--- Page 1 --- Tactics MCDP 1-3 U.S. Marine Corps PCN 142 000002 00 SEMPER FIDELIS --- Page 2 --- DEPARTMENT OF THE NA VY Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, D.C. 20350-3000 4 April 2018 CHANGE 1 to MCDP 1-3 Tactics 1. This publication has been edited to ensure gender neutrality of all applicable and appropriate terms, except those terms governed by higher authority. No other content has been affected. 2. File this transmittal sheet in the front of this publication. Reviewed and approved this date. --- Page 3 --- BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS ROBERT S. WALSH Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration Publication Control Numbers: Publication: 142 000002 00 Change: 142 000002 01 --- Page 4 --- DEPARTMENT OF THE NA VY Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, D.C. 20350-1775 30 July 1997 FOREWORD This publication is about winning in combat. Winning requires many things: excellence in techniques, an appreciation of the enemy, exemplary leadership, ba ttlefield judgment, and focused combat power. Yet these factors by themselves do not ensure suc- cess in battle. Many armies, both winners and losers, have pos- sessed many or all of these attributes. When we examine closely the differences between victor and vanquished, we draw one con- clusion. Success went to the armies whose leaders, senior and junior, could best focus their efforts—their skills and their resources—toward a decisive end. Their success arose not merely from excellence in techniques, procedures, and material but fro m their leaders’ abilities to uniquely and effectively combine th em. Winning in combat depends upon tactical leaders who can think creatively and act decisively. This book pertains equally to all Marine leaders, whether their duties entail combat service support, combat support, or combat arms. It applies to the Marine air-ground task force commander as well as the squadron commander and the fire team leader. All --- Page 5 --- Marines face tactical decisions in battle regardless of their r oles. Tactical leaders must develop and hone their warfighting skills through study and practice. This publication serves as a guide for that professional development. It addresses the theory of tacti cs and its application in a chaotic and uncertain environment. The concepts and ideas within t his publication are battle teste d. Throughout our history, one of the most important reasons for the success of the United States Mar ine Corps has been the military skill of our leaders at every level of command. Through their tac- tical skill and battlefield judg ment, our commanders achieved tactical and operational advantage at the decisive time and place. This publication is a revision of Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-3 , Tac tic s, of 1991 and supersedes it. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publi- cation (MCDP) 1-3 fully retains the spirit, scope, and basic co n- cepts of its predecessor. MCDP 1-3 further develops and refines some of those concepts; in par ticular, a new chapter has been added on exploiting success and finishing, and some of the origi- nal material has been reorganized and expanded. Tac tic s is in consonance with MCDP 1, W arfighting, and the other Marine warfighting publications. Presuming an understand- ing of maneuver warfare, MCDP 1-3 applies it specifically to th e tactical level of war. Like MCDP 1, it is not prescriptive but descriptive, providing guidance in the form of concepts and ideas. --- Page 6 --- This publication establishes the Marine Corps’ philosophy for waging and winning battles. C. C. KRULAK General, U.S. Marine Corps Commandant of the Marine Corps DISTRIBUTION: 142 000002 00 © 1997 United States Government as represented by the Secretary of the Navy. All rights reserved. --- Page 8 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics Chapter 1. Understanding Tactics An Art and A Science—The Environment—How We View Combat and How We Fight—Marine Corps Tactics—Conclusion Chapter 2. Achieving a Decision Anzio: A Model of Tactical Indecisiveness—Cannae: A Clear Tactical Decision Achieved—Understanding Decisiveness— Military Judgment– Understanding the Situation–Acting Decisively— Conclusion Chapter 3. Gaining Advantage Combined Arms—Maneuver—Exploiting the Environment– Terrain–Weather–Periods of Darkness or Reduced Visibility— Complementary Forces—Surprise—Trapping the Enemy— Developing an Ambush Mentality—Asymmetry—Conclusion Chapter 4. Being Faster Speed in Combat—What is Speed?—Speed and Time—Timing— Relative Speed—Continuing Speed—Speed and Change— Becoming Faster—Conclusion --- Page 9 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics Chapter 5. Adapting Anticipation—Improvisation—Flexible Plans— Decentralization—Conclusion Chapter 6. Cooperating Control in Combat—Cooperation—Discipline—Conclusion Chapter 7. Exploiting Success and Finishing Building on Advantage—Consolidation, Exploitation, and Pursuit—Finishing the Enemy—Use of the Reserve in Combat—Conclusion Chapter 8. Making it Happen Doctrine—Education—Training—Training and Educational Methods–Professional Reading and Historical Study–Tactical Exercises– Wargaming– Terrain Walks–Competition–Critiques—Conclusion Notes --- Page 10 --- Chapter 1 Understanding Tactics “In tactics, the most importan t thing is not whether you go left or right, but why you go left or right.”1 —A. M. Gray “There is only one principle of war and that’s this. Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts him the most, when he ain’t looking.”2 —Sir William Slim --- Page 12 --- Understanding Tactics 1-3 This book is about winning in combat. Winning requires a thor- ough understanding and knowledge of tactics. But what is tactics? AN ART AND A SCIENCE Tactics is “the art and science of winning engagements and bat- tles. It includes the use of firepower and maneuver, the integr a- tion of different arms and the im mediate exploitation of succes s to defeat the enemy,”3 as well as the sustainment of forces during combat. It also “includes the technical application of combat power, which consists of those techniques and procedures for accomplishing specific tasks within a tactical action.” 4 T h i s description is from Marine Corps doctrine and reflects our approach to tactics. What does it tell us? Tactics refers to the concepts and methods we use to accomplish a particular objective in either combat or military operations ot her than war. In war, tactics is the application of combat power to defeat the enemy in engagements and battles. Combat power is the total destructive force we can bring to bear against the enemy; it is a unique product of a variety of physical, moral, and men tal factors. 5 Tactics results in the actions and counteractions between opposing forces. It includes the use of maneuver, supported by the application and c oordination of fires, to gain advantage in order to defeat the enemy. In m ilitary operations other than wa r, --- Page 13 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 1-4 tactics may be the schemes and methods by which we perform other missions, such as to control a crowd or to provide a secu re environment for the delivery of f ood, medicine, or supplies to a nation or people in need. As stated in the definition, tactics is a combination of art and sci- ence to gain victory over the enemy. The art of tactics lies in how we creatively form and apply military force in a given situation. It involves the creation, positioni ng, and maneuver of combat power. When do we flank the enemy, and when do we ambush? When do we attack, and when d o we infiltrate? How do we use speed and momentum to achieve a decisive advantage? This cre- ativity is a developed capacity, acquired through education, prac- tice, and experience. The science of tactics lies in t he technical application of com bat power. It includes mastering the techniques and procedures that contribute to the developmen t of warfighting skills such as marksmanship, navigation, gunnery, and close air support. The execution of these techniques and procedures must become sec- ond nature for us; this requires intensive and continuous train ing. Without mastery of basic warfighting skills, artistry and creativity in their application are impossible. Now that we have examined the art and science of tactics, let u s look at how we use tactics to complement strategy and cam- paigning. Strategy and campaigning bring our forces to a particu- lar place at a particular time. We use tactics to win in combat . A war typically involves many individual engagements that form a continuous fabric of activity. Sometimes a cluster of engagements --- Page 14 --- Understanding Tactics 1-5 flows together to make up a battle that may last for hours, days, or even several weeks. Tactical competence is indispensable to vic - tory in such engagements and battles. Leaders at the operationa l and strategic levels use tactical victories to bring about success in the campaign and, ultimately, in the war as a whole. In combat, our objective is victory. Sometimes this involves th e complete destruction of the enemy’s forces; at other times achiev- ing victory may be possible by attacking the enemy’s will to fight. The Marine Corps must be equally prepared to win during both situations—those in which the enemy forces must be com- pletely destroyed (as during World War II), and those in which the complete destruction of the enemy’s forces may not be neces- sary or even desirable. As the Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division in Desert Storm, stated, “Our focus was not on destroying everything. Our focus was on the Iraqi mind and get- ting behind [it].” 6 The 1st Marine Division Commanding General knew that the path to victory did not lie in the total destruct ion of the Iraqi forces, but in undermining their will to fight. THE ENVIRONMENT The tactical arena is a dynamic, ever-changing environment. The complexity of this environment makes combat chaotic and unpre- dictable. As an example of confusion and chaos on the battlefield, consider the amphibious assault on the island of Tarawa in November 1943. --- Page 15 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 1-6 During the assault, the combinatio n of high casualties, lack of effective communications, and disruption of the 2d and 8th Marine Regiments’ landings on the assault beaches led to a cha- otic and nearly disastrous situation for the 2d Marine Division . Units were decimated under heavy fire. Surviving Marines hud- dled together under a coconut log sea wall in intermingled unit s without effective communications . Landing craft carrying rein- forcements and supplies could not make it over a coral reef to the landing beaches. Only through da ring leadership, initiative, an d teamwork were Marines able to ge t off the beach and annihilate the defending Japanese force. 7 The violence of combat only inc reases the level of confusion and chaos. Robert Sherrod, a Time a n d Life correspondent at Iwo Jima, gave testimony to this chaos in what he called “war a t its worst”: The first night on Iwo Jima can only be described as a nightmare in hell. . . . About the beach in the morning lay the dead. The y h a d d i e d w i t h t h e g r e a t e s t p o s sible violence. Nowhere in the Pacific have I seen such badly mangled bodies. Many were cut squarely in half. Legs and arms lay fifty feet from any body.8 Battle is the collision of opposin g forces—animate, interactive , and unpredictable in behavior. P erformance varies from week to week, day to day, and even hour to hour as a unit interacts with its environment and the enemy. Military forces are complex systems consisting of individuals and equipment. They interact interna lly and externally in seemingly --- Page 16 --- Understanding Tactics 1-7 chaotic ways. As Clausewitz wrote, “A battalion is made up of individuals, the least important of whom may chance to delay things or . . . make them go wrong.”9 As Marines, we believe the a c t i o n s o f s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l s c a n h a v e g r e a t i m p a c t i n c o m b a t and can also make things go right. For example, Sergeant John Basilone as a machine gunner a t Guadalcanal contributed “in large measure to the virtual annihilation of a Japanese regi- ment.”10 He steadfastly manned his position in the face of repeated wave-type assaults and was instrumental in breaking the enemy’s ability to press the attack, forcing them to retrea t without achieving their goals. Battle is also influenced by a variety of external conditions— directions and missions estab lished by authorities, terrain, weather, attitudes of the civilian populace—that often cannot b e foreseen. The outcome of combat can only be anticipated in terms of probabilities. Technology also affects the tactical environment—but not always as anticipated. Technology may reduce uncertainty, and it also may increase it. The Spartans, organized into phalanxes, attacked i n close formation, making it easy to see and control one’s forces . Today, tactical formations are less well-defined as distances between elements have increased, complicating command and control. Increased weapons letha lity, communications range, and tactical mobility cause us to disperse forces over greater distances. War is more fluid as a result of technology. While the machine gun bogged down warfare in World War I, tactical innovations like the tank, the airplane, and the aircraft carrier made warfare more rapid and free-flowing in World War II. --- Page 17 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 1-8 Future battle is likely to beco me even more chaotic. Although combat in Operation Desert Storm was between fairly well- defined forces in a well-defined space, the forces and operatin g areas in Vietnam, Somalia, and Grenada were far less well- defined. Enemy units were dispersed and often hidden within the civilian population, making them hard to detect and harder to tar- get. They converged at a time and place of their choosing. Futu re opponents may choose to fight in this manner to offset our over - whelming superiority in firepower. This chaotic environment also brings opportunity. Clausewitz wrote about combat, “No other human activity is so continuously . . . bound up with chance.” 11 The challenge is to recognize opportunity when it occurs in the midst of chaos and uncertaint y and to seize it to obtain a clear, unambiguous victory. When viewed through time, even the most chaotic of systems may reveal recurring patterns that m ay then be exploited. The exper i- enced tactician will look for these recurring patterns that can be exploited to advantage. HOW WE VIEW COMBAT AND HOW WE FIGHT How we view the combat environment in large part determines how we operate in it. There are two competing views of combat. Some see it in simple terms as if the battle and the environmen t represent a closed mechanical system. This “deterministic” view argues that combat is predictable. Among the advocates of this --- Page 18 --- Understanding Tactics 1-9 view are military theorists who s eek prescriptive rules for bat tle and analysts who predict battle outcomes based upon force ratios. The other view is that combat is chaotic and uncertain. In th is “probabilistic” view, battle is se en as a complex phenomenon in which participants interact with one another and respond and adapt to their environment. The probabilistic viewpoint sees com- bat as unpredictable. The distinctions between these two views of combat are important. They drive the choices commanders make in combat. The deterministic view of combat often leads to centralized con - trol. It can be a recipe for micromanagement stifling the initiative subordinates need to deal with c ombat’s inevitable uncertainties. Overly prescriptive orders and plans inhibit a unit’s ability t o cope with uncertainty and change. Eventually, the unit, inflexible and unable to adapt, may be overwhelmed by events. The probabilistic view of combat recognizes that the complexity and uncertainty of war leads to a more decentralized approach t o control. We place greater trust in subordinates to achieve a desired result. Through use of mission orders and commander’s intent, subordinates are able to handle unforeseen situations a nd exploit opportunities that arise. Marine Corps tactics are based on the probabilistic view of com - bat. We must be able to cope with uncertainty and operate in an ever-changing combat environment. We must be flexible and responsive to changes in the situation. There are no fixed rule s that can be applied automatically, and every situation is different. As one tactics manual put it more than half a century ago: “The --- Page 19 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 1-10 leader who frantically strives to remember what someone else did in some slightly similar situatio n has already set his feet on a well-traveled road to ruin.”12 Leaders must remember that there are no fixed rules and no pre- cise checklists, but there are bounds. That is why successful lead- ers study, train, and exercise their minds to improve tactical proficiency. We study examples of successes and failures not to emulate someone else’s scheme, but to increase our own tactical understanding and competence. MARINE CORPS TACTICS The successful execution of Marine Corps tactics hinges on the thoughtful application of a number of tactical concepts so as t o achieve success on the battlefield. Key among these concepts ar e achieving a decision, gaining advantage, being faster, adapting, cooperating, a n d exploiting success . Each of these concepts is discussed in detail later in this publication. Creative and practical employment of these ideas throughout the planning and execution of tactics leads to success. These concepts are not stand-alone ideas but are to be combined so as to achieve an effect that is greater than their separate sum. Part of the art and science of tac- tics lies in knowing where and w hen to apply these concepts and which combinations to use to achieve the desired effect. --- Page 20 --- Understanding Tactics 1-11 The number and definition of the se concepts are not fixed, and their order of presentation does not indicate their value. Mari nes may find in their studies new or slightly different ideas that may be just as important. These ideas are presented in this publication so that readers will think about how to achieve success on the bat- tlefield. These concepts help to provide a framework for develop- ing a tactical mindset that has long been a hallmark of Marine leaders, from corporal through general. CONCLUSION Tactical excellence is the hallmark of a Marine Corps leader. W e fight and win in combat through our mastery of both the art and the science of tactics. The art of tactics involves the creativ e and innovative use of maneuver warfare concepts, while the science of tactics requires skill in basic warfighting techniques and proce- dures. It is our responsibility a s Marine leaders to work conti nu- o u s l y t o d e v e l o p o u r o w n t a c t i c a l p r o f i c i e n c y a n d t h a t o f o u r Marines. Understanding the concepts presented in this publica- tion provides a foundation for that development. --- Page 22 --- Chapter 2 Achieving a Decision “It follows, then, that the le ader who would become a com- petent tactician must first close his mind to the alluring for- mulae that well-meaning people offer in the name of victory. To master his difficult art he must learn to cut to the heart of a situation, recognize its decisive elements and base his course of action on these.”1 —Infantry in Battle “We must be ruthlessly opport unistic, actively seeking out signs of weakness, against which we will direct all available combat power. And when the decisive opportunity arrives, we must exploit it fully and aggressively, committing every ounce of combat power we can muster and pushing our- selves to the limits of exhaustion.” 2 —FMFM 1, Warfighting --- Page 24 --- Achieving a Decision 2-3 Tactics is the employment of un its in combat. The objective of tactics is to achieve military s uccess through a decision in ba ttle. Using tactical actions to achiev e a decision is central to Mari ne Corps tactics. In the past, military forces have often won only incremental gains when they sought victory—takin g a hill here or a town there, pushing the front forward a few kilometers, or adding to the body count. Sometimes these incremental gains were the result of a competent enemy or the chaotic nature of war. Many times, how- ever, commanders sought incr emental gains as a means to achieve victory. This incrementalist view sees war as a slow, cumulative process and is best e xemplified by the grinding attr i- tion tactics seen on the Western Front in World War I. There th e opponents were more or less evenly matched, and their tactics r e s u l t e d i n i n d e c i s i v e a c t i o n . I n V i e t n a m , w h e r e t h e o p p o s i n g forces were quite dissimilar in their military capabilities, th e incremental approach led to the U.S.’s overreliance on firepowe r and body counts. This, in turn, led to the conduct of military oper- ations that were often irrelevant to the outcome of the war, ev en though a comparison of casualty ratios appeared favorable. Therefore, the Marine Corps has embraced a more flexible, imagi- native, and effective way to wage war: maneuver warfare. Marine success with this approach has been demonstrated in places like Grenada and the Persian Gulf. In contrast to tactics based on incre- mental attrition, tactics in maneuver warfare always aims at deci- sive action. --- Page 25 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 2-4 This does not mean, however, that combat should be viewed as a bloodless ballet of movement. Com bat, especially at the tactica l level of war, will be characterized by tough, brutal, and desperate engagements. We must remember that war is a violent clash of two opposing wills in which each side is trying to wrest advantage from the other. Our future enemies may not allow us to gain, maintain, or employ technological or numerical superiority. The future battl e may be bloody and tough, and that makes it vitally important that Marine leaders strive to develop tactical proficiency. What do we mean by achieving a decision? Take a moment to compare these two historical examples. ANZIO: A MODEL OF TACTICAL INDECISIVENESS In late 1943, the Allies were searching for a way to alleviate the stalemate in Italy. The campai gn had stalled around the Cassino front and resembled the trench warfare of World War I. In order to keep the pressure on the Germans, bypass the stubborn German defenses at Cassino, and capture Rome, a bold operation was envisioned. The U.S. Army’s 3d Division and the British Army’s 1st Division would make an amphi bious landing at Anzio, about 35 miles south of Rome. (See figure.) --- Page 26 --- Achieving a Decision 2-5 --- Page 27 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 2-6 The Allies achieved complete surprise by landing at Anzio on January 22, 1944. Under the command of the U.S. Army’s Major General Lucas, the Americans an d British quickly established a beachhead and rapidly advanced 3 miles inland by midmorning against light German resistance. With the majority of their for ces concentrated farther south aro und Cassino, the Germans could not possibly reinfor ce the Anzio beachhead until January 23d or 24th. If the Allies pressed their advantage, the road to Rome l ay virtually undefended. The seizure of Rome would have had the effect of isolating the German defenders in the south and firml y establishing Allied control over Italy. Yet General Lucas delayed. Concerned about being over- extended and wanting to build u p his logistics ashore, Lucas failed to press his initial advant age of surprise and allowed t he Germans to reinforce the Anzio area. Not until January 29th did Lucas feel strong enough to make an offensive bid, but by that time it was too late. The German s had arrived in force and had seized the dominating high ground in the beachhead area. Not only was the Allied offensive at Anzio stalled, but the Germans had seized the initiative and qui ckly threatened to drive the Americans and British back into the sea (see figure). --- Page 28 --- Achieving a Decision 2-7 --- Page 29 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 2-8 As a result, the Allies did not complete the reduction of the G er- man defenses in southern Italy and capture Rome until several months later. General Lucas lost a tremendous opportunity to exploit an initial success and gain a decisive result. 3 CANNAE: A CLEAR TACTICAL DECISION ACHIEVED On August 2, 216 B.C., the Carthaginian general Hannibal fought the Roman army under the command of Terentius Varro near the city of Cannae in southern Italy. Hannibal based his tactics on the specific characteristics of both forces and on the aggressive p er- sonality of the Roman commander. As dawn broke, Hannibal drew up his force of 50,000 veterans with his left flank anchored on the Aufidus river, secured from envelopment by the more numerous Romans. His center con- tained only a thin line of infan try. His main force was concen- trated on the flanks. His left and right wings each contained d eep phalanxes of heavy infantry. Ei ght thousand cavalry tied the le ft of his line to the river. Two th ousand cavalry protected his op en right flank. Eight thousand soldiers guarded the camp in the rear. Varro and more than 80,000 Romans accepted the challenge. See- ing the well-protected Carthagin ian flanks, Varro dismissed any attempt to envelop. He decided to crush his opponent by sheer weight of numbers. He placed 65,000 soldiers in his center; 2,400 --- Page 30 --- Achieving a Decision 2-9 cavalry on his right; and 4,800 cavalry on his left and sent 11,000 soldiers to attack the Carthaginian camp. Following preliminary skirmishes, Hannibal moved his light cen- ter line forward into a salient against the Roman center. (See A in figure on page 2-10.) Then, his heavy cavalry on the left crush ed the opposing Roman cavalry and swung completely around the Roman rear to attack the Roman cavalry on the other flank. The Roman cavalry fled the field. The Carthaginian heavy cavalry t hen turned back to assault the rear of the dense Roman infantry that had pressed back Hanni- bal’s thin center line. At the same time, Hannibal wheeled the right and left wings into the flanks of the Roman center. The Romans were boxed in, unable to maneuver or use their weapons effectively. (See B in figure on page 2-10.) Between 50,000 and 60,000 Romans died that day as Varro’s army was destroyed. UNDERSTANDING DECISIVENES What do these examples tell us about achieving a decision? First, achieving a decision is important. An indecisive battle w a s t e s t h e l i v e s o f t h o s e w h o f i g h t a n d d i e i n i t . I t w a s t e s t he efforts of those who survive as well. All the costs—the deaths, the wounds, the sweat and effort, the equipment destroyed or used up, the supplies expended—are suffered for little gain. Such --- Page 31 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 2-10 battles have no meaning except for the comparative losses and perhaps an incremental gain for one side or the other. --- Page 32 --- Achieving a Decision 2-11 Second, achieving a decision is not easy. History is littered with indecisive battles. Sometimes it was enemy skill and determina- tion that prevented even a victorious commander from achieving a decisive goal. In other cases, commanders fought a battle with- out envisioning a larger resu lt for their actions. Sometimes, e ven with a vision of making the ba ttle decisive, they could not achieve their goals due to the chaos and friction that is the n ature of war and makes decisive victory so difficult. That leads to the third lesson our examples point out. To be de ci- sive, a battle or an engagement must lead to a result beyond itself. Within a battle, an action that is decisive must lead directly to win- ning in the campaign or war as a whole. For the battle to be deci- sive, it must lead directly to a larger success in the war as a whole. On the other hand, we must not seek decisiveness for its own sake. W e do not, after all, seek a decision if it is likely to be against us. We seek to ensure—insofar as this is possible, given the inhere nt u n c e r t a i n t i e s o f w a r — t h a t t h e b a t t l e w i l l g o o u r w a y . W e h a v e stacked the deck in our favor before the cards are laid on the table. Otherwise, to seek decisive battle is an irresponsible gamble. When we seek battle, we must seek victory: accomplishment of the assigned mission that leads to further significant gains for the force as a whole. At Anzio, the Allied aim was to break the stalemate in the south, opening up a southern f ront that would force Germany to move additional forces from the defense of Normandy. This weakening of the Normandy defenses would support our planned invasion of France later that same year. At Cannae, Carthage won one round in its long contention with Rome for the domination of --- Page 33 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 2-12 the Mediterranean. These tactical battles were planned for thei r overall operational and strategi c effect. The consequences of a tactical engagement should lead to achieving operational and strategic goals. MILITARY JUDGMENT Once we understand what is meant by the term decisive and why it is important to seek a decision, a question naturally arises: How do we do it? There is no easy answer to that question; each battle will have its own unique answers. As with so much in warfare, it depends on the situation. No formula, process, acronym, or buzzword can provide the answer. Rather, the answer is in military judgment, in the ability of the commander to understand the battlefield and act decisively. Military judgment is a developed skill that is honed by the wisdom gained through experience. Combined with situa- tional awareness, military judgmen t allows us to identify emerg - ing patterns, discern critical vul nerabilities, and concentrate combat power. Understanding the Situation The first requirement of a commander is to understand the situation. The successful tactician studies the situation to develop a clear pic- ture of what is happening, how it got that way, and how it might fur- ther develop. Considering the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and --- Page 34 --- Achieving a Decision 2-13 weather, troops and support available-time available (METT-T), the commander must think through all actions, determine the desired result, and ascertain the means to achieve that result. Part of the commander’s thinking should also include assuming the role of the enemy, considering what the enemy’s best course of action may be, and deciding how to defeat it. Thinking through these elements helps the commander develop increased situational awareness. Based on this understanding of the situation, the commander can begin to form a mental image of how the battle might be fought. Central to the commander’s thi nking must be the question, “In this situation, what efforts w ill be decisive?” The commander asks this question not just onc e, but repeatedly as the battle pro- gresses. The commander must als o address possible outcomes and the new situations that will result from those possibilities. As the situation changes, so will the solution and the actions tha t derive from it. For every situation, the leader must decide which of the countless and often confusing pieces of in formation are important and reli- able. The leader must determine what the enemy is trying to do and how to counter the enemy’s efforts. The leader’s skill is essentially one of pattern recognition, the ability, after seeing only a few pieces of the puzzle, to fill in the rest of the picture correctly. Pat- tern recognition is the ability t o understand the true signific ance and dynamics of a situation with limited information. Pattern rec- ognition is a key skill for success on the battlefield. Tactics requires leaders to make decisions. A leader must make decisions in a constantly changing environment of friction, --- Page 35 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 2-14 uncertainty, and danger. Making e ffective decisions and acting on those decisions faster than the enemy is a crucial element o f Marine Corps tactics. Sometimes there may be time to analyze situations deliberately and to consider multiple options. Comparing several options and select- ing the best one is known as analytical decisionmaking. When time allows a commander to apply analytical decisionmaking—usually before an engagement or battle begins—the commander should make the most of it. Once engaged, however, the comm ander finds time is short and the need for speed paramount. In some cases, speeding up the analytical decisionmaking process may be sufficient; however, in most cases intuitive decisionmakin g is needed to generate and maintain tempo. Intuitive decisionmaking relies on a com- mander’s intuitive ability to reco gnize the key elements of a p ar- ticular problem and arrive at the proper decision without havin g to compare multiple options. In tuition is not some mysterious quality. Rather, it is a developed skill, firmly grounded in ex peri- ence, and one that can be further developed through education and practice. It is not without some risk, however, and leaders should use the decisionmaking style that works for them. Leaders with strong situational awareness and broad experience can act quickly because they hav e an intuitive understanding of the situation, know what needs to be done, and know what can be done. This insight has often been called coup d’oeil (pronounced koo dwee), a French term meaning literally “stroke of the eye.” It has also been called “tactical sense.” --- Page 36 --- Achieving a Decision 2-15 Union Army Brigadier General John Buford’s approach to the battle of Gettysburg offers a good example of understanding the battle so that it leads to a deci sion. Arriving at Gettysburg with a division of cavalry on the morning of June 30, 1863, Buford saw Confederate forces approachin g from the northwest. With the bulk of the Union forces still so me miles away, Buford was able to conceptualize the coming battle in his mind. From his position on a hill outside town, he could see that early seizure of the high ground west of Gettysburg was critical to giving the Army of th e Potomac time to mass its forces. O ccupation of this high ground would also preserve the tactical advantage of the high ground t o Buford’s rear for the Union Army once they arrived on the battle- field. Buford also knew that if the Confederates were allowed t o mass their forces first around the high ground to the south and west, Lee would have the advantage over the arriving Union forces. (See figure on page 2-16.) Quickly spreading out one brig ade west of town along McPher- son Ridge, General Buford settled in to defend Gettysburg until the arrival of Union reinforcements. On July 1st, the following day, he held his ground against a division of Confederate infantry supported by artillery until General John Reynolds’ Second Corps came up and reinforced the line. General Buford’s ability to foresee the coming battle, take quick action in the disposit ion of his forces, and hold the high ground until reinforced was one of the decisive actions that defeated the Army of Northern Virgini a at the battle of Gettysburg. 4 Buford’s actions at Gettysburg demonstrated an exceptional ability to grasp the essence of a t ac- tical situation through the skill s of pattern recognition and i ntui- tive decisionmaking. --- Page 37 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 2-16 --- Page 38 --- Achieving a Decision 2-17 Acting Decisively Our ability to understand the situation is useless if we are not pre- pared to act decisively. When the opportunity arrives, we must exploit it fully and aggressively, committing every ounce of com- bat power we can muster and pushing ourselves to the limits of exhaustion. The keys to this effort are identifying enemy criti cal vulnerabilities, shaping the ope rating area to our advantage, designating a main effort to focus our combat power, and acting in a bold and ruthless manner. Critical Vulnerabilities. For battlefield success, it is not enough to generate superior combat power. We must focus that combat power. We must concentrate our efforts on a critical vulnerability, that is, a vulnerability which p ermits us to destroy some capab il- ity without which the enemy cannot function effectively. Seeking the enemy’s vulnerabil ities means striking with our strength against the enemy’s weakness (rather than the enemy’s strength) and at a time when the enemy is not prepared. This is where we can often cause the greatest damage at the lowest cost to ourselves. In practical terms, this often means avoiding the enemy’s front, where the enemy’s attention is focused, and striking the enemy’s flanks and rear, where the enemy does not expect us. Just because a target is vulnerable does not, however, mean that it is worth attacking. We must direct our resources and strike at --- Page 39 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 2-18 those capabilities that are critical to the enemy’s ability to func- tion—to defend, attack, or sustai n the enemy, or to command the enemy’s forces. We must focus our efforts on those critical vul - nerabilities that will bend the enemy to our will most quickly. At the lower tactical level, this may mean using fire and maneu - ver to take out a machine gun po sition that is the backbone of an enemy defense. It may mean using a gap in the enemy’s fields of fire, which allows us to get into the rear of the enemy’s posit ion. It may mean exploiting the enemy’ s lack of air defenses by call - i n g i n c l o s e a i r s u p p o r t . I t m a y m e a n t a k i n g a d v a n t a g e o f a n enemy’s lack of mobility by ra pidly overrunning a key position faster than the enemy can respond. It may mean interdicting enemy resupply routes when the enemy’s supplies are running short. It may mean exploiting a lack of long-range weapons by employing standoff tactics. Whatever we determine the enemy’s critical vulnerability to be, we m ust be prepared to rapidly ta ke advantage of it. There is no formula for determ ining critical vulnerabilities. Each situation is different. Critical vulnerabilities will rarely be obvious. This is one of the things that make mastery of tactics so diffi cult and one reason that so few actio ns achieve a decisive outcome. Identifying critical vulnerabilities is an important prerequisi te to achieving a decision. Shaping the Operating Area. Once we have developed an under- standing of the situation and have determined enemy critical vu l- nerabilities to attack, we try to shape the operating area to o ur advantage. Shaping includes bo th lethal and nonlethal activitie s --- Page 40 --- Achieving a Decision 2-19 such as planning fires to fix the enemy, using an axis of advance to facilitate movement, designating objectives to focus our combat power, or using deceptive measur es to reinforce enemy expecta- tions. Shaping activities can make the enemy vulnerable to attack, impede or divert his attempts to maneuver, facilitate the maneuver of friendly forces, and otherwise dictate the time and place fo r decisive battle. Shaping forces the enemy to adopt courses of action favorable to us. We attempt to shape events in a way tha t allows us several options, so that by the time the moment for decisive action arrives, we have not restricted ourselves to on ly one course of action. Through shaping we gain the initiative, pre- serve momentum, and control the tempo of combat. Main Effort. The main effort is a central maneuver warfare con- cept: concentrating efforts on achieving objectives that lead t o victory. Of all the actions going on within our command, we rec - ognize one as the most critical to success at that moment. The unit assigned responsibility for accomplishing this key mission is designated as the main effort— the focal point upon which con- verges the combat power of the force. The main effort receives priority for support of any kind. It m ust be clear to all other units in the command that they must suppo rt that unit in the accomplishment of its mission. The main effort becomes a harmonizing force for a subordinate’s initiative. Faced with a decision, we ask ourselves: How can I best support the main effort? S o m e a c t i o n s m a y s u p p o r t t h e main effort indirectly. For ex- ample, a commander may use other forces to deceive the enemy --- Page 41 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 2-20 as to the location of the main effort. Marine forces used this con- cept extensively in conducting a series of combined arms raids prior to the ground offensive in Operation Desert Storm. The raids were to confuse the Iraqis as to the true position and in ten- tion of Allied forces. “The raid force appeared in the middle o f the night and fired from positions the enemy had every right to believe were unoccupied.”5 Use of a main effort implies the use of economy of force . This term does not mean that we use as little force as we think we can get away with. Rather, it means t h a t w e m u s t n o t f a i l t o m a k e effective use of all of the assets available to us. Forces not in a position to directly support the main effort should be used to indi- rectly support it. Such forces might be used to distract the en emy or to tie down enemy forces that might otherwise reinforce the threatened point. Uncommitted fo rces can be used in this effort by maneuvering them in feints and demonstrations that keep the enemy off balance. While a commander always designates a main effort, it may shift during the course of a battle as events unfold. Because events and the enemy are unpredictable, few battles flow exactly as the com- mander has planned. As a resu lt, the commander must make adjustments. One way is by redesignating the main effort. For example, if Company A is designated as the main effort but runs into heavy enemy resistance while the adjacent Company B makes a breakthrough that exploits a critical vulnerability, th e --- Page 42 --- Achieving a Decision 2-21 battalion commander may designate Company B as the main effort. This new designation of Company B as the main effort must not, however, be merely nominal. It means that the combat power which was supporting Company A now shifts to support Company B. Identifying the main effort is the p r i n c i p a l a n d m o s t i m p o r t a n t answer to the question, “How do we achieve a decision?” Boldness and Ruthlessness . Forcing a successful decision re- quires the commander to be bold and ruthless. Boldness refers t o d a r i n g a n d a g g r e s s i v e n e s s i n b e h a v i o r . I t i s o n e o f t h e b a s i c requirements for achieving clear-cut outcomes: In order to try for victory, we must dare to try for victory. We must have a desire to “win big,” even if we realize that in many situations the condi - tions for victory may not yet be present. Ruthlessness refers t o pursuing the established goal mercilessly and single-mindedly. This is doubly important once we gain an advantage. Once we have an advantage, we should exp loit it to the fullest. We shou ld not ease up, but instead increase the pressure. Victory in comb at is rarely the product of the initial plan, but rather of ruthle ssly exploiting any advantage, no matter how small, until it succeeds. Boldness and ruthlessness must be accompanied by strong leader- ship and tempered by sound ju dgment. Without these qualities, boldness can become recklessness , and ruthlessness can be dis- torted into cruelty. --- Page 43 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 2-22 CONCLUSION A s M a r i n e l e a d e r s , w h e t h e r o f f i r e t e a m s o r o f a M a r i n e e x p e - ditionary force, we are responsib le for achieving success. In combat, the success we seek is victory—not merely a partial or marginal outcome that forestalls the final reckoning, but a victory that settles the issue in our favor. To be victorious, we must work ceaselessly in peacetime to develop in ourselves a talent for military judgment—the ability to understand a situation and act decisively. Military judgment results from the wisdom gained from experience. It allows us to identify patterns of activity and to concentrate our efforts ag ainst a critical vulnerability that w ill bend the enemy to our will. We must sharpen our ability to make decisions intuitively based on our understanding of the situation. --- Page 44 --- Chapter 3 Gaining Advantage “In war the power to use two fists is an inestimable asset. To feint with one fist and strike w ith the other yields an advan- tage, but a still greater advantage lies in being able to inter- change them—to convert the fein t into the real blow if the opponent uncovers himself.”1 —B. H. Liddell Hart “The challenge is to identify and adopt a concept of war- fighting consistent with our understanding of the nature and theory of war and the re alities of the modern battle- field. What exactly does this require? It requires a concept of warfighting that will functio n effectively in an uncertain, chaotic, and fluid environment— in fact, one that will ex- ploit these conditions to advantage.” 2 —FMFM 1, Warfighting --- Page 46 --- Gaining Advantage 3-3 A basic principle of martial arts is to use the opponent’s stre ngth and momentum against him/her to gain more leverage than one’s own muscles alone can generate, thereby gaining an advantage. The same concept applies to tacti cs. We strive to gain an advan - tage over our adversary by exploiting every aspect of a situati on to help us to achieve victory, not by overpowering him/her with our own strength. This chapter will discuss several different ways of generating leverage to gain advantage over the enemy. Consider the American Indian ambush technique. A small number of warriors would draw a superior force of pursuing cavalry into a canyon or similar close terrain. There a larger force of warrio rs, lying in wait, would quickly surround and ambush the soldiers, who thought they had been pursuing a retreating enemy. By exploiting the cavalry’s initial advantages of strength and momen- tum, the American Indians were able to seize the initiative and gain the advantage through the use of this classic ambush method. COMBINED ARMS The use of combined arms is a key means of gaining advantage. It is based on the idea of presenting the enemy not merely with a problem, but with a dilemma—a no-win situation. We combine supporting arms, organic fires, a nd maneuver in such a way that any action the enemy takes to a void one threat increases vulner - ablity to another. 3 For example, an entrenched enemy should --- Page 47 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 3-4 discover that by hunkering down in fighting holes, Marine artil - lery and air will blast the position. If the enemy comes out to attack, Marine infantry will cut him/her down. When trying to retreat, Marine armor and airpower will pursue him/her to destruction. That is combined arms. A good example of the use of combined arms at the squad level would be the squad leader positioning squad automatic weapons and grenade launchers to provide support by fire while infantry - men with rifles assault the position. The firepower from the auto- matic weapons keeps the enemy in their fighting holes while grenades make those holes untenable. These supporting fires keep the enemy from reacting effectively to our maneuvering infantry force. The enemy forces are placed in a no-win situation. Modern tactics is combined arms tactics. That is, it combines t he effects of various arms—infantry, armor, artillery, and aviation— to achieve the greatest possible effect against the enemy. Artillery and infantry, for example, are normally employed together because of their mutually reinfor cing capabilities—the infantry provides close support to the a rtillery, protecting them from d is- mounted threats, while the artille ry provides the infantry with timely, close, accurate, and continuous fire support. The strengths of the arms complement and reinforce each other. At the same time, the weaknesses and vulner abilities of each arm are pro- tected or offset by the capabilities of the other. --- Page 48 --- Gaining Advantage 3-5 While a division commander in 1941, General Patton had the fol- lowing comments regarding combined arms: There is still a tendency in each separate unit . . . to be a one-handed puncher. By that I mean that the rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker to charge, the artilleryman to fire . . . . That is not the way to win battles. If the band played a piece first with the piccolo, then with the brass h o r n , t h e n w i t h t h e c l ar i n e t , an d t h en w i t h t h e t r u m p e t , there would be a hell of a lot of noise but no music. To get harmony in music each instrument must support the others. To get harmony in battle, each weapon must sup- port the other. Team play wins. 4 The Marine air-ground task force is a perfect example of a bal- anced combined arms team. Combined arms tactics is standard practice and second nature for all Marines. MANEUVER Maneuver provides us a means to gain an advantage over the enemy. In too many battles, one or both sides have sought to gain advantage in combat through fi repower and attrition. In World War I, one side would rush across no-man’s-land under murderous fire and attempt to push an oppon ent off desired terrain. If th e --- Page 49 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 3-6 attack succeeded—and few did—the evicted forces counterat- tacked in the same manner, usually reoccupying the same terrain they had before. These battles were fire-power and attrition co n- tests, and the advantage lay with the side that had the most person- nel and equipment to expend. The cost in casualties and equipment was high and often produced no decisive results. We want to avoid this type of engagement. Traditionally, maneuver has meant moving in a way that gains positional advantage. For examp le, we may maneuver by envel- oping an exposed enemy flank or by denying the enemy critical terrain. We may maneuver by threatening the enemy’s lines of communications and forcing a withdrawal. We may maneuver by seizing a position which allows u s to bring effective fire to b ear against the enemy but which protects us against enemy fires. We may maneuver in other dimensions as well. For instance, we may also maneuver in time by increasing relative speed and operatin g at a faster tempo than the enemy. Normally we maneuver both in time and space to gain advantage and, ultimately, victory at th e least possible cost. EXPLOITING THE ENVIRONMENT The use of the environment offe rs tremendous opportunities to gain advantage over the enemy. We must understand the char- acteristics of any environment where we may have to operate: jun- gle, desert, mountain, arctic, riverine, or urban. More importantly, --- Page 50 --- Gaining Advantage 3-7 we must understand how the effects of terrain, weather, and peri- ods of darkness or reduced visibility impact on our own and our adversary’s ability to fight. Terrain Our objective is to employ tacti cs that makes terrain an advan- tage to us and a disadvantage to our opponent. Terrain impacts on our maneuver and influences our tactical dispositions. We must understand terrain and comprehend its effects, as it may limit our movement, reduce our visibility, or restrict our fires. We must understand how it affects the enemy’s abilities to detect or engage us. We must be aware that the enemy also seeks advantage from terrain. We must understand tha t terrain shapes the enemy’s maneuver and dispositions, as well as our own. Lieutenant Harrol Kiser of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, knew how to use terrain to gain an advantage. In November 1950, his company was ordered to seize a key piece of terrain at Toktong Pass during the march out of the Chosin Reservoir area. Lieu- tenant Kiser had only 20 Marines left in his platoon, and the p ass was heavily defended by the Chinese. Using a flanking ridgeline to conceal his approach, Lieutenant Kiser skillfully enveloped the enemy from the rear and quickly r outed the Chinese out of their well-entrenched position.5 Today, as in Korea, the intelligent use of terrain has become a standard practice for Marines. Weather Adverse weather—cold, heat, rain—impedes combat opera- tions. The military unit that is best prepared to operate in th ese --- Page 51 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 3-8 conditions will gain an advantage over its opponent. During the breakout from Chosin Reservoir in November 1950, Marines demonstrated time and time a gain the ability to use harsh weather to their advantage over a determined enemy. The assault of Able Company, 1st Batt alion, 1st Marine Regiment, on Hill 1081 in a blinding snowstorm is such an example. Despite visibility of only 25 yards, the company was able to coordinate a combined arms attack and envelop this key piece of terrain that blocked the breakout of the 1st Marine Regiment . Using a snowstorm to mask its movement, Able Company sur- prised and annihilated the Chin ese defenders, thereby opening a route for the rest of the division. 6 If we are to use weather to our advantage, we must train and pr e- pare rigorously to operate in a ll climatic conditions. We must be able to operate our equipment and employ our weapons effec- tively in hot, cold, or wet environments—literally in every cli me and place. Periods of Darkness or Reduced Visibility Units that can operate effecti vely during hours of darkness or periods of reduced visibility of ten gain significant advantage over their opponent. Reduced visibility can make the simplest o f tasks difficult to accomplish. This obvious disadvantage can be turned on its head and used to our advantage by a commander whose forces are trained, equipped, able, and willing to operate at night. Night operations can produc e great gains against a force --- Page 52 --- Gaining Advantage 3-9 that cannot or will not operate at night. Operating during peri ods of reduced visibility creates tempo by adding another 10 to 12 hours to the day for fighting. The psychological impact of nigh t fighting is also great and can produce significant rewards. A good example of the tactical impact of night attacks is found in the battle for Okinawa during Wo rld War II. Marine forces were essentially stalemated by the presence of a strong Japanese defen- sive line in the coral ridges of southern Okinawa. After days o f ineffective attacks by the 7th Marine Regiment, the regimental commander elected to attack under cover of darkness. At 0330 on 12 June 1945, the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 7th Marines advanced, using a road that inte rsected the ridge as a guide. C ol- onel Edward W. Snedecker, Commanding Officer of the 7th Marines at the time, noted: . . . two companies, one from each [of] the 1st and 2d Battalions, got across the valley during the night into position [on the ridge]. Early in the morning when the Japanese came out to cook breakfast, they found a little bit of a surprise . . . [for] them. 7 The Japanese defenders were not used to U.S. forces attacking a t night. The use of darkness allo wed Marines to occupy positions along the crest of Kunishi Ridge literally without firing a sho t. From these positions, the Marines dislodged the enemy from their entrenched positions and mov ed onward until the Japanese defenders were annihilated.8 --- Page 53 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 3-10 COMPLEMENTARY FORCES Complementary forces—the idea of fix-and-flank—are an important way of gaining advan tage. The idea behind comple- mentary forces is to use our forces as a nutcracker. We seek to crush the enemy between two or more actions. Consider the case of an enemy firing from behind a tree. If one Marine fires from the front, the enemy is protected by the tree. If the Marine maneu- vers and attempts to fire from behind, the enemy merely moves to the other side of the tree to maintain cover. However, two Marines can place our opponent in a dilemma. One can fire from t h e f r o n t w h i l e t h e o t h e r s n e a k s a r o u n d a n d f i r e s a t t h e e n e m y from the flank or rear. The opponent is now vulnerable to one o r the other of the two Marines. Th e enemy cannot use the tree for protection against both. The same idea applies in air-to-air tactics. Upon detecting ene my aircraft, a flight of fighters splits into two or more elements beyond air-to-air missile range. They a pproach the enemy aircraft from multiple directions and varying altitudes. No matter how the enemy aircraft moves—dives, climbs, turns, or twists—it is exposed. Sun Tzu described this concept as the cheng and th e ch’i. 9 The cheng is the more direct, obvious action. It fixes the enemy. The ch’i is the unexpected or extraordinary action. It is the bid for a decision, or, as we call it today, the main effort. These two actions work together against the enemy. The two actions are inseparable and can be interchangeable in battle; the cheng may become the --- Page 54 --- Gaining Advantage 3-11 ch’i. The concept is basic, but it can be implemented in a variety of combinations limited only by our imagination. SURPRISE Achieving surprise can greatly increase leverage. In fact, sur- prise can often prove decisive. We try to achieve surprise through deception, stealth, and ambiguity. “War is based on deception,”10 stated Sun Tzu. We use deception to mislead our opponents with regard to our real intentions and capabilities. By employing deceptio n, we try to cause our oppo- nents to act in ways that will eventually prove prejudicial for them. We may use deception to mislead the enemy as to the time and location of our pending attack. We may use deception to cre- ate the impression that our for ces are larger than they really are. We hope the enemy will realize this deception only when it is too late for them to react. Marines have often relied on deception to mislead the enemy in regard to the location of amphibious landings. Marines used decep- tion to create the illusion of force where there was none in Opera- tion Desert Storm. Lieutenant General Boomer stated the situation which necessitated an extensive deception operation: “We’re tak- ing on 11 Iraqi divisions with two Marine divisions. Our force ratios are horrible. We don’t want him to know that. . . .” 11 T h e --- Page 55 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 3-12 Marines created Task Force Troy: 460 Marines imitated the activi- ties of a 16,000-strong division using loud-speakers, dummy tanks and artillery, and helicopters conducting simulated resupply. Surprise can be generated through stealth. Stealth is used to advantage when maneuvering against an enemy. It provides less chance of detection by the enemy, leaving the enemy vulnerable and unprepared for a surprise action. Marines may also employ stealth by lying in wait for an approaching enemy—an ambush. The ambush is perhaps the most effective means of surprising opponents, especially a t the lower tactical level where surpris e through stealth is easiest to achieve. We can also achieve surprise through ambiguity. It is usually dif- ficult to conceal all our movements from the enemy, but we can sometimes confuse the enemy as to the meaning of our move- ments. Sun Tzu said: The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does not know where I intend to give battle he must prepare in a great many places. And when he pre- pares in a great many places, those I have to fight in any one place will be few. 12 Ambiguity was central to the tactics of the World War II German blitzkrieg. An attack in blitzkrieg involved multiple thrusts with reinforcements following which ever thrusts were most success- ful. The multitude of thrusts created paralyzing uncertainty because the opponent could not determine which constituted the --- Page 56 --- Gaining Advantage 3-13 real attack. There was nothing secret about the German attack, but it was ambiguous on a massive scale. TRAPPING THE ENEMY Modern tactics is based not on pu shing the enemy, but on trap- ping the enemy—another excellent way of gaining advantage. Trapping is the desired result of the application of combined arms, fire and maneuver, or complementary forces tactics. Why do we want to trap instead of just push the enemy? A push- ing contest is seldom decisive. The side that is pushed out com es back the next day still ready to f ight again and again. Unfortu - nately, in Vietnam, many of our battles were pushing battles. W e were always able to push the en emy off the held ground and to inflict casualties. The enemy jus t withdrew, regrouped, replace d losses and came back to fight us again. The result was a series of indecisive actions and a seemingly endless war. However, if we can trap our enemy, we have a better oppor- tunity to win decisively. Many of history’s decisive battles have been trapping actions. Recall how the Roman legions were trapped at Cannae or the German divisions at Stalingrad? Trapping gains advantage by disrupting the enem y’s ability to think through th e dilemma we have caused. Trapping allows us to gain and maintain the initiative as the enemy is forced to react to our actions. It can --- Page 57 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 3-14 also temporarily undermine a weakened enemy’s will to resist— while we continue to press the attack and our initiative. A good example of trapping from the Vietnam conflict occurred during Operation Dewey Canyon. (See figure.) North Vietnamese activity along the Laotian-Sou th Vietnamese border increased dramatically in early January 1969. Large enemy convoys, including armored vehicles, regularly traveled from Laos into South Vietnam, threatening friendly units. Colonel Robert H. Barrow’s 9th Marines responded with Operation Dewey Canyon. The three battalions of the 9th Regiment crossed the Da Krong River on February 11th and 12th. The Third and First Battalions moved south-southeast through th e mountainous terrain toward Laos. Second Battalion, to the west, swung south-southwest, turning east astride the south V ietnam-Laos border. The North Vietnamese forces moving along Route 922 from Laos into the A Shau Valley were trapped between the three battalions. The North Vietnamese were mauled as a result. Their equipment losses were staggering. More importantly, Operation Dewey Canyon de- stroyed a North Vietnamese base area and so disrupted their logistics that it forced them to abandon their planned spring offensive in I Corps’ area. 13 --- Page 58 --- Gaining Advantage 3-15 --- Page 59 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 3-16 DEVELOPING AN AMBUSH MENTALITY Perhaps the most common tactical tool for gaining advantage is the ambush. All Marines are familiar with an ambush as a type of combat patrol.14 In maneuver warfare, ambush takes on a much broader meaning, and the development of the ambush mentality is integral to maneuver warfare tactics. T h e a m b u s h m e n t a l i t y i s p r o b a b l y n o t n e w t o m o s t o f u s . W e may have employed th e ambush mentality in sports. In football, the trap block is an ambush. A player pulls an offensive player off the line, leaving a hole. When a defender comes through the hole, another offensive player suddenly blocks the defensive player from the side, usually knocking the defensive player down. The players have blind-sided the defensive player. That i s the ambush mentality. In basketball, setting up a pick is an ambush. As one teammate drives to the basket, another st eps into the defender’s path fr om behind, blocks the path, stops the defense, and momentarily clears the lane to the basket for the other teammate. Again, that is the ambush mentality. In combat, we move our reinfor ced squad into position along a well-traveled trail. We position flank security to protect ourselves and give identification and warning of enemy movements down the trail. We position our weapon s so as to concentrate our fir es into a “kill zone” and to seal off exits, forcing the enemy to remain subject to our fires. The squa d waits in position until signale d when they immediately respond with concentrated, sustained fires --- Page 60 --- Gaining Advantage 3-17 on enemy forces trapped in the kill zone. The enemy, surprised into inaction, unsure of what to do or where to move, is annihi - lated. Fires are maintained un til all the enemy are killed or u ntil signaled to stop. That is the ambush mentality. The ambush mentality tries to turn every situation into an ambush. In this broader context, an ambush has several distinct features. First, in an ambush we try to surprise the enemy. Think of a patrol that we ambush. Our enemies are walking through the woods when suddenly, out of nowhere, they are under fire from multiple directions. They are taking heav y casualties. The psychological impact of surprise may paralyze their thoughts and actions, lea v- ing them incapable of reacting effectively. To have an ambush mentality means we always try to surprise the enemy, to do the unexpected. Surprise is the rule rather than the exception. Second, we want to draw our enemy unknowingly into a trap . This will often involve deception. We make one course of action appear inviting. When the enemy takes that course of action, we are waiting. Third, an ambush is invisible. If the ambush is not invisible, it ceases to be an ambush and instead becomes a target for the enemy. Whether we are defending or attacking, the enemy must not detect us until it is too lat e to react. Surprise often dep ends upon invisibility. That invisib ility may be provided through stealth in movement or in focusing the enemy’s attention else- where to allow our forces to maneuver without detection. --- Page 61 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 3-18 The reverse slope defense is an example of using invisibility t o spring an ambush. The enemy, not knowing we are there, comes over the crest of a hill and is hit by our fires. The enemy’s vehicles are hit on their soft underbellies. Enemy troops are fully exposed to our weapons. Because we are concealed until the last moment, the enemy could not call in artillery fire on our position. The rev erse slope not only protects us from the enemy’s direct fire; it protects us from the enemy’s observation and thus the enemy’s indirect fire. That is part of the ambush mentality: Do not let yourself be seen. Fourth, in an ambush we want to shock the enemy. Instead of tak- ing the enemy under fire gradua lly with a few weapons at long range, we wait until the enemy is within easy range of every weapon. We then open up suddenly, all at once, with everything we have. The enemy is paralyzed by the shock and cannot react. Everything was going fine, and suddenly the enemy is in a firestorm with people falling a ll around. Often the enemy will panic, making the problem worse by reacting rather than acting. Combined arms may be used to ambush the enemy. Artillery raids that reach deeper into the enemy’s vital areas than expected ca n produce that same desired sh ock effect as a ground-based ambush. The enemy is placed in a dilemma, attempting to move from the effects of artillery and right into an attack by air. Finally, in the ambush mentality, we always focus on the enemy . The purpose of an ambush is not to hold a piece of terrain. It is to destroy the enemy. We use terrain to affect the ambush, but ter - rain itself is not what we are fighting for. --- Page 62 --- Gaining Advantage 3-19 ASYMMETRY Fighting asymmetrically means ga ining advantage through im- balance, applying strength again st an enemy weakness. Fighting asymmetrically means using dissi milar techniques and capabili- ties to maximize our own strengths while exploiting enemy weak- nesses. Fighting asymmetrically means fighting the enemy on our terms rather than on the enemy’s. By fighting asymmetrically, we do not have to be numerically superior to defeat the enemy. We only have to be able to exploit enemy vulnerabilities. For example, using tanks to fight enemy tanks, infantry to figh t enemy infantry, and air to fight enemy air is symmetrical. Usin g attack helicopters to fight en emy tanks and close air support against enemy infantry are examp les of fighting asymmetrically. In these examples, we gain the advantage of the greater speed and mobility of the aircraft relative to the enemy. Ambushing tanks with attack helicopters in terra in which hampers tank maneuver provides even more effect and generates even more advantage. CONCLUSION Combat is a test of wills where the object is to win. One way t o win is to gain and exploit every possible advantage. This means using maneuver and surprise whenever possible. It means employing complementary forces and combined arms. It means --- Page 63 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 3-20 exploiting the terrain, weather, and times of darkness to our advantage. It means trapping our enemy by ambush or by some other means. It means fighting asymmetrically to gain added advantage. This is what Sun Tz u meant when he wrote: “There- fore a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates.”15 --- Page 64 --- Chapter 4 Being Faster “Hit quickly, hit hard and keep right on hitting. Give the en- emy no rest, no opportunity to consolidate his forces and hit back at you.”1 —Holland M. Smith “For the infantryman to be truly effective . . . he will have to be as light of foot as he is quick of thought. . . . Mobility is needed most of all in the clash of arms. Swift and agile movement plus rapidity and intelligent tactical flexibility are its true essentials.” 2 —John A. English --- Page 66 --- Being Faster 4-3 Usually, to think of weapons means to think of a personal rifle or pistol; the unit’s machine guns and mortars; or the aircraft’s mis- siles, bombs, or guns. A logistician may realize that weapons include trucks, bulldozers, and excavators. Some Marines over- look one of their most powerful weapons, one that creates advan- tage for infantrymen, aviators, and logisticians equally. That weapon is speed. SPEED IN COMBAT How is speed a weapon? Think of sports again: The breakaway in hockey uses speed as a weapon. By rapidly passing the puck down the ice, one team denies th e other the chance to set up a defense. Speed circumvents their opponent’s ability to respond in an organized manner. The fastbreak in basketball seeks the same result. In two or three passes, the ball is downcourt and the basket scored, all before the opposition can react. The results of speed often reach beyond the immediate goal. How many times have we seen a team score on a fastbreak, steal the ball as it comes inbounds, and immediately score again, and even a third time? Unable to regain their composure, the victims of the fastbreak become the victims of a rally. The victims lose confi - dence. Passes go astray; signals become crossed; tempers flare; --- Page 67 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 4-4 arguments ensue. The rally becomes a rout. The beleaguered players see certain defeat. They virtually give up while still on the court. The same thing can happen in com bat. The battalion or fighter aircraft or logistics train that can consistently move and act faster than its enemy has a powerful advantage. In June of 1943, during the battle of Saipan, the aggressive, hard- hitting tactics of General Holland Smith proved to be singularl y successful in defeating the Japanese defenders. General Smith’s tactical plan for Saipan called for applying “unremitting pressure on the enemy and . . . bypassing strong points of resistance fo r mopping up by reserve elements in order to press the attack to better ground.” 3 Long indoctrinated with the value of speed in amphibious operations, General Smith’s bypassing tactics placed the Japanese remaining in their fixed defenses at an extreme tacti- cal disadvantage. These tactics proved very effective in isolat ing and reducing the Japanese defense. General Smith’s use of speed served as a force multiplier, and it also reduced Marine casualties. The British Royal Air Force bested the Germans during the Battle of Britain in World War II in part because they were able to speedily recover their downed p ilots, return them to base, plac e them in new aircraft, and have them fighting again in the after - noon. Downed German pilots were less easily recovered, and the Luftwaffe had fewer of the long-range aircraft required for replacement. Eventually, pilot and aircraft losses forced the G er- mans to end daylight bombing an d resort strictly to relatively ineffective night attacks. --- Page 68 --- Being Faster 4-5 Great leaders have repeatedly stated the value of speed in combat. Napoleon said, “I may lose a ba ttle, but I shall never lose a m in- ute.”4 Nathan Bedford Forrest told the secret of his many victories: “Get there first with the most men.”5 General Patton said in 1943, “When the great day of battle comes remember your training and remember above all else that speed and violence of attack are t he sure road to success.” 6 History’s great commanders differed in many ways, but one thing they shared was a sense of the impor- tance of speed. In Operation Urgent Fury in 1983, the Marines of Battalion Land- ing Team 2/8, moved fast, as thei r commander, Lieutenant Colo- nel Ray Smith, had trained them to do. When they captured the operations officer of the Grenadian army, he said to them, “You appeared so swiftly in so many places where we didn’t expect you that it was clear that resistance was hopeless, so I recom- mended to my superiors that we lay down our arms and go into hiding.” 7 That is what speed used as a weapon can do for you. WHAT IS SPEED? “What is speed?” would seem to have a simple answer: speed is going fast. This is speed as we think of it when driving a car— more miles per hour. That is part of the answer in tactics as well. We use speed to gain the initiative and advantage over the enemy. For example, when a --- Page 69 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 4-6 tank battalion attacks, it goes o ver the ground as fast as it c an. General Balck was asked whether the Russian tanks ever used terrain in their attacks against him in World War II. He replie d that they had used terrain on occasion, but that they more ofte n used speed. The questioner followed up: “Which was harder to defend against?” Balck answered, “Speed.” 8 Physical speed, moving more miles per hour, is a powerful weapon in itself. On our approach to the enemy, speed in move- ment reduces the enemy’s reaction time. When we are going through or around the enemy, it changes the situation faster th an the enemy can react. Once we are past the enemy, it makes a reac- tion irrelevant. In all three cases, speed impacts the enemy, e spe- cially mentally, causing fear, indecision, and helplessness. Remember, attacking the enemy’s mind is a central tenet of maneuver warfare. SPEED AND TIME In a military sense, there is more to speed than simply going f ast, and there is a vital difference between acting rapidly and acti ng recklessly. With time we must always consider the closely related factor of timing. Speed and time are closely related. In fact, speed is defined in terms of time: miles or kilometers per hour. In tactics, what this means is that time is always of the utmost --- Page 70 --- Being Faster 4-7 importance. Time that cannot be spent in action must be spent thinking about how to act effectively. Even when we are engaged with the enemy, we are not always moving fast. Some of the time we are not moving at all. Nonethe- less, every moment is still of the utmost importance even when we are sitting still. A battalion staf f that takes a day to pla n an action is obviously slower than one that takes an hour. A tank battalion that takes 3 hours to refuel is slower than one that takes 2 hours, just as one that must refuel every hundred miles is slower than one that must refuel every two hundred. A company that sits down to eat once it has taken its objective is slower than one that immediately presses on into the enemy’s depth. A fighter squadron that can fly only three sorties per aircraft per day i s slower, in terms of effect on the enemy, than one that flies si x. A maintenance repair team that takes 2 days to fix a damaged vehi - cle and get it back into action is slower, in terms of effect o n the enemy, than one that can do it overnight. Making maximum use of every hour and every minute is as important to speed in combat as simply going fast when we are moving. It is important to every member of a military force whether serving on staffs or in units—aviation, combat service support, ground combat, everyone. A good tactician has a constant sense of urgency. We feel guilty if we are idle. We never waste time, and we are never content with the pace at which events ar e happening. We are always sayi ng to ourselves and to others, “Faster! Faster!” We know that if speed is a weapon, so is time. --- Page 71 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 4-8 TIMING We employ speed and use time to create tempo. Tempo is not merely a matter of acting fastest or at the earliest opportunity. It is also a matter of timing—acting at the right time. Timing requires an appreciation for the rhythm of combat so we can exploit that rhythm to our advantage. It is physically impossi- ble to operate always at peak tempo. Even though we can extend operating cycles thro ugh the economical use of resources, we cannot operate at top speed indefinitely. We must rest our peop le and replenish our supplies. The test of skill is to be able to gener- ate and maintain a fast pace when the situation calls for it an d to recover when it will not hurt us. Timing means knowing when to act and, equally important, when not to act. Although speed is an important tactical weapon, there are situations in which it is better to bide our time. If our c oncept of operations involves a diversion, we need to allow time for t he diversion to take effect. If we have laid an ambush for the enemy, we need to give the enemy time to fall fully into the trap. If a situ- ation is still forming, we may want to develop it further before we commit to a course of action. For example, an error commonly made by defenders is counterattacking too soon so that the enemy is merely pushed back rather than cut off, encircled, and destroyed. Decisive action is our goal, and it must be timed to occur at the proper moment. There are times to act, and there a re other times to set the stage and wait. --- Page 72 --- Being Faster 4-9 A benefit from a decision not to act is that it saves precious resources and energy for later commitment. Some leaders dissi- pate their units’ energy on constant, unprioritized activity. Not all activities support the mission. A unit’s energy is not easily replen- ished and should be treated as a precious resource to be expended only towards decisive goals. RELATIVE SPEED Going fast and making efficient use of time are both parts of t he answer to the question, “What is speed?” However, something else must be considered: the enemy. As with all things in war, speed is relative. Speed is meani ngful militarily only if we ar e acting faster than the enemy. We can do that either by slowing the enemy or by increasing our own speed. In the battle for the Falkland Is lands in 1982, the British Arm y moved slowly. The terrain was dif ficult, the weather was abomi- nable, and much of the material was carried on foot, all of whi ch slowed down the British. Nevertheless, the British still had th e advantage in speed because they moved faster than the Argen- tines who, once they had made th eir initial dispositions, essen - tially did not move. That superiority in relative speed allowed the British to maintain the in itiative throughout the campaign. --- Page 73 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 4-10 CONTINUING SPEED To be consistent, superiority in relative speed must continue over time. It is not enough to move faster than the enemy only now and then because when we are not moving faster, the advantage, the initiative, passes to the ene my. Most forces can manage an intermittent burst of speed but m ust then halt for a considerab le period to recover between bursts. During that halt, they are likely to lose their advantage. We realize that we cannot operate at f ull speed indefinitely, and the challenge is to be consistently fas ter than the enemy. One way to sustain speed is to u se the effects of combined arms . When the infantry or mounted troops must break contact tempo- rarily to maneuver, resupply, or recover, air or artillery can keep the pressure on. Maneuver cannot be sustained indefinitely, but the momentum can be maintained thr ough skillful planning of com- bined arms effects, keeping the enemy always at a disadvantage. Here the speed of logistics beco mes critical. Although physical exhaustion is a factor, halts oft en are driven by logistics: gr ound or aviation units must stop for equipment repair, maintenance, and resupply. Supporting forces can minimize loss of speed if they can deliver the supplies and perform the maintenance quickly. Thus, they enable combat units to move before the enemy gains the initiative. --- Page 74 --- Being Faster 4-11 SPEED AND CHANGE In order to act consistently fas ter than the enemy, it is neces sary to do more than move quickly. It is also necessary to make rapid transitions f r o m o n e a c t i o n t o a n o t h e r . W h i l e t h e r e a r e m a n y types of transitions in combat, the important thing to remember is that transitions produce friction. Reduction of friction minimi zes the loss of tempo that the friction generates at the point of t ransi- tion. A unit that can make trans itions faster and more smoothly than another can be said to have greater relative speed. In the 18th century, the impor tance of fast transitions (some- times called agility) was displa yed when shifting from column formation into line. If an army could not rapidly deploy into l ine and consequently was engaged while still in column, it was often beaten. Much drill was devoted t o practicing this difficult tra nsi- tion so that it could be accomplished rapidly in combat. Today we develop proficiencies in battle drills and immediate-action dri lls that allow units to rapidly transition from one formation to another without pausing. It is important to be able to effect rapid changes in organization as well. Being quick to effect required changes in task organizati on based on a rapidly changing b attle situation increases agility and decreases reaction times. Battle d rills and rehearsals can be c on- ducted to smooth out procedures for changing organization rap- idly. The faster these transitions can be made, the more effective the force becomes. --- Page 75 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 4-12 The place in time and space where transitions occur can be called a friction point. Friction points commonly encountered in tactics include movement from an assembly area to attack; from patrol movement formation to ambush posture; from defensive posture to attack; from one maneuver to another, and so forth. The transi- tion involves simply positional changes and drills, but also changes of attitude in the minds o f Marines. We must shift our mental focus from one movement to another. A modern example of the importance of fast transitions comes from aerial combat. In the Korean War, American aviators achieved a high kill ratio of about 10:1 over their North Korea n and Chinese opponents. At first glance, this is somewhat surpri s- i n g . T h e m a i n e n e m y f i g h t e r , t h e M i G - 1 5 , w a s s u p e r i o r t o t h e American F-86 in a number of key respects. It could climb and accelerate faster, and it had a better sustained turn rate. The F-86, however, was superior to the MiG in two critical, though less obvious, respects. First, because it had high-powered hydraulic controls, the F-86 could shift from one maneuver to another faster than the MiG. Second, because of its bubble canopy, the F-86 pilot had better visibility. The F-86’s better field of view provided better situational awareness and also contributed to fast trans i- tions because it allowed its pilot to understand changing situa - tions more quickly. American pilots developed new tactics based on these two advan- tages. When they engaged the MiGs, they sought to put them through a series of maneuvers. The F-86’s faster transitions --- Page 76 --- Being Faster 4-13 between maneuvers gave it a time advantage that the pilot trans - formed into a position advantag e. Often, when the MiG pilots realized what was happening, they panicked—and thereby made the American pilot’s job all the easier. These tactics illustrate the way fast transitions contribute to over- all speed and to a time advantage. The importance of time and speed in a broader sense has been brought out in the work of John Boyd. A former colonel in the U.S. Air Force, Boyd studied a wide variety of historic battles, campaigns, and wars. He noted t h a t w h e r e n u m e r i c a l l y i n f e r i o r f o r c e s h a d d e f e a t e d t h e i r o p p o - nents, they often did so by presenting the other side with a su d- den, unexpected change or a series of changes. The superior forces fell victim because they could not adjust to the changes in a timely manner. Generally, defeat came at relatively small cost to the victor. 9 This research led to the Boyd th eory, which states that conflic t may be viewed as time-competitive cycles of observation-orienta- tion-decision-action (OODA). First, each party to a conflict enters the fray by observing himself/herself, the surroundings, and th e enemy. In tactics, this equates to adoption of a hunting instin ct: searching; actively looking; hun ting for the enemy; and seeing what the enemy is doing or is about to do. It also includes ant ici- pating the enemy’s next moves—getting inside the enemy’s mind. Second, based upon those observations, the combatant orients to the situation, that is, produces a mental image of the situatio n and gains situational awarenes s. This awareness becomes the --- Page 77 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 4-14 foundation on which to erect a plan. Generally, the better the ori- entation, the better the plan. Next, based upon this orientation, the combatant decides upon a course of action. The decision is developed into a plan that can be disseminated among subordinates for their planning and execution. Last, the combatant acts, or puts the decision into effect. In tactics this is the execution phase where the decision, or plan, is imp le- mented. Since this action has ch anged the situation, the combat - ant again observes, beginning the cycle anew. Boyd’s cycle is also known as the OODA loop. The Boyd theory helps to define the word “maneuver.” It means being consistently faster than our opponent. As our enemy observes and orients on our initi al action, we must be observin g, orienting, deciding, and acting upon our second action. As we enact our third, fourth, and fifth move, the time gap between o ur actions and our enemy’s reactions increasingly widens. Our enemy falls behind in a panicked game of catch up trying to respond t o our penetration as we attack his/her reserves and his/her command and control. As the enemy counterattacks with a mobile reserve, we bypass with helicopterborne forces. Everything the enemy does is too late. Thus, the military answer to the question “What is speed?” is not simple. Nonetheless, it is central to every aspect of tactics. As General George Patton said, “In small operations, as in large, speed is the essential element of success.”10 --- Page 78 --- Being Faster 4-15 We should also exercise caution so as not to confuse speed with haste. General Patton made this observation: Haste and Speed: There is a great difference between these two words. Haste exists when troops are committed without proper reconnaissance, without the arrangement for proper supporting fire, and before every available man has been brought up. The r e s u l t o f s u c h a n a t t a c k w i l l b e t o g e t t h e t r o o p s i n t o a c t i o n early, but to complete the action very slowly. Speed is acquired by making the necessary reconnaissance, providing the proper artillery [support], . . . bringing up eve ry [available] man, and then launching the attack with a prede- termined plan so that the time under fire will be reduced to the minimum. 11 BECOMING FASTER Now we see clearly the importance of speed. We want to be fast. How do we do it? We start by recognizing the importance of time. As leaders of Marines, we have a responsibility to make things happen fast. Our sense of the importance of time, of urgency, must direct ou r actions. We must work to create and build that sense within our - selves. --- Page 79 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 4-16 Once we have it, there are a number of things we can do to increase speed. First, we can keep everything simple . Simplicity promotes speed; complexity slows things down. Simplicity should be central to our plans, our staffs (large staffs may be one of war’s greatest consumers of t ime), our command and control, and our own actions. Second, speed is increased through decentralization. Decentral- ization is an important concept in the execution of maneuver war- fare. How do we achieve decentra lization, while still retaining control? We use two main tools that provide the required contro l of the effort and the decentralization of its execution. These tools are mission tactics and commander’s intent. Mission tactics is the assignment of a mission to a subordinate without specifying how the mission must be accomplished. It is a key tenet of maneuver warfare. In mission tactics, the higher commander describes the mission and explains its purpose. The subordinate commander determines the tactics needed to accom- plish the task based on the mission and the higher commander’s i n t e n t . I n t h i s w a y , e a c h l e a d e r can act quickly as the situati on changes without passing information up the chain of command and waiting for orders to come back down. Speed is greatly increased by this decentralization process. According to John A . English in his work On Infantry, decentralization has been one of the most significant features of modern war. English wrote: “In the confused and often chaotic b attlefield environment of today , only the smallest groups are likel y to keep together, particula rly during critical moments.” 12 In such circumstances, individuals --- Page 80 --- Being Faster 4-17 rally around their leader who, armed with knowledge of the pur- pose or intent behind their task, can lead them toward success. The commander’s intent provides the overall purpose for accom- plishing the task assigned throu gh mission tactics. Although th e situation may change, subordinates who clearly understand the purpose and act to accomplish that purpose can adapt to changing circumstances on their own without risking diffusion of effort or loss of tempo. Subordinate commanders will be able to carry on this mission on their own initia tive and through lateral coordi na- tion with other subunits, rather than running every decision through the higher commander for approval. A third way to become faster is through experience. Experience breeds speed. Experience gives units advantages over other less experienced units. This is why veteran units are usually much faster than green, untried units. If we are familiar with a situation or at least know generally what to expect, we can think, act, a nd move faster. In peacetime, our Marines are not likely to be com - bat veterans. Still, we can give them experience through tactic al decision games, sand table exerci ses, war games, field exercise s, and rehearsals. These and other forms of training help to reduc e the stress and confusion of combat. Another way in which experience helps us become faster is through the use of implicit communications. Implicit communica- tions are mutual understandings that require little or no actua l talking or writing. For example, two company commanders know each other well. They think alike because their battalion com- mander has established standing operating procedures and has --- Page 81 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 4-18 schooled subordinate commanders in an approach to war. Thus, the commander of Company B does not need to talk with the com- mander of Company C very often in action because each knows from common past experiences and from daily observations how the other is likely to react in many different situations. If B Com- pany’s commander creates an o pportunity, C Company’s com- mander will take advantage of it. That is implicit communication. It is faster and more reliable th an explicit communication (trying to pass words or messages back and forth over radios or telephones). Of course, implicit communica tions must be developed over time. This requires actions that strengthen unit cohesion and mutual trust. This requires keep ing people together in their un its and stable in their assignments . It implies keeping good teams together. It means developing a band of brothers in our units, as Admiral Horatio Nelson did. He spent many evenings with his captains gathered in the cabin of his flagship talking over tac - tics, ways they might fight different engagements, how they would defeat this or that opponent. From those evenings came a shared way of thinking so strong that, at Trafalgar, Nelson needed only to signal “England expects every man will do his duty,” and “Close action.” 13 Sometimes words have meaning beyond the normally obvious meani ng because of shared experi- ences and understanding. Another way speed gains from ex perience is in the development of lateral communication, or coordination. If all communication is up and down the chain of command, action will move slowly. If commanders and leaders at every level communicate laterally—if we, as leaders, talk directly to other leaders—action moves muc h --- Page 82 --- Being Faster 4-19 faster. Lateral communication is not a natural consequence of mission orders. It must be practiced in training. It results from the confidence of the higher comman der who through past experi- ences has found that subordinates can exercise initiative based on the assigned mission and the commander’s stated intent. A good example of lateral comm unication comes from aviation. In the air, the pilots of a flight of aircraft communicate laterally as a matter of course. A pilot who needs to talk to another does so. A message need not go through the mission commander and then be relayed to the other pilot. Even ts would quickly outpace commu- nication if pilots tried to talk t hat way. The same procedures may be employed by ground combat and logistics units as well. A fourth way to become faster is by positioning the commander at the point of friction. This position may be with the main effor t, with a supporting effort, or in the rear. A commander who is fo r- ward can instantly influence th e battle as the situation develo ps. For the same reason, a commander may choose a position at a cru- cial crossroad during a night movement, or where a unit is pushing supplies forward, or where a counterattack force in the defense may be sited. The key is to be where we can best influence the actions of our units. As Marines , we believe in leading from th e front since that is where most fri ction points occur, but they may occur elsewhere. We must choose our positions accordingly. Throughout World War II and his entire career, Lieutenant General Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller believed that Marines had to lead from where the fighting was. “This Command Post business will ruin the American Army and Marines if it isn’t watched,” 14 he said while he --- Page 83 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 4-20 was the commanding officer of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, at Gua- dalcanal. As a battalion commander, Puller usually positioned him- self directly behind the point element of his battalion and his headquarters element directly behind the lead company so that h e could best influence the actions of his unit. From this locatio n, Puller was able to impose his will and personally affect the ou t- come of the engagement. Depending on the situation, he could also be found at other points on the march or on the perimeter. His idea was to be where he could best influence the action. Finally, it is important not only to be faster, but to maintain that speed through time. This endura nce is made possible through physical and mental fitness . Physical fitness develops not only the speed, energy, and agility to move faster, but it also deve lops the endurance to maintain that speed for longer durations. With endurance, we not only outpace the enemy but maintain a higher tempo longer than the enemy can. Mental fitness builds the abil - ity to concentrate for longer p eriods of time and to penetrate below the surface of a problem. For this reason, fitness plays an important part in the life of every Marine. Patton once said “High physical condition is vital to victory.” 15 CONCLUSION We must be faster than our opponent. This means we must move fast, but, more importantly, we must act faster than our enemy. The aim is to tailor our tactics so that we can act faster than the --- Page 84 --- Being Faster 4-21 enemy force can react. Our ability to plan, decide, and execute faster than our enemy creates advantage that we can exploit. We have just discussed ways to impro ve our speed. Readers of this publication may think of additio nal ways to be fast. When you find one that works, tell your fellow Marines about it so they can use it too. Anything that works to make you faster is good even if it is not yet in the books. --- Page 86 --- Chapter 5 Adapting “Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after they occur.”1 —Giulio Douhet “In any problem where an opposing force exists, and cannot be regulated, one must foresee and provide for alternative courses. Adaptability is the law which governs survival in war as in life—war being but a concentrated form of the hu- man struggle against environment.”2 —B. H. Liddell Hart --- Page 88 --- Adapting 5-3 The modern battlefield is charact erized by friction, uncertaint y, disorder, and rapid change. Each situation is a unique combina- tion of shifting factors that cannot be controlled with precision or certainty. This chapter discusses ways to think about adapting or modifying our decisions based on changed circumstances or sud- den opportunities. A tactically proficient leader must be able to adapt actions to each situation. The OODA loop discussed in chapter 4 essentially describes the process of adaptation—we observe the situation, orient to it, decide what to do, and act. The antagonist who can consistently adapt more quickly to the situation will have a significant advan- tage. Adaptability is thus an impo rtant part of Marine Corps ta c- tics. In essence, adaptability means shortening the time it takes to adjust to each new situation. There are two basic ways to adapt. Sometimes we have enough situational awareness to unders tand a situation in advance and take preparatory action. This is anticipation. A t o t h e r t i m e s w e have to adapt to the situation on the spur of the moment withou t time for preparation. This is improvisation. To be fully adaptable, we must be able to do both. ANTICIPATION The first basic way to adapt is to anticipate, by which we mean to introduce new methods, schemes, or techniques for future use. In --- Page 89 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 5-4 order to anticipate, we must be able to forecast future actions , at least to some extent. Our forecasts are usually based on past expe- riences. Often a forecast involves considering what we learned through trial and error in training, exercises, or actual combat. An excellent example of anticipation is the Marine Corps’ develop- ment of amphibious warfare techniques at Quantico during the 1920s and 1930s. These techniques proved to be essential to suc - cess in World War II, both in the Pacific and in Europe. All planning at all ec helons is a form of anticipatory adapta- tion—adapting our actions in advance. Another important tool for tactical adaptation is the use of immediate-action drills or st and- ing operating procedures. These are practiced, pre-designed, generic actions which cover common situations. Having a collec- tion of these tools at our disposal allows us to react immediat ely in a coordinated way to a broad variety of tactical situations. Immediate-action drills do not replace the need for tactical ju dg- ment; they merely provide a way to seize initiative in the earl y stages of a developing situatio n until we can take more consid- ered action. They provide the basis for adaptation. IMPROVISATION The second basic way to adapt is to improvise, to adjust to a situa- tion on the spur of the moment without any preparation. Like antic- ipation, improvisation is key to maneuver warfare. Improvisation --- Page 90 --- Adapting 5-5 requires creative, intelligent, and experienced leaders who have an intuitive appreciation for what will work and what will not. Improvisation is of critical imp ortance to increasing speed. It requires commanders who have a strong situational awareness and a firm understanding of thei r senior commander’s intent so that they can adjust their own actions in accordance with the higher commander’s desires. Often we will find ourselves in a sit- uation where our organic resources—weapons, vehicles, and so on—are not adequate to keep us moving fast. In France in 1940, German General Heinz Guderian put some of his infantry in com- mandeered French buses. On Grenada, when Army Rangers needed vehicles, they took East German trucks belonging to the Grenadian army. Sound unorthodox? There is nothing “orthodox” about failure due to an inability to adapt. For instance, take the situation in which Marines of the 2d Battal- ion, 5th Marine Regiment, found themselves in the battle of Hue City, Republic of Vietnam, in February 1968. One of their first objectives was to retake the city ’s Treasury building, which wa s heavily defended by the North Vietnamese. Prior to the assault, the Marines were disappointed to see that th eir mortar fire was having little effect on the building or its defenders. Then the bat- talion executive officer found some U.S. tear gas canisters and dispensers in the Military Assistance compound they had reoccu- pied. Realizing the North Vietnamese lacked gas masks, the Marines proceeded to lob the tear gas canisters into the Treasu ry building. As a result of the executive officer’s quick thinking and adaptation, the North Vietnamese q u i c k l y v a c a t e d t h e b u i l d i n g , and the Marines secured the objective with minimal casualties. 3 --- Page 91 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 5-6 FLEXIBLE PLANS We have several techniques to he lp us develop adaptability. One of these is to make flexible plans. Flexible plans can enhance adaptability by establishing a cour se of action that provides f or multiple options. For example, a blocking position that covers two avenues of approach from th e same location instead of only one provides the flexibility to adapt to an enemy coming throug h either avenue. We can increase our flexibility by providing branches for current and future operations. Branches are options (e.g., changing dispo- sitions, orientation, strength, movement, or accepting or declining battle) to deal with changing conditions on the battlefield that may affect the plan. 4 Flexibility can also be i ncreased by providing sequels for current and future operations. Sequels are courses of action to follow prob- able battle or engagement outcomes; victory, defeat, or stalemate.5 The value of branches and sequels is that they prepare us for sev- eral different actions. We should keep the number of branches and sequels to a relative few. We should not try to develop so many branches and sequels that we cannot adequately plan, train, or prepare for any of them. Th e skillful, well-thought-out use of branches and sequels becomes an important means of anticipating future courses of action. This anticipation helps accelerate th e decision cycle and therefore increases tempo. --- Page 92 --- Adapting 5-7 Flexible plans avoid unnecessary detail that not only consumes time in their development but has a tendency to restrict subord i- nates’ latitude. Instead, flexible plans lay out what needs to be accomplished but leave the mann er of accomplishment to subor- dinates. This allows the subordinates the flexibility to deal with a broader range of circumstances. Flexible plans are plans that can be easily changed. Plans that require coordination are said to be “coupled.” If all the parts of a plan are too tightly coupled, the plan is harder to change beca use changing any one part of the plan means changing all the other parts. Instead, we should try to develop modular, loosely coupled plans. Then if we change or modify any one part of the plan, it does not directly affect all the other parts. 6 Finally, flexible plans should be simple plans. Simple plans ar e easier to adapt to the rapidly changing, complex, and fluid sit ua- tions that we experience in combat. DECENTRALIZATION Another excellent way to improv e adaptability is to decentraliz e decisionmaking authority as much as each situation allows. This means that commanders on the scene and closest to the events have the latitude to deal with the situation as required on their --- Page 93 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 5-8 own authority—but always in accordance with the higher com- mander’s intent. This decentra lization speeds up reaction time: we do not have to wait for information to flow up to a higher commander and orders to flow back down. It increases the responsiveness of the organization, which in turn increases adapt- ability. Decentralizing control th rough the use of mission orde rs is one of the tools we use to maximize our ability to adapt. Confidence in the abilities of subordinates plays an important part in decentralization. Leaders who have confidence in the capabil i- ties of their subordinates will feel more comfortable in granti ng them greater latitude in accompli shing tasks. It fosters a clim ate where senior leaders know that their intent will be carried o ut. This was particularly true for the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, during Operation Desert Storm. As the battalion began breaching operations for the advance of th e 1st Marine Division across th e first two Iraqi mine belts, Marines were suddenly overwhelmed with “ ‘hundreds upon hundreds of Iraqis sporting white flags’ ” 7 who were trying to surrender. The number was so great that it threatened to stop the Marine advance. However, the battalion commander immediately recognized the situation, judged that the Iraqis were harmless, and instructed the battalion not to stop to accept their surrender. “It was precisely the . . . type of local situ- ation that [the division comma nder] wanted his commanders to recognize and use their own initiative to correct.” 8 Here the com- manding officer who was closest to the situation and who under- stood the division commander’s intent not to lose the momentum of the advance adapted to the s ituation. This adaptation result ed in a rapid breach of Iraqi defenses. --- Page 94 --- Adapting 5-9 CONCLUSION Successful warfare is filled with examples of leaders adapting to changing situations. We must st a r t t o l e a r n h o w t o a d a p t n o w during our training. Leaders should value and encourage innova- tive thinking. Moreover, they sh ould expect creative thinking from their subordinates because it creates new opportunities. For adaptation to be effective, commanders must readily exploit the opportunities uncovered by subordinates. Commanders can- not remain tied to plans that b lind them to fleeting opportunit ies. While making the best possible preparations, they must welcome and take advantage of unforeseen opportunities. --- Page 96 --- Chapter 6 Cooperating “Unity of command (effort) is coordinated action toward a common goal; it is cooperation. It is working together by all commanders toward the accomplishment of a common mis- sion, which is imperative for complete and final success. Commanders must develop in their staffs and subordinates the desire to cooperate, not only among themselves but with other elements of the command.” 1 —NA VMC 7386, Tactical Principles “The first element of command and control is people—peo- ple who gather information, make decisions, take action, communicate, and cooperate w ith one another in the ac- complishment of a common goal.”2 —MCDP 6, Command and Control --- Page 98 --- Cooperating 6-3 Everything that we have to do in tactics—gaining advantage and, above all, achieving a decisive result—needs a team effort. If efforts are not in harmony, results may be indecisive. For exam - ple, if the aviation combat eleme nt’s actions are not harmonize d with those of the ground combat element, they are unlikely to have a decisive effect. If artillery support is not well coordi nated with an infantry attack, combined arms synergy will not be achieved, and the attack may fail. However, achieving this team effort is easier said than done. It requires rapidly maneuverin g forces, often widely dispersed, to work together under the most adverse conditions. CONTROL IN COMBAT Because war is characterized by chaos, uncertainty, and rapid change, control quickly breaks down. It is probably a mistake to speak of control in combat. MCDP 6 states that “given the nature of war, it is a delusion to think that we can be in cont rol with any sort of certitude or precision.” 3 As anyone who has experienced combat will undoubted ly agree, it is impossible to control everything. Attempts to impose control also can easily undermine the initiative upon wh ich Marine Corps tactics depends. Marines can become hes itant; they may feel they must wait for orders before acting. We are not likely to move faster or gain leverage over a compet ent opponent unless Marines at every level exercise initiative. --- Page 99 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 6-4 The dilemma, then, is this: How do we achieve the goal of work- ing together in harmony while e xercising a more decentralized type of control? COOPERATION The beginning of the answer lies in cooperation. We define co- operation as the union of sel f-discipline and initiative in pur suit of a common goal. Cooperati on can be viewed as a component of control. Control can generally be divided into two types: centralized an d decentralized. Centralized control tends to be in one direction and works from the top down: someon e at a higher level determines what subordinates will and will not do. Centralized control makes us conform to higher dictates because only one person does the thinking for the organization—the person in control. In contrast, decentralized contr ol works from the bottom up. Command is the exercise of authority and guidance, and control is felt as feedback about the effects of the action taken becau se thinking is required at all leve ls. (See figure.) This feedback allows the commander to adapt to changing circumstances and to command subsequent action. Cooperation is required in decen- tralized control. Subordinates wo rk together laterally and from the bottom up to accomplish task s that fulfill the commander’s --- Page 100 --- Cooperating 6-5 intent. Cooperation means we t ake the initiative to help those around us accomplish our shared mission.4 Cooperation is essential to Marine Corps tactics. The flight leader and wingman work on the basis of cooperation. These pilots coop- erate with the infantry they support. Two infantry units, fight ing side by side, cooperate. A mobile combat service support detach - ment and the mechanized force it supports cooperate. We all work together far more effectively when we communicate laterally than Two views of the relationship between command and control. --- Page 101 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 6-6 when we communicate only through higher headquarters and respond only to centralized dir ection. As an ancillary benefit, we relieve our overloaded communications networks. The history of tactics is filled with examples where cooperatio n made the difference—and contro l could not. One such example occurred during an Iraqi counterattack in Operation Desert Storm. Black smoke from burning oil wells turned the day into night. A UH-1N Huey pilot used night vision equipment to lead flights of AH-1W Cobras through near-zero visibility to attack Iraqi armored vehicles. The specially equipped Huey designated tar- gets so that the Cobras could engage them at near pointblank range with antiarmor Hellfire mi ssiles. For nearly 10 hours, th e Huey pilot led flight after flig ht into the pitched battle, ear ning the Navy Cross for heroism.5 The pilots worked together to d estroy targets the Huey could no t eng age an d th e Co bra co uld no t see. Thi s example shows what cooperation can accomplish. DISCIPLINE Cooperation can harmonize efforts and get everyone to work together without the centrali zed control that undermines initia - tive. However, it raises a more fundamental question: How do we prepare people to cooperate when the going gets tough? --- Page 102 --- Cooperating 6-7 The answer is discipline. “There is only one kind of discipline — PERFECT DISCIPLINE. If you do not enforce and maintain dis- cipline, you are potential murderers.”6 In the face of adversity and difficulty, discipline enables individuals to pursue what is best for those around them, their unit, and the Marine Corps. Individual s and units might have the desire, but without discipline they wi ll be unable to accomplish the most difficult tasks in combat—oper- ating faster than the enemy, gaining advantage, generating deci - sive force, and achieving decisive results. In combat, instant obedience to orders is crucial. Orders may n ot be popular, but there comes a point where they must be carried out without question. Discipline is a result of training. In training for war, discipline should be firm, but fair. The Marine Corps is known as a highly disciplined fig hting force. Discipline is one of the strengths that make Marine s equally effective assaulting a beach, conducting a noncombatant evacuation operation, fighting a fire, or guarding our embassies. Nonetheless, discipline is founded not only on obedience but also on a sense of duty. The discipline needed for cooperation comes from two sources: imposed discipline and self-disci pline. The first source, impos ed discipline, is more often associa ted with the term “military di s- cipline.” Imposed discipline, t ypified by the Prussian approach , is characterized by instant obe dience to orders. External in nature, it ensures compliance w ith established procedures, rule s, or guidance and direction from above. It is a means to achieve efficiency in accomplishment of routine duties or drills. In it s most extreme form, it can be rigi d, paralyzing, and destructive --- Page 103 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 6-8 of initiative. Imposed discipline also may make units vulnerabl e to the effects of chaos and uncertainty and unable to cooperate with one another. Self-discipline is an internal f orce that morally obligates all Marines to do what they know is right—in this case, to cooper- ate with every other Marine in the pursuit of a common goal. The obligation is internal in each individual; it is something he o r she feels powerfully about. Coupled with a sense of camaraderie and esprit de corps, it pulls from w ithin and causes Marines to do everything they can for fellow Marines. At the unit level, this force can be felt as morale. “No system of tactics can lead to vic- tory when the morale of an army is bad.”7 Self-discipline can be seen in successful athletic teams as wel l as military units. Team players ins tinctively back up their team- mates. In baseball, the outfielders cover each other on flyballs. In hockey, rarely does only one player rush the goal. In football, offensive linemen do not stand by idly on a pass play if no defen- sive player faces them. They blo ck the first defender they can find. Members of squads and fire teams also work together as teams to accomplish tasks and take care of each other. This coop- eration among teammates cannot be enforced by a coach or leader. It depends upon the self-discipline of the individuals. Marine discipline is the self-dis cipline of a successful team, not just the imposed discipline of the army of Frederick the Great. For Marines, military discipline means accepting personal responsibil- ity. Self-discipline will not a llow us to shirk responsibility or --- Page 104 --- Cooperating 6-9 blame others. A discipline failure—often a failure to act—is a per- sonal failure. Our form of discipline is also absolute. There is no time off. Someone else may be in charge, but that does not absolve us from the responsibility to do everything we can to achieve the common goal. It does not reduce our re sponsibility to cooperate with f el- low Marines in our unit and beyond. This discipline is a mindset, a way of thinking and behaving . It runs through everything that we do. It is as much a part of gar ri- son life as of combat. We also carry this sense of personal respon- sibility and duty to contribute into our private lives. We see it whenever off-duty Marines take the initiative to help at the scene of an accident, act as leaders in their communities, or in othe r ways do more than their share. They do so because of something inward, not because they are com pelled by control. That some- thing is self-discipline, and it is not limited to one aspect of life. CONCLUSION Modern tactics relies on coopera tion. Cooperation, in turn, de- pends on discipline. Discipline consists of both imposed disci- pline and self-discipline. As leaders of Marines, we must create a climate in which self-disciplin e and a high level of initiative can flourish within the boundaries of military discipline. This climate --- Page 105 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 6-10 depends on us. Words are easy; anyone can give an occasional pep talk on the merits of self-discipline. Marines judge action s, not words, and respond positively to leadership by example. If the leader creates a climate where perfect discipline is expected a nd demonstrated, cooperation will follow. --- Page 106 --- Chapter 7 Exploiting Success and Finishing “Do not delay in the attack. Wh en the foe has been split off and cut down, pursue him immediately and give him no time to assemble or form up . . . spare nothing. Without regard for difficulties, pursue the enemy day and night until he has been annihilated.”1 —Field Marshal Prince Aleksandr V . Suvorov “Pursue the last man to the Adda and throw the remains into the river.”2 —Field Marshal Prince Aleksandr V . Suvorov “When we have incurred the risk of a battle, we should know how to profit by the victory, and not merely content our- selves, according to custom, with possession of the field.”3 —Maurice de Saxe --- Page 108 --- Exploiting Success and Finishing 7-3 It is not enough merely to gain advantage. The enemy will not surrender simply by being placed at a disadvantage. The successful leader exploits a ny advantage aggressively and ruthlessly not once but repeated ly until the opportunity arises for a finishing stroke. We must always be on the lookout for such opportunities—whether we create them ourselves or they arise in the flow of action—and when we perceive an opportunity to be decisive, we must seize it. The application of Marine Corp s tactics does not mean that we expect to win effortlessly or bloodlessly or that we expect the enemy to collapse by being outmaneuvered. It means we look for and make the most of every advantage and apply the decisive stroke when the opportunity presents itself. BUILDING ON ADV ANTAGE Once we have gained an advantage, we exploit it. We use it to create new opportunities. We th en exploit those opportunities t o create others, shaping the flow o f action to our advantage. The advantages do not necessarily have to be large; even small favor- ing circumstances exploited repeatedly and aggressively can quickly multiply into decisive advantages. Like the chess grand - master, we must think ahead to our next move and the one beyond it: How am I going to use this advantage to create another one? For example, in an attack by penetration, once we --- Page 109 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 7-4 have created one advantage by punching through the enemy’s position and getting into his r ear, we create another by pourin g forces through the gap, generating the “expanding torrent” that Liddell Hart wrote about. 4 Rommel recounts how exploiting each advantage in the battle for Kuk in the Carpathian mountain s during World War I led to another opportunity. As his detac hment exploited each situation and moved farther behind the enemy lines, it generated more sur- prise and advantage. During th is action, Rommel’s detachment captured thousands of enemy sold iers with very little fighting, due largely to his unwillingness to lose momentum. One success led directly to another opportunity, which he immediately seized.5 After the battle for Tarawa in November 1943, Major Henry Crowe, Commanding Officer of 2 d Battalion, 8th Marines, was asked why he thought the Japanese had been defeated so quickly once the Marines were established ashore. He remarked that it was due to the constant pressure of naval gunfire, bombs, and mortars. The Marines used their advantage in supporting arms to create opportunities for success. 6 CONSOLIDATION, EXPLOITATION, AND PURSUIT Once we have created leverage, how do we take advantage of it? A decisive result or victory rarely stems from the initial action, no matter how successful. More often, victories are the result of --- Page 110 --- Exploiting Success and Finishing 7-5 aggressively exploiting some r elative advantage until one becomes decisive and the action turns into a rout. Casualty rat es historically tend to remain relatively constant and often fairl y even until one side or the other tries to flee. Only then do si gnifi- cantly asymmetrical casualty rates commonly occur. This exploitation of the enemy’s bad situation can yield surprisingl y great results. We can take several specific types of actions to exploit opportuni- ties we have created or discovered. The first way we can exploi t success is by consolidation—as when we consolidate our forces after seizing a position we intend to hold against the enemy.7 Here our aims are limited to protecti ng what we have already gained. We must realize that by consolid ating, rather than continuing t o force the issue, we may be su rrendering the initiative. There may be any number of reasons for choosing this course. Perhaps we lack the strength to continue to advance. Our new gain may be o f critical importance, and the risk of losing it outweighs the ad van- tages of any further gains. Perhaps the new gain by itself gran ts a significant advantage. For ins tance, a position that provides excellent fires or threatens the enemy’s lines of communication s may put the enemy in an untenable position. Perhaps the new gain compels the enemy to meet us on our terms—for example, we seize a critical piece of terrain with strong defensive qualities, forcing the enemy to attack on unfavorable terms. The second way to pursue an advantage is through exploitation, an offensive tactic that is desi gned to disorganize the enemy i n depth. 8 Exploitation usually follows a successful attack that has created or exposed some enemy vulnerability. For example, an --- Page 111 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 7-6 attack that has torn a gap in enemy defenses allows us to attac k vital enemy rear areas. The object of exploitation is not to destroy the combat forces directly opposing us, even though they may be weakened. Instead, the object is to disrupt the entire enemy sy s- tem by attacking important activities and functions. For example, during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the Army’s Tiger Brigade was employed by the 2d Marine Division as an exploitation force during the division’s final attack. The brig ade had the advantage over the Iraqis in speed, fire-power, and nig ht combat capabilities. With these a dvantages the Tiger Brigade sliced deep into the rear of th e Iraqi III Corps and sealed off the vital highway intersections north o f A l J a h r a . T h e r e s u l t w a s a total disruption of the Iraqi organized defense.9 The third way to exploit advantage is through pursuit. A pursuit is an offensive tactic designed to catch or cut off a hostile f orce that has lost cohesion and is a ttempting to escape in order to destroy it.10 If the intent is to bring about the final destruction or capture of the enemy’s forces, then pursuit should be pushed with the utmost vigor. It is here that operations turn into routs, a nd overwhelming victories often occur. General Grant’s pursuit of Gen eral Lee’s Confederate Army of Northern Virginia from Petersburg to Appomattox in April 1865 is a classic example of a pursuit. Here Grant pushed his forces to their limits in order to prevent Lee’s escape. This ultimately led to the capture and surrender of Lee’s forces.11 --- Page 112 --- Exploiting Success and Finishing 7-7 The Confederate Army’s Lieutenant General Thomas J. “Stone- wall” Jackson summed up pursuit when he said, “Strike the enemy and overcome him, never give up the pursuit as long as your men have strength to follow; for an enemy routed, if hotly pursued, becomes panic-stricken, and can be destroyed by half their number.” 12 FINISHING THE ENEMY Ultimately, we want to cultivate opportunities into a decisive advantage. Once we do, we make the most of it. Marine Corps tactics calls for leaders who a re “strong finishers.” We must have a strong desire to “go for the jugular.” We must be con- stantly trying to find or to create the opportunity to deliver the decisive blow. At the same tim e, we must not be premature in our actions. We must not make the decisive move before the conditions are right. This ability to finish the enemy once and for all derives first from possessing an aggressive mentality. Second, it stems from an understanding of the commander’s intent. Third, it stems from a keen situational awareness that helps us recognize opportunitie s when they present themselves and understand when the condi- tions are right for action. --- Page 113 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 7-8 USE OF THE RESERVE IN COMBAT The reserve is an important too l for exploiting success. The re - serve is a part of the commande r’s combat power initially with- held from action in order t o influence future action. 13 The reason to create and maintain a reserve is to provide flexibility to d eal with the uncertainty, chance, and disorder of war. The reserve is thus a valuable tool for maintaining adaptability. In general, the more uncertain the situation, the larger should be the reserve. Napoleon once said that “War is composed of nothing but acci- dents, and . . . a general should never lose sight of everythin g to enable him to profit from [those] accidents.” 14 These accidents take the form of opportunities and crises. The reserve is a key tac- tical tool for dealing with both. The commander should have a purp ose in mind for the reserve’s employment and design it to fu lfill that purpose. To truly expl oit success may warrant assignment of the commander’s best subor- dinate unit or a preponderance of combat power or mobility assets to the reserve. Those comm anders who properly organize, task, and equip their reserves are usually the ones with the ca pa- bility to finish the enemy when the opportunity arises. Winston Churchill recognized the value of a reserve when he wrote: “It is in the use and with holding of their reserves that th e great Commanders have generally excelled. After all, when once the last reserve has been thrown in, the Commander’s part is played . . . . The event must be left to pluck and to the fighting troops.”15 --- Page 114 --- Exploiting Success and Finishing 7-9 A strong reserve is also a way to retain the initiative. If an advance s l o w s , t h e r e s e r v e c a n i n c r e a se the momentum. If an advance picks up speed, the commitment of the reserve can create a rout . We may use the reserve to expand or exploit gaps or penetrations. We may commit the reserve to attack in a different direction, thus exploiting opportunities for success instead of reinforcing failure. Without a strong reserve, even t he most promising opportunities can be lost. A classic example of the use of the reserve is the battle for T ar- awa. With the 2d and 8th Marine Regiments held up on the assault beaches, General Julian Smith decided to land the 6th Marine Regiment, the division reserve, to break the stalemate. The 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, which was task-organized as par t of the division reserve, landed on the western end of the islan d, passed through 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, and from the flank con- ducted a swift and violent assault of the Japanese fortificatio ns across the island. Within 48 hours, the Japanese forces were anni- hilated and the island secured. General Smith’s use of his reserve to exploit success and finish the enemy was the key to victory at Tarawa. 16 (See figure on page 7-10.) Sometimes we must employ the rese rve to deal with some crisis, rendering it temporarily unavaila ble for commitment elsewhere. In such instances, a reserve sh ould be reconstituted as rapidly as possible. We should look for the opportunity to employ the reserve to reinforce success. However we may employ the reserve, we should always think of it as the tool for clinching the --- Page 115 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 7-10 victory. In this respect, Marshal Foch wrote that “the reserve is a club, prepared, organized, reserved, carefully maintained with a view to carrying out the one act of battle from which a result is expected—the decisive attack.”17 It is generally through offensive action, even in the defense, that we achieve decisive results. Since the reserve represents our bid to achieve a favorable dec i- sion or to prevent an unfavorable one, it often becomes the main effort once committed and should be supported by all the other elements of the force. Along with the tangible assets used as a reserve, the prudent com- mander must also be aware of, and plan for, the intangible factors --- Page 116 --- Exploiting Success and Finishing 7-11 that impact combat power and its sustainment. Intangible factor s include fatigue, leadership qual ity, proficiency, morale, team- work, and equipment maintena nce. We build reserves also by reserving aviation sortie rates o r numbers, withholding unique or low-density munitions, or holding critical supplies such as fuel or petroleum, oils, and lubricants for a specific goal. We conside r these intangible factors when cr eating and tasking the reserve, as we do in all assignments of tasks. These concepts apply not only to units initially designated as the reserve but also to any unit, since any unit can be shifted or recommitted as the reserve. Thu s a commander must always be mentally prepared to redesignate roles of units and to create a nd use reserves as the situation requires.18 CONCLUSION Most decisive victories do not result from the initial action, but from quickly and aggressively e xploiting the opportunities cre- ated by that action. We may find any number of ways to exploit tactical opportunity, but they all have the same object—to increase leverage until we have the final opportunity to decide the issue once and for all in our favor. A goal in Marine Corps tactics is not merely to gain advantage but to boldly and ruthlessly exploit that advantage to achieve final victory. --- Page 118 --- Chapter 8 Making It Happen “Nine-tenths of tactics are certain, and taught in books: but the irrational tenth is like th e kingfisher flashing across the pool and that is the test of generals. It can only be ensured by instinct, sharpened by thought practicing the stroke so often that at the crisis it is as natural as a reflex.” 1 —T. E. Lawrence “It cannot be too often repeated that in modern war, and es- pecially in modern naval war, the chief factor in achieving triumph is what has been done in the way of thorough preparation and training before the beginning of war.”2 —Theodore Roosevelt --- Page 120 --- Making It Happen 8-3 Reading and understanding the id eas in this publication are the initial steps on the road to tactical excellence. The primary way a Marine leader becomes an able tactician is through training and education, both of which are firmly rooted in doctrine. Doctrin e establishes the philosophy and practical framework for how we fight. Education develops the u nderstanding, creativity, milita ry judgment, and the background essential for effective battlefiel d leadership. Training follows doc trine and develops the tactical and technical proficiency that underlies all successful militar y action. Individual and group exercises serve to integrate train ing and education, producing a whole that is greater than the sum o f its parts. The lessons learned from training and operational ex pe- rience then modify doctrine. DOCTRINE Doctrine establishes the fundamental beliefs of the Marine Corps on the subject of war and how we practice our profession. 3 Doc- trine establishes a particular way of thinking about war and ou r way of fighting, a philosophy fo r leading Marines in combat, a mandate for professionalism, a nd a common language. Doctrinal development benefits from our collective experience and distill s its lessons to further education and training. Our doctrine within the Marine Corps begins with the philosophy contained in MCDP 1, Warfighting. This philosophy underlies publications in the Marine Corps Warfighting Publications series --- Page 121 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 8-4 that contain tactics, techniques, and procedures for specific f unc- tions. This body of thought helps form Marine tacticians throug h its implementation in education and training. (See figure.) EDUCATION While combat provides the most in structive lessons on decision- making, tactical leaders cannot wait for war to begin their educa- tion. We must be competent in our profession before our skills are called upon. The lives of our Marines depend on it. Our education in tactics must d evelop three qualities within al l tactical leaders. The first quality is creative ability. Tactical lead- ers must be encouraged to devise and pursue unique approaches to military problems. No rules govern ingenuity. The line separat- ing boldness from foolhardiness is drawn by the hand of practical experience. That said, an education in tactics must possess an ele- ment of rigor. Too often, tactical discussions lack an in-depth The doctrinal development cycle. --- Page 122 --- Making It Happen 8-5 analysis of cause and effect. The tactically proficient leader must learn how to analyze solutions to tactical problems. Lacking such a rigorous analysis, the tactic ian will not learn from experien ce nor exercise creative ability. The second quality is military judgment, which includes the skills for gaining situational awareness and acting decisively. The tacti- cian must readily recognize the critical factors in any situati on— enemy capabilities, weather, terra in characteristics, and the c on- dition of our own forces, to men tion just a few. Marine leaders must be able to cut to the heart of a situation by identifying its important elements, developing a sound plan, and making clear decisions. Our educational approach should emphasize the ability to understand the mission, issue a clear intent, and determine the main effort. The third quality is moral courage. Moral courage is the ability to make and carry out the decision regardless of personal cost. It is different from—and rarer than —physical courage. The cost of physical courage may be injury or death, whereas the cost of moral courage may be the loss of friends, popularity, prestige, or career opportunities. The burden of conflicting responsibilitie s in combat—responsibility for the liv es of subordinates, support fo r peers, loyalty to superiors, duty to the Nation—can be heavy. Our educational efforts should l ead potential leaders to work through the proper resolution of such conflicts in peacetime. Leaders often need to make morally correct decisions in combat, but there will rarely be time for deep moral or ethical contemp la- tion on the battlefield. --- Page 123 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 8-6 An effective leader willingly takes on the risks which come wit h military responsibilities. In that light, the greatest failing of a leader is a failure to lead. Two steadfast rules apply. First, in situ- ations clearly requiring independent decisions, a leader has th e solemn duty to make them. Whet her the subsequent action suc- ceeds or fails, the leader has made an honorable effort. The broad exercise of initiative by all Marines will likely carry the bat tle in spite of individual errors. Second, inaction and omission based on a failure of moral courage are much worse than any judgment error reflecting a sincere effort to act. Errors resulting from such moral failings lead not only to ta ctical setbacks but to the br eak- down of faith in the chain of command. Proper training, educa- tion, and concerned leadership are the keys to instilling the qualities of creative ability, military judgment, and moral courage in the minds of all Marines. TRAINING Good tactics depend upon sound t echnical skills. These are the techniques and procedures which enable us to move, shoot, and communicate. We achieve technical competence through train- ing. We build skills through repetition. Training also instills con- fidence in weapons and equipment. It develops the specialized skills essential to functioning in combat. One of the ultimate aims of training is speed. Essential to speed is the requirement for accuracy. S peed without accuracy may be --- Page 124 --- Making It Happen 8-7 counterproductive and causes more damage than inaction. Whether Marines comput e firing data, pract ice rifle marksman- ship or weapons gunnery, rearm a nd refuel aircraft, repair vehi - cles, stock or transport supplies, or communicate information, the speed and accuracy of their actions determine the tempo of the overall force. Training develops the proficiency which enables this effective combination of speed and accuracy. Small-unit training should focus on proficiency in such tech- niques and procedures as immedia te-action drills, battle drills , and unit standing operating proc edures. Practicing to reach tec h- nical proficiency applies to all types of units, whether a section of aircraft executing air combat man euvers, a maintenance contact team repairing a vehicle under fire, an artillery gun team conduct- ing displacement drills, or a rif le squad conducting an in-stri de breach of an obstacle. We develop and refine these measures so that units gain and maintain the speed and accuracy essential f or success in battle. Staffs, like units and individua l leaders, must train to increa se speed and accuracy. Staffs increase speed by accomplishing three things: first, by obtaining and o rganizing information to help the commander and themselves underst and the situation; second, by understanding the commander’s decision and coordinating efforts to focus combat power to achieve the commander’s goal; and third, by monitoring events, mai ntaining situational awareness, and anticipating and adapting to changes. As staffs train, they increase accuracy by becoming more proficient both in their respective areas and in functioning as a team. --- Page 125 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 8-8 Field Marshal Erwin Rommel knew the value of speed and accu- racy for his staff when he wrote: A commander must accustom his staff to a high tempo from the outset, and continuously keep them up to it. If he once allows himself to be satisfied with norms, or anything less than an all-out effort, he gives up the race from the starting post, and will sooner or later be taught a bitter lesson. 4 The speed and efficiency of a unit depend not only on the techn i- cal proficiency of its individual members but also in large par t upon its cohesiveness. Such cohesion requires both personnel sta- bility and solid leadership. Training should also prepare Mar ines for the uniquely physical nature of combat. Living and caring for themselves in a spartan environment, confronting the natu ral elements, and experiencing the discomfort of being hungry, thirsty, and tired are as essen tial in preparing for combat duty as any skills training. The point is not to train individuals on how to be miserable, but rather on how to be effective when miserable or exhausted. Likewise, training should enable us to take appropriate action in any environment and at any time. This readiness includes operat - ing during inclement weather an d periods of limited visibility. We must make terrain, weather, and darkness our allies if we ar e to gain advantage and deliver decisive force at a time and plac e of our choosing. We can neither anticipate nor appreciate the inherent friction that these natural factors produce unless we experience them.5 --- Page 126 --- Making It Happen 8-9 TRAINING AND EDUCATIONAL METHODS There is no single “best” approach to developing tactical profi - ciency. However, any approach should be adaptable to all eche- lons and to all grades. The en vironment should be one that is challenging and conducive to cr eative thinking. Like all prepar a- tion for war, training should reflect the rigors of that environment. The following examples may provide some tools for developing tactical proficiency in Marines. Professional Reading and Historical Study Because of the relative infrequency of actual combat experi- ences in most military leaders’ careers, Marines must seek to expand their understanding through other, less direct means. Th e study of military history is criti cal to developing judgment an d insight. It enables us to see how successful commanders have thought through—and fought through—the situations they faced. Not many people can do it instinctively—few possess the rare native ability to think militarily. Even those few can enhance their abilities through study and practice. Historical studies provide the most readily available source of indi- rect experience in our profession. These studies describe the lead- ership considerations, the horrors of war, the sacrifices endur ed, the commitment involved, the resources required, and much more. These studies include biographies and autobiographies of military figures, books on specific battle s, wars, and military institut ions, unit histories, after-action repo rts, films, and documentaries. --- Page 127 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 8-10 Group discussions help to expand the insights into leadership and battle that we have gained through individual study. Professional readings and study are not solely the responsibili ty of military schools. Individuals cannot afford to wait for atte n- dance at a military school to begin a course of self-directed study. Military professionalism demands that indiv iduals and units fin d time to increase their professio nal knowledge through profes- sional reading, professional military education classes, and in di- vidual study. Tactical Exercises Tactical success evolves from the synthesis of training and educa- tion—the creative application of t echnical skills based on sound judgment. Exercises enable leaders to practice decisionmaking and individuals, staffs, and units to practice and perfect collective skills. Exercises also serve to test and improve tactics, tech- niques, and procedures, immediate actions, battle drills, and com- bat standing operating procedures. An exercise should serve as a unit’s internal assessment of the quality of its training and educat ion, not as grading criteria for higher commands. The conclusions should aim to note shortfalls so as to address them through future instruction and not to penalize poor performance. A unit will never be fully trained. There wil l always be room for improvement. Exercises also test the ability of units to sustain tempo for a n extended period of time. Since v ictory is rarely the product of --- Page 128 --- Making It Happen 8-11 single actions, the ability to operate and sustain combat effective- ness over time is important. K nowing when hostilities will ceas e is a convenience denied the comba t Marine. Equipment must be maintained, and people must be sustained with adequate rest, nourishment, and hygiene until they accomplish their mission. Tactical exercises can range from field exercises to command post exercises to tactical exercises without troops. Field exer - cises, conducted by units of any size, involve all unit personn el working together to learn, test, and refine their collective ba ttle- field tasks. Such exercises can be general in nature, or they can be detailed rehearsals for specific upcoming missions. Command post exercises are lar gely limited to commanders and their staffs. Their purpose is to familiarize staffs with their com- manders’ personal preferences and operating styles as well as t o exercise staff techniques and procedures and to review particul ar contingency plans. Tactical exercises without troops provide tactical leaders opportu- nities to exercise ju dgment while permitting other unit element s to conduct training and educatio n of their own. There are two approaches to conducting them. The first method provides a leader an opportunity to evaluate a subordinate’s ability to perform in a given scenario. This meth od places students in an area of operations and provides a situati on upon which to plan and execute a task—for example, “Establish a reverse slope defense.” The aim here is to exercise tactical pr ofi- ciency in the siting of weapons and the use of terrain. --- Page 129 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 8-12 The second method also places students in an area of operations and provides a situation but gives them a mission order—for example, “Prevent enemy moveme nt north of Route 348.” The aim here is to exercise judgment. After walking the ground, the students must first decide whether to defend or attack, supporting their conclusions with reasoning. The reasoning is then discussed and criticized. This approach encourages students to demonstrate ingenuity and initiative. They ha ve free rein to employ their resources as they see fit to achieve the desired results.6 Wargaming Wargames can be a valuable tool for understanding the many fac- tors that influence a leader’s decisions. Morale, enemy and friendly situations, the higher commander’s intentions, fire- power, mobility, and terrain are o nly a few of the decision fac - tors included in the play of war games. In all these simulations , from the sand table to a commerc ial board game to a comput- erized simulation, routine should be avoided. The less familiar the environment, the more creativity the student must display. Sand table exercises, tactical decision games, and map exercise s present students with a general s ituation, mission orders, and a minimum of information on enemy and friendly forces. Sand table exercises are especially suited to novice tacticians. They pres ent the terrain in three-dimensional a r r a y , w h e r e a s a m a p r e q u i r e s interpretation. Both map and sand table exercises enable students to conceptualize the battle, deliver their decisions, and issue orders to --- Page 130 --- Making It Happen 8-13 subordinates. Afterwards, students discuss their decisions and are critiqued. The discussion should focus on making a decision in the absence of perfect information or complete intelligence. Terrain Walks Terrain walks introduce the rea lities of terrain, vegetation, a nd weather. Terrain walks can be conducted in at least two ways. The first method provides stude nts with an area of operations, a general situation (usually depic ted on a map), and a mission. A s in sand table and map exercises, students describe their view o f the battle. Choosing one plan, the group then begins to walk th e terrain according to the plan. The group will then encounter unan- ticipated terrain and obstacles, while the instructors introduc e enemy actions into the play of th e problem. In this way, studen ts must contend with the disparity b etween actual terrain and vege - tation and maps as well as the chaos and uncertainty generated by enemy actions that invariably occur in real-world operations. The second method involves the firsthand study of historic battle- fields. We gain a special vantage on battle by walking the ground and seeing the battlefield from the perspective of both command- ers. We gain a new appreciation for an historical commander’s blunders. Often such blunders seem incomprehensible—until we see the ground. Only then can we realistically consider alternative courses of action that the commander might have pursued. 7 --- Page 131 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 8-14 Competition Exercises should provide realis m. The means to achieve tactical realism are competitive free-play or force-on-force exercises. Whenever possible, unit training should be conducted in a fre e- play scenario. This approach can be used by all leaders to develop their subordinates. It affords both leaders and unit me m- bers the opportunity to apply their skills and knowledge agains t an active threat. Free-play exercises are adaptable to all tactical scenarios and ben- eficial to all echelons. Whethe r it is fire teams scouting agai nst fire teams, sections of aircraft dueling in the sky, or compani es, battalions, squadrons, and Marine air-ground task forces operat - ing against one another, both leaders and individual Marines ben- efit. Leaders form and execute their decisions against an opposing force as individual Marines empl oy their skills against an acti ve enemy. Through free-play exercises, Marines learn to fight as a n organization and to deal with a realistically challenging foe.8 Critiques A key attribute of decisionmakers is their ability to reach dec i- sions with clear reasoning. Critiques elicit this reasoning process. Any tactical decision game or tactical exercise should culminat e with a critique. --- Page 132 --- Making It Happen 8-15 The standard approac h for conducting critiques should promote initiative. Since every tactical s ituation is unique and since no training situation can encompass more than a small fraction of the peculiarities of a real tactical situation, there can be no ide al or school solution. Critiques should focus on the students’ ration ale for doing what they did. What factors did a student consider, o r not consider, in making an estimate of the situation? Were the decisions the student made consistent with this estimate? Were the actions ordered tactically sound? Did they have a reasonabl e chance of achieving success? Ho w well were the orders commu- nicated to subordinates? These q uestions should form the basis for critiques. The purpose is to broaden a leader’s analytical pow- ers, experience level, and base of knowledge, thereby increasin g the student’s creative ability to devise sound, innovative solutions to difficult problems. Critiques should be open-minded and understanding, rather than rigid and harsh. Mistakes are essential to the learning process and should always be cast in a positive light. The focus should not be on whether a leader did well or poorly, but rather on the progr ess achieved in overall development. We must aim to provide the best climate to grow leaders. Damaging a leader’s self-esteem, espe- cially in public, therefore shou ld be strictly avoided. A leade r’s self-confidence is the wellsprin g from which flows the willing- ness to assume responsibility and exercise initiative.9 --- Page 133 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics 8-16 CONCLUSION In this publication, we have exp lored themes that help us to un - derstand the fundamentals and to master the art and science of tactics. From the study of our warfighting philosophy, we have gained an appreciation for the requirement to be decisive in ba t- tle. To accomplish this, we mus t clearly visualize the battlesp ace through gained situational awar eness, recognize patterns, and make decisions intuitively. We have also discussed ways we can gain the advantage over the enem y and force the enemy to bend to our will. We also explored how to be faster in relation to t he enemy, to adapt to changing conditions, to cooperate for succes s, to exploit success, and to finish the enemy. Finally, we discus sed how we can begin to act on th ese ideas during our training for combat. The ideas presented in this publication have implications far beyond battlefield tactics and the doctrinal way we think about warfare. They also influ ence the way we organize—using task organization and flexible c o m m a n d a n d c o n t r o l r e l a t i o n - ships—and the way we equip ourselves for combat. Waging war in maneuver warfare style demands a professional body of officers and Marines schooled in its science and art. When asked why the Marines were so successful in Operation Desert Storm, General Boomer replied: The thing that made the big diff erence on the battlefield is th at we had thousands and thousands of individual Marines con- stantly taking the initiative. The young lance corporal would take a look, see something 75 or 100 meters out in front that needed to be done, and go out and do it without being told. As I --- Page 134 --- Making It Happen 8-17 read through [the] award citations from Desert Shield and Des- ert Storm, this theme reappears, time and time again. That aggressive spirit comes from b eing well-trained, and confident in your professional knowledge.10 Everything we do in peacetime should prepare us for combat. Our preparation for combat depends upon training and education that develop the action and thought essential to battle. --- Page 136 --- Notes Notes-1 Understanding Tactics 1. Statement by Gen A. M. Gray, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, during a ceremony commemorating the anniversary of the groundbreaking for the Marine Corps Research Center, June 20, 1997. 2. Sir William Slim, Defeat into Victory (London: Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1956) pp. 550–551. 3. MCDP 1, Warfighting (June 1997) p. 30. MCDP 1’s definition differs from that given in Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dic- tionary of Military and Associated Terms : “ tactics—1. The employ- ment of units in combat. 2. The ordered arrangement and maneuve r of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to use their full potentialities.” 4. Ibid., p. 3. 5. Combat power: “The total means of destructive and/or disrup- tive force which a military unit/formation, can apply against t he oppo- nent at a given time.” (Joint Pub 1-02) 6. LtCol G. I. Wilson, “The Gulf War, Maneuver Warfare, and the Operational Art,” Marine Corps Gazette (June 1991) pp. 23–24. 7. This example was taken from Joseph H. Alexander, Utmost Savagery; The Three Days of Tarawa (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995). 8. B ill D. Ross, Iwo Jima: Legacy of Valor (NY: Vanguard Press, 1985) pp. 79–80. --- Page 137 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics Notes-2 9. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 119. 10. Medal of Honor Recipients 1863–1973 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973) p. 492. 11. Clausewitz, p. 85. 12. Infantry in Battle (Washington, D.C.: The Infantry Journal, Incorporated, 1939) p.1. Achieving a Decision 1. Infantry in Battle, p. 1. 2. FMFM 1, Warfighting (March 1989) p. 61. 3. Martin Blumenson, Anzio: The Gamble That Failed (Phil- adelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1963). 4. Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative (NY: Random House, 1963) pp. 467–468. 5. Maj Charles D. Melson, Evelyn A. Englander, Capt David A. Dawson, comps., U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: Anthol- ogy and Annotated Bibliography (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, History and Muse ums Division, 1992) p. 181. Also see pages 173–182 of the same publication and LtCol Charles H. Cure ton, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: With the 1st Marine Divi- sion in Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993) pp. 26–27. --- Page 138 --- Notes Notes-3 Gaining Advantage 1. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Col, USMC, Retired, Dictionary of Mil- itary and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Insti- tute, 1966) p. 321. 2. FMFM 1, p. 57. 3. Combined arms: “The tactic s, techniques, and procedures employed by a force to integrate firepower and mobility to prod uce a desired effect upon the enemy.” FMFRP 0-14, Marine Corps Supple- ment to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (January 1994). 4. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers , v o l . 2 ( B o s t o n , M A : Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974) pp. 39–40. 5. Andrew Geer, The New Breed (NY : Harper & Brothers, 1952) p. 339. 6. Ibid., pp. 365–366. 7. Joe Douglas Dodd, “Night Attack on Kunishi Ridge,” Marine Corps Gazette (April 1985) p. 43. 8. Ibid., pp. 42–44. 9. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (NY: Oxford University Press, 1963) p. 91. 10. Ibid., p. 106. --- Page 139 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics Notes-4 11. Maj Robert R. Parker, Jr., “Deception: The Missing Tool,” Marine Corps Gazette (May 1992) p. 97. 12. Sun Tzu, p. 98. 13. The Marines in Vietnam, 1954–1973: An Anthology and Anno- tated Bibliography (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1985) pp. 173–181. 14. FMFM 6-7, Scouting and Patrolling for Infantry Units (January 1989) p. 2-1. 15. Sun Tzu, p. 93. Being Faster 1. Heinl, p. 220. 2. John A. English, On Infantry (NY: Praeger, 1984) p. 223. 3. Jeter A. Isley and Philip A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory, and Its Practice in the Pacific (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951) p. 338. 4. Peter G. Tsouras, Warrior’s Words: A Quotation Book: From Sesostris III to Schwarzkopf, 1871 B.C. to A.D. 1991 (London: Cassell Arms and Armour, 1992), p. 434. 5. Heinl, p. 63. 6. “Command,” Time (January 25, 1943) p. 61. 7. Col Ray Smith, USMC, telephone interview by Capt S. R. Shoemaker, USMC, 12 March 1991, Washington, D.C.. --- Page 140 --- Notes Notes-5 8. Gen Hermann Balck, interview by William S. Lind, 6 June 1980, Washington, D.C.. 9. William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder , CO: Westview Press, 1985) pp. 5–6. 10. Gen George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It ( N Y : B a n t a m Books, Inc., 1979) p. 323. 11. Ibid., pp. 330–331. 12. English, p. 217. 13. Capt A. T. Mahan, USN, The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1899) p. 730. 14. FMFRP 12-110, Fighting on Guadalcanal (September 1991) p. 33. 15. Patton, p. 376. Adapting 1. Tsouras, p. 21. 2. Ibid., p. 21. 3. Keith William Nolan, Battle for Hue (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983) pp. 51–52. 4. Branch: “A contingency plan or course of action (an option built into the basic plan or course of action) for changing the mission, disposition, orientation, or dir ection of movement of the force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportuni ties, or --- Page 141 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics Notes-6 disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions as determined during the wargaming process.” MCRP 5-2A, Operational Terms and Graphics (June 1997). 5. Sequel: “Major operations that follow the current major opera- tion. Plans for these are based on the possible outcomes (victo ry, stale- mate, or defeat) associated with the current operation.” (MCRP 5-2A). 6. See MCDP 5, Planning, for a more complete discussion of modular plans. 7. Cureton, p. 77. 8. Ibid, p. 77. Cooperating 1. NA VMC 7386, Tactical Principles (Quantico, V A: Marine Corps Schools, 1955) p. 7–8. 2. MCDP 6, Command and Control (October 1996) p. 48. 3. Ibid., p. 43. 4. Ibid., pp. 39–41. 5. Melson, Englander, and Dawson, comps., p. 140. 6. Patton, p. 376. 7. Heinl, p. 196. --- Page 142 --- Notes Notes-7 Exploiting Success and Finishing 1. Tsouras, p. 349. 2. Ibid., p. 349. 3. Heinl, p. 109. 4. Capt B. H. Liddell Hart, “The ‘Man-in-the-Dark’ Theory of Infantry Tactics and the ‘Expanding Torrent’ System of Attack,” Jour- nal of the R.U.S.I. (February 1921) p. 13. 5. Erwin Rommel, Attacks (Vienna, V A: Athena Press, 1979) pp. 235–250. 6. FMFRP 12-90, Second Marine Division Report on Gilbert Islands—Tarawa Operation (September 1991) p. 51. 7. Consolidation of position : “Organizing and strengthening a newly captured position so that it can be used against the enem y.” (Joint Pub 1-02) 8. Exploitation: “An offensive operation that usually follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in d epth.” (Joint Pub 1-02) 9. Col Charles J. Quilter, II, U.S. Marine Corps in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993) p. 99. --- Page 143 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics Notes-8 10. Pursuit: “An offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it.” (Joint Pub 1-02) 11. Bruce Catton, This Hallowed Ground: The Story of the Union Side of the Civil War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956) p. 384. 12. Heinl, p. 259. 13. Reserve: “Portion of a body of troops which is kept to the rear, or withheld from action at the beginning of an engagement, avai lable for a decisive moment.” Tactical reserve : “A part of a force, held under the control of the commander as a maneuvering force to in flu- ence future action.” (Joint Pub 1-02) 14. Brig Gen Thomas R. Phillips, U.S. Army, ed., “Military Max- ims of Napoleon,” in Roots of Strategy: A Collection of Military Clas- sics (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co., 1940) p. 436 . 15. Heinl, p. 275. 1 6 . T h i s e x a m p l e w a s t a k e n f r o m M a r t i n R u s s , Line of Depar- ture: TARAWA (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975). 17. Heinl, p. 274. 18. Much of the material in this section is based on Capt John F . Schmitt’s article, “The Use of the Reserve in Combat,” Marine Corps Gazette (March 1990) pp. 63–69. --- Page 144 --- Notes Notes-9 Making It Happen 1. T. E. Lawrence, “The Science of Guerrilla Warfare,” introduc- tion to “Guerrilla Warfare,” Encyclopedia Britannica , 1 3 t h e d . ( N Y : Encyclopedia Britannica, 1926). 2. Heinl, p. 329. 3. Doctrine: “Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objec- tives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application .” (Joint Pub 1-02) 4. As attributed to Erwin Rommel by Heinl, p. 60. 5. For more detailed information on the establishment of unit training programs, see MCRP 3-0A, Unit Training Management Guide (November 1996). 6. For more detailed readings on the subject of designing and ex e- cuting training exercises, see MCRP 3-0B, How to Conduct Training (November 1996). 7. William Glenn Robertson, The Staff Ride (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987) provides an excelle nt description of the use of terrain walks. See also Staff Ride Handbook (Quantico, V A: Marine Corps University, 1996). 8. This section reflects the emphasis found in MCDP 1, War- fighting, regarding the requirement to simulate the “clash of opposing wills” found in combat by conduc ting free-play exercises. --- Page 145 --- MCDP 1-3 Tactics Notes-10 9. The subject of how to conduct critiques and hold after-action reviews is covered in detail in both MCRP 3-0A and MCRP 3-0B. 10. Melson, Englander, and Dawson, comps., p. 94.