank attack from the direction of Paris seriously endangered the IV Reserve Corps; the II Corps was rushed to its assistance during the night 5-6 September; during the following days the remaining corps advanced on the Ourcq by forced marches; it was impossible to preserve the original order in line. The operation of am- munition and supply trains became exceedingly difficult. Army Headquarters was compelled to intervene in corps administrative arrangements and undertook to regulate all movements in daily orders. b. Application to small units.As usual, there are no fundamental differences; the time element is more favorable: in the case of the First Army, corps were fed into the battle area successively at the rate of a corps a day; in the next example, the entry into line by regiments was reckoned by hours only; nevertheless, the shift to a new front, expressed in hours, is never a question of sleight of hand. Units of the 4th Bavarian Division were facing northwest on the line: Long. ueval—Flers; they were completely deployed in shallow, linear formations, in the order: 7th, 5th, gth Infantry and 2d Jaeger.2' Orders for the next morning required a change of front to the southwest, to --- Page 82 --- THEORY OF MANEUVER73 assist in an encircling movement against Montauban.Ordinarily, a turn to the left would have changed the present front into a general march column via Longueval; however, enemy resistance was expected in the vicinity of Montauban and a partial development, in the new direction, was indicated; this required the formation of at least two columns; an order was issued to that effect at 9:50 A. M. Right column: 7th and 5th Inf.,1 Bn. i ith F.A., to assethble east of Longueval and advance on Montauban.Left column: gth Inf. and 2d Jaeger, 2d Bn. sith F.A., to advance via Ginchy (G'y)—Guillemont (G'mt). The order was received at Flers at 10:45 A. .;thedispatch consumed almost an hour, although it was but a distance of 6 kms. A "warning order" dispatched at 9:25bymotor did not arrive until ii: i8 A.M.The reason for this delay was confusion as to the exact location of unit headquarters; this was a combat situ- ation and staffs were in concealment. The right column started out; they received information that the woods "B" northwest of Longueval were held by the French; it was clear that the march on Montauban was practicable only after this threat to the right flank was removed; the regiment changed direction at Longueval and deployed at 1: o P. M. on the northwest edge of Longueval, for attack on woods "B." The left column started out at i i30 A. M. but ran into the 7th Cavalry and was delayed; enemy harassing fire, at that period, forced a cross-country march and it was not until :o i. r. that this column reached Ginchy. The French held Montauban; artillery fire was heavy; Guillemont and Ginchy were in flames; enemy resistance had stiffened. The division commander, knowing the "larger picture," realized that these units were crowding to the south and that the new front, to be effective in the framework of the larger operation, would have to be re-oriented on the line B'n—Longueval. Staff officers, in motors, intercepted the columns; individual battalions and detachments were turned off by the shortest routes toward Longueval. The left column, through its attack on woods "B," had actually cleared space for these movements. However, it was not until 5:oo p. M. that the units were approximately in line, on the new front. The march to the left flank and the development of the 4th Division had consumed 6 to 7 hours, although the road distances varied fromto io kms only. In peace-time maneuver situations, such movements are accomplished in short order and are calculated as involving a much lesser time element. This tendency must be guarded against, in the light of combat experience. The units of this division had fought the day before, after forced marches, and needed reorganization; hostile harassing fires, crossing of units, burning villages and congested roads slowed down the rate of march and the development. Change of attack direction by a deployed division."Militar.Wochenb!att. Sept. 11, 1931. --- Page 83 --- V CENTRAL MANEUVER 21. A SCHEMATIC CLA.ssxuIcATIoN OF MANEUVER. In the progress of investiga- tion, a point is now reached where one can profitably examine the principal types of maneuver. Upon examination it will be found that these types are clearly derived from the initial basic factors of combination of directions, rela- tive distribution of forces, and a maneuver idea, which controls the initial die. position or grouping of forces. "Attack" is obviously the culminating point of maneuver, the final act in a drama based on maneuver, the tactical expression of the maneuver idea. The embryo of attack stirring uneasily in the march formations of the Imperial Army was shown in the advance on Eylau. The terms "penetration, envelopment, turn- ing movement," ordinarily found in official texts, describe the act, as a form of execution. To penetrate—where? To envelop—what flank? There is an amplifying terminology possible that is not based on a description of the act, but rather on its location, on the vast battle fronts of modern armies; and that is a classification as flank maneuvers, on a flank or wing, and central maneuvers, in the center of the general dispositions. Under these headings, there are additional subdivisions of maneuver forms that have appeared on a thousand battlefields and in a thou. sand texts. _______FLANt MANEUVER I.Converging Attack 2.Close-in Envelopment 3.WideEnvelopment & ________________________________Holding Attack 4.FlankAttack CENTRAL MANEUVER I.Operation on Interior Lines 2.Penetration. (Break-through) ________________________________. Dislocation.(Fragtnentation ________of the front) PLATE51.SCHEMATICCHART: TYPES OF MANEUVER. At the outset, it should be noted that this text does not primarily seek to establish the superiority of one form or another. This is simply an endeavor to recognize the properties of each and to note their conditions of execution. However, flank maneuvers will eventually emerge as the most important maneu- ver form. F. S. R.. Par. 435:The decisiveresults following successful action on the enemys eank favor adoption of theenvelopiagform of attack whenever practicable. 74 —.----- . --- Page 84 --- CENTRAL MANEUVER75 As you reflect on the schematic diagram, itis apparent that each type of maneuver requires special preparatory dispositions. For a converging attack, for instance, the units will have to be placed abreast and widely spaced at the start, or they will collide rather than converge. A point involved in spacing them is whether they converge in front or in rear of a hostile area. For a close-in envelopment, the initial disposition involves a line approximately equal in extent to that of the enemy and the location of reserves in rear of the flank which is to be enveloped. 2 Fora wide envelopment, or turning movement,3 the enveloping mass must be detached rather early, in order to gain the necessary distance in an attack direction which completely clears the hostile flank. Certain preliminary conditions appear as a characteristic of alltypes of maneuver. This is just another angle to a general problem—a final argument, for the prearranged maneuver, which finds early expression in initial march formations. The dose relation between initial dispositions and the subsequent maneuver has one glaring disadvantage, however—the preliminary disposition may reveal the projected maneuver. The enemy may recognize it by deduction. This is in- creasingly more important, as the efficiency of aerial reconnaissance has enor- mously increased. The air service is here to stay; it cannot possibly be excluded from any future strategical maneuver. Apart from night marches, practically the only parry against the menace of aerial observation and the loss of surprise, consists in maintaining what might be termed an amorphous disposition—shapeless, not crystallized, but capable of rapid transformation at the last moment. Numerous examples of this sort can be found in military history, particularly in the Napoleonic campaigns; of course, they are not useful in their archaic form, but they suggest the direction in which a modern solution may be sought. 22. OPERATION ON INTERIOR LINES. This maneuver was frequently resorted to in the past; the Napoleonic campaigns of 1796, 1813 and 1814 are examples. Hindenburg used it in Poland in 1914 and 1915.Thesystem presupposes that thç enemy is dispersed in groups which are too far separated to be able to par- ticipate in the same action; the idea is to defeat the enemy in detail, containing one fraction with a detachment while faIling upon the other with the bulk of one's forces; this is merely an application of the old principle of economy of force. The Austrians, under Beauiieu, and the Sardinians, under Colli, faced the French along the Appenines. Napoleon concentrated mass in the gap between the Miles. He first attacked the Austrians at Montenotte, driving them from their positions; the gap widened. Containing the Austrians with a detached force, Napoleon immediately turned against the Sardinians and defeated them at Millessimo; the gap widened still more. The subsequent operations were characteristic, maneuvers oninterior lines, with Bonaparte reinforcing one or the other wing to create a local superiority. The apparent simplicity of the procedure may give one a false idea that it is IAnenvelopment is effected by an extension of an attacking wing during the course of battle through the use of reserves. P. S. R., Par. 433:According to the situation the decisive or main attack aims to envelop or turn a hostile flank. S.R.. Par. 438: When the enemy takes up a defensive position, the commander of the opposing forces always considers the possibility of turning the hostile position. 'See Chap. VI. --- Page 85 --- 76 MANEUVER IN WAR easylGreatstrength of soul and character are necessary to play such a desperate game.Thecampaign of Tannenberg is a brilliant modern example of themaneu- ver on interior lines. First phase: Note the initial basic conditions profitable. which make such a maneuver PLATE 52. THE CAMPAIGN OF ITALY, 1796. a.The enemy is divided into two masses: one fragment cannot immediately support the other. Ii. The separation is brought about by a terrain feature: a chain of lakes. c. One fraction of the enemy is contained by detached forces, in a preliminary action. d. Rapid concentration of mass is effected against the remaining fraction. e. Its defeat is accomplished by a converging attack: a double envelopment. Second phase: Note the immediate regrouping of the German forces for an attack on the initial enemy fraction with a view to defeating it in turn. It is possible, however, that the dispersion of the enemy takes place in the course of battle and may lead to isolating a part of the enemy forces; the pro- cedure against this fraction is then analogous to an operation on interior lines. French military thought appears to be much impressed with this type of action and has given it a special name, "action of dislocation." 94p KM. ep GLF OF GENOA I --- Page 86 --- CENTRAL MANEUVER77 23. DISLOCATION: FRAGMENTATION OF THE FRONT. The French terminology means nothing more or less than "exploiting a gap in the line." Everyrecent war contains examples of fragmentation of the enemy's front and opportunities for exploiting it by maneuver. 1STPHASE PLATE 53. TANNENBER.G, AUGUST 1g14:FIRSTAND SECOND PHASES. a. The Russo-Japanese War, 1904. Two days after the launching of the Japanese counteroffensive in the morning of iOctober, the Russian line was "dislocated" into three groups, echeloned on a front of approximately o miles. The Japanese. however, did not profit by this situation since they had already oriented their principal maneuver against the Russian right wing. b. The World War, 1914. A more aggressive enemy took prompt advantage of a similar situation, on 22 August 1914,inthe Battle of the Ardennes. The RUSSIANS GERMANS p".'•_ M --- Page 87 --- 78 MANEUVER IN WAR French Fourth Army was advancing on a front of about 40 miles. Note the general dispositions of the corps, divisions and brigades in echelon, from north. west to southeast; each column, echeloned to the rear, was expected to protect the flank of the preceding column; due to delays in marching, numerous gaps developed and the east flank of certain columns became uncovered and exposed. The terrain was unfavorable; parallel bands of wooded zones extended, in gen- eral, across the direction of advance of the French, while the advance of the PLATE M. THE BATTLE OF THE SHA-HO, igo. Germans,from east to west, was made in clearings; the routes of the French became virtual defiles in the forest. Liaison with neighboring units was practi- cally impossible; this led to isolated actions; divisions and even brigades had to fight as if in separate compartments; the result was a series of isolated combats and defeat in detail. Certain conditions seem to be present in all instances—extended fronts and compartmented terrain. These are the same conditions that are prerequisites for the maneuver on interior lines. In the Wars of i866 and 1870, generally opposite circumstances were present. French and Austrians fought on comparatively narrow fronts and fought de- fensively. Maneuver against the center was not indicated; one can understand why the Germans preferred flank manuevers. The French professional regard for the tactical possibilities of "dislocation" is probably traceable to the dark days of August 1914whentheir first successes along the Marne were due primarily to the exploitation of gaps in the line. This situation and the march of the German First Army to the Ourcq have been covered in preceding paragraphs. 6SeeChap. IV,Par.1$.Plates44 to O. o 25 OJAPANESE --- Page 88 --- CENTRAL MANEUVER79 The withdrawal of the German Ill and IX Corps tosupport von Kiuck in the battle of the Ourcq, had created a wide gap between the First and Second Armies; von Kiuck's Army was split, one section facing west and heavily engaged with the French, the other attached to the right wing of von Bulow's Second Army and facing south. The British Expeditionary Force and the French Fifth Army began toenter this gap; they had in front of them only Marwitz's cavalry fighting delaying actions on a wide front. ° On this same front, there is another example of the exploitation of a gap in the line: von Kiuck's movements had been pulling von Bulow more and more to the west; on g September, this displacement resulted in a gap between La Fere Champenoise and the marshes of St. Gond; Foch recognized this gap and drew in his last division. 8 24. THE PENETRATION, a. General considerations. Military literature and official doctrine agree, perhaps reluctantly, to acknowledge and accept penetra- tion as a form of attack. • The withdrawal of von Kiuck's Corps and the resulting gap were having a bad effect on von Bulow. Bulovwas a martinet, of some ability, who had established a reputation in the conduct of peace maneuvers; battle-fieldconditions and irregularities confused him; the gap,which vonKluckcreatedwith a gambler's nonchalance (which is also a distinguishing mark of great commanders) worried von Bulow, and maneuver rulings would cer-tainly have called for a withdrawal.See Chap. III. Par. 3, Plate 32. $Thisoperation, while a typical situation of "dislocation."is made to appear in French accounts as theprincipal reason for the German withdrawal; the order for withdrawal was issued three hours before the 42dDivisIon started and was well under way before the advance of the French began to be felt. • P. S. R., Par. 433: '..-Accordingto the situation, the main attack aims to envelop or turn a hostile flank or to penetrate the hostile front." P. S. It.. Par. 436:"..- Whenthe situation does not favor an enveloping attack, the attack is directed to a penetration of the hostile front." PLATE 55. THE BATTLE OF THE ARDENNES. i. --- Page 89 --- MANEUVER IN WAR 'P z0 Uzw a: 'I) z a: w I vi) I- a: m .2 U --- Page 90 --- CENTRAL MANEUVER8i Through its World War experience on stabilized fronts, thepresent generation should be expert in "penetration"—a frontal attack leading toa breakthrough. It was found that a penetration is not in itself a decisive act; in the evolution of combat, it belongs to the preparatory phase. In the wars of the ancients, the Greek phalanx and the Roman legion, com- posed of infantry, conducted what was a frontal attack pure and simple. The decision, if any, was invariably brought on by cavalry actions on the flanks. With the advent of firearms and more supple formations, such as the division, infantry was able to extend its former simple action of frontal attack to include maneuver in a combination of directions. Napoleon used this supple instrument to the limit of its capacities. It is sig- nificant that the majority of his maneuvers were flank maneuvers. He did not hesitate to attempt an occasional breakthrough, but he found it to be an expen- sive undertaking. At Lutzen, he lost 3o,ooo men or as much as his enemies, but he could afford it less; at Waterloo, d'Erlon's Corps sufferedper cent losses in less than an hour. In the American Civil War our experience was very similar. Just prior to the World War, the French and Germans held divergent views on the value of penetration. The French Regulations on the Conduct of Large Units, 1913,statedthat "frontal attacks, leading to a tactical break-through, may lead to a decisive success." The German school of thought, however, was not in favor of frontal attacks with a view to a penetration. This school was thoroughly indoctrinated with the views of Count Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff from 1891 to 1905.Schlieffensaid, in substance: "Frontal attack is indecisive, since it merely drives the enemy to a new position...anew operation must be started. This may be all right if you have plenty of time—but not when you are counting minutes.donot attack frontally; the thing to do is to crush the enemy's flanks." Count Schlieffen was not blind to certain possibilities of penetration.In a staff ride, he had occasion to remark: "Everybody wants to envelop—conse- quently, everybody extends their flanks. And so it goes on—until you are stretched to the limit—overextended. Then you think of a penetration. But where, at what point? Nowadays, there won't be any high point, from which the commander can observe the battle in its entirety and personally discover the weak spot in the enemy's lines." Impressed with his views, the German armies of 1914reliedon flank maneu- vers and attempted no penetration, except when the fluctuation of battle prac- tically forced them to it, as was the situation of the German First Army in the first battle of the Marne in 1914. Inthe paralysis of stabilized warfare, 1915to1917,thepenetration became highly developed as the only remaining form of the attack and was practiced by all opponents; the following operations are characteristic American types. b. The regiment in penetration: Cantigny, 28 May 1918. Cantigny formed the apex of the German salient toward Amiens and was on the natural approach to cut the Amiens—Compiegne railroad. The sector was well organized and particularly strong in artillery support. The town contained numerous and strong machine-gun positions. Full advantage had been taken of the ruins, cellars, etc., to improve the defense. It was held, at the time, by the 8ad German Reserve Division (271st and 272d Reserve Regiments). '° --- Page 91 --- MANEUVER IN WAR The 28th U. S. Infantry, Colonel H. E. Ely commanding, was designated to make the attack. As a concession to the psychological importance of this opera. tion, extraordinary preparations were made to insure success. The attack was rehearsed in the rear areas, near Maisoncelle and St. Eusoye; the departure trenches were laid out and the town with its various important defenses patterned on the ground, in order to familiarize the command with distances and locations. The officers studied a relief map of the terrain around Cantigny, on a large sand PLATE 57. THE CAPTURE OP CANTIGNY, 28 MAY 1918. table, and recent oblique and direct airplane photographs and a sketch showing the location of important cellars, dugouts, and shelters were issued to include platoon commanders." The plans for the attack were drawn by the American staff. So thorough were 10Hi:o?y of Pjrg Divi,ion, pp. 77-78.UMajor 3.V. Ware,Zofantry.Hitoric,l Monograph.Infantry School.fluofficer wa in command Cl o.H, 28th Infantry during the attack. --- Page 92 --- CENTRAL MANEUVER8 the plans and orders issued that when submitted to the French corps commander for approval, no changes were found necessary. 12 The formation of the regiment for the attack was with three battalions abreast, each battalion with three companies in line and one in reserve; one machine- gun company had been attached to each battalion. A section of flame-throwers, a group of 12 Schneider tanks, aviation, and certain artillery units were furnished by the French; the artillery support for the attack was markedly strong: 22 batteries -mm. guns, six of i 55-mms., 178 heavy guns and howitzers, and40 trench mortars, in addition to the organic divisional artillery. After one hour of artillery preparation the attack was launched at 6:45 A. M., 28 May, under cover of a rolling barrage which advanced at the rate of 24 minutes per hundred meters. The advance was made with the precision of a peace- time maneuver. The American infantry followed so close behind the barrage and supporting tanks that the enemy had no time to emerge from his shelters and was either killed or surrendered in considerable numbers. The objective was reached by 7:20 A. M. and the work of consolidation begun immediately. The reaction of the Germans against the American troops was extremely violent. Counterattacks were launched on the 28th, 2gth and oth, but were repulsed. The sudden with- drawal of the French supporting artillery, for service against the German drive of 28 May, enabled the stronger German artillery to concentrate a merciless fire on the new American position; most of the American losses occurred during that period. After o May, the fire gradually decreased and the sector became corn- partively quiet. The 28th Infantry was relieved by the i6th Infantry (i June). The losses incurred amounted to 4 officers and 1,022 men. The facile demonstration at Cantigny greatly impressed the French; 1 there- after the Allies accepted the fact that the Americans could be depended upon. ' c. The Division in penetration: Soissons, 18 July 1918. The position of the Germans in the Marne salient was inherently weak; it was out of the question to supply the large number of divisions in the salient for any length of time. The chief reliance was of necessity upon motor vehicles, and the supply of gasoline was limited. As early as June 6, General Pershing suggested to Marshal Pétain that "a blow at the enemy's line south of Soissons, if successful, would compel him to retire. I was very eager that our troops should be allowed to undertake such an attack." 15 During the engagement along the Somme, Marshal Foch ordered preliminary 'Theresponsible staff officers,for this period: Colonel Campbell King, Chief of Staff, and Colonel Geo. C. MarshallAsat. C. of S.. G.3. 11deCfsambrun, p.142:'Citation a l'ordre de notre lere 4rmée a Ia suite de lopération de Cantigny. Regiment anime' d'un maniflque esprit de l'offensive.Le 28 Ma, 1918. sous lea ordres du Colonel H. E. Elys'est lance avec un allant irresistible a lattaque d'un village forteinent organize.A atteint tous ses objectifs et a conserve Ic terrain conquis malgré des contre-attaques rCpêtéea."1Pershing"My Experiences" Vol. II, Chap. 30. p. 60:"It was a matter of pride to the whole A.E.F. thatthe troops of the 1st Div., in their first battle, and in the unusually trying situation that followed, displayedthe fortitude and courage of veterans, held their gains and denied to the enemy the slightest advantage." v. Giehrl, pp. 23.24:"In this phase of the War the Americsn troops furnished decisive assistance, to the Entente, which had ex- hausteditsstrength.If the lrench and British had been limited to their own resources, the Germans wouldprobably have been able to finish them; at any rate, mutual exhaustion would have led to mutual concessions. But in this critical hour, the Entente received powerful aid. p.24.The impression which the Germans gained of Americans, in these early engagements, was entirely avoue tactical training of the American infantry appeared deficient, and the American soldier was awkward and very careless.The artillery appeared more efficient and had the habit, to systematically search the battle field.But the physical condition of the men, equipment, and supply appeared to us extraordinary, and the perU sonal bravery and initiative of certain individuals very great.The Americans were always engaged in small.offensive operations to harass and fatigue our weary troops, and stopped at nothing to gain their objectives.The Americans made a profound impression on the German soldier; this waa due to the nervous exhaustion of ourtroops. fatigued by the excessive demands of the recent major offensives.The military significance of the support of the Americans was not only based upon their mass, but more especially on their nervous resistance.These troops were characterizd by absolute fitness, a physical and psychic superiority, combined with indifference to danger, probably based on inexperience.ii Pershing."Experiences." Vol. II, Chap. 32. p. 92. --- Page 93 --- 84 MANEUVER IN WAR concentrations in the region of Villers-Cotteret; the 4th and 28th U. S. Divisions, en route from the British front, were diverted to this point; the 2d, 3d, 26th and 42d were in that area, a force equivalent to 12 French divisions. To the XXCorps was allotted the critical part of the attack, to outflank the northeastern edge of the Foret de Retz, capture Chaudun and Vierzy, secure the plateau northeast of Hartennes and hold the southern outlet of the Ravine de Crise. The attack of the corps was made with divisions abreast—ist U. S., 1st Moroccan Division and 2d U. S. Division, in the order from north to south; the axis of attack was through Dommiers—Chaudun—Villemontoire. Marshal Foch approved the plan on 13 July. In order to insure secrecy, the concentration was to be completed in four days and the attack launched on the i8th. The 1st U. S. Division. The ist Division was assigned to the XX Corps on i July, while in vicinity of Dammartin; it was entrucked and in position behind its zone of action on the 17th. The night march, to the line of departure, was made under extraordinary difficulties; a violent rainstorm turned the trails into a quagmire; the men were constantly slipping and falling into shell holes; the congestion toward the front was terrific—tanks, trucks, artillery intermingled with the exhausted soldiers. 16 The rolling barrage started at 4:35 A. M. The divi- sion advanced with regiments abreast, regiments in column of battalions, in the order: 28th, 26th, i6th and i8th Infantry, from north to south, with the i5d French Division on the left, and the Moroccans on the right. The divisional artil- lery was reinforced by French guns, and supported by 48 French tanks, on a front of about 2,000 meters. 18 July. There was no artillery preparation; the Germans were taken by surprise. The first objective was reached about 5:30 A. M. and by 7:oo A. M.the 1st Brigade had seized part of the second objective. The German resistance began to stiffen; the wheat fields were dotted with machine guns, which were operated with reckless courage. The 2d Brigade was unable to advance, since the i53d 1MajorC. R. Huebner. Infants7.Historical Monograph.This officer, as Battalion conander, participatedwith distinction in this entire operation. Istand 2nd. Divisions JuJy I822,I9l8 Front Unes-— PLATE 58. THE ATTACK OF THE iST AND 2D U. S. DIVISIONS, 18-22 JULY igi8. --- Page 94 --- CENTRAL MANEUVER85 French Division, on itsleft, made slow progress. The Missy-aux-Bois ravine proved to be a formidable obstacle. After desperate fighting the eastern slope of the ravine was finally reached about 10:30 A. M. Thereafter the advance was everywhere contested fiercely; the curious cave formation, in this vicinity, en- abled enemy detachments to emerge and fire at the Americans from behind and slow down the attack. Such an incident took place in the sector of the 28th In- fantry, which received fire from the vicinity of Mont d'Arcy; eventually 20 officers and several hundred men were taken from this cave. The left brigade was unable to reach its objective. In spite of this local check, the day had been successful; approximately 2,000 prisoners were taken and several batteries of artillery. At dark, the front line extended along the Missy Ravine, past Missy, to the final objective, one kilometer farther to the east and linked up with the Moroccans at Chaudun. 19 July. At 4:00 A. M., the next day, the attack was continued. The Germans had not been idle during the night; originally only one division, the 42d, had opposed the 1st U. S., during the day three other divisions, thei ith Bavarian, 34th and 28th Divisions were identified. The advance to the Paris—Soissons road was very costly. Violent machine-gun and artillery fire from Ploisy stopped the 2d Brigade, after advancing less than one kilometer from the Missy Ravine. The 1st Brigade also suffered heavy casualties and barely reached the ravine at Chazelle. After reorganization, late in the afternoon, at 5:3o P. M., the division was able to renew the assault and reach the western edge of the Ploisy Ravine. Severe hand-to-hand fighting continued throughout the night; the farm of Mt. de Courmelles was captured, lost and recaptured, 17andthe fighting in the village of Ploisy was desperate. Casualties probably numbered 3,000, but the enemy losses were equally appalling and 35 officers and i,ooo men were captured; 20 field guns were taken at Ploisy and Chazelle. 20 July. The advance of the i53d French Division, as noted, had not kept pace with the 1st Division on the i8th or i9th. The strong point of Berzy-le-Sec was originally in the zone of action of this division. Orders for the 20th assigned Berzy to the 1st U. S. Division. After reorganization, during the night, the divi- sion renewed the attack on the 20th, but failed to take Berzy-le-Sec or to reach the Chateau-Thierry road. The 2d Brigade suffered serious casualties; the 1st Brigade, however, in conjunction with the Moroccans reached the vicinity of Bois Gerard, Visigneux, and Aconin Farm. The i53d French Division, on the left, and the Moroccan Division, on the right, were relieved by the 69th and 87th Divisions. The 2d U. S. Division was relieved by the French 58th Colonial Division. The 1st Division remained still on the line—the only one of the divi- sions that began the assault to remain unaided. 21 July. Berzy-le-Sec was the key point of the defense of the Chateau-Thierry— Soissons railroad; it was held by remnants of the German 6th, 34th, 42d and iith Bavarian Divisions and was reinforced during the night by the 46th German Division. With the brigade commander and his staff in the first wave, the feeble echelons moved to the attack.(Brig. Gen. B. B. Buck.) The 1st Brigade attacked at 4:45 AM, under cover of a rolling barrage,and reached the objectives on the height north of Buzancy; the 2d Brigade delayed its departure because the 69th French Division required an artillery preparation of three hours.18 The advance was made at 8:o and proved most successful; by 9:15 AM, Berzy.le.Sec was in American hands, with important captures in men and materiel. At nightfall, the line ran — 17 SoissonsMonograph.Book 3. p.16. 18SoissonsMonograph.Book 3. p. 18. --- Page 95 --- MANEUVER IN WAR from east of Berzy-le-Sec to the Chateau.Thierry road, south of the Sucrerie, to north of Visigneux. That night the exhausted division heard news of impending relief by the i5th Scottish Division. 22 July. As the 87th French Division had failed to take Buzancy no further progress was practicable; the day was devoted to organizing the defensive line; the 26th Infantry took the Sucrerie and filled a gap between the ist Brigade and the 28th Infantry. During the night 22-23 July, the division was relieved; about noon 23 July, trucks moved the remnants of the division to the Dammartin-en Coele area. The heroic endurance of this division during five days of bitter fighting must be considered as a remarkable performance; none but the best disciplined and seasoned troops could have preserved their cohesion under the losses sustained. All reserves were employed early on 21 July. It became necessary to use Engineers and form fresh reserves from elements of the trains and newly arrived replace. ments. The casualties of the division amounted to 285 officers and 7,655 men killed, wounded or missing. They included 75 per cent of the infantry field officers and 6o per cent of company officers. On 20 July, the 26th Infantry was commanded by a captain of less than two years' service.'9 However, this gallant unit had ac- complished its mission. The road and railroad south from Soissons was cut. The German retreat from the Marne pocket was begun in haste. The division had advanced ii kilometers, against five enemy divisions; it had captured 125 officers, 3,375 men, 75 artillery field pieces, 300 machine guns, 2,500 rifles and large qualities of small arms and artillery ammunition.2° d. Smaller units in penetration. What about smaller units: the battalion, the company and platoon? What is their role in penetration? In the attack on Cantigny,2' there is a pattern of parallel boundaries, nine companies of a single regiment fighting in corridors toward a limited objective. At Soissons there was a front of four regiments abreast, battalion with two com- panies abreast, and each regiment in column of battalions: a modern phalanx— 2900 yards wide and several hundred yards deep.22 An observer at Chaudun, in the zone of advance of the Moroccan Division, had a glimpse of this phalanx on the move: "It was in the early afternoon of July 20th, a hot sunny day, that the first movement of our infantry, looking to an attack on Berzy-le-Sec, was revealed. The ii History of ibe lit Divirion, 1922.'Every battalion commanderinthefourinfantryregiments wisa casualty, and the 26th Infantry was commanded by a Captain of less than 2 years service."(Captain B&rnwell R. Legge. of South Carolina.)p. 138.de Chambrun, p. 142.In recognition of the participation of the II American Corps, the Commander ofthe French Third Army issued the following order.G. 0. 218—July 30, 1918:"Shoulder to shoulder with your French comrades you were thrown into the counter-offensive battle.You rushed into the fight as into a fete.Your msgniflcent courage completely routed a surprised enemyand your indomitable tenacity checked the counterattacks of his fresh divisions.91 guns, 7.200 prisoners, immense booty, 10 kilometers of country reconquered; thisis your portion of the spoil of victory. To attack him is to vanquish him.American comrades. I am grateful to you for the blood so generouslyspilled on the soil of my country.Mangin," v. Giehrl."Am. Exp. Korps."p.33-34: "The principle assault echelons which debauched from the Forest of Villers-Cotterets were formed by the 1st and 2d American Divisions, with the Moroccan Division.The American troops carried the main burden of the attack. When the Germans withdrew behind the Aisne, the American troops could claim a major share ofin this success."Pershing."Experiences."Vol. II. Chap. 37, p. 161."Our 1st and 2d Divisions, with the Moroccan Division between them, had struck the decisive blow that turned the tide of War.Petain said,it could not have been done without our Divisions.' Hindenburg. pp. 348-349:"Part of our troops, not required for defense, start harvesting in the wheatfields.They are surprised by asudden gust of shells.Before they realize the situation, tanks appear in the high wheat.Our forward positions are pierced; the greatest danger threatens between the Ourcq and Sosssons.Shattered remnants of our frontlines put up a desperate resistance.Their heroism saved us from a catastrophe.The enemy has succeeded inpenetrating our most sensitive area—the shoulder of the Marne salient, in the direction of Soissons.His pressure affects our only railroad line."See Chap. II, Par. 8, Plate 27.See Chap. III, Plate 36. --- Page 96 --- CENTRAL MANEUVER ground along the Paris-Soissons road, until then occupied only bysome of our batteries and now deserted, save for their personnel, suddenly became alive with men. Under the torn boughs of the poplars and marching toward the southeast appeared a strong force of infantry. The composition of this force was not known to the observer and he was not aware of the impending attack. Field glasses were leveled in its direction to discover its identity. Meanwhile, more of the infantry appeared and it was seen that the men were in attack formation, except that they were moving by the flank. Their pace was slow and impressive—about that at which a barrage rolls. The faces of the infantry, in the shadow of the steel helmets, appeared black, and a French officer exclaimed, 'They are the tirailleurs!', referring to the Algerian regiment of the Moroccan Division on the right of the ist Division. But further inspection showed they were not tirailleurs. They were the remnants of available reserves of the 1st Division after three days of terrific battle. On the breast of each man was the unmistakable box respirator, and the broad American bayonets flashed in the hot July sun. The wide column slowly wound down the grassy ravine toward the Crise. It was probably somewhat over a kilometer in length and three hundred meters wide. "Our leading waves now appeared approaching the crest of the ridge above Berzy-le-Sec, following the barrage. Each individual soldier in the attack was distinctly visible against the grassy hillsides. The whole mass was proceeding with the utmost regularity and precision. As the leading elements reached the crest of the ridge, a single battery of enemy 150-mm. howitzers opened fire with time shell, obviously with observed fire on the target. This battery was followed almost at once by many other batteries of 150-mm. and 105-mm. howitzers, all firing time shell. The accuracy of preparation of this fire was such that practically no adjust. ment was required, and, almost immediately, our infantry was shrouded in smoke and dust. Great gaps were left in the ranks as the shells crashed among them. Nevertheless, the advance continued in the most orderly way. It was noticed that the enemy's artillery diminished its range as our infantry advanced. "Many of our infantry passed out of sight over the ridge, accompanied by the devastating fire of the enemy's artillery. Men struck by the enemy's fire either disappeared or ran aimlessly about and toppled over. "Then began to be heard also the rattle of the enemy's machine guns. The attack had met the resistance of a strong position occupied in great force by the enemy. It could not be taken at this time by our worn soldiers, and, after this advance, they could go no farther. The thin lines lay down in shell holes, while long files of wounded hobbled painfully back. "Then appeared a sight which at first seemed inexplicable. Individual men and groups of twos and threes began to wander about all overthe field. They were the unit leaders, reorganizing their groups against counterattack. "Thus the afternoon passed and night fell."28 When boundaries are fixed, as they were then and now, the smaller unit goes forward to fight; as an interior unit it would appear that there will be little op- portunity for Napoleonic concepts and planning, except to carry fire forward; that is particularly true of the attack on fortified positions. And yet, once out into the opening, the hostile shell pierced and elbow room available, maneuver possi- bilities present themselves in all echelons. Note the action of the o6th U. S. Infantry in an envelopment against St. Juvin, 14 October 1918, and that of Company C, iod U.S. Infantry in the attack on Hill 190, 20 July 1918.24 A number •Hiaory of theFin! Pivisie's. Chap.I, Pu. Sc,Plates18and 20. --- Page 97 --- 88 MANEUVER IN WAR of very interesting situations developed in the zone of action of one of the regi- ments at Soissons, the 28th U. S. Infantry:25 (i) The capture of St. Amand Farm. The assault companies moved forward to the attack at : 35 AM and soon closed on the barrage. By : o the 3d Battalion reached the first objective, the road running northeast from Dommiers. The assault companies continued their advance, following the barrage closely, until they reached a position about 200 meters west of the Raperie and the enemy's line of resistance. At this point, they met with heavy rifle and machine-gun fire, most of it coming from St. Amand Farm, which pinned them to the ground. On account of the level ground, the support platoons of both companies were forced to take cover from the enemy fire being directed at the assault lines. Something had to be done quickly to relieve this situation, as the barrage would stop only 15minutesin front of the first objective. The support companies were not within supporting distance at this time, and the only unit which was available for maneuver was the scout platoon of the battalion. This platoon was composed of one lieutenant and 35 enlisted men. The men were all expert shots and had been selected on account of their good shooting ability and former bravery in action. The scout lieutenant was ordered to attack the Raperie with his platoon. Two squads of the platoon opened fire on it from the front, and the other two squads were maneuvered to a position on the flank from which enfilade fire could be delivered on it. As soon as fire was opened by the squads on the left flank, the two in front, led by the lieutenant, charged the enemy. One platoon of Company H, led by its lieutenant, joined this charge. Both lieutenants were severely wounded as they were about to close with the enemy, but the men, inspired by their leaders, continued the charge and succeeded in capturing the position. Five heavy machine guns and about ioo prisoners were captured in and around this strong point. The enemy's casualties had been very heavy on account of the accurate shooting of our men. The capture of the strong point lessened the fire on our assault companies, and the advance was continued, the men firing from the shoulder as they moved forward in the high wheat. (2) The Caves of Mont d'Arly. The 3d Battalion then took over the front line of the regiment at about 4:oo i'. M. The 2d Battalion went into a support position on the eastern edge of the Missy.aux-Bois Ravine, just east of Breuil. While the fighting was going on in the Missy.aux-Bois Ravine, it was discovered that great numbers of the enemy were emerging from a large cave in the vicinity of le Mont d'Arly and that they were firing on our troops from the rear. This cave had not been captured by the troops that had previously attacked and captured le Mont d'Arly. The reserve company, which had been left on the western edge of the Missy-aux-Bois Ravine, attacked the enemy at once and took them on the flank. The Germans were driven back in the cave, and they refused to surrender. It was impossible to bomb them out as the entrance was covered with machine guns from within. This made it necessary to lay siege to the entrance. The com- mander of the enemy garrison held out until about 4:oo p. M., when he came out under cover of a white flag and surrendered his entire force, consisting of twenty officers, including a commandant, and between three and four hundred men. Several horses, officers' mounts fully equipped, a great number of machine guns and trench mortars were also captured in this cave. ()Saconin-et-Breuil.The Missy Ravine presented a serious obstacle—deep, with a marshy bottom and about goo yards wide; the strong defensive possibilities Lt. Col. Clarence R. Hueboer.Personal experience report.This officer commanded the 2d Bn. 28th lot.. in this action, with conspicuous gallantxy. --- Page 98 --- CENTRAL MANEUVER89 are obvious; the area was studded with enemy field guns and machine guns. Five of the French accompanying tanks were disabled by direct fire of-mm. gunslocated in the ravine. When the Americans reached the bottom of the ravine, they were stopped by direct enfilading fire from Breuil. Major Huebner directed Companies G and H on Breuil, along the east slope of the ravine; these units soon came under heavy fire from le Mont d'ArIy and slowed down; casualties amounted to 50 per cent. Major Tack, the commander of the 3d Battalion, in rear, realized the gravity of the situation and brought his fresh units into the action. ()Berzy-le-Sec.On the fourth day of the attack, 21 July, the shattered remnants of the gallant 28th Infantry made their last and successful attack on Berzy-le.Sec. The regiment was disposed with the 1st and 2d Battalions, in line; the 8d Battalion in support; a sadly depleted battalion of the i8th Infantry took its place, in line with the 2d Battalion. The regiment resorted to maneuver in a double envelopment: at 8:3o A.M. the first battalion moved around the north of the town, the second around the south; the Germans evacuated the position. Our most reliable authority very wisely remarks: "...asharp distinction between the various classes of offensive situations and the methods employed cannot always be made. Each class may temporarily present aspects which are characteristic of the others." This very conservative observation applies to the transition from penetration to break through—they are two of a kind: the difference is one of relative size, importance and intensity. Cantigny27 represents a penetration while Meggido28 is a breakthrough. Finally, military terminology2a is by no means as clear-cut as the profession fondly believes it to be: penetration is a preparatory action that may (or may not) lead to a breakthrough 25. THE BREAKTHROUGH, a. General considerations. Principles. The opening phases of the World War, in the period August-September 1914,arecharacteristic of a war of movement. The hectic character of these engagements presents a sharp contrast with the sudden paralysis that fell over these fronts in the years from 1915 to 1918—a period known as "stabilization." It seemed scarcely possible that an extended front such as this could ever have developed in the short space of time between August and November 1914.In these days of motorization and mechanization, with "speed, mobility, maneuver" as key-words, it seems equally impossible that these lines should have become stationary. How did this come about? The enormous staying power of automatic defensive weapons, combined with field fortifications, made the frontal attack expensive. This lesson might have been observed in all previous wars, particularly our own Civil War. The strategic and tactical solution to be attempted was a foregone conclusion: the envelopment, the flank maneuver, the turning movement. Each opponent tried it. There began a series of attempts to envelop the enemy, who, in turn, extended his flanks, to meet and check this threat—on the Oise, Picardy, the Artois, and Flanders. The only limits to this endless extension seemed an exhaustion in man power or an insurmountable natural obstacle—the sea. Both elements came into play, NF.S. R.. Par. 440."Chap. II. Plate 27. NChap.II, Plate 25.• As a characteristic example of military ambiguity, note the termcorps,i.e.,army corps, dental corps., esprit de corps. corps-troops, engineer corps, corps of oicers, etc. --- Page 100 --- CENTRAL MANEUVER9' •2 0. •ø 0 00N .0 0.0V .2 c3 r g •• -C. o .0V UN —Nj..' (CV0.•00.._0 V—002..2.E.5°&.EE.o'EI. . . N .0 .00 0 o V.=0 1. H 2 U N8(CV .— 002 . V v.-.. (C l_I 0 0 0 (C 0 0 I. V•0 .2 .2 — 0 .00 .2I-00• ... . (0 (C ('0 CC 0 I I •00 (C — E0 z0 0. 0 0 U 1- 0. o-b0b0 0 2:o.EbE..2.IEE E81,(C .h.:U L.li1Lf 2.cC2°E °E22 —N 02..2 .u(CV.0Q 2—- 02 g 8.0•.0 0h.00. .:v0bO o20 0 0 b00 2 ..0 • g('0- 00ON Uo8vI..V 0.0CC 00E (CV 8. . o o 20.5 •0.0 0=.0 E-E o (0C(0IIOC 0.0.0. .4-q N( E.. 0. S.; (0'0N ' (0O((00 0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0. '--q quc —04•((0(0L'(0CC0 --- Page 101 --- MANEUVER IN WAR and by December 1914theopposing armies had dug in, in that incredible belt of trenches which stretched from the Channel to the Swiss border. On the West Front, the story of the years from 1914 to igiS is one of repeated desperate attempts to break the deadlock of trench warfare through the only remaining tactical methods of "penetration" or "breakthrough". Four conspicu ous examples of "breakthrough operations" may show the characteristic form of this operation: (i) The breakthrough at Gorlice-Tarnow, May igi5: a success. (2) The second battle of the Aisne, April igi: a failure. ()Thebattle of Verdun, February 1916: a hybrid. ()Thetank attack at Cambrai, November igi: a modern solution. From this brief evaluation of "success" or "failure," it is apparent that this paragraph represents an analysis of "cause and effect?"3° At first glance, it seems pointless to revive incidents of "stabilization," which is now generally regarded as an abnormality. However, "breakthrough" operations are not exclusive phenomena of stabilized fronts; they have appeared, as "local penetrations," in open warfare situations, sometimes within the framework of a single battle. At any rate, our current military texts still accept "penetration" and "break. through" as normal military possibilities. The question immediately presents itself: "What principles are involved in this type of operation—the breakthrough?" These principles are listed in Plate 6o. The whole method and procedure, in a breakthrough operation, is clearly described in these paragraphs. It is equally obvious that these complex factors can be reduced to a list of "command principles," shown in the right column. From this point on the analysis Consists of the relatively simple task of tracing and checking the selected operations against this list of command principles with a view to determine to what extent they were applied. The record of this investi- gation should explain success or failure, as the case may be. b. The breakthrough of Gorlice—Tarnow, May 1915. The Eastern Front held jointly by German and Austrian forces was defended by one and three.fourths million Russians and had the enormous extent of over 8oo miles. In the spring of 1915,thesituation was generally unfavorable for the Central Powers. On the Austrian front, the Russians had practically broken through the Carpathians and constituted an immediate, serious menace to Hungary. The problem of GHQ was to relieve the intolerable pressure in this area.In view of the stabilization that had set in, the operation of course had to take the form of a "breakthrough." Where, on this enormous front, approximately equivalent to the distance from New York to Chicago, was the point of breakthrough and the reasons for its selection? An advance from East Prussia in the north could hardly affect the Russians on the Carpathian front. Frontal pressure against the face of the great salient seemed fruitless, leading only to a step-by.step withdrawal toward the east. A breakthrough on the flank of the Carpathian front in the south, however, might remove the threat to Hungary. GHQ consequently decided on a break. through on the front: Gorlice—Tarnow. Mass was provided by creating a new army,3' the Eleventh, under command See chap. 1, Par. 3.The role of the historical example.Like the analysis of the defense of river lines,the contents of this paragraph represent the Correct approach to military history, through a process of comparativeanalysis as the only way to an understanding of the nature of war."F.S. R.. Par. 436. --- Page 102 --- CENTRAL MANEUVER of Mackensen, and hurling it against the Russian Third Army, which was over- extended in this area. On 2 May 1915,thebreakthrough was made on a narrow front of approximately 25 miles, with 6 corps abreast; over 700 artillery pieces, including heaviest calibers, supported the assault by intensive concentration of 4 hours; the brevity of this preparation was an aid to surprise.Chronologically, this was the first great break- through operation of the World War on a scale sufficiently large to bring about PLATE 6i. THE BREAKTHROUGH AT GORLICE—TARNOW: 2-9 MAY 19t5. tremendous results. Within four days, the German-Austrian forces had penetrated to a depth of 50 miles and were in the open. Captures in prisoners amounted to over ioo,ooo and immense materiel was taken.83 This breakthrough is classified as "a Success." Compared with similar operations, as you will see presently, the F. 5. R.. Par. 483.F. S. R.. Par. 478. --- Page 103 --- MANEUVER IN WAR net results of this breakthrough were immeasurably superior. Generally speaking, a majority of the listed principles were observed. c. The second battle of the Aisne: April 1917. The Second Aisne Offensive, a breakthrough by another commander, is termed a "failure" because the front was not broken through and there was no decisive success. The general situation on this West Front was similar to the Russian Front: a stabilized front and a demand for action through a breakthrough. Consequently, the problem and the objective were the same for Nivelle, the French commander, as they had been for Mackensen at Gorlice. PLATE 62. THE ARR.AS—SOISSONS SALIENT, 1917. The plan called for a coordinated attack by the British on the Arras Front, to be followed by the French main attack on the Aisne, pinching out the German salient and bagging the occupants. This was a good plan and in accord with the command principles involved in breakthrough operations.2' Mass was certainly provided for; behind the breakthrough fronts over a million men were made available. F. S. R., Par. 483. SCALE o 5 10 152025 MILES --- Page 104 --- CENTRAL MANEUVER95 Before the attack could begin, the Germans disrupted its foundation by evacuat- ing the threatened salient and retiring to the newly fortified Hindenburg Line, leaving their foes to follow laboriously through an intervening desert created by an elaborate program of devastation. The withdrawal enabled the Germans to gain additional reserve divisions, dislocated the initial plans of the Allies and restricted the attacks to the flanks of the devastated areas. The British struck first, at Arras; they obtained a very considerable success, capturing about 20,000 prisoners; however, three weeks of wire cutting followed by a five-day bombardment gave the Germans ample warning; after sweeping forward to a depth of 4 miles, the British were stopped by intact defenses in the rear. The French attack on the Aisne, known as the Nivelle Offensive, was equally abortive in strategic results. It was launched after an artillery preparation often days. At the dose of the first day of the attack, however, it was evident that the breakthrough had failed, except the capture of the German first lines as far as the Chemin des Dames. The element of surprise was totally lacking," and the Germans were eventually able to engage 40 divisions against 48 French divisions. The French losses for this type of operation were not excessive, but they were exaggerated in reports. The' moral effect on the Government, the people and the army was disastrous. Nivelle was relieved from command. It is difficult to charge this failure directly to Nivelle. Very abnormal conditions surrounded this operation. Haig was not satisfied with Nivelle's plan. This pessi- mistic view was shared by most of Nivelle's army and corps commanders. The plan became notorious and was discussed on the sidewalks of Paris. In the opinion of most military critics, the principal cause of failure was lack of surprise, which enabled the Germans to match ample reserves against the French breakthrough mass. d. The battle of Verdun: February 1916. Gorlice and the Aisne Offensive were breakthrough operations, with dearly defined tactical and strategic characteristics. At Verdun, we are confronted with something novel in military history—and something monstrous. Falkenhayn, in turning to the West Front, decided on a major offensive effort. This was un- avoidable because the Germans could not maintain the defensive as a policy. Time was working for the Allies. Falkenhayn believed that France had almost reached the breaking point; if it could be demonstrated that her military power could not succeed, she might quit. To accomplish this, he planned to attract the shrinking French reserves to the defensive of an objective of great national importance which would gradually consume all available French man power.Such an objective he believed to he Verdun. In the execution of this plan, he specifically dismissed the breakthrough, in the form we saw at Gorlice, or as Nivelle planned it at the Aisne, i.e., as a "preliminary operation to a war of movement." In selecting the Verdun salient, Falkenhayn gauged the French temperament correctly; it was an area for the re- tention of which the French were willing to throw in every man they had; the defense of that little salient, scarcely o miles in width, became a point of national honor. Falkenhayn, the adherent of the strategy of attrition, carried his ruling idea into tactics through a series of limited objectives. This was the plan at Verdun, if it can be called a plan at all—a continuous series of limited attacks which by P. S. R.. Par. 483. --- Page 106 --- CENTRAL MANEUVER97 their menace should gradually draw all French reserves into the fire of German artillery. The attack began on 21February.In four days the Germans made their maximum advances of approximately 6 miles; thereafter, the attackcame to a virtual standstill, like the British at Arras or the French on the Chemin des Dames. In his monstrous conception, Falkenhayn believed that he could bleed France white. He was wrong; the balance of attrition, in the final reckoning, was only slightly in favor of the Germans—283,000 against315,000forthe French; an in- credible strain on the man power of France, but almost equally disastrous for the Germans. Stripped of sentiment, this operation represents the utter bankruptcy of general. ship.It had no plan, no purpose except destruction—the slaughterhouse for a half a million cattle that were relentlessly driven through the chutes." Verdun represents an expensive frontal attack under most adverse conditions. The item of "objective" must be emphasized, as shown by a pertinent paragraph of our F. S. R. and the analogous views of a great French commander. The enter- prise had no military or strategic objective; it was doomed to failure from its in- ception. It particularly ignored that cardinal provision of the purpose of the attack as means to regain maneuver. F.S.R..Petain Par. 47g.The object of a major attackisThe breakthrough is not the object but theto force the enemy into open ground with ameans of deliveringbattlein open war- view to his subsequent defeat by the applica-fare tion of methods of open warfare e. The tank attack at Cambrai: November 1917. The story would be incomplete without covering a highly important develop- ment which seems to also point the way to the future: tank versus machine gun. It was the British solution to the deadlock of the trench barrier, by producing a machine invulnerable to machine guns and capable of crossing trenches, aweapon which would restore the balance upset by the new preponderanc of defensive over offensive. The idea of a machine for this purpose was conceived by Colonel Swin. ton in October 1914andcame to maturity in the tank of 1916. On 15 September igi6, in the closing days of the Battle of the Somme, this new instrument of war received its baptism of fire. This was one of the few attacks on the West Front, since 1914,thatdid not require a magnifying glass to detect its progress—but itis likely to become a veritable landmark in the history of war. The eventual effect of the tank is best appreciated by the evidence of those who had to face it. Ludendorif spoke of the great tank surprise of 8 August igi8 as the "black day of the German Army in the history of the war..." and mass attacks by tanks remained hereafter our most dangerous enemies." More emphatic still is the comment of General von Zwehl: "...Itwas not the genius of Marshal Foch that beat us, but the tank.. ManyGerman regimental histories record similar impressions: "...the arrival of the tanks on the scene had the most shattering effect on the men. MThe ruthless expenditure of man power, in a final essence,ischarac'eristic of all wars, modern or ancient.The romance of war, the hypnotism of patriotic cliché, cannot completely hide the commercial quality of this terrible business:the balance sheet of man power, the' credit entry'of replacements,the 'debt entries' of dead.hsosils remntter than the Germans,Falkenhayn had his British counterpart,Sir Henry Wilson.Here is an interesting little annotation in the diary of this clever, and sometimes cynical staff officer: "Macready came over to see fohnnie French and me, and brought casualty lista.Since July 1916, up toOcober 10 last, Haig has lost 900 000in killed, wounded and missingnot sick,and o these 80,000 are missing.It appears that our monthly wastage in Franceis50,000, and an optimistic estimate of intakeis SO 000 though 25,000 will probably be nearer the mark.This shows a monthly deficit of 20 000 to 23,000. So' that a year hence, with, the past to guide us, we shall be 240.000-300,000 men deficient,allinfantry; and we start today with a deficit of 48,000.. Monthly 'wutage" and "intake' ?Quite a bookkeeper, this lad Wilson! --- Page 107 --- MANEUVER IN WAR They felt powerless against these monsters which crawled along the top of the trench enfilading it with continuous machine-gun fire..." Theaction on 15-17 September was merely a preliminary to a more important test—the tank surprise at Cambrai. At 6:20 A. M., 20 November 1917, 381 tanks rolled forward in a misty dawn without the courtesy of an artillery preparation to announce their coming. PLATE 64. THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI: NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1917. Within a single morning a penetration of five miles had been made—the equivalent of months of heavy fighting and heavier losses on the Somme and at the Third Battle of Ypres; the enemy's three main lines had been overrun—open country lay beyond; the German official teport admits the fact "that a wide gap remained open for many hours, between Masnieres and Crevecoeur...itwas great luck as no reinforcements could be expected to reach there before evening." St ' 4 .t..—. it4. t iiV L?..CFRONT GERMANMLR.20N0'/. GERMANM.L.R.29N I..... FRONT-DECEMBER _,_BRITISH --- Page 108 --- CENTRAL MANEUVER99 But the British tank crews were exhausted; the infantry showed little capacity to make progress on their own;and the cavalry divisions failed in their role of exploitation. The next successful tank attack, the assault of 456 tanks at Amiens on 8 August, showed the same symptom, i.e., an initial surprise effect, a deep penetration, but the next day the attack flickered out as rapidly as it had blazed up. Why? It is well to remember that the problem of maintaining continuity of advance was never solved in the World War. Surprise and initial mass were provided for and achieved, but exploitation, through continuity of effort by fresh reserves was lacking.It would appear that the tank, as a tactical instrument, is subject to the same laws of economy of force as any other military means; but its effectiveness was brilliantly proven, then and for the future. Generally speaking, the factors: mass—objective--continuity of action, have applied in successful breakthrough actions. Modern trends in armament and methods will add rather than detract from these factors. RECAPITULATION OF FACTORS CorliceAisneVerdunCambraj Mass — Surprise— — Objective— — — Direction— Continuity* — Exploitation— — — r P.5. R.. Par. 490.N F.S. R.. Paz. 478. --- Page 109 --- VI FLANK MANEUVER 26. THE CONVERGINGATrACK. Inthe analysis of previous historical examples, as at Montdidier, La Fere Champenoise, and the First Marne, the basic factors of mass and direction appear in the form of a combination of frontal attack with a flank attack, i.e., direction is not applied along a single axis but always in conjunction with an effort along another axis.A concentric advance, i.e., a converging attack, belongs in this category. The converging attack involves the advance of numerous columns concentri• cally oriented toward a probable battlefield. This system was considered as ideal by the prewar German regulations. The whole scheme is a matter of long, prior preparation and preconceived decision; the commander practically abandons personal direction of combat as soon as the principal columns are engaged. The action at Fleurus, 1794, represents a characteristic example: the con centric advance on Charteroi is unmistakable.The French, with 75.000 men, were disposed on a perimeter of about 15 miles. The Austrians attacked in several columns—a clear.cut example of a converging attack. A military operation may be examined from a fixed viewpoint, in order to develop a single striking feature or angle; it is understood, of course, that this is a narrow interpretation; there are many features and diverse angles to a. battle action; the design is not uniform; there are many facets. Fleurus lends itself primarily as an example of the converging attack, the concentric advance: the conversion of columns is unmistakable; the pattern is clean.cut and satis. factory (for pedagogy). But we also find, in this same action, a neat example of the "exploitation of a gap in the line" (fragmentation): in the course of the action, the French left wing under Montaigne had to give way; it was promptly pursued by the nearest *P.S. R.. Pu. 43S. 100 icele ('320.000 PLATE65. THE BATTLE OF FLEURUS, --- Page 110 --- FLANK MANEUVER Austrian column. The French center, however, held firm; this resulted in a local gap between the Austrian right and center. The French commander took immediate advantage of this situation and threw his reserve into the gap, to attack the Austrians in flank and rear; the maneuver succeeded perfectly. The theoretical parry for the converging maneuver is:(a) an extension of the front at the moment of engagement—this was partly done in the French disposi- tions in the battle of Fleurus, or (b) a partial or complete evacuation of the battlefield so that the enemy columns converge on empty space—a blow in the air. This was the situation at Le Mans; as you recall, the German columns were acirc .ØGtRMAN3 to converge on Ardenay; the movement was in full progress when the French commander evacuated the initial battlefield. The Germans had to start another maneuver. The use of the converging maneuver is chiefly in the realm of strategy, but it may appear, in lower echelons, in the details of a flank attack orwide envelop- ment. a. Frontal attack and envelopment. A concentric advance by several columns on an objective of any size is obviously undertaken with a view to eventual en- velopment. 2Wecan safely agree that there is a close connection among all the acts that constitute a maneuver—as at Montdidier. In the "flank maneuver," in particular. there is a repercussion of the frontal attack on the flank attack or envelopment, and vice versa;as usual, our basic texthas clearly recognized the relationship between the frontal attack and the envelopment. In view of the 'See Chap.IV.Par. 19.Preconceived Maneuver."•P. S. It.. Par. 434:"According to the situation ... the main attack aims to envelop—or to penetrate." 'V.S. It., Par. 435:"..Enveloping and frontal attacks take place simultaneously or the evelopiai at. tack is preceded by the frontal attack. 'I, LE PLATE 66. THE BATTLE OF LE MANS, 1871. --- Page 111 --- 102MANEUVER IN WAR relatively great importance of this form of attack, this entire subject is examined in detail in a later chapter. Sharp distinctions between the various classes of offensive situations cannot always be made; each class may temporarily present aspects which are character. istic of others. In the framework of a single operation, one can often trace the entire range and variation of several military actions, which are ordinarily regarded as dis. tinct types. In the advance on the line: Adrianople—Kirk.Kilisse, in the Turco. Bulgarian Campaign of 1913, it is possible to list a number of so.called categories that merge imperceptibly: TURCO- BULGARIAN CAMPAIGN1913 0102030 D BULGARIAN •TURKS CNVCLOPING(MAIN) ATTACK ARMY 1tNG 0PMENT PLATE67. THE TURCO.BULGARIAN CAMPAIGN, 1913. (i)Converging attack: The advance of the First and Second Armies, against the Turkish left, appears as the concentric advance of numerous columns. con• verging on Adrianople; a situation identical with the advance on Charleroi and Fleurus. (2) Flank attack: In the ensemble of the armies, the Second Army is engaged in a flank attack. ()Main(decisive) attack and secondary (holding) attack: The First and Third Armies are engaged in a frontal (holding) attack while the Second Army is executing a main (enveloping) attack against the Turkish left (Adrianople). It is noteworthy and characteristic that this dual action is repeated in lower echelons, viz: in the Second Army, note the gth Division in a holding attack while the 8th envelops. Smaller units have already been shownas operating on identical lines, viz: Regiment: The 3o6th U. S. Infantry: St. Juvin, 14 October 1918. 'Chap. Vili, Pars. 36 and 37.'F. S. R.. Par. 440.'Chap. 1. Par. Sb. --- Page 112 --- FLANK MANEUVER108 Battalion:The 4th Battalion 65th Fjenth Infantry: Cuisy en Almont, 20 August 1918. Company: Company C, iod U. S. Infantry: Hill 190, 20 July 1918. Platoon:St. Amand Farm: Soissons: i8 July 1918. b. Turning movement. The line of demarcation between turning movement, wide envelopment and converging attack is vague—all require the concentric advance of separate columns on a common objective; characteristic examples have been shown elsewhere, viz: Beersheba, St. Juvin, Cuisy en Almont. 27. THE ENVELOPMENT, a. General considerations. An envelopment maybe regarded as a converging maneuver in the area in which it is conducted. The principal inherent defect of the converging maneuver, however, lies in operating against an enemy who is not stationary. This disadvantage can be offset by con- ducting the envelopment in two phases: a first phase of finding the enemy and holding him where found, and a second phase of moving troops on his flank to envelop him. If the enemy has reserves, he will certainly use them to extend his front, in proportion as we extend our own. This was done on a large scale in 1914, at the time of the race to the sea; the location of the flank changed continuously. Current regulations' give a clear picture of the form and execution of en- velopments; a few general observations are added: the envelopment as a combat form is as old as the hills; it is known and practiced by the youngest platoon com- mander. The envelopment is the habitual maneuver of small units when they run into an enemy holding a non-continuous front. In these minor operations one sometimes notes a tendency to economize too much on the frontal attack and to expect the entire result from the virtues of the enveloping movement itself. One must guard against a similar tendency in the manipulation of larger units. A great military thinker has made a very pertinent comment: Foch: "We do not cause a real adversary to fall back, by a cleverly chosen direction. We can not immobilize him without an effective attack...Waris positive in Its nature, admits of only positive solutions.No effect without cause: If you desire the effect, develop the cause: apply force." It can be stated confidently that:(a) the effect of the envelopment is chiefly proportional to the quantity of enemy troops taken in flank; (b) the envelopment is effective only on condition of being combined with an attack from another direction. This brings us directly back again to one of our basic factors: combination of direction and, consequently, the ideal form of the flank maneuver appears as a frontal attack combined with a flank attack. This conception is emphatically not modern; two thousand years of warfare contain endless examples of its applica- tion! It is proposed to cover this enormous space of time by selecting the dates of 216 B. C., 1756, 1817, i86, i866, and 1914—the maneuver of Hannibal, of Frederick II, of Simon Bolivar, of Robert E. Lee, of the elder Moltke and of Count Schlieffen. Centuries have elapsed between the maneuver of Cannae, in 2 i6 B. C. and the Schlieffen Plan of 1914, and yet they are definitely linked by a remarkable continuity of thought. Count Schlieffen, a Field-Marshal and for many years Chief of Staff of the Imperial German Army, made the battle of Cannae, fought ifl 216 B. C., the basis of a stupendous strategic doctrine that permeated the High. • P. S. R.. Pars. 434.439. --- Page 113 --- 104MANEUVER IN WAR Command of the German Army and controlled the intellectual orientation of an entire generation of army officers. With Cannae as a starting point, as a model for the battle of annihilation, the Count traced the factors present at Cannae through the major military conflicts of the nineteenth century, the Wars of Frederick II, Napoleon, the Austro-Prus- sian, and Franco-Prussian Wars. His work is not a presentation of military history but rather a document of instruction. The military operations he describes are problems of application, in pursuit of a central idea: the decisive character of the flank maneuver and the envelopment on a large scale. It is one of the greatest of modern military books; it is great because of the position and prestige of its author and its influence on the conduct of the World War; it is modern, since no one can claim staff and command capacity without the background of the military theories herein developed. b. The double envelopment. (i) The Battle of Cannae, 216 B. C. What ele- ments were present in this battle, in which Hannibal, with inferior numbers destroyed a great Roman army? Stripped of all details, we can distinguish three phases: 1st:Hannibal's Army, arranged for battle, presents a convex front toward the Romans. 2d:On contact, Hannibal's center falls back slowly while the wings hold fast, so as to present, at the end of the movement, a concave front to the enemy. 3d:The wings of the Carthaginian Army, reinforced in the beginning, dose in, in a double envelopment. 'C.gjeng,. by GeneralP*eld.Marshal Count Alfred vonSchlieffen.Authorized translation.c.& G. s.s.Pt.Leavenworth, Kansas. 1931.Thu monumental treatise on the art of war was published through thepersonal Intervention of Major General S. Heintzelman and Colonel W. Buxtt. the Commandant and Assistant Commandant of the Command and General Staff School. 0Lson S.ps 0Re,rn THE MARNE PLATE 68.CANNAE AND THE MARNE. ROMANS (,.• Lflt.1b1 CARTHfrGINIANS CANNAE VenMeauxo V7/ry L\ --- Page 114 --- FLANK MANEUVER105 It may sound like a paradox that in an age of machine guns and tanks, one should evoke the ghost of Roman and Carthaginian Armies. But there is a strik- ing similarity between this maneuver and the situation in the first battle of the Marne: In the first phase the French Armies presented a convex front to the Germans; in the second phase the center fell back while the wings held fast at Paris and Verdun; in the third phase the left wing attacked from the direction of Paris and eventually forced the enemy to withdraw from the Manic. The tactical details of the operation at Cannae are unimportant and anti- quated, but one can easily recognize two maneuver conceptions that somehow seem to have survived the changes of centuries—in idea, one finds the Romans committed to a frontal attack—in execution, one finds a mass, disposed in great depth, without articulation and therefore incapable of maneuver; the flanks were protected by cavalry: if that protection was removed, the dispositions were such that a flank attack by the enemy could not be opposed by foot units in time or in space. -Byconcentrating his forces on a restricted front, the Roman com- mander lost the benefit of a great initial, numerical superiority. PLATE 69. BATTLE OF CANNAE: INITIAL SITUATION. Hannibal, on the contrary, compensated for his numerical weakness by stretch- ing his center to the limit, in order to be strong on the wings, where he sought a decision by a double envelopment in a prearranged maneuver. 6,000 heavy armed CarthainiaflS 20,000 heavyarmed Speiniard3 & Gaula CANNAC --- Page 115 --- MANEUVER IN WAR These dispositions, flexible and articulated, contain the germ of the flank maneuver, which has already been defined as acombination of directions, i. e., a combination of an action on a flank closely coordinated in time and space with an action on the front. Hannibal weakened his center at the risk of having it penetrated, in order to favor the maneuver of his wings, where he had prepared a local superiority of unians means. As for his cavalry, he gave it a modern mission of exploitations in a maneuver against the rear of the enemy dispositions and the pursuit of defeated units. The victory was so decisive that this type of operation has since become known as a "Cannae." (a) The Battle of the Cow pens, 1781. Committed to the proposition that there is a historical continuity of maneuver forms and ideas, it ought to be sufficient demonstration to bridge the gap of centuries in a virtual repetition of actions; it is entirely feasible to link the conception of Hannibal at Cannae, 2 i6 u. C. with Morgan at the Cowpens in 1781 and Lawrence in the engagement of Tafila, 1918; the size, armament and composition of the opponents varied enormously from the Roman boardsword to the magazine rifle of the World War, but scheme of maneuver and tactical dispositions remained substantially the same. In Corñwallis' campaign in South Carolina, Tarleton was detached to run CANNAC PLATE 70.BATTLEOF CANNAE: THE COLLISION. --- Page 116 --- FLANK MANEUVER107 down Morgan; the British strength was about i ioo, that of Morgan aboutgoo. Morgan fell back to a place called the "Cowpens." 10 Heplaced the untrained militia under Pickens far in front, to deliver two volleys; after that, they could run around the left flank and in rear of the main body, where they could reform at leisure. PKKE?S,I About150 yards in rear of the militia, Morgan placed picked troops under Howard on a slight hill; '5° yards farther back, he held his cavalry under Colonel Washington. Tarleton attacked at sunrise; the militia received him better than expected and retreated as ordered; the British then attacked the second line of Americans, with the intent to envelop them; the greatest pressure seemed to be on the American right, which was refused. At that time, Washington's cavalry turned the British right flank and charged, while Pickens' militia, reassembled, had turned the British left flank and attacked also; the main line then delivered a burst of fire at o yards and charged the British. The confusion was terrific; Tarleton escaped but lost 230 men killed and wounded and 6oo prisoners. The analogy with Cannae is obvious: a preliminary ac&ion to drive in "light troops," the collision of the main bodies, the double envelopment, with cavalary, i. e., mobile troops, operating on at least one flank. ()Tafila,191& To complete the cycle of comparison and similarities, a small- unit operation of the World War period is quoted: Lawrence at Tafila. The forces engaged were even less than at the Cowpens—about 900Turksand floo Arabs. 1.PIth. TARLETON PLATEi.THEBATTLE OF THE COWPENS, 1781. --- Page 117 --- MANEUVER IN WAR The village of Tafila became a military objective in the defense of the Jordan valley, and the Turks dispatched a small force, composed of three reduced- strength battalions, a troop of cavalry, 2mountainguns and 26 machine guns, to capture it. It was held by a motley crew of Arab irregulars, under Sheriff Zeid and Major Lawrence. 012M I I I PLATE 72.THEENGAGEMENT AT TAFILA, 24JANUARY,igi8. East of Tafila, the terrain presented a roughly triangular plain, bounded by ridges; the Turks had to enter the apex of this triangle. Lawrence chose the base ridge as his final defensive line. On the morning of 24January,the Turks attacked the northern ridge, held by Tafila townsmen and farmers, making rapid progress. Through a personal reconnaissance, Lawrence had ascertained the ranges to targets in the plain; gradually reinforcing his defensive position, he slowed down the Turkish advance, principally by fire from this ridge; i.e., he pinned them down frontally. After establishing superiority of fire, Lawrence initiated an offensive maneuver: he sent a mounted detachment, reinforced with auto- rifles, around the Turkish left to gain the crest of the eastern ridge. A group of about too men, arriving from a neighboring village, was sent around the Turkish right flank; surpriie fire and attack, by the enveloping forces, was nicely coordinated with increased fire from the base ridge; when the flank attacks made themselves felt, the Turks began to waver; at this time, Lawrence made a show of a frontal attack, with a few remaining horsemen. The Turks fled, leav- ing 250 prisoners, abandoning machine guns, howitzers and baggage. ()Amodern Cannae. It has been stated once before that in every maneuver 1AF I ARAB --- Page 118 --- FLANK MANEUVER109 thereare two things: a speculative idea and its realization on the ground. Now, while the realization is always dependent on the conditions of themoment, it often occurs that the fundamental idea varies but little throughout the centuries. Trained by Schlieffen, indoctrinated with his conception of Cannaeas a battle for decision, for annihilation, it is no coincidence that the Staff of the Eighth German Army, in the Battle of Tannenberg, maneuvered the Russian mass into the salient of Allenstein, restricted in maneuver space in an area which had all the earmarks of a mouse-trap and then crushed in their flanks by a series of flank maneuvers and envelopments. 1STPHASE PLATE73.TANNENBERG,1914:FIRSTPHASE. This operation was a replica of Cannae, on a magnificent scale, with the Russian Second Army in the role of the Roman Legions caught in the deadly vice of Hannibal's maneuver. Now one understands why Schlieffen's epochal work should be a medium of instruction, and that it is not exactly a paradox that in an age of machine guns, tanks and aviation the ghosts of Roman and Carthaginian armies have been evoked. At this point, attention is invited to the intervention of cavalry in this battle of Cannae: it was a decisive intervention. In the wars of antiquity and for centuries to come, infantry was condemned to purely frontal actions. The Greek Phalanx, as well as the Roman Legion, knew only one maneuver-form—the break- through, the frontal attack, the simple collision of two moving bodies. This action in itself was rarely wholly decisive; it was always the intervention of cavalry that brought on the decision because cavalry alone was capable of rapid maneu- ver, usually taking the form of a flank attack. The development of firearms had the effect of thinning out the antique mass formations as a consequence of the establishment of a continuous line of fire on a broad front; this resulted in the so-called linear tactics of the seventeenth century. The linear formations of that period, however, were still preferably em- RUSSIANS mGERMANS p 0I B MD.' --- Page 119 --- 110MANEUVERIN WAR ployed in frontal combat and not flexible enough for maneuver in the mode sense, and cavalry still remained the most effective means for decisive action. c. Frederick II. Frederick II struck a fresh note in definitely employing i fantry in maneuver. He consistently attempted to operate against the enem flank. His system was incomplete, however, since he failed to realize fully t indispensable correlation between the flank maneuver and the frontal attac The Battle of Leuthen in 1757 represents a typical example of his metho AUSTRIANS PRU5SIANS PRUSSI(Vt5— 24 sii AU3TRIANS TheAustrian Army, 8o,ooo strong, was in line of battle, facing west. The Prus- sians reached the battlefield in the morning ofrDecember'757, with approxi- mately o,ooo men. The King decided to make a decisive attack against the left flank of his opponent. He employed his advance guard to make a feint against the hostile center and right, while the mass of his army moved toward the enemy's left, by what was virtually a flank march. He then attacked the Austrian left wing by a series of successive efforts, which were successful principally because the Austrians were slow to conform to the new Prussian dispositions. The plan of the attack was clearly a maneuver against a hostile wing. Stripped of all details, the execution may be termed a turning movement under cover of a diversion by .the advance guards, in a threat against the enemy front. This front, however, was not "fixed," "pinned down," in the modern sense. Foch's 9 KM. PLATE 74. THE BATTLE OF LEUTHEN, 5 DECEMBER. 1757. --- Page 120 --- FLANK MANEUVER111 famousremark applies obviously to this case.The mass of Frederick's Army was certainly placed in a "cleverly chosen direction," but the Austrians were not "immobilized" and were actually able to eventually change front to the south. It may be argued that the maneuver succeeded even though the principal attack was made in a single direction; that is true, but this case is the exception which proves the rule and the maneuver succeeded only because the enemy was passive and inept at maneuver. Frederick II was the first to recognize this special circumstance, when he said 11 Pods: • Wedo not cause a real adversary tofall back by a cleverly chosen direction. We cannot im- mobilize him without an effective attack•.. Waris positive in its nature, admits of 0017 positive iolutioos No effect without cause:ifyou desire the effect, develop the cause: apply fo • --- Page 121 --- 112MANEUVER IN WAR "oblique battle order"—a mere word that is utterly meaningless, since there is no particular military virtue attached to "obliquity." d. Napoleon I. The next important milestone in the evolution of the art of war is represented by the Napoleonic period. The activities, views, methods and achievements of Napoleon I are so important to the military profession that we have made a minute and detailed examination of the methods of this extra- ordinary genius, to be presented in later chapters of this series: VII, "The Napoleonic Concept of Maneuver" and VIII, "The Napoleonic Concept of Battle." For the sake of continuity, however, we shall present at this point only the sketchiest summary of his views: (i) Napoleon may be said to have created the flank maneuver in its modern sense. (2) He was a firm believer in the effect of flank maneuvers. "It is by turning the enemy and by operating on his flank, that battles are won." ()Inthe field of strategy, Napoleon opened most of his campaigns by a turn- ing movement of his mass, directed against the enemy's flank and rear. ()Inthe field of Tactics we see the habitual employment of close-in and wide envelopments, viz: (a) "This wide movement will bring us in a few days into Bavaria—several days' march in rear of the enemy, who has no time to lose to avoid complete destruction." (Bulletin, 7 October 1805)(b) "Make a counter-attack, to draw the attention of the enemy while I maneuver to turn him." (Letter to King of Holland, 20 September 1806) (c) "My intention is that Marshal Soult outflank the right of the enemy, turn it, and attack him, a maneuver which should assure us a certain and decisive success." (Letter to Murat, 12 October 1805) (d) "I desire that General Lauriston assemble all his forces and march on Drehsa; having passed the Spree, he will find that he has turned the hostile posi- tion." (Order of i8 May 1813) (e) "Maneuver in order to envelop the right of the enemy and attack from the rear." (Napoleon to Ney, i6 June 1815) It is apparent from these random quotations that Napoleon practiced combina- tion of directions, one of our basic factors! As to the remaining factor, distribu- tion of forces, it was a Napoleonic maxim to be "strongest at the decisive point." He strove habitually for the creation of "mass": In the first wars of the Empire, he operated with a field army of approximately 2oo,ooo; he succeeded in assem- Wing on the battlefield of Ulm 170,000,atAusterlitz i6o,ooo, at Wagram 140,000; at Moscow he brought 130,000againstan equal number of the enemy, at Bautzen i6o,ooo against ioo,00o, at Leipzig 271,000against215,000. Thesefigures are indicative of concentration of mass, as a habitual tool of Napoleonic workmanship. His views on the frontal attack are equally well known; he was prepared to sacrifice the units engaged frontally in order to immobilize the enemy and wear him down relentlessly. There is a famous—or shall we say notorious?—quotation that embodies ruthlessness, strength of character and veteran experience on a hundred battlefields: "Once having engaged the units nearest to the enemy, you have to let them go, without worrying too much about their good or bad fortune. Only you must be careful not to yield too easily to requests for help .. Thisis as far as we care to go into an analysis of the Napoleonic maneuver at this time. Chapters VII and VIII of this series are allotted to a special study of this great genius and his masterly conduct as a commander of large units. --- Page 123 --- MANEUVER IN WAR e. Simon Bolivar. The enormous range and extentof the campaigns of this great South American commander have alreadybeen touched upon.12 Simon Bolivar, the Liberator, was a contemporary and friend of George Wash- ington; in political purpose and military achievement, these great colonial leaders were very much alike: both fought wars of liberation at heavy odds, tofree American colonies from European monarchical domination. In an impressive sequence of successful strategical and tactical operations, the campaign of Carabobo is certainly among the more important. Bolivar was a master in the application of the flank maneuver, the envelopment; he appreciated perfectly the decisive character of the flank attack and employed it on numerous occasions; he had to: operating precariously with limited resources, every blow delivered had to be effective! On 24 June i 821,Bolivar'scolumn had reached the broken country east of the Sabanos de Carabctho and was in an assembly position, in vicinity of the Casa del Naipe.13 His adversary, the Spanish General de Ia Torre, expected the Patriot column to advance along the roads from San Carlos or Pao, and the Royalists were dis- posed in depth to dispute the passage; the route of the Patriots represented a defile along its entire length, with considerable advantage on the side of the defender. Bolivar made a prompt decision: an envelopment of the Spanish right flank, with the bulk of his forces, the ist and 2d Divisions, in conjunction with a frontal or holding attack by the d Division." The enveloping force, under General Paez, started the movement at ii:oo o'clock and debouched on the Plains of Carabobo about noon. When de la Torre recognized the threatening movement, he shifted the nearest battalions, Burgos, Hostairich and Barbasto, to the north. The envelopment had difficult terrain to overcome; the leading unit, the Battalion "Apure," attacked four times; the next in column, the Battalion "Britannicos," containing American and British volunteers, had equally hard going; the Spanish cavalry also inter- vened and, for a time, the Patriots had to defend themselves in forming the tradi- tional "square;" reinforcements of the "Tiradores" arrived in time to tip the scales; a subsequent charge by Paez's mounted bodyguard threw the Spaniards in confusion; reports indicate that the action did not last longer than an hour. In the meantime, the Spanish unit guarding the defile, the Battalion "Valencey," withdrew and the 3d Patriot Division followed close on Lheir heels; the pursuit was pushed with vigor. It is obvious that the enveloping attack bore the brunt of this action and was the decisive factor; the frontal pressure was not sufficient to hold the Spanish forces; for a time Paez's situation was very critical, since de Ia Torre was able to shift the bulk of his forces in that direction; nevertheless, Bolivar forced the hand of his opponent and dictated the course of action from start to finish. This battle "Chap. II. Plate 26. "Compositionand relative strength of the opponents were asfollows:Patriots: 9 battalionsof infsnt.ty (4000i.10squadrons of cavalry (2500).Royalists:y battalions of infantry (3300).10 squadrons of cavalry (1700).2 batteriesof artillery (130). 1 Thispointhas certain controversial aspects; some writers assume that only the 1st Division was ordered onthe envelopment.General Lopez Contreras believes that Bolivar intended his entire armytolnqveon the Spanishtight—adispositionwhich resembles Frederick's attackat Leuthen—and that CedenOs division could not makg itself felt except through the "Tiradores."becauseof the general speed of the action and the Coo- gestlon on narrow trails.Bolivarwas with the, enveloping troops; the 2d Divisipn followed the 1st Division. and itis reasonable to assume thatit was Bolivar'a intention to useit.(GeneralEleazar Lopez Contreras: Bo!iv, Condaicle, de Tropa.Caracas,Venezuela,1930.jVicente Lecuna La Cam pana de CarababoLa ji,rn:en 4. &rmatdez.El Cojo lllustrado.No. 304.13 Dec. 1912.—'Colonel Arturo Santaoa L.a Catepaw.a 4. Cirabobo. Caracas.1921.) --- Page 124 --- FLANK MANEUVER"5 is a confirmation of the deisive character of the envelopment; it is as modern in its conception today as it was appropriate and effective in 1823.15 f.VonMolike the Elder. After the eclipse of the Napoleonic star, the next great luminary to appear on the military horizon was the elder von Moltke, victor of the Wars of i866 and 1870. The extraordinary success obtained by the Prussian Armies in these wars brought into sharp relief the figure of the elder von Moltke. Regarded as a theorist by many of his cotemporaries, he conceived and conducted operations in the manner of Hannibal and Napoleon in which a battle of decision was sought by maneuver. The Campaign of i866 against the Austrian Army is very characteristic of his method and is a classic example of the development of a flank maneuver on a large scale. In examining this general situation, it is apparent that the strategic concentra- tion of the Prussian Armies was dictated by the railroad and road net leading to the hostile frontier.1 Von Moltke's plan of campaign involved the groupings of three armies or ap- proximately twelve divisions. How would you group them? The railroad net, of the time, was deficient: if one north-to-south track is allotted to each army— and that is a very modest railroad allotmentll_one can easily determine the result. ing, suitable concentration areas, viz: 'Therelative dispositions of the 3d Division, in the secondary or holding attack, while the 1st and 2dDivisions were massed for the main or decisive attack. agree with current American regulations:P.S. R..Pu. 434. and of course conforms to the principles of mass and directioi. chap. It, Par. 8.1Asa general remark, this is alicable to all armies and every initial strategic war plan."The logistic point involved Ia the physical limit of a single.track railway which affectstrain densities. N. B OHMEN •14$JNICN PLATE77a.ARMY CONCENTRATIONS:AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN WAR,,866. --- Page 125 --- MANEUVER IN WAR Line of Communications Berlin—Juterbog--Dresden Kreuz—Frankfurt-—Gorlitz Kreuz—Breslau—Neisse Area Elbe Army First Army Second Army z I-N z z0 S --- Page 126 --- FLANK MANEUVER Those were the only suitable railroad lines which in turn affected the detraining points. As regards the Austrians, the possibilities of concentration were equally limited to certain railroad loops: Vienna—Lundenberg (L)—Olmutz, and an ad. vanced area: Pardupitz (P)—Josephstadt (J)—Koniggratz (K)—Prag. Without going into logistic details, the relations of time and space, the presence of a mountain barrier and the limited rail and highway net, von Moltke planned a junction of the three armies somewhere in Bohemia. This junction was to be effected in a general strategic area, largely depending upon the eventual location of the Austrian concentration. The Prussian scheme of concentration was not --- Page 127 --- MANEUVER IN WAR unknown to the Austrians; in fact, it could have been deduced from the Prussian railroad situation. What plans were open to Austria to counteract or block the Prussian plans? Prevent a debouchment of the Prussian Armies from the mountain passes. The rate of mobilization of the Prussian army was conceded to be superior to that of the Austrians. The arc of these mountains is something like 150 miles. The Prussian First Army had already crossed. The Austrian concentration was com- paratively slower, and a desperate situation like this required maximum speed. Obviously there was no practical chance to block the debouchment of three Prus- sian Armies at all the passes. With the First Army across the mountains, what was the next best move for the Austrians? To contain the Second Army, which was still in the passes, and concentrate mass against the First Army, i.e., an application of the "maneuver on interior lines." This was done, but the Austrian X and VI Corps operating against the Second Army were not equal to the supreme importance of their delaying mission. This plan, with a strong probability of success, failed because an intermediate unit failed in execution. The chain was only as strong as its weakest link! After local, initial successes, the Austrian X and VI Corps fell back on their main army, and the debouchment of the Prussian Second Army was accomplished. As regards the Prussians, after clearing the mountains the possibilities of maneuver com- binations are obvious: frontal attack by the Second Army and flank attacks by the First and Elbe Armies or vice versa. (i SCCOND ELBE I oa4oeio PLATE 79. THE BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ, 3 JULY t866. For the next few days, the Austrian Army adopted a purely passive attitude, congested in a central locality confronted by the converging advance of numerous hostile columns, in a general disposition that contained endless possibilities of F!RST ARMY eo,000 G ARMY --- Page 128 --- FLANK MANEUVER119 maneuver:(a) double envelopment by the Prussian Second Army and the Army of Elbe, (b) frontal attack by the Prussian First Army and flank attack by the Second Army, (c) and even an encirclement—any number of possibilities, inherent in the force that maneuvers against a force that has gone on a passive defense. These possibilities were clearly understood by von Moltke but only partially executed by his subordinates. It is evident that an encirclement could have been made byJuly, The conception of such a maneuver aimed at a battle of decision, as at Cannae, but the vastness of the idea escaped von Moltke's subordinate com- manders. Mass attacks against the front and accumulating reserves "for a rainy day" were considered more important than encircling movements or flank attacks. This refractory attitude on the part of his subordinates was perhaps natural, in view of a very curious circumstance that ought to be mentioned here: von Moltke was comparatively unknown to the rank and file of the army. It is a historical fact that a staff officer at Headquarters First Army questioned the authenticity of a cer- tain order by saying: "It seems to be all right, but who is von Moltke?" This is not improbable; we wager you have never heard of half of the officers now on duty on the General Staff in Washington. Events moved swiftly. On 2Julythe First Army encountered the Austrians in position on the west bank of the Bistritz and decided to attack the next morning. The Second Army was then still at a considerable distance from the probable battlefield. Von Moltke realized at once the incomplete coordination between the First and Second Armies and the possibility of defeat in detail and peremptorily ordered the immediate advance of the entire Second Army in an "attack against the right flank of the enemy." The subsequent phases of the battLe are well known: (a) Frontal attack by the First Army, maintained with difficulty. (b) Envelopment of the Austrian south flank by the Elbe Army in conjunction with the First Army. (c) General flank attack, made decisive by the mass of the Second Army, the whole scheme actually resulting in three separate actions at Nechanitz, Sadowa and Benatek. However debatable may be the conception which governed the debouchment of the Prussian forces into Bohemia, it is certain that on 2Julythe three armies were practically united, ready for battle and with ample maneuver space. It is true that von Moltke's hand was forced to some extent by the initiative of the First Army, but his maneuver still remains as a typical concentric maneuver, involving turning movements and envelopments and culminating in a flank attack of maximum effectiveness. Remember the analysis of maneuver and the basic factors: Direction—Mass. One must admire without reservation the "combination of directions" of the two armies: Sadowa (S)—Chlum (C) Horenowes—Nedelwitz (N) As to mass, or distribution of forces, it was employed in a masterly fashion: an entire army was charged with the envelopment. Of a total of 230,000,two-thirdswere engaged in a maneuver for envelopment; 110,000,themass of the Second Army, were employed in a flank attack. The coordination of effort with respect to space is remarkable: this battle offers the rare example in modern history of the coordinated action of three armies, two of which were used to envelop the flanks of an enemy already worn down by an extended frontal combat. --- Page 129 --- MANEUVER IN WAR The time factor may be open to criticism: the First Army attacked too early and made it difficult for the Second Army to intervene. Before leaving the elder von Moltke, a historical fallacy as absurd as Frederick's alleged "oblique order" should be exploded, and that is the general assumption that Moltke's conduct of laige units represents the principle of advance of separate masses and their conjunction on the battlefield, while Napoleon is said to repre- sent the junction prior to battle; this is a purely artificial distinction. It is recog- nized that the initial separation of the Prussian Armies, prior to the debouchment into Bohemia, was primarily dictated by topographical conditions and a deficient railroad net; the junction of these armies was not planned precisely on the battle- field of Koniggratz but in a general strategic area. There is no essential difference between von Moltke's and Napoleon's methods other than the effect of modern conditions and the general progress in technical equipment. g. The American Civil War. Immediately preceding the Austro..Prussian War of i866, the American Civil War engaged the attention of the world. Certain special conditions set this stupendous conflict apart from the swift moving cam- paigns of Western Europe; it contains phenomena which are characteristic of the gradual conversion of a non-military nation into an armed camp. This transitional period may take only a few days with the professionalized armies of Europe, while it has always taken the United States a much longer period to get ready. This was the most expensive training school to convert civilians into soldiers that has ever been devised—in fact, the U. S. Pension Bureau is still paying tuition for a large number of pupils. During the Civil War, aooo engagements were fought, of which 159 may be dassed as battles. PLATE So. THEDEFENSE OF PETERSBURG. 1864. --- Page 130 --- FLANK MANEUVER121 TheCivil War was strongly affected by the development, increasedrange and accuracy of all weapons, a situation somewhat similar to the introduction of the needle-gun in the Austro-Prussian War of z866. The resultwas the same: frontal attacks promptly became costly! When Grant assaulted Leeat Cold Harbor, his loss in twenty minutes was ten thousand while that of the defenderwas less than one thousand. At Fredericksburg, Burnside made six successive attempts to drive the enemy from his positions. At Mechanicsville, the Confederates tried to drive Porter from his positions by repeated frontal attacks; each time theywere thrown back in disorder. In two months, from the Wilderness to the beginning of the siege of Petersburg, Grant lost 75,000men—morethan the whole Confederate Army he was attacking. The power of the defensive had increased enormously and became accentuated by the almost habitual use of field fortifications. This lesson might have been profitably remembered in the World War. It was a foregone conclusion that envelopments would be attempted to avoid the costliness of frontal collisions: Second Bull Run, Mechanicsville, Chancellors- ville, Nashville, and the Campaign of Atlanta are examples of wide envelopments; it is significant that in all cases the maneuver was successful, even though the execution was faulty; the only baffle in which this type of maneuver failed, the first Battle of Bull Run, is the one in which the holding attack failed to carry out its mission. h. The Russo-Japanese War. At the beginning of the twentieth century, some- one might have reasonably asked if the wing or flank maneuver was applicable in the wars to come. We have already answered this by quoting World War opera- tions tending to show that envelopment is still the most effective maneuver. The enormous progress in modern communications and means of transport seems to favor the envelopment, as it facilitates the rapid displacements of large units to distant points of the theatre of operations. In retrospect, the Russo-Japanese War generally confirmed the efficacy of the envelopment. Kuroki's Army constantly outflanked the Russian left first in the hill country between the Yalu and the Lia-ho and then in the battle of Liao.Yang (July-August, 1904).Theoperations around Mukden also involved an envelop- ment of the Russian right by Nogi's Third Army (in realitydivisions) 24February —7 March, 1905.Asin previous wars, frontal attacks were found to be expensive and time consuming. The envelopment appears to have proved its almost invariable effectiveness, and it was again to be demonstrated in 1914andthe World War. i. Von Schlieflen. The strategic concentration and the almost instant collision of vast armies in 1914broughtField-Marshal Count v. Schlieffen's name into the limelight as the master mind that formulated the initial plan of operations of the Imperial German Armies. In the light of events, as we know them, it is generally agreed that this stupendous plan had a good chance of success, if it had been followed in its entirety. The execution of the "Schlieffen Plan," i.e., the details of the Battle of the Frontiers and the First Battle of the Marne, is common knowledge. This discussion will be limited to bringing out the characteristics of maneuver and the presence of our basic factors: direction and mass. There is no doubt that in the evolution of this plan one is in the presence of a superior mind—perhaps a genius.It is true, the man was deprived of a great historical opportunity: Count Schlieffen died in 1913,oneyear before the crucial test of his ideas. The "Schlieffen Plan" is only a label for a masterly study on the employment --- Page 131 --- MANEUVER IN WAR of large units; every conceivable phase of the conduct, function and responsibilities of commanders of large units was considered in this stupendous undertaking. In 1905, on his relief as Chief of Staff, after 15 years in this post, Schlieffen left a memorandum with his successor, the younger Moltke, which was, in fact, a mobili. zation plan for that year, a plan of campaign for the invasion of France and a scheme of maneuver for the German general attack on the ensemble of the French Armies. Schlieffen said textually: "France must be regarded as a huge fortress. The line of fortifications: Belfort—Epinal—Toul—Verdun, is practically invincible, while the section: Montmedy—Maubeuge—Dunkirchen, is incomplete and not initially occupied. It is through this gap that we must force an entrance into that fortress. After this, we shall encounter a second barrier, the line: Verdun—Rheims—Laon— Le Fere. This barrier, however, can be outflanked from the north...Itis possible that the French armies will then form a defensive wing, behind the Oise, between La Fere and Paris. We contemplate passing Paris on the west and south and then attacking the French left flank to force the French Army in an easterly direction toward the Marne and Swiss border. The essential feature of this plan is a strong right wing, to force the enemy to retreat, by constant pressure and the continuous threat of envelopment." The single, dominating feature of this plan was the envelopment, the successive turning movements. Schlieffen said: "The main attack must not be directed against a front— the thing to do is to crush in a flank. With flank, I do not mean 1' 4600 000 Jow140— PLATE Si. ORIENTATION MAP: FRANCE, 1914. --- Page 132 --- FLANK MANEUVER the extreme end of the enemy's front line, but the entire area in rear of his dispositions; the attack must be against his rear." In the light of past events, authoritative military opinion, including the French, are agreed that this grandiose plan could have succeeded, as in fact it enjoyed a partial success. Why did it fail? Because of a violation of the basic factors of direction and mass. After reaching Amiens, there was a general conversion to the south; the German enveloping wing became contracted; the possibility of envelop. ment, which consists primarily in overlapping the enemy's front, was thereby lost. The decisive character of direction was also lost! The German flank, instead of threatening an envelopment, became in turn subject to an envelopment from the direction of Paris. This fateful change of direction, in the final essence, was due to violation of --- Page 133 --- 124MANEUVER IN WAR mass. There is a legend that the dying Schlieffen gasped a last admonition: "Do not weaken the right wing." Be that as it may, Schlieffen, while he was alive, certainly provided for a strong enveloping wing—3o divisions! That mass was reduced by his successor, initially to 24 divisions without any provision for rein- forcements, and its strength was successively frittered away on secondary missions until it had shrunk to 8 divisions on the Ourcq during the most hazardous moment of the entire war. Under Moltke, the ratio of the offensive wing to the defensive Wing was 7 to 3, while under Schlieffen it had beento i. This shrinkage from 30 to 8 divisions is all that is needed to explain what has since become known as the "miracle of the Marne." Armies19051911 First and SecondiiCorps8 Corps 7 Reserve corps5 Reserve corps Third and Fourth6 Corps6 Corps 4 Reserve corps3 Reserve corps Fifth8 CorpsCorps 5 Reserve corps2 Reserve corps SixthCorps4 Corps iReservecorpsiReserve corps SeventhNone2 Corps iReservecorps Total4"/z35 This comparative tabulation of the initial composition and grouping of the German armies and the relative distribution of forces is proof that the Schlieffen Plan was substantially modified and how the enveloping wing was radically weak- ened; the cause of failure may be traced to this progressive modification, to a change of decisive direction and a violation of the principle of mass. In the gradual collapse of the Schlieffen Plan, one can trace the initial presence of the basic factors of maneuver—direction and mass—as well as their gradual disappearance in a slow, almost imperceptible attrition, like rills of water vanish. ing in sand; as Hindenburg has very aptly expressed it:"... TheSchlieffen Plan had been liquified, diluted, watered, thinned down beyond recognition." 28. TaE DEFENSIVE MANEUVER. At this point in natural progression, it is advis- able to cover a particular type of maneuver, which, at first glance, would seem to be a negation of all that has been said before, but which in reality is an indis- pensable form of warfare, predicated upon modern trends in armament and equip- ment, and that is the "Defensive Maneuver." For generations, the offensive has been the fetish of the military profession; every other consideration had to give way to this traditional attitude. The staggering effectiveness of modern weapons, however, as a principal development of the World War, has given an enormous advantage to defensive action. The increased possibilities of the defensive are beginning to be appreciated and have found a very definite echo in modern military literature. Extracts from some of our own texts follow: M.C.L.U.. Par. i:"A large proportion of the decisive battles of history has been gained by numerically inferior forces in defensive battles...overthe greater part offronts in Contact during the greater part of cIte time. 1)0th sides are on the defensive. In war the mental attitude is habitually that of offense, but the physical attitude is habitually that of defense F.S.R.. Par. S: "...thenecessity lOT concentrating the greatest possible force at the point --- Page 134 --- FLANK MANEUVER125 ofdecisive action requires strict economy in the strength of forces assigned to secondary missions." F.S.R., Par. 380:.. Adefensive attitude is adopted ...forthe purpose of economizing forces on a front where a decision is not sought, in order to concentrate superior forces at the point of decisive action." These statements appear to have a slight flavor of apology, where the defensive is concerned; apparently the defensive is still a stepchild, a military Cinderella, o) 0 I- 04 .-1 < ,z S U, U 0- --- Page 135 --- MANEUVER IN WAR while it represents in reality the highest form of military leadership in establish. ing a proper balance between the defensive and the offensive. This thought seems to be supported by official recognition in the training manuals of all modern armies. Great commanders have invariably appreciated that delicate balance, in critical N a I (I ..1 ( I I p. I F— S 'p S xj ( --- Page 136 --- FLANK MANEUVER127 situations: Lee at Chancellorsville, Napoleon at Leipzig, Schlieffen confronted by the staggering problem of a war on two fronts. The sequence of operations at Chancellorsville, 28 April toMay, 1863, repre- sents an impressive example of Lee's genius. The Confederate Army, approxi- mately 6o,ooo men, 6509cavalryand 170 guns, poorly equipped, wretchedly dad, and living upon short rations, faced the Army of the Potomac of i ,ooo infantry, * 0 I U) w -J --- Page 137 --- MANEUVER IN WAR 12,000 cavalry, and 400 guns; the first movements began on 27 April, 1863, and the campaign ended with the Federal retreat on the night of 5 May. The Federal commander obligingly equalized his numerical superiority in favor of his opponent by dividing his army into two almost equal parts, like the Russians at Tannenberg, with a view to containing Lee in vicinity of Fredericksburg, cross- ing the Rappahannock in Lee's rear and operating against him from Chancellors- ville. Lee resolved to attack one of its wings. He left Early's division and one brigade to contain Sedgwick at Fredericksburg and moved his mass on Chancellors- ville. This initial strategic decision has all the ingredients of the philosophy of the defensive maneuver, i.e., to strip the defensive front to the bone 'in order to estab- lish mass for offensive action elsewhere. A similar decision for tactical effect was made on the battlefield of Chancellors- ville. Lee contained the Federals frontally with about 17,000 men while Jackson's Corps of 26,000 men made a hazardous turning movement and rolled up the Federal right and rear. The relative distribution or density of forces between the defensive and offensive areas is highly characteristic of the defensive maneuver; the precarious situation of the Confederates, in a fight against overwhelming num- bers, merely accentuates the extraordinary boldness and brilliance of Lee's decisions and movements. The balance between offensive and defensive effort, expressed in troop densities, is also clearly seen in the dispositions of the French Imperial Army, in the Battle of Wachau, i6 October, 1813. There is no hesitancy in placing Lee abreast of Napoleon and quoting the Campaign of Chancellorsville with that of Leipzig; in both cases the strategic problem was similar and the intellectual orientation of both commanders led them to reach identical decisions. Napoleon was confronted by the concentric advance of several Allied Army groups, Schwartzenberg, Blucher, Bennigsen. After a vain attempt to collar the Army of Silesia, in vicinity of Duben, Napoleon moved on Leipzig in order to strike Schwarzenberg before the latter could join Bennigsen—a typical operation on interior lines, predicated on widely dispersed enemy units. A successful concentration of the Allies would have brought 311,000 men and 1330 guns on the prospective battlefield, while Napoleon could havemustered only i8o,ooo men and 734 guns. In a masterly balance of offensive and defensive dispositions Napoleon contained the advance of Blucher and Bernadotte on his right and rear with a density of men per yard of front, while the VIII, II, and V Corps faced the enemy frontally, with a density of i6 men per yard, and strong reserves were made available for the habitual breakthrough combined with a turning movement. A century later, in 1914, another great military thinker was confronted by a similar problem, on a vaster scale, when Schlieffen decided to contain the Russians in the East while attempting a swift campaign of decision on the West Front. The relative distribution of forces, on the vast fronts created by the inter- national situation of Germany in August, 1914, represents still another example of the balance between offensive and defensive effort; the controlling thought, the philosophy of the defensive maneuver, were the same in the Wilderness in 1863, at Leipzig in 1813, and in Lorraine in 1914—a curious proof of the continuity of military speculation. It is as if a magnifying glass had been applied, the bigades at Chancellorsville being enlarged to corps at Leipzig and, finally, becomingc army groups in 1914. --- Page 138 --- FLANK MANEUVER129 Onthe West Front itself we find a divisiOn into offensive and defensiveareas; the strategic role assigned to the left wing, the German Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Armies, is almost a paraphrase of Par. 585, F.S.R.: "...forthe purpose of economizing forces on a front where a decision is not sought in order to concentrate superior forces at the point of decisive action..." Thedecision was sought by the German right wing, in the operative movements of the First, Second and Third Armies. PLATE 86. DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES. THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN, igo. 29. As-rACK oa DEFENSE: RELATIvE TACrICAL VALUES.a.Evolution in the World War period. For centuries attack was synonymous with war. From the time of Frederick the Great through the Franco-Prussian War, 1870, defense was so exceptional that it had to be ordered. After that war, Moltke advocated the defense as a necessary preliminary to the attack in many instances. In the World War at the outset the defensive was in disrepute. The turning point of the war may in fact be found in 1914 on the West Front when the offensive was abandoned. The breaking off of the battle of the Marne may not have been necessary. But --- Page 139 --- MANEUVER IN WAR the consequent impasse was not a transition to the defensive for its own sake but a mere temporary measure which became permanent because there were no reserves. In the German Army the Moltke idea of the defensive had been repudiated. Only the offensive was considered. There was no training in the defensive along the lines Moltke had laid down. There was no regard for the victories which had been won by other armies by a numerically inferior side employing the defensive, e.g., Kunersdorf, Hohenlinden, Caldiero, Austerlitz, Talavera, Busaco, Torres Vedras, Fuente de Honor, Albuera, San Cristobal, Dresden, Belle Alliance, St. Lucia, Custozza 1848 and i866, the three Plevna battles, Sivin, and in the American Civil War the incomparable Campaign of Chancellorsville. From the Boer War's examples of the defensive, the lessons drawn were only those for the offensive; consequently, on the West Front the German Anny persisted in the attitude that there was but one form of combat: the offensive. In the regulations of the German Army today, the defensive has practically been abandoned. It survives (F. u. G. 12) only in the provision that "defense is justified against an enemy greatly superior in numbers, and then only as a temporary measure to enable the attack to be renewed, or to permit an attack at another point, or at a later time." These regulations do not countenance the doctrine that "the high command has entire freedom to decide whether to attack, defend, delay, or withdraw." This viewpoint neglects a strategical method which has been employed success- fully in many battles of the past and that was used successfully on a large scale in the World War (Hindenburg—Ludendorff on the Eastern Front), and which has had outstanding proponents in theory: Clausewitz, Moltke I. Skepticism as to the attack, as the strongest form of combat, however, had be- come rife during the World War. The criticisms arose from the German offensives of igi8, the most carefully prepared of any that German troops have ever been engaged in. They began with the great battle in France. "For each kilometer of front there were 20 to o German batteries (an average of 100 guns), not induding trench mortars. There was a German superiority of 25 to o divisions on the West Front. The comparative combat strength bespoke a success" (Ludendorif, My War Experiences). But there was no strategic success in spite of numerical supe- riority, high morale and excellent training. Why this failure, in view of Tannen- berg and Gorlice, and the successful attacks of Frederick the Great's time? There had, in fact, been a great change in the two forms of combat. A chief factor—the improvement in fire-arms—was appreciated by Field Marshal Moltke in i86i. He wrote: "The attack of a position has essentially become more difficult than the defense." The sentence ends"...thedefensive during the first phases of a combat is a decisive advantage." At the beginning of the World War and until Gorlice, machine guns were few. For a long time the Germans had superiority in heavy army artillery. Trench mortars had not yet been introduced. In spite of the increase in artillery the proportion of guns to combatants had not increased much; in Frederick the Great's battles there were on the average 31/2,inexceptional cases 7, cannons to iooo combatants, as e.g., in the Battle of Torgau. Moreover the attacks resulted usually from meeting engagements, so that a planned defense had not been evolved. Condusions had not yet been drawn from the outstanding results of the defensive on the East Front. There, weak German forces, with properly utilized machine gun fire, had caused attacks, such asBrussilov's in 1916, to break down. Since that time, however, the number of machine guns and guns had increased tremendously on the West Front. At Tannenberg the Germans had had .7 F. A. --- Page 140 --- FLANK MANEUVER'3' guns to each woo combatants, the Russiansguns (according to another authority respectively2.9 and 2. i), while there were hardly i y2 machine guns for this number of combatants. But in thegreat West Front battle the attacker was faced by ii to 12 guns, 4 to 6 trench mortars, and14 to 15 machine guns toeach woo combatants. Conversely, the improvement and increase in numbers ofarms had also in-creased the combat strength of the attacker. Hewas less vulnerable, due to machine-gun and portable infantry shields and steel helmets. It seemed plausible that this would result again insuccess by attack, e.g., at the end of 1917. At that time, the British attack of20 November 1917 at Cambrai took place. On a front of io kilometers they not only succeeded in breaking through for a depth of io kilometers but "the Germans would not have succeeded in stopping this breakthrough if the British commander had exploited it"(Luden- dorfi). Was the success of this attack to be attributed to the improvement and increase of firearms and the protection of armor? One knows that the heavy infantry shields had long ago been abandoned, that the steel helmet was only fully effective in the trenches, that machine guns were effective in attack, in spite of and not because of the shields. The rolling artillery barrage of the breakthrough was a two-edged sword and is not to be compared in effectiveness with the counter preparations and protective barrages of the defensive. What then occasioned this success? Five hundred tanks had decided this "tank battle." The defensive had secured a great advantage in the improvement of firearms, but this had been overcome by the Allies by not relying solely on the slowly.moving and vulnerable infantry- man to carry fire and shock to the enemy. They had created an almost invulnerable mobile machine of attack which could "carry the fire" and which possessed, more- over, considerable shock power. Since then, the effectiveness of tanks has been increased.It must be borne in mind how combat aviation aided the tank echelons by fire in the battle of the Somme; it must be realized how they strive today in developing attack aeroplanes with shock power. In igi8 the Germans had only 15 tanks (besides 75 captured tanks) and did not value them as decisive factors; it becomes plain why the attack could no longer be considered as the strongest form of combat. The continuous employment of the defensive as a salient form of combat was already in effect during the World War. Tannenberg is a conspicuous example of the efficacy of the defensive. There the eventual victory of three days of attack by the entire Eighth Army was made possible only by previous four days of defense by the reinforced XX Army Corps; otherwise, the Narew Army would not have been beaten since the Njemen Army could have intervened; in that precarious strategic situation, the defensive was relied on and chosen by the German High Command; they were not forced thereto by circumstances. b. Relative tactical values: Offensive—Defensive.Statistical data regarding military operations are almost as numerous in military literature as they are erroneous! One of the best known studies on this subject is Berndt's Numbers in War.' An analysis of losses, or percentages, in principal battles (to 1877-78) led this author to condude that "future battles would be less costly;" this erroneous condusion is partly accounted for by the gradual disappearance of cavalry from the modern battlefield. He failed to note that the number of engagements in. creased, which would render all wars in their entirety more expensive in human 2IVien*a.1997. --- Page 141 --- MANEUVER IN WAR life; each month of operations. for instance, brought the following relative losses: Wars of Frederick II: 1272 casualties; the Wars of 1813.15:8625;the Franco- Prussian War: 22,177; more recent operations, the Balkan wars, the Russo-Japanese War and the Battles of the Frontiers (World War), all indicate a growing per. centage of casualties. Obviously, there is a limit to the practical application of statistical data: A comparison of psychological factors is difficult; military "genius" can hardly be defined through statistical methods or numerical comparison. The relativity of "victory" is sometimes hard to determine, since political effect is often out of pro. portion to military effort. Yet, it would be desirable to develop some scheme of comparative analysis, in order to determine "relative success" in battle. There is available a special study 1 whichseems to point the way in a general principle: "The tactical value of a victory can be determined by dividing strength plus losses of the defeated by corresponding figures for the victor." Defeated1 i3,0O men plus 13,ooo casualties: 126,000=0.6Gravelotte:Victor187,000 men plus 20,000 casualties: 207,000 Defeated200,000 men plus 40,000 casualties: 240,0002.18Dresden:Victorioo,ooo men plus io,ooo casualties: 110,000 The objection may be made that this procedure merelycovers a "tactical" factor; at any rate, it represents a method of comparison between the factor of "credit" (strength, battle efficiency) and "debit" (casualties,losses), in an attempt at establishing an organic relationship. Bodart, however, overlooked a most important factor: the relative number of field pieces; (the artillery ratio is important, as at Magersfontein4.12 per moo for the British, but only 2 per iooo for the Boers). Thissuggests an amplification of Bodart's calculation, with reference to the battle of Dresden: Artillery of Defeated:316 guns40 lost:356= 1.24Artillery of Victor:286 gunso lost:286 Strike an average of both calculations (2.18 and 1.24) and determine1.71 as the "relative index," for victory, in the case of Dresden.In more recent battles, the relative proportion of machine guns might be evaluated in an identical manner. This approach is possibly open to criticism, in the field of tactics; however, in the absence of a better method, it admittedly represents a method of "comparative evaluation."In the following tabulation, a distinction is made between vic- tory, as the result of attack, and through the defense; and a column is added showing the duration, in hours, of the action. This tabulation is admittedly of a general nature. The great number of "rela- tive" victories, through defensive operations, is probably surprising.It may be argued that only a limited number of "offensive victories" was quoted; according to Bodart's classification, however, they were battles with the highest "relative value," while the defensive battles were listed without distinction.It may be argued that victories through offensive action are far more numerous than through defensive action. Dr. G. Bodut, MiIi:ary.HiuoricJ Eacyclopedia. Vienna, 1908. --- Page 142 --- FLANK MANEUVER PLATE 87.OFFENSIVE-DEFENSIVE: COMPARATIVE EVALUATION. This is true, in a limited sense, in that victory was predicated on a superiority of numbers, in most cases, or were fought in meeting engagements, i.e., attack versus attack; this situation, however, is not the clean-cut differentiation between offensive and defensive method, which is established in the table above. Superior generalship has frequently gained victory with inferior numbers, but the element of risk became accentuated.Frederick II won 5 attack victories, with inferior numbers, 2 with equal strength; but he had at least 2 failures: Kolin, Kunersdorf.Napoleofi won only twice with inferior numbers and failed five times: Aspern, La Rothiere, Laon, Waterloo, Leipzig.Moltke deliberately avoided this risk; his victories were fought with a smaller or larger margin of superiority in numbers: Koniggratz (2.2: 2.1),Gravelotte(1.7:i).Moltkeap- pears to have recognized a principle "...thetactical defensive has gained an unmistakable advantage over the offensive, as a result of increased fire power." An analysis of the column "Relative value" shows a decrease in value of attack victories and an increase in value of defense victories. This permits a conclu- sion, "...theattack of a position has become increasingly more difficult than its defense." This tendency is unmistakable in all recent operations, with perhaps the ex- ception of Vionville, 1870, and the Shaho, 1904, and, even then, local circum- stances tend to show that these engagements were border.line cases: Vionville was a partial victory; the percentages of losses of the Prussians was much lighter; they remained in possession, however, of the field of battle.This same applies to the Shaho; the Russians could have won with a little more persistence, but the Army commander suspended the attack when he received unfavorable reports OFFENSIVE VICTORIES Name of Dura. lion Relá• live BattleHoursValueDate 133 DEFENSIVE VICTORIES Dura.Rela. Name oflionlive BattleHoursValue KolinRoszbach Leuthen 2 6 2.35 z.i8 1757 1757 ., .. ........ 1759 i8oo Austerlitz12 .. .. .. .. .. 1.65 .................... 1805 *809 i8io i8iii8ui8,i Beresina76 ... ... 1.55 .... .... 1812 i8i5 *86, Vionville St. Quentin AladschaDag. ... io ... .. 10 '.. .. 8 ... .. .. z.88 ........ 1.19 ........ 0.55 ............ *870 1870 i8o 187, ,8' ,877 1877 1877 1877 i88i .. ..,........ i8g9 1899 Schaho •.. 192 .... 1.39 1900 1904 51,40.89 Kunersdorf Hohenlinden61.26 Caldiero Talavera 7 10 1.00 1.01 Busaco Fuentes tie Onor 12 26 1.70 1.22 Albuera8o.8i Sabugal Salamanka Waterloo BullRun Beaume la Rolande .. Champigny Loigny-Voupry An der Lisaine ,.Plewna 2.Plewna .Plewna Seidekian(Delibaba) .. Sivin LaingsNeck Colenso(14./15.2).... Magersfontein Paardeberg(18.2).... 8 12 1! g 10 7 8 72 4 10 48 6 10 8 ,7 12 *2 i.o 1.52 1.73 2.62 1.17 2.44 1.46 2.75 o,8o 1.78 4.50 1.25 2.25 5.56 4.82 3.09 5.21 --- Page 143 --- MANEUVER IN WAR from the IV Siberian Corps.There is one significant operation in this battle that more than ever demonstrates the increase in power of the defensive; a small force (Japanese Reserve Brigade) successfully resisted the pressure of the Russian Ill Corps, in the defense of the defile of Pensihu. As regards duration, the attack appears to require more and moreNtime; in the defense, this column shows some fluctuation but a decrease in more recent operations. Is this theory sustained by operations in the World War? Again the defensive demonstrated inherent advantages.The Germans maintained the West Front defensively for 4 years.The reaction of their opponents had the same result: in a general aspect, the defense was able to withstand attacks for a total of 1478 daysor 35,472 hours! The defensive has established itself as a combat method of unquestionable merit and profitable employment.Slowly, the true purpose and application of the defensive became recognized ("Instructions for defensive operations," 1916.17): "...theobject of the defensive is not maintenance of terrain but maximum damage to the enemy, combined with economy of our own forces." A rough summary of relative losses, the "price paid," clearly supports this contention: Allied casualties, approximately 7.4 millions.German forces in the West, approximately 4 millions—altogether a profitable balance. The general characteristics of the Boer Wars of i88i and i8gg are an addi- tional argument for defensive operations, or defensive strategy: a militia, weak in artillery, is able to oppose a professional army, superior in every respect, merely because its tactics and strategy were orientated along defensive lines, in order to offset this initial inferiority. The inevitable conclusions can be expressed as follows: The defensive is an PeziodEngagement Dead & British Wounded German Missing & British Prisoners German Total C British asualties German Aug..Oct. 1913 Autumn battle,at La Bassee • 84,000 31 of which 3346 officers 27,000 :10 of which 341 officeri 10,7003.80093,000 29 33.000 :10 Jy'Dee. 1916 Battle of the Somme434,000 22 194,000 :10 37.00042.000471.000— 20236.000 :10 1917On!, Britishattacks (Except closing phase of the tank battle)Flanders 708.000 —18 349,000 :10 32,00099,000760.000 17 448,000 :10 March 21April 30. to 1918 German attacks Spring Battle Armentieres Kemmel 209,000— 10309,000 :13 93,00040.000302,000— 10349,000 :11,3 August 1918 Britishattacks Aug. 8 & 21 & following113.000— 1862,000:10 9.00011,000122,000 9 139,000 :10 Sept. 1918 British attacks (Cambrai, Guise, Flanders) 103,000— 1837,000 :10 10,00070,000113,000 9 127.000 :10 Oct. 1918 Planned German Withdrawal Battles109.000 23 44,000 10 12,00042,000121,000= 1582,000:10 These figures cover only the more important offensives of the later period of the World War. For simplicity, losses are totaled without distinction between officers and men.Quiet trench periods are omitted.The presentmaterialis to be found in "Statistics of the British Empire during the Great War" 0 the British War Office which has employed the German Reichasrchiv work asits source on German casualties. The total casualties in the first four brackets are greater for the attacker than the defender.However, theproportion became less each time.In August-September 1918 theaituation changes.In October 1918, thedefender has more.To find an explanation of these factsitis necessary to examine the casualties in detail.Dead and wounded are without exception greater for the attacker. Prisoners are more numerous for the defender. PLATE88. CASUALTIES IN ATTACK AND DEFENSE. 1915.18. --- Page 144 --- FLANK MANEUVERi55 efficient and profitable form of combat for the weak. To make it an exclusive form is objectionable, as it will minimize the factor of morale; Moltke developed a "golden rule": "...cleverstrategy aims at forcing the enemy to attack a strong position, of our own choice, and then to assume the tactical offensive, when the enemy has become weakened by losses or exhaustion." As you consider the forces at work in the kaleidoscope of military operations through the nineteenth century, maneuver forms appear as a derivation of two simple, basic elements: direction and mass. There are endless variations in the application or fusion of these elements, reflected in the multiple function of high command; under that heading, we recognized the imperative need of anticipation: the preconceived maneuver. As to relative merit in maneuver forms, it is apparent that the envelopment has been practiced universally and successfully since the wars of antiquity. Considering the rarity of great commanders, experts in their dangerous craft, we were naturally forced to draw on history for comparative examples. Do not be deceived that these examples are the ghosts of the dead who have no place in a world of the living!Ideas do not die!Intellectual values are im- perishable! The maneuver of Cannae was executed breast to breast; the Roman sword against Carthaginian arrows.In the course of centuries, it was executed with breech-loaders and machine guns, and it will appear again with armored cars and mechanized units. Cannae 215B.C. andTannenberg 1914 are separated by time but not in sub- stance! --- Page 145 --- VII THENAPOLEONIC CONCEPT OF MANEUVER o. A MODERN ORGANIZATION.It may seem as if we were taking a step in the wrong direction in returning to the beginning of the nineteenth century and Napoleon I—an about-face into the dim recesses of a past that has long been dead. Fully aware that the advancements of modern technique have modified the complexion of battle and making a correct appraisal of antiquated tactical de- tails, there must remain a profound conviction that itis still worth while to observe the workings of a superb professional mind, to savor the intellectual quality of his conceptions, to recognize that they have retained a distinct flavor of modernity and to determine why they have survived a century of warfare.1 Finally, we are persuaded that the extraordinary refinement of the Napoleonic technique and his superb conduct of large masses are a natural corollary to a preliminary digest of strategical and tactical principles, and it is apparent that the Napoleonic concept of tactics and strategy fit perfectly into the framework of this general study. While it is true that improvements in modern weapons have changed the com- plexion of the battlefield very considerably, the advance of armies, the march to battle; the strategic concentration and other operative problems have remained the same.In the Campaign of Ulm, Napoleon marched over 200,000 men from the English Channel to the valley of the Danube, a distance of approximately 8oo miles.There is very little intellectual difference between that historical operation and an average, modern C.&G.S.S. map problem that starts the student in the vicinity of Baltimore with two corps and a mission requiring an advance on Gettysburg, or the actual concentrations in maneuver areas required currently as an annual feature of our Army maneuvers or Army command post exercises. In the tentative situations that develop in one as well as the other case, the ques- tion presents itself instantly: "What formation shall I adopt?Divisions abreast or in echelon? What routes are to be selected and why?"If we consider that improved communications have given us a marked advantage over Napoleon, then the very fact that he solved similar problems in an incomparably brilliant manner would seem to imply that the Napoleonic style may still be fashionable and worthy of imitation.2 Your attention is invited to the following tabulation, showing a typical Napo- leonic organization—the forerunner, in fact, the foundation of all modern army organization.It is not too difficult to substitute the term "division," in the modern sense, for the Napoleonic "corps," in order to arrive approximately at the set-up of a modern field army, consisting of 2 corps, or 6 divisions.3 1j is claimed on good authority that the literatureonNapoleon Bonaparte comprises approximately 40000 separatetitles, and the subjectisapparently not yet exhausted; for obvious reasons, tho French have beenespecially productive.There are able German and British Interpretations, but the most modern note was prob. ably struck by General Camon in his brilliant study Lesysteme deGuerredeNa/so!esis(Berger-Levrault10231, The salient features of Camon's able theory are briefly covered in this chapter; itis significant that this theo isin accord with the central theme of the "Maneuver Element." especially as regards chap. IV.Pars.1 17. 18 and 19.'The subject is almott inescapable not only as a broad cultural background for allofilcers, hut of specificapplication in our advanced serviceschools:the C.&G.S.S.,Fort Leavenworth and the WarCollege.Stu. denta ate assigned command of divisions and corps almost over night,i.e.,a theoreticaltest of capacity offorces ranging from15.000to 150 000 men; the manipulation of such masses, even on paper, requires a strate- gic imagtoation which might profitably feed on a study of the Napoleonic conduct of war. • On the subject of comparative strength. may we point out a very common errorinthe evacuation ofmilitary factors?The personnel total of any unit is never conclusive of its combat strength; that total should always be reduced to'rifle and automatic weapon strength." and should be expressed in terms of "volume ofor "capacity for effective fire."For example, the enormous total of the present American division (1934),i.e.,22,893 animals and men, will shrinkto approximately 8064riflesifadistinctionis made between- 'effective" and"non-effective"rifles.Men whose assigned, duties are such that they are unable tor in the firefight are classed as "non-effective" ;'viz:orderlies, messengers, sectionleaders,artificers,tailors. etc.under this classification, of 144 riflesin the American rifle company, only 108 are effective weapons. 136 --- Page 146 --- U 0U jj 5 i .jv1u i:k pQ 0N .9 N .9 I c•9 . tC.. . 0 0.c—° & . ....0 0 i : : • : : : i ' . 0 • , 0 8 .L .-J . .< a II .I. . . : . . —. ' r : : : •S ' : .2 . : : :: : : . : . . : 2• e 0N ,. I, . I•U 3 — U . : : : : : C .2- : : : 8 : : :: :: : —U a : .2b 0 - . .0 A. Ua - §< E • — :: :: C& 0 :::::a: . .0 a 0 <9 •!: iI1urL)j .E :0 - N •- .0 ... . .. . :::Z — II L--_ — a .9u—e I LiiL 2. I E : : . I4LJUI!J N V I•9 I d1 I I t a0'I a a a z -. ; 4 . ; a .e •. —C .I. .2UVU z .0 •0a -l a •g.2 I --- Page 147 --- THE NAPOLEONIC CONCEPT OF MANEUVER. TYPICAL NAPOLEONIC ORGANIZATION The Grand Army of 1805: Campaign of Ulm Guards: BESSIERES6,ooo I Corps: BERNADOTTEi8,ooo I Cavalry Division; 2 Infantry Divisions. II Corps: MARMONT21,000 i Cavalry Division;Infantry Divisions. III Corps: DAVOUT27,000 1 Cavalry Division;Infantry Divisions. IV Corps: SOULT41,000 1 Cavalry Division; 4 Infantry Divisions. V Corps: LANNESi8,ooo VI Corps: NEY24,000 Cavalry Reserve: MURAT22,000 General Headquarters Reserve: VII Corps14,000 Bavarian Corps20,000 Allied Contingent8,ooo 31. NAPOLEON'S SYSTEM OF OPERATIONS.From his first campaign in 1796 to his last in 1815, Napoleon employed but two systems or types of operations: a. The maneuver against flank and rear of the enemy. b. The maneuver from a central position, i.e., operations on interior lines. In the first system, he threw the mass of his army into the hostile zone of re- treat to cut the enemy's line of communication, in order to force a decisive battle, i.e., a turning movement. In the second system, he moved his army in a compact mass to a central posi- tion between enemy units not yet united in order to defeat them in detail, i.e., an operation on interior lines. The orientation map shows the location of the principal Napoleonic battle- fields and the characteristic types of maneuver employed thereon; the light dots represent operations on interior lines and the black dots operations against the rear. It is quite apparent that while Napoleon employed the maneuver on interior lines on comparatively few occasions, he operated against the flank and rear of his opponent almost habitually. Without considering the Peninsular War, Napoleon's Campaigns contain at least twenty-seven characteristic maneuvers against the hostile rear, but he at- tempted many others and planned still more, viz.: I 796—Lodi, Bassano, Arcole, Dolce i8oo—Marengo 18o5—Ulm, Hollabrunn 1 8o6—Jena 18o7—Puitusk, Allenstein, Friedland i8og—Landshut, Eckmuehl 1812—Vilna, Witebsk, Smolensk 1813—Leipzig, Bautzen, Dresden, Dueben 19 14—Saint-Dizier, Brienne, Montmirail, Soissons, Mery-sur-Seine. The strategic and tactical results of some of these operations were absolutely crushing or decisive, notably: Bassano, Arcole, Marengo, Ulm, Jena, Friedland, Landshut, Montmirail. There were others in which faulty execution or the re- suit of unforeseen incidents did not produce the full effect.Nevertheless, all --- Page 148 --- MANEUVER IN WAR succeeded in driving the enemy far to the rear and gaining large amounts of territory: Lodi, Castelnuovo, Dolce, Hollabrunn.There was only one failure: St. Dizier. 32. THE MANEUVER AGAINSTFLANK AND REAR.There is a justifiable reluc. tance to reduce military operations to a formula. The art of war is not of slow and continuous growth but the spasmodic product of genius.When a great soldier appears, art develops at so high a speed that few can follow its course. Genius is most difficult to gauge and in spite of all historical exactitude is apt to pass into the realm of romance. U 0 Nevertheless, it would be extraordinary if military genius were not subject to basic laws, if it had no system or method when one knows that in the arts as well as in science, genius is the result of system and method. As to the term "system,' when certain operations, as a type, are repeated --- Page 149 --- THE NAPOLEONIC CONCEPT OF MANEUVER twenty-seven times over a period of years, then the application of the termap- pears to be more than justified in the deliberate sense of its dictionary definition: "System: Orderly combination of parts or elements, into a whole, according to some rational principle." The general idea underlying Napoleon's favorite and most effective system—. the maneuver against the rear of the enemy—can be expressed as follows: (i)Frontalpressure will rarely lead to a decision; the enemy can always with- draw, fight delaying actions in successive positions and finally escape. (2)Throughdemonstrations by detached forces, the enemy is drawn away from his bases or capitol. ()Inrapid, secret concentrations, the mass of the army is moved into the hostile zone of retreat by a march around the enemy's flank; if possible, this movement is under cover of a natural screen: mountain range, forest, etc. (.j) The objective is a position astride the enemy's line of communications in order to secure a strategic barrier, usually a river line, cutting off his avenues of retreat. ()Thisthreat in rear is expected to produce a certain degree of demoraliza- tion and a reversal of enemy movements. (6) Then turn against the enemy in a battle of your own choice, in time and location. PLATE gi. SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM: MANEUVER AGAINST THE REAR OF THE ENEMY. This conception can be reduced to a schematic diagram;4 it is like a stage setting; note the scenery, the "props": (z) Initial movements of the enemy against the French frontier; demonstra- tion to keep him occupied. (2) Secret concentration of the French mass; movement around the enemy's flank into the hostile rear areas. (3) Specifically—where? To a position astride the enemy's line of retreat, pre- ferably resting on a natural barrier: a river line, for instance.It is this barrier which became the initial, strategic objective of Napoleon; he waged battle or- dinarily only after he had secured it. 'Csmon. 7 UER RENCHj)' --- Page 150 --- 140MANEUVER IN WAR ()Theenemy, aware of the threat to his rear, must make an about-face. In this connection, it is well to visualize the complex organization of an army rear-area, its administrative and supply establishments, lines of communications, depots, dumps, distributing points and various echelons of supply; the move- ment and location of reserves, trains, service units, supply and evacuation facil- ities are all generally oriented in a forward direction: suddenly this flow of men and materiel must be reversed!5 In the Campaign of Jena, October i 8o6, the French Army had reached the zone of retreat of the Prussian Army, as planned. Napoleon wrote to Lannes: "All intercepted letters indicate that the enemy has lost his head.They are holding war councils day and night.My army is united and astride their routes to Dresden and Berlin.It is now a question to defeat the enemy in detail and before he can unite." He ordered Murat: "Attack everything in sight; those are columns en route to some point of concentration. I have moved too fast for them to have received counter-orders; a few engagements like that, and the Prussian Army might be defeated without a general battle." The presumptive demoralization of the enemy, however, was not the only ad- vantage accruing from this maneuver.Special conditions at that time favored it: the French had developed a superior strategic mobility as compared with their opponents.The French carried several days of fire within units at the expense of Class-I supplies, which they obtained through foraging and requisi- tions or the capture of hostile depots.The Austrians and Prussians depended almost entirely on convoys and rear-establishments; consequently, they were ex- tremely sensitive to threats against their communications. L :?cOAUSTRIANS FRENCH PLATE 92.THEATEROF WAR, LOIBARDY, 1796. Finally, Napoleon did not employ thismaneuver until he had sufficient strength to secure a local superiority of numbers. Are modern armies less sensitive to threats against their communications? On See Chip.IV,Plates 44.49. --- Page 151 --- THE NAPOLEONIC CONCEPT OF MANEUVER141 thecontrary, communications have become more vulnerable than ever.The entire Meuse-Argonne Offensive in which the American Army played such a distinguished part was based on a single idea: a threat to German communica- tions, the 4-track railway line (Sedan.Mezières), and it worked in igi8 as an attack on communications did in 1796or18o5 or i8o6. In covering briefly a few of Napoleon's principal maneuvers it is interesting to observe to what extent the factors shown on the schematic diagram apply. a. The maneuver of Lodi, 1796. General situation.6 Campaign of Italy, 1796. Austrian and Sardinian forces opposed the French along the Appenines and the Alps.In a typical "operation on interior lines" directed against the point of junction of the Allied forces, Napoleon isolated the Sardinians and conduded an armistice with them. The Austrians continued to hold in the area: Acqoi— Alexandrie—Tortone. What was the decision of the French commander? The answer is contained in Napoleon's own sardonic words in his famous report to the French War Depart- ment, 29 April 1796: "I have no doubt that you approve of my decisions.Here is one wing of a hostile army, agreeing to an armistice—in order to give me time to defeat the other.' It is obvious that in this particular situation every effort had to be made to defeat the Austrians before the Armistice with the Sardinians should elapse; in this situation the time factor had become all-important; a maneuver solution that was time-consuming was useless. Now let us turn to the Austrian commander. What plans were open to him? Pending the expiration of the armistice he had to keep in mind the possibility of rejoining his ally; for the present there was the imperative necessity to fight the French_by disputing everyinch of ground. • See Chap.V. Plate2. PLATE g. AUSTRIAN LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS, LOMBARDY, 1796. --- Page 152 --- MANEUVER IN WAR In order to maintain a relationship with the schematic diagram (Plate gi) it is suggested that the factors involved are recalled, as a sort of check-list. We have already covered the item, "initial dispositions;" we shall next examine the Austrian "supply establishments," their "lines of communication and retreat." The Austrian main supply depots were located at Milan and Mantoue. Note that the route to Milan crossed a series of parallel river-lines, the Sesia, Agogna, Tessin, Lembro and Adda, that lent themselves to protracted defense or delaying actions and that the Po, an immense stream, would cover the Austrian south flank in the course of such an operation. Note that the Adda represented a "strategic barrier" across the Austrian routes of withdrawal to the east, to their home territory and the strong fortifications of Mantua. What plans were open to Napoleon? How did he propose to operate against the Austrians? At least one plan open to him was to continue operations in the valley of the Tanaro, i.e., frontal pressure in the direction of Alexandria and attack the Aus- trians where found. What objections, if any, may be made against this operation? Napoleon's present task consisted in keeping the Allies divided and defeating one before the Armistice expired; this meant prompt, decisive action against the Austrians. Recall the analysis of the idea underlying the "maneuver against the enemy flank and rear." We then stated that "...frontalpressure can rarely lead to a decision; the opponent can withdraw from one position to another, caus- ing loss of time and strength, and finally escape." Compare this statement, dated 1796,withSchlieffen's comment,7 dated 1905,inan argument against frontal at- tack: "...frontalattacks are indecisive, since they merely drive the enemy to a new position ... anda new operation must be started. This is all right if you have plenty of time... butnot when you are counting minutes...donot attack frontally; the thing to do is to crush the enemy's flanks.. Inthis situation Napoleon was "counting minutes," a veritable race against time, against the date of expiration of an armistice. As a matter of fact he adopted "frontal pressure" as it should be used, as a pre- liminary operation, as a demonstration or feint under cover of which he planned a more decisive stroke. On o April, the Austrians evacuated their forward positions. Massena was ordered to push on in the direction of Alexandrie and engage in "frontal pressure." Napoleon then formed a detached corps and directed it deeply into Austrian territory, to seize a crossing of the Po. His ultimate plan was fully revealed in his report to the French War Department, 6 May: "My intention is to force a crossing of the Po, as dose to Milan as possible, to avoid further obstades to that city.By this movement, I turn the successive lines of defense which (the Austrians) have prepared along the Agogna and Tessin.I move on Plaisan:e today, and shall be between the enemy and his depots...Imay be accused of being bold. but not of being slow In this conception, one should have no difficulty in recognizing the salient factors: demonstration by Massena against Alexandrie—Valenza to deceive the Austrians and keep them engaged frontally; a rapid march, under cover of a natural screen, the Po River, in order to place the mass of the French in rear of the enemy; the seizure of a strategic barrier, the line of the Adda, astride the Austrian communications. This agrees in every detail with the procedure previously shown on the schematic diagram; in other words, we are in the presence of a system! 'SeeChap. V. Par. 23g. --- Page 153 --- THE NAPOLEONIC CONCEPT OF MANEUVER'43 By 8 May, Napoleon was across the Po. He fought a sharpengagement with an Austrian detached force and secured the crossing of the Adda at Pizzighettane; he then moved north to seize Lodi and Cassano and cut off the lastavenues of retreat left open to the Austrians. The reaction of the Austrians was violent; the threat to the rear was sufikient to cause their retreat on Milan and Mantoue; their rear guards barely cleared the crossing at Lodi when the leading element of the French Army appeared there. , -'-- -—.-S .- PLATE 94.ITALY, 1796: OPERATIONS 2APRILTO 8 MAY. Napoleon was not able to intercept his opponent entirely; there were delays due to his lack of bridge equipment and the state of exhaustion of some of his units. Nevertheless, he had forced the Austrians to evacuate Lombardy in disorder and completely isolated their former ally, the Sardinians, with immediate political effect.Seemingly abandoned by the Austrians, the Sardinians promptly nego- tiated for a separate peace. The manuever against the rear accomplished what direct frontal pressure against successive lines could never have achieved. b. The maneuver of Ulm, 1805. In analyzing the maneuver of Lodi, only one of the many similar operations has been selected; many others could be mentioned if time and space were available. Advancing about ten years to the next example, in 1805, one recognizes the same general maneuver on a more ambitious scale. The preliminaries of the campaign of Ulm, 1805, represent one of the most interesting examples of a command decision. Note the initial French concentra- tions along the channel with a view to attempting a landing in England. Sud- denly evidence developed that Austria and Russia were making war-like prepara- tions. By early September, Austrian armies were actually advancing west to the line of the Rhine. The Austrian strategic dispositions would indicate dispersion; at this stage of the game, this was understandable, as they were trying to cover both northern Italy and the Tyrol. Requirement: Decision of Major General "A,' i.e., Napoleon I. --- Page 154 --- z I 0z 0 144MANEUVERIN WAR Napoleon decided on a complete reversal of plans—to abandon the initial proj- ect of an invasion of England, for the time being, and by a colossal march-of concentration to move his army from the Channel to the Rhine in order to turn against the Austro.Russian combination. z w -J 4 This is an extraordinary example of strength of character, strategic imagination and boldness of conception. Napoleon's decision and the resulting campaign are perhaps the finest example of professional workmanship in recorded military history. --- Page 155 --- THE NAPOLEONIC CONCEPT OF MANEUVER145 The next movements in this great military drama should be plain because you already know the secret of the Napoleonic system: a maneuver against the rear of the enemy. 0 z0 I- In a huge wheel to the south, which resembles the German advance into Bel- glum in 1914,hiscorps converge on the junction of the Danube, Iller and Lech. On 2 October, Napoleon wrote Bernadotte: °U the Austrians dday. I expect to arrive on the Lech before them, cut their retreat and drive them into TyroL" On 3 October he wrote Soult: '1t is my intention to surround the enemy when he is encountered." --- Page 156 --- 146MANEUVERIN WAR With his mass in vicinity of Augsburg, astride the Austrian communications, Napoleon initiated a concentric movement against his opponent. On 12 October, he was certain to be able to surround the Austrians and wrote Soult: 'It is not now a question of merely attacking the enemy; I now expect not a single man to escape—not a man to carry the news to Vienna After a vague attempt to break through the tightening cordon, the Austrian First Army was forced to capitulate at Ulm. As one views this campaign in its entirety, one is impressed with the fact that the final battle dispositions around Ulm seem almost visibly forecast in the strategic advance that began on the English Channel and terminated in a city in Bavaria, as if a gigantic hand had stretched across a continent to gather in the Austrian forces. c. The maneuver of lena, 1806. Another example of the favorite Napoleonic maneuver is shown in his campaign against Prussia, culminating in her defeat at Jena and Auerstadt in i8o6. The usual recapitulation of essential factors will be followed: (1) Initial dispositions. Wide dispersion of French corps in cantonments. Initial Prussian concentrations, with a view to attacking the French in the western area; Russian support was arranged for and they were en route from the east. (2) Enemy lines of communications, supply bases, and avenues of retreat. (a) The route: Erfurt—Leipzig—Berlin. (b) The route: Jena—Gera—Dresden, towards Russian reinforcements. 95000 PLATE .GENERALSITUATION OF THE FRENCH ARMIES, iSo6. --- Page 157 --- THE NAPOLEONIC CONCEPT OF MANEUVERz47 (c) The route: Eisenach—Mansfeld—Magdeburg. Like the Austrians in 1796 and 1805, the Prussian Army. was dependenton convoys and depots for supplies. ()Strategicbarrier: A river line cutting the line of communication, in this particular situation the river Saale and its tributaries. ()Strategicscreen to cover the movements of the French: The line of the Thuringer Wald; a belt of forests. ()Demonstrationto deceive the enemy. Demonstration against Wesel by the King of Holland. Occupation of cantonments until the last moment, in order to give the impression that no offensive was contemplated. (6) Movement and objective of the French: Rapid concentration by forced marches in the directiOn of Berlin and seizure of the crossings of the Saale, which control the avenues of retreat of the Prussian Armies on Leipzig and Dresden. (7) The decisive battle: Converging movement against the enemy, who was retreating in several columns, and defeat of fractions in detail at Jena and Auer- stadt. d. The model maneuver. Throughout his career Napoleon maintained an absolute confidence in the efficacy of this maneuver against the rear of an enemy. We shall give a final proof that his views, his conception of this maneuver, were absolutely fixed to a degree of a system by quoting his own words. 50050(00 PLATEg8. THE ADVANCE ON JENA, '806. In 1813 Prince Eugene was holding the Adige with 40,000 men; the Austrians were between the Brenta and the Adige. The Prince wrote Napoleon for advice. --- Page 158 --- 148MANEUVER IN WAR The master replied: "Do not give up the Adige without a fight.Thisis the maneuver which I would under- take: Move via Brondolo-Mestre on Trevise and the Piave.. Youcan expect incalculable results.The enemy communications run via Trevise and Conegliano; cut them ...Per- haps I should not insist on this bold maneuver, but itis my style, my manner of doing things..." So Napoleon had a "style," a "manner of doing things." A favorite system, that of a maneuver against the enemy's rear! A wide turning movement—and not the frontal pressure that head-on collision which for some inexplicable reason has become a favorite tactical solution by the average commander. 33. THE MANEUVER ON INTERIOR LINES. We are now ready to cover the second of Napoleon's favorite maneuvers, a maneuver from a central position,i.e., operations on interior lines.8 The operation is generally effective and deserves most respectful regard; its most modern application is to be found in the Battle of Tannenberg in 1914. The "Orientation Map" (Plate go) shows the relative frequency with which Napoleon resorted to operations on interior lines. Compared with operations against the enemy's rear, or turning movements, the ratio is approximately 7 to 3. We propose to cover the initial phase of the Campaign of 1796 and the entry into the Campaign of 1815. What constitutes the "maneuver from a central position?" When Napoleon had no effective superiority of strength or numbers or was unable to make the necessary concentration to that effect, he did not fall back to "position warfare" or a purely "defensive battle" but had recourse to maneuvers from a central position, or operations on interior lines. He sought to divide the opponent or profit from an initial division if it existed; he then maneuvered for a central position between enemy fractions in order to defeat them in detail, viz: •The Preach phraseology is "maneuver from a central position ;"theinevitable French. logic implies that thereis,initiallyat least,a'positionin readiness.' PLATE gg. EUGENE INITALY,18*3. --- Page 159 --- THE NAPOLEONIC CONCEPT OF MANEUVER149 THEMANEUVER FROM A CENTRAL POSITION (a)Operation from a central position. as an "initial offensive": The opening campaigns of 1796, 1812,and1815. (b)The central position, as a "position of readiness": 1796—Operations at Castiglioni, Arcole, Rivoli.Central position: Mantoue. 1805—Before Austerlitz.Central position: Vienna. i806—Before entry into Warsaw.Central position: Warsaw. i8og—Before Essling.Central position: Vienna. i8i—Fall Campaign.Central position: Goerlitz. 1914—Entire Campaign.Central position: Zone between Seine and Marne. The characteristic execution of this maneuver, conceived as an "initial offensive," may be summarized as follows: As an initial offensive stroke, Napoleon threw his mass into a gap existing in the enemy's dispositions. He attempted to destroy the separated fractions in detail by concentrating mass against one while containing the other until he could turn against the latter. This maneuver ordinarily required a painstaking preparation in which certain essential factors must be satisfied in advance: (i)Selectionof initial direction of offensive. (2) Selection of enemy fraction to be attacked. ()Secondaryoperation, demonstration, to deceive the actual area of offensive. PLATE soo. CAMPAIGN OF ITALY, t7g6. enemy as to the 04p PM. GLLP OF GENOA I --- Page 160 --- MANEUVER IN WAR ()Specialmeasures to insure secrecy. ()Thestrategic concentration. (6) Organization of alternate lines of operation. a. Campaign of 1796. We propose to show the application' of these elements in the Campaign of Italy, 1796. Inthe opening phases of this campaign, Austrians and Sardinians opposed the French along the Appenines. (i) Selection of initial direction of offensive: Napoleon decided on a break. through operation from Savona in the direction of the point of junction of the Austrians (Beaulieu) and Sardinians (Colli). (2) Selection of enemy fraction to be attacked: Napoleon decided on attack- ing the Austrians in position at Montenotte. (3) Secondary operation to deceive enemy as to the actual area of the offen- sive: Preparatory to the offensive stroke, Napoleon made demonstrations against Voltri to divert the Austrians, and frontally against the Sardinians up the valley of the Tanaro. The Austrians reacted to the threat on Voltri by making a detach- ment of approximately io,ooo men, thereby weakening their main forces pro. portionately. ()Specialmeasures to insure secrecy: Secret concentration at Savona; a night march to Carcare for surprise attack at dawn. The Austrians were driven from their positions and fell back; a gap was created between the Allies. (5) Organization of alternate lines of operation: Containing the Austrians, Napoleon immediately turned on the Sardinians and defeated them at Millesimo; the gap widened still more. The operations from this point on are characteristic 'p 0 -J50KM. 'TWERP \ NAPOLEON PLATE101. CAMPAIGN OF 1815. --- Page 161 --- THE NAPOLEONIC CONCEPT OF MANEUVER151 "operations on interior lines," with Bonaparte reinforcing one or the other wing to create local superiority. The rest of the story has been told already in describ- ing the maneuver of Lodi.° b. Campaign of 1815. The next example, the entry into Campaign of1815, reveals nothing that we do not already know as to method and execution. In many respects this was a campaign of despair, and yet it might have succeededt It is matchless in boldness of conception. It is an exact replica of the maneuver of 1796, but the reaction of Blucher and the Prussians was different in 1815 from that of Beaulieu and the Austrians in 1796. A curious coincidence—the same maneuver at the beginning and the end of an incomparable career! Note the usual situation: a strategic disposition of the Allies that invited a strategic penetration. Napoleon decided to concentrate his forces rapidly and secretly, then throw this mass into the gap existing between the Allies, and defeat one or the other before they could effect a junction. The opening moves wçre successful; Napoleon's concentration was completed before the Allies were fully aware of it. On i6 June 1815 he struck the Prussians at Ligny. The blow, however, was not decisive enough; instead of retreating east, Blucher made every effort to rejoin Wellington.If Blucher had retreated or remained impassive, the situation might have developed into an exact repetition of the maneuver of 1796.In the meantime Napoleon turned on Wellington, leaving to Grouchy the delicate task of pursuing or containing the Prussians. Grouchy failed in this infinitely important mission, and Waterloo was decided against Napoleon by the timely arrival of the Prussians who rejoined the British. The question might be raised as to applicability and value of Napoleon's two favorite strategic maneuvers in modern warfare. As regards the maneuver against the rear of an enemy, the communications of a modern army are probably today more vulnerable and its dependence on them greater than at any previous period in history. Mobility has been greatly increased by the use of armored fighting vehicles and motor transport, and nowadays mobile columns can be equipped for rapid movement at a rate relatively far greater, com- pared to the main force of the adversary, than would ever have been possible in Napoleon's time. In addition, they enjoy the valuable guidance and assistance of the air arm. We may say that under modern conditions the first Napoleonic maneuver may be adapted for use with a spçed and efficiency of which its author could not have conceived. The maneuver from a central position, on the other hand, depended for its success on obtaining a rapid and complete decision in the initial offensive actions. Under modern conditions this would probably prove less easy of attainment than in Napoleon's time. Modern means of information and signal communications tend to facilitate the cooperation and liaison of separated forces of the enemy and guard against defeat in detail.It seems that only under special circumstances would this second of the Napoleonic maneuvers retain its value today; e.g., if the enemy were very widely dispersedand his columns divided by difficult natural obstacles. • Par. 32a. supra. --- Page 162 --- vm THENAPOLEONICCONCEPT OF BATTLE 34. THE TRANSiTION FROMMANEUVER io BATTLE. The Napoleonic concept of manuever and his concept of battle are intellectually and originally related.The first deals with operations of a strategic character, while the other approaches the field of tactics, and yet they are closely interwoven, as strategy and tactics must be,aconception in which the strategic plan ripens into tactical execution on the battlefield. That organic relationship is never more apparent than in the Napoleonic operations.Reflect on the Campaign of Ulm where the final battle around a little Bavarian city seems almost visibly forecast in those enormous marches of concentration that began on the English Channel. Napoleon himself remarked on this interrelation: "In the difficult art of war, the system of battle is already conceived in the system of operations, of the Campaign, as a whole; thisis ordinarily not understood." PLATE 102.THEMANEUVER This thought is as applicable today as it was a hundred years ago; it is especially applicable to the control of large units, army, corps and divisions. The dispositions of such units are not easily changed. A platoon command,er may change his mind and his small Unit will react quickly; unfortunately, that is not the case with large units. Once those ponderous masses are launched, it is as if one had opened the floodgates of a mighty dam. 1Correspondence. Vol.XII,page10,032.Observations surIarelation ocielle Russe deIiBataille dAusterlitz. 152 3BRAUNSBERG MEHLSACPc L.8ING . FRIDLANO MOHRUNGEN• SA.ALFCLD LOBAU STRASBURO BERNADOTTE MIAWA(I VANV'OSTROLCNR PRASNVEe OF EYLAU, 1807. --- Page 163 --- 0 z — U I- THE NAPOLEONIC CONCEPT OF BATTLE The initial march dispositions of large units must conform to a plan, culminat- ing in maneuver, and therein lies the enormous personal responsibility of the commander: the necessity for anticipation. That anticipation increases in direct ratio with an increase in the size of his unit. The brigade commander ordinarily will not have to think beyond the local combat zone, a zone limited by the effect of fire. The division commander may have to enlarge this to, let us say, a radius z -J 'C I- ofaction of one or two days; the corps increasingly so, and the army, to a radius of action comprising a theater of war. It has been stated previously that there are two elements in a plan of maneuver: --- Page 164 --- 154MANEUVERIN WAR (i) a speculative initial idea and (2) its realization on the ground. The operations leading to Eylau are a clear demonstration of this highly important distinction. On the battlefield of Eylau, Napoleon brought about a double envel9pment in conjunction with a frontal attack.If you examine critically the march.graph of the Imperial Army, it is apparent that this "speculative initial idea" governed the movements of the army and dictated the general march dispositions: central columns to fix and contain the enemy, and flank columns to close in on the enemy's flank as soon as he had been fixed by the central mass. One can readily see the suppleness of this system and this formation. The maneuver idea is independent of the zone or area in which it will be executed: whether the battlefield be Bergfried, Landsberg, or Eylau, there is still a frontal attack aided by two flank attacks. Since Napoleon attempted more than forty times a strategic operation against the enemy's rear, it is a foregone conclusion that something similar would be attempted on the field of battle. In the Campaign of Ulm, i8o, the preliminary objective of the Napoleonic columns was a line astride the enemy's avenue of retreat to the east, i.e., mass placed in rear of his opponent; the final objective, however, was the Austrian Army in vicinity of UIm; in his further advance, Napoleon retained his mass astride the main Austrian line of retreat toward Augsburg, while flank detachments closed in via the Danube and Memmingen. In such a situation the enemy may either turn and fight or try to escape. The "mass" moves on him, while "flank detachments" intercept alternate lines of retreat or withdrawal. When the mass gains contact, it engages the enemy and pins him down while the flank detachments dose in to decide the issue. As at Eylau, it is apparent that the strategic advance is already an initiation of later tactical dispositions, resulting in a frontal combat by the mass and envelopment or flank attacks by secondary or detached forces. PLATE 104.THEBATTLE OF ULM. --- Page 165 --- THE NAPOLEONIC CONCEPT OF BATTLE155 35.THE INTERNAL. Suucruas OF BATTLE. In a step-by-step development of the internal structure of the Napoleonic battle you will find presently that you are already familiar with his basic ideas; as an interesting sidelight, it can be shown that many terms of the most modern application have either been directly coined by Napoleon or were used by him in a modern sense. In general, the structure of the battle, the scheme of maneuver, is influenced by a basic principle frequently enunciated by Napoleon himself. Tssa BAsic PRINclria "War of movement or siege operations have one idea in common; fire must be con- centrated on a single point: once the breach is made, the equilibrium is broken, the rest is useless... donot dissipate your attacks but concentrate them." There is a direct corollary to this basic thought: it is not necessary to be strong along the entire front or expect success all along the line. It is sufficient to effect, through a local powerful blow, a local disorganization which will bring about the collapse of the remaining front. This blow has been called the "principal attack," or, as we call it, "main attack." L'attaque principale: Term used by Napoleon in his critique of the Battle of Minden. (Précis des Cuerres de Frederic II, Vol. XXXII, page 203.) Thecomparatively ancient thought is repeated in our latest official texts: Ow WINEIN NEW BOi-rLEs THE STRUCTURE 0F BATTLE PLATE 105.THESTRUCTURE OF BATrLE. B B Napoleonic Version Fire must be concentrated on a single point ..."... Donot dissipate your attacks, but concentrate them .. Modern Version Manual Commanders Large Units, 1930, page 59: '...tacticalmaneuyer that will result In concentrating a superiority of fire and numbers at the vital point .. Page6o: '...(Commander)seeks to de- liver a main blow at some essential or weak point, by organizing a main attack upon which he concentrates a maximum effort-." NENEMY LINE OFRETREAT 2NENVELOPMENT 1 3 --- Page 166 --- 156MANEUVERIN WAR One may even say, amongst professionals, that the Napoleonic principles are commonplace, but when one traces their execution, one is amazed at the skill, intelligence and brilliancy with which this great commander fitted a "principle" to local conditions! The Napoleonic battle is oriented exclusively with reference to this main attack. Ordinarily one can distinguish three phases or acts: I.First Phase:Preparation of the Main Attack: .Frontalor hol4ing attack 2.Operationon the flank of the enemy: Envelopment 11.Second Phase:Execution of the Main Attack: 5.Penetration HI.Third Phase:Exploitati6n of the Main Attack: 4.General direct pressure 5.The strategic pursuit. On the eve of battle, with contact established and sufficient information of the enemy dispositions, in the broadest meaning of the term, Napoleon determined his scheme of maneuver from which he rarely deviated. This scheme of maneuver was oriented exclusively with reference to the main attack and the point or area in which this main attack was to be executed: that point was often fixed "in advance," and before battle. Now where was this critical area located? Ordinarily on that wing of the enemy's disposition which was nearest his natural line of retreat or line of communication and at the point of junction of this wing with the enemy center. In modern school language, this preliminary consideration could be termed "initial disposition for battle and the location of the main effort." That phase of the action under the heading of "preparation" involved a holding attack. We are familiar with the tactical purpose of the holding attack: to contain the enemy, to force him to commit his reserves, to exhaust his combat power, and to prevent him from reinforcing the front where the main attack eventually is to take place; for this phase of the fight, Napoleon used troops sparingly. With the holding attack under way, Napoleon staged an envelopment. Oc- casionally, his object was demoralization rather than tactical effect. He counted on the enemy's reaction to this threat: his use of his last reserves, if any, or—more important still—an extension of his flank. This extension might result in a gap or an over-extension, i.e., a distinct weakening of the enemy's line in that area. With the weakening process under way, Napoleon hurled a compact mass for a breakthrough, a penetration at that point. The envelopment was then shifted to cut the enemy's line of communication and make the victory decisive. The role of the envelopment may consequently be defined as follows: s.Exercise a demoralizing effect upon the enemy. 2.Produceover-extension of the enemys flank, in a known area. .Fixthe time of the main attack. 4.Close the enemys line of retreat. This is a very important point! The envelopment was used to create a soft spot, ripe for penetration! In the language of 1918, this is "soft.spot tactics"—with the enormous difference that the Napoleonic "soft.spot" was created as a calculated effect of his own dispositions and was not the soft-spot of igi8, left to chance discovery as the attack progressed. A further important point is the ultimate use of the envelopment in the ex- ploitation of the breakthrough. The envelopment was directed against the enemy line of retreat; in its ultimate purpose it was to establish a barrier to intercept the retreating fragments of the enemy. A characteristic example of the role of the envelopment can be cited in the --- Page 167 --- THE NAPOLEONIC CONCEPT OF BATTLE157 operations around Allenstein—Bergfried, on the march to Eylau. In the "Bulletin of the Battle of Allenstein," Napoleon wrote: This same thought is clearly expressed in our current2 PLATE iofl.BATTLE OF ALLENSTEIN, 1807. Soult was ordered to move on the road to Guttstadt and to seize the bridge of Bergfried, and debouch on the rear of the enemy with his entire corps—a maneuver which would have given this battle a decisive character." 435.An enveloping attack will ordinarily be successful only when accompanied by a frontal attack sufficiently vigorous to force the enemy to commit a large part of his forces to frontal defense In the general case, the enemy's preparations to meet the envelopment of his flank can not be as completely organized as the defense of his front- Successfulenvelopment directly endangers the enemy's lines of communication and opens the way for the decision. The general attack is so timed that the enveloping and frontal attacks take place simul- taneously or that the enveloping attack is preceded by the frontal attack designed to force the enemy to commit the greatest possible portion of his forces to frontal defense Every thought contained in these modern paragraphs represents distinguishing marks of the Napoleonic battle: the combination of frontal attack and envelop- ment, the effect of the envelopment, the timing of both attacks, or rather, their coordination in time and space—old wine in new bottles, 36. THE EXECUTION OF THE MAIN ArrACK. Now let us consider the main attack. It usually took the form of a penetration, a breakthrough operation. For this purpose, Napoleon set aside a "breakthrough mass" (masse de rupture). This mass must penetrate to the heart of the enemy position. Napoleon made this mass as strong as possible—ordinarily a corps reinforced by the artillery of his guard and the general cavalry reserve. The principle of concentration is every- where apparent: a massing of fire, a concentration of artillery, an assault organized in depth and carried regardless of losses. The employment of artillery was modern; the technique of the breakthrough was modern. The Battle of Friedland is typical of the Napoleonic employment of artillery: 120 guns were collected, then galloped to a distance of 8oo yards from the enemy for fire by salvo; then they advanced by echelon to 300 yards, firing case-shot. One-half of the gun crews and two-thirds of the limbers were put out of action, •P. S. R.. U. S. Army, 1923. --- Page 168 --- 158MANEUVERIN WAR but their mission was fulfilled: preparation for the breakthrough assault of the infantry. The procedure at Wagram was similar: covered by a cavalry charge, ioo guns were brought close to the enemy for a murderous preparation fire; then the break- through mass was launched in the assault. In this case, the decision, however, was not exactly brought about by the breakthrough but rather through the effect of Davout's flank attack. The breakthrough column was echeloned in great depth: 8 battalions in column of battalions, followed by i6 additional battalions echeloned to the right and left; behind this mass, the cavalry divisions of Nansouty and Walther and a reserv, furnished by 20 battalions of the Divisions Serras and Wrede. It was expected that the assault echelon would be "consumed," but the rear echelons were to roll up the flanks of the gap while the cavalry exploited the breakthrough. This is all quite "modern," or the modern version is quite "Napoleonic," which. ever you prefer. Note Marshal Petain's Observations on the Battles of Champagne: Our current regulations3 have something to say about this: 0u WINEIN NEW BOrrLa.s 436. When the situation does not favor an enveloping attack, the main attack is directedwith a view to a penetration of the hostile front.The greatest distribution in depth isplaced in front of the prospective point of penetration..- Thepenetration is to effect a complete breakthrough of the enemys disposition so that he will be unable to recon-stitute his front on a rearward line.-reservesof corps and larger units are assigned themission of rolling up the flanks of a gap created by penetration. Isthere an essential difference in this paragraph and the Napoleonic conception? The language of the paragraph would seem to recommend penetration if envelop- ment was impracticable, i.e., either form of attack is regarded as exclusive of the other. Note that Napoleon used both and in close conjunction. Note the reference to the "prospective point of penetration." We know that Napoleon fixed this point a priori and we know why: opposite the soft-spot of $P.S. R., U. S. Army. 1923. PLATE toy.BATTLE OF WAGRAM, 1809. --- Page 169 --- THE NAPOLEONIC CONCEPT OF BATTLE159 theenemy disposition. And we further know that this soft-spot was brought about through over-extension or diversion of the enemy reserves, as a calculated direct effect of the envelopment. Consequently, there had to be an envelopment as an integral part of the maneuver. This feature appears to be the striking novelty in the Napoleonic set-up. ,il11" 112 Bns [ard PLATEio8. WAGRAM, 8og: MACDONALD'S ASSAULT. The 'breakthrough' is not the object but the means of arriving...atopen war- fare...byattacking the enemy upon one or both of the flanks, formed by a withdrawal of part of the front." 37. THE COORDINATION OF THE MAIN AND SECONDARY ATTACK. An equally important factor in the Napoleonic battle was the coordination, the accurate timing of the main attack and the envelopment. In the schematic diagram, they are marked successively 2 and .Ifunduly delayed, the envelopment may permit the enemy to endanger the holding attack; if premature, it may be stopped by available reserves. The exact timing, the obvious interrelation in this dual action, concerned Napoleon profoundly. One finds evidence of this preoccupation in each of his battle reports: DECISIVE MOMENT Bulletinde Bautzen: "The 'moment to decide' the victory was already dear Bulletin de Wachau: -Themoment appeared to be decisive-.." Castiglioni(Correspondence. Vol. XXIX, page 135): -Serrurierwas to march at night, appear in rear of Wurmser's left, at daybreak. His fire was to be the signal for the principal attack.We expected a great moral effect from this surprise attack." Bulletin de Wagram: •(Davout) was to turn the position of Neusiedel-•-theDuke of Raguse and MacDonald formed column, to attack Wagram at the moment when (Davout) debouched." This ought to interpret sufficiently the factor of timing of the main attack, predicated upon the secondary or enveloping attack. As a rule, the envelopment 8Battalions 6 Bns Nansouty II Bns______ Serras Waliher 9 Bns Wrede --- Page 170 --- i6oMANEUVER IN WAR was subordinate to the main attack. But there were instances in which the envelop. ment was assigned the major role. Even if there is no question as to their relative importance, there is always a distinction between the principal and the secondary action, which is reflected in the distribution of troops between a principal and a secondary zone of combat. The maximum density of troops, of course, is laid in the principal zone of combat. This is just another way of stating the time- honored "principle of economy of force" and "mass". Our current regulations4 express it as follows: 44.'...troopsare distributed...intotwo principal elements:A main or de- cisive attack in which the greatest possible offensive power is concentrated...anda secondary or holding attack designed to contain the enemy, force him to commit his reserves to action.. preventhim from reinforcing the front attacked by the troops of decision." 38. TEE EXPLOITATION OF THE MAIN ArrACK. This leads to the last act in the drama of battle: the exploitation of the main attack. The penetration may have affected only a portion of the enemy's line, certainly the wing against which the main attack was directed. But the penetration is carried through: "the breach is made; the equilibrium is disturbed..." Atthis point Napoleon ordered general direct pressure along the entire front even to the point of exhaustion, in order to facilitate the further action of his envelopment and initiate the strategic pursuit. This envelopment aimed generally at the enemy's line of com- munication or retreat, with a view to seizing a strategic barrier in order to inter- cept the retreating fragments of the enemy. This function of the envelopment naturally forced the retreating enemy units to long detours greatly facilitating the strategic pursuit, which then became the mission of cavalry and horse artillery in strong cavalry formations, especially created by Napoleon. At Marengo, the Austrian Army had to capitulate. At Ulm, the remnants of Mack's Army were caught later by Murat. After Jena, every remnant of the Prussian Army was picked up in less than a month's time. Z'%OA L PENETRATION PLATE 109.THESTRUCTURE OF BATTLE. As one reflects on the schematic diagrams representing the structure of the Napoleonic battle, it is apparent that there is a sequence of events and a careful coordination of effort. The most striking single factor is the positive combination of main attack and envelopment and the deliberate attempt to create a soft-spot, as a calculated after-effect of this envelopment. The soft-spot of 1918 was left to chance, to be exploited when discovered; the soft-spot of 1807 was created as a part of a deliberate scheme of maneuver. 'F. 5. R., U. S. Army, 1923. 5Camon. --- Page 171 --- THE NAPOLEONIC CONCEPT OF BATTLEi6i This single measure is a stroke of genius.It explains the man, in part, who made his own opportunities in the most spectacular career known to mankind. 39. EXAMPLES OF THENAPOLEONIC METHOD. a. TheBattle of Bautzen, 1813. Now let us trace the internal structure of the Napoleonic battle in several concrete examples. We have selected the Battle of Bautzen, 20-21Mayi8 i as one of the most characteristic types. I Notethe strategic advance of the French columns leading to the battlefield of Bautzen. We have previously mentioned the necessity for anticipation by higher commanders: "To command is to foresee." In large units, the principal mission --- Page 172 --- MANEUVER IN WAR of high command is to prepare the battle and not to conduct it personally on the terrain. It was further demonstrated, as in the maneuver of Eylau, that the con- ception of maneuver was present beforehand and was dearly reflected in the strategic advance, and that what we term scheme of maneuver, ordinarily confined to battle, was already contained in embryo in the march dispositions of the French columns converging on the probable battle area. The advance on Bautzen is as good an example as the maneuver of Eylau. It is obvious that the general plan of the Emperor for battle was forecast in his strategic march dispositions. The enemy was reported in the area: Hochkirch—Klix—Bautzen—Wilchen. The Emperor decided to "fix" the enemy, i.e., to contain him frontally with or 4 corps (Marmont, MacDonald, Oudinot) while Ney proceeded on a wide envelopment (turning movement) of the enemy right wing via Klix, to cut his communications and line of retreat to Bohemia. Supposing the enemy had been at intermediate points: Konigsbruck, Dresden, or Pirna? There would still have been a frontal attack combined with a wide envelopment of the enemy's r.ighd The Allies held a defensive position on the high ground between Doberschautz and Bautzen. On ig and 20 May, the French had gained contact all along the line. The arrival of Ney was timed for 21 May. PLATE iii. THE BATTLE OF BAUTZEN, 2t MAY i8t. The subsequent events developed according to the schematic diagram showing the structure of the Napoleonic battle. Check off the items: (I)Holding attach:Oudinot, MacDonald (2 corps). (2)Envelopment: Ney (3 corps), approximately 6o,ooo. In this instance the envelopment waz to be decisive in strength and effect; the center of gravity is in the envelopment rather than the so.called main attack. () Main attach: Soult and Bertrand (2 corps). Reserve: Imperial Guard, i cavalry corps. lix____- French '-AUles SOUL Bautze --- Page 173 --- THE NAPOLEONIC CONCEPT OF BATTLE163 Theset.up was perfect and promised a decisive battle.Ney, however, was several hours late in arriving and then became partially involved in a local struggle instead of marching straight on Hochkirch, astride the enemy's line of retreat. The main attack was heavily opposed until the pressure of Ney's envelopment made itself felt. This is an interesting instance where gravity shifted from the so. called main attack to the envelopment. But it returned eventually; the Emperor threw in his Guard, i.e., his last reserves. With their front broken, their right increasingly menaced, the Allies began a precipitate retreat. Napoleon did not reap the full fruit of this victory, however, as Ney had not reached his objectives and there was no cavalry for exploitation. The conduct of battle was typical and followed in general the schematic sequence which we established previously. b. TheBattle of Ulm,1805. The strategic background for this battle has already been covered. On 8 October 1805, Napoleon had reached an area in rear of the Austrians, commanded by Mack. Mack was compelledto face east. Napoleon began a con- verging advance on Ulm, to surround Mack. In Directive No. 9372, Napoleon wrote Murat: "If the enemy remains in his present position. I expect to wage battle—not tomorrow but the day attest—in order to give Soult time to arrive in this vicinity.I want Soult to envelop his right—a turning movement that ought to give us decisive effect." in the gradual development of this maneuver, a French central mass was placed astride the natural line of retreat of the Austrians and advanced towards them. The sequence of events is normal—as we now understand Napoleonic normalcy (i)Frontalor holding attack: Corps Murat, Ney, and Lannes. (2) Envelopment (Austrian south flank): Corps Soult, called from the south, where it had cut the last avenue of escape open to the Austrians. KIix2 3 PLATE 112.THEBATTLE OF BAUTZEN: SCHEMATIC. --- Page 174 --- 164MANEUVER IN WAR ()Mainattack: To startonarrival of Soult and directed against the Austrian right. PLATE ii.THEBATTLE OF ULM. 1805. o0 KM PLATE114.THEADVANCE ON JENA. 1806. --- Page 175 --- THE NAPOLEONIC CONCEPT OF BATTLE165 c. The Battle of lena, 1806. You are already familiar with the background to the battle of Jena. The Prussians were reported in the vicinity of Weimar. In swift concentra- tion, the mass of the French reached their rear, intercepting their communica- tions on Berlin and Dresden. Davout, with a secondary mass, was en route to Naumburg to cut their alternate retreat on Magdeburg. Without waiting for Davout, Napoleon established contact with the Prussian main forces under Hohenlohe. We have the usual procedure: (i)Frontal or holding attack:Angereau. Lannes, Ney. (2)Envelopment: Soult (enemy left). (3)Main attack (against enemy left): The Guard and Cavalry Reserves. Hohenlohe was defeated; the subsequent strategic pursuit resulted in the total destruction of the entire Prussian Army. 2 FRONTAL ATT- WAu g e r e a U •Iéna PLATE"5. THE BATTLE OF JENA, i8o6. d. The Battle of Eylau, 8 February 1807. You are already familiar with the maneuver of Eylau. The Russians in retreat had reached the vicinity of Eylau. Napoleon marched with a central mass on that point. Flank columns under Ney cut the Russian communications to the west toward Dantzig, and Davout operated on their east flank. In the evening of 7 February, Napoleon attacked the Russians in order to pin them to the ground. However, this was a cautiously conducted engagement, clearly a preliminary operation; he had no intention to risk the main battle until the afternoon of the following day, pending the intervention of his flank columns under Ney and Davout. The Russians counter-attacked on the morning of 8 February. Nevertheless, Napoleon took his usual dispositions, although with reduced forces: (i) Frontal or holding attack: Soult's Corps, approximately 20,000 men in 3 ENVELOPMEISoult 3 Lannes serve --- Page 176 --- i66MANEUVER IN WAR divisions. They were extended over a wide front, but Napoleon made up this deficiency by employing his entire artillery. (a) Mainattack (penetration): Angereau'sCorps, approximately ia,ooo, and Murat's Cavalry of io,ooo sabers. Napoleon retained the Guard as general reserve, approximately 6ooo men. L8thIG PREUS3 HOLLANDa MARIENBURG LIEBSTAD! MOPUNGEN' SAALtLD a LOGAU STRASBUR"\ BERNADOTTE •PRASNYC PLATEii6. THE MANEUVER OF EYLAU. 18o7. (3) Envelopment:Davoutreceived orders to turn the Russian left with his i8,ooo men; it was understood that Ney would turn their right if he arrived in time. PLATE fl7. THE BATTLE OF EYLAU. 1807. BRANSBCAG FRIOLANDa Russian Reserve Guerd* Murøt4•Qo/henen uereau --- Page 177 --- THE NAPOLEONIC CONCEPT OF BATTLE167 At io:oo o'clock the Emperor heard that the leading elements of Davoutwere arriving. He personally observed a shifting of the Russianreserves, evidently to meet the oncoming flank attack by Davout. It was at this junction that he ordered Angereau forward: Another example of the perfect timing, the close interrelation of main attack and envelopment. However, Angereau's Corps lost direction in a heavy snow storm while Davout's advance was slowed down. The battle became indecisive until the arrival of Ney; then the Russians retreated. 40. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. In the analysis of the Napoleonic concept of maneuver, we have recognized the presence of two characteristic systems of opera- tion employed by that great master:(i) the maneuver against the rear of the enemy, and (2) the maneuver from a central position,i.e., an operation on interior lines. It is quite apparent from the orientation map that while Napoleon employed the maneuver on interior lines on comparatively few occasions only, he operated against the flank and rear of his opponent almost habitually. One can obviously establish a parallel in his conduct of battle. The "maneuver against the rear of an enemy" becomes a turning movement, or a combination of frontal attack with an envelopment on the battlefield. "The maneuver from a central position" is an operation on interior lines, which is the same in the field of tactics as it is in strategy. We presume that we have given you a sufficient number of historical examples to show a comparative uniformity, or system, in the Napoleonic conduct of battle. We could quote still more: Castiglioni(1796), Marengo (i800), Allenstein (1807), Friedland (1807), Wagram (1809), Lutzen (1813), Wachau (1813). These are all battles of the normal type, using the term "normal" in the sense of fre- quent application, and they fall in the category of operations against the enemy's flank and rear. As regards battle from a central position, or operation on interior lines, there are only two clear-cut examples: Rivoli and Leipzig. The procedure, in tactics, in this case, was identical with that in strategy: when Napoleon was forced to fight with inferiority of numbers or means he never considered a purely defensive attitude but had recourse to a difficult, almost desperate maneuver: operations on interior lines, an operation you are familiar with, containing with a minimum of force the converging columns of the enemy while concentrating a local mass to strike and defeat a selected enemy fragment, repeating this until an equilibrium in combat strength was reestablished. Napoleon ordinarily avoided the risk inherent in this maneuver; as stated before, there are really only two characteristic examples. We may therefore conclude that battle from central position was exceptional and that Napoleon preferred a combination of frontal-attack, envelopment and penetration, which we have analyzed sufficiently to call it the normal or Napoleonic battle. We may further state that in this framework or system Napoleon employed every type of offensive action but their function was subordinate to a central idea, which can be expressed as follows: THESINE QUA NON "Thestrategic and tactical methods of Napoleon were designed solely to create, in his enemy, a state of material and moral dislocation for which he had prepared means of exploitation." --- Page 179 --- MANEUVER IN RECENT WARS --- Page 181 --- INTRODUCTION Excited by the international tension of these days, the public mind iscon- cerned with the nature and probable characteristics of the next war. The nature of war is static: the conflict of collective interests, prejudice and hatreds, impelled by economic causes, with war as an instrument of national policy; armies and the military are mere tools of statecraft, and the impasse that explodes in war is created by civil authorities, politicians, legislatures and cabinets. As regards the technical characteristics of war, there is no point in repeating the platitude that they are influenced by armaments and technicalprogress. The unmistakable tendencies of the wars of the nineteenth century are already out- lined in this study; the answer lies in the well-defined direction of historical evolution: the war of 1940islike the war of igg, which followed the pattern of 1958! The historical continuity of maneuver forms and the secret of military success have already been demonstrated; the general characteristics and probable efficacy of modern armaments are pretty well established; they are confirmed in very recent wars, in China, in Spain, in Ethiopia. Granted that in each case there were sharp variations in the relative combat value of the opponents, but this did not affect the manner, the method, the modern procedure with which the better equipped army operated, and it can still be stated that we know now how Japan or Spain or Italy will wage war, because we have seen them do it! As to other countries, in the absence of actual war, the annual maneuvers of foreign armies will generally reveal and forecast their manner of waging war. This reasoning lends considerable importance to the recent campaigns in Abyssinia, China and, more particularly, in Spain; in those far-flung operations there is to be found not only the age-old story of political and economic conflict growing into armed collision but also the reappearance of characteristic maneuver concepts and maneuver forms that have not changed materially from the work- manship of other days. The analysis of political antecedents was not initially in the purview of this technical study, and the writer has avoided the subject in previous chapters. The complex nature of modern war, however, requires a reference to basic causes and motivations in political, economic and social fields. To ignore these elements, in ostrich fashion, would be like dwelling on the destructive quality of a high-explosive without including its chemical composition. Obviously, modern history is still too controversial in some of its aspects to permit severe moral distinctions; contemporary history must remain largely a matter of individual interpretation; consequently1 the opinions expressed in these chapters are strictly personal and do not necessarily represent the views of the War Department. '7' --- Page 182 --- lx THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936-1939 41. A POLiTICAL IMPASSE. On 12 July ig6, Calvo Sotelo,the leader of the Conservative Party in the Spanish Cortes, delivered a sharp attack on the radical government, listing an appalling series of political crimes chargeable to the an- archist-socialist elements in government; the cleavage between political parties had become irreconcilable. When he finished his address, he had also signed his own death warrant. The Communist Party member, Dolores Ibarruri, known as the "pasionaria," a stream- lined, 1936 model of the "canaille" of the French Revolution, rose and shrieked a sinister challenge: "...thisman has spoken for the last timet" In the night of the 13.14, Sotelo was arrested in his home, driven to a lonely spot, in the best Chicago manner, and murdered by Fernando Cortes, an agent of the Guardia Civil. The effect of this murder can best be appreciated by placing it squarely in an American setting: it was equivalent to the theoretical assassination of the rec- ognized leader of one of our own political parties—an inconceivable situation in the United States, but for that very reason highly illuminating the desperate character of the Spanish internal situation and the moral quality of the so-called "Loyalists." At this point Franco stepped into the picture: his radio from Morocco on the seventeenth was a declaration of civil war. Two-thirds of the regular army took sides at once. 1Swiftaction before civil partisans could be organized—an im- portant lesson in civil disturbances—brought control of Andalusia to Queipo de Llano in the south, of Asturias to Mola in the north; inexplicable delay on the part of General Fanjul cost him his life and that of a majority of his officers and led to the piece-meal massacre of the garrison of Madrid. Goded, who was to have led a motorized unit from Barcelona, found a mutinous garrison on his bands and was executed. 42. CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATIONS. Initially, the Insurgents advanced from the south in three columns, sweeping aside the poorly organized and disciplined Government militia, and in a comparatively short time had reached the foot of the Guadarrama Mountains; this advance was checked at the gates of Madrid. Franco turned his attention to more favorable objectives and promptly cap- tured the city of Malaga, 9 February 1937. Shifting his operations to the north, be captured Bilbao, Santander and Gijon successively and by i October 1937, the Asturian campaign was successfully completed. From the viewpoint of high command, a certain quality of General Franco's is easily recognizable, that stamps him as a great commander; his elastic strategic dispositions, in shifting rapidly from one theater of operations to another, i.e., the essence of maneuver, when he recognized that natural or tactical obstacles made a continuation of the attack costly or fruitless, involving command deci- IThei&tial strength of Pranco was limited to immediately available Regulars, that sided with him, viz: The Army of Morocco3,000The continental Army117.000 StatePolice25,000 The troops in the Peninsula were scattered in variousgarrisons and eventuallyoperated in separate theaters. viz:Andalusia, Asturias, etc.The government had started with 30,000'AssaultGuards.i.e.,red militia and remnants of Regulars and nolice; both sides resorted to conscription, by annual classes,in territories under their control; initially, the advantage of potential man power lay with the eovernment.Q'ith a year. both op ponents were able to draft acid organize oves 200,000 men; by 1938 roughly half a million men were undea arms, on various fronts. 172 --- Page 183 --- THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936.1939173 sionsof a high order, indicative of an inherent strength of character; in this respect, Franco compares most favorably with that type of generalship of the World War that poured hundreds of thousands into a localized conflict,as at Verdun or Messines Ridge or the Somme. PLATE u8. PROGRESS OF CIVIL WAR IN SPAIN, 1936-1939. TheconceptiDn of movement, of maneuver, of the combination of frontal attack with the envelopment appears to have permeated all units of Franco's forces; we find its application in tactics as well as in strategy. The operations lead- ing to the capture of Santander are characteristic. A competent observer, Gen- era] Duval,French Army, remarks: "With inadequate artillery and weak in- fantry, the Italian legions obtained decisive results in a few days, thanks to con- tinuous movement, to maneuver along the heights against the flanks of the enemy, in a constant application of the envelopment. Can we learn from this? Yes, the triumph of mobility over inert mass, of attack over mere passive defense, 'Duval.Lvileconidv la giver, d'Espagne, Paris.1938. --- Page 184 --- 174MANEUVERIN WAR the superiority of quality troops skilled in maneuver over those who seek an ex dusive solution in the defense of trenches." The capture of Bilbao, with a formidable defensive organization, shows an analogous procedure: direct assaults against heavily organized positions appeared futile and costly; the attack was planned with separate columns against various passes, with mobile reserves held in readiness, to exploit any weakness discovered; the exploitation habitually took the form of flanking actions. At dawn, recon- naissance detachments would develop the hostile position; artillery registration began discreetly; on the next clear day, strong artillery concentrations, includ- ing 26o.mm and 3o5.mm howitzers, would be laid down and the infantry attacked on narrow fronts; the breach made, the shoulders were promptly rolled up; neighboring units then combined in flanking actions against the remaining de- fense segments. PLATE 119.THEDRIVE TO THE SEA, MARCH 1938 TO FEBRUARY '939. A temporary lull in ground operation followed the Asturian Campaign. On 15 December 1937, the Government launched a counter-offensive and captured Teruel. Sharply stung, the Insurgents reacted violently; operating in the dead of winter, they recaptured Teruel by23 February 1938. Without let-up of pres. sure, preparations were then pushed for a drive to the Mediterranean. On g March zg8, Franco launched his overwhelming and spectacular offensive which struck hard, swift blows with lightning-like rapidity on a front of 125 miles and THE DRIVETO THESEA AND MARCH1938 TO FEBRUARY1939 --- Page 185 --- THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936.1939175 in a little over a month captured oo towns and villages. By i April, the In- surgents had reached the sea, at Vinaroz; the Spanish "Vicksburg" campaign had split enemy territory in two, with the strategic advantage of thereafter being able to turn against one fragment while containing the other. The comparatively narrow corridor was widened in succeeding months by operations toward Sagunto and along the Ebro River. Red counter-attacks were local in effect and character, and by November 1938 the Government fell back definitely behind the line of the Ebro. Franco then made preparations for "the last push,' against Barcelona and Catalonia. On Christmas day, the final offen- sive began and did not end until the French border was reached on io February 1939. PLATE 120.THEOPERATIONS AGAINST THE SIERRA PALOMERA. 5-7 FEBRUARY ig8. 43. CHARACTERISTIC TYPES OF MANEUVER. It is not the purpose of thisstudy to cover these operations in detail, other than to continue to develop the central theme of "maneuver." This war has been followed with concentrated attention by the General Staffs of all armies; the nature of modern war was to be revealed, the efficacy of modern --- Page 186 --- 176MANEUVERIN WAR armament and equipment tested. There is no doubt that tell-tale information was secured, that relative values were established for many controversial items— and yet, the extremists who expected everything from the air or mechanization were not fully sustained. There were special conditions that limited the full effec- tiveness of modern armament and final conclusions are not yet justified, but, as a general remark, this war follows a fairly consistent pattern and the historical continuity of maneuver forms is once more established: the combination of frontal attack and the envelopment, the invariable efficacy of the flank maneuver, the interplay of mass and direction in which these time-honored factors reappear, buttressed by the latest armament: tanks, motor transport and aviation. a. Operations against the Sierra Palomera. This operation was a preliminary to the eventual recapture of Teruel, with the immediate objective of reducing the Sierra Palomera salient, which dominated the railroad to Saragossa. The tactical possibilities of this prominent salient were apparently appreciated by the Reds; as early as 27 January, General Rojo launched the division "Karl Marx," in direction of Singra, in an abortive attack to cut the Saragossa railroad. The Nationalists lost no time to retaliate with a counter-offensive. The group- ing of forces was as follows: General Yague (Y):s Moroccan Division, i Navariese Division, the Legion, 1 Cavalry Division. General Sanchez (S):1 Navarrese Division. General Aranda (A): 2 Galician Divisions, i Navarrese Division. The factors of mass and direction are clearly present: the relative weight of the frontal or holding attack and the decisive envelopment are recognizable in the allotment of three divisions to the flanks of the salient (Generals Yague and Aranda) and a minimum of only one to its front (General Sanchez); the maneuver procedure is identical with the historical pattern described previously.' The timing of the frontal attack, the progress of successive efforts, the superb coordina- tion of widely spaced converging attacks, create a picture of maneuver concept, superior staff work and command capacity that can hardly be surpassed. (1) The frontal attack:Sanchezattacked from assembly positions in vicinity of Torre de Carvel; by noon, he had captured the crest north of B.M. i58o and by evening he had reached Argente. (2) The envelopment (north): Under cover of a dense fog and supported by tanks, General Yague broke through Portalrubio and, without regard to his exposed left flank, pressed on to the vicinity of Fuentes; he captured 2000 prisoners. ()Theenvelopment (south): Aranda advanced in direction of Alfambra to get in rear of the defenders of the salient and cut their line of retreat; a Red counter-attack against Peralejos by the 151st and 157th Brigades was repulsed, and Alfambra was reached after heavy fighting. ()Onthe morning of the sixth, Aranda changed attack direction to the northeast, against the rear of the Red contingents held frontally by Sanchez. (5) During the sixth and seventh, Yague's main column continued the advance south via Perales and established contact with Aranda, while Monasterio's Cavalry Division operated in the gap, in direction of Visiedo, and in close con- junction with attack aviation harassed and destroyed the retreating remnants of the "Karl Marx" Division.' 'Chap. III. Pars. 10. 11. and 14; Chap. VI. Par. 26a;Chap.VIIIPars. 36 and 37.'The decisive intervention of modern cavalry in the exploitation 0/ a breakthrough and inDursuits1,ni,1 be noted in this action.Yague stated: • Alarge share of the credit for the success of this operation should go to Monasterios cavalryveterans,who demonstratedsowelltheirefficiencyinour northerncamDaign and who have again repudiatedthe doubts some militaryauthorities boldregarding cavairya usefulness in modernwar." --- Page 187 --- THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936-1939177 The net result of the three-day operations was the reduction of the salient, the capture of 70 field pieces, 6oo machine guns and 12,000 prisoners; losses were estimated at io,ooo in killed or wounded. b. Operations against the Sierra de San Just, April 1938. After the reduction of the Palomera salient and the subsequent recapture of Teruel, the next objec- tive was another defensive bastion jutting into the narrow Nationalist corridor to the sea, the salient formed by the Sierra de Pobo, on the west, and the Sierra SIERRADE SAN JUST PLATE121.THEOPERATIONS AGAINST THE SIERRA DE SAN JUST. 23 APRIL— 5 MAY 1938. de San Just, on the north; the western face of this salient was the line: Portal- rubio—Alfambra—Teruel, previously established by the brilliant attack on the Palomera salient, already described; this operation is consequently a continua- tion of the former and very typical of the step-by-step advance, in this period, where every ridge in mountainous country became a defensive line to be broken. The plan of attack involved a scheme of maneuver characteristic of Franco's style of warfare, i.e., avoidance of expensive frontal attacks, the envelopment of tactically difficult areas and cooperation of advancing columns by mutually supporting flanking actions, as the opportunity presented itself. With such a concept of maneuver, it was obvious that the Sierras de Pobo and San Just would be enveloped. The main effort was placed on the front: Perales—Fuentes Calientes, utilizing the existing road net, in three columns, and advance in the valley between the Sierras, on Villalba and Aliago. Envelopments by. weaker forces were undertaken in the south from Teruel on Corbalan, and in the north from Molinos on Ejulve and Bordon. A column operating from Alfambra against Escorihuela furnished the traditional frontal attack, against the face of the Pobo, designed to pin the defenders to the ground until the envelopment became tactically effective. At 8:oo A.M.,23 April, Varela fired a brief concentration of several hundred guns; the infantry advanced within 30 minutes, supported by successive waves of attack aviation. An advance of approximately 9 miles was made on the first day by Sanchez' --- Page 188 --- 178MANEUVERIN WAR 82d Division via Culvas and by the right column via Calve; the frontal attack and the envelopment on the south slowed down, which would have the ultimate effect of making the progress of the main effort even more decisive. Heavy snows on the twenty-fourth made the going difficult, but Varela pressed down the cor- ridor of Aliaga-Aguila; he hoped to cut off the garrison of San Just, in conjunc- tion with the io6th Division coming from the north; this outfit, however, did not get far beyond Ejulve; it took this division until the twenty-eighth to reach Bordon, and the bulk of the Reds made their getaway. Varela changed direction to the south, to complete the encirclement of the Sierra de Pobo (and the 22d Red Division); he took Jorcas and Ababuj on the twenty-sixth; when the weather cleared on 3 May, three Nationalist columns launched a reorganized attack and took El Pobo, Allepuz and Villaroja and cut the important Red communication via Cantavieja to the sea. The new front line stabilized, as shown on the map and, as so often before, a new bastion presented itself, the Sierra de Gudar, to be taken in the customary manner at a later date. PLATE 122. THE REDUCTION OF THE ALBENTOSA SECTOR, i TO 22 JUNE ig8. c. The reduction of the Albentosa Sector, June 1938. This operation was incidental to the drive on Sagunto. Franco took personal command. The salient was pronounced but was held by considerable Red forces, 40 battalions with 6o guns in heavily organized defensive positions, the XVII Corps on the north front, the XIII Corps on the west face of the salient, in vicinity of Sarrion, and two corps in general reserve. The sequence and timing of successive efforts in the plan of attack are char- acteristic of Franco's method and represent an object lesson in staff coordination. (i) Initially, pressure was applied against the east face of the salient, along the front of the Sierra Espadan, in the period 8 to i 2 June, by Generals Valino (GV) and Aranda (A), to immobilize enemy forces. (2) In the meantime, Franco assembled mass against the directly opposite face of the salient, on the line Mora de Rubielos—Sarrion—Manzanera. The group- ing of forces was as follows: ALBENTOSA --- Page 189 --- THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936.1939179 GeneralBerti: 3 Italian Divisions: Littorio, a3d March and Blue Arrow Divisions. General Soichaga (S): 2NavarreseDivision and Sad Division. General Varela (V):mixed divisions. ()Bertiattacked via Sarrion; Soichaga in direction of Manzanera. At 5:30 *.M.,13June, 300 guns opened fire against the relatively narrow breakthrough front; at 6:00 A.M. aheavy concentration was placed on Sarrion with over ooo shells, since it was known that the town contained staffs and reserves; at 7:oo A.M. bombersbegan to operate and within half an hour, the infantry followed. 5Sarrion was taken by nightfall. At this point, street fighting took place between tank units; with heavy going, an advance of 5 miles was accomplished that day. PLATE 1*5.THEOPERATIONS IN ESTREMADURA. ig-aJULY1938. Various crests in vicinity of Sarrion were heavily organized with concrete em- placements; close support by infantry mortars made a slow progress possible. $Thasaction contains an interesting example of infantsy.tank cooperation; the second wave of breakthrough tanks carried inIantzy detachments, with light M. G. and band grenades, who formed nuclei of resistance in disputed areas. 0 ESTREMADURA a$i'S:5$5 X*fl --- Page 190 --- i8oMANEUVER IN WAR ()Varelahad instructions not to attack on the thirteenth in order not to force back the defenders of the north salient but await theprogress of the break- through, which would eventually lead to an encirclement. ()Themain effort was shifted to south of Sarrion, in Soichaga's zone of action; local heights were taken by envelopment and successive artillery concen- trations. (6) On the fifteenth and sixteenth an advance was ordered along the entire front. Albentosa was captured; a mechanized column drove into Barracas. In the north, Varela took Mora de Rubielos and turned on Noguerelas, across the mountain. The time was ripe to close the salient from the east. ()Onthe seventeenth, a column advanced west of Lucena via Castillo and Zucaina; in forced marches they reached the vicinity of Montan on the nineteenth and established contact with Varela's troops: the salient was cut off. d. The operations in Estremadura, July 1938. This pattern of elastic warfare, so familiar and yet so modern in the tools of its workmanship, is repeated every- where. While Palomera, San Just, Albentosa are characterized by a step-by-step advance in mountainous terrain, the same pattern was applied in other sections of Spain with equally smashing results. The salient of Don Benito in Estremadura came within40 miles of the frontier of Portugal; the Reds attempted to extend it, in the fall of1937, and the National- ists made a previous attempt against Medellin; then calm reigned in this area until 14 June 1938, when Queipo de Llano drove a salient into the Sierra del Pedrosa to Peralede de Zauco. A month later, a more important offensive, prepared in strictest secrecy, was to net considerably more territory. The plan involved a double flank attack, or double envelopment, from the south by Queipo de Llano (Q),andfrom the north by General Saliquet(S) who had Monasterio's veteran cavalry division at his disposal, in view of great distances and lack of roads in this region. (i)Inthe broiling heat, Saliquet started on the nineteenth, mopped up the area north of the Guadina, crossed this river at Orellana on the twentieth and pushed on to Campanaria. (2)Queipode Llano advanced on Benquerencia and Castuera, which he reached on the twenty-second; on the twenty-fourth he established contact with Saliquet at Campanaria, and the salient was cut off. ()Afrontal attack via Medellin on Don Benito kept the defenders occupied until the town fell; the remnants began to withdraw, only to find their retreat cut off in the east. By the twenty-eighth, 20,000 prisoners had been collected, with 112 guns of various caliber, 82 tanks and 1326 motor vehicles. To protect the Almaden mercury mines, the Reds sent reinforcements in this region and a lull set in, since major operations had begun on the line of the lower Ebro. 44. THE EFFECT OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION. The Spanish cockpit was patron- ized by a number of "aficionados," who did a lot of spirited betting: the Russians, the French, the Germans and Italians; the British alone held aloof except for an occasional polite though futile gesture. The line of demarcation, of course, was strictly along political ideologies, i.e., communism versus totalitarianism, with a dash of strategic speculation on the part of the French, who may one day find the line of the Pyrenees in unfriendly hands; finally, the Blum government had never attempted to hide its parlor-pink coloring, while the Soviets would fIsh in troubled waters, as a matter of policy. --- Page 191 --- THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936-1939i8i The extent of French and Russian assistance is recognizable in the tell-tale per- centage of foreign materiel captured by the Insurgents in a single year:125 tanks, 947 aircraft (809 of Russian and 138 of French manufacture), 533 artillery pieces, 1457 light and 1466 heavy machine guns, 75,347 rifles, 126,600 artillery projectiles, 105,000,000 rifle cartridges;in that period, the Reds lost 220,000 men in prisoners and an estimated 3oo,ooo in killed and wounded; this is roughly equivalent to our Regular Army, National Guard and Organized Reserves com- bined. Russian shipments via the Dardanelles from September 1936 to o July 1937 were reported to amount to two million tons, carried in 469 vessels.' In this period, 8oo field pieces, 8oo tanks, 300 planes and 6ooo motor vehicles were received from the Russians, not to mention 2000 technical advisers, in commis- sioned grades. These figures represent approximately organic equipment for a field army of 400,000. In a single month, August 1937, i6i freight steamers (io British) docked in Spanish Mediterranean ports; 33 carried war material, 32 coal, 18 gasoline, 2 motor vehicles, and the balance miscellaneous freight. 8 Frenchsupport was equally important: during the crucial operations along the line of the Ebro (river operations), the Red attack was made possible only by bridge material that came via France; in a single month, August 1938, approxi- mately i o,ooo tons of war material reached Barcelona, containing i 700 tons in weapons and ammunition. Occasional glimpses of accurate daily data became available "...155motor trucks, loaded with 920 tons of supplies, for the Leftists, were speeding to Barcelona.""...fourfreight cars of machine guns and antiaircraft guns, 38 cars of knocked-down tanks ready for assembly and other heavy equipment entered from France." 10 Atthe French frontier town of le Perthus, on the main road to Barcelona, this writer has watched for many days a seemingly endless stream of 10-ton trucks crossing into Spain. A customs official told me the daily average was 200 trucks •..2000 tonsof war material entering Spain every day." A Theseesaw of conflicting interests, of course, is a typical case of the pot call. ing the kettle black. The Germans and Italians were equally active in releasing men, materiel and equipment to Franco. Apparently the Germans primarily furnished antiaircraft guns, artillery, tanks and airplanes with cadres of technicians, in rotation. The Italians, on the other hand, maintained organized expeditionary divisions from the outset; their de- signations became known in early dispatches, viz: Littorio, Black Arrow, Green Arrow, 23d March., etc. The first year of the war was admittedly a critical one for Franco; the important if not decisive character of Italian support can be gauged by figures released in the semi-official Force Armata. "... Theperiod of mid-December 1936 to April i7 was a period of most intense activity (for the Royal Italian Navy). In those four months there were transported to Spain about 100,000 men, 4370 motor vehicles, 40,000 tons of materiel and 750 cannons, in 52 ships which made i 32 voyages and for the protection of which it was neces- sary to employ o war vessels which made 134 trips." MU Wissenschaf I Nach,ichten, l9'R.Statistical Reports.0. H. Q., Burgos, i937. ' Post war revelations throw a sidelight on the commercialcharacter ofRussian assistance:...ac' cordingtoa communication dated Feb.10,1937. from the Spanish Republics Ambassador in Moscow, Bar. celino Pasqua, the amount of gold deposits in Russia was 501.079.529 grams of gold, approximatey $373,989,113 at 833 an ounce for gold."(1.uis Araquistain, Former Russian Ambassador to France.) In the mean'ime. the commosunists and "fellow travellers" have been collecting pennies and dimes for Spain on the street corners of New York.New York Hera!d.Tr:bune, 19 June, 1939. • Time, April51938. LaSoi.',Paris, March, 1938.•La Soir, March 12, 1938.1Axelson, NewYo,h Tsnsii, Aped12,193$. U Mathews,New Yo,k Tim,,, June8, 1939. --- Page 192 --- MANEUVER IN WAR 45. TACrICS ANDTECHNIQUEOF THE SEPARATE ARMS. a. Limiting factors. While significant, the military characteristics of the war in Spain are not altogether applicable to war between first-class powers; there are many limiting factors to be considered, for example the divergence of equipment and combat value in units. The Italian Legionnaires and Nationalists conformed to modern doctrines of combat and were organized as modern regular-army units. Variation in quality was more pronounced with the Reds; generally speaking, armament and train. ing were below the normal standards in corresponding infantry units of a modern army. The numerical deficiency of artillery, in both armies, affected tactical move- ments; mass concentrations were comparatively rare. In some sectors, defensive organization was strong and continuous because it covered vital objectives (Madrid, Saragossa, Huesca, Granada, etc.); in other sectors, there were only a series of observation posts, along roads, or small gar- risons in villages. b. Artillery. Initially, there was a shortage of artillery on both sides. The avail. able amounts, for the entire Spanish Army, at the outbreak of the war are re- ported as approximately 175 batteries of light and medium artillery; i8 batteries were organic equipment for each of the 8 normal infantry divisions. Franco's Moroccan Army of 34,000 men disposed of ibatteries only. 12Thislack of artil- lery was obviously responsible for the extensive use of bombardment aviation on what would ordinarily have been artillery missions. A contributory factor may be found in the prevailing mountainous terrain with defilades; the necessity of high angle fire, in such situations, for forward infantry, is reflected in the organic assignment of 65-mm howitzers to Franco's regiments. The first noteworthy concentration of artillery occurred in the siege of Bilbao. General Duval estimates 32 batteries, others as high as 50, a very respectable massing of fire behind 40,000 combat troops; such a force is roughly the equi. valent of two war-strength American divisiozis, with an organic allotment of only 6 batteries. ' Subsequently,there must have been a steady increase in the artillery ratios, until a massing of fire, in breakthrough areas, was possible that resembled the artillery densities on the West Front in igi8; such concentrations were the pre- lude to the attacks on the Sierra de Palomiera and on Sarrion. 1 Itis estimated that 30 to 40 batteries, principally of -mm and i-mm, sup- ported the Government attack on Brunete and Navalcarnero, 5 July 1937, with the added intervention of zoo to 150 planes. The Insurgent counteroffensive, two weeks later, was made with approximately 40,000 men and an artillery compo- nent of 40 batteries. The reports of captured enemy materiel, already touched upon (Par. 43) list from 500 to 700 guns, i.e., 125 to 175 batteries; this figure represents a severe loss for any army in any war, but it is also indicative of artillery ratios of consider- able strength. The employment of artillery is consequently in accord with pre- vailing doctrines and presents no startling innovation; it rather confirms the lessons of the World War: concentration of every available means of fire (artillery, aviation, tanks) upon a narrow front for a decisive breakthrough. As an acknowl- edgment of "historical continuity," the reader. need not be reminded that this UDuval,Lecon,itlagaerred'Epgae."Capt. Johnson. C. & G. S. S. Qaa,Ir-Iy, No. 72.1Col. Lanza.P. 4. Joarnal, June. 1958: "Two Italian divisions ...hadabout 72 batteries,or28* duos. insupport,ona front of some S kinsthe artillery prepuation lasted 75 minutes with an avera ex- penditureofnot quite 2 rounds perininute.. Thesehuresand frontages correspond roughly to the preparation Ssxs on Sarrion for the operation in the Albentosa sector. --- Page 193 --- THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936-1939183 point was perfectly understood by Napoleon, whowas a good artilleryman, first and last. 15- inview of the limited number of guns available, as a general proposition, the organic artillery of divisions had often to take over both directsupport and counterbattery fires; it was sometimes possible to satisfy both missions, but more often not. The problem of displacement forward, as the attack proceeded,was also difficult; pack batteries were reported doing this about as quickly as motor- ized units. Infantry-artillery liaison became an early and important factor. Direct and continuous observation was important; the radio set of the observation-liaison parties gave good results. Situation sketches, with objectives and targets entered and suitably designated by symbols, were effective; requests for fire were then made by these symbols for predetermined durations. c. Aviation. With mechanization, the air factor remains as the most challeng- ing of modern question marks. The experience-tests in the Spanish laboratory are not condusive, partly because of the comparatively modest extent of air opera- tion—but there are enough straws in the wind! 10 Aviationin Spain has carried out every conceivable flying mission, from troop- transport to bombardment. They launched the Insurgent movement by trans- porting between 5000 to io,ooo men, in tn-motor planes, from Morocco in August 1936. Relative strength varied; in 1g37, estimates credited the Nationalists with 6oo first-class aircraft, the Government with a steadily declining number. The equipment was modern, consisting of recent German, Italian, Russian and French types, viz: GermanItalianRussianFrench PursuitMessersmith-1o9Fiat-iChato & Mosca Potez & Type io BombardmentDornier- 17Savoia-79KatiouskaDewoitine Nationalist pursuit averages speed of 225 miles per hour; some bombardment types exceed that, with loads ranging from 1650 to 4960 lbs. The Government enjoyed a temporary superiority in the "Mosca" with a speed of 280 miles per hour and a rate of fire of i8oo rounds per minute from 2 M. G. Reconnaissance: With types limited to pursuit and bombardment, the latter had to carry out reconnaissance missions; in general, information received as the result of photographic and visual reconnaissance of front-line activities was poor; information of rear areas, however, was satisfactory. Bombing missions: Fast bombers, like the "Katiouska," performed their mis- sions at high altitude and without pursuit protection; interception was rarely accomplished and losses remained negligible; such speed and range permitted strategic employment of aircraft in different theaters of operations. Based on Madrid, these aircraft operated against Bilbao and Santander at distances of i8o miles. 17 Pursuit:The "Mosca" proved the importance of speed for pursuit aviation; on the other hand, some pilots perferred the Chato, with less speed, but greater 'Chap.VIII. Par. 35. 16GeneralArmengaudFrench Army, LaGue,'re d'Espa5ne. iT Brereton.C. & G. .S.Quariarly, No. 72. --- Page 194 --- MANEUVER IN WAR maneuver capacity. Contrary to prevalent ideas, this great speed does not prevent attack of other aircraft from either front or rear; the strong armament (M.G.) of the "Chato" made it perfectly willing to accept attack from the front. Cooperation with ground troops: Direct participation in the ground battle (as a "fifth arm," as Arrnangaud terms it) was a very characteristic feature of the war inSpain. Many infantry and staff officers are of the opinion that direct air sup- port of infantry is essential; German opinion particularly favors this position. In Spain, this use of aircraft had become almost habitual; low-flying bombers and flights of pursuit completed the artillery prepartion, or extended it, and often rendered close support to the infantry in the assault. Observers believe that it was primarily aviation which blasted out the intrenched defenders of Bilbao. A Government colonel stated: "No enemy attack of any importance could have suceeded with artillery preparation alone...artilleryfire had to lift as soon as the infantry was within 300 yards of our trenches...theaviation produced enormous moral and material effects...afterseveral days of violent bombard- ment, the occupants of our front lines being buried, killed, or worn out, the hostile infantry took possession"18 Armangaud. RevueMilüai,eGenevale, March. 1938. PLATE 124.THEMOTORIZED ADVANCE ON GUADALAJARA. -AVIATION AGAINST MOTORIZED INFANTRY— GUAALJARA MARCH 12.1937 05 --- Page 195 --- THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR., 1936-1959185 Thereis an opinion that on account of the speed of the modern plane, the results obtained by bombs upon small objectives such as bridges, cross-roads,etc., are largely a matter of chance; on the other hand, the bomber is most effective in beaten zones 500-600 yards long by 150-200 yards wide; it is regarded as "at least equal to artillery." A French observerstates: "infantry stands up badly to bombs, particularly the i10 lbs.,which is the standard projectile used by both sides." An ideal target for air attack, of course, are columns of vehicles or men en route; the incident at Guadalajara has furnished a historical example of dis- turbing quality, although the harassment of Turkish troops after Meggido in igi8 already forecasts all sinister possibilities. Aviation againstmotorizedinfantry.Theoperation on the Aragon front, known as the Battle of Guadalajara, deserves more attention than it has received. It repre- sents the decisive intervention of air craft against motor columns and stands as a warning of the constant menace of air attack in modern warfare. The Aragon front had remained a "quiet sector" until 8 March, when two Insurgent (Italian) divisions started a drive against. Guadalajara; until 17 March only hasty Government reinforcements were available; in the meantime (specifi- cally on 12March)the ensuing battle was fought and won by air operations. Approximately 20,000 men of Italian origin were shifted from the Insurgent Malaga front to the Aragon area on 2000trucks,a distance of 500miles.They were grouped into two "divisions," reinforced by "Ansaldo" light tanks and a few batteries of porte artillery. The fighting quality of these units was open to question—volunteers from southern Italy, farmers, unemployed on public relief, poorly trained recruits, held loosely together by "black-shirt" cadres and staffs. Concentrated on the line: La Tobe—Algora, the 2d Division encountered little resistance on this quiet front and advanced via Gajanejos, in S6 hours. One day, the tenth, was lost in waiting for the ist Division advancing to the east. This delay was due to the obviously poor road net: Almadrones—Brihuega. The weather turned cold and rainy. The elevation of this inhospitable section of Aragon is over ooo feet. On the eleventh, the long lines of motor trucks weathered a heavy storm by being tied to their paved routes; it was this column of about iooo vehicles that became the target for Russian attack aviation the next day. It must be noted that the terrain was ideal for an air attack: a barren, treeless plateau of ooo feet elevation with a single, narrow paved highway running in an almost straight line from Torija to the north; the adjacent ground was water- logged and very muddy. There was no evidence of anti-aircraft protection in the 20-km. column and the troops were not skilled in defensive measures. The Government assembled approximately zoo planes at the airdrome of Alcala-de-Henares, primarily Russian planes and Russian pilots; the composi- tion of this striking force was as follows: No.of Bombs planesType,lrmament01100 lbs. 48MonoplaneI i Attack2M. G.2 48Monoplane L i6 PursuitiM.G.2 24BiplaneR .ç Attack4 M.G.4 24MonoplaneS. B. "Katiousica"2M.C.4 Each M. G. was provided with i,rno cartridges. Apparently the bad weather prevented effective counter-operations by Insur- gent planes; the extraordinary optimism of the column commander may have been a countributing factor. 1Cq'tain Ponlain. Jo'rnd R. U. S.1..1932. --- Page 196 --- i86MANEUVER IN WAR On the twelfth, this mass of aviation was launched in a surprise attack, under cover of a low ceiling and. heavy douds, all planes flying low. The ad Division was caught strung out over 20 kms. along the highway to Saragossa. The attack was staged in successive waves: First—3o attack planes: I 15's Second—4o mixed planes: I 15's and R 5 Third—45 pursuit planes: L i6's. The L i6's were initially on protective missions but emptied their machine guns into the columns, toward the end of the action; over oo bombs were dropped and 200,000roundsfired. The motor column was stopped in its tracks, lack of lateral roads and the vile weather making escape or deployment impossible. Panic swept the command. An eyewitness reported "...alongthe straight highway, telegraph poles are blown up and the wires flutter like tendrils; every- where demolished trucks and cadavers.. Onthe thirteenth, 28 planes repeated the attack against fragments of the convoy, withdrawing to the north. On the sixteenth the attack turned against Brihuega, in which the Italian 1st Division had found refuge; thirty R 5's and I 15's operated against this locality. On the eighteenth, Government infantry units made their first appearance and took Brihuega. The Italians withdrew via Almadrones. This movement w' pickedup on the nineteenth and 8o planes attacked with 6oo bombs, and fired ioo,ooo rounds. By the twenty-first, the Insurgents were driven once more be- hind the initial line of departure. The striking success of this air operation was partly due to feeble enemy air- craft reaction, unfavorable weather and terrain and the efficient cooperation of fast pursuit type on covering missions, enabling a maximum performance by the attack echelons. Only fifteen years before, a similar disaster overtook the retreating Turkish columns in Palestine in the defile of Wadi-Fara, igi8.If column commanders recognize the necessity for security measures on the ground, in the form of advance or flank guards, they must also admit the necessity for "air-guards," in view of the air menace which has rendered march formations tactically far more vulnerable than any terrestrial consideration has ever suggested. While capricious factors of chance were present in this operation, it has an ominous significance; itis hardly questionable that this column would have blundered through and reached Guadalajara, in spite of bad weather, road jams and poor traffic control, had it not been for this unexpected, terrific bolt of fire from the air. What do 386 aviation machine guns, 200,000rounds,and 8,6oo lbs. of bombs represent in terms of infantry and artillery battalions and in "days of fire"? In volume of fire, the Italian battalion of 6o men is roughly equivalent to that of 32 machine guns; 336 aviation guns consequently represent iol/2 infantry battalions; a pound of bomb is roughly equivalent to an analogous weight in a -mm shell; the 38,600 lbs. of bombs dropped on these columns consequendy represent one day of fire for a 75-mm F.A. battalion; the aoo,ooo rounds of M.G. ammunition fired in the attack roughly compare with one day of fire for an American infantry regiment. The air attack, therefore, was equivalent in fire power to the sudden flank attack of ten infantry battalions, reinforced by artillery, against six infantry battalions; it must be further considered that the comparative --- Page 197 --- THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936.1939187 "days of fire" were expended in the space of two hours—a terrific concentration by all ordinary standards.2' Effectof bombardmenton civil populations. The result of such attacks were very evident in Madrid. In the French bridge and University City areas, the ap- pearance of these quarters vividly recalls Verdun, Arras and R.heims during the World War. Compared to the small number of aircraft employed, heavy losses have been inflicted on the civil population; the number of wounded is also rela- tively high; the effect of such bombardment would have been more serious had either force been employing chemicals. 21 Itis generally agreed that notwithstanding the usual press exaggerations, both opponents were restrained in their bombing of cities, since as Spaniards they had no real motive in destroying their country. To interpret this restraint as proof that Douhet was wrong is stretching a point. The continuous bombardment of Barcelona, i6 to i8 March 1938,wasa real test and the results were terrific. In occasional bombardments of Madrid, oo lb. bombs were employed with uniform results; these projectiles cut through old houses of six stories and steel and cement flooring from three to five stories; the destruction in narrow streets was considerable; it is arguable that the fullpotentiality of this weapon has not been remotely tested. d. Antiaircraft defense. In 1937. General Armangaud32reported:"The small automatic guns make the sky practically untenable up to medium altitude, within the limit of their range of action." A year later, General Niessel estimated losses due to anti-aircraft artillery 'as18 per cent. While pursuit aviation has accounted for roughly three-fourths of enemy air-• craft shot down, and antiaircraft artillery the remainder, it is generally recog- nized that this weapon has become very dangerous. The German 88-mm is very effective against high-flying craft to a range of 20,000 feet; the German 37-mm and the Swiss ao-mm Oerlikon are equally effective against low-flying planes. e. Cavalry. Insurgent cavalry has become synonymous with Monasterio's cavalry division; this veteran cavalry commander and his Moroccan units played a consistent, quiet. effective role throughout this war. He carried out the tradi- tional cavalry missions of reconnaissance, security, exploitation and pursuit, with an initial force of approximately aooo sabers. The adaptation of this purely mounted force to a modern situation is revealing: motorized infantry and artillery, armored cars and tanks were gradually attached until this powerful unit was able to play a decisive role, on several occasions, particularly in the operations against the Sierra Palomera. 1936: This cavalry operated on the right flank of Franco's advance on Madrid on security missions. On 6 November, it seized and held a position outside Madrid until the in- fantry came up. 1937: Cavalry elements assisted in various operations, on the Jarama River, at Bilbao, Santander and Gijon and, on a large scale, in the Sierra Palomera. 1938: At Herrera, g March, cavalry went through the gap opened by Valino's The debacle of Guadalajara has been made the bashof anti-Italian propaganda; any motor column, of any army, under these circumstances, would bave suffered tremendously;ourown maneuvers have shown such surprise attacks to be entirely feasible: day1iht marches have become risky; the deadly potentialities of the air arm had better be faced!Arinangaud.Brereton.C. & G S. S. Qesrserly. No. 72. R,ees I,, Deex Moths. 1937.•La Frace Miutakv.1935. --- Page 198 --- s88MANEUVER IN WAR Navarrese division and played havoc with enemy rear establishments; by the thirteenth it had advanced 40 miles. Cavalry was used to cover the crossings of the Ebro and assist in the advance on Bujaraloz; a few days later, cavalry held the gap between the Moroccan Corps and Valino. In the offensive of Estremadura, Monasterio was attached to Saliquet's force, in view of the limited road net and the great distances involved, in this lonely region. Automotive vehicles apparently have not yet displaced horse cavalry, a con- ception which seems to be borne out by the campaign in Ethiopia as well. f.Infantry.Due consideration must be given to certain deficiencies affecting infantry organization, training and equipment. In many cases the materiel was inefficient or inadequate; in others, it was improperly used and handled by par. tially trained personnel. The relative combat value of the opponents is not easily gauged; in many ways, the improvisation of armies was similar to the initial phases of the American Civil War. (i) Government: Militia: The initial formations were based on armed labor organizations and conscripts. For a long time the combat value of the militia was practically nil; however, little by little a certain amount of training was ac- qüired, although combat efficiency left much to be desired. International Brigades: These units are characterized as volunteers from dif- ferent countries with cadres formed by veterans of the World War. Outstanding successes obtained by the government have often been due to the international brigades which developed more or less rapidly into fairly cohesive fighting bodies. (2) Nattonajjst: The foundation of General Franco's forces were: Regular army units which jfl 1936 passed to the command of General Franco, approximately 50 per cent of the peace establishment. Regular contingents from Morocco, principally the Foreign Legion butcom• posed almost entirely of Spaniards and certain native forces. Phalangists: civil contingents which were recruited initially(1933) to preserveorder. Requetes: Carlist volunteers recruited in Navarre. Civil guards: Police contingents; very good troops similar to the French Gen- darmerie and Garde Mobile. Foreign contingents: Italian and German volunteers of undeterminednum- bers, estimated from 3o,00o to ioo,ooo men. The Italian Legion was composed of cadres and men from the Black Shirt Divisions, disbanded after the conquest of Abyssinia. The German volunteers were mostly specialists who operated modern German materiel; they were prin. cipally artillerymen and aviators, comparatively few serving in the infantry. Moroccan troops were well trained and well equipped. The Italian volunteers had had war experience. The phalangists and the requestes, whilecourageous, were difficult to handle; in ig they were incorporated into regular infantry units. ()Men,materiel and equipment: The Spanish War has shown that in- fantry still plays the preponderant role in combat. As always, the infantryman gains, occupies and holds terrain and in the end determines success or failure. The world-wide progress made in armament apparently has not made possible the substitution of the machine for the man. It is an error to believe that future wars will be conducted primarily with tanks, airplanes and guns. --- Page 199 --- THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936-1939189 Temporary results due to an overwhelming materiel have been obtained, but final success has never been secured by a commander who neglected to employ infantry to occupy and retain the conquered ground.Airplanes used in large numbers against ground troops may disperse them, demoralize them temporarily and inflict heavy losses; the same can be said of tanks or artillery, but when all is said and done infantry remains the deciding factor; Machine guns, accompanying weapons and tanks will give maximum results only when operated and employed by efficient infantry. The rifle squad: The squad had an average strength of io men, with one auto- matic rifle. This strength came to be regarded as inadequate; in advancing the A-rifle for maneuver, the remaining rifle fire was considered too weak to neutralize opposition; recommendations tended toward two A-rifles and a squad strength of 14 men. The rifle platoon: The platoon consisted of 3 squads andA-rifles. An adjustment of squad strength would result in 2 squads and 4 A-rifles, an increase in fire power and simplicity of control. A tendency was noted to take up linear formations too early, resulting in fatigue and slow movements; it was found that units in line of columns reached the line of departure earlier and in good condition. The rifle company: The company comprised 3 platoons. The company was the smallest unit with maneuver capacity.It was found that "maneuver," in the presence of the enemy, was difficult; decentralization, leaving platoon commanders certain latitude, was useful.The employment of the support platoon to pass through the forward platoon, and continue the attack, was so frequent as to become "typical." The rifle battalion:It comprised 3 rifle companies and 1 M.G. company ( guns).The battalion made a brilliant showing as the fundamental tactical unit of infantry; scarcity of mortars (high angle fire in direct support) made itself felt; this was compensated for, in part, by the use of accompanying guns (light artillery, caliber 65-mm). The machine-gun company: The M.G. company was organized intoplatoons ofguns each. The attachment of a platoon to each rifle company became habitual for direct support. The guns of reserve units were often employed for initial fires, in support of an attack. At Santander, a battery of ao-mm rapid-fire cannon and a company of machine guns executed overhead fire at 1200 yards in support of a rifle battalion in attack; topographical conditions were ideal, since the attack advanced over a forward slope in plain view of the reserve unit; the cannon, a weapon of precision, was able to fire within a few yards of advance elements, while the machine guns suspended firing, as a safety factor since observation of fire was impossible; this points to the liberal use of tracer ammunition. Infantry mortars: Organized in platoons, of g and 6 mortars, these units were assigned to regimental headquarters company; they were attached to battalions. While most useful, these weapons consumed considerable ammunition; the problem of munition supply was always difficult. ()Attackand defense:It has been claimed that the Spanish War has dem- onstrated the superiority of the defense over the attack; this is an exaggeration! If properly supported, trained infantry in the attack has obtained tactical results far and beyond those obtained by infantry remaining on the defensive. --- Page 200 --- 190MANEUVER IN WAR Progress in materiel and armament favors the defense but cannot substitute the negative advantages of the defense for the positive advantages of the offense. While infantry attack has become more and more difficult, it has not become impossible, for with improved infantry materiel, tanks, automatic arms, mortars, the task is greatly facilitated; while certain advantages, already foreseen, have accrued to the defense, the respective values of attack and defense have not been materially altered by events in the Spanish War. Efficient defense requires ability above that possessed by improvised troops, and strong positions, weakly held, offer feeble resistance to a determined enemy. Reports by competent observers 24onthe "iron ring" at Bilbao, erected by the Basques in 1936-37, are significant: "... Thedefensive system was well built by specialists but did not resist the Nationalist attacks for two reasons: "Trace and siting: though well conceived from a technical viewpoint and excellent construction, the defenses were tactically deficient due to poor siting, lack of continuity in the defense system, absence of good flanking fires, absolute ignorance of the employment of the reverse slope and lack of organization in depth except in certain localities. "Defensive garrison:It is a gross error to think that a defensive position con- sists only of entrenchments.22 The efficiency of a position depends upon the men who man it.The position of Bilbao was held by insufficient and untrained infantry,instead of 70,000 men necessary to hold 70 kms. of trench system, the Basques had hardly 50,000." ()Infantryand Stabilized Fronts:While progress in armament does not dearly establish the supremacy of defense over attack, it does modify the form of warfare.Present armament, and especially that of the infantry, tends to stabilization. Infantry was able to reestablish itself more easily and more promptly than heretofore on a position after a retrograde movement, providing it made full use of its automatic arms and accompanying weapons, was adequately supported by artillery and organized the terrain rapidly and judiciously. (6) Accompanying guns: One battery of 65-mm was assigned per regiment, as accompanying gun; its tactical mission was to bridge the gap between the front line and the divisional artillery.Under pressure of the tank menace, this weapon was often employed as a purely anti-tank weapon, i.e., distribution to front lines.This dual mission was found to be confusing and undesirable; in the domain of the regiment, it was recognized that two types (for anti-tank and accompanying fires) were required. (7) Infantry antitank weapons:Concerning antitank weapons, Spain has constituted a veritable proving ground, and antitank defense appears to have outstripped tank development. The antitank weapons primarily operated by infantry which have given the best results are: The 13-mm Hotchkiss gun The aomm Oerlikon gun The -mm Hotchkiss gun TheP.A.K. German gun. The characteristics of this armament are as follows: 1MaIQ,Andriot,FrenchArmy. —GenerilDuval, Lec.411. --- Page 201 --- THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 196-199191 13-mm Hotchkiss gun: Weight200kgs.(441 lbs.) Maximum rate of fire450 rounds per minute Weight of pojectile52 grams (1.8 oz.) The projectile contains no explosive charge; its power of penetration exceeds slightly that of the machine gun. Good results were obtained when vulnerable parts of the tank were hit. 20-mmOerlikongun: Weightoo kgs. (661 lbs.) Maximum rate of fireoo rounds per minute Weight of projectile (tracer).. iggrams (4.9 oz.) Contains an explosive charge of 4 tO 9 grams. This small shell penetrates armor as follows: 15-mm thickness1200 meters so-mm" 1500meters 40-mm300meters A 20-mm automatic rifle, model 1936, possessing the same characteristics as the gun up to a range of 500meters,has been built by Oerlikon.It weighs 42 kgs. (g lbs.) and is broken down into two parts for transportation, 20 and 22 kgs. respectively.It employs the same projectile as the gun. 25-mm Hotchkiss gun: WeightSoo kgs. (1764 lbs.) Maximum rate of fire8o rounds per minute Weight of projectile330 grams (i i.6 oz.) Explosive charge: i8 grams (o.6 oz.) The weight of this gun makes handling difficult. 47-mm P.A.K.(Panzer-Abwehr-Kanone) German gun: There is no definite information on the characteristics of this weapon; it is probably similar to the -mm anti-tank gun built by the Rhein-Metall Com- pany, which is now being developed in an efficient American adaptation. (8) Mortars, light and medium calibers:Due to insufficient artillery, the infantry mortar has been used to a large extent.It has been very efficient against troops occupying positions, defiladed against flat trajectory weapons. (9) Infantry defense against air attacks:Infantry has often been attacked by low-flying airplanes, either during an attack or defense of a position.Such attacks have had great moral and material effect and have apparently demon- strated that antiaircraft fire is inefficient against low-flying ships, possibly due to surprise, effect on morale and speed. The Spanish operations have shown that aviation will be used more and more to intervene in the ground attack; consequently, infantry antiaircraft defense must be perfected. Antiaircraft guns: The 20-mm AA type was found to be highly effective; they were also used as an accompanying weapon, for precision fire, as described above, at Santander; this is probably the exception rather than the rule, since modern battle will keep these guns occupied with their basic missions. g. Motorization.Motor transport has been used extensively by both sides. After initial improvisations and frequent mechanical breakdowns, both sides or- ganized repair and maintenance echelons, auto parks and motor transport bat- talions.Concentrations and troop movements by motor were extensive; night movements became customary, especially after the sharp lesson of the Guadalajara debade. --- Page 202 --- MANEUVER IN WAR The secret Government concentrations (o,ooo) as a preliminary to the attack on Brunete were made possible by motor transport; on the other hand, Insurgent reinforcements (40,000) for the subsequent counter-offensive were also rushed up by motor vehicles. In April 1938, a force of four infantry battalions, two F.A. battalions, one heavy battery, one antiaircraft battery and antitank guns were moved at night, by motor, from Gandesa to Tortosa, over a 20-mile stretch of mountain roads, as timely reinforcements; there are many similar instances of the tactical use of motors. The supply of Madrid, i.e., 8oo,ooo inhabitants, for nearly two years, represents the greatest achievement of motor transport by successfully bridging the gap of 90 miles to the nearest Government railhead. In spite of the Guadalajara debacle, troop movements by motor have been frequent and successful; in fact, they explain in part Franco's remarkable ma- neuver capacity. On a front of roughly 2000 miles, the Nationalists repulsed two counter-offensives, 300 miles apart, and staged five widely separated offensives beginning on the extreme south of their line and ending on the extreme north. Motorization, however, is at best a logistic tool; a competent local observer,2' warns against undue conclusions: "... completelymotorized units are limited in number and usefulness and may become a hindrance ...theidea of employ. ing motorized detachments in the fighting zone must be rejected...theside which has the means to liberate itself from a dependence on wheels has an advan- tage...itis a question of correctly balancing animal and motor transport." h.Tanks. Mechanizationis one of the most controversial and baffling factors in modern warfare.Operations in Spain were watched with intense interest, hoping for final answer.In Spain, German and Italian tanks, the Fiat Ansaldo and the German 6-ton model, were pitted against Russian light(T-26) and medium (T.28) types; the general characteristics of these tanks are given in the following table:2' A British observer believes that the German tanks have proved to be mediocre implements of war, and the Italian tanks even more so; that the Russian tanks have been generally superior to the others but have not obtained successes com- parable with those of the World War. "Everywhere that tank attacks have encountered defensive elements in sufficient number and quality, the attacks have been broken up or become immobilized without accomplishing the mission.If, on the other hand, these elements of defense have been lacking or are no longer intact (owing to neutralization or destruction by an artillery preparation) the tanks habitually reach their objective with almost mathematical certainty.2' "The Spanish War has shown also that the possibility and usefulness of great speed in combat have been greatly exaggerated. It was thought that speed would protect tanks from enemy fire, but this has not proved to be the case. In fact, at the speeds visualized (25 to 30 mph.), the precision of hostile fire becomes a trap and the fatigue of crews is such that they lose all idea of the friendly and hostile positions ..." Exceptfor Franco's drive to the sea, employment of tanks in mass has apparently not been practiced; there were probably never enough of them to risk it. In that operation, tanks were employed by battalions. The impression prevails that limited numbers caused the tank to be considered a GHQ weapon by both sides, to be N Colonel Cane,ariItalian Army. vi JohnsonC. & ô. S. S. Qart.vly, No. 72.N Majoz deneral E. Tempesly. --- Page 203 --- THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936-1939 GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TANKS USED INSPAIN 193 Type Maxi- Maxi- Length Weight mum mum (feel)(tons)Speed Armor (mph) (inch) Arma- mentCrew Rotating Turret Radio INSURGENT German (light) Italian (Fiat-Ansaldo) (tankette) 13 10 5-6306o 3.627.51 z MGs 1 or 2 MGs 2 2 Yes No No No GOVERNMENT T-a6(light) Russian modification of Vickers-Armstrong 6-ton A (the principal tankofGovernment army) i68-925.67i 45-mm gun and 1MG or 2 MG 2-3YesOcca- sion- ally T-a8 (Russian-medium, modi- fication of Vickers 16-ton) (Believed tohave been little used) ,i.6i8or20-251.0 20 i 45-gun and 3 MGs 5-6YesOcca- sion- ally Christie-Ruski 34 (Russian medium convertible) 191440 On.6tracks 1 45-mm gun and 1 MG dual mounted 2-3YesNo Renault (French light)-.18Slow1.0i MG or2YesNo 57-mmgun Trubia (Spanish light)-. -P6-8P33 MGsYesNo allotted to corps or divisions as circumstances dictated. In cooperation with in- fantry, tanks advanced in several waves, usually preceding the infantry. In the domain of tactics, the experiences in Spain must be classed as inconclusive, butpreviousobservations and principles have not been jeopardized thereby: (i)Fromcasual employment, in small numbers, the tendency toward larger, compact formations is unmistakable. (2) Cooperation with infantry, as accompanying tanks, was habitual. ()Strongsupporting fires were present on decisive fronts, as at Sarrion, and the objective was limited. Cooperation with cavalry: Light tanks were employed with cavalry on security missions as well as in the attack. They appeared frequently as nuclei of advance guards and in protection of motor transport columns; they operated in conjunc- tion with motorcyclist M.G. detachments. In an attack in fairly open country negotiable by horses, the following forma- tions were observed: One squadron, in advance guard, followed by a company of tanks and motor- ized artillery 65-mm, moving by bounds. Two squadrons advancing parallel to a road and clearing the road for the tanks. --- Page 204 --- 194MANEUVERIN WAR When the leading squadron engaged the enemy, it dismounted, the 65mm guns took position, the tank company attacked frontally while reserve squadrons, mounted, attacked the enemy in flank and rear. It must be noted that antitank means were limited in this situation, and the enemy was on the defensive on a narrow front. Coo peratzon with infantry: Coordination of movements, maneuver and rates of advance were difficult. Tanks generally left infantry far behind; in most cases, the line of departure was at least iooo yards from the enemy. Tanks overran enemy positions without completely neutralizing their fires; the tank crews thought the enemy wiped out, as soon as they passed over him, and moved against further objectives, where they found themselves isolated and sometimes without fuel. As regards armament, there is a general impression that tanks equipped with cannon easily vanquished those armed with machine guns only; it was recommended that a certain proportion of tanks should always be armed with cannon, in the ratio of 1to3. i. Antitank defense: The whole problem of tank employment is closely linked with the efficacy of antitank weapons, which ranged from crude individualto pre- cision armament of special design. A competent observer30 remarked: Of the five antitank guns used in Spain, viz: Hotchkiss 13-mm and -mm, Oerlikon 20-mm, German (Rhein-Metall) -mm and Bofors 40-mm, only the Oerlikon has really given satisfaction. "The 13-mm Hotchkiss is eliminated because of its solid shot, the German 37-mm because of its slow rate of fire, the Hotchkiss -mm because of its excessive power. The 20-mm gun penetrates the one-inch armor of medium tanks within a range of 500 yards, and its rate of fire is practically double that of the -mm Hotchkiss gun while its weight is only a third of the weight of the latter; the 20-mm cannon might even be replaced by a rifle of the same caliber, which is now under study. "Antitank defense apparently is primarily a matter of cannons using direct fire, and the first line of defense should have antitank weapons capable of providing protection at least against the more lightly armored machines." It must be remembered that neither tank nor antitank means were strongly represented in Spain. The density of antitank guns, on any front, is insignificant with what can be put into action by French, German or Russian divisions; the same condition applies to tanks and their numerical ratios; in the Champagne maneuvers, in igi, the French assembled over 5000 motor vehicles, of which 2200 were armored types, i.e., tanks. If we compare this formidable figure with the modest grouping of 40 to 8o tanks, in certain Spanish offensives, we can hardly venture to make sweeping deductions or forecasts, based on this limited experience. However, statistics of losses by antitank fire can hardly be ignored. During 1937, the average loss in reported tank actions was 27.6 per cent; it is not entirely clear what proportion of this total is chargeable to mechanical breakdown and subse- quent capture. This percentage can be directly compared with World-War rec- Bottles of gasoline covered with soaked rags are ignited and thrown at the rear armor of the tank; thebottle shatters, and burning gasoline spreads over the tank and toits vitals...anotherexpedient is con- trived by tying several grenades in a bundle; the psnis pulled from one grenade when the bundle is thrownat a tank track. Dr. Klotz. L&onsMii&sJre, de l Gaerre eN E,page. --- Page 205 --- THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936.1939195 .ords.31The average percentage of tank casualties throughout the war was 17.2per cent, but individual percentages in local actions was higher, viz: If we accept the average percentage figures, there is no marked change in ratio of losses, in the period igi8 tO 1939; the development of antitank defense appar- ently has kept pace with improvements in tank design and the net result may be a static combat condition. The defensive remained all-powerful during the first three years of the World War. Then the appearance of the tank combined with fatigue of the adversary brought success to the Allies. Some concluded from this that the strength of the defensive had diminished and that decisive results could be obtained from brutal attacks by large mechanized forces. In Spain, however, the antidote for the tank was reasonably demonstrated. The tank can no longer count on tactical or technical surprise; it has to fight on an equal basis with the antitank defense, and the theories proclaimed for the devastating power of Panzerdivisions and other massed armored formations used "independently" are apparently refuted by actual events. Militiamen of mediocre military capacity have occasionally held up the offen- sives of units relatively superior in training and technical ability, and, in spite of the weakness of the troops engaged and the extent of front, there has developed a continuous stabilized front and a situation analogous to that of 1914.1918. If this is a picture of the "next war," it is of some comfort to us; since we shall enter it, as in 1917, with improvised armies. Lt. Col. Perre. Rest: d'Infantesie,1936. La Malmaison: of 121 tanks engaged, 8o were immobilized, 52 were stopped by shell fire, i. C., 43 per cent. 28 broke down through mechanical failure. Chateau Thierry: 585 Renaults, 190St.Chamonds and 185 Schneiders were employed in a ten-day period; 37 per cent were knocked out. April-Nov. igi8: Enemy action accounted for 29.7percent of the medium and 13.2 per cent of the light tanks engaged. --- Page 206 --- x THESINO-JAPANESE WAR 46.THE PouTIco-EcoNoMIc BACKGROUND. a. Red sickle or risingsun? The geographical chart marked "Conflict of Empire" clearly shows the colliding di. rections in spheres of influence, propaganda, economic and colonial expansion of the great powers primarily interested in the Orient: Japan, Great Britain and Russia. While Anglo-Japanese differences have become more pronounced in this decade, the incontrovertible fact that Great Britain once sought and for years maintained a military alliance with Japan (1911.1922)permitsan assumption that these differences may yet be amicably adjusted along the Singapore—Auck- land line. The differences between Japan and the Soviets, however, are of a vastly more complicated character and involve a conflict in philosophy of government. The philosophy of the centralized monarchy of Japan is bound to be in con- tinuous, sharp opposition to the communistic principle; any tolerance is incon. ceivable against the background of the racial, social and historical characteristics of Japan—it is a far cry from Meiji to Marx! PLATE 125.CONFLICTOF EMPIRE. The diagram "Conflict of Empire" shows plainly the precarious situation of Japan in relation to communism: its home territory andareas of influence are contiguous to Soviet territory or areas under Soviet influence; whilenot an ex- dusive factor, Japan's anticommunistic orientation has ofcourse affected her ig6 --- Page 207 --- THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR197 diplomatic policies; the comparatively recent Japanese expansion, on the main- land, was influenced by a natural desire to create a "buffer-zone" against com- munistic encroachment; it may as well be acknowledged that under this heading Japan assumes the role of champion of the capitalistic and monetary economy. A sentimental world may eventually have to choose between the "rising sun" and the "red sickle."' There are numerous other contributory factors, of course, primarily of an economic order; this grave problem is too complex to be covered in these pages; it is enough to recognize that the Japanese have convictions and are apparently willing to fight for them.However, the "Conflict of Empire" chart clearly re- veals at least one major, basic element of conflict: population pressure and colonization space. b. Population densities and colonial space.Great Britain, France, Russia and Holland control enormous territories, acquired in colonial, expansionist wars of past centuries, while Japan, Italy and Germany have entered this colonial race too late; the resulting population densities, exclusive of colonial space, range from 21 to 76 inhabitants per square mile for the former, and 137 to 460 for the latter;2 the figure for Japan is nearer 8oo if one considers the non-arabic, mountain- ous sections of the island.In these appalling figures may be found a rational basis for the currently popular but wholly fictitious line of demarcation between "gangster" nations and the "democracies"—the former accused of incurably im- perialistic, war-like tendencies, while the latter are credited with an enduring, peaceful disposition. The "Empire Chart" clearly reveals that the line of demarca- tion in reality is between powers with ample colonial space and those with limited territories, or, as it is popularly phrased, a conflict between the "have" and the "have-not" powers. It is important to note and easily demonstrable that the "haves" acquired their present favorable position through historical, unvarnished con- quests and that the "have-nots" are merely attempting to follow suit at a belated hour; to attempt to make a moral issue out of this is sheer hypocrisy. A glance at the relative extent of the colonial conquests of Great Britain suggests that Japan's current enterprise is very modest, indeed, though Japan and England in their historical evolution share one common initial characteristic, in that they were both "little island-empires on the make." c. Strategic raw materials.Population pressure or "ratio of population density to available space" is only one of many factors that drive nations on the warpath. Toward the end of the Bronze Age, great geographical disturbances drove the Nordic tribes southward, to escape the relentless advance of the ice barrier,4 just as the loss of arabic land hurled the Cimbri into the Milanese plains in a later period.The great migrations of the fourth century were merely the recurring symptom of an old disease. For the ancient world, it was the quest for land, for grazing space, that drove the nomad hordes to conquest; for our age, the possession of basic raw materials es- 1TheodoreRoosevelt suggested to Viscount Kaneko in 1905 the establishment of a Japanese Monroe Dot. trineforAsia.Secretaryof State Lansing in 1917 recognized that "Japan has special interests in Chsn*, par-ticularlyinthe part towhich her possessions arecontiguous."U.S. Ambassador Castle.in1930. said that 'Japan must be and wilt be the guardian of peace in the Pacific."The Japanese refer with approval to Article XXI of the Covenant of the League of Nations which expressly recognizes the American Monroe Doctrine as aregional understanding and interpret it as an international sanction of their own regional commitments in China.(Stephen Dugan, Ph.D.. TI,, TwoAmericas, p.157.) 1Accordingto the JapanYearbook,based on the census of 1925. the population density per square mite ofcultivated area was 374.1.The annual increasein population, since that date,is estimated at 700,000.The World Almanacfor1939 shows that density to be 460.This is among the worlds highest; that of the United States is 16.0. a The percentageof arabIc land in Iaoan was estimated in 1930at only 15.4;this ratiois lower than Switzerland. the Irish Free State (22). Belgium (40). or Italy (44).(R. Isbn. Ph.D., Popzdalion Pressure,U. of C. Press. pp. 63.64.)'The echo of that historical trek for the promised land reverberates through the'Edda," and the legend of "Gotterdammerung" is orobably the memory of that arctic night. --- Page 208 --- 198MANEUVERIN WAR sential to a modern, industrialized civilization becomes the dominating factor— a vicious cycle of conflicting interests, in which the pauper nations regard the others with sullen envy. Coal, iron ore and crude oil are items of supreme importance. Japan's position, in this regard, is precarious and furnishes the impetus for her career of conquest; this urge is unintelligible to people, like those of the United States, who are not subject to such economic pressure, or to those of Great Britain, France and Russia who have, through timely conquests, procured potential economic reserves. Japan's situation as regards strategic raw materials is generally unsatisfactory. Coal: There is an annual consumption of fifty million tons of hard coal for miscellaneous industrial requirements; as regards soft coal, 6o per cent of require- ments comes from Korea and 35 per cent from Sakhalin. Iron: The strategic reserves in iron ore are definitely limited: only 8o million tons in Japan proper, 4 million tons in Korea but an estimated 750milliontons in Manchukuo. Foreign imports have generally equalled home production, for years; this obvious dependence on foreign sources has resulted in Japan's ac- quisition of overseas properties, for exploitation, as in Australia, Queensland and the Malay Peninsula. Oil: Japan's situation is precarious; the annual peace-time consumption is about three million tons against local, native production of one-fourth to one- half million tons only. d. The eclipse of the white man. While conceding to Japan the economic neces- sities inherent in an industrialized state in quest of raw materials and markets, it is recognized generally that her record, as in Manchukuo of "squeezing" out com- peting foreign interests (i.e., a violation of the so-called "open-door" policy), is a tendency that augurs ill for the western powers.8 On the other hand, the checkered careers of Chinese war-lords, exploiting their temporary holdings, were no guaranty for peaceful economic development by any interested parties. Japan's gravamen against China may be expressed in two words—treaty viola- tions; Kawakami in Japan Speaks (1932)liststhe more important cases, ranging from arbitrary increases in customs duties of a discriminatory character to the development of competitive enterprises and the persecution of Japanese subjects. The advent of Sun-Yat-Sen brought on an ideological renaissance and the pos- sibility of national unity; but within this ideology lurked the menace of com- munism, and Soviet influence was steadily active. In the see-saw of conflicting interests, the Japanese attack crystallized patriotic feeling in a remarkable manner, and Chiang Kai-shek emerged, for the time being, as a truly national figure. Up to a certain point, national disaster has the power of fusion; but, if disaster is too continuous, disintegration may set in. The speed of the unexpected capture of Canton is highly suspicious and has all the earmarks of treason; apparently there are elements in Chiang's military and political en- tourage that will sell out while the chief is fighting with his back against the wall. The general implications of the Sino-Japanese conflict are indeed menacing. The studied severity of the Japanese Tientsin "blockade" in which British citizens 'Important current articles(SasardyE,seing P.,:. May7, 1938) representthis view;inthe interestofimpartial,historicalinvestigation,itshould be notedthatthe U. S. Department of Commerce Bulletin No. 839. on page 36. appears to contradict this conclusion Average annual sale of U. S. goods in Manchukuo 1926-1930*7,531.000Sale of U. S. goods in Manchubuo itt 1937$16,061,000In the period 1926-1930 Manchukuo was under Chinese dictatorship rule; Japan occupieditin 1932; iithe slump in world trade(i. e., the depression)is considered, the annual averages under Japanese rule were sull $7,930,333; so comparison with book years, our trade in Msnchukuo in1935-36. was off53 rr cent (though steadily increasing) • while in China proper it was off 63 per cent.(Ralph Townsend, Tb:High Ci,.,: a!His:.) --- Page 209 --- THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR199 weresingled Out for embarrassing treatment is more than a local gesture; in the Orient, where "face" is important above everything, an attack on and the possible collapse of British prestige is a very serious phenomenon. The alleged dis- robing of British women in Japanese police stations° becomes an act of symbolism, which may mark the exit of the white man, the end of the Kipling saga, but the first blow by the colored world was struck at Adowa forty years ago when Italian soldiers fell under the assagais of Menelik;' the sightless eyes of Baratieri's dead peered into the future and may have seen Japanese barricades around a British city and yellow fingers clawing at white women. In this connection, the views of a competent French observerare interesting: •.theJapanese is not yellow like the Chinese or Mongol or Manchurian. He is not a merchant and if he is an industrialist, it is by necessity.His spirit is dis- ciplined, religious, courageous, proud and artistic; it is like that of a conqueror, sailor, a great noble, or a commander. It is made to command and direct, not to submit. However, this spirit possesses the faculty of adaptation.In 1854,the Japanese delegates boarded an American naval vessel, which was a terrifying novelty to them; they restrained their astonishment, understood and ceded before an evidence of force. The local dignitary, the Daimio, who made this moral sur- render, atoned for it by committing "han-kin." The Japanese has an overde- veloped sense of honor which does not permit him to allow an injury to go un- avenged. "Recognizing force, the Japanese patiently decided to become strong themselves —with the extraordinary intelligence that differentiates them from the other yel- low peoples. They digested massive doses of new sciences; they created factories and shipyards.In 1894 the first trial came in the conquest of Corea, Formosa and the Liao-tung peninsula...Tomorrowmost of China, Amur and perhaps Australia may pass under their control. ...TheJapanese are a people who know how to command ... themajority of Chinese, in territories held by the Japanese (Manchukuo), do not want to fight...theycan finally live in order and pros- perity ... havingformed a homogeneous mass, Japan will speak, demand what it wants. How soon? Japan knows how to wait but will not forget. The whites have never missed an opportunity, in their blind vanity, to make the little Japanese drink bitter doses...theresult will be the expulsion of the whites from the Far East...neitherthe Chinese individualist, nor the Soviet Union, nor the U. S. can do anything to change it.Only the complete, sincere, definitive union of all the whites, federated, for the life of the race, will have a chance of success in the physiognomy of the unpredictable future." 47. CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATION,a. Japanese expansion: 1895-1938.Achar- acteristic "incident," the clash of outposts near Marco Polo's bridge on 7 July 1937, started the present undeclared Sino-Japanese war, but the foundations for it had been laid elsewhere, over a period of years.Startled readers of sensational jour- nalism are not usually aware of the historical background of current events. Japan has had collisions with China before; Hideyoshi Toyotomi (1583-1589) conquered Korea and planned a further advance, via Peking in the north and via the Yangtse River in the south—a curious analogy with the modern campaign of 1938.His essential motive was to offset the menacing advent of European powers.History has borne out this medieval "estimate of a situation." The spectacular Japanese renaissance, the "Meiji," in the reign of Mutsuhito (1867-1912), brought on the SNewYork Time,July1939, and miscellaneousnewspaper reports,in apparent coafiunation.TheU. huirasedLondo,, New,,July 29.1939. 'SeeChapter XI, Par. 3. Rev,,, Mititai,'eGeaer,,le(France), July 1938. --- Page 210 --- 200MANEUVER IN WAR greatest political-economic transformation of modern history: the development of a non-European power to world rank, in a single generation! Inescapably so, empires are not established by conferences but by conquest; Rome and its great successor, England, have furnished the traditional pattern; Japan has merely followed in the footsteps of its Western European masters. England herself trained that formidable Japanese navy that now hovers over Chinese ports and blockades England's citizens. PLATE is6. THE PROGRESS OF JAPANESE EXPANSION IN CHINA FROM 1895 TO 1958. i.Formosaceded by China in 1895.2.PortArthur and the Kwantung Peninsula acquired in 1905.3.Sahhalin ceded by Russia in 1905.4.Korea annexed in 1910.5.Mukden captured in igi.6. Shanghai invadedin 1932andig36.7. Manchuria converted into the new state of Manchukuo Ifl1933.8. Jehol annexed by Manchukuo in 1955.g.Anti-Soviet Government of EastHopeiformed in 1935.io.The current invasion of Chahar, Shansi, Hopei and Shan. tung. The shaded areas comprise the five Provinces of North-China and represent the probable objectives of the Japanese military effort. In 1932Japanrisked an initial collision in Shanghai; it was a dress rehearsal for later and more serious attempts, though the Chinese defense of the city area was not without credit.In ig, it strengthened its position in Manchukuo by adding Jehol. The Soviets were not idle; at the expense of China, they occupied Outer Mongolia; its capital, Ulan Bator, became headquarters of the XXXIII Russian Corps, as a token of sovereignty. Soviet influence supported Red Chinese • International protests were launched in the case of Manchukuo and Jehol. while this "grab" was lot. USSR --- Page 211 --- THE SINO-JAPANESE WARaoi armies in South China and Kansu; Chiang Kai-shek waged several campaigns against them, on his own account. Japan regarded the spread of communist in- fluence with a jaundiced eye; along the Amur and on the line Chabarowsk— Vladivostok, both opponents developed fortified positions; an eventual show. down was practicable only via Ulan—Bator against the Siberian railway. As a preliminary strategic condition for this plan, the Peking—Tientsin area was needed for military concentrations, and the five Chinese provinces, Shantung, Hopei, Chahar, Shensi and Suiyuan, had to be brought under Japanese influence. This was the situation when a detachment of the 37th Chinese Division opened fire on a Japanese company engaged in night maneuvers on 7 July in the vicinity of the Marco Polo bridge. PLATE 127.SINO.JAPANESETHEATER OP WAR. b. Concentration and strategic deployment. The sequence of operations fol- lows an almost orthodox professional pattern, i.e., the step-by-step progress of modern war, from the seizure of suitable concentration areas, under the pro- --- Page 212 --- MANEUVER IN WAR tection of covering forces (which may have to engage in serious preliminary fight. ing) to the strategic advance and development, in accord with a prearranged plan of campaign. (i) Seizure of a concentration area. Armies are not assembled in haphazard fashion; serious administrative and logistic problems will have to be met, adequate road and railroad nets, shelter for the concentration and space for the eventual strategic deployment are required; the Peking—Tientsin area satisfied all require- ments, as a line of departure of sufficient width, with rail lines to the zone of the interior (i.e., Manchukuo) and the Tientsin—Taku port,. as an oversea's advance- base for shipments from Japan.In sharp, localized fighting, Japanese covering forces seized Peking and Tientsin, 26 and 29 July. (2) Operations of the covering force.In the last weeks of July, Japanese covering forces drove their opponents 10southof the Yung-ting River; this se- cured a line of departure for the advance to the south, but the west flank of their concentration, in direction of Nankow, Suiyuan and the Soviets, remained open. The Chinese moved elements of the 89th division via Calgan and quickly occupied Nankow Pass. The Japanese sent a motorized column, 4000 men and 6oo vehicles, initially as a covering force, and then threw mass against the position in a com- bination of frontal attack envelopment and took Nankow Pass.11 The Japanese pressed south, in pursuit, while their Mongol ally, Prince Teh, took Calgan in rear of the Chinese defenders ARMY CONCENTRATIONS AU5TRO•PRUSIAN WAR 1%6 Strategic RatIroaO PLATE ia8. THE WAR. OF THE RAILROADS. A PARALLEL TO THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT. ()Thewar of the railroads. With the south and west boundaries of the concentration area secured, the assembly of a field army of modern composition of 200,000 to 3oo,ooo men proceeded methodically during August; the Japanese The 29th Chinese Army (30. 31. 33, 37, 38 Div.)Japanese:2 Manchurian, 3 Japanese Div.'SeePar. 32 and Plate 146. I Bö $t4LN •MVNgCN --- Page 213 --- THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR203 wereopposed, on a broad front of approximately i6o miles, by three times their number, but their opponents were inadequately organized, with incomplete artil- lery and transport. The subsequent advance of the Japanese, i.e., the skeleton framework of their campaign, was strongly influenced by the existing rail net, in a country generally devoid of modern communications and adequate highways. Four rail lines of the greatest strategical significance traverse North China: The line: Peking—Suiyuan, via the Nankow Pass. The line: Haichow—Suchow---Kaifeng—Sian, the so-called "LunghaL" The line: Tientsin—Tsinan—Nanking, the so-called "Tsinpu." The line: Peking—Kaifeng—Hankow, the so-called "Pinghan." While motor transport has become an important item of modern high-speed PLATE 129.OPERATIONSON THE NORTH FRONT, ig. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS. July 7—Incident of Marco Polo bridge.Sep. 13—The capture of Pawing. July i6—Seizure of Peking (Peping).Oct.2—The combat at Jen3men Pass. July 29—Chinese coup.de-main in Tientsin.Oct. io—The capture of Schikiachwang. Aug. 29-Assault on Nankau Pass. --- Page 214 --- MANEUVER IN WAR communication, it can only supplement but never replace railroads; a standard train of 45 cars will deliver 1500 tons; it would be uneconomical, for long hauls, to attempt this volume with trucks; the enormous consumption of class I, II and III supplies for several hundred thousand men is clearly dependent on "volume delivery," i.e., railroads. The World War shows numerous examples of operations undertaken solely for the control or interdiction of railways. The broad lines of the Japanese offensive, in this theater of war, were fixed by the available rail- road net. Once again, we can make a definite historical comparison with a campaign pre- viously covered, viz: the advance of the Prussian armies into Bohemia, in i866;' as in China, the concentration and advance of these armies was predetermined by a limited number of railroad lines; we also encounter the classical factors of frontal attack and envelopment and shall presently see them at play, in China, in the relation of the North and South fronts. c. Operations on the North Front: 1937.The advance to the south to the Hoang-Ho was conducted in three columns: on the east, General Katsuki followed the "Tsinpu" railroad; in the center, General Nishio advanced along the "Ping. han"; in the west, Itagaki, initially based on Tatung on the Suiyuan railway, moved on Taiyuan into Shansi province.Prince Teh, Japan's Mongol ally, operated along the Suiyuan railway into Outer-Mongolia. The objective of these columns was the seizure of the Lunghai corridor and the control of the northern provinces. The progress of the three main columns was comparatively swift; in less than three months, the Japanese had overrun approximately half of the northern provinces, a lineal advance of about300 miles,, along a 200-mile front.15Each column encountered successive defensive positions of considerable strength: the east column at Tsang-tschau, 24 September, the center column at Pauting and Schikiachwang, io October, the west column at the Jengmen Pass; this column, incidentally, narrowly escaped destruction in a clever Chinese trap. The initial operations of the Japanese columns advancing south of Peking and Tientsin along the "Pinghan" and "Tsinpu" railroads is characteristic of the war of the railroads and the nature of Japanese maneuver. On 22 August, the 26th Chinese Army (6 divisions) held a front from Liuliho to vicinity of Tsinghai; the flanks, i.e., rail lines, were held strongly while the center, along the Hun.ho, was covered by one and one-half divisions only.Count Ter. auchi, the Japanese commander in chief, decided on a breakthrough in the center, with preliminary enveloping attacks against the flanks. The timing of the successive efforts in this scheme of maneuver is significant and affords a glimpse of how the elusive factor of surprise can still be attained in these days of modern observation facilities. Sept. it:TheJapanese left wing took Matschang, wading hip-deep in flooded terrain, andadvanced slowly on Tsangtschau.Chinese reserves were attracted to this front. -Sept.I5:The right wing began the attack against the strong positions of Fangchan andLiuliho.Chinese reserves were drawn to this area. Sept. s6: The breakthrough is launched at Kuan, with the infantry supported by tanks. heavy artillery and attack aviation: reserves moved through thegap on Tschotschau, in rear ofthe weakened Chinese position, and took the town on17September;another detachment movedon Tsnghsing to block the Chinese line of retreat. "See Chap.VI. Par. 21/.1$ Inorderto gauge the remarkablelogistic record established bt the Japanese in this and other advances.itshould be compared with an analogous operation in the World War, the brilliant advance of the Austro.German column after the breakthrough of Gorlice via Lemberg.in1913.Thisoffensive began on May 2;by the end of June, s.e.. within two months, the front had been advanced 250 kma, under favorable climaticconditions.The advance of the Japanese to the vicinity of Chanate amounted to 500 kms,i.e.,twice thedistance involved in the Gorlice offensivein the westthe occupation of Pautu required an advance of 630kans and the seizure of Taiyuan involved an advance 01 550 kmain mountainous territory.Thi, astonishingrecord sa not due to the use of motorization which was occasional only, but represents the march nerformanceof foot troops, evidently in the nink of condition. --- Page 215 --- THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR205 The Chinese 26th Army, seriously endangered by encirclement, barely made good its escape to the southwest. The Chinese High Command attempted to reorganize along the line: Yitschau—Tsangtschau; the Japanese continued pres- sure to the south, and this front was kept in motion until December. The Japanese habitually employed the combination of frontal attack and en- velopment; the double envelopment was not uncommon, in spite of their in- feriority in numbers; the use of motorized columns for flanking operations ap- pears again and again; the Japanese term this "fan-tactics"; the conception, of course, is not new: we have seen it in Napoleon's advance on Eylau.14 The units designated for flanking operations were relatively small, independent and or- ganized as "combat teams," containing all arms, including aviation detachments; French observers report the similarity of these organic bodies to the "groupes "Oap.IV.Pan. 19and20. PLATE iso.INITIAL OFFENSIVE IN HOPE!, AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1937. --- Page 216 --- MANEUVER iN WAR mobiles" of the French in the Riff Campaign;15 the threat to flank and rear was usually sufficient to force the Chinese to withdraw; this is merely a confirmation of the Napoleonic concept of maneuver.t8 The modern touch is furnished by habitual, dose liaison of aviation with ground operations; air units intervened repeatedly in direct support of ground combat and, as in Spain, sometimes took over artillery missions. This swift advance, based on railroads, slowed down in December, primarily because events on the South Front became of paramount interest. d. Operations on the South Front: Shanghai—Nanking, 1937. On 9 August, Lieut. Ojama, a marine officer, was killed by Chinese police within the interna- tional settlement. Two days later, a Japanese naval squadron appeared before Shanghai and landed 4000 marines; thereafter, reinforcements had to be fed into this sector, until it became a major theater of operations. The storm broke on 13 August; fighting continued with increasing intensity for three and one-half months. Bridgehead operations. The Japanese were faced by markedly superior num- bers from the outset.1' The character of their initial operations was clearly that of joint army-navy actions,18 landing operations, the establishment and expansion of bridgeheads for a coordinated, general advance into the interior. 51M.Lewet in, Strategicde Li GIftre Sino.Japomsite. IS Chap.VII, Par. 32. 1?TheChinese 87. 8898.59. 69 and Guards Divisions under command of General Tsaithsie Ku. who conductedthedefense of Shanghai in 1932.IIA navalsquadron,of 20units, Vice-Admiral 'Hasegawa commanding,intervenedrepeatedlyindirect support of landing forces. PLATE ti, OPERATIONS ON THE SOUTH FRONT. SHANGHAI—NANKING, '937- Aug. is—AssaultofTchapei. Aug.23—LandingatWusung. Aug.28—Landingat Liuho. Sep. 13—Attack on Liuho—Shanghai Front. Oct. 5-28—Attack Ofl Liuho—Suchow Front. Nov. 9—Withdrawal to Winter-line. Nov. 20—AttaCk on Winter-line. Nov. 25—Japanese pursuit and advatice on Nanking. Dec. 12—Assault Ofl Nanking. --- Page 217 --- THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR207 Underthe protective fire from Japanese warships, the initial Japanese bridge. heads at Hongkiu Park and Yukong wharf were precariously held against im- mense pressure.The narrow bridgehead was enlarged by a landing nine miles north of Shanghai, at Wusung.F'ive days later, the flanking maneuver of 1932 was repeated and a landing effected at Liuho, in spite of notoriously unfavorable shore conditions. From now on, the newly appointed Japanese commander, General Iwane Mat- sui, engaged in step-by-step lighting of increasing ferocity, gaining and losing ground on the front, Liuho—Shanghai. Both opponents steadily increased their forces until an estimated 120,000 Japanese were battering against 3oo,ooo de- fenders in the Shanghai corridor. September rains delayed a serious offensive in a veritable morass of canals; mechanized vehicles and heavy artillery were immobilized; supplies had to be handled by coolie carriers and 5000packanimals—a nice example of Japanese foresight.Reinforced to 225,000, Matsui attacked late in October and forced the Chinese to rearward lines. On 6 November, the outfianking maneuver of Liuho was repeated: two divisions landed o miles behind the Chinese lines, and their south flank was opened.Shifting to the north on i November, that flank was then attacked, and the Chinese withdrew to the "winter-line," a previously pre. pared strong position. This position rested on the south on a series of lakes, regarded as a serious tactical obstacle; the resourceful Japanese enveloped this flank, employing flatboats and motor launches of Japanese make; simultaneously, a successful penetration of the center was staged in seizing Sutschou through a bold coup-dc-main; this brought on the collapse of the "winter-line"; thereafter, the Chinese engaged in delaying action in successive positions; once again, the envelopment of a flank, the trans- port of troops across Tai Lake, turned the new position and by forced marches the Japanese reached Nanking on 12 December.'° A southern column took Wuhu. on the upper Yangtse, to cut off the retreat of the remnants of the Chinese forces, while the main body attacked the city of Nanking from three sides; the city fell within a few hours. Scenes of the wildest disorder ensued in a barbarous sack of the doomed city, which recalled the merciless record of Ghenghis Khan. While the Chinese deny it, there is a prevailing opinion that the creation of the Shanghai Front was provoked by Chiang Kai-shek, against the advice of his foreign staff; it is possible that he did not care to send his best divisions north of the Yellow River; perhaps he hoped to embroil Japan with foreign powers who had heavy investments in Shanghai, sixth largest city in the world. The Japanese would hardly have embarked on this expensive enterprise which clearly divided China into two separate theaters of operation, while a major effort already taxed their resources elsewhere; however, the net result was the framework of a strategic envelopment of stupendous size, in which the enveloping force operated on the axis: Shanghai—Sutschou—Nanking, while the frontal attack followed the present North Front to the Lunghai corridor; the historical analogy, suggesting itself immediately, is again the Austro-Prussian Campaign of i866, in its decisive phases, i.e., the operation of the Plussian First and Second Armies against Koniggratz. e. Operations against the Lunghai corridor, 1938. (1)Tacticaland strategical considerations.In the wake of the collapse of the Shanghai Army, its remnants withdrew in various directions; the Japanese High Command saw no reason to 'Onthat date.the IJ.S.S.•Panay" was sunk by Japanese aircraft while anchored so the YaDgtzeRiver twelvemiles above Naokmng. --- Page 218 --- MANEUVER IN WAR pursue them in a major effort. An immediateadvance on Hankow presented a difficult line of communications except via the Yangtze River, which was still blocked by a number of booms. An advance northward, in direction of Suchow, was of greater promise, es pecially if coordinated with an advance toward the south by the left wing of Terauchi's Northern Army. The Lunghai railroad, it will be recalled, is a great arterial line, a "rocade," linking the "Tsinpu" and "Pinghan" railroads, and represents in its western branch (Kaifeng—Sian) the gate to Russiaand the point of entry of a continuous stream of war materiel. A simultaneous, coordinated advance from the north and south would cut this PLATE t*..THEWAR OF THE RAILROADS. A PARALLEL TO THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT. artery in vicinity of Suchow (Hsuchou), an important rail center, encircle the Chinese forces in that area, or push them westward; consequently, the Lunghai corridor became the next Japanese objective. It is obvious that the capture of Suchow in itself could not have an immediate decisive effect; it was expected that Chinese reinforcements would pour into this area—and they did; Chiang Kai-shek made the defense of the Lunghai the great military issue of this wartIn keeping with the characteristic feature of modern large.scale campaigns, battle is not a single act but the aggregate of many sub. sidiary acts, a series of progressive efforts coordinated in time, space and relative weght.2° The entire length of the "Lunghai" was bound to be affected; Suchow became one of several objectives; indeed, the Kaifeng area farther west was even more important as the junction of the "Lungbai" with the "Pinghan" railroad over which all Chinese troops in the corridor were supplied from Hankow. Reflecting on the military distances involved, the Napoleonic concept of the Japanese High Command was never more clearly demonstrated than when it shifted from the initial attack on Suchow, as it slowed down, to extend to the west •Chap. IV,Pu.. 17andis. SITUATION TO INCLUDE 27 JUNE 866 AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN WAR 1866 --- Page 219 --- THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR.O9 and threaten the entire "Lunghai" front, with the main effort in direction of Kaifeng; when it was found later on that the mass of Chinese forces was com- mitted within the corridor, the Japanese quickly shifted again, resumed operations in Shantung and forced a decision in the battle of Suchow. The subsequent advance west, in an envelopment, while the line of the Lunghai was contained frontally, PLATE i.OPERATIONSAGAINST THE LUNGHAI CORRIDOR, 1938. cleared the corridor in hard fighting and opened the avenue for an advance on Hankow, the last stronghold of organized Chinese resistance. The timing, tactical characteristic, and sequence of these operations (1938) is interesting: JanuaryJapanese Left:Operations in Shantung (Envelopment) FebruaryJapanese Center:Advance on Kaifeng (Breakthrough) MarchJapanese Right:Operations in Shansi (Flank Security) AprilJapanese Left:The Chinese Counteroffensive: Tayerchwang (Defensive) MayJapanese Left:A Japanese Major Offensive: Suchow (Main Effort) June.JulyJapanese Ensemble: The Envelopment of the Corridor (Pursuit) Aug.-Oct.Japanese Ensemble:Operations against Hankow (Exploitation) (2) Operations in Shantung.The Japanese Second Army, in the north, faced Tsinan; the crossing of the Hoangho was effected on 23 December. Tsinan fell on the twenty-seventh; the Chinese Shantung divisions, under a lukewarm commander, offered feeble resistance.Tsingtau was taken and fresh troops started west from this port.The Japanese right wing, however, ran into stiff resistance along the Grand Canal; by mid February, the line stabilized on the front: Tsining—Yihsien. The advance of the First Army from the south, in three columns, made fair progress initially; the Wai River line was reached by the end of January, but strong Chinese counterattack held their opponents thereafter on the front: Pen- gpu—Huntze Lake. ()Advanceon Kaifeng—Chengchow. The advance of the Japanese First --- Page 220 --- 210MANEUVER IN WAR and Second Army was not only stopped but seriously hampered by continuous Chinese counteroffensives; the Japanese estimated that this effort must have drawn forces from western "Lunghai"; consequently early in February, they re- inforced their Third Army on the Changte Front and began an advance in several columns. They succeeded in reaching the north bank of the Hoangho and hold- ing it generally in spite of serious Chinese counterattacks; this army thereafter re- mained in position as a threat to the vital Kaifeng—Chengchow area. ()Operationsin Shansi. The Eighth Chinese Army (Communistic) and numerous guerrilla had been able to threaten all Japanese communications in this province, thereby constituting a constant threat against the right of the Japanese northern armies.Operating from Tayuan, the Japanese Fourth Army advanced generally along the Tayuan—Tungkwan Railroad and parallel moun- tain roads; elevations of 7000 feet give an indication of the terrain difficulties en- countered; the Japanese detached a force from Changte, to take the Chinese in rear; this detachment covered 140milesin six days. By the end of February, the Japanese reached the Hoangho and established an effective western barrier and flank security for the ensemble of their armies in the east. PLATE 134. THE HSUCHOU—TAYERCHWANG AREA, APRIL 1g38. ()TheChinese Counteroffensive: Tayerchwang.The center of gravity shifted from the western end of the Lunghai to its eastern mouth and the railroad junction Hsuchou. In this sector the Japanese slowly continued south in the direction of Hsuchou and reached the line: Tsining—Tayerchwang. Chiang Kai-shek, in the meanwhile, --- Page 221 --- THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR211 had amassed enormous reinforcements in this area, evidently for a major counter- offensive; the numerical superiority over the Japanese forces was estimated at 6 to z.In reckless attacks, the Chinese seriously endangered their opponents; the precarious Japanese communications to the north were cut repeatedly; Tayer. chwang changed hands several times. For the first time in recent history a Japanese unit was to be defeated, although through overwhelming numbers. Japanese re- inforcements, in particular the ioth (Isogai) and 11th (Itagaki) Divisions, at- tempted to regain lost terrain; in bitter fighting, from 27 March toApril, they took Tayerchwang only to find themselves completely cut off; escape to the east was blocked by inundations, since the Chinese had blown up the levees of the Grand Canal; o tanks, 77 field pieces and hundreds of trucks were mired; the Japanese lost heavily; only General Itagaki, with a few thousands, cut his way through to the north where he took up and held a defensive position at Ishien. The remnants of Isogai's Division were massacred.2' Stung to the quick, the Japanese rushed reinforcements to this front; both North and South Armies were increased by four divisions each;22 nevertheless, the Japanese were still confronted by superior numbers, an unsatisfactory ratio that prevailed throughout this war, and a tell-tale index of the efficacy of troops with adequate modern equipment over improvised organizations. (6) Japanese major offensive: Hsuchou, May 1938. In the first week of May, both Japanese armies began a coordinated advance on Hsuchou, from the north and south; the five columns (corps) of the northern army, from right to left, ad- vanced on the following objectives: First column: West of Tsining (TSI) on Kweiteh (KW) Second column: Vicinity Tsining on Tangshan (T) Third column: Tsining on Hsuchou Fourth column: Tsuhsien (TS) on Tayerchwang (TA) Fifth column: Itchou (IT)—Tancheng (TAN) on Sinanchen (S) 21Themoraleffectof this set-back was considerable, but thetacticalconsequences were negligible and couldnot stop the Japanese in their final drive on Hsuchou.. The North Army wa, composed of ten divisions, operating infive columns.For the first time in the war, the Japanese employed several regular divisions, from Manchuria. which bad been in positions of readi. ness for the ever-present, possible showdown with Soviet Russia. PLATE 135. TAYERHCHWANG,APRIL 1938. --- Page 222 --- 212MANEUVER IN WAR The southern army started its advance: on the right, Sató'S column reached Funing (F); his neighbor was stopped at Sunsien (S). The main column, following the Peking Railroad, ran into stiff resistance at Kuchen (K) and Menchen (M), but by a series of outfianking movements with motorized units pushed northward to Yungchen (Y) and finally Hsiashin (H); this column, with 40 tanks and heavy artillery, ran into a fresh Chinese division, poorly armed, and broke right through it; that night, 6ooo Chinese attacked the Japanese, in bivouac, in corral formation, but were repulsed. The Chinese fought gallantly in every sector of this widely dispersed battle area. PLATE 136. THE JAPANESEMAJOROFFENSIVE: HSUCHOU, MAY ig8. In the north, the columns attempting to cut the Lunghai at Kweiteh (KW) and Tangshan (T) were repulsed. On the line Hsuchou-Tayerchwang (TA), the Jap- anese ran into a prepared position, and they were promptly slowed down. It was apparent that this front could not be broken easily and that gains would have to be made by the flanking columns; battering against organized positions, from14 to17May,the third column slowly made headway: on the right, the fifth column fought against superior numbers, in a ratio of ito5, but cut the "Lunghai" on 15May,at Sinanchen. On the twentieth, contact was made with the leading ele- ments of the southern army. Elements of the left column of the southern army turned north on Suhsien and collided on i6 May with strong Chinese forces fighting desperately; these were divisions withdrawing from Hsuchou; the Japanese stood fast, but wide intervals --- Page 223 --- THE SINO.JAPANESE WAR.213 between adjacent units enabled the bulk of the Chinese to make a get.away to rallying positions in the wesL' After i6 May, the northern army made definite progress, and the right and center reached the outskirts of Hsuchou (Hsutschau) on the nineteenth. The city fell after a heavy bombardment in which 200 aircraft participated; a surprisingly SITUATION: MAY 181938 PLATE '87. THE BATTLE OF HSUCHOU, 15.18 MAY 1958. small number of defenders fell into Japanese hands; the bulk of the garrison escaped in an incredible detour, slipping through Japanese columns. However, the great mass of Chinese divisions, containing the best available units, had been The Chinese troops were ably led by General Li.Tung.Yen. SITUATION: MAY 15.1938 --- Page 224 --- MANEUVER IN WAR severely handled in pitched engagements, and their morale and power of organized resistance were definitely lowered. (7) The envelopment of the corridor. Within a few days of the fall of Hsuchou, the Japanese organized the pursuit along the axis of the "Lunghai," with Kaifeng as the next objective24 In accord with accepted procedure, in pursuit, detachments were sent on Tchu- kaikou to intercept the Chinese retreat on Hankow, while in the corridor itself the i4th Japanese Division" attempted to block the flood of retreating columns. far in rear, at Kaifeng; this place was taken on the twenty.fourth, but this small division found itself immediately confronted by overwhelming numbers and was surrounded.It held Kaifeng until the twenty-eighth, then broke through the cordon to the north; with incredible tenacity, this outfit battled for its life until pressure was relieved by the subsequent Japanese advance within the corridor itself. This progress was contested step by step; heavy fighting took place at Kweiteh and Ninglingle The Japanese finally took Kaifeng on 6 June. It was calculable at the moment that the Chinese in the Tchengchau-Kaifeng area were trapped and their retreat on Hankow seriously threatened. The Chinese High Command then made a grave decision: on 12 June, the levees of the Hoangho were ordered cut and the surrounding country was flooded for hundreds of square miles; the Hoangho, in this area, is at a level approximately 25 feet above the adjacent plains. This artificial disaster stopped any further Japanese operations in this sector but brought death and ruin to hundreds of Chinese villages and hamlets. Equally determined and far more resourceful, the Japanese High Command promptly abandoned the line of the Lunghai and shifted its operative advance against Hankow, across high ground and along the Yangtze valley. j. Operations against Hankow: 1938-1939. The Japanese Navy, while usually in the background of events, has engaged in effective joint army-navy action on numerous occasions, as at Shanghai and in the advance on Nanking; in the opera- tions along the Yangtze, its intervention was to become of the utmost importance; this navigable river is a direct avenue of approach into Hankow; the Chinese had constructed a number of booms, supported by shore batteries and fortifica- tions; it was the arduous task of the navy, over a period of months, to clear the river. By 12 June their work made possible the seizure of the city and port of Anking. The Japanese plan involved a general advance along the axis: Hsuchou— Hankow, on the north, and an advance in the Yangtze valley, in the south, with the major effort probably on the south wing; the front of this advance was roughly oo miles. The Chinese had organized positions for successive defense, utilizing the river to the utmost, especially in vicinity of Kiukiang, and the Lüshan moun- tains, north and south thereof, with elevations ranging from3000 to 6ooo feet. The defenders, under General Tschen Tscheng, were estimated at500,000 to i,ooo,ooo men. The Japanese ajvanced in two columns in the river valley and along the foot- hills; the river coltlmn was continuously supported by naval units, and its action became an endless series of landing operations to reduce local resistance; the northern column had to cope with flood waters and fought a bitter, step-by-step advance. It took the better part of July to finally capture Kiukiang, the gateway to Hankow. "See Plates 133 and 134.General Doiharacommanding, the"Lawrence" of China. For many years negotiator For the JapaneseGovernment in North äina. MOnehundred twenty.five thousand men, ably commanded by the Chinese General He Taung. --- Page 225 --- THE SINO.JAPANESE WAR.215 It is characteristic of the Japanese maneuver concept that the advance in several columns, as a habitual formation, developed tactically into frontalpressure sup- ported by envelopments and flanking operations; this is, ofcourse, a planned procedure; there is a continuous alternating play of frontal attack and envelop- ment in units of all sizes. Viewing the advance up the Yangtze as a frontal assault, then the northern columns operating from Hopei represent the envelopment on a large scale; in August, these columnswere reinforced and proceeded to slug their way west, while the main effort, as a "breakthrough," continued on the line: Kiukiang—Hankow. The Chinese poured more and more men into the Kiukiang2a front. The Jap- anese, on the other hand, realized that a breakthrough at this point was unavoid- ?PrinceManilko, commanding.• One hundred thirty nunbered divisions were identiñedin this general area, Kiang Kai.shek a last levee of organized units. 0100200300M1.I PLATE i8. THE ADVANCE ON HANI(OW. --- Page 226 --- MANEUVER IN WAR able, since the control of the Yangtze furnished a safe and reliable line of commu- nication and simplified supply. During October, the column operating on the river was able to push steadily forward, but the heaviest fighting fell to the columns branching to the south and southwest, with Nantschang and Tschangscha, as objectives, or at least the inter- ception of the railway to Canton; bitter combats were reported north of Nantschang. The final story is monotonous in a recital of stubborn rear-guard actions by the Chinese, of outfianking maneuvers by their mobile opponents. On 26 October, motorized Japanese elements entered Hankow, while the remnants of the Chinese armies were retreating into the western provinces, and Chiang Kai-shek set up his capital in Chungking. A few days before the fall of Hankow, another blow fell on the generalissimo; Canton, since the fall of Shanghai the principal remaining port of entry for the Chinese, was captured. Thereafter, the problem of supplies and ammunition must loom large on the horizon. After cleaning up the Hankow area, the Japanese pushed south and took Youchou, about zoo miles south of Hankow, Ofl 12 November; thereafter, a lull set in in this area until the spring of zg when the Japanese made a surprise move on Nancharig, took the city on 28 March and cut the last remaining rail- road to the east coast. The Japanese have been consistent n their drives on widely scattered objectives; they not only sought the military defeat of the armed forces of the enemy but lost no opportunity to strangle him economically, in cutting every important line of communication and supplies. PLATE i.THECAPTURE OF HANE.OW. --- Page 227 --- THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR217 The capture of Canton was perfectly timed to coincide with the critical phases of the great battle of Hankow, which strained Chinese man power to the utmost; many southern divisions were identified in this struggle,and the Japanese esti mated that weakness existed in that area. The operation against Canton was a classical, joint army-navy action. The initial landings were at Bias-Bay, which PLATE 140.THECAPTURE OF CANTON. had a bad reputation on account of swampy areas; the initial bridgehead was widened rapidly; by iOctober,the Japanese had 6o,ooo men available. The overland advance of this army, in several columns, proceeded without encounter- ing serious resistance 29whilethe fleet attacked the Boca Tigris forts and opened Pearl River. At :o PM, 21 October, motorized advance guard elementsentered the city. The Chinese fell back to a semicircular position about ioo milesnorth and west of Canton. 48. THE PROBLEM OF CHINESE SUPPLY. The fall of Canton represented theloss of the last remaining rail communication with the outside world; since the fall of Shanghai, 85 per cent of war shipments had entered via Hong Kong and Canton; the loss of this vital port of entry left only two practicable routes for supply: in the north, the ancient "silk-route" from Soviet territory with the terminal point at Sian; in the south, the caravan route from Yunnan to Lashio, in British-Burma, and the narrow-gauge railroad to Haiphong, French Indo-China. The northern route comprises a distance of 2000 miles, with mountains of i8,ooo ft. and passes of • The Japanese coveted 190kms in8days,an average of 21kmsa day, fighting several actions, over routes that had been demolished to some extent. --- Page 228 --- MANEUVER IN WAR 6,ooo ft. elevation intervening; the caravan route to Yunnan has been improved for motor traffic since i937by a veritable army of thousands of Coolies. This "life line" is by no means a modern, high-speed motor road, but an im- provisation, with make-shift bridge and culvert construction. Apparently, this road is serviceable, since it is reported that 500to1500motorvehicles operate on schedule, in groups of io trucks; there is a daily dispatch of three to six groups, i. e, 30to6o trucks in convoys. Ten days are required ordinarily from Lashio to Yunnan, i. e., roughly 6o convoys are in continuous operation. The enterprise is managed as a civil commercial monopoly, the 'Southwestern Transport Company, Rangoon." Assuming a conservative figure of o trucks (tons)arriving daily in Yunnan, the useful tonnage is from 7 to io tons; if this tonnage is restricted to munitions and weapons (Class II, III and IV), it might suffice for an average Chinese corps of two divisions. The possibilities of adequate supply over this limited road net, in construction, PLATE 141.LINESOF COMMUNICATIONS, '939. --- Page 229 --- THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR119 are at best accompanied by unusual difficulties. An American opinion S0putsthis in a nutshell: "... Transferthe theater of war to the United States. An invader has occupied all territory east of the Mississippi; the battle line extends from Minneapolis to New Orleans, with base depots at Seattle, Los Angeles and Browns. yule. The northern front is being supplied over a single motor road from Seattle to Kansas City, while the southern sector draws its munitions from Los Angeles and Brownsville. Kansas City and Tulsa, Oklahoma, are forward depots three to four hundred miles from the actual front lines. How long could 'West' operate offensively under such conditions?" 31 Averageprofessional opinion would conclude that operations would henceforth be limited to the defensive and exclusive guerrilla operations, as a direct effect of this precarious supply factor. 49. ATuc-op.W. GUERRILLAS AGAINSTREGULARS.Guerrilla warfare is not to be underrated. Napoleon found it extremely dangerous in Spain, and the Grande Armee was as good or better in its days as the Japanese armies of today. PLATE 142.THE"LIFE LINE": LASHIO—YUNNAN. Armies of occupation in territories overrun by patriot bands are on continuous nerve-racking alert; such an army is not popular, at home, in enemy country, and with itself, and watchful waiting is apt to become very tiresome. Cavour once re- marked: "You can do anything with bayonets except sit on them." Chinese bands of considerable size appear to operate as guerrillas in rear of the Japanese forces and along their lines of communication. The extent of these activities can be judged from the record of Japanese operations; from October Major 3. W. CoffeyandLieut.3. Rudolph. C.& G. S. S. Qaaruvly, No. 71.1939.' SeePlate 147. C Sa --- Page 230 --- MANEUVER IN WAR to December ig8, over 200 separate expeditions, of varying size, had to be under- taken in central China. The record for January, in Shantung, Hopei, Honan and Anwhei is 197; in Shansi, 327 separate actions. As late as December, the "Pinghan" Railroad was repeatedly interrupted; spo- radic fighting broke out in all western provinces, particularly in Shansi. The end is not in sight; the lot of Japanese units on lines of communication duty is not to be envied, but this sort of war is not apt to bring on a decision. The Japanese Regular, acclimated in victorious campaigns, is easily a match for the guerrilla, the "hit and run" fighter, but the nuisance value of this type of warfare is un- questionable. The possibility of occasional counter-offensives is not excluded; there is still plenty of fight left in the Chinese. As late as April, coordinated attacks of con- siderable strength were delivered along the entire front from Shansi to Canton: operations against Kaifeng 82,againstNanchan", and against the bridgehead of Canton.8 Although these attacks were eventually brought to a standstill, they showed considerable vigor and took the Japanese by surprise. Chiang Kai-shek stated in a press interview on i8 April that "peace was out of the question...meanwhile the (Japanese) militarists are being dragged deeper and deeper into a swantp from which it will be difficult to extricate themselves... Japanwill be reduced to the status of a second-class power as the result of the prolonged resistance of China." '5 50. STATISTICS OF CONQUEST. Japanese G. H. Q.communiquesof the period," furnish a bird's-eye view of the extent of operations, relative losses and extent of front,' viz: Japanese losses:47,133 killed. Chinese losses:Shanghai:81 ,ooo Nanking:83,ooo Hsuchou:123,000 Hankow:195,000 Guerrillas:g8,ooo Captured material:ao8,ooo rifles iz,ooo M. G. 12,000 sabers 68o field pieces 1200trenchmortars 560 trucks 2200 railroad cars z,ooo,ooo rifle ammunition 2,300,000handgrenades 817,000 shells 1,700,000 mortar shells, etc. The Japanese front had an extent of approximately 2,000kms;this is about four times as long as the West Front during the World War. The front in South China is approximately 425 kms, i. e., twice as long as the front in the battle of Mukden, 1904.5. The area occupied by the Japanese comprises seven provinces: Chahar, Suiyuan, Hopei, Shantung, Kiangsu, Anwhei and Honan; this is an area General Yu.hsueh.thuus.'Genera!Lo.tchoying.URegularChinese divisions wereidenti6edcc the 131. 152, 134. 159 and 160th. lournal.Royal UnitedService Institution.August 1939.N 0y thefirst eighteenmonthsofthe war. STMi1:tmrwu:eifscbejihcb,MisSsil*n gee, Api1 1939. --- Page 231 --- THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR.221 twice as big as the Japanese Empire, or about 1,151,696 square kms. The area of China still under Chiang Kai-shek is about 3,204,588 square kms; i.e., the Jap- anese area represents 46 per cent of the original domain. Compared with greater China, 15 per cent is occupied by the Japanese but within this space is located9per cent of China's total population. 51.CnAcrERIsTIc Tvpr.s OF MANEUVER. While the advantage in training and equipment is all on the Japanese side, the Chinese were generally able to throw a heavy superiority of numbers into the scale. Operating on the defensive, an infe- riority in armament was not as noticeable, and once again, as at Shanghai, the defensive in organized positions proved a hard nut to crack. The Japanese solu- tion was maneuver, generally a combination of frontal or holding attack combined with the envelopment and flank attack. We are, once more, in the presence of our traditional factors, mass and direction! It is arguable that the Spanish Civil War, especially in its last phases, is more significant than the Sino-Japanese conflict, because the former employed more modern, latest type armament; nevertheless, the scale and range of operations of the Japanese armies represent the picture of modern war and the modern manipu- lation of large masses; every "type" of operation, if that term is permissible, is represented. t.Assemblyof field forces: the stra- a. Seizure of Peking and Tientsin areas.Plate tegic concentration. 2.Theoperations of covering forces,a.Seizure of Ying•ting River.Plate 129b. Attackand seizure of the Nankow Pass.Plate 146 c.Initiallanding operations in Shanghai.Plate 131 . Thestrategic advance inseveral a. The effect of the railroad net.Plate 127 columns.i.Advancealong Suiyuan KR.and i*8 2.Advanceon Tayuan.Plate isg .Advancealong the Pinghan RB.. .Advancealong the Tsinpu KR. 4. The collision: The battle.Attack a. The front:Liuliho.Tsinghai.Plate ioon a broad front.b.Thefront:Liuho-Shanghai.Plate iic. The"winter-line":Shanghai. d.Thebattle of Hsuchou.Plate i7 Timing of &uccessive efforts.a.Initial offensive in Hopei.Plate ioi.Japaneseleft wing: Matchang. 2.Japaneseright wing: Liuliho. .Japanesecenter: Kuon. Frontal attack and envelopment,a.Operations on the South Front.Plate iii. TheManeuver of Liuho. 2.Theenvelopmentofthe"winter- line." 3. The envelopment via Lake Tai. b.Operationsagainst the Lunghai corridor. Plate 133 c. Thecapture of Hankow.Plate 339 d.Thecapture of Canton.Plate 540 5.Pursuit,a. The advance on Nanking.Plate 531 Exploitation.b.Theenvelopment of the Lunghai cor- Plate 133 ridor. c.Theadvance on Hankow.Plate 138 6. Joint Army-Navy action,a. Operations in vicinity of Shanghai.Plate 131 b. Advanceon Nanking. c.Advanceon Hankow.Plate 138 7.Supplyand logistics,a. The problem of Chinese supply.Plate 541 b. Relativedistances:Sino-Japanese War. Plate 147 Noarmy, however, has a monopoly on maneuver or tactical combinations; the Chinese have made a good showing on several occasions, considering the lack of --- Page 232 --- MANEUVER IN WAR trained officers and staffs. As an example, the operations of the 142d Chinese Division in northern Kiangsi, in the period 26 September to i6 October 1938, show flexibility, tactical skill and command capacity; this division was by no means an elite division. PLATE 143.THE142D CHINESE DIVISION, 26 SEPTEMBER-16 OCTOBER 1938. In a general advance to the south, two Japanese brigades had reached the vi- cinity of Wanghiapu and Yangfang; they encountered elements of the Chinese 141st and 6oth Divisions east and west of Paishui and attacked; the Chinese held precariously. On 25 September, Chinese reinforcements arrived from the south: the 142d Division, General Li Han-hun commanding. The division moved against the Japanese eastern column to positions below Yangfang and attacked on the twenty- sixth; the attack was continued for several days. The Japanese fell back, but they were still holding the high ground southwest of Chuchiatang (C). At this point, the pursuing Chinese were ordered to remove the enemy from what was obviously a position threatening the flank of any further Chinese ad- vance; the 7 i6th Infantry was ordered to take the hill. One battalion was held in division reserve, leaving the regimental commander two rifle battalions, reinforced by a battery of -mm, two 7-mm guns and eight mortars. Orders reached him at 3:oo p;theline of departure was 2000 yards from his objective. Preceded by a screen of scouts, the companies advanced initially in col- umn of twos. Darkness and rain set in, when the attack was launched; the support- --- Page 233 --- THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR223 ing fire, however, was effective and greatly encouraged the men (who were cvi. dently not used to efficient artillery support); the Japanese gave way, and the Chinese occupied the position at io:oo PM. On the next day, the pursuit continued, when reports reached the commander that fresh Japanese columns were advancing from east and west. The 142d Division was hastily recalled and moved south via Paishui. PLATE 144.THE142D CHINESE DIVISION 26 SEPTEMBER-i6 OCTOBER ig8. By 4 October, the division was about 9 miles north of Kanmukuan; the 6th Brigade turned southwest to attack the Japanese main column in flank; the 5th Brigade turned east, made a demonstration against the Japanese columns and then, in a wide detour, gained the high ground west of Changling; they stopped a Jap- anese attack on the seventh and counterattacked on the eighth; by the tenth they had fought the Japanese to a standstill. The 6th Brigade did not fare so well and was compelled to fight delaying actions to the eleventh. With remarkable coolness, the Chinese commander then shifted the 5th Brigade to assist the 6th; with their backs exposed to the Japanese eastern column, the division slipped away on the sixteenth in the direction of Nanshang. 52. TAcncs AND TECHNIQUE OF SEPARATE ARMS. a. Aviation. The Japanese employ current types of planes (pursuit, observation, attack, etc.) with bombing planes predominating; they are known as 87, 88, 91 and 92 types, principally of --- Page 234 --- MANEUVER IN WAR Japanese manufacture; speed and annament vary from 150 to i8o miles per hour, twin M. G.'s and bomb loads of 1200 tO 2200 lbs,38 Bombardment aviation was primarily active against hostile airdromes; the Jap- anese employ incendiary and fragmentation bombs (20 to ioo lbs.) and high. explosive types (iso to 450 lbs.). Raids were carried out in relatively large groups of o to 40 planes. Direct cooperation with ground forces, however, is no exception; besides power dives and M. G. fire, small fragmentation banibs (20 lbs.) are employed; each plane carries from 30 to 40 such bombs. Initially, Chinese opposition was weak until foreign planes, especially Russian, became available; both sides claim to have scored success—the Chinese report downing oo to 6oo Japanese planes; the Japanese claim from 8oo to aioo. suz GIBRALTAR PLATE145. AVIATION PERFORMANCE AND COMPARATIVE TREATERS OF WAR. Japanese naval aviation, because of more modern equipment and longer flight ranges, has been very active; some remarkable long-distance missions are on record. Foreign observers, however, are not impressed with any outstanding achievement 'japsnese types:Pa,'rnig:Nakadsima 91, monoplane; motor: Jupiter Vi and VII. 40 H.P.; groundspeed: about t60 miles per hour; ceiling:19,000 ft.; armament:2Vickers M.G.Kawassaki 92biplane; motor: M.W..VI. 600 H.P.; ground speed: 200 miles per hour; ceiling: 40,000 ft.; armament: 2 Viccers MG.Objervatioss:Kawassaki 88,2.seater, biplane; motor: B.M.W..Vl, 600 H.P.; ground speed:about 10miles per hour; ceiling: 26,000 ft.; armament: 4 M.G.'s.Mitsubishi 92 motor of same name, 420 H.P.;ground speed: 130 miles per hour; .ceiling: 26,000 ft.; armament: 4 M.G. s. Bombardment(Light):Kawassaki 88, sotor: B.M.W..VI, 600 H.P.(Medium) Kawassaki 87, two motors: B.M.W..VI.(Heavy Night Bomber) Junkers 5.38.four motors: Rolls.Royce 800 H.P. each; ground speed:130 miles per bout; armament: 7 M.G.'s, I cannon.(Russian Sources.) 4 HSNGAN --- Page 235 --- THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR225 or innovations; this is partly due to quality in equipment and the vast extent of the theater of war; Plate 145 shows relative distances between the principal European airdromes in comparison with the approximate theater of operations in China: In this area, from 8oo,ooo to i,ooo,ooo men are locked in conflict, supported by about woo airplanes; considerable as these figures are, they dwindle in strategical and tactical significance when they are compared with an analogous situation in the western European theater of operations, where 25,000 airplanes could be set in motion to support io,ooo,ooo men. b. Infantry. As in Spain, infantry still remains the basic arm. The march per. formance of both Japanese and Chinese infantry is of the highest order. The Chinese soldier has stood a severe test in Shanghai and in Hsuchou; the great strength of infantry, on the defensive, was again demonstrated, but maneuver and the offensive have always gained a decision. The Japanese have given evidence of extraordinary tactical flexibility; it is recog. nized that they operated against superior numbers in practically every important battle; the adverse ratio was as high as 7 tol. The available man power and partial training led the Chinese to adopt dense formations and solid fronts; these fronts were habitually turned by their opponents in the classical application of the factors of mass and direction. Japanese reports indicate that they operated in mobile detachments of 1500 to ooo men, reinforced by artillery and tanks; frequently motorized, these combat groups were able to select favorable assembly areas and launch surprise attacks in decisive directions; a disposition, in echelon of other similar groups within the framework of divisions (corps), favored maneuver com- binations and swift, tactical groupings. Infantry weapons were adequate although high-angle, supporting fires were required in combat for villages and localities; mortars and grenade-projector units had to be organized for liberal attachment to infantry. c. Artillery. The terrain imposed the use of high-angle fire, howitzers and mountain guns; the organic divisional artillery, deficient in this category, was reinforced according to need by special artillery groupments. Frequently, pack artillery was found most useful, especially in the western provinces. Heavy artil- lery support is characteristic of the Japanese attack, while Chinese failure is often traceable to a lack of artillery. The Japanese have employed medium and heavy calibers. The artillery-infantry team has been excellent, on the whole, in Japanese armies; a characteristic example of this team play, the terrain difficulties, as well as the capacity of the Japanese for maneuver is to be found in the operations of the Japanese 5th Division at Nankow Pass 3-24August,z937. On i August the 5th Japanese Division, consisting of the 1 ith, 21st, 41st and 42d Infantry, was engaged in the Peking area. A regiment of the Chinese 8gth Division occupied Nankow Pass and entrenched. This defile, 26 miles northwest of Peking, is a most important terrain feature and the natural gateway to Suiyuan. Oddly enough, the Japanese failed to occupy it initially. On io August, they started a belated attack; the division had been reinforced by three batteries of 105-mm, two batteries of -mm, and 25 light and medium tanks. While the preliminary movements were under way, heavy rains converted the plain over which the Japanese had to operate into a veritable quagmire; the pass itself is mountainous, with steep, rocky slopes. The artillery was in action for several days, without seriously touching the Chinese defenders arranged in tiers of foxholes; the tanks were unable to operate. The walled town of Nankow was taken on the thirteenth, but the pass held out until the twenty-fourth; frontal attacks were repulsed several times; the Japanese --- Page 236 --- MANEUVER IN WAR losses were 3000 killed and wounded. The Japanese finally resorted to an envelop. ing movement; two depleted battalions made their way over a difficult trail south. west of the pass; when they appeared in their rear, the Chinese defenders withdrew. d. Mechanized and motorized units. The war found Japan in the midst of a partial program of motorization and mechanization; it was contemplated to form, within each division, a mechanized regiment, to consist of: PLATE 246. THE OPERATIONS AT NANKOW PASS, 3-24 AUGUGST. 1937. iCompany light tanks: Carden-Lloyd VI i Company M. G., motorcyclist i Company armored cars, mixed i Battery F. A., motorized a Companies infantry, truck-drawn There are several important examples of the use of such motor-mechanized units E