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3-00-010 
NAVAL DOCTRINE COMMAND 
Norfolk, Virginia 
i 
"Maneuver" or Manoeuvre  Warfare for the U.S. Navy? 
by 
Dr. James J. Tritten 
July 1995 
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 
19950907 017 
TJ£X<*$ fO&W 

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NAVAL DOCTRINE COMMAND 
Norfolk Virginia 
Rear Admiral F.L. 
Commander 
Lewis 
The work reported herein was prepared by the Naval Doctrine 
Command.  This  report reflects the opinion of the author only 
and does not represent the views or policies of the Naval 
Doctrine Command, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, or the 
Department of Defense. 
Reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized. 
This report was prepared by: 
DR. JAMES JOHN TRITTEN 
Doctrine Specialist 
Reviewed by; 
e Division 
Released by; 
C. M. deGRUY, CAPT, US} 
Chief of Staff 

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11. TITLE (INCLUDE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION) 
MANEUVER' OR MANOEUVRE WARFARE DOCTRINE FOR THE U.S. NAVY? 
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) 
DR. JAMES J. TRITTEN 
13a. TYPE OF REPORT 
FINAL 
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FROM MAY 84 TO JUL 85 
14. DATE OF REPORT (YY,MM,DD| 
95,07,14 
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28 
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION 
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GROUP 
18.SUBJECT TERMS Umm,*irw*s.;t**&rymliUMfykrUKkm,lm1 
DOCTRINE MILITARY DOCTRINE CASTEX 
NAVY DOCTRINE MANEUVER FRENCH NAVY 
NAVAL DOCTRINE MANEUVER WARFARE 
19. ABSTRACT (CONTINUE ON REVERSE IF NECESSARY AND IDENTIFY BY BLOCK NUMBER) 
INITIAL REPORT ON THE THEORY OF 'MANEUVER' WARFARE IN THE DEEP OCEAN ENVIRONMENT. AUTHOR'S THESIS 
IS THAT NAVY OFFICERS HAVE HAD OVER TEN YEARS OF EXPOSURE TO LITERATURE ON GROUND AND SEA-SHORE 
CONCEPTS OF 'MANEUVER' WARFARE BUT THAT IT HAS NOT YET TAKEN FIRM HOLD. IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE NAVY 
TO BE AN EQUAL PARTICIPANT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 'MANEUVER' WARFARE DOCTRINE, THIS CONCEPT WILL HAVE TO 
BE EXPLAINED IN TERMS FAMILIAR TO THE MAJORITY OF NAVY OFFICERS-OPEN OCEAN 'MANEUVER' NOT 
ASSOCIATED WITH SEA-SHORE "MANEUVER.' REPORT OPENS WITH HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF "MANEUVER" 
AND AN ANALYSIS OF HOW CURRENT JUXTAPOSITIONS WITH ATTRITION ARE INACCURATE. A MORE CORRECT 
READING OF HISTORY IS THAT WARFARE IS EITHER ATTRITION (OVER TIME) OR ANNIHILATION (QUICK). 'MANEUVER' WARFARE 
FITS INTO EITHER. AN INITIAL THEORY OF NAVY MANOEUVRE WARFARE DOCTRINE IS DEVELOPED USING CLASSICAL ITALIAN, 
RUSSIAN, GERMAN, CHINESE, JAPANESE, AND FRENCH MATERIALS. OF SPECIFIC NOTE IS THE EARLIER WORK OF FRENCH 
ADMIRAL RAOUL CASTEX IN THE AREA OF MANOEUVRE AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR. REPORT ENDS 
WITH A VISION OF A FUTURE BATTLESPACE IN WHICH 'MANEUVER'/MANOEUVRE WARFARE IS THE 
PRIMARY DOCTRINE FOR NAVAL FORCES. THE REPORT IS THE FIRST IN A SERIES WHICH WILL EXPLORE THE CONCEPT. 
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"Maneuver" or Manoeuvre  Warfare for the U.S. Navy?1 
By 
James J. Tritten 
Introduction 
Today, we face the possibility of a new shift in paradigms 
not based upon any introduction of new technology. That paradigm 
shift grows out of the overall shift in fleet missions to be more 
focused on operations from the sea to the shore and applying the . 
"maneuver" warfare concepts of land warfare for use at sea. When 
the Naval Doctrine Command stood up in March 1993, the U.S. 
Marine Corps brought with it a well-developed doctrine for 
"maneuver" warfare. The marriage of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps 
doctrinal development effort cannot help but influence U.S. Navy 
Service-unique doctrine--including the embracing of "maneuver" 
warfare. The U.S. Navy cannot help but also be influenced by the 
acceptance of this form of warfare by the U.S. Army and the U.S. 
Air Force. 
In exploring the concepts of "maneuver" warfare, however, we 
have had over a decade of ground-oriented explanations available 
from which to draw upon and develop the maritime parallels.1 The 
Marine Corps and a small group of amphibious-experienced U.S. 
Navy officers have done an excellent job of developing the 
concept of "maneuver" warfare. Today we readily accept General 
Douglas MacArthur's New Guinea campaign during World War II as 
the model for modern "maneuver" warfare from the sea to the 
shore.2 
What remains to be done today is to more fully investigate 
the concept of "maneuver" warfare in the deep water environment 
so that navy officers throughout the world can internalize the 
concept and then be more equal partners in the full development 
of multi-Service naval "maneuver" warfare doctrine. More examples 
of ground warfare are not the answer to how to do this. We have 
sufficient literature on both the theory of "maneuver" warfare as 
well as historical ground or amphibious examples. What we need 
today, and soon, are well-researched examples of navy operations, 
battles, engagements, strikes, and systematic combat actions that 
exemplify the theory of "maneuver" warfare at sea. 
We also need those examples of navy officers, from any 
country, who have given the subject of "maneuver" warfare their 
full attention and whose thoughts have been committed to paper. 
The Naval Doctrine Command did a search of the literature when it 
1 The views expressed by the author are his alone and do 
not necessarily represent those of the U.S. government, 
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Navy. 
1 

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first came to grips with the term "doctrine" and drew upon the 
writings of previous navy officers who had first attempted to 
explore the concept. Results of a literature search for maritime 
concepts of "maneuver" warfare are thus far limited, but there is 
at least one French admiral who developed a well-thought out 
theory for such warfare that is totally consistent with the ideas 
of Sun Tzu and more modern advocates of "maneuver" warfare.3 
In addition, the Imperial Japanese Navy made a thorough 
study of such "maneuver" warfare doctrine and embraced it prior 
to World War II, about the same time as they formulated their 
initial war plans against the U.S. According to their doctrine: 
"The keys to battle are initiative and concentration. 
To get the benefit of initiative it is necessary to 
observe skillfully the military situation and, taking 
advantage of opportunities and exploiting the enemy's 
weakness, attack him speedily and boldly. To acquire 
the advantages of concentration it is necessary always 
to ensure good contact between various units taking 
part in an operation together, attack a part of the 
enemy's forces with all of ours, and seize 
opportunities. "4 
One scholar has argued that it was because the Japanese failed to 
remember the teachings of Sun Tzu and instead became fascinated 
by German models that they prepared poorly for war with America.5 
The influence of Sun Tzu and other ancient Chinese philosophers 
on navy warfare has not been well explored in the West. 
This report will explore how the various concepts of warfare 
apply to navies and how "maneuver" warfare fits. Navy "maneuver" 
warfare will be examined for its theory as well as applicability 
for the future. Where it enhances understanding, historical 
examples of "maneuver" warfare will be introduced. A more fully 
developed historical presentation of "maneuver" will appear in 
subsequent reports. Finally, appropriate conclusions will be 
drawn. Due to the extensive existing literature on "maneuver" 
warfare ashore, and from the sea to the shore, discussion of 
"maneuver" warfare herein will be limited to concepts primarily 
at sea. 
Origins of "Maneuver" Warfare 
The original philosophy underlying the concepts of modern 
"maneuver" warfare comes from China and the Roman empire of 
Julius Caesar. The U.S. Marine Corps has embraced the concepts of 
Sun Tzu contained in The Art of War,   written around 400 B.C.6 
Indeed, in their capstone Service-unique doctrinal publication, 
Wa.rfighting,   FMFM-1, Sun Tzu is quoted at the beginning of the 
chapter on "The Theory of War:"7 

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"Invincibility lies in the defense; 
the possibility of victory in the attack. 
One defends when his strength is inadequate; 
he attacks when it is abundant." 
A further understanding of the value of knowing when to 
attack, and when not to attack, can be found in other classical 
Chinese literature, such as: the Ssu-ma Fa,   the Wu-tzu,   the Wei 
Liao-tzu,   the T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings,   the Three 
Strategies  of Huang Shih-kung, and the medieval Questions and 
Replies  between T'ang T'ai-tsung and Li Wei-kung.8 Another 
Chinese classic, Lao Tzu's Tao Te Ching  (The Book of the Way), 
which may predate Sun Tzu by a few hundred years, teaches that: 
"When two great forces oppose each other, 
the victory will go 
to the one that knows how to yield."9 
Whereas the Chinese ground forces doctrine may currently be 
generally biased toward long-term attrition warfare and the 
defense, ancient Chinese doctrine was oriented toward "maneuver" 
warfare and subduing the enemy without actually engaging him--due 
to then-particular geographic and demographic conditions. 
Although most American analyses of ancient Chinese combat 
doctrine emphasizes "maneuver," one Chinese scholar expresses 
incredulity over the West's placing of importance of the non- 
combative aspect of "maneuver." According to this scholar, the 
"maneuver" in ancient writings refers to deterrent actions--when 
combat forces actually meet, there is no question that they are 
supposed to fight traditional combat!10 
"Maneuver" warfare, however, is generally cast today in more 
recent descriptive terms as being that style of warfare of the 
German Army versus the "attritionist" strategies of France, in 
World Wars I and II, and the Soviet Union in World War II. German 
Army doctrine during the inter-War years was based upon two field 
service regulations issued in 1921 and 1933.n German doctrine 
emphasized maneuver, mobility, the offensive, surprise, tempo, 
and the penetration of enemy defenses. Indeed, German Army 
doctrine called for one continuous battle with the commitment of 
reserves to ensure that the enemy was overwhelmed and momentum 
was not lost. 
German Army doctrine also emphasized decentralization and 
initiative at the lowest levels of the chain of command. German 
Army doctrine emphasized the auftragstaktik,   or task-oriented 
tactics that permitted the lower-echelon commander to operate 
within his senior's intent. An officer could ignore standing 
directives, naturally at his own risk, if he were responding to 
local conditions. French Army doctrine, on the other hand, was 

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centralized and emphasized control. As a result of their 
doctrine, the Germans could count on locally-initiated 
counterattacks while fighting on the defensive. The French Army- 
needed to be ordered into a counterattack. 
The catastrophic and unexpected failure of the French Army 
in the early days of World War II can be, in great part, 
attributable to their strategy and doctrine for war.12 Simply put, 
the French Army attempted to fight an attrition-based war based 
upon defense, firepower, centralization, and control in a series 
of sequential methodical battles. The German Army, on the other 
hand, had adopted a doctrine of "maneuver" warfare of one 
continuous battle that made the French response inadequate and 
self-defeating. Unfortunately, due to the nature of French Army 
doctrine, there was no alternative solution. When the need for 
change was recognized, after defeats in the first phase of the 
war, it simply was too late. 
Another German technique being resurrected is that of 
fingerspitzengefühl,   or finger-tip feel for the battlefield, by 
the combat leader.13 Championed by General Hermann Balck and 
General Major Friedrich von Mellenthin, the commander's 
fingerspitzenge fühl  would appear to be a Teutonic version of 
Napoleon's concept of coup d'oeil,14  or the inner eye, a concept 
fully consistent with "maneuver" warfare. 
Annihilation, Attrition, and "Maneuver" 
Complicating any discussion of "maneuver" warfare is the 
lack of universal acceptance of the concept itself. For example, 
the noted German military historian Hans Delbrück argues that 
there is no such thing as pure "maneuver" warfare.15 On the other 
hand, Clausewitz pays homage to this form of warfare and 
nominates the Italian Raimondo Montecuccoli and Prussian 
Frederick the Great as its most skillful practitioners.16 
The Italian lieutenant general Raimondo Montecuccoli fought 
in the'17th Century as a field marshal for the Austrian Hapsburg 
empire. He won more than forty battles in his lifetime. 
Additionally, Montecuccoli wrote a great deal on military art and 
strategy. This included Tratto della guerra   [Treatise on War] , 
his major work, as well as Delle battaglie   [Battles] ,   Tavole 
militari   [Military Tables] ,   and Delia guerra con il  turco in 
Ungheria   [War with the Turks in Hungary] . Montecuccoli gave equal 
weight to wars of annihilation and those of attrition and he 
practiced combat in which maneuver was equally important as the 
clash itself. The military art of Montecuccoli is the art of 
fighting well to win.17 
Another complication to the concept of "maneuver" warfare is 
the improper juxtaposition of this form of warfare against 

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attrition warfare.18 Recent advocates of "maneuver" warfare posed 
their "maneuver" warfare alternative as the smarter form of 
warfare in a 1980s Soviet-NATO conflict in Europe as a part of 
the military reform movement. The result of this advocacy has 
been intellectual gymnastics as other thinkers attempted to 
ignore the lessons of history. Simply put, "maneuver" warfare is 
not an alternative to attrition warfare--it is a method of 
warfare that can be used either as a part of attrition warfare or 
as a part of warfare of annihilation. A short review of the 
theory of these two basic forms of warfare is in order. 
The first division of warfare into annihilation and 
attrition was by Montecuccoli.19 Montecuccoli's theories were 
accepted by Frederick the Great. Prussian General, and world 
renown military theoretician, Karl von Clausewitz also accepted 
this bifurcation and was in the middle of revising Vom Krieg  to 
encompass the theory when he died. 
More recent acceptance of these theories was by the Prussian 
Generals Helmuth von Moltke [the Elder] and Alfred von 
Schlief fen.20 While Chief of Staff, Moltke developed the concept 
of the continuous strategic-operational sequence which would 
defeat the enemy in one great and decisive battle of annihilation 
--the Vernichtungsschlacht.  Schlieffen further developed the 
concept of the rapid decisive campaign of annihilation in his 
campaign planned for Europe prior to World War I. 
This concept of annihilation and attrition as two opposite 
poles was further refined by Delbrück, who termed the two types 
of warfare niederwerfungsStrategie   (annihilation) and 
ermattungsStrategie   (exhaustion) .21 Perhaps a better German word 
for attrition warfare is abnuetzungschlacht.  The separation of 
warfare into annihilation and attrition has a long history in 
German military theory. 
The most complete treatment of the two concepts is to be 
found in the post-World War I lectures and writings of Soviet 
General and Professor Aleksandr A. Svechin.22 His book Strategy 
was essentially devoted to advocating attrition war over that 
which he termed "destruction." Svechin wrote probably the most 
exhaustive treatise of the two different types of warfare with 
numerous historical examples.23 He is also credited with 
originating the concept of operational art and the operational- 
level of warfare based upon his experiences in the Russo-Japanese 
War (1905). 
In annihilation warfare, niederwerf ungs Strategie,  victory 
follows a decisive engagement, vernichtungsschlacht,   against the 
center of gravity--the enemy fleet in navy warfare. A campaign of 
annihilation was the basic strategy (War Plan Orange) developed 
by the U.S. Navy and Army for warfare in the Pacific prior to 

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World War II. It was also the basic form of combat under Imperial 
Japanese Navy doctrine.24 Annihilation warfare subordinates all 
actions to a single supreme purpose. Under annihilation, 
withdrawal is normally not considered an honorable alternative. 
Warfare by annihilation ashore has been successfully practiced by 
relatively few commanders--Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Julius 
Caesar, and Napoleon Bonaparte--but it has been an accepted way 
of war at sea for centuries. 
The navy counterpart to attrition warfare, 
abnuetzungschlacht,   is the well-known navy concept of gruerre de 
course.  Examples include convoy defense practiced in the World 
War II Battle of the Atlantic and other forms of warfare where 
one single engagement or battle is not crucial to the outcome. 
Despite the plan to fight a war of annihilation in the Pacific 
during World War II, Admiral William Halsey, USN, actually 
engaged in a war of attrition against the Japanese--although he 
was continually seeking a decisive battle of annihilation, 
Vernichtungsschlacht.25  Attrition warfare, abnuetzungschlacht,   is 
realistic under today's environment and allows the commander a 
higher degree of flexibility. Under attrition, withdrawal is 
regularly considered an honorable alternative. Warfare ashore by 
attrition has been successfully practiced by many more commanders 
than has warfare of annihilation--Pericles during the 
Peloponesian Wars, Frederick the Great in the Seven Years' War,26 
Britain during the World War II air defense Battle of Britain, 
and by the Russians in their Second Great Patriotic War. 
The obvious question is what then to do about this concept 
of "maneuver" warfare. Is it "maneuver" versus 
niederwerfungsstrategie  or abnuetzungschlacht?  Actually, 
"maneuver" warfare is a philosophy of warfare that can serve to 
support either warfare of annihilation or attrition. Since modern 
naval warfare will still embrace aspects of annihilation and 
attrition warfare, we need to focus on the contributions that can 
be made by "maneuver" warfare to both. The greatest problem with 
the concept of "maneuver" warfare doctrine in the United States 
is that most native speakers of American-English assume that they 
know what the concept means because they recognize the word 
"maneuver." For this reason alone, we should adopt a new term. 
The current phrase "maneuver" warfare is most closely 
identified with the U.S. Marine Corps. Any investigation of this 
concept therefore treads on written Marine Corps Service-unique 
doctrine and presumably could affect Marine Corps programmatics. 
It is hoped that the Marine Corps will not view the investigation 
of "maneuver" warfare at sea as a threat--the purpose of this 
investigation is to help the U.S. Navy come to grips with the 
concept of "maneuver" warfare so that it can be an equal partner 
in multi-Service naval doctrinal development. 

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A major lesson to be learned from the doctrine of the 
Imperial Japanese Navy prior to World War II was that good 
doctrinal concept development gave way to sloganeering and the 
use of catchy phrases which were not subject to analysis and 
criticism. These included: "using a few to conquer many" (ka o 
motte,   shü i  seu-su)   and "fight the enemy on sight" (kenteki 
hissen); that had the distinction of being a mantra that was 
accepted on faith and was not allowed to be questioned.27 This 
mystical approach to naval doctrine did not serve the Imperial 
Japanese Navy well--Japan fought the coming war with faulty 
doctrine. The failure to open up "maneuver" warfare to scrutiny 
by outsiders will not serve the U.S. Marine Corps well either. 
Navy "Maneuver" Warfare Doctrine Explained 
The most comprehensive investigation of navy "maneuver" 
warfare to date has been completed by the French Navy. It is here 
that we must first look to get a nautical understanding of the 
concept. Following World War I, the French Navy came under the 
influence of the writings of Admiral Raoul Castex. His five 
volume Theories strategiques2*  is perhaps the most complete 
theoretical survey of maritime strategy to ever appear. A sixth 
volume, Melanges strategiques,  was published in 1976 after his 
death. The essence of Castex's work can be found in a summary of 
some 2,600 pages of original text in French recently translated 
by the U.S. Naval Institute into 428 pages in English in 
Strategic Theories.19 
Castex recognized that his task was to provide doctrine for 
a second-ranking navy and not one that would ever hope to 
challenge a first-rate fleet. He formulated the concept of la 
force organisee,   the main force which could be mustered for a 
limited counteroffensive against a superior enemy which would be 
manipulated so that it could not bring its full strength to bear. 
There is some similarity between Castex and some of the writings 
of Sir Julian Corbett in Britain.30 Castex gave significant 
attention to commerce raiding, raids, blockade, mine, and 
amphibious warfare. The centerpiece of his writings is strategic 
manoeuvre and,not battle. 
Castex's writings played the same role that did those of 
Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan in the United States and 
elsewhere in the world--they were used as textbooks and points of 
departure for internal government position papers. Students at 
the ecole de guerre navale  were still educated in traditional 
French naval doctrine of guerre de course,   whereas students from 
foreign nations flocked to the ecole superieure de guerre  to 
study the latest developments in annihilation warfare ashore.31 
Theories strategiques  was translated into Spanish by the 
Argentine Navy and various sections have been translated into 

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Serbo-Croat, Greek, Japanese and Russian. It has been widely used 
in Latin America and Mediterranean countries. 
The renowned American strategic thinker Bernard Brodie paid 
Castex homage in his A Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy by 
stating that "the underlying value of the teachings of men like 
Mahan, Corbett, and Castex is still largely intact."32 In the 
revised 3rd. ed. of this book, re-titled A Guide to Naval 
Strategy,   Brodie's annotated reading list contains the following 
notation for Castex's Theories strategigues   (emphasis added): 
"This great work by a French naval officer is in the 
classic tradition of Mahan and Corbett, which it 
carries forward in its examination of the strategic 
lessons of World War I. Castex's ideas on submarine 
warfare were translated into German and greatly 
influenced German planning for the submarine campaign 
of World War II."33 
« 
Castex's concepts of manoeuvre  warfare doctrine are not 
ideal, of course, in guiding us to a new paradigm in the next 
century. On the other hand, the use of the term manoeuvre rather 
than "maneuver" demands that both the writer and reader recognize 
that the concept being advanced is different. The problem with 
using the word "maneuver" in English is that despite over a 
decade of trying, many navy officers have failed to understand 
the subtleties associated with the concept because they assume 
that they know what "maneuver" means. 
For example, Commander Linton Wells II, USN, gets the theory 
of "maneuver" warfare right in a December 1980 U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings  article, but then applies this theory to 
explain only why navies need to perform various movements prior 
to weapons launch, while defending themselves, and during 
antisubmarine warfare. Wells understands that an objective of 
"maneuver" warfare is to introduce ambiguity into the enemy 
commander's picture of the tactical situation, but he fails to 
get beyond the movement as maneuver paradigm in his analysis.34 
Manoeuvre  warfare is not about "movement," although "moving" 
forces can be an extremely important element of manoeuvre. This 
report will deliberately use the French and British spelling 
manoeuvre to refer to a manoeuvre  warfare combat doctrine at sea; 
while it retains the English word "maneuver" for this type of 
doctrine ashore or from the sea to the shore. "Maneuver" warfare 
is a term that is counter-productive to communicating its real 
intent and does a disservice to the excellent ideas contained 
within its theory. The theory deserves a better title. 

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Manoeuvre Warfare Theory 
Manoeuvre  warfare doctrine, more art than science, is about 
planning and executing skillful operations or combat actions that 
depend upon mental agility rather than simply the application of 
brute force. At a minimum, manoeuvre  warfare pits strength 
against weakness. Manoeuvre warfare doctrine creates favorable 
conditions for combat actions at sea in which one multiplies the 
greatest possible return for the effort expended. An analogy is 
chess in which one always is looking for an opportunity to 
confront the enemy in unexpected ways. The proper analogy is 
"move->move-»move" rather than "move-»countermove->move." Such 
concepts of manoeuvre warfare need to be both in operational 
doctrine and in planning doctrine. 
Manoeuvre  warfare doctrine attempts to create favorable 
situations to control or alter events. By control, however, we do 
not necessarily need order--indeed, manoeuvre warfare is 
comfortable with the chaos of combat, but strives to ensure that 
battle conditions are not imposed by the enemy. In the beginning 
of the 18th Century, the English attitude toward navy doctrine 
generally split into two camps.35 The first camp emphasized the 
ability of the line-ahead to bring the maximum number of guns to 
bear on the enemy. The second group placed more emphasis on 
independent maneuver and is referred to by some historians as the 
"meleeists." The manoeuvre-oriented milee  doctrine attracted some 
of the more dashing English commanders who did not want to be as 
bound by rules and had the skills to master the freedom of 
manoeuvre  warfare. This manoeuvre-oriented melee  doctrine has 
continued to be advocated by many navy commanders since then. 
Clausewitz talks of a "trinity" of warfare in his classic 
Vom Krieg.  War consisted of rational, irrational, and non- 
rational dimensions. Where seeking to dominate the rational 
portions of war, policies and doctrine can help. Where seeking to 
dominate the irrational dimensions of warfare, emotion--such as 
inspirational combat leadership--is a virtue. Where warfare is 
non-rational, such as with weather and the chance associated with 
the "fog" of war, the manoeuvre-oriented meleeist  seeks to make 
such uncertainty his friend. 
Manoeuvre warfare doctrine seeks to dominate fate rather 
than yielding to it. It implies seizing the initiative, thus 
forcing the enemy to react rather than to dominate the 
battlespace. Initiative does not imply the mindless offensive; 
manoeuvre  warfare doctrine accepts the legitimate role of both 
the offensive and defensive forms of warfare; during both of 
which initiative can play a critical role. 
Over-reliance on offensive warfare paradigm is directly 
attributable to the defeat of the Imperial Japanese Navy in the 

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Pacific during World War II. At the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 
1942), the Japanese striking force attempted to seek out the 
allied battle fleet instead of remaining with its own transports 
in a defensive posture. Japanese doctrine had no developed 
concept for defense of their carrier battle forces, let alone the 
transports, in any other manner than an offensive strike against 
the enemy.36 
Admiral Raymond Spruance, USN saw the virtue of the 
defensive and operated initially in a defensive posture at the 
Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 1944) resulting in a major 
American victory. Spruance sought a decisive defensive 
engagement, vernichtungsschlacht,   on his own best terms rather 
than fighting on the offensive against both enemy aircraft and 
antiaircraft defenses. The lesson is to not rely only on the 
offensive form of warfare, but to also develop theories for the 
defensive. Both can be used to obtain a decisive battle and both 
have a role in manoeuvre warfare. 
A Vision of the Future Manoeuvre  Warfare Battlespace at Sea 
Forecasting the future battlespace is extremely difficult. 
One way is to present a vision of the future and to then develop 
supporting concepts with more detail.37 The vision of manoeuvre 
warfare doctrine theory outlined above leads us to a series of 
open-ended issues which need consideration. From these questions, 
we can better understand the concepts which we can then test in 
games and fleet exercises. With validated concepts, we can then 
turn to doctrine development and programmatic requirements. 
Obviously we need to first look for other examples of manoeuvre 
or "maneuver" warfare theories and then search for the historical 
navy examples which will make us more comfortable with the 
vision. But we first need to ask ourselves how naval power will 
be used in a modern and non-Cold War context? 
Surface Annihilation Warfare 
Manoeuvre warfare doctrine generally states that the enemy 
should not be engaged unless it is necessary to the mission and 
then only from a condition of advantage. Recognizing that the 
concept was originally designed for a weaker navy, we need not 
adopt every detailed element for the U.S. Navy today. Given the 
state of the world's navies, the U.S. Navy probably can deal with 
regional enemy surface fleets, generally light units, in one 
quick and decisive strike or engagement, vernichtungsschlacht, 
during the initial phase of a future contingency operation. 
Simultaneous and decisive strikes as part of a modern battle of 
annihilation against the full depth of the enemy battlespace are 
not only possible against most potential enemy surface navies of 
the world, they are also a good idea. 
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--- Page 14 ---
If we do not eliminate enemy surface forces all at once, we 
then must posture navy forces in defense against strikes and 
raids. A decisive engagement, on the other hand, precludes the 
enemy even retaining his surface forces as a fleet-in-being. 
Either situation would require us to blockade or provide a navy 
covering force rather than our use of our own navy forces to 
support operations from the sea to the shore--the primary aim of 
future naval operations. In short, deal with an enemy surface 
fleet all at once and move on to other things. This concept of 
striking from a position of advantage is fully consistent with 
manoeuvre warfare doctrine. 
Exploitation Phase 
With a navy annihilation warfare doctrine, niederwerfungs- 
strategie, for defeat of an enemy surface fleet in one decisive 
battle, vernichtungsschlacht,   there must be a subordinate 
doctrine for an exploitation phase. In navy attrition warfare, 
abnuetzungschlacht,  we also need theories of what to do after an 
individual battle. Simply put, if the desired end state of a 
battle or an engagement is either the immediate annihilation of 
the enemy surface force or its whittling down by a series of 
attrition battles, then the victorious commander has to be 
supported by an established doctrine that includes guidance about 
both how achieve initial success and then how to exploit initial 
success to achieve the desired end state. 
The issue of exploiting the initial victory has come back to 
haunt many commanders over history--each being criticized during 
his lifetime, and subsequently in history, for not having fully 
exploited his immediate success with subsequent destruction of 
the enemy force as it left the battlespace. For example, during 
the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), in which France became the 
dominant power on the continent of Europe, French Marshal Henri 
de la Tour d'Auvergne, Vicomte de Turenne, achieved the 
withdrawal of Holy Roman Empire forces from a city, but then he 
chose to not exploit this immediate success with a pursuit and 
complete annihilation of the enemy. In a subsequent encounter in 
1674, Turenne maneuvered Austrian General Count Raimondo 
Montecuccoli and William Frederick, the Great Elector of 
Brandenburg, out of Alsace without engaging them in battle.38 
These are classic examples of "maneuver" warfare ashore--where 
the political objective was reached without a major battle. In 
his writings, Clausewitz expresses his disdain for such 
"maneuverist" generals who sought to attain a decision without 
battle.39 
Guidance for an exploitation phase is not required for pure 
maneuver where there is no battle intended. Nor is such guidance 
necessary for a strike or raid where rapid damage in one brief 
effort is all that is attempted. Doctrine for battles, 
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engagements, and major operations, on the other hand, must 
include the initial stages of contact with the enemy, the main 
combat phase, and an exploitation phase where the commander 
achieves his desired end state. 
Most times sufficient strength can be massed against enemy- 
weakness during the pursuit--or exploitation--phase of a battle. 
Capitalizing on the opportunities afforded by the exploitation 
phase of a battle is totally consistent with Clausewitz's study 
of war.40 If navies are to also adopt "maneuver" warfare doctrine, 
but retain the desire to actually engage in combat at sea, then 
they also are going to have to come to grips with subordinate 
doctrine outlining policies for the exploitation phase of battle. 
There have been notable examples where navy commanders have 
failed to master the exploitation phase of battle. 
French Admiral Anne-Hilarion de Costentin, Comte de 
Tourville, failed to exploit a major victory against the combined 
English and Dutch fleets at Beveziers [Beachy Head] (1690). 
British Admiral Lord George Brydges Rodney failed to exploit his 
victory at the Battle of the Saints (1782) and the innovative 
Admiral Lord Richard Howe did the same at the Glorious First of 
June (1789). Japanese Admiral Ito Yüko achieved a decisive 
victory over China at the Battle of the Yalu [Yellow Sea] (1894) 
and was severely criticized for not exploiting the victory--thus 
allowing an enemy fleet-in-being to remain. 
There were a few very notable examples of failure to exploit 
the battlefield victory during World War II. Admiral Mikawa 
Gun'ichi's failure to exploit his victory after the Battle off 
Savo Island (August 1942) has been attributed due to a failure in 
doctrine.41 Yet more careful research reveals that the World War 
II Imperial Japanese Navy Battle Instructions  clearly required a 
commander to take advantage of the exploitation phase.42 
Of course Admiral Spruance's decision to remain and protect 
the invasion force instead of exploiting his victory at the 
Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 1944) led, in part, to the 
decision by Admiral Halsey, off Cape Engafio during the Battle of 
Leyte Gulf (October 1944) to not stay with the invasion force, 
but instead seek out the enemy's carriers. In short, if one's end 
state is to annihilate an enemy surface fleet, it must be done 
ruthlessly even as a part of a manoeuvre warfare doctrine. 
Victory may be determined by who leaves the battlefield in 
retreat, but the desired end state must go beyond this 
intermediate concept. 
The need for an exploitation phase was fully understood in 
pre-War and World War II doctrine of the U.S. Navy. In the War 
Instructions:  united States Navy,   F.T.P. 43, 143 and 143(A), 
signed out in 1927, 1934 and 1944, the U.S. Navy outlined a 
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--- Page 16 ---
pursuit phase of combat, which is where the exploitation of the 
tactical victory would take place.43 This pursuit phase was fully 
consistent with the concept of strength vs. weakness--a major 
part of manoeuvre warfare theory. 
Need for Continued Attrition Doctrine 
Enemy air and subsurface forces, however, probably cannot be 
eliminated with one quick decisive strike of annihilation and 
will thus have to be dealt with in attrition warfare, 
abnuetzungschlacht,   over time. This will include battles, the 
planned engagement as well as the unplanned meeting engagement, 
strikes, and raids. Here we will have more opportunity to use 
manoeuvre  warfare concepts such as the temporary massing of 
firepower to deal with weaker enemy forces when and where we 
choose. Sequential combat actions will require the careful 
selection of the main areas for combat activity to pit strength 
against the principle objective (weakness) at the decisive time. 
When dealing with an enemy force that cannot be defeated 
with one main effort, vernichtungsSchlacht,   it is well to 
remember the example of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Imperial 
Japanese Navy doctrine called for the destruction of a 
significant part of the enemy battle fleet in a first strike raid 
followed up by a subsequent decisive battle between enemy battle 
fleets. Japan did this against the Russians in 1905 and attempted 
to do this against the U.S. in 1941. The Japanese success at the 
Battle of Tsushima was not to be repeated in World War II. The 
lesson here is that, if one must plan for more than one strike to 
attain the desired end state, there is no guarantee that the 
opportunity or success will follow once the enemy is warned. 
Defense 
Defense under manoeuvre warfare doctrine requires that 
defending commanders not be enticed into unfavorable battle. 
Battle avoidance and escape must be portrayed as an honorable 
alternative. Initiative cannot be equated only with offensive 
combat actions. On the other hand, tactical-level defense 
generally is quite offensive and aggressive--even within an 
operational or strategic defensive. 
Vital to an understanding of manoeuvre  warfare doctrine are 
the concepts of security and protection. Security and protection 
conserve the fighting potential of own forces so that it can be 
applied later at the decisive point and time. Fortunately navies 
are well familiar and comfortable with such concepts and have a 
long history of operational security, deception, circuitous 
routing, zig-zag plans, smoke screens, scouting and 
reconnaissance, anti-scouting and counter-reconnaissance, 
screening, dispersal, convoys, mobility, the avoidance of mutual 
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--- Page 17 ---
interference, and offensive actions taken to suppress subsequent 
attacks. Naval architecture has made full use of armor, damage 
control, camouflage and deceptive painting, and direct defense 
capabilities to ensure the security and protection of navy ships. 
Desired End State Without Battle? 
Taking the initiative and achieving surprise because of 
successful security will allow the delivery of psychological 
shock which can stun the enemy and lower his combat potential. A 
recent example of such a manoeuvre  warfare effort by a navy was 
the sinking of the Belgrano  during the Falklands War of 1982. As 
the result of one strike by a submarine, the Argentine Navy was 
stunned and remained in port for the rest of the war. This was an 
exact example of how to apply strength to stun the enemy and 
protect one's own forces by doing so. 
Planning Manoeuvre 
There is also an extremely important planning aspect to 
manoeuvre  warfare doctrine. Once we get beyond the point of 
thinking that manoeuvre warfare doctrine is about movement, we 
realize that the concept of manoeuvre must be taught at our war 
colleges and be made a routine part of our planning process. 
Manoeuvre  theory needs to drive deliberate and crisis planning as 
well as execution planning and tactical and operational 
innovations during actual combat operations. We cannot expect our 
officers to be able to innovate during battle unless innovation 
is made a regular part of their training and suitable rewards are 
offered for innovators. Also, manoeuvre  warfare doctrine requires 
the absolute security of plans in order to ensure full freedom of 
action by the commander in the field. 
Problems Associated with Manoeuvre  Warfare 
When trying to translate a ground forces concept of 
operations to warfare at sea, there are some difficulties which 
must be addressed. It does not appear that any of these issues 
present insurmountable obstacles, but all bear close scrutiny. 
Strength Against Weakness 
Strength against weakness, as a central element of 
"maneuver" warfare ashore, has had some problem areas when moving 
from theory to practice in air warfare. For example, rather than 
only attempting to target enemy hardened and defended nuclear 
offensive systems with our own nuclear offensive systems 
(strength versus strength), we attempted to also match strength 
against weakness. Targeting of non-hardened and undefended 
military-economic "bottlenecks" is an alternative to 
"counterforce" targeting of enemy nuclear systems. Although this 
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--- Page 18 ---
would be both an example of nuclear and conventional bombing 
"maneuver" warfare, the creation of economic models of target 
nations is extremely difficult--to the point where one cannot 
really prove that the desired political objectives can be 
achieved through attacks against "bottlenecks."44 
Still, the theory of targeting only "bottlenecks" has merit 
and resulted in considerable attention during the Cold War era. 
It continues to receive attention today in any discussion of 
strategic bombing in air warfare. When joint, naval, or navy air 
theories attempt to wrestle with "maneuver" warfare doctrine, 
they will need to be aware of the problems associated with 
"bottlenecks" associated with strength against weakness. 
Windows of Opportunity 
Another problem with "maneuver" warfare theory is that 
critical vulnerabilities of centers of gravity may only be 
critical during short windows of opportunity. Under manoeuvre 
warfare doctrine, forces are shifted from secondary to main areas 
of combat actions in order to mass them for the main effort 
during a window of opportunity. It is not easy to know when 
windows of opportunity are going to be available, unless such 
windows are created by one's own actions. In this case, forces 
may be shifted from main to secondary and then back to primary 
combat actions to create and then take advantage of windows of 
opportunity. 
Creating diversions to allow a window of opportunity to 
present itself in a main theater is risky because of the pressure 
to succeed in every military combat action being undertaken. Such 
manipulation of secondary efforts requires that we not allow 
highly visible secondary efforts to sidetrack the main efforts--a 
historical problem. Naval, joint, and multinational military 
organizations must be responsive to such flexibility in tasking 
if manoeuvre  warfare remains our preferred doctrine. 
Defense 
Defense of specific land areas under "maneuver," warfare 
doctrine is transitory. Yet "maneuver" warfare is associated most 
strongly in the U.S. with the Marine Corps, who would not like 
the U.S. Navy to abandon them in an amphibious objective area. 
Hence, although "maneuver" calls for some degree of flexibility 
in defense of fixed areas, an amphibious objective area must be 
defended or forces withdrawn--preventing navy forces from leaving 
the immediate area until there is absolute command of the air and 
sea. 
A related issue involves training. How can we ensure that 
the defensive is given sufficient emphasis in training when the 
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--- Page 19 ---
military is biased toward taking offensive actions as the answer 
to the call to arms? Manoeuvre warfare requires a blending of 
both the offensive and defensive, and neither should be viewed as 
being inherently unsatisfactory. The true master of manoeuvre 
warfare will use either when it is to his advantage. 
Synchronization 
It would appear that the concepts of "maneuver" warfare are 
at odds with those of the general desire for ground forces to 
synchronize actions by various combined arms. This problem may 
appear more difficult to resolve for ground forces, but the basic 
problem may haunt the development of air and navy doctrine as 
well. The basic split between "formalists" who preferred 
coordinated line-ahead doctrine for fleets and the manoeuvre- 
oriented meleeist  is an excellent example of the problems with 
synchronization at sea. The manoeuvre-oriented mSleeist was quite 
content with a minimum of direction and a maximizing of taking 
advantage of opportunities. 
Organizational Problems 
The U.S. Navy has already learned the lessons of the need to 
be more integrated with the Joint Forces Air Component Commander 
(JFACC). Is it ready to assume the full role of the JFACC from 
its afloat location or should there be a division of labor 
between a maritime and shore JFACC?45 
If the naval Services fully develop their "maneuver"/ 
manoeuvre warfare doctrine, and such doctrine is absent from the 
U.S. Air Force, how can we fight in the air together? Will 
targeting recommended by the Joint Targeting Coordination Board 
(JTCB) be different if it is run by U.S. Air Force officers or 
U.S. Navy officers? Can a U.S. Air Force-led Area Air Defense 
Commander (AADC) provide defense for naval units operating under 
"maneuver"/manoeuvre  warfare doctrine? 
The U.S. Coast Guard is to be incorporated within the U.S. 
Navy in time of war. Even in other times, there is a very close 
relationship between these two Services. What are the views of 
the U.S. Coast Guard on manoeuvre  warfare? If the Coast Guard 
continues to emphasize operations other than war (OOTW), how will 
we be able to rapidly be assimilated into the U.S. Navy without 
having trained to manoeuvre  warfare doctrine? 
Not all concepts for the future battlespace are dependent 
upon the individual Services to implement them. For example, as 
we translate our "maneuver"/manoeuvre  warfare vision of the 
future battlespace to actual doctrine, the U.S. Navy will be 
dependent upon new organizations, such as the U.S. Atlantic 
Command (USACOM) to execute them. This new organization has the 
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--- Page 20 ---
role as the primary Commander-in-Chief (CinC) for training 
conventional armed forces assigned to the continental U.S. 
Another CinC that has an independent training role is U.S. 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Will the U.S. Navy's future 
vision for "maneuver" warfare be accepted by USACOM and will they 
train forces in accordance with joint or naval doctrine? Will 
USSOCOM continue to buy their own hardware and train their own 
forces or will they coordinate their vision of navy special 
warfare with doctrine developed by the U.S. Navy? 
Training for joint operations is done in accordance with 
joint doctrine. The current version of Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine 
for Joint Operations,   addresses maneuver but primarily from the 
context of movement.46 Although certain aspects of "maneuver" 
warfare are found throughout this publication, it does not 
contain a coherent explanation of "maneuver" warfare theory or 
doctrine. If "maneuver" warfare is to determine how the U.S. 
armed forces will actually fight in an integrated manner, then 
this concept must be embraced in joint doctrine. Similarly, there 
is standing NATO doctrine for fighting in a combined environment. 
Such doctrine also does not address "maneuver" warfare theory. 
If U.S. armed forces operating in a major regional 
contingency are assumed to be part of an alliance, coalition, or 
other multinational force, they will be operating under 
multinational doctrine--currently devoid of "maneuver" warfare. 
In the multinational arena there is the option, however, of 
assigning national forces to separate individual sectors rather 
than fighting as an integrated whole. In such a case for ground 
forces, the U.S. contingent could operate under "maneuver" 
warfare doctrine--if it becomes joint doctrine--where other 
national contingents could operate otherwise. 
In certain navy forces, such distinctions will be more 
difficult. For example, there are fully integrated standing navy 
forces, such as the Standing Naval Forces Atlantic and the 
Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean. Currently these forces are 
navy and not naval (including Marine Corps-type forces). If we 
see a change to NATO standing forces to include standing, or at 
least on call, amphibious forces as well, it may prove more 
difficult to integrate the Marine Corps portion of the naval 
forces unless the U.S. forces are segregated from naval infantry 
units from other countries. 
Organizational Support of Manoeuvre  Doctrinal Development 
To foster consideration of a new vision of the future 
battlespace in the face of standing doctrine, navies probably 
need formal structures where new manoeuvre warfare doctrinal 
ideas are tested. These organizations already exist in the form 
of centers of excellence, such as: the Naval Strike Warfare 
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--- Page 21 ---
Center, the Surface Warfare Development Group, Submarine 
Development Squadron TWELVE and the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet 
Tactical Training Groups. All that would need to be done is to 
formalize lines of communications with those and similar 
organizations, with an eye toward manoeuvre doctrine development. 
Indeed, there is a long history in many navies of the world 
of having squadrons of evolution, or other named units, whose 
function was to test new doctrine. This concept was once advanced 
by Rear Admiral Stephen Luce, USN, with regard to the role of the 
Naval War College and the U.S. North Atlantic Squadron. 
Historical test and development units were more singularly 
focused on operational doctrinal development rather than today's 
units which often spend a significant amount of their effort in 
support of programming. 
New Opportunities for Manoeuvre? 
Manoeuvre  warfare requires that we take advantage of all 
strengths and opportunities to achieve the desired end state 
without resorting to traditional methods of brute force. Some 
possible opportunities are discussed below. 
Technological Manoeuvre 
Manoeuvre  warfare doctrine has an important technological 
component. As we attempt to pit strength against weakness on the 
battlefield, we also should take advantage of any technological 
competitive advantages. If a current strength of the U.S. is its 
ability to dominate information, it would seem that an integral 
part of information warfare ought to include the pitting of this 
strength against enemy information weakness. Are there new 
technologies which support or will lead to new forms of warfare 
for which the enemy is not prepared? Periods of technological 
superiority are often transitory and they must be taken advantage 
of with speed in order to maximize the opportunity of surprise. 
We must also maintain the security and protection of new 
technologies that have not yet been revealed in combat. 
The U.S. Navy need not only concentrate on 1970's stealth 
technology in order to build a fleet for the next century. 
Concentrating on unmanned vehicles can capitalize on the U.S. 
Navy's inherent strengths of staying power and relative 
invulnerability. There is no reason, however, that naval 
architects need be constrained by current design models.47 Can we 
maintain technological primacy vis-a-vis potential adversaries by 
wholesale shifts in types of forces for the future? Is there 
merit to semi-submersible "fire ships" which stand off the 
coastlines of an enemy and deliver accurate and lethal firepower 
with advanced unmanned systems? 
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--- Page 22 ---
Since we must assume that affordability will remain a key- 
criteria for any new weapons systems, can industry deliver 
aircraft engines that will support the development of more 
capable aircraft not dependent upon traditional catapults and 
arresting gear? Such development would allow the use of less 
capable flight decks for strike and fighter aircraft-- 
proliferating the threat to an enemy. 
Politico-Military Manoeuvre 
There is also a political side to manoeuvre warfare 
doctrine. Castex argues that manoeuvre also includes the 
organization of the overall political-military effort. When 
gathering the resources for the principal theater, one should 
also use political influence, propaganda, and other non-military 
tools'. Hence the pact signed by Nazi Germany with the Soviet 
Union can be seen as a political manoeuvre by Germany to ensure 
that the well-established principle of war "economy of force" was 
applied to the forthcoming campaign. 
Enemy Manoeuvre 
Defense against high technology fielded by an enemy is both 
technological and doctrinal agility. Our forces need to remain 
capable of multiple responses that are not fixed nor preordained 
by limited technology and hidebound doctrine. At the strategic 
and operational-levels of warfare, the lack of agility 
necessitated by reductions in force structure will soon lead to 
more predictability on the part of our potential opponents. 
Manoeuvre  warfare doctrine will probably be the type of 
doctrine governing many potential enemies. Simply put, by looking 
at the concepts in reverse, we can see that a wise enemy will 
attempt to upset our own main efforts by making his attacks in 
our secondary areas so that we will be unable to mass firepower 
when we want to. The value of such enemy actions will be measured 
by the amount of resources diverted from the main effort, the 
amount of time that such forces are unavailable in the main 
areas, and the degree to which such actions hinder the enemy's 
decision-making abilities. We need to study how manoeuvre warfare 
doctrine can, and will, be used against us. 
Castex also applied the principle of manoeuvre  to the 
function of intelligence. By careful analysis of the budgets of 
potential enemies, one can uncover the areas of primary effort 
and those that are secondary. Naturally, one can manipulate such 
information and thus deny intelligence to an enemy. Such concepts 
were regularly applied during the Cold War-era. 
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--- Page 23 ---
Conclusions: Must we Spell it Manövrieren? 
There is a tendency in the United States to view military 
art and military science as all-encompassing terms that include 
warfare in all possible dimensions.48 At the apex of theoretical 
studies of military art and military science are books such as 
Clausewitz's On War.  Within such books are doctrinal principles 
which have been accepted by ground forces, but may be totally 
inappropriate for naval and other forces.49 
For example, Clausewitz teaches us that the defensive is the 
stronger form of warfare--despite historical examples to the 
contrary, such as Julius Caesar's conquests.50 A review of naval 
warfare history also suggests otherwise. A review of air warfare 
and the theory of nuclear warfare likewise suggests that the 
offensive form of war is stronger than the defense. Yet we are 
trapped in a paradigm of military art based upon interior lines 
of communications that teaches us that the defense is stronger. 
Perhaps the real issue is that there is a separate and equally 
important naval art and naval science that parallels military art 
and military science. The new "maneuver"/manoeuvre  warfare 
paradigm needs to include the three-dimensional aspects of 
warfare in its theory. 
In studying historical examples, it is easy to get 
sidetracked into culturally-biased preconceptions about other 
Services and nations based upon historical track records of 
combat prowess. In looking at history and foreign theories of 
military and naval art, we need not allow such prejudice to 
influence our thinking. After all, it is not our objective to 
study combat success, but rather bureaucratic behavior and sound 
thinking. The Soviet Union had a long-standing history of good 
military theory, planning, and strategic success, but an equally 
long record of poor execution at the tactical and operational- 
levels of warfare. The U.S. Army has studied and adopted much 
from the Russian model. Similarly, Germany has a long record of 
sound thinking and good execution at the tactical and 
operational-levels of warfare with defeat at the strategic level- 
-and we continue to study them today. 
The myth of French military performance on the battlefield 
or of French Army doctrine in no way denigrates the proud combat 
heritage of the French Navy of the ancien regime  and the 
excellent doctrinal development that has long-characterized the 
French Navy. Unfortunately, most of that story has never been 
adequately translated into English and internalized by the U.S. 
Navy officer corps, which views its cultural antecedent as the 
Royal Navy. Quite frankly, the performance and heritage of the 
French Army has been allowed to cloud the opinion of U.S. Navy 
officers about the French Navy in an altogether unwarranted 
fashion. 
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--- Page 24 ---
In the words of a well-respected scholar, "...France has had 
little just cause to be ashamed of her navy: the navy may have 
had some just cause to be ashamed of France."51 If the U.S. Armed 
Forces can enthusiastically embrace the Napoleonic concept of 
coup d'oeil,   then it can embrace the French concept of manoeuvre 
as well. Perhaps we should use Castex's theories, but spell the 
word in German--manövrieren! 
Parts of the U.S. military accepted the concept of 
"maneuver" warfare over a decade ago. It has officially been 
adopted by the U.S. Marine Corps and, through the publication of 
Naval Warfare,   NDP-1, by the U.S. Navy. "Maneuver" warfare 
concepts have been embraced by the U.S. Army, but the term has 
not. The U.S. Air Force has just begun to explore the term and 
come to grips with what it will mean. Joint and multinational 
doctrine--which determines how we will actually fight--have not 
yet embraced "maneuver" warfare. This strongly suggests that 
"maneuver" warfare is more programmatic doctrine than combat 
doctrine. If it were combat doctrine for warfighting at the joint 
and multinational strategic and operational-levels of war, then 
it would have to be accepted as joint or multinational doctrine 
as well. 
Manoeuvre  warfare doctrine is a warfighting doctrine that 
should be developed by the U.S. Navy regardless of programmatic 
considerations. Until such time as the U.S. Navy understands 
manoeuvre warfare, it will not be able to come to the table as an 
equal partner in any discussions of "maneuver" warfare where the 
examples are dominated by ground warfare considerations. Such a 
situation would naturally be intolerable. 
There is even a more complex reason to master "maneuver"/ 
manoeuvre warfare. Currently the U.S. Navy, joint, and 
multinational doctrine have yet to fully reflect or embrace 
"maneuver"/manoeuvre  warfare. Essentially, U.S. Navy, joint, and 
multinational doctrine are all oriented on "brute force." The 
military is being asked to consider concepts of warfare based 
upon the information "revolution" or some new "wave" or style of 
war. Should, or can, the armed forces skip over the "maneuver"/ 
manoeuvre stage and advance directly into some new epoch? 
Although this is tempting, the risk is that one cannot fully 
exploit the benefits of the information age without having first 
mastered the concepts of manoeuvre warfare doctrine. After all, 
"maneuver"/manoeuvre  warfare doctrine is mostly about how to 
think about war and plan combat actions. If the next era is 
information-based, we would be unable to fully exploit this stage 
unless we had first learned how to get beyond "brute force." 
The U.S. Navy has traditionally not been very good at 
articulating a vision of future warfare. In defense of the U.S. 
Navy, the record of most large and bureaucratic American 
21 

--- Page 25 ---
organizations in strategic planning and management of change is 
similarly tainted. We have an opportunity, today, to change that 
record by looking forward into the future with a vision of the 
future battlespace centered around a coherent manoeuvre  warfare 
doctrine for naval warfare at sea. What we need to assist in this 
effort are the bright minds of industry and the analytic 
community who have been developing alternative concepts to come 
forward with their ideas for consideration. All new ideas will be 
presumed to have merit, although clearly not all ideas will 
survive the review process. 
Doctrine development is a process that will accept inputs 
from any sources. We need the opinions of the fleet, of industry, 
the analytic community, and academe. We invite their 
participation in the great debates of the future and await their 
contribution. Perhaps the introduction of a manoeuvre warfare 
doctrine into the U.S. Navy will be of such importance that it 
will constitute a "revolution in military affairs." 
Notes 
1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War,   Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, 
USMC (Ret.), trans., New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1963; 
William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook,   Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1985; Robert R. Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver- 
Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle,   Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 
1991; and Richard D. Hooker, Jr., ed., Maneuver Warfare: An 
Anthology,   Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993. 
2. Commander Terry Pierce, USN, "Operational Maneuver From the 
Sea," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,   120, no. 8 (August 1994): 
33-34. 
3. Admiral Raoul Victor Patrice Castex, Theories strategiques,   in 
5 vols., Paris: Societe d'Editions Geographiques,   Maritimes et 
Coloniales,   1929-1935. 
4. Imperial Japanese Navy, Kaisen yomurei   [Battle Instructions], 
Part II "Battle," Chapter 1 "The Essentials of Battle," paragraph 
2, circa 1934, contained in Sanematsu Yuzuru, Kaigun daigaku 
kyöiku,   Tokyo, Japan: Köjinsha, 1975, p. 210-241, translated by 
David C. Evans and provided to the author in February 1995. 
5. Rear Admiral Yoichi Hirama, JMSDF (Ret.), "Sun Tzü's Influence 
on the Japanese Imperial Navy," unpublished paper presented at 
the 2nd International Symposium on Sun Tzü's Art of War, October 
16-19, 1990, Beijing, China. 
6. Sun Tzu, The Art of War,   Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, 
USMC (Ret.), trans., New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1963. 
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--- Page 26 ---
7. Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Warfighting,   FMFM 
[Fleet Marine Force Manual] 1, Washington, DC: 6 March 1989, p. 
17. 
8. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China,   Ralph D. Sawyer, 
trans., Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993 contains additional 
texts that set Sun Tzu's The Art of War  into a more coherent 
whole. 
9. Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching {The Book of the Way), Stephen Mitchell, 
trans, and ed., New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 1988, p. 
69. 
10. Discussion with Senior Colonel Peng Guang Qian, Strategic 
Studies Department, Academy of Military Science, Beijing, held at 
Naval Doctrine Command, May 8, 1995. 
11. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Allan Doughty, The Breaking 
Point:  Sedan and the Fall of France,   1940,  Hamden CT: Archon 
Books, 1990, p. 30-32, 321-332. 
12. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine:  France, 
Britain,   and Germany Between the World Wars,   Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1984, p. 105-140, 220-244; Lieutenant Colonel 
Robert Allan Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster:  The Development of 
French Army Doctrine,   1919-1939,   Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1985; 
his subsequent The Breaking Point:   Sedan and the Fall  of France, 
1940,   Hamden CT: Archon Books, 1990, p. 19-32, 321-332; and his 
chapter, "The French Armed Forces, 1918-40," Military 
Effectiveness,   Volume II:   The Interwar Period,   Allan R. Millett 
and Williamson Murray, eds., Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, for the 
Mershon Center, Ohio State University, 1988, p. 39-69; Lieutenant 
General Philip D. Shutler, USMC (Ret.), "Thinking About Warfare," 
Marine Corps Gazette,   71, no. 11 (November 1987): 22-23; and 
Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes:  The Anatomy 
of Failure in War,   New York, NY: The Free Press, 1990, p. 197- 
230. 
13. General William DePuy, U.S. Army (Ret.), "Generals Balck and 
von Mellenthin on Tactics: Implications for NATO Military 
Doctrine," The BDM Corporation technical report BDM/W-81-077-TR, 
Alexandria, VA: Defense Nuclear Agency, 19 December 1990, p. 21. 
See also Commander Gerard D. Roncolato, USN, "Chance Dominates in 
War," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,   121, no. 2 (February 
1995): 37. 
14. Karl von Clausewitz, On War,   O.J. Matthijs Jolles, trans., 
New York, NY: The Modern Library, 1943, p. 33-35. German Field 
Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke referred to this same phenomenon 
as blick,   literally a glance. German military literature 
frequently used this term to mean the ability to make a quick 
estimate of the situation. Daniel J. Hughes, ed., [Field Marshal 
23 

--- Page 27 ---
Helmuth Graf von] Moltke on  the Art of War:   Selected Writings, 
Harry Bell and Daniel J. Hughes, trans., Novato CA: Presidio 
Press, 1993, p. 196. 
15. Hans Delbrück, History of the Art of War,   Volume IV:  The Dawn 
of Modern Warfare,  Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., trans., Lincoln, NE 
and London, UK: University of Nebraska Press, 1985 [original 
German version published in 1920], p. 380. 
16. Karl von Clausewitz, On War,   O.J. Matthijs Jolles, trans., 
New York, NY: The Modern Library, 1943, p. 528. 
17. Vice Admiral Luigi Donolo, Italian Navy (Ret.) letter to Rear 
Admiral Frederick L. Lewis, USN, Commander Naval Doctrine 
Command, February 15, 1995. 
18. Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Warfighting,   FMFM 
[Fleet Marine Force Manual] 1, Washington, DC: 6 March 1989, p. 
28-30, 59. See also Naval Doctrine Command, Naval Warfare,   NDP 
[Naval Doctrine Publication]-1, Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 28 March 1994, p. 31-33; and Commander Linton 
Wells II, USN, "Maneuver in Naval Warfare," U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings,   106, no. 12 (December 1980): 34. 
19. Günther E. Rothenberg, "Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, 
Raimondo Montecuccoli, and the 'Military Revolution' of the 
Seventeenth Century," Makers of Modern Strategy:  From Machiavelli 
to the Nuclear Age,   ed. Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1986, p. 55-57. 
20. Günther E. Rothenberg, "Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine 
of Strategic Envelopment," Makers of Modern Strategy:  From 
Machiavelli   to the Nuclear Age,   ed. Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 296; David H. Zook, Jr. and 
Robin Higham, A Short History of Warfare,   New York, NY: Twayne 
Publishers, 1966, p. 238. 
21. Gordon A. Craig, "Delbrück: The Military Historian," Makers 
of Modern Strategy:  From Machiavelli  to the Nuclear Age,   ed. 
Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 
341-342; and Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of 
Machine Warfare, 1914-1945," Makers of Modern Strategy: From 
Machiavelli  to  the Nuclear Age,   ed. Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 531. 
22. Condoleezza Rice, "The Making of Soviet Strategy," Makers of 
Modern Strategy:  From Machiavelli   to the Nuclear Age,   ed. Peter 
Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 665, 
673. 
24 

--- Page 28 ---
23. Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy,   ed. Kent D. Lee, Minneapolis, 
MN: East View Publications, 1992 [translation of 1927 original 
Russian-language edition], p. 239-250. 
24. Imperial Japanese Navy, Kaisen yomurei   [Battle Instructions], 
Part II "Battle," Chapter 1 "The Essentials of Battle," paragraph 
3, circa 1934, contained in Sanematsu Yuzuru, Kaigun daigaku 
kyöiku,   Tokyo, Japan: Köjinsha, 1975, p. 210-241, translated by 
David C. Evans and provided to the author in February 1995. 
25. Thomas B. Buell, "Oral Histories Help Tell the Tale," U.S. 
Naval Institute Proceedings,   120, no. 7 (July 1994): 47. 
26. Hans Delbrück, History of the Art of War,   Volume IV:   The Dawn 
of Modern Warfare,  Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., trans., Lincoln, NE 
and London, UK: University of Nebraska Press, 1985 [original 
German version published in 1920], p. 375, 378-380. 
27. David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun   [Navy]:   Strategy, 
Tactics and Technology in  the Imperial Japanese Navy,   1887-1941, 
August 1994 draft book manuscript, chapter 2. 
28. Admiral Raoul Victor Patrice Castex, Theories strategiqu.es, 
in 5 vols., Paris: Societe d'Editions Geographiques,  Maritimes et 
Coloniales,   1929-1935. Volume 2 is the source of Castex's 
principle thought on manoeuvre  warfare doctrine. 
29. Strategic Theories,   selections translated and edited, with an 
introduction by Eugenia C. Kiesling, Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 1994. Professor Kiesling translated three of 
nine chapters and an appendix from the critical second volume 
dealing with manoeuvre warfare doctrine. The sections that were 
not translated by the Professor Kiesling have been translated for 
the Naval Doctrine Command's internal efforts to gain a better 
understanding of the concept of manoeuvre. 
30. Castex had Julian Corbett's Some Principles of Maritime 
Strategy  (1911) translated in 1932. See Herve Coutau-Begarie, 
"Corbett and Richmond in France," Mahan is Not Enough:   The 
Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett 
and Admiral  Sir Herbert Richmond,   Commander James Goldrick, RAN 
and John B. Hattendorf, eds., Newport, RI: Naval War College 
Press, 1993, p. 284. 
31. Ronald Chalmers Hood III, Royal Republicans:  The French Naval 
Dynasties Between the World Wars,   Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1985, p. 83-84, 143-146. 
32. Bernard Brodie, A Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy,   London, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 1943, p. x. 
25 

--- Page 29 ---
33. Bernard Brodie, A Guide to Naval Strategy,   Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1944, p. 296. 
34. Commander Linton Wells II, USN, "Maneuver in Naval Warfare," 
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,   106, no. 12 (December 1980): 
34-41. 
35. Such a formal division of opinion into two schools of 
doctrinal thought is not clearly documented in history. On the 
other hand, from a review of history, it is reasonably clear that 
there were often two relatively distinct views on doctrine as 
demonstrated by fleet engagements and courts-martial. Historians 
have provided names to two "schools" which may not have actually 
existed in fact, but probably did exist in spirit. 
36. Imperial Japanese Navy, Kaisen yömurei   [Battle Instructions], 
Part II "Battle," Chapter 7 "Other Forms of Battle," paragraph 
147, circa 1934, contained in Sanematsu Yuzuru, Kaigun daigaku 
kyöiku,   Tokyo, Japan: Köjinsha, 1975, p. 210-241, translated by 
David C. Evans and provided to the author in February 1995. 
37. Such a methodology was employed by the Director of Naval 
Intelligence in his July 1992 Strategic Planning for the Office 
of Naval  Intelligence:  Visions and Directions for the Future.   For 
a discussion of the difficulty of translating this vision into 
programmatic reality, see James J. Tritten, "A Sea of Change for 
Naval Intelligence: Adjusting to the New Realities," Naval 
Intelligence Professionals Quarterly,   Spring 1994, p. 5-7. 
38. Hans Delbrück, History of the Art of War,   Volume IV:  The Dawn 
of Modern Warfare,   Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., trans., Lincoln, NE 
and London, UK: University of Nebraska Press, 1985 [original 
German version published in 1920], p. 335-337. Montecuccoli had 
demonstrated his own "maneuver" successes against Turenne in 1673 
and 1675. 
39. Karl von Clausewitz, On War,   O.J. Matthijs Jolles, trans., 
New York, NY: The Modern Library, 1943, p. 209-210. 
40. Karl von Clausewitz, On War,   O.J. Matthijs Jolles, trans., 
New York, NY: The Modern Library, 1943, p. xxxi, 180. 
41. Toshikazu Ohmae, "The Battle of Savo Island," and associated 
comment by Admiral Mikawa Gun'ichi, The Japanese Navy in World 
War II:   In  the Words of Former Japanese Naval  Officers,   2nd ed., 
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986, p. 242, 244. 
42. Imperial Japanese Navy, Kaisen yömurei   [Battle Instructions], 
Part II "Battle, " Chapter 1 "The Essentials of Battle," paragraph 
2; Chapter 2 "The Fleet in Battle," Section 2 "Principles of 
Battle in General," paragraphs 29 and 30, circa 1934, contained 
in Sanematsu Yuzuru, Kaigun daigaku kyöiku,   Tokyo, Japan: 
26 

--- Page 30 ---
Köjinsha, 1975, p. 210-241, translated by David C. Evans and 
provided to the author in February 1995. 
43. Admiral E.W. Eberle, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, War 
Instructions:  united States Navy,   F.T.P. 43, Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1924 [signed 19 May 1924], p. 122- 
124; Admiral W.H. Standley, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, War 
Instructions:   united States Navy,   F.T.P. 143, Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1934 [signed 28 March 1934], p. 
109-112; Admiral E.J. King, Commander in Chief United States 
Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, War Instructions:  united 
States Navy,   F.T.P. 143(A), Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1944 [signed 1 November 1944], p. 88-90. 
44. Michael Kennedy and Kevin N. Lewis, "On 'Keeping Them Down' 
or Why Do Recovery Models Recover So Fast?" P-6531, Santa Monica, 
CA: The RAND Corporation, June 1981, p. 32; and Desmond Ball, 
"Targeting for Strategic Deterrence," Adelphi Papers No. 185, 
London, UK: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
Summer 1983, p. 29-31. 
45. Colonel James L. Whitlow, USMC, "JFACC [Joint Forces Air 
Component Commander]: Who's in Charge? Joint Force Quarterly,   no. 
5 (September 1994): 64-70. 
46. General Colin L. Powell, U.S. Army, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations,   Joint Pub 3-0, 9 
September 1993, p. IV-12 through IV-13. 
47. Captain Charles C. Pease, USN, "Sink the Navy," U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings,   109, no. 9 (September 1983): 30-36. 
48. Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, Basic Aerospace 
Doctrine of the United States Air Force,  Air Force Manual 1-1 
[AFM 1-1], Vol. II, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, March 1992, p. 26-28; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 
Warfare of the US Armed Forces,   Joint Publication 1, Washington, 
DC: National Defense University Press, 11 November 1991, p. 21. 
49. Perhaps it is time to spend less time studying "dead 
Germans." See: Michael A. Palmer, "If Nelson Spoke German," 
Military Review,   69, no. 1 (January 1989): 98-99. 
50. Hans Delbrück, History of the Art of War,   Volume I:  Warfare 
in Antiquity,  Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., trans., Lincoln, NE and 
London, UK: University of Nebraska Press, 1985 [original German 
version published in 1920], p. 567-568. Delbrück is also credited 
with destroying the myth of some of Caesar's victories over 
"impossible" odds. See for example his discussion of Caesar's 
defeat of Arvernian Vercingetoriz at Alesia, p. 495-507. 
27 

--- Page 31 ---
51. Ernest H. Jenkins, A History of the French Navy:  From its 
Beginnings  to  the Present Day,   London, UK: MacDonald and Jane's, 
1973, p. 344. Not everyone shares this opinion, however. For an 
opposing view, see: Herve Coutau-Begarie, "France," Ubi Sumus?: 
The State of Naval and Maritime History,   John B. Hattendorf, ed. 
Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1994, p. 128. 
28 

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Dr. Ross R. Vickers 
Code 211 
Naval Health Research Center 
P.O. Box 85122 
San Diego, CA 92186-5122 

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Captain David Watson,  USN 
Chairman 
Department of Joint Military Operations 
686 Cushing Road 
Naval War College 
Newport, RI 02841-5010 
Dr. Hans Wegmüller 
Amsel weg 22 
CH-3110 Münsingen 
Switzerland - via air mall   - 
Dr. Jay Williams 
Department of Political Science 
Loyola University of Chicago 
6525 N. Sheraton Road 
Chicago, IL 60626 
Captain George Wilson, USN 
Code: AU/CCN 
Air War College 
325 Chennault Circle 
Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6427 
Dr. Harold R. Winton 
Code ACSC/AS 
School of Advanced Airpower Studies 
600 Chennault Circle 
Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6426 
Dr. Robert Wood 
Member NDC Academic Advisory Group 
Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies 
686 Cushing Road 
Naval War College 
Newport, RI 02841-1207