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MARINECORPSUNIVERSITYLIBRARY
DiRECTO!3RESEARCHCENTERjLLECTiONMANAGEMENT(G40RGL)2040BROADWAYSTQUANTIGQVA22134-5107


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FMFM1
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U.S.MarineCorpsPCN13900005000


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-A33-AJD.//9f7


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Chapter1.TheNatureofWarWarDefined—Friction—Uncertainty—Fluidity—Disorder—TheHumanDimension—ViolenceandDanger—MoralandPhysicalForces—TheEvolutionofWar—ArtandScienceofWarChapter2.TheTheoryofWarWarasanInstrumentofPolicy—MeansinWar—TheSpectrumofConflict—LevelsofWar—OffenseandDefense—StylesofWarfare—CombatPower—ConcentrationandSpeed—SurpriseandBoldness—ExploitingVulnerabilityandOpportunityChapter3.PreparingforWarPlanning—Organization—Doctrine—Leadership—Training—ProfessionalMilitaryEducation—EquippingChapter4.TheConductofWarTheChallenge—ManeuverWarfare—PhilosophyofCommand—ShapingtheBattle—DecisionMaking—MissionTactics—Commander'sIntent—FocusofEffort—SurfacesandGaps—CombinedArmsNotes


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Chapter1TheNatureofWar
"Everythinginwarissimple,butthesimplestthingisdifficult.Thedifficultiesaccumulateandendbyproducingakindoffrictionthatisinconceivableunlessonehasexperiencedwar.
"
x
—CarlvonClausewitz
'Inwarthechiefincalculableisthehumanwill."2-B.H.LiddellHart
"Positionsareseldomlostbecausetheyhavebeendestroyed,butalmostinvariablybecausetheleaderhasdecidedinhisownmindthatthepositioncannotbeheld."3—A.A.Vandegrift


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TounderstandtheMarineCorps'philosophyofwar-fighting,wefirstneedanappreciationforthenatureofwaritself—itsmoralandphysicalcharacteristicsanddemands.4AcommonviewamongMarinesofthenatureofwarisanecessarybaseforthedevelopmentofacohe-sivedoctrine.
WardefinedWarisastateofhostilitiesthatexistsbetweenoramongnations,characterizedbytheuseofmilitaryforce.Theessenceofwarisaviolentclashbetweentwohostile,inde-pendent,andirreconcilablewills,eachtryingtoimposeitselfontheother.Thus,theobjectofwaristoimposeourwillonourenemy.Themeanstothatendistheorganizedapplicationorthreatofviolencebymilitaryforce.Whensignificantdisagreementscannotbesettledthroughpeacefulmeans,suchasdiplomacy,nationsresorttowar.Nationsnotatwarwithoneanothercanbesaidtobeat


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peace.However,absolutewarandpeacerarelyexistinprac-tice.Rather,theyareextremesbetweenwhichexisttherela-tionsamongmostnations.Theneedtoresorttomilitaryforceofsomekindmayariseatanypointwithintheseextremes,evenduringperiodsofrelativepeace.Thus,forourpurposeswarmayrangefromintenseclashesbetweenlargemilitaryforces—backedbyanofficialdeclarationofwar—tocoverthostilitieswhichbarelyreachthethresholdofviolence.5
FrictionSoportrayed,warappearsasimpleenterprise.Butinprac-tice,becauseofthecountlessfactorsthatimpingeonit,theconductofwarbecomesextremelydifficult.Thesefactorscollectivelyhavebeencalledfriction,whichClausewitzdescribedas"theforcethatmakestheapparentlyeasysodifficult."6Frictionistheforcethatresistsallaction.Itmakesthesimpledifficultandthedifficultseeminglyimpossible.Theveryessenceofwarasaclashbetweenopposedwillscreatesfriction.Itiscriticaltokeepinmindthattheenemyisnotaninanimateobjectbutanindependentandanimateforce.Theenemyseekstoresistourwillandimposehisownwillonus.Itisthedynamicinterplaybetweenhiswillandoursthatmakeswardifficultandcomplex.Inthisenviron-ment,frictionabounds.


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Frictionmaybemental,asinindecisionoveracourseofaction.Oritmaybephysical,asineffectiveenemyfireoraterrainobstaclethatmustbeovercome.Frictionmaybeexternal,imposedbyenemyaction,theterrain,weather,ormerechance.Orfrictionmaybeself-induced,causedbysuchfactorsaslackofaclearlydefinedgoal,lackofcoor-dination,unclearorcomplicatedplans,complextaskorgani-zationsorcommandrelationships,orcomplicatedcommunicationsystems.Whateverformittakes,becausewarisahumanenterprise,frictionwillalwayshaveapsy-chologicalaswellasaphysicalimpact.Whileweshouldattempttominimizeself-inducedfriction,thegreaterrequirementistofighteffectivelywithinthemediumoffriction.Themeanstoovercomefrictionisthewill;weprevailoverfrictionthroughpersistentstrengthofmindandspirit.Whilestrivingtoovercometheeffectsoffrictionour-selves,wemustattemptatthesametimetoraiseourenemy'sfrictiontoalevelthatdestroyshisabilitytofight.
Wecanreadilyidentifycountlessexamplesoffriction,butuntilwehaveexperienceditourselves,wecannothopetoappreciateitfully.Onlythroughexperiencecanwecometoappreciatetheforceofwillnecessarytoovercomefrictionandtodeveloparealisticappreciationforwhatispossibleinwarandwhatisnot.Whiletrainingshouldattempttoapproximatetheconditionsofwar,wemustrealizeitcanneverfullyduplicatetheleveloffrictionofrealcombat.


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UncertaintyThenextattributeoftheenvironmentofwarisuncertainty.Wemightarguethatuncertaintyisjustoneofmanysourcesoffriction,butbecauseitissuchapervasivetraitofwarwewilltreatitsingly.Allactionsinwartakeplaceinanatmosphereofuncertainty—thefogofwar.Uncertaintypervadesbattleintheformofunknownsabouttheenemy,abouttheenviron-ment,andevenaboutthefriendlysituation.Whilewetrytoreducetheseunknownsbygatheringinformation,wemustrealizewecannoteliminatethem.Theverynatureofwarmakesabsolutecertaintyimpossible;allactionsinwarwillbebasedonincomplete,inaccurate,orevencontradictoryinformation.Atbest,wecanhopetodetermineprobabilities.Thisimpliesacertainstandardofmilitaryjudgment:whatisprobableandwhatisnot?Throughthisjudgmentofprobabilitywemakeanestimateofourenemy'sdesignsandactaccordingly.But,havingsaidthis,wealsorealizethatitispreciselythoseactionswhichfalloutsidetherealmofprobabilitythatoftenhavethegreatestimpactontheoutcomeofwar.Wemustlearntofightinanenvironmentofuncertainty,whichwecandobydevelopingsimple,flexibleplans;plan-ningforcontingencies;developingstandingoperatingproce-dures;andfosteringinitiativeamongsubordinates.


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Byitsnature,uncertaintyinvariablyinvolvestheestima-tionandacceptanceofrisk.Riskisinherentinwarandisinvolvedineverymission.Riskisalsorelatedtogain;nor-mally,greaterpotentialgainrequiresgreaterrisk.Further,riskisequallycommontoactionandinaction.Thepracticeofconcentratingcombatpoweratthefocusofeffortnecessitatesthewillingnesstoacceptprudentrisk.However,weshouldclearlyunderstandthattheacceptanceofriskdoesnotequatetotheimprudentwillingnesstogambletheentirelikelihoodofsuccessonasingleimprobableevent.Partofriskistheungovernableelementofchance.Theelementofchanceisauniversalcharacteristicofwarandacontinuoussourceoffriction.Chanceconsistsofturnsofeventsthatcannotreasonablybeforeseenandoverwhichweandourenemyhavenocontrol.Theuncontrollablepotentialforchancealonecreatespsychologicalfriction.Weshouldrememberthatchancefavorsneitherbelligerentexclusively.Consequently,wemustviewchancenotonlyasathreatbutalsoasanopportunity,whichwemustbeeverreadytoexploit.
FluidityLikefrictionanduncertainty,fluidityisanintegralattributeofthenatureofwar.Eachepisodeinwaristhetemporary


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resultofauniquecombinationofcircumstances,requiringanoriginalsolution.Butnoepisodecanbeviewedinisola-tion.Rather,eachmergeswiththosethatprecedeandfollowit—shapedbytheformerandshapingtheconditionsofthelatter—creatingacontinuous,fluctuatingfabricofactivityrepletewithfleetingopportunitiesandunforeseenevents.Successdependsinlargepartontheabilitytoadapttoaconstantlychangingsituation.
Itisphysicallyimpossibletosustainahightempoofactivityindefinitely,althoughclearlytherewillbetimeswhenitisadvantageoustopushmenandequipmenttothelimit.Thus,thetempoofwarwillfluctuate—fromperiodsofintenseactivitytoperiodsinwhichactivityislimitedtoinformationgathering,replenishment,orredeployment.Darknessandweathercaninfluencethetempoofwarbutneednothaltit.Acompetitiverhythmwilldevelopbetweentheopposingwills,witheachbelligerenttryingtoinfluenceandexploittempoandthecontinuousflowofeventstosuithispurposes.
DisorderInanenvironmentoffriction,uncertainty,andfluidity,wargravitatesnaturallytowarddisorder.Liketheotherattrib-utesoftheenvironmentofwar,disorderisanintegralchar-acteristicofwar;wecannevereliminateit.Intheheatof


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battle,planswillgoawry,instructionsandinformationwillbeunclearandmisinterpreted,communicationswillfail,andmistakesandunforeseeneventswillbecommonplace.Itispreciselythisnaturaldisorderwhichcreatestheconditionsripeforexploitationbyanopportunisticwill.
Eachencounterinwarwillusuallytendtogrowincreas-inglydisorderedovertime.Asthesituationchangescon-tinuously,weareforcedtoimproviseagainandagainuntilfinallyouractionshavelittle,ifany,resemblancetotheorigi-nalscheme.Byhistoricalstandards,themodernbattlefieldispartic-ularlydisorderly.Whilepastbattlefieldscouldbedescribedbylinearformationsanduninterruptedlinearfronts,wecannotthinkoftoday'sbattlefieldinlinearterms.Therangeandlethalityofmodernweaponshasincreaseddispersionbetweenunits.Inspiteofcommunicationstechnology,thisdispersionstrainsthelimitsofpositivecontrol.Thenaturalresultofdis-persionisunoccupiedareas,gaps,andexposedflankswhichcanandwillbeexploited,blurringthedistinctionbetweenfrontandrearandfriendly-andenemy-controlledareas.Theoccurrencesofwarwillnotunfoldlikeclockwork.Thus,wecannothopetoimposeprecise,positivecontroloverevents.Thebestwecanhopeforistoimposeageneral


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frameworkoforderonthedisorder,toprescribethegeneralflowofactionratherthantotrytocontroleachevent.Ifwearetowin,wemustbeabletooperateinadisord-erlyenvironment.Infact,wemustnotonlybeabletofighteffectivelyinthefaceofdisorder,weshouldseektogeneratedisorderforouropponentanduseitasaweaponagainsthim.
ThehumandimensionBecausewarisaclashbetweenopposinghumanwills,thehumandimensioniscentralinwar.Itisthehumandimen-sionwhichinfuseswarwithitsintangiblemoralfactors.Warisshapedbyhumannatureandissubjecttothecomplexi-ties,inconsistencies,andpeculiaritieswhichcharacterizehumanbehavior.Sincewarisanactofviolencebasedonirreconcilabledisagreement,itwillinvariablyinflameandbeshapedbyhumanemotions.Warisanextremetrialofmoralandphysicalstrengthandstamina.Anyviewofthenatureofwarwouldhardlybeaccurateorcompletewithoutconsiderationoftheeffectsofdanger,fear,exhaustion,andprivationonthemenwhomustdothefighting.7However,theseeffectsvarygreatlyfromcasetocase.Individualsandpeoplesreactdifferently10


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tothestressofwar;anactthatmaybreakthewillofoneenemymayonlyservetostiffentheresolveofanother.Nodegreeoftechnologicaldevelopmentorscientificcal-culationwillovercomethehumandimensioninwar.Anydoctrinewhichattemptstoreducewarfaretoratiosofforces,weapons,andequipmentneglectstheimpactofthehumanwillontheconductofwarandisthereforeinherentlyfalse.
ViolenceanddangerWarisamongthegreatesthorrorsknowntomankind;itshouldneverberomanticized.Themeansofwarisforce,appliedintheformoforganizedviolence.Itisthroughtheuseofviolence—orthecrediblethreatofviolence,whichrequirestheapparentwillingnesstouseit—thatwecompelourenemytodoourwill.Ineitherevent,violenceisanessen-tialelementofwar,anditsimmediateresultisbloodshed,destruction,andsuffering.Whilethemagnitudeofviolencemayvarywiththeobjectandmeansofwar,theviolentessenceofwarwillneverchange.8Anystudyofwarthatneglectsthischaracteristicismisleadingandincomplete.Sincewarisaviolententerprise,dangerisafundamentalcharacteristicofwar.Andsincewarisahumanphenomenon,11


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fear—thehumanreactiontodanger—hasasignificantimpactontheconductofwar.Allmenfeelfear.Leader-shipmustfosterthecouragetoovercomefear,bothindividu-allyandwithintheunit.Courageisnottheabsenceoffear;rather,itisthestrengthtoovercomefear.9
Leadersmuststudyfear,understandit,andbepreparedtocopewithit.Likefear,couragetakesmanyforms,fromastoiccouragebornofreasonedcalculationtoafiercecouragebornofheightenedemotion.Experienceunderfiregenerallyincreasescourage,ascanrealistictrainingbyles-seningthemystiqueofcombat.Strongleadershipwhichearnstherespectandtrustofsubordinatescanlimittheeffectsoffear.Leadersshoulddevelopunitcohesionandespritandtheself-confidenceofindividualswithintheunit.InthisenvironmentaMarine'sunwillingnesstoviolatetherespectandtrustofhispeerswillovercomepersonalfear.
MoralandphysicalforcesWarischaracterizedbytheinteractionofbothmoralandphysicalforces.Thephysicalcharacteristicsofwararegener-allyeasilyseen,understood,andmeasured:hardware,tech-nology,physicalobjectivesseized,forceratios,lossesofmaterielorlife,terrainlostorgained,prisonersormaterielcaptured.Themoralcharacteristicsarelesstangible.(The12


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termmoralasusedhereisnotrestrictedtoethics—althoughethicsarecertainlyincluded—butpertainstothoseforcesofpsychologicalratherthantangiblenature,toincludethementalaspectsofwar.10)Moralforcesaredifficulttograspandimpossibletoquantify.Wecannoteasilygaugeforceslikenationalandmilitaryresolve,nationalorindividualcon-science,emotion,fear,courage,morale,leadership,oresprit.Yetmoralforcesexertagreaterinfluenceonthenatureandoutcomeofwarthandophysical.1'Thisisnottolessentheimportanceofphysicalforces,forthephysicalforcesinwarcanhaveasignificantimpactonthemoral.Forexample,thegreatesteffectoffiresontheenemyisgenerallynottheamountofphysicaldestructiontheycause,buttheeffectofthatphysicaldestructiononhismoralstrength.Becausethemoralforcesofwararedifficulttocometogripswith,itistemptingtoexcludethemfromourstudyofwar.However,anydoctrineortheoryofwarthatneglectsthesefactorsignoresthegreaterpartofthenatureofwar.
TheevolutionofwarWarisbothtimelessandeverchanging.Whilethebasicnatureofwarisconstant,themeansandmethodsweuseevolvecontinuously.Thesechangesmaybegradualinsomecasesanddrasticinothers.Drasticchangesinthenature13


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ofwararetheresultofdevelopmentsthatdramaticallyupsettheequilibriumofwar,suchastherifledboreandtherailroad.Onemajorcatalystofchangeistheadvancementoftech-nology.Asthephysicalhardwareofwarimprovesthroughtechnologicaldevelopment,somustthetactical,operational,andstrategicusageofthosemeansadapttotheimprovedcapabilities—bothtomaximizeourowncapabilitiesandtocounteractourenemy's.Wemuststayabreastofthisprocessofchange,forthebelligerentwhofirstexploitsadevelopmentintheartandscienceofwargainsasignificant,ifnotdecisive,advantage.Conversely,ifweareignorantofthechangingfaceofwar,wewillfindourselvesunequaltoitschallenges.
ArtandscienceofwarFromthediscussiontothispoint,wecanconcludethatwardemonstratescharacteristicsofbothartandscience.Variousaspectsofwar,particularlyitstechnicalaspects,fallprincipallyintherealmofscience,whichwewilldescribeasthemethod-icalapplicationoftheempiricallawsofnature.Thescienceofwarincludesthoseactivitiesdirectlysubjecttothelawsofphysics,chemistry,andlikedisciplines;forexample,the14


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applicationoffires,theeffectsofweapons,andtheratesandmethodsofmovementandresupply.However,theseareamongthecomponentsofwar;theydonotdescribethewholephenomenon.Owingtothevagariesofhumanbehaviorandthecountlessotherintangiblefactorswhichcontributetoit,thereisfarmoretotheconductofwarthancanbeexplainedbyscience.Thescienceofwarstopsshortoftheneedformilitaryjudgment,theimpactofmoralforces,theinfluenceofchance,andothersimilarfactors.Wethusconcludethattheconductofwarisultimatelyanart,anactivityofhumancreativityandintuitionpoweredbythestrengthofthehumanwill.Theartofwarrequirestheintuitiveabilitytograsptheessenceofauniquebattlefieldsituation,thecreativeabilitytodeviseapracticalsolution,andthestrengthofpurposetoexecutetheact.
ConclusionAtfirstglance,warseemsarathersimpleclashofinterests.Butatcloserexamination,ittakesshapeasoneofthemostdemandingandtryingofman'sendeavors.Fog,friction,andchaosareitsnaturalhabitat.Eachepisodeistheuniqueproductofthedynamicinteractionofmyriadmoralandphysicalforces.Whilefoundedonthelawsofscience,wardemands,ultimately,theintuitionandcreativityofart.
15


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"Thepoliticalobjectisthegoal,waristhemeansofreachingit,andthemeanscanneverbeconsideredinisolationfromtheirpurposes."l
—CarlvonClausewitz
"Invincibilityliesinthedefense;thepossibilityofvictoryintheattack.Onedefendswhenhisstrengthisinadequate;heattackswhenitisabundant."2 -SunTzu
"Battlesarewonbyslaughterandmanoeuvre.Thegreaterthegeneral,themorehecontributesinmanoeuvre,thelesshedemandsinslaughter.
"
3 —WinstonChurchill


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Havingarrivedatacommonviewofthenatureofwar,weproceedtodevelopfromitatheoryofwar.Ourtheoryofwarwillinturnbethefoundationforthewayweprepareforandwagewar.
WarasaninstrumentofpolicyWardoesnotexistforitsownsake.Itisanextensionofpolicywithmilitaryforce.4Thepolicyaimthatisthemotiveforwarmustalsobetheforemostdeterminantforthecon-ductofwar.Thesinglemostimportantthoughttounder-standaboutourtheoryisthatwarmustservepolicy.Asthepolicyaimsofwarmayvaryfromresistanceagainstaggressiontocompleteannihilationoftheenemy,somusttheapplicationofviolencevaryinaccordancewiththoseaims.Ofcourse,wemayalsohavetoadjustourpolicyobjectivestoaccommodateourmeans;wemustnotestab-lishgoalsoutsideourcapabilities.Whenthepolicymotiveofwarisintense,suchastheanni-hilationofanenemy,thenpolicyandwar'snaturalmili-tarytendencytowarddestructionwillcoincide,andthewarwillappearmoremilitaryandlesspoliticalinnature.On19


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theotherhand,thelessintensethepolicymotive,themorethemilitarytendencytowarddestructionwillbeatvariancewiththatmotive,andthemorepoliticalandlessmilitarythewarwillappear.5
Theaiminwaristoachieveourwill.Theimmediaterequirementistoovercomeourenemy'sabilitytoresistus,whichisaproductofthephysicalmeansathisdisposalandthestrengthofhiswill.6Wemusteithereliminatehisphys-icalabilitytoresistor,shortofthis,wemustdestroyhiswilltoresist.Inmilitaryterms,thismeansthedefeatoftheenemy'sfightingforces,butalwaysinamannerandtoadegreeconsistentwiththenationalpolicyobjective.
MeansinwarAtthenationallevel,warinvolvestheuseofalltheelementsofnationalpower,includingdiplomacy,militaryforce,eco-nomics,ideology,technology,andculture.7Ourprimarycon-cerniswiththeuseofmilitaryforceasaninstrumentofpolicy.Butwhilewewillfocusontheuseofmilitaryforce,wemustnotconsideritinisolationfromtheotherelementsofnationalpower.Theuseofmilitaryforcemaytakeanynumberofforms,fromintensewarfarewithsophisticatedweaponrytomeredemonstrations.Theprincipalmeansfortheapplica-tionofmilitaryforceiscombat—violenceintheformofarmedconflictbetweenmilitaryorparamilitaryforces.20


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FMFM1 TheTheoryofWarThespectrumofconflictConflictcantakeawiderangeofforms,constitutingaspec-trumwhichreflectsthemagnitudeofviolenceinvolved.Atoneendarethoseconflictsoflowintensityinwhichtheappli-cationofmilitarypowerisrestrainedandselective.Theotherendofthespectrumrepresentsconflictsofhighintensity,suchasnuclearwar.Theplaceonthespectrumofaspecificconflictdependsonseveralfactors.Amongthemarepolicyobjectives,militarymeansavailable,nationalwill,andden-sityoffightingforcesorcombatpoweronthebattlefield.Ingeneral,thegreaterthedensity,themoreintensetheconflict.Asaresult,wemaywitnessrelativelyintenseactionswithinalow-intensityconflictorrelativelyquietsectorsorphasesinanintensewar.Low-intensityconflictsaremoreprobablethanhigh-intensityconflicts.Manynationssimplydonotpossessthemilitarymeanstowagewaratthehighendofthespectrum.And,unlessnationalsurvivalisatstake,nationsaregener-allyunwillingtoaccepttherisksassociatedwithwarsofhighintensity.However,aconflict'sintensitymaychangeovertime.Belligerentsmayescalatethelevelofviolenceiftheoriginalmeansdonotachievethedesiredresults.Similarly,warsmayactuallyde-escalateovertime;forexample,afteraninitialpulseofintenseviolence,thebelligerentsmaycon-tinuetofightonalesserlevel,unabletosustaintheinitiallevelofintensity.
21


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TheMarineCorps,asthenation'sforceinreadiness,musthavetheversatilityandflexibilitytodealwithmilitaryandparamilitarysituationsacrosstheentirespectrumofconflict.Thisisagreaterchallengethanitmayappear;conflictsoflowintensityarenotsimplylesserformsofhigh-intensitywar.Amodernmilitaryforcecapableofwagingawarofhighintensitymayfinditselfill-preparedfora"small"waragainstapoorlyequippedguerrillaforce.
LevelsofwarWartakesplacesimultaneouslyatseveralcorrelatedlevels,eachwithdifferingends,means,characteristics,andrequirements.Activitiesatthestrategiclevelfocusdirectlyonnationalpolicyobjectives.Strategyappliestopeaceaswellaswar.Withinstrategywedistinguishbetweennationalstrategy,whichcoordinatesandfocusesallthecomponentsofnationalpowertoattainthepolicyobjective,8andmilitarystrategy,whichistheapplicationofmilitaryforcetosecurethepolicyobjec-tive.9Militarystrategythusissubordinatetonationalstrategy.Strategycanbethoughtofastheartofwinningwars.Strategyestablishesgoalsintheatersofwar.Itassignsforces,providesassets,andimposesconditionsontheuseofforce.Strategyderivedfromnationalpolicymustbeclearlyunderstoodtobethesoleauthoritativebasisofalloperations.22


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Activitiesatthetacticallevelofwarfocusontheappli-cationofcombatpowertodefeatanenemyincombatataparticulartimeandplace.10Tacticscanbethoughtofastheartandscienceofwinningengagementsandbattles.Itincludestheuseoffirepowerandmaneuver,theintegrationofdifferentarms,andtheimmediateexploitationofsuc-cesstodefeattheenemy.Includedwithinthetacticallevelofwaristhesustainmentofforcesduringcombat.Thetac-ticallevelalsoincludesthetechnicalapplicationofcombatpower,whichconsistsofthosetechniquesandproceduresforaccomplishingspecifictaskswithinatacticalaction.Thesetechniquesandproceduresdealprimarilywithactionsdesignedtoenhancetheeffectsoffiresorreducetheeffectsofenemyfires—methodssuchasthecallforfire,techniquesoffire,thetechnicaloperationofweaponsandequipment,ortacticalmovementtechniques.Thereisacertainoverlapbetweentacticsandtechniques.Wemakethepointonlytodrawthedistinctionbetweentactics,whicharetheproductofjudgmentandcreativity,andtechniquesandprocedures,whicharegenerallyperformedbyrepetitiveroutine.Theoperationallevelofwarlinksthestrategicandtacti-callevels.Itistheuseoftacticalresultstoattainstrategicobjectives.Theoperationallevelincludesdecidingwhen,where,andunderwhatconditionstoengagetheenemyinbattle—andwhen,where,andunderwhatconditionstorefusebattle—withreferencetohigheraims.Actionsatthislevelimplyabroaderdimensionoftimeandspacethandotactics.Asstrategydealswithwarsandtacticswith23


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battlesandengagements,theoperationallevelofwaristheartofwinningcampaigns.Itsmeansaretacticalresults,anditsendisthemilitarystrategicobjective.
OffenseanddefenseRegardlessofitstypeandnatureorthelevelatwhichitisfought,combatmanifestsitselfintwodifferentbutcom-plementaryforms:theoffenseandthedefense.Theoffenseanddefenseareneithermutuallyexclusivenorclearlydis-tinct;aswewillsee,eachincludeselementsoftheother.Theoffensecontributesstrikingpower.Theoffensegener-allyhasasitsaimsomepositivegain;itisthroughtheoffensethatweseektoimposesomedesignontheenemy.Thedefense,ontheotherhand,contributesresistingpower,theabilitytopreserveandprotectoneself.Thus,thedefensegenerallyhasanegativeaim,thatofresistingtheenemy'swill.Thedefenseisinherentlythestrongerformofcombat.Werethisnotthecase,therewouldbenoreasonevertoassumethedefensive.Theoffense,withitspositiveaim,wouldalwaysbepreferable.1
2
Butinfact,ifweareweakerthanourenemy,weassumethedefensivetocompensateforourweakness.Similarly,ifwearetomountanoffensivetoimposeourwill,wemustdevelopenoughforcetoover-cometheinherentsuperiorityoftheenemy'sdefense.24


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Atleastonepartytoaconflictmusthaveanoffensiveintention,forwithoutthedesiretoimposeupontheothertherewouldbenoconflict.Similarly,thesecondpartymustatleastpossessadefensivedesire,forwithoutthewilling-nesstoresistthereagainwouldbenoconflict.Wecanimagineaconflictinwhichbothpartiespossessanoffensiveintention.Butaftertheinitialclashoneofthemmustassumeadefensivepostureoutofweaknessuntilabletoresumetheoffensive.Thisleadsustotheconclusionthatwhilethedefenseisthestrongerformofcombat,theoffenseisthepreferredform,foronlythroughtheoffensecanwetrulypursueapositiveaim.Weresorttothedefensivewhenweaknesscompels.Whileopposingforms,theoffenseanddefensearenotmutuallyexclusive.Infact,theycannotexistseparately.Forexample,thedefensecannotbepurelypassiveresistance.Aneffectivedefensemustassumeanoffensivecharacter,strikingattheenemyatthemomentofhisgreatestvulner-ability.Itis"notasimpleshield,butashieldmadeupofwell-directedblows."13Thetrulydecisiveelementofthedefenseisthecounterattack.Thus,theoffenseisanintegralcomponentoftheconceptofthedefense.Similarly,thedefenseisanessentialcomponentoftheoffense.14Theoffensecannotsustainitselfindefinitely.Atsometimesandplaces,itbecomesnecessarytohaltthe25


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offensetoreplenish,andthedefenseautomaticallytakesover.Furthermore,therequirementtoconcentrateforcesatthefocusofeffortfortheoffenseoftennecessitatesassum-ingthedefensiveelsewhere.Therefore,outofnecessitywemustincludedefensiveconsiderationsaspartofourcon-ceptoftheoffense.Thisbringsustotheconceptoftheculminatingpoint,'5withoutwhichourunderstandingoftherelationshipbetweentheoffenseanddefensewouldbeincomplete.Notonlycantheoffensenotsustainitselfindefinitely,itgenerallygrowsweakerasitadvances.Certainmoralfactors,suchasmoraleorboldness,mayincreasewithasuccessfulattack,butthesegenerallycannotcompensateforthephysicallossesinvolvedinsustaininganadvanceinthefaceofresistance.Weadvanceatacost—lives,fuel,ammunition,physicalandsometimesmoralstrength—andsotheattackbecomesweakerovertime.Eventually,thesuperioritythatallowedustoattackandforcedourenemytodefendinthefirstplacedissipatesandthebalancetipsinfavorofourenemy.Wehavereachedtheculminatingpoint,atwhichwecannolongersustaintheattackandmustreverttothedefense,Itispreciselyatthispointthatthedefensiveelementoftheoffenseismostvulnerabletotheoffensiveelementofthedefense,thecounterattack.Thisrelationshipbetweenoffenseanddefenseexistssimul-taneouslyatthevariouslevelsofwar.Forexample,wemay26


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employatacticaldefenseaspartofanoffensivecampaign,availingourselvesoftheadvantagesofthedefensetacticallywhilepursuinganoperationaloffensiveaim.Weconcludethatthereexistsnocleardivisionbetweentheoffenseanddefense.Ourtheoryofwarshouldnotattempttoimposeoneartificially.Theoffenseanddefenseexistsimultaneouslyasnecessarycomponentsofeachother,andthetransitionfromonetotheotherisfluidandcontinuous.
StylesofwarfareJustastherearetwobasicformsofcombat,therearetwoessentialcomponents:fireandmovement.Ofallthecount-lessactivitiesincombat,wecandistillthemtothese.
Itwouldseemintheorythatfireandmovementrepresentoppositeendsofaspectrum.Butinreality,onecannotexistwithouttheother,forfireandmovementarecomplementaryandmutuallydependent.Itismovementthatallowsustobringourfirestobearontheenemyjustasitistheprotectionoffiresthatallowsustomoveinthefaceoftheenemy.Itisthroughmovementthatweexploittheeffectsoffireswhileitisthedestructiveforceoffiresthataddsmenacetoourmovements.27


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Althoughallwarfareusesbothfireandmovement,thesecomponentsprovidethefoundationfortwodistinctstylesofwarfare:anattritionstyle,basedonfirepower,andamaneuverstyle,basedonmovement.Thedifferentstylescanexistsimultaneouslyatdifferentlevels.Forexample,theisland-hoppingcampaigninthePacificduringtheSecondWorldWarwasamaneuvercampaigncomprisingaseriesofattritionbattles.Warfarebyattritionseeksvictorythroughthecumula-tivedestructionoftheenemy'smaterialassetsbysuperiorfirepowerandtechnology.Anattritionistseestheenemyastargetstobeengagedanddestroyedsystematically.Thus,thefocusisonefficiency,leadingtoamethodical,almostscientific,approachtowar.Withtheemphasisontheefficientapplicationofmassed,accuratefires,movementtendstobeponderousandtemporelativelyunimportant.Theattritionistgaugesprogressinquantitativeterms:battledamageassessments,"bodycounts,"andterraincaptured.Heseeksbattleunderanyandallconditions,pittingstrengthagainststrengthtoexactthegreatesttollfromhisenemy.Resultsaregenerallyproportionatetoefforts;greaterexpen-dituresnetgreaterresults—thatis,greaterattrition.Thedesireforvolumeandaccuracyoffiretendstoleadtowardcentralizedcontrol,justastheemphasisonefficiencytendstoleadtoaninwardfocusonproceduresandtechniques.Suc-cessthroughattritiondemandsthewillingnessandabilityalsotowithstandattrition,becausewarfarebyattritioniscostly.Thegreatestnecessityforsuccessisnumericalsuperiority,28


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andatthenationallevelwarbecomesasmuchanindus-trialasamilitaryproblem.Victorydoesnotdependsomuchonmilitarycompetenceasonsheersuperiorityofnumbersinmenandequipment.Incontrast,warfarebymaneuverstemsfromadesiretocircumventaproblemandattackitfromapositionofadvan-tageratherthanmeetitstraighton.Thegoalistheappli-cationofstrengthagainstselectedenemyweakness.Bydefinition,maneuverreliesonspeedandsurprise,forwith-outeitherwecannotconcentratestrengthagainstenemyweakness.Tempoisitselfaweapon—oftenthemostimpor-tant.Theneedforspeedinturnrequiresdecentralizedcon-trol.Whileattritionoperatesprincipallyinthephysicalrealmofwar,theresultsofmaneuverarebothphysicalandmoral.Theobjectofmaneuverisnotsomuchtodestroyphysi-callyasitistoshattertheenemy'scohesion,organization,command,andpsychologicalbalance.Successfulmaneu-verdependsontheabilitytoidentifyandexploitenemyweakness,notsimplyontheexpenditureofsuperiormight.Towinbymaneuver,wecannotsubstitutenumbersforskill.Maneuverthusmakesagreaterdemandonmilitaryjudg-ment.Potentialsuccessbymaneuver—unlikeattrition—isoftendisproportionatetotheeffortmade.Butforexactlythesamereasons,maneuverincompetentlyappliedcarrieswithitagreaterchanceforcatastrophicfailure,whileattri-tionisinherentlylessrisky.
29


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Becausewehavelongenjoyedvastnumericalandtech-nologicalsuperiority,theUnitedStateshastraditionallywagedwarbyattrition.However,MarineCorpsdoctrinetodayisbasedonwarfarebymaneuver,aswewillseeinthefourthchapter,"TheConductofWar."16
CombatpowerCombatpoweristhetotaldestructiveforcewecanbringtobearonourenemyatagiventime.17Somefactorsincombatpowerarequitetangibleandeasilymeasured,suchassuperiornumbers,whichClausewitzcalled"themostcommonelementinvictory."18Somemaybelesseasilymeasured,suchastheeffectsofmaneuver,tempo,orsur-prise;theadvantagesestablishedbygeographyorclimate;therelativestrengthsoftheoffenseanddefense;ortherela-tivemeritsofstrikingtheenemyinthefront,flanks,orrear.Andsomemaybewhollyintangible,suchasmorale,fightingspirit,perseverance,ortheeffectsofleadership.
Itisnotourintenttotrytolistorcategorizeallthevariouscomponentsofcombatpower,toindextheirrelativevalues,ortodescribetheircombinationsandvariations;eachcom-binationisuniqueandtemporary.Norisitevendesirabletobeabletodoso,sincethiswouldleadustoaformulisticapproachtowar.30


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FMFM1 TheTheoryofWarConcentrationandspeedOfalltheconsistentpatternswecandiscerninwar,therearetwoconceptsofsuchsignificanceanduniversalitythatwecanadvancethemasprinciples:concentrationandspeed.19
Concentrationistheconvergenceofeffortintimeandspace.Itisthemeansbywhichwedevelopsuperiorityatthedeci-sivetimeandplace.Concentrationdoesnotapplyonlytocombatforces.Itappliesequallytoallavailableresources:fires,aviation,theintelligenceeffort,logistics,andallotherformsofcombatsupportandcombatservicesupport.Simi-larly,concentrationdoesnotapplyonlytotheconductofwar,butalsotothepreparationforwar.Effectiveconcentrationmayachievedecisivelocalsuperi-orityforanumericallyinferiorforce.Thewillingnesstocon-centrateatthedecisiveplaceandtimenecessitatesstricteconomyandtheacceptanceofriskelsewhereandatothertimes.Todevotemeanstounnecessaryeffortsorexcessivemeanstonecessarysecondaryeffortsviolatestheprincipleofconcentrationandiscounterproductivetothetrueobjective.Sincewarisfluidandopportunitiesfleeting,concentrationappliestotimeaswellastospace.Wemustconcentratenotonlyatthedecisivelocation,butalsoatthedecisivemoment.Furthermore,physicalconcentration—massing—makesusvul-nerabletoenemyfires,necessitatingdispersion.Thus,apat-terndevelops:disperse,concentrate,disperseagain.31


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Speedisrapidityofaction.Likeconcentration,speedappliestobothtimeandspace.And,likeconcentration,itisrelativespeedthatmatters.Speedovertimeistempo—theconsistentabilitytooperatefast.20Speedoverdistance,orspace,isvelocity—theabilitytomovefast.Bothformsaregenuinesourcesofcombatpower.Inotherwords,speedisaweapon.Superiorspeedallowsustoseizetheinitiativeanddictatethetermsofcombat,forcingtheenemytoreacttous.Speedprovidessecurity.Itisaprerequisiteformaneu-verandforsurprise.Moreover,speedisnecessaryinordertoconcentratesuperiorstrengthatthedecisivetimeandplace.Sinceitisrelativespeedthatmatters,itfollowsthatweshouldtakeallmeasurestoimproveourowntempoandvelocitywhiledegradingourenemy's.However,experienceshowsthatwecannotsustainahighrateofvelocityortempoindefinitely.Asaresult,anotherpatterndevelops:fast,slow,fastagain.Acompetitiverhythmdevelopsincombat,witheachbelligerenttryingtogeneratespeedwhenitistohisadvantage.Thecombinationofconcentrationandspeedismomen-tum.21Momentumgeneratesimpetus.Itadds"punch"or"shockeffect"toouractions.Itfollowsthatweshouldstrikethedecisiveblowwiththegreatestpossiblecombinationofconcentrationandspeed.32


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FMFM1 TheTheoryofWarSurpriseandboldnessWemustnowacknowledgetwoadditionalconsiderationsthataresignificantasmultipliersofcombatpower:surpriseandboldness.Bysurprisewemeanstrikingtheenemyatatimeorplaceorinamannerforwhichheisunprepared.Itisnotessen-tialthatwetaketheenemyunaware,butonlythathebecomeawaretoolatetoreacteffectively.Thedesireforsurpriseis"moreorlessbasictoalloperations,forwithoutitsuperi-orityatthedecisivepointishardlyconceivable."22But,whileanecessaryconditionforsuperiority,surpriseisalsoagenuinemultiplierofstrengthinitsownrightbecauseofitspsychologicaleffect.Surprisecandecisivelyaffecttheoutcomeofcombatfarbeyondthephysicalmeansathand.Surpriseistheparalysis,ifonlypartialandtemporary,oftheenemy'sabilitytoresist.23Theadvantagegainedbysurprisedependsonthedegreeofsurpriseandtheenemy'sabilitytoadjustandrecover.Surpriseisbasedonspeed,secrecy,anddeception.Itmeansdoingtheunexpectedthing,whichinturnnormallymeansdoingthemoredifficultthinginhopesthattheenemywillnotexpectit.Infact,thisisthegenesisofmaneuver—tocircumventtheenemy'sstrengthtostrikehimwhereheisnotprepared.Purposelychoosingthemoredifficultcoursebecauseitislessexpectedneces-sarilymeanssacrificingefficiencytosomedegree.Theques-tionis:Doestheanticipatedadvantagegainedcompensateforthecertainlossofefficiencythatmustbeincurred?24
33


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Whiletheelementofsurpriseisoftenofdecisiveimpor-tance,wemustrealizethatitisdifficulttoachieveandeasytolose.Itsadvantagesareonlytemporaryandmustbequicklyexploited.Friction,adominantattributeofwar,istheconstantenemyofsurprise.Wemustalsorecognizethatwhilesurpriseisalwaysdesirable,theabilitytoachieveitdoesnotdependsolelyonourownefforts.Itdependsatleastasmuchonourenemy'ssusceptibilitytosurprise—hisexpectationsandpreparedness.Ourabilitytoachievesurprisethusrestsonourabilitytoappreciateandthendis-locateourenemy'sexpectations.Therefore,whilesurprisecanbedecisive,itisamistaketodependonitaloneforthemarginofvictory.Boldnessisamultiplierofcombatpowerinmuchthesamewaythatsurpriseis,for"inwhatotherfieldofhumanactivityisboldnessmoreathomethaninwar?"25Boldness"mustbegrantedacertainpoweroverandabovesuccessfulcalculationsinvolvingspace,time,andmagnitudeofforces,forwhereveritissuperior,itwilltakeadvantageofitsopponent'sweakness.Inotherwords,itisagenuinelycreativeforce."26Boldnessissuperiortotimidityineveryinstanceandisatadisadvantageonlyinthefaceofnervy,calculatingpatiencewhichallowstheenemytocommithim-selfirrevocablybeforestriking—aformofboldnessinitsownright.Boldnessmustbetemperedwithjudgmentlestitborderonrecklessness.Butthisdoesnotdiminishitssignificance.
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FMFM1 TheTheoryofWarExploitingvulnerabilityandopportunityItisnotenoughsimplytogeneratesuperiorcombatpower.Wecaneasilyconceiveofsuperiorcombatpowerdissipatedoverseveralunrelatedeffortsorconcentratedonsomeindeci-siveobject.Towin,wemustconcentratecombatpowertowardadecisiveaim.27
Weobviouslystandabetterchanceofsuccessbycon-centratingstrengthagainstenemyweaknessratherthanagainststrength.Soweseektostriketheenemywhere,when,andhowheismostvulnerable.Thismeansthatweshouldgenerallyavoidhisfront,wherehisattentionisfocusedandheisstrongest,andseekouthisflanksandrear,wherehedoesnotexpectusandwherewecanalsocausethegreatestpsychologicaldamage.Weshouldalsostrikeatthatmomentintimewhenheismostvulnerable.Ofallthevulnerabilitieswemightchoosetoexploit,somearemorecriticaltotheenemythanothers.Itfollowsthatthemosteffectivewaytodefeatourenemyistodestroythatwhichismostcriticaltohim.Weshouldfocusoureffortsontheonethingwhich,ifeliminated,willdothemostdeci-sivedamagetohisabilitytoresistus.Bytakingthisfromhimwedefeathimoutrightoratleastweakenhimseverely.
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Therefore,weshouldfocusoureffortsagainstacriticalenemyvulnerability.Obviously,themorecriticalandvul-nerable,thebetter.28Butthisisbynomeansaneasydeci-sion,sincethemostcriticalobjectmaynotbethemostvulnerable.Inselectinganaim,wethusrecognizetheneedforsoundmilitaryjudgmenttocomparethedegreeofcriti-calitywiththedegreeofvulnerabilityandtobalancebothagainstourowncapabilities.Reducedtoitssimplestterms,weshouldstrikeourenemywhereandwhenwecanhurthimmost.Thisconceptappliesequallytotheconflictasawhole—thewar—andtoanyepisodeofthewar—anycampaign,battle,orengagement.Fromthiswecanconcludethattheconceptappliesequallytothestrategic,operational,andtac-ticallevels.Atthehighestlevelacriticalvulnerabilityislikefytobesomeintangiblecondition,suchaspopularopinionorashakyalliancebetweentwocountries,althoughitmayalsobesomeessentialwarresourceorakeycity.Atthelowerlevelsacriticalvulnerabilityismorelikelytotakeonaphysicalnature,suchasanexposedflank,achokepointalongtheenemy'slineofoperations,alogisticsdump,agapinenemydispositions,oreventheweaksidearmorofatank.Inreality,ourenemy'smostcriticalvulnerabilitywillrarelybeobvious,particularlyatthelowerlevels.Wemayhavetoadoptthetacticofexploitinganyandallvulnera-bilitiesuntilweuncoveradecisiveopportunity.36


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Thisleadsustoacorollarythought:exploitingopportu-nity.Decisiveresultsinwararerarelythedirectresultofaninitial,deliberateaction.Rather,theinitialactioncre-atestheconditionsforsubsequentactionswhichdevelopfromit.Astheopposingwillsinteract,theycreatevarious,fleetingopportunitiesforeitherfoe.Suchopportunitiesareoftenbornofthedisorderthatisnaturalinwar.Theymaybetheresultofourownactions,enemymistakes,orevenchance.Byexploitingopportunities,wecreateinincreas-ingnumbersmoreopportunitiesforexploitation.Itisoftentheabilityandthewillingnesstoruthlesslyexploittheseopportunitiesthatgeneratedecisiveresults.Theabilitytotakeadvantageofopportunityisafunctionofspeed,flexi-bility,boldness,andinitiative.
ConclusionThetheoryofwarwehavedescribedwillprovidethefoun-dationforthediscussionoftheconductofwarinthefinalchapter.Thewarfightingdoctrinewhichwederivefromourtheoryisonebasedonmaneuver.Thisrepresentsachangesince,withafewnotableexceptions—StonewallJacksonintheValley,PattoninEurope,MacArthuratInchon—theAmericanwayofwartraditionallyhasbeenoneofattri-tion.Thisstyleofwarfaregenerallyhasworkedforusbecause,withourallies,wehaveenjoyedvastnumericalandtechnologicalsuperiority.Butwecannolongerpresumesuchaluxury.Infact,anexpeditionaryforceinparticularmustbepreparedtowinquickly,withminimalcasualtiesandlimitedexternalsupport,againstaphysicallysuperiorfoe.Thisrequirementmandatesadoctrineofmaneuverwarfare.37


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"Theessentialthingisaction.Actionhasthreestages:thedecisionbornofthought,theorderorpreparationforexecution,andtheexecutionitselfAllthreestagesaregovernedbythewill.Thewillisrootedincharacter,andforthemanofactioncharacterisofmorecriticalimportancethanintellect.Intellectwithoutwillisworthless,willwithoutintellectisdangerous."l
—HansvonSeekt
"Thebestformofwelfareforthetroopsisfirst-classtrain-ing,forthissavesunnecessarycasualties."2—ErwinRommel"Untutoredcourage[is]uselessinthefaceofeducatedbullets."*—GeorgeS.Patton,Jr.


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Duringtimesofpeacethemostimportanttaskofanymilitaryistoprepareforwar.Asthenation'srapid-responseforce,theMarineCorpsmustmaintainitselfreadyforimmediateemploymentinanyclimeandplaceandinanytypeofconflict.Allpeacetimeactivitiesshouldfocusonachievingcombatreadiness.Thisimpliesahighleveloftraining,flexibilityinorganizationandequipment,qualifiedprofessionalleadership,andacohesivedoctrine.
PlanningPlanningplaysasimportantaroleinthepreparationforwarasintheconductofwar.Thekeytoanyplanisaclearlydefinedobjective,inthiscasearequiredlevelofreadiness.Wemustidentifythatlevelofreadinessandplanacam-paigntoreachit.Acampaignisaprogressivesequenceofattainablegoalstogaintheobjectivewithinaspecifiedtime.4
TheplanmustfocusalltheeffortsofthepeacetimeMarineCorps,includingtraining,education,doctrine,organization,andequipmentacquisition.Unityofeffortisasimportantduringthepreparationforwarasitisduringtheconductofwar.Thissystematicprocessofidentifyingtheobjectiveandplanningacoursetogainitappliestoalllevels.41


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OrganizationTheFleetMarineForcesmustbeorganizedtoprovideforward-deployedorrapidly-deployableforcescapableofmountingexpeditionaryoperationsinanyenvironment.Thismeansthat,inadditiontomaintainingtheiruniqueamphib-iouscapability,theFleetMarineForcesmustmaintainacapabilitytodeploybywhatevermeansisappropriatetothesituation.TheactiveFleetMarineForcesmustbecapableofrespondingimmediatelytomosttypesofconflict.Missionsinsustainedhigh-intensitywarfarewillrequireaugmenta-tionfromtheReserveestablishment.Foroperationsandtraining,FleetMarineForces—activeandReserve—willbeformedintoMarineAir-GroundTaskForces(MAGTFs).MAGTFsaretaskorganizationscon-sistingofground,aviation,combatservicesupport,andcommandcomponents.Theyhavenostandardstructure,butratherareconstitutedasappropriateforthespecificsituation.TheMAGTFprovidesasinglecommandertheoptimumcombined-armsforceforthesituationhefaces.Asthesituationchanges,itmayofcoursebenecessarytorestructuretheMAGTF.Tothegreatestextentpracticable,FleetMarineForcesmustbeorganizedforwarfightingandthenadaptedfor42


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peacetimeratherthanviceversa.TablesoforganizationofFleetMarineForceunitsshouldreflectthetwocentralrequirementsofdeployabilityandtheabilitytotask-organizeaccordingtospecificsituations.Unitsshouldbeorganizedaccordingtotypeonlytotheextentdictatedbytraining,administrative,andlogisticrequirements.Further,weshouldstreamlineourheadquartersorganizationsandstaffstoeliminatebureaucraticdelaysinordertoaddtempo.Commandersshouldestablishhabitualrelationshipsbetweensupportedandsupportingunitstodevelopopera-tionalfamiliarityamongthoseunits.Thisdoesnotprecludenonstandardrelationshipswhenrequiredbythesituation.
DoctrineDoctrineisateachingadvancedasthefundamentalbeliefsoftheMarineCorpsonthesubjectofwar,fromitsnatureandtheorytoitspreparationandconduct.5Doctrineestab-lishesaparticularwayofthinkingaboutwarandawayoffighting,aphilosophyforleadingMarinesincombat,aman-dateforprofessionalism,andacommonlanguage.Inshort,itestablishesthewaywepracticeourprofession.Inthismanner,doctrineprovidesthebasisforharmoniousactionsandmutualunderstanding.43


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MarineCorpsdoctrineismadeofficialbytheComman-dantandisestablishedinthismanual.Ourdoctrinedoesnotconsistofprocedurestobeappliedinspecificsituationssomuchasitestablishesgeneralguidancethatrequiresjudg-mentinapplication.Therefore,whileauthoritative,doctrineisnotprescriptive.
LeadershipMarineCorpsdoctrinedemandsprofessionalcompetenceamongitsleaders.Asmilitaryprofessionalschargedwiththedefenseofthenation,Marineleadersmustbetrueexpertsintheconductofwar.Theymustbemenofactionandofintellectboth,skilledat"gettingthingsdone"whileatthesametimeconversantinthemilitaryart.Resoluteandself-reliantintheirdecisions,theymustalsobeenergeticandinsistentinexecution.6
Themilitaryprofessionisathinkingprofession.Officersparticularlyareexpectedtobestudentsoftheartandscienceofwaratalllevels—tactical,operational,andstrategic—withasolidfoundationinmilitarytheoryandaknowledgeofmilitaryhistoryandthetimelesslessonstobegainedfromit.
44


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Leadersmusthaveastrongsenseofthegreatresponsi-bilityoftheiroffice;theresourcestheywillexpendinwararehumanlives.
TheMarineCorps'styleofwarfarerequiresintelligentleaderswithapenchantforboldnessandinitiativedowntothelowestlevels.Boldnessisanessentialmoraltraitinaleader,foritgeneratescombatpowerbeyondthephysi-calmeansathand.Initiative,thewillingnesstoactonone'sownjudgment,isaprerequisiteforboldness.Thesetraitscarriedtoexcesscanleadtorashness,butwemustrealizethaterrorsbyjuniorleadersstemmingfromoverboldnessareanecessarypartoflearning.Weshoulddealwithsucherrorsleniently;theremustbeno"zerodefects"mental-ity.7Notonlymustwenotstifleboldnessorinitiative,wemustcontinuetoencouragebothtraitsinspiteofmistakes.Ontheotherhand,weshoulddealseverelywitherrorsofinactionortimidity.Wewillnotacceptlackofordersasjustificationforinaction;itiseachMarine'sdutytotakeinitiativeasthesituationdemands.Consequently,trustisanessentialtraitamongleaders—trustbyseniorsintheabilitiesoftheirsubordinatesandbyjuniorsinthecompetenceandsupportoftheirseniors.Trustmustbeearned,andactionswhichunderminetrustmustmeetwithstrictcensure.Trustisaproductofconfidenceandfamiliarity.Confidenceamongcomradesresultsfromdemonstratedprofessionalskill.Familiarityresultsfromsharedexperienceandacommonprofessionalphilosophy.45


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Relationsamongallleaders—fromcorporaltogeneral—shouldbebasedonhonestyandfrankness,regardlessofdis-paritybetweengrades.Untilacommanderhasreachedandstatedadecision,eachsubordinateshouldconsiderithisdutytoprovidehishonest,professionalopinion—eventhoughitmaybeindisagreementwithhissenior's.However,oncethedecisionhasbeenreached,thejuniorthenmustsupportitasifitwerehisown.Seniorsmustencouragecandoramongsubordinatesandmustnothidebehindtheirrankinsignia.Readycomplianceforthepurposeofpersonaladvancement—thebehaviorof"yes-men"—willnotbetolerated.
TrainingThepurposeofalltrainingistodevelopforcesthatcanwinincombat.Trainingisthekeytocombateffectivenessandthereforeisthefocusofeffortofapeacetimemilitary.How-ever,trainingshouldnotstopwiththecommencementofwar;trainingmustcontinueduringwartoadapttothelessonsofcombat.AllofficersandenlistedMarinesundergosimilarentry-leveltrainingwhichis,ineffect,asocializationprocess.ThistrainingprovidesallMarinesacommonexperience,aproudheritage,asetofvalues,andacommonbondofcomradeship.ItistheessentialfirststepinthemakingofaMarine.46


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Basicindividualskillsareanessentialfoundationforcombateffectivenessandmustreceiveheavyemphasis.AllMarines,regardlessofoccupationalspecialty,willbetrainedinbasiccombatskills.Atthesametime,unitskillsareextremelyimportant.Theyarenotsimplyanaccumulationofindividualskills;adequacyinindividualskillsdoesnotautomaticallymeanunitskillsaresatisfactory.Commandersateachechelonmustallotsubordinatessufficienttimeandfreedomtoconductthetrainingneces-sarytoachieveproficiencyattheirlevels.Theymustensurethathigher-leveldemandsdonotdenysubordinatesadequateopportunitiesforautonomoustrainingandthatoversuper-visiondoesnotpreventsubordinatecommandersfromtrain-ingtheirunitsastheybelieveappropriate.Inordertodevelopinitiativeamongjuniorleaders,theconductoftraining—likecombat—shouldbedecentralized.Seniorcommandersinfluencetrainingbyestablishinggoalsandstandards,communicatingtheintentoftraining,andestablishingafocusofeffortfortraining.Asarule,theyshouldrefrainfromdictatinghowthetrainingwillbeaccomplished.Trainingprogramsshouldreflectpractical,challenging,andprogressivegoalsbeginningwithindividualandsmall-unitskillsandculminatinginafullycombined-armsMAGTF.47


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Ingeneral,theorganizationforcombatshouldalsobetheorganizationfortraining.Thatis,units—includingMAGTFs—shouldtrainwiththefullcomplementofassigned,reinforcing,andsupportingforcestheyrequireincombat.Collectivetrainingconsistsofdrillsandexercises.Drillsareaformofsmall-unittrainingwhichstressproficiencybyprogressiverepetitionoftasks.Drillsareaneffectivemethodfordevelopingstandardizedtechniquesandproceduresthatmustbeperformedrepeatedlywithoutvariationtoensurespeedandcoordination,suchasgundrillorimmediateactions.Incontrast,exercisesaredesignedtotrainunitsandindividualsintacticsundersimulatedcombatconditions.Exercisesshouldapproximatetheconditionsofbattleasmuchaspossible;thatis,theyshouldintroducefrictionintheformofuncertainty,stress,disorder,andopposingwills.Thislastcharacteristicismostimportant;onlyinopposed,free-playexercisescanwepracticetheartofwar.Dictatedor"canned"scenarioseliminatetheelementofindependent,opposingwillsthatistheessenceofcombat.Critiquesareanimportantpartoftrainingbecausecriticalself-analysis,evenaftersuccess,isessentialtoimprovement.Theirpurposeistodrawoutthelessonsoftraining.Asaresult,weshouldconductcritiquesimmediatelyaftercompletingthetraining,beforethememoryoftheevents48


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hasfaded.Critiquesshouldbeheldinanatmosphereofopenandfrankdialogueinwhichallhandsareencouragedtocontribute.Welearnasmuchfrommistakesasfromthingsdonewell,sowemustbewillingtoadmitanddiscussthem.Ofcourse,asubordinate'swillingnesstoadmitmistakesdependsonthecommander'swillingnesstotoleratethem.Becausewerecognizethatnotwosituationsinwararethesame,ourcritiquesshouldfocusnotsomuchontheactionswetookasonwhywetookthoseactionsandwhytheybroughttheresultstheydid.
ProfessionalmilitaryeducationProfessionalmilitaryeducationisdesignedtodevelopcrea-tive,thinkingleaders.Aleader'scareer,fromtheinitialstagesofleadershiptraining,shouldbeviewedasacontinu-ous,progressiveprocessofdevelopment.Ateachstageofhiscareer,heshouldbepreparingforthesubsequentstage.Whetherheisanofficerorenlisted,theearlystagesofaleader'scareerare,ineffect,hisapprenticeship.Whilereceivingafoundationinprofessionaltheoryandconceptsthatwillservehimthroughouthiscareer,theleaderfocusesonunderstandingtherequirementsandlearningandapply-ingtheproceduresandtechniquesassociatedwithhisfield.Thisiswhenhelearnshistradeasanaviator,infantryman,49


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artilleryman,orlogistician.Asheprogresses,theleadershouldhavemasteredtherequirementsofhisapprentice-shipandshouldunderstandtheinterrelationshipofthetech-niquesandprocedureswithinhisfield.Hisgoalistobecomeanexpertinthetacticallevelofwar.Asanofficercontinuestodevelop,heshouldunderstandtheinterrelationshipbetweenhisfieldandalltheotherfieldswithintheMarineCorps.Heshouldbeanexpertintacticsandtechniquesandshouldunderstandamphibi-ouswarfareandcombinedarms.Heshouldbestudyingtheoperationallevelofwar.Attheseniorlevelsheshouldbefullycapableofarticulating,applying,andintegratingMAGTFwarfightingcapabilitiesinajointandcombinedenvironmentandshouldbeanexpertintheartofwaratalllevels.TheresponsibilityforimplementingprofessionalmilitaryeducationintheMarineCorpsisthree-tiered:itresidesnotonlywiththeeducationestablishment,butalsowiththecommanderandtheindividual.Theeducationestablishmentconsistsofthoseschools—administeredbytheMarineCorps,subordinatecommands,oroutsideagencies—establishedtoprovideformaleducationintheartandscienceofwar.Inallofficereducationparticularly,schoolsshouldfocusondevelopingatalent50


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formilitaryjudgment,notonimpartingknowledgethroughrotelearning.Studyconductedbytheeducationestablish-mentcanneitherprovidecompletecareertrainingforanindividualnorreachallindividuals.Rather,itbuildsuponthebaseprovidedbycommandersandbyindividualstudy.Allcommandersshouldconsidertheprofessionaldevel-opmentoftheirsubordinatesaprincipalresponsibilityofcommand.Commandersshouldfosterapersonalteacher-studentrelationshipwiththeirsubordinates.Commandersareexpectedtoconductacontinuingprofessionaleducationprogramfortheirsubordinateswhichincludesdevelopingmilitaryjudgmentanddecisionmakingandteachesgeneralprofessionalsubjectsandspecifictechnicalsubjectsperti-nenttooccupationalspecialties.Usefultoolsforgeneralprofessionaldevelopmentincludesupervisedreadingpro-grams,mapexercises,wargames,battlestudies,andterrainstudies.Commandersshouldseethedevelopmentoftheirsubordinatesasadirectreflectiononthemselves.Finally,everyMarinehasabasicresponsibilitytostudytheprofessionofarmsonhisown.Aleaderwithouteitherinterestinorknowledgeofthehistoryandtheoryofwarfare—theintellectualcontentofhisprofession—isaleaderinappearanceonly.Self-studyintheartandscienceofwarisatleastequalinimportance—andshouldreceiveatleastequaltime—tomaintainingphysicalcondition.Thisisparticularlytrueamongofficers;afterall,anofficer'sprincipalweaponishismind.51


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EquippingEquipmentshouldbeeasytooperateandmaintain,reliable,andinteroperablewithotherequipment.Itshouldrequireminimalspecializedoperatortraining.Further,equipmentshouldhedesignedsothatitsusageisconsistentwithestab-lisheddoctrineandtactics.Primaryconsiderationsarestrategicandtacticallift—theMarineCorps'relianceonNavyshippingforstrategicmobilityandonhelicoptersandvertical/shorttakeoffandlandingaircraftfortacticalmobilityfromshiptoshoreandduringoperationsashore.EquipmentthatpermitsovercontrolofunitsinbattleisinconflictwiththeMarineCorps'philosophyofcommandandisnotjustifiable.Inordertominimizeresearchanddevelopmentcostsandfieldingtime,theMarineCorpswillexploitexistingcapabilities—"off-the-shelf"technology—tothegreatestextentpossible.Acquisitionshouldbeacomplementary,two-wayprocess.Especiallyforthelongterm,theprocessmustidentifycombatrequirementsanddevelopequipmenttosatisfytheserequirements.Weshouldbasetheserequirementsonananalysisofcriticalenemyvulnerabilitiesanddevelopequip-mentspecificallytoexploitthosevulnerabilities.Atthesametime,theprocessshouldnotoverlookexistingequipmentofobvioususefulness.52


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Equipmentisusefulonlyifitincreasescombateffective-ness.Anypieceofequipmentrequiressupport:operatortraining,maintenance,powersourcesorfuel,andtransport.Theanticipatedenhancementofcapabilitiesmustjustifythesesupportrequirementsandtheemploymentoftheequipmentmusttaketheserequirementsintoaccount.Asmuchaspossible,employmenttechniquesandproce-duresshouldbedevelopedconcurrentlywithequipmenttominimizedelaysbetweenthefieldingoftheequipmentanditsusefulnesstotheoperatingforces.Forthesamereason,initialoperatortrainingshouldalsoprecedeequipmentfielding.Wemustguardagainstoverrelianceontechnology.Technologycanenhancethewaysandmeansofwarbyimprovingman'sabilitytowageit,buttechnologycannotandshouldnotattempttoeliminatemanfromtheprocessofwagingwar.Betterequipmentisnotthecureforallills;doctrinalandtacticalsolutionstocombatdeficienciesmustalsobesought.Anyadvantagesgainedbytechnologicaladvancementareonlytemporary,formanwillalwaysfindacountermeasure,tacticaloritselftechnological,whichwilllessentheimpactofthetechnology.Additionally,wemustnotbecomesodependentonequipmentthatwecannolongerfunctioneffectivelywhentheequipmentbecomesinoperable.
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ConclusionTherearetwobasicmilitaryfunctions:wagingwarandpreparingforwar.Anymilitaryactivitiesthatdonotcon-tributetotheconductofapresentwararejustifiableonlyiftheycontributetopreparednessforapossiblefutureone.But,clearly,wecannotaffordtoseparateconductandprepa-ration.Theymustbeintimatelyrelatedbecausefailureinpreparationleadstodisasteronthebattlefield.
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"Nowanarmymaybelikenedtowater,forjustasflowingwateravoidstheheightsandhastenstothelowlands,soanarmyavoidsstrengthandstrikesweakness."l
—SunTzu"Speedistheessenceofwar.Takeadvantageoftheenemy'sunpreparedness;travelbyunexpectedroutesandstrikehimwherehehastakennoprecautions.
"
2 —SunTzu"Manyyearsago,asacadethopingsomedaytobeanofficer,Iwasporingoverthe'PrinciplesofWar,'listedintheoldFieldServiceRegulations,whentheSergeant-Majorcameuptome.Hesurveyedmewithkindlyamusement.'Don'tbotheryourheadaboutallthemthings,melad,'hesaid.'There'sonlyoneprincipleofwarandthat'sthis.Hittheotherfellow,asquickasyoucan,andashardasyoucan,whereithurtshimmost,whenheain'tlookin'l'"3-SirWilliamSlim


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ThesolejustificationfortheUnitedStatesMarineCorpsistosecureorprotectnationalpolicyobjectivesbymilitaryforcewhenpeacefulmeansalonecannot.HowtheMarineCorpsproposestoaccomplishthismissionistheproductofourunderstandingofthenatureandthetheoryofwarandmustbetheguidingforcebehindourpreparationforwar.
ThechallengeThechallengeistoidentifyandadoptaconceptofwarfightingconsistentwithourunderstandingofthenatureandtheoryofwarandtherealitiesofthemodernbattlefield.Whatexactlydoesthisrequire?Itrequiresaconceptofwarfightingthatwillfunctioneffectivelyinanuncertain,chaotic,andfluidenvironment—infact,onethatwillexploittheseconditionstoadvantage.Itrequiresaconceptthat,recognizingthetime-competitiverhythmofwar,generatesandexploitssuperiortempoandvelocity.Itrequiresaconceptthatisconsistentlyeffectiveacrossthefullspectrumofconflict,becausewecannotattempttochangeourbasicdoctrinefromsituationtosituationandexpecttobeproficient.Itrequiresaconceptwhichrecognizesandexploitsthefleetingopportunitieswhichnaturallyoccurinwar.57


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Itrequiresaconceptwhichtakesintoaccountthemoralaswellasthephysicalforcesofwar,becausewehavealreadyconcludedthatmoralforcesformthegreaterpartofwar.Itrequiresaconceptwithwhichwecansucceedagainstanumericallysuperiorfoe,becausewecannolongerpresumeanumericaladvantage.And,especiallyinexpeditionarysituationsinwhichpublicsupportformilitaryactionmaybetepidandshort-lived,itrequiresaconceptwithwhichwecanwinquicklyagainstalargerfoeonhishomesoil,withminimalcasualtiesandlimitedexternalsupport.
ManeuverwarfareTheMarineCorpsconceptforwinningunderthesecondi-tionsisawarfightingdoctrinebasedonrapid,flexible,andopportunisticmaneuver.Butinordertofullyappreciatewhatwemeanbymaneuverweneedtoclarifytheterm.Thetraditionalunderstandingofmaneuverisaspatialone;thatis,wemaneuverinspacetogainapositionaladvantage.4However,inordertomaximizetheusefulnessofmaneuver,wemustconsidermaneuverintimeaswell;thatis,wegenerateafasteroperationaltempothantheenemytogainatemporaladvantage.Itisthroughmaneuverinbothdimensionsthataninferiorforcecanachievedecisivesuperiorityatthenecessarytimeandplace.58


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Maneuverwarfareisawarfightingphilosophythatseekstoshattertheenemy'scohesionthroughaseriesofrapid,violent,andunexpectedactionswhichcreateaturbulentandrapidlydeterioratingsituationwithwhichhecannotcope.Fromthisdefinitionweseethattheaiminmaneuverwarfareistorendertheenemyincapableofresistingbyshat-teringhismoralandphysicalcohesion—hisabilitytofightasaneffective,coordinatedwhole—ratherthantodestroyhimphysicallythroughincrementalattrition,whichisgener-allymorecostlyandtime-consuming.Ideally,thecompo-nentsofhisphysicalstrengththatremainareirrelevantbecausewehaveparalyzedhisabilitytousethemeffectively.Evenifanoutmaneuveredenemycontinuestofightasindividualsorsmallunits,wecandestroytheremnantswithrelativeeasebecausewehaveeliminatedhisabilitytofighteffectivelyasaforce.Thisisnottoimplythatfirepowerisunimportant.Onthecontrary,thesuppressiveeffectsoffirepowerareessen-tialtoourabilitytomaneuver.Nordowemeantoimplythatwewillpassuptheopportunitytophysicallydestroytheenemy.Wewillconcentratefiresandforcesatdecisivepointstodestroyenemyelementswhentheopportunitypresentsitselfandwhenitfitsourlargerpurposes.Buttheaimisnotanunfocusedapplicationoffirepowerforthepurposeofincrementallyreducingtheenemy'sphysical59


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strength.Rather,itistheselectiveapplicationoffirepowerinsupportofmaneuvertocontributetotheenemy'sshockandmoraldisruption.Thegreatestvalueoffirepowerisnotphysicaldestruction—thecumulativeeffectsofwhicharefeltonlyslowly—butthemoraldislocationitcauses.Iftheaimofmaneuverwarfareistoshattertheenemy'scohesion,theimmediateobjecttowardthatendistocreateasituationinwhichhecannotfunction.Byouractions,weseektoposemenacingdilemmasinwhicheventshappenunexpectedlyandfasterthantheenemycankeepupwiththem.Theenemymustbemadetoseehissituationnotonlyasdeteriorating,butdeterioratingatanever-increasingrate.Theultimategoalispanicandparalysis,anenemywhohaslosttheabilitytoresist.
Inherentinmaneuverwarfareistheneedforspeedtoseizetheinitiative,dictatethetermsofcombat,andkeeptheenemyoffbalance,therebyincreasinghisfriction.Throughtheuseofgreatertempoandvelocity,weseektoestablishapacethattheenemycannotmaintainsothatwitheachactionhisreactionsareincreasinglylate—untileventuallyheisovercomebyevents.Alsoinherentistheneedforviolence,notsomuchasasourceofphysicalattritionbutasasourceofmoraldislo-cation.Towardthisend,weconcentratestrengthagainst60


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criticalenemyvulnerabilities,strikingquicklyandboldlywhere,when,andhowitwillcausethegreatestdamagetoourenemy'sabilitytofight.Oncegainedorfound,anyadvantagemustbepressedrelentlesslyandunhesitatingly.Wemustberuthlesslyopportunistic,activelyseekingoutsignsofweakness,againstwhichwewilldirectallavailablecombatpower.Andwhenthedecisiveopportunityarrives,wemustexploititfullyandaggressively,committingeveryounceofcombatpowerwecanmusterandpushingour-selvestothelimitsofexhaustion.Thefinalweaponinourarsenalissurprise,thecombatvalueofwhichwehavealreadyrecognized.Bystudyingourenemywewillattempttoappreciatehisperceptions.Throughdeceptionwewilltrytoshapehisexpectations.Thenwewilldislocatethembystrikingatanunexpectedtimeandplace.Inordertoappearunpredictable,wemustavoidsetrulesandpatterns,whichinhibitimaginationandinitiative.Inordertoappearambiguousandthreatening,weshouldoper-ateonaxesthatofferseveralcoursesofaction,keepingtheenemyunclearastowhichwewillchoose.
PhilosophyofcommandItisessentialthatourphilosophyofcommandsupportthewaywefight.Firstandforemost,inordertogeneratethe61


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tempoofoperationswedesireandtobestcopewiththeuncertainty,disorder,andfluidityofcombat,commandmustbedecentralized.Thatis,subordinatecommandersmustmakedecisionsontheirowninitiative,basedontheirunderstandingoftheirsenior'sintent,ratherthanpassinginformationupthechainofcommandandwaitingforthedecisiontobepasseddown.Further,acompetentsubordi-natecommanderwhoisatthepointofdecisionwillnatur-allyhaveabetterappreciationforthetruesituationthanaseniorsomedistanceremoved.Individualinitiativeandresponsibilityareofparamountimportance.Theprincipalmeansbywhichweimplementdecentralizedcontrolisthroughtheuseofmissiontactics,whichwewilldiscussindetaillater.
Second,sincewehaveconcludedthatwarisahumanenterpriseandnoamountoftechnologycanreducethehumandimension,ourphilosophyofcommandmustbebasedonhumancharacteristicsratherthanonequipmentorprocedures.Communicationsequipmentandcommandandstaffprocedurescanenhanceourabilitytocommand,buttheymustnotbeusedtoreplacethehumanelementofcommand.Ourphilosophymustnotonlyaccommodatebutmustexploithumantraitssuchasboldness,initiative,personality,strengthofwill,andimagination.Ourphilosophyofcommandmustalsoexploitthehumanabilitytocommunicateimplicitly.5Webelievethatimplicit62


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communication—tocommunicatethroughmutualunder-standing,usingaminimumofkey,well-understoodphrasesorevenanticipatingeachother'sthoughts—isafaster,moreeffectivewaytocommunicatethanthroughtheuseofdetailed,explicitinstructions.Wedevelopthisabilitythroughfamiliarityandtrust,whicharebasedonasharedphilosophyandsharedexperience.Thisconcepthasseveralpracticalimplications.First,weshouldestablishlong-termworkingrelationshipstodevelopthenecessaryfamiliarityandtrust.Second,keypeople—"actuals"—shouldtalkdirectlytooneanotherwhenpossi-ble,ratherthanthroughcommunicatorsormessengers.Third,weshouldcommunicateorallywhenpossible,becausewecommunicatealsoinhowwetalk;ourinflectionsandtoneofvoice.Andfourth,weshouldcommunicateinpersonwhenpossible,becausewecommunicatealsothroughourgesturesandbearing.Acommandershouldcommandfromwellforward.Thisallowshimtoseeandsensefirsthandtheebbandflowofcombat,togainanintuitiveappreciationforthesituationwhichhecannotobtainfromreports.Itallowshimtoexerthispersonalinfluenceatdecisivepointsduringtheaction.Italsoallowshimtolocatehimselfclosertotheeventsthatwillinfluencethesituationsothathecanobservethemdirectlyandcircumventthedelaysandinaccuraciesthatresultfrompassinginformationupthechainofcommand.63


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Finally,werecognizetheimportanceofpersonalleadership.Onlybyhisphysicalpresence—bydemonstratingthewill-ingnesstosharedangerandprivation—canthecommanderfullygainthetrustandconfidenceofhissubordinates.Wemustrememberthatcommandfromthefrontdoesnotequatetooversupervisionofsubordinates.Aspartofourphilosophyofcommandwemustrecognizethatwarisinherentlydisorderly,uncertain,dynamic,anddominatedbyfriction.Moreover,maneuverwarfare,withitsemphasisonspeedandinitiative,isbynatureaparticu-larlydisorderlystyleofwar.Theconditionsripeforexploi-tationarenormallyalsoverydisorderly.Forcommanderstotrytogaincertaintyasabasisforactions,maintainposi-tivecontrolofeventsatalltimes,orshapeeventstofittheirplansistodenytheverynatureofwar.Wemustthereforebepreparedtocope—evenbetter,tothrive—inanenviron-mentofchaos,uncertainty,constantchange,andfriction.Ifwecancometotermswiththoseconditionsandtherebylimittheirdebilitatingeffects,wecanusethemasaweaponagainstafoewhodoesnotcopeaswell.Inpracticaltermsthismeansthatwemustnotstriveforcertaintybeforeweactforinsodoingwewillsurrendertheinitiativeandpassup,opportunities.Wemustnottrytomaintainpositivecontroloversubordinatessincethiswillnecessarilyslowourtempoandinhibitinitiative.Wemust64


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notattempttoimposepreciseordertotheeventsofcombatsincethisleadstoaformulisticapproachtowar.Andwemustbepreparedtoadapttochangingcircumstancesandexploitopportunitiesastheyarise,ratherthanadheringinsistentlytopredeterminedplans.Thereareseveralpointsworthrememberingaboutourcommandphilosophy.First,whileitisbasedonourwarfightingstyle,thisdoesnotmeanitappliesonlyduringwar.Wemustputitintopracticeduringthepreparationforwaraswell.Wecannotrightlyexpectoursubordinatestoexerciseboldnessandinitiativeinthefieldwhentheyareaccustomedtobeingoversupervisedintherear.Whetherthemissionistraining,procuringequipment,administra-tion,orpolicecall,thisphilosophyshouldapply.Next,ourphilosophyrequirescompetentleadershipatalllevels.Acentralizedsystemtheoreticallyneedsonlyonecompetentperson,theseniorcommander,sincehisisthesoleauthority.Butadecentralizedsystemrequiresleadersatalllevelstodemonstratesoundandtimelyjudgment.Asaresult,initiativebecomesanessentialconditionofcompetenceamongcommanders.Ourphilosophyalsorequiresfamiliarityamongcomradesbecauseonlythroughasharedunderstandingcanwedeveloptheimplicitcommunicationnecessaryforunityofeffort.And,perhapsmostimportant,ourphilosophydemandsconfidenceamongseniorsandsubordinates.65


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ShapingthebattleSinceourgoalisnotjustthecumulativeattritionofenemystrength,itfollowsthatwemusthavesomeschemeforhowweexpecttoachievevictory.Thatis,beforeanythingelse,wemustconceiveourvisionofhowweintendtowin.Thefirstrequirementistoestablishourintent;whatwewanttoaccomplishandhow.Withoutaclearlyidentifiedintent,thenecessaryunityofeffortisinconceivable.Wemustidentifythatcriticalenemyvulnerabilitywhichwebelievewillleadmostdirectlytoaccomplishingourintent.Havingdonethis,wecanthendeterminethestepsnecessarytoachieveourintent.Thatis,wemustshapethebattletoouradvantageintermsofbothtimeandspace.Similarly,wemusttrytoseeourselvesthroughourenemy'seyesinordertoidentifyourownvulnerabilitieswhichhemayattackandtoanticipatehowhewilltrytoshapethebattlesowecancounteracthim.Ideally,whenthemomentofengagementarrives,theissuehasalreadybeenresolved:throughourorchestrationoftheeventsleadinguptotheencounter,wehavesoshapedtheconditionsofwarthattheresultisamatterofcourse.Wehaveshapedtheactiondecisivelytoouradvantage.Toshapethebattle,wemustprojectourthoughtsforwardintimeandspace.Thisdoesnotmeanthatweestablishadetailedtimetableofevents.Wehavealreadyconcluded


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thatwarisinherentlydisorderly,andwecannotexpecttoshapeitstermswithanysortofprecision.Wemustnotbecomeslavestoaplan.Rather,weattempttoshapethegeneralconditionsofwar;wetrytoachieveacertainmeas-ureofordereddisorder.Examplesincludecanalizingenemymovementinadesireddirection,blockingordelayingenemyreinforcementssothatwecanfightapiecemealedenemyratherthanaconcentratedone,shapingenemyexpectationsthroughdeceptionsothatwecanexploitthoseexpectations,orattackingaspecificenemycapabilitytoallowustomax-imizeacapabilityofourown—suchaslaunchingacam-paigntodestroyhisairdefensessothatwecanmaximizetheuseofourownaviation.Weshouldalsotrytoshapeeventsinsuchawaythatallowsusseveraloptionssothatbythetimethemomentofencounterarriveswehavenotrestrictedourselvestoonlyonecourseofaction.Thefurtheraheadwethink,thelessouractualinfluencebecomes.Therefore,thefurtheraheadweconsider,thelessprecisionweshouldattempttoimpose.Lookingaheadthusbecomeslessamatterofinfluenceandmoreamatterofinterest.Aseventsapproachandourabilitytoinfluencethemgrows,wehavealreadydevelopedanappreciationforthesituationandhowwewanttoshapeit.6
Also,thehigherourechelonofcommand,thegreaterisoursphereofinfluenceandthefurtheraheadintimeandspacewemustseektoimposeourwill.Seniorcommanders67


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developingandpursuingmilitarystrategylookaheadweeks,months,ormore,andtheirareasofinfluenceandinterestwillencompassentiretheaters.Juniorcommandersfightingthebattlesandengagementsathandareconcernedwiththecominghours,evenminutes,andtheimmediatefieldofbattle.Butregardlessofthespheresofinfluenceandinterest,itisessentialtohavesomevisionofthefinalresultwewantandhowweintendtoshapetheactionintimeandspacetoachieveit.
DecisionmakingDecisionmakingisessentialtotheconductofwarsinceallactionsaretheresultofdecisions—orofnondecisions.7Ifwefailtomakeadecisionoutoflackofwill,wehavewill-inglysurrenderedtheinitiativetoourfoe.Ifweconsciouslypostponetakingactionforsomereason,thatisadecision.Thus,asabasisforaction,anydecisionisgenerallybetterthannodecision.Sincewarisaconflictbetweenopposingwills,wecannotmakedecisionsinavacuum.Wemustmakeourdecisionsinlightoftheenemy'santicipatedreactionsandcounter-actions,recognizingthatwhilewearetryingtoimposeourwillonourenemy,heistryingtodothesametous.68


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Whoevercanmakeandimplementhisdecisionsconsis-tentlyfastergainsatremendous,oftendecisiveadvantage.Decisionmakingthusbecomesatime-competitiveprocess,andtimelinessofdecisionsbecomesessentialtogeneratingtempo.Timelydecisionsdemandrapidthinking,withcon-siderationlimitedtoessentialfactors.Weshouldsparenoefforttoaccelerateourdecision-makingability.Amilitarydecisionisnotmerelyamathematicalcompu-tation.Decisionmakingrequiresboththeintuitiveskilltorecognizeandanalyzetheessenceofagivenproblemandthecreativeabilitytodeviseapracticalsolution.Thisabil-ityistheproductofexperience,education,intelligence,bold-ness,perception,andcharacter.Weshouldbaseourdecisionsonawarenessratherthanonmechanicalhabit.Thatis,weactonakeenapprecia-tionfortheessentialfactorsthatmakeeachsituationuniqueinsteadoffromconditionedresponse.Wemusthavethemoralcouragetomaketoughdecisionsinthefaceofuncertainty—andacceptfullresponsibilityforthosedecisions—whenthenaturalinclinationwouldbetopostponethedecisionpendingmorecompleteinformation.Todelayactioninanemergencybecauseofincompleteinformationshowsalackofmoralcourage.Wedonotwanttomakerashdecisions,butwemustnotsquanderoppor-tunitieswhiletryingtogainmoreinformation.69


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Wemusthavethemoralcouragetomakebolddecisionsandacceptthenecessarydegreeofriskwhenthenaturalinclinationistochoosealessambitioustack,for"inaudacityandobstinacywillbefoundsafety."8
Finally,sincealldecisionsmustbemadeinthefaceofuncertaintyandsinceeverysituationisunique,thereisnoperfectsolutiontoanybattlefieldproblem.Therefore,weshouldnotagonizeoverone.Theessenceoftheproblemistoselectapromisingcourseofactionwithanacceptabledegreeofrisk,andtodoitmorequicklythanourfoe.Inthisrespect,"agoodplanviolentlyexecutednowisbetterthanaperfectplanexecutednextweek."9
MissiontacticsHavingdescribedtheobjectandmeansofmaneuverwarfareanditsphilosophyofcommand,wewillnextdiscusshowweputmaneuverwarfareintopractice.Firstisthroughtheuseofmissiontactics.Missiontacticsarejustasthenameimplies:thetacticofassigningasubordinatemissionwith-outspecifyinghowthemissionmustbeaccomplished.10Weleavethemannerofaccomplishingthemissiontothesubordinate,therebyallowinghimthefreedom—andestab-lishingtheduty—totakewhateverstepshedeemsnecessarybasedonthesituation.Theseniorprescribesthemethod70


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ofexecutiononlytothedegreethatisessentialforcoordi-nation.Itisthisfreedomforinitiativethatpermitsthehightempoofoperationsthatwedesire.Uninhibitedbyrestric-tionsfromabove,thesubordinatecanadapthisactionstothechangingsituation.Heinformshiscommanderwhathehasdone,buthedoesnotwaitforpermission.
Itisobviousthatwecannotallowdecentralizedinitia-tivewithoutsomemeansofprovidingunity,orfocus,tothevariousefforts.Todosowouldbetodissipateourstrength.Weseekunity,notthroughimposedcontrol,butthroughharmoniousinitiativeandlateralcoordination.
COMMANDER'SINTENTWeachievethisharmoniousinitiativeinlargepartthroughtheuseofthecommander'sintent.Therearetwopartstoamission:thetasktobeaccomplishedandthereason,orintent.x'Thetaskdescribestheactiontobetakenwhiletheintentdescribesthedesiredresultoftheaction.Ofthetwo,theintentispredominant.Whileasituationmaychange,makingthetaskobsolete,theintentismorepermanentandcontinuestoguideouractions.Understandingourcom-mander'sintentallowsustoexerciseinitiativeinharmonywiththecommander'sdesires.71


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Inordertomaintainourfocusontheenemy,weshouldtrytoexpressintentintermsoftheenemy.Theintentshouldanswerthequestion:WhatdoIwanttodototheenemy?Thismaynotbepossibleinallcases,butitistrueinthevastmajority.Theintentshouldconveythecommander'svision.Itisnotsatisfactoryfortheintenttobe"todefeattheenemy."Towinisalwaysourultimategoal,soanintentlikethisconveysnothing.Fromthisdiscussion,itisobviousthataclearexplana-tionandunderstandingofintentisabsolutelyessentialtounityofeffort.Itshouldbeapartofanymission.Theburdenofunderstandingfallsonseniorandsubordinatealike.Theseniormustmakeperfectlycleartheresultheexpects,butinsuchawaythatdoesnotinhibitinitiative.Subordinatesmusthaveaclearunderstandingofwhattheircommanderisthinking.Further,theyshouldunderstandtheintentofthecommandertwolevelsup.Inotherwords,aplatooncommandershouldknowtheintentofhisbattal-ioncommander,orabattalioncommandertheintentofhisdivisioncommander.
FOCUSOFEFFORTAnothertoolforprovidingunityisthroughthefocusofeffort.Ofalltheeffortsgoingonwithinourcommand,werecognizethefocusofeffortasthemostcriticaltosuccess.72


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Allothereffortsmustsupportit.Ineffect,wehavedecided:ThisishowIwillachieveadecision;everythingelseissecondary.Wecannottakelightlythedecisionofwhereandwhentofocusourefforts.Sincethefocusofeffortrepresentsourbidforvictory,wemustdirectitatthatobjectwhichwillcausethemostdecisivedamagetotheenemyandwhichholdsthebestopportunityofsuccess.Itinvolvesaphysicalandmoralcommitment,althoughnotanirretrievableone.Itforcesustoconcentratedecisivecombatpowerjustasitforcesustoacceptrisk.Thus,wefocusoureffortagainstcriticalenemyvulnerability,exercisingstricteconomyelsewhere.Normally,wedesignatethefocusofeffortbyassigningoneunitresponsibilityforaccomplishingthateffort.Thatunitbecomestherepresentationofthefocusofeffort.Itbecomescleartoallotherunitsinthecommandthattheymustsupportthatunitinitsefforts.Likethecommander'sintent,thefocusofeffortbecomesaharmonizingforce.Facedwithadecision,weaskourselves:"HowcanIbestsupportthefocusofeffort?"Eachcommandershouldestablishafocusofeffortforeachmission.Asthesituationchanges,thecommandermayshiftthefocusofeffort,redirectingtheweightofhiscombatpowerinthedirectionthatoffersthegreatestsuccess.Inthiswayheexploitssuccess;hedoesnotreinforcefailure.73


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SurfacesandgapsPutsimply,surfacesarehardspots—enemystrengths—andgapsaresoftspots—enemyweaknesses.Weavoidenemystrengthandfocusoureffortsagainstenemyweakness,sincepittingstrengthagainstweaknessreducescasualtiesandismorelikelytoyielddecisiveresults.Wheneverpossible,weexploitexistinggaps.Failingthat,wecreategaps.Gapsmayinfactbephysicalgapsintheenemy'sdispo-sitions,buttheymayalsobeanyweaknessintimeorspace:amomentintimewhentheenemyisoverexposedandvul-nerable,aseaminanairdefenseumbrella,aninfantryunitcaughtunpreparedinopenterrain,oraboundarybetweentwounits.Similarly,asurfacemaybeanactualstrongpoint,oritmaybeanyenemystrength:amomentwhentheenemyhasjustreplenishedandconsolidatedhispositionoranintegratedairdefensesystem.Anappreciationforsurfacesandgapsrequiresacertainamountofjudgment.Whatisasurfaceinonecasemaybeagapinanother.Forexample,aforestwhichisasurfacetoanarmoredunitbecauseitrestrictsvehiclemovementcanbeagaptoaninfantryunitwhichcaninfiltratethroughit.Furthermore,wecanexpecttheenemytodisguisehisdis-positionsinordertolureusagainstasurfacethatappearstobeagap.12
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Duetothefluidnatureofwar,gapswillrarelybeper-manentandwillusuallybefleeting.Toexploitthemdemandsflexibilityandspeed.Wemustactivelyseekoutgapsbycon-tinuousandaggressivereconnaissance.Oncewelocatethem,wemustexploitthembyfunnelingourforcesthroughrapidly.Forexample,ifourfocusofefforthasstruckasur-facebutanotherunithaslocatedagap,weshiftthefocusofefforttothesecondunitandredirectourcombatpowerinsupportofit.Inthismannerwe"pull"combatpowerthroughgapsfromthefrontratherthan"pushing"itthroughfromtherear.13Commandersmustrelyontheinitiativeofsubordinatestolocatethegapsandmusthavetheflexi-bilitytorespondquicklytoopportunitiesratherthanfollowingpredeterminedschemes.
CombinedarmsInordertomaximizecombatpower,wemustusealltheavailableresourcestobestadvantage.Todoso,wemustfollowadoctrineofcombinedarms.Combinedarmsisthefullintegrationofarmsinsuchawaythatinordertocoun-teractone,theenemymustmakehimselfmorevulnerabletoanother.Weposetheenemynotjustwithaproblem,butwithadilemma—ano-winsituation.
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Weaccomplishcombinedarmsthroughthetacticsandtechniquesweuseatthelowerlevelsandthroughtaskorga-nizationathigherlevels.Insodoing,wetakeadvantageofthecomplementarycharacteristicsofdifferenttypesofunitsandenhanceourmobilityandfirepower.Weuseeacharmformissionsthatnootherarmcanperformaswell;forexample,weassignaviationataskthatcannotbeper-formedequallywellbyartillery.Anexampleoftheconceptofcombinedarmsattheverylowestlevelisthecomplementaryuseoftheautomaticweaponandgrenadelauncherwithinafireteam.Wepinanenemydownwiththehigh-volume,directfireoftheautomaticweapon,makinghimavulnerabletargetforthegrenadelauncher.Ifhemovestoescapetheimpactofthegrenades,weengagehimwiththeautomaticweapon.WecanexpandtheexampletotheMAGTFlevel:Weuseassaultsupporttoquicklyconcentratesuperiorgroundforcesforabreakthrough.Weuseartilleryandcloseairsupporttosupporttheinfantrypenetration,andweusedeepairsup-porttointerdictenemyreinforcements.Targetswhichcannotbeeffectivelysuppressedbyartilleryareengagedbycloseairsupport.Inordertodefendagainsttheinfantryattack,theenemymustmakehimselfvulnerabletothesup-portingarms.Ifheseekscoverfromthesupportingarms,ourinfantrycanmaneuveragainsthim.Inordertoblockourpenetration,theenemymustreinforcequicklywithhisreserve.Butinordertoavoidourdeepairsupport,hemuststayofftheroads,whichmeanshecanonlymoveslowly.Ifhemovesslowly,hecannotreinforceintimetopreventourbreakthrough.Wehaveputhiminadilemma.76


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FMFM1 TheConductofWarConclusionWehavediscussedtheaimandcharacteristicsofmaneuverwarfare.Wehavediscussedthephilosophyofcommandnecessarytosupportthisstyleofwarfare.Andwehavedis-cussedsomeofthetacticsofmaneuverwarfare.Bythistimeitshouldbeclearthatmaneuverwarfareexistsnotsomuchinthespecificmethodsused—weeschewformulas—butinthemindoftheMarine.Inthisregard,maneuverwarfare—likecombinedarms—appliesequallytotheMarineexpedi-tionaryforcecommanderandthefireteamleader.Itappliesregardlessofthenatureoftheconflict,whetheramphibi-ousoperationsorsustainedoperationsashore,ofloworhighintensity,againstguerrillaormechanizedfoe,indesertorjungle.Maneuverwarfareisawayofthinkinginandaboutwarthatshouldshapeoureveryaction.Itisastateofmindbornofaboldwill,intellect,initiative,andruthlessopportunism.Itisastateofmindbentonshatteringtheenemymorallyandphysicallybyparalyzingandconfoundinghim,byavoidinghisstrength,byquicklyandaggressivelyexploit-inghisvulnerabilities,andbystrikinghiminthewaythatwillhurthimmost.Inshort,maneuverwarfareisaphilosophyforgeneratingthegreatestdecisiveeffectagainsttheenemyattheleastpossiblecosttoourselves—aphilosophyfor"fightingsmart."
77


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FMFM1 Notes
TheNatureofWar
1.CarlvonClausewitz,OnWar,trans,anded.M.HowardandP.Paret(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1984)p.119.2.B.H.LiddellHart,asquotedinEncyclopediaBritannica,1929.3.A.A.Vandegrift,"BattleDoctrineforFrontLineLeaders,"(ThirdMarineDivision,1944)p.7.4.Forthedefinitivetreatmentofthenatureandtheoryofwar,seetheunfinishedclassic,OnWar,byClausewitz.AllMarineofficersshouldconsiderthisbookessentialreading.ReadthePrincetonUniversityPressedition,thebestEnglishtranslationavailable.ThisversionalsoincludesseveralvaluableessaysonthebookandauthorandausefulguidetoreadingOnWar.5.Inthestrictlegalsense,theUnitedStatesentersastateofwaronlybyformaldeclarationofCongress,whichpossessesthesoleconstitutionalpowertodoso.TheUnitedStateshasdeclaredwaronfiveoccasions:withBritain(1812);withMexico(1846);withSpain(1898);withGermanyandAustria-Hungary(1917);andwithJapan,Germany,Italy,Bulgaria,Hungary,andRuma-nia(1941-2).APresident,ascommanderinchief,maycommitU.S.Forcestomilitaryactionwithoutadeclarationofwarwhenthecircumstancesdonotwarrantorpermittimeforsuchadecla-ration.Militarilytherewillbelittleifanydistinctionbetweenwarandmilitaryactionshortofwar.Withinthiscontext,thisbookwillfocusonthemilitaryaspectsofwar,andthetermwarasdis-cussedherewillapplytothatstateofhostilitiesbetweenoramongnationsregardlessoftheexistenceofadeclarationofwar.79


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WarfightingFMFM1
6.Clausewitz,OnWar,p.121.7.Forafirst-handdescriptionofhumanexperienceandreac-tioninwar,readGuySajer'sTheForgottenSoldier(Annapolis,MD:NauticalandAviationPublishingCo.,1988),apowerfulaccountoftheauthor'sexperienceasaGermaninfantrymanontheeasternfrontduringtheSecondWorldWarandultimatelyatributetothesupremacyofthehumanwill.8.Clausewitz:"Kind-heartedpeoplemight,ofcourse,thinktherewassomeingeniouswaytodisarmordefeatanenemywith-outtoomuchbloodshed,andmightimaginethisisthetruegoaloftheartofwar.Pleasantasitsounds,itisafallacythatmustbeexposed:warissuchadangerousbusinessthatthemistakeswhichcomefromkindnessaretheveryworst..."Thisishowthemattermustbeseen.Itwouldbefutile—evenwrong—totrytoshutone'seyestowhatwarreallyisfromsheerdistressatitsbrutality."OnWar,pp.75-76.9.Foraninsightfulstudyofthereactionofmentocombat,seeS.L.A.Marshall'sMenAgainstFire(NewYork:WilliamMorrowandCo.,1961).10.TheAmericanHeritageDictionary,(NewYork:DellPublishingCo.,1983).
11
.
Inhisoften-quotedmaxim,Napoleonassignedanactualratio:"Inwar,themoralistothematerialasthreetoone."


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FMFM1 Notes
TheTheoryOfWar
1.Clausewitz,OnWar,p.872.SunTzu,TheArtOfWar,trans.S.B.Griffith(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1982)p.85.LikeOnWar,TheArtofWarshouldbeoneveryMarineofficer'slistofessentialreading.Shortandsimpletoread,TheArtofWariseverybitasvaluabletodayaswhenitwaswrittenabout400B.C.3.WinstonS.Churchill,TheWorldCrisis(NewYork:CharlesScribner'sSons,1923)vol.II,p.5.Thepassagecontinues:"Nearlyallbattleswhichareregardedasmasterpiecesofthemilitaryart,fromwhichhavebeenderivedthefoundationofstatesandthefameofcommanders,havebeenbattlesofmanoeuvreinwhichtheenemyhasfoundhimselfdefeatedbysomenovelexpedientordevice,somequeer,swift,unexpectedthrustorstratagem.Inmanybattlesthelossesofthevictorshavebeensmall.Thereisrequiredforthecompositionofagreatcommandernotonlymas-sivecommonsenseandreasoningpower,notonlyimagination,butalsoanelementoflegerdemain,anoriginalandsinistertouch,whichleavestheenemypuzzledaswellasbeaten.Itisbecausemilitaryleadersarecreditedwithgiftsofthisorderwhichenablethemtoensurevictoryandsaveslaughterthattheirprofessionisheldinsuchhighhonour..."Therearemanykindsofmanoeuvreinwar,someonlyofwhichtakeplaceuponthebattlefield.Therearemanouevresfartotheflankorrear.Therearemanoeuvresintime,indiplomacy,inmechanics,inpsychology;allofwhichareremovedfromthebattlefield,butreactoftendecisivelyuponit,andtheobjectofallistofindeasierways,otherthansheerslaughter,ofachievingthemainpurpose."81


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WarfightingFMFM1
4.Clausewitz,OnWar,p.87.Wepreferthephrasewithmili-taryforceratherthanbymilitaryforceastranslatedsincemilitaryforcedoesnotreplacetheotherelementsofnationalpower,butsupplementsthem.5.Ibid.,pp.87-88.6.Clausewitz,OnWar,p.77.7.TheNationalSecurityStrategyoftheUnitedStates(Washing-ton:TheWhiteHouse,1988),pp.7-8,liststheelementsofnationalpowerasmoralandeconomicexample,militarystrength,eco-nomicvitality,alliancerelationships,publicdiplomacy,securityassistance,developmentassistance,scienceandtechnologycooper-ation,internationalorganizations,anddiplomaticmediation.8.Alsoreferredtoasgrandstrategyorthepolicylevel.FromJCSPub.1-02:"NationalStrategy-fDOAIADB)Theartandscienceofdevelopingandusingthepolitical,economic,andpsy-chologicalpowersofanation,togetherwithitsarmedforces,duringpeaceandwar,tosecurenationalobjectives."9.JCSPub.1-02:"MilitaryStrategy-tf)OAIADB)Theartandscienceofemployingthearmedforcesofanationtosecuretheobjectivesofnationalpolicybytheapplicationofforceorthethreatofforce."10.JCSPub.1-02:"TacticalLevelofWar-(DOD)Thelevelofwaratwhichbattlesandengagementsareplannedandexecutedtoaccomplishmilitaryobjectivesassignedtotacticalunitsortaskforces.Activitiesatthislevelfocusontheorderedarrangementandmaneuverofcombatelementsinrelationtoeachotherandtotheenemytoachievecombatobjectives."82


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FMFM1 Notes
11
.
JCSPub.1-02:"OperationalLevelofWar-(DOD)Thelevelofwaratwhichcampaignsandmajoroperationsareplanned,conducted,andsustainedtoaccomplishstrategicobjectiveswithintheatersorareasofoperations.Activitiesatthislevellinktacticsandstrategybyestablishingoperationalobjectivesneededtoaccomplishthestrategicobjectives,sequencingeventstoachievetheoperationalobjectives,initiatingactions,andapplyingresourcestobringaboutandsustaintheseevents.Theseactivi-tiesimplyabroaderdimensionoftimeorspacethandotactics;theyensurethelogisticandadministrativesupportoftacticalforces,andprovidethemeansbywhichtacticalsuccessesareexploitedtoachievestrategicobjectives."12.Clausewitz,OnWar,pp.84,357-359.13.Ibid.,p.357.14.Clausewitzargued(p.524)thatwhiletheoffenseisanintegralcomponentoftheconceptofdefense,theoffenseiscon-ceptuallycompleteinitself.Theintroductionofthedefenseintotheconceptoftheoffense,heargued,isanecessaryevilandnotanintegralcomponent.15.Clausewitz,OnWar,p.528.16.TheUnitedStatesArmyhasalsoadoptedadoctrinebasedonmaneuver,called"AirLandBattle."TheprincipaldoctrinalsourceisFieldManual100-5,Operations(1986).17.JCSPub.1-02:"CombatPower-fDOANATO)Thetotalmeansofdestructiveand/ordisruptiveforcewhichamilitaryunit/formationcanapplyagainsttheopponentatagiventime."83


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WarflghtingFMFM1
18.Clausewitz,OnWar,p.194.19.Ibid.,p.617.20.Tempoisoftenassociatedwithamentalprocessknownvariouslyasthe"DecisionCycle,""OODALoop,"or"BoydCycle,"afterretiredAirForceColonelJohnBoydwhopioneeredtheconceptinhislecture,"ThePatternsofConflict."Boydidentifiedafour-stepmentalprocess:observation,orientation,decision,andaction.Boydtheorizedthateachpartytoaconflictfirstobservesthesituation.Onthebasisoftheobservation,heorients;thatis,hemakesanestimateofthesituation.Onthebasisoftheorientation,hemakesadecision.And,finally,heimple-mentsthedecision—heacts.Becausehisactionhascreatedanewsituation,theprocessbeginsanew.Boydarguedthatthepartythatconsistentlycompletesthecyclefastergainsanadvantagethatincreaseswitheachcycle.Hisenemy'sreactionsbecomeincreas-inglyslowerbycomparisonandthereforelesseffectiveuntil,finally,heisovercomebyevents.21
.
Frombasicphysics,momentumistheproductofmassandvelocity:M=mv.22.Clausewitz,OnWar,p.198.23.EdwardN.Luttwak,Strategy:TheLogicofWarandPeace(Cambridge,MA:BelknapPressofHarvardUniversityPress,1987)p.8.24.Luttwak,Strategy:TheLogicofWarandPeace,pp.8-10.25.Clausewitz,OnWar,p.190.26.Ibid.84


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FMFM1 Notes
27.Weshouldnotethatthisconceptismeaninglessinattri-tionwarfareinitspurestform,sincetheidentificationofcriticalvulnerabilitybydefinitionisbasedonselectivity,whichisafor-eignthoughttotheattritionist.Inwarfarebyattrition,anytargetisasgoodasanyotheraslongasitcontributestothecumulativedestructionoftheenemy.28.Sometimesknownasthecenterofgravity.However,thereisadangerinusingthisterm.Introducingthetermintothetheoryofwar,Clausewitzwrote(p.485):"Acenterofgravityisalwaysfoundwherethemassisconcentratedthemostdensely.Itpresentsthemosteffectivetargetforablow;furthermore,theheaviestblowisthatstruckbythecenterofgravity."Clearly,Clausewitzwasadvocatingaclimactictestofstrengthagainststrength"bydaringalltowinall"(p.596).ThisapproachisconsistentwithClausewitz*historicalperspective.Butwehavesincecometopreferpittingstrengthagainstweakness.Applyingthetermtomodernwarfare,wemustmakeitclearthatbytheenemy'scenterofgravitywedonotmeanasourceofstrength,butratheracriticalvulnerability.
PreparingforWar
1.HansvonSeekt,ThoughtsofaSoldier,trans.G.Water-house(London:ErnestBennLtd.,1930)p.123.2.ErwinRommel,TheRommelPapers,ed.B.H.LiddellHart,trans.P.Findlay(NewYork:DaCapoPress,Inc.,1985)p.226.3.GeorgeS.Patton,Jr.,CavalryJournal,April1922,p.167.85


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WarflghtingFMFM1
4.JCSPub.1-02:"CampaignPlan-tfX)Z),IADB)Aplanforaseriesofrelatedmilitaryoperationsaimedtoaccomplishacommonobjective,normallywithinagiventimeandspace."Asdenned,acampaignplanpertainstomilitaryoperations,butthethoughtappliesequallytopreparations.5.JCSPub.1-02:"Doctrine-fDOAIADB)Fundamentalprin-ciplesbywhichthemilitaryforcesorelementsthereofguidetheiractionsinsupportofnationalobjectives.Itisauthoritativebutrequiresjudgmentinapplication."6.FieldManual100-5,TentativeFieldServiceRegulations(Washington:GovernmentPrintingOffice,1939)p.31.7.Clausewitz:"Inacommanderaboldactmayprovetobeablunder.Neverthelessitisalaudableerror,nottoberegardedonthesamefootingasothers.Happythearmywhereill-timedboldnessoccursfrequently;itisaluxuriantweed,butindicatestherichnessofthesoil.Evenfoolhardiness—thatis,boldnesswith-outobject—isnottobedespised:basicallyitstemsfromdaring,whichinthiscasehaseruptedwithapassionunrestrainedbythought.Onlywhenboldnessrebelsagainstobedience,whenitdefiantlyignoresanexpressedcommand,mustitbetreatedasadangerousoffense;thenitmustbeprevented,notforitsinnatequalities,butbecauseanorderhasbeendisobeyed,andinwarobedienceisofcardinalimportance."OnWar,pp.190-191.
TheConductofWar
1.SunTzu,TheArtofWar,p.101.2.Ibid.,p.134.


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FMFM1 Notes
3.SirWilliamSlim,DefeatintoVictory(London:CassellandCo.Ltd.,1956)pp.550-551.4.JCSPub.1-02:"Maneuver-(DOD,NATO)...4.Employ-mentofforcesonthebattlefieldthroughmovementincombina-tionwithfire,orfirepotential,toachieveapositionofadvantageinrespecttotheenemyinordertoaccomplishthemission."5.Boydintroducestheideaofimplicitcommunicationasacommandtoolinhislecture,"AnOrganicDesignforCommandandControl."6.Hencethetermsareaofinfluenceandareaofinterest.JCSPub.1-02:"AreaofInfluence-(DOD,NATO)Ageographicalareawhereinacommanderisdirectlycapableofinfluencingoperations,bymaneuverorfiresupportsystemsnormallyunderhiscommandorcontrol.""AreaofInterest-(DOD,NATO,IADB)Thatareaofconcerntothecommander,includingtheareaofinfluence,areasadjacentthereto,andextendingintoenemyter-ritorytotheobjectivesofcurrentorplannedoperations.Thisareaalsoincludesareasoccupiedbyenemyforceswhocouldjeopardizetheaccomplishmentofthemission."7.MuchofthematerialinthissectionisadaptedfromJohnF.Schmitt'sarticle,"ObservationsonDecisionmakinginBattle,"MarineCorpsGazette,March1988,pp.18-20.8.NapoleonBonaparte,"MaximsofWar,"NapoleonandModernWar;HisMilitaryMaxims,annotatedC.H.Lanza(Harrisonburg,PA:MilitaryServicePublishingCo.,1953)p.19.
87


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9.GeorgeS.Patton,Jr.,WarAsIKnewIt(NewYork:HoughtonMifflin,1979)p.354.10.JCSPub.1-02:"MissionTypeOrder-(DOD,IADB)...2.Ordertoaunittoperformamissionwithoutspecifyinghowitistobeaccomplished."11.JCSPub.1-02:"Mission-(DOD,IADB)1.Thetask,togetherwiththepurpose,whichclearlyindicatestheactiontobetakenandthereasontherefor."12.ThewellknownSovietfire-sackdefense,forexample.13.Hencethetermsreconnaissancepullandcommandpushrespectively.SeeWilliamS.Lind'sManeuverWarfareHandbook(Boulder,CO:WestviewPress,1985)pp.18-19.U.S.GOVERNMENTPRINTINGOFFICE:1991-338-046
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