--- Page 1 --- USMC US Marine Corps PCN 143 000117 00 USMC MCWP 3-11.1 Infantry Company Operations DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. --- Page 2 --- DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, D.C. 20350-3000 6 October 2014 FOREWORD Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-11.1, Infantry Company Operations, is a complete rewrite of MCWP 3-11.1, Marine Rifle Company/Platoon . This publication contains a new mission statement for the infantry company that better reflects current real- ity. It also covers the range of military opera tions that deployed infantry companies deal with today or may deal with tomorrow. Desp ite this extended coverage, MCWP 3-11.1 is not intended to be all encomp assing. There are many aspects of infantry company opera- tions that are not addressed he rein because a specific publi cation already exists for that aspect. To cover it here would be redundant. This publication does serve, however, as the basic warfighting company publication and is to be used in conj unction with appropriate small unit, battalion, and other Marine Corps doctrinal and warfighting publications. This publication is intended fo r the infantry company comma nder and his staff. It is a foundational document that assists in the pr eparation and execution of company level operations in the current operational environment. This publication supersedes MCWP 3-11.1, Marine Rifle Company/Platoon, dated 17 February 1978, and cancels MCIP 3-11.01A, Infantry Company Operations, dated 5 December 2013. Reviewed and approved this date. BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS K. J. GLUECK, JR. Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration Publication Control Number: 143 000117 00 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. --- Page 3 --- 1-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 This Page Intentionally Left Blank --- Page 4 --- Infantry Company Operations __________________________________________________________________________________ iii INFANTRY COMPANY OPERATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1. General Philosophies Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 Conflict Continuum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 Range of Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 Infantry Company Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2 Rifle Company Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 Rifle Company Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 Duties of Key Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 Attachments and Enablers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8 Weapons Company Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9 Weapons Company Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10 Alternate Weapons Company Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12 Weapons Company Key Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-15 Chapter 2. Planning Planning Fundamentals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 Decisionmaking Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 The Value of Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2 Planning and Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2 Marine Corps Planning Process and Other Planning Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3 Modification of the Marine Corps Planning Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3 Other Planning Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4 Operational Planning Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4 Planning Execution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4 Problem Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4 Course of Action Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8 Course of Action Wargaming. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9 Course of Action Comparison and Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10 Orders Development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10 Transition (Preparation for Operations) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11 Assessment and Reorientation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12 Assessment Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-13 Analysis Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15 Chapter 3. Command and Control People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2 Task Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2 Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3 Transitions in Command and Control Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3 --- Page 5 --- iv _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Command and Control Transition Plans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5 Company Leadership Roles and Responsibilities in Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5 Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8 Classes of Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8 Information Characteristics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9 Managing Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9 Information Management Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9 Information Management Techniques and Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10 Command and Control Support Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13 Command Posts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14 Command and Control Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-19 Command and Control Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-21 Chapter 4. Intelligence Company Commander’s Role. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1 Evaluating Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1 Establishing Priority Intelligence Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1 Integrating Intelligence Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2 Staffing the Combat Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2 Step 1: Define the Battlespace Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2 Step 2: Describe the Battlespace Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4 Step 3: Evaluate the Adversary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6 Step 4: Determine Adversary Courses of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6 Information Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. . . . . . . . . . . 4-11 Intelligence Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14 Planning and Direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14 Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14 Processing and Exploitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-17 Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-17 Dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-17 Utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-18 Intelligence Support to Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-18 Intelligence Support to Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-18 Problem Framing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-18 Course of Action Development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-19 Course of Action Wargaming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-19 Course of Action Comparison and Decision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-19 Orders Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-19 Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-20 Intelligence Support to Execution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-20 Targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-20 Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-20 CARVER Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-21 Target Folders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-21 --- Page 6 --- Infantry Company Operations ___________________________________________________________________________________ v Company Level Intelligence Cell Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-21 Intelligence Training for All Marines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-22 Chapter 5. Company Level Fire Support Roles and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1 Company Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1 Fire Support Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2 Fire Support Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4 Begin Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4 Arrange for Reconnaissance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6 Make Reconnaissance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7 Complete the Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8 Issue the Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8 Supervise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8 Targeting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8 Decide. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-9 Detect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-9 Deliver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-10 Assess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-10 Fire Support Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-11 Fire Support Coordination at the Company Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-11 Clearing Fires at the Company Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12 Information Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13 Information Operations Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13 Information Operations and Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess . . . 5-16 Information Operations Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18 Chapter 6. Offensive Operations Purpose of the Offense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1 Marine Corps Planning Process in Offensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1 Characteristics of Offensive Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2 Fundamentals of Offensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3 Orient on the Enemy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3 Gain and Maintain Contact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3 Develop the Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3 Concentrate Superior Firepower at the Decisive Time and Place . . . 6-3 Achieve Surprise. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3 Exploit Known Enemy Weaknesses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3 Seize or Control Key Terrain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4 Gain and Maintain the Initiative. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4 Neutralize the Enemy’s Ability to React . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4 Advance by Fire and Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4 Maintain Momentum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4 Act Quickly. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4 Exploit Success. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4 --- Page 7 --- vi _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Be Flexible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5 Be Aggressive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5 Provide for the Security of the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5 Types of Offensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5 Movement to Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5 Attack Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-9 Exploitation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12 Pursuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13 Offensive Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13 Organization of the Battlespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-14 Distribution of Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-14 Forms of Offensive Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-15 Phases of Offensive Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-17 Attack Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-19 Limited Visibility Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-21 Planning Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-21 Illumination and Fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22 Reconnaissance and Rehearsals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-24 Simplicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-24 Consolidation and Reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-24 Helicopterborne Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-24 Planning Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-25 Key Billets and Duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-26 Manifest/Helicopter Team Wave and Serial Assignment Table. . . . . 6-26 Supporting Fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-27 Landing Zones/Pickup Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-27 Mounted Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28 Planning Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-29 Execution Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31 Mounted Operations Planning Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34 Tank/Infantry Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34 Chapter 7. Defensive Operations Purpose of the Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1 Types of Defensive Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1 Characteristics of the Defense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2 Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2 Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2 Mass and Concentration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3 Flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3 Use of Terrain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3 Mutual Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4 Defense in Depth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4 Surprise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4 Knowledge of Enemy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4 Local Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4 --- Page 8 --- Infantry Company Operations __________________________________________________________________________________ vii Organization of the Battlespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-5 Organization of the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-6 Main Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-6 Supporting Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-6 Reserve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7 Defensive Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7 Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7 Battle Position. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8 Strong Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9 Linear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9 Perimeter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9 Reverse Slope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10 Retrograde . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10 Sequence of the Defense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-11 Reconnaissance, Security Operations, and Enemy Preparatory Fires. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-11 Occupation and Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12 Approach of the Enemy Main Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12 Enemy Assault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12 Counterattack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-13 Consolidation and Reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-13 Planning Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-13 Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-13 Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-13 Fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-15 Force Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-15 Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-18 Engagement Area Development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-19 Identify Likely Enemy Avenues of Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-19 Determine Enemy Scheme of Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-20 Determine Where to Destroy the Enemy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-21 Emplace Weapon System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-21 Plan and Integrate Obstacles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-23 Plan and Integrate Indirect Fires. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-24 Rehearse Execution of Operation in Engagement Area . . . . . . . . . . . 7-25 Adjacent Unit Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-25 Mounted Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-25 Planning Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-26 Task Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-26 Combat Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-27 Defensive Planning Considerations for Forward Operating Bases and Combat Outposts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-28 General Base Defense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-29 Forward Operating Bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-31 Combat Outposts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-31 --- Page 9 --- viii ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Chapter 8. Patrolling Purpose of Patrolling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1 Tenets of Patrolling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1 Detailed Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2 Productive Rehearsals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2 Thorough Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2 Positive Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2 All-Around Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2 Every Marine a Collector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3 Patrol Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3 Reconnaissance Patrols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3 Combat Patrols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-4 Patrol Planning and Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-5 Considerations for Developing a Company Patrol Plan . . . . . . . . . . . 8-6 Contingency Plan Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-7 Considerations for Mounted Patrols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-7 Patrol Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-8 Armor and Force Protection Versus Maneuverability . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-8 Task Organization and Vehicle Load Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-8 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9 Considerations for Patrol Bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9 Key Leader Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-10 Company Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-10 Executive Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11 First Sergeant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11 Gunnery Sergeant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11 Fire Support Team Leader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11 Watch Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12 Postpatrol Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12 Accountability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12 Debriefs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12 After Action Reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-13 Chapter 9. Amphibious Operations Types of Amphibious Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2 Characteristics of Amphibious Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2 Integration Between Naval and Landing Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2 Rapid Buildup of Combat Power From Sea to Shore . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2 Task-Organized Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3 Unity of Effort and Operational Coherence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3 Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3 Flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3 Self-Sustainment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3 Mobility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3 --- Page 10 --- Infantry Company Operations __________________________________________________________________________________ ix Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3 Shipboard Command Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3 Other Shipboard Personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4 Embarkation and Landing Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5 Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-6 Predeployment Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-6 The Load Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-6 The Landing Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-7 Operational Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8 Embarkation Planning Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8 Storage and Shipping Containers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-9 Armory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-9 Communications Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10 Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10 Maintenance Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10 Training Aids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10 Troop Spaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11 Combat Rubber Raiding Craft Embarkation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11 Rehearsals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11 Operational Rehearsals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11 Call Away Rehearsals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11 Ship Rehearsals and Drills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-12 Movement to the Objective Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-13 Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-13 Underway Vehicle Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-14 Shipboard Life Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-14 Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-16 Landing Craft, Air Cushioned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-16 Landing Craft, Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-16 Amphibious Assault Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-16 Helicopterborne Assault Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-16 Combat Rubber Raiding Craft Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-17 Chapter 10. Stability, Crisis Response and Limited Contingency, and Counterinsurgency Operations General Principles and Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1 Categories of Stability Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2 Principles of Stability Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2 Stability Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3 Stability Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3 Stability Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3 Environmentally-Oriented Tactical Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7 Civil-Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7 Conduct of Civil-Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8 Civil-Military Operations Mission-Essential Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8 --- Page 11 --- x ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Stability Operations Planning Considerations and Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-9 Planning Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-9 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace and Stability Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11 Stability Operations Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-12 Assessing Stability Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-17 Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-18 Types of Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations . . . . 10-18 Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations Planning Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-23 Counterinsurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-23 Dynamics of an Insurgency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-24 Elements of an Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-24 Chapter 11. Other Tactical Operations Engineering Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1 Mobility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1 Countermobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5 Mine Dump Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-8 Cordon Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-8 Cordon and Search Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-9 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-9 Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-11 Relief in Place Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-15 Critical Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-15 Planning Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-16 Execution Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-16 Passage of Lines Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-17 Types. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-17 Planning Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-19 Linkup Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-20 Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-21 Linkup Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-21 Reconnaissance Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-22 Control Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-23 Chapter 12. Force Protection Planning Operational Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1 External Force Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2 Operations Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2 Antiterrorism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-3 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-5 Internal Force Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8 Guardian Angel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8 Fratricide Prevention and Battlespace Geometry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8 Combat Checks and Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-10 --- Page 12 --- Infantry Company Operations __________________________________________________________________________________ xi Body Armor Protective Level. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11 Environment Risk Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-12 Chapter 13. Logistics Logistic Functional Areas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1 Supply. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1 Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1 Health Service Support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1 General Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2 Transportation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-4 Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-4 Logistic Preparation and Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-4 General Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-5 Supply. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-5 Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-8 General Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-8 Transportation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-11 Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-11 Health Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-12 Load Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-13 Unit Sustainment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-13 Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-13 Distribution Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-14 Convoys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-17 Logistic Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-20 Consolidation and Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-21 Battle Damage Repair. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-21 Equipment Accountability and Turnover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-21 Redeployment Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-22 Orders Process and Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-22 Captured Personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-23 Detention Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-23 Detention Facility Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-24 Appendices A—Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1 B—Training Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1 C—Foreign Weapons Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1 D—Tactical Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1 E—Rules of Engagement and Force Continuum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-1 Glossary References and Related Publications --- Page 13 --- xii _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 This Page Intentionally Left Blank --- Page 14 --- CHAPTER 1 GENERAL PHILOSOPHIES Warfare An overview of warfare throughout history would reveal that, while technology influenced the meth- ods and tactics of conflict, the strategies and forms of war remain unchanged. Large scale, formalized warfare occurred between kingdoms and nation states; whereas, insurgencies, guerilla warfare, and asymmetrical techniques have always been a stra- tegy of choice for weaker parties in the face of overwhelming force. The c ounters used by either the strong or the weak have run the gamut from “winning hearts and mi nds” to annihilation. Examples of all these types of conflict exist in all environments and weather (see app. A). The prob- lem facing military professionals, therefore, is not confronting a new strategy or a new environment, but determining which st rategies, methods, and environments they are mo st likely to experience and then preparing them selves and their forces accordingly. Victory goes to those who choose and prepare wisely. Conflict Continuum Conflict occurs across va rying levels of violence and has appropriately vary ing levels and types of military engagement. On one extreme of the continuum, the military maintains a readiness for conflict, while actively working to preempt potential violence thro ugh sustained engagement and relationships with bo th allies and potential foes. On the other extrem e of the continuum, the military devotes all its re sources and ability to a general conflict of extreme violence. The Marine Corps now regularly expect s to use its training, equipment, and capability to task-organize the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) to em- ploy its operating forces fully across a range of military operations. Task organization allows fuller application of Ma rine Corps warfighting doctrine by providing commanders far greater flexibility and tools when seeking to bend the opponent’s will. Range of Military Operations The range of military oper ations refers to the employment of military forces across the conflict continuum. As depicted in figure 1-1, there are three broad categories w ithin which all military operations fall: major op erations and campaigns; crisis response and limited contingency opera- tions; and military engagement, security coopera- tion, and deterrence. The military activities conducted within this ra nge are usually executed through some combination of offense, defense, Major Operations and Campaigns Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence Peace Conflict Continuum War Range of Military Operations Figure 1-1. The Range of Military Operations. --- Page 15 --- 1-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 and stability operations . The joint phasing con- struct (see fig. 1-2) de monstrates the potential relationships between the three. Sometimes stabil- ity operations will be the focus, with offense and defensive activities limite d to such actions as strikes, raids, and force protection (FP). At other times, offensive operations may be the focus, with defensive and stability activities limited to screens, guards, and humanitarian assistance (HA). For fur- ther information on the ra nge of military opera- tions and the joint phas ing construct see Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations. Infantry Company Employment Marine Corps infantry co mpanies execute stabil- ity, offensive, and de fensive operations. The concept of employability within a range of mili- tary operations model demands greater use of infantry companies as task-organized entities capable of executing semi-independent actions over sustained peri ods. Often referr ed to as en- hanced company operations, the Marine Corps expects that its infantry companies can disperse across the battlespace as needed, execute opera- tions within all three operational functions, maintain themselves, and rapidly regroup to generate mass and deliver decisive results at the point of decision. Figure 1-3 illustrates th e changes between tradi- tional infantry company employment and what is envisioned through en hanced company opera- tions. The traditional infantry company was staffed and equipped to function only at the high- est levels of violence and only within a narrow Shape Stability Deter Stability Offense Defense Seize Initiative Offense DefenseStability Dominate Offense DefenseStability Stabilize Offense Defense Stability Enable Civil Authority Offense Defense Stability NOTE: Stability operations are conducted outside the United States/ Department of Defense provides similar support to US civil authorities for homeland defense and other operations in the US through civil support operations. Figure 1-2. Notional Balance of Offensive, Defensive, and Stability Operations. --- Page 16 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 1-3 parameter of employment. The infantry company must now be able to operate simultaneously at varying levels of violence across all the phases of joint operations. Rifle Company Employment The mission of the Marine infantry company is to defeat the enemy by fire , maneuver, and close combat and to conduct other operations as directed across the range of military operations. The rifle company normally operates as a maneuver ele- ment of the infantry battalion; although, when appropriately reinforced and augmented, employ- ment to conduct semi-independent actions for var- ious lengths of time is appropriate. The company is the base unit for creat ing mission-oriented task elements, which are employable across a range of military operations, th rough the attachment of command and control (C2), combat support (CS), and logistics combat elements (LCEs). While variables, such as a rifle company’s leader- ship, morale, state of readiness, and level of train- ing, always carry weight in decisions on how to employ a specific unit at any give n time, the fol- lowing capabilities and special considerations apply to all rifle companies:  Conduct day and night offensive and defen- sive operations in all types of environments.  Conduct combined arms action across a range of military operations.  Conduct semi-independe nt, noncontiguous, and distributed actions.  Conduct small unit operations.  Operate in conjunction with other Services, agencies, and special operations forces.  Participate in amphibious operations. Shape Deter Seize the Initiative Dominate Stablize Enable Civil Authorites Increasing Violence REALCD Legend: LCD - locate, close with, and destroy REA - repel the enemy assault 2009 Infantry 1978 Infantry 2009 Infantry 1978 Infantry Figure 1-3. Enhanced Company Operations Versus Traditional Infantry Company Employment. --- Page 17 --- 1-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Tactical capabilities of the rifle company are to—  Seize, secure, occupy, and retain terrain.  Defeat, destroy, neutrali ze, suppress, interdict, disrupt, block, canalize, and fix enemy forces.  Breach enemy obstacles.  Feint and demonstrate to deceive the enemy.  Reconnoiter, deny, bypass, clear, contain, and isolate (these tasks may be oriented on both terrain and enemy).  Screen and guard friendly units. Rifle companies can also—  Provide security for stability operations.  Provide organizational structure, communica- tions capability, and manpower resources for stability operations.  Execute small unit tr aining and military engagement operations with partnered nation security forces.  Coordinate with civil authorities.  Conduct key leadership engagement. The rifle company is limit ed in that it often oper- ates with—  Austere combat logistic assets.  Austere C2 assets.  Limited vehicle mobility.  Vulnerability to armor, artillery, and air threats.  Vulnerability to enem y chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attacks with only limited decontamination capabilities. Rifle Company Organization The rifle company serves as one of three rifle companies in each infant ry battalion. The com- pany is organized in a triangular design around three maneuver elements and one fire support element. The activities of the subordinate units are controlled and c oordinated by a company headquarters (see fig. 1-4). Within each rifle comp any are three rifle pla- toons. The rifle platoon is the basic maneuver ele- ment for the rifle compa ny and its characteristics are essentially the same as the company. The pla- toon has the same tria ngular structure built around three squads and each squad is built around three fire teams (see fig. 1-5). Within each rifle compa ny is one weapons pla- toon. The weapons platoon is the basic fire sup- port element for the rifle company. It provides the company with organic machine gun, mortar, rocket fire, and antiarmo r defense. Its organiza- tion and equipment perm it maximum flexibility, control, and ease of employment in support of the rifle platoons. Each w eapons platoon contains one 60-mm mortar secti on, one medium machine gun section, and one assau lt section (see fig. 1-6 on page 1-6). Duties of Key Personnel Rifle company key pers onnel include the com- pany commander, executive officer (XO), first ser- geant, gunnery sergeant, fire support team (FST) leader, operations chie f, logistic noncommis- sioned officer (NCO), in telligence specialist, and administrative clerk. The company commander—  Is responsible for everything the company does or fails to do.  Is responsible for th e employment, training (see app. B), combat efficiency, discipline, morale, administration, welfare, maintenance, and sustainment of the company.  Understands the capabili ties of the company’s personnel, weapons, s upporting weapons, and their proper employment.  Seeks to know and unders tand the capabilities of the enemy, threat level, and operational environment.  Knows, understands, and develops situational awareness across the company. --- Page 18 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 1-5  Coordinates with military and nonmilitary enti- ties across the battlespace and within the area of interest (AOI).  Is prepared to execute actions across a range of military operations and requests additional sup- port as necessary. The company XO—  Serves as the company’s second in command and is responsible for maintaining situational awareness of the company’s tactical situation during combat.  Assumes command in the company com- mander’s absence. Company Headquarters Weapons Platoon Platoon Commander Platoon Sergeant First Lieutenant - 0302 Gunnery Sergeant - 0369 Rifle Platoon Platoon Commander Platoon Sergeant Second Lieutenant - 0302 Staff Sergeant - 0369 Legend: NCO - noncommissioned officer Company Commander Captain - 0302 Executive Officer First Lieutenant - 0302 First Sergeant First Sergeant - 8999 Gunnery Sergeant Gunnery Sergeant - 0369 Operations Chief Staff Sergeant - 0369 Assistant Operations Chief Sergeant - 0311 Intelligence Specialist Corporal - 0231 Logistics NCO Corporal - 0481 Property NCO Corporal - 0311 Operations Clerk Lance Corporal - 0311 Administrative Clerk Lance Corporal - 0111 Messenger/Driver Private - 0311 Figure 1-4. Marine Rifle Company. Platoon Headquarters Platoon Commander Platoon Sergeant Rifle Squad Squad Leader Sergeant - 0311 Fire Team (3 teams per squad) Fire Team Leader Corporal - 0311 Second Lieutenant - 0302 Staff Sergeant - 0369 Figure 1-5. Marine Rifle Platoon. --- Page 19 --- 1-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1  Is prepared to assume the duties of the company FST leader when necessary or as directed.  May be assigned to aid in control of phases of a battle (such as a passage of lines or counter- attack) and is prepared to assume tactical duties (such as landing zone [LZ] control officer or detachment/element leader).  Plans and supervises the company’s combat service support (CSS) planning, requirements, and execution to incl ude coordination with higher or other support agencies.  Supervises company preparations to execute training or combat miss ions in support of the company commander’s plans and goals.  Serves as the company training officer and supervises all aspects of unit training and unit training management (U TM) in support of the company commander’s training plan and guidance.  Is prepared to supervise either a permanent or semipermanent company combat operations center (COC) to includ e the management, col- lation, and processing of information; receipt and forwarding of tactic al reports; and mainte- nance of communications with higher and adja- cent units. The company first sergeant—  Serves as the senior en listed Marine in the company and as the principal enlisted adminis- trative and tactical a dvisor to the company commander.  Serves as principal assistant to the company commander in supervis ing the administration of the company.  Supervises, inspects, or observes matters des- ignated by the commander.  Executes and supervises routine operations to include enforcing the tactical standing operat- ing procedures (SOPs) ; maintaining account- ability of all personne l; coordinating and reporting personnel and administrative actions; and supervising discipline, field hygiene, and medical evacuation operations. The company gunnery sergeant—  Serves as a technical and tactical advisor to the company commander, platoon commanders, and platoon sergeants.  Coordinates training, ope rations, and logistical support requirements for the company. Weapons Platoon Headquarters Platoon Commander Platoon Sergeant First Lieutenant - 0302 Staff Sergeant - 0369 Mortar Section Assault SectionMachine Gun Section No Section Leader Mortar Squad Squad Leader/Gunner Assistant Gunner Ammunition Man Corporal - 0341 Lance Corporal - 0341 Private - 0341 Assault Squad Squad/Team Leader/Gunner Assistant Gunner Corporal - 0351 Private - 0351 Machine Gun Squad Squad Leader Sergeant - 0331 Machine Gun Team (2 teams per squad) Team Leader Gunner Ammunition Man Corporal - 0331 Lance Corporal - 0331 Private - 0331 Section Leader Sergeant - 0341 Section Leader Sergeant - 0351 Team Leader/Gunner Lance Corporal - 0351 Assistant Gunner Private - 0351 Figure 1-6. Weapons Platoon. --- Page 20 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 1-7  Assists the commander in the discipline, appearance, training, co ntrol, conduct, and welfare of the company.  Assists the commander in conducting opera- tional risk management (ORM).  Directs the supply and resupply of the com- pany.  Supervises and assists in company training sup- port to include mainta ining training records, developing training pl ans and schedules, pub- lishing letters of instru ction, and supervising range and training area requests.  Assists the commander in ensuring the estab- lishment of a perimeter defense, security/ observation posts (OPs), or a FP posture.  Coordinates and supervises the embarkation and debarkation for the deployment of the company.  Supervises the setup, function, and displace- ment of the COC as we ll as other functional areas as directed.  Supervises the actions within the COC (e.g., preparation and submission of reports and mes- sages to higher headqu arters [HHQ], watch bills, operational journals, journal files).  Supervises the flow of information provided by available C2 systems a nd supervises the con- trol, dissemination, and destruction of classi- fied information within the COC. The FST leader—  Is generally the weapons platoon commander.  Serves as the company commander’s FST leader and fire support coordinator (FSC) when applicable, and advises the company com- mander on the capabiliti es and limitations of fire support assets.  Plans and executes the company’s fire support plan in support of the company commander’s concept of operations (CONOPS) and guid- ance, coordinates the pl an with the battalion FSC, and ensures the prop er integration of all available fire support assets.  Ensures all aspects of essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) are appl ied during planning and execution.  Is capable of briefing the fire support plan dur- ing the operation order (OPORD).  Integrates platoon targets into the company fire support plan and forwards that plan to the bat- talion. The operations chief—  Coordinates and executes the setup, function, and displacement of the COC as well as other functional areas as directed.  Manages the flow of information provided by available C2 systems and supervises the con- trol, dissemination, and destruction of classi- fied information within the COC.  Supervises the company’s operations section, logistics NCO, intelligence specialist, and administrative clerk in ensuring all required reports are accurate an d submitted in a timely manner.  Ensures the proficiency of the personnel assigned to the COC and the enforcement of COC standing operating procedures.  Is capable of participat ing in the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP).  Executes and supervises routine operations to include enforcing the tactical SOPs; maintain- ing accountability of all personnel; coordinat- ing and reporting person nel and administrative actions; and supervisin g discipline, field hygiene, and medical evacuation operations. The logistic NCO—  Assists in the development of logistic plans that support the company commander’s con- cept of operations and employment.  Has direct responsibility for the development of company embarkation and debarkation plans and the supervision of their execution.  Executes tactical logistics for the company to include the coordinatio n of CSS activities --- Page 21 --- 1-8 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 necessary for mission accomplishment. These activities include supp ly and maintenance, coordination of trans portation resources and employment, embarkation, general engineer- ing support, and genera l services support.  Leads and conducts helicopter support team operations and train other Marines as required.  Is proficient in the use of, and capable of train- ing Marines on, such systems as the automated information systems that support logistic com- mand and control and in -transit vi sibility, expeditionary energy systems, and water filtra- tion and purification systems.  Is capable of participating in the MCPP.  Is capable of performing all physical require- ments associated with serving in an infantry company. The intelligence specialist—  Supervises company level intelligence cell (CLIC) operations and assigned personnel and serves as the senior inte lligence expert in the company COC.  Supports the creation of the company’s intelli- gence plan, oversees it s execution, and super- vises the collection management process and the dissemination of ba ttalion priority intelli- gence requirements (P IR) and company-spe- cific orders or requests.  Supports the company’s intelligence collec- tion plan by seeking organic and nonorganic support, communicating and coordinating with higher, adjacent, and supporting units, and requesting products and support from the bat- talion intelligence section.  Produces and supervises the production of var- ious intelligence produc ts to include briefs, maps, targeting information, and imagery.  Supervises enemy prisoner of war (EPW)/ detainee tracking to pr ocess, disseminate, and exploit information ga ined through tactical questioning, document ex ploitation, and other means.  Assists in the enforcement of active and pas- sive operational security measures.  Is capable of participating in the MCPP.  Is capable of performi ng all physical require- ments associated with serving in an infantry company. The administrative clerk—  In conjunction with the company first sergeant, executes all company-related administrative matters to include naval correspondence, administrative action forms, promotion- and pay-related issues, performance evaluations, and re-enlistments.  Maintains and updates re lated unit readiness statistics and databases and executes morning report, personnel management, and casualty tracking.  Serves as company legal representative, exe- cuting necessary duties as sociated with nonju- dicial punishment, unit punishment book, and punitive and nonpunitive correspondence.  Conducts necessary coordination with battalion and other personnel ad ministration centers as required.  Is capable of participating in the MCPP.  As required, is prepared to serve in the com- pany COC, conduct headquarters security, and can perform all physical requirements associ- ated with serving in an infantry company. Attachments and Enablers During normal operations, including garrison training, the rifle comp any requires organic attachments from the battalion’s weapons compa- nies and headquarters and service companies in order to accomplish assi gned tasks. Beyond this augmentation, the co mpany commander must expect to generate certain skill sets from within his own company while certain special enablers from units beyond the ba ttalion may serve as attachments to the co mpany. Finally, he must expect to encounter certain elements beyond his control, such as battalion snipers operating in his battlespace. Other such expectations (discussed in --- Page 22 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 1-9 detail in chap. 3) from the battalion and from both outside and within the company follow. Expectations from the battalion include—  An 81-mm mortar forward observer (FO) from the weapons company.  A radio operator (RO) fr om the battalion com- munications platoon.  An intelligence specialis t from the battalion’s intelligence section.  Eleven corpsmen from the battalion aid sta- tion (BAS).  A tactical air control pa rty from the battalion’s operations section. Expectations from external sources include—  An artillery observer and scout.  A naval gunfire liaison team. Expectations from within the company include—  Any additional Marines necessary to augment the intelligence specialist in manning a CLIC.  Any additional personnel necessary to augment the company headquarte rs Marines executing operations and communi cations functions in the company COC.  Combat logistic support skills, such as ammu- nition drivers, animal packers, and armory cus- todians.  Several Marines per company with appropriate environmental supporting skills, such as moun- tain or jungle warfare specialists. Weapons Company Employment The weapons company pr ovides basic, organic fire support and other capabilities for the infantry battalion. The equipment and structure of the company allows infantry battalions additional heavy weapons and firepower, mobility, and aug- mented communications. Battalions may use these capabilities to provide support for its maneuver elements, may use the weapons company as a foundation for the creation of task-organized ele- ments to accomplish assigned missions, or may use a combination of these methods. Traditionally, the mission of a weapons company is to provide medium mo rtar support, antiarmor support, heavy machine gun (HMG) support, and fire support coordination in order to support the infantry battalion’s sc heme of maneuver. When employed differently, such as a fourth maneuver element within the ba ttalion, the weapons com- pany (an infantry comp any by basic definition) defers to the infantry company mission. The weapons company is un iquely equipped with heavy weapons to suppor t the maneuver of the rifle companies and task elements within the bat- talion. The heavy weapons, fire control capabili- ties, and communications a ssets contained in the weapons company include a mix that can be tai- lored to a particular mission based on mission, enemy, terrain and weat her, troops and support available-time availabl e (METT-T) and, when applicable, civilian considerations. Like the rest of the infantry battalio n, the weapons company maneuvers in all types of terrain, climates, and visibility conditions. The inherent vers atility of the weapons company as part of the infantry battalion also makes it well suited to employ against asymmetrical threats across a range of military operations. During tac- tical operations, heavy weapons units can sup- press, fix, or destroy th e enemy at long ranges, allowing other infantry units or combined arms teams to maneuver to a position of advantage. While variables, such as a weapons company’s leadership, morale, state of readiness, and level of training, always carry weight in decisions on how to employ a specific unit at any given time, the following capabiliti es and special consi- derations apply to weapons companies supporting the battalion as designed. Weapons companies employed as maneuver elements or in other combinations should reference rifle company employment, discussed earlie r in this chapter, for --- Page 23 --- 1-10 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 additional capabilities. The general capabilities of a weapons company are as follows:  It is self-mobile, possessing the ability to move rapidly on the battlefield to shift combat power to where it is needed.  It is task-organized to have the flexibility to provide support for the companies and/or bat- talion and the ability to change those configu- rations rapidly.  It has robust, organic communications assets.  It can support the assaul ts of other units with massed supporting fires.  It can conduct day and night offensive and defensive operations in all types of environ- ments.  It can conduct combined arms operations across a range of military operations.  It operates in conjunction with other Services and special operations forces.  It participates in amphibious operations.  It can conduct limited self-sustainment and maintenance. The weapons company’s ta ctical capabilities are as follows:  It can deliver accurate , long-range, large-cali- ber direct fires to destroy enemy armored vehi- cles and fortifications.  It can deliver massed HMG and automatic gre- nade launcher fires to engage enemy personnel, destroy light vehicles, and provide area sup- pression.  It can deliver indirect fires to limit, disrupt, destroy, and s uppress enemy positions, units, and air defense.  It can coordinate, ma ss, and shift long-range direct fires.  It can integrate indirect and aerial fires with the unit’s direct fire plan. The weapons company’s limitations include—  Vulnerability to armor, artillery, and air threats.  Vulnerability to enemy CBRN attacks.  Limited decontamination capabilities.  Increased logistical fuel and maintenance requirements. Weapons Company Organization The weapons company (one per infantry battal- ion) is the basic, organi c direct and indirect fire support for the infantry battalion. The company consists of one 81-mm mortar platoon, one anti- armor platoon, and one HM G platoon. This orga- nization allows for maximum flexibility in providing support to the ma neuver units of the battalion or task-org anizing the company to accomplish assigned tasks. Depending on employment decisions made by the battalion commander, the weapons company may receive the battalion’s sniper plat oon or may receive the mission to train them. Normally, the weapons company provides support to the infantry compa- nies according to direct ion and tasks received from the battalion oper ations officer via guid- ance from the battalion commander (see fig. 1-7). Within the weapons company is one 81-mm mor- tar platoon. The 81-mm mortar platoon provides the basic, organic indirect fire support for the bat- talion. The platoon can operate mounted or dis- mounted, as a massed platoon, or as two independent sections. Regardless of its configura- tion, the battalion generally employs the platoon vice the platoon’s attachme nt to the rifle compa- nies (see fig. 1-8). --- Page 24 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 1-11 Weapons Company Headquarters Company Commander Executive Officer First Sergeant Operations Chief Property NCO Messenger Driver x 2 Major - 0302 First Sergeant - 8999 Master Sergeant - 0369 Sergeant - 0311 Corporal/Private First Class - 0311 Antiarmor Platoon Platoon Commander Platoon Sergeant Messenger/Driver First Lieutenant - 0302 Gunnery Sergeant - 0369 Private - 0311 Heavy Machine Gun Platoon Platoon Commander Platoon Sergeant Messenger/Driver Ammunition Man/ Driver First Lieutenant - 0302 Gunnery Sergeant - 0369 Private - 0331 Private - 0331 81-mm Mortar Platoon Platoon Commander Platoon Sergeant Ammunition Technician Ammunition Man Ammunition Man Driver First Lieutenant - 0302 Gunnery Sergeant - 0848 Lance Corporal - 2311 Private - 0341 Private - 0341 First Lieutenant - 0302 Figure 1-7. Weapons Company Organization. 81-mm Platoon Headquarters Platoon Commander Platoon Sergeant Ammunition Technician Ammunition Man Ammunition Man/Driver First Lieutenant - 0302 Gunnery Sergeant- 0369 Lance Corporal - 2311 Private - 0341 Private - 0341 Section Headquarters Section Leader Ammunition Man Ammunition Man/Driver Plotter/Recorder Recorder/Driver FO x 2 Staff Sergeant - 0369 Private - 0341 Private - 0341 Corporal - 0341 Lance Corporal - 0341 Corporal - 0341 Mortar Squad Squad Leader Gunner Assistant Gunner Ammunition Man Ammunition Man Ammunition Man/Driver Sergeant - 0341 Corporal - 0341 Lance Corporal - 0341 Private - 0341 Private - 0341 Private - 0341 Mortar Squad Squad Leader Gunner Assistant Gunner Ammunition Man Ammunition Man Ammunition Man/Driver Sergeant - 0341 Corporal - 0341 Lance Corporal - 0341 Private - 0341 Private - 0341 Private - 0341 Section Headquarters Section Leader Ammunition Man Ammunition Man/Driver Plotter/Recorder Recorder/Driver FO x 2 Staff Sergeant - 0369 Private - 0341 Private - 0341 Corporal - 0341 Lance Corporal - 0341 Corporal - 0341 Figure 1-8. 81-mm Mortar Platoon. --- Page 25 --- 1-12 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Within the weapons company is one HMG pla- toon. The HMG platoon provides heavy caliber direct and grenade launch er machine gun fire for the battalion. The platoon can operate mounted or dismounted, as a massed platoon, or as indepen- dent squads. The battalion’s rifle companies may receive portions of the HMG platoon as attach- ments. The HMG platoon al so serves as the base for creating maneuver elements, such as com- bined antiarmor team s (CAATs) or mobile assault platoons (MAPs) (see fig. 1-9). Within the weapons company is one antiarmor pla- toon. The antiarmor plat oon provides heavy cali- ber, long-range, antiarmor fires for the battalion. The platoon can operate mounted or dismounted, as a massed platoon, or as independent sections. The battalion’s rifle co mpanies may receive por- tions of the antiarmor platoon as attachments. The antiarmor platoon may also combine with the HMG platoon to create maneuver elements, such as CAAT or MAP (see fig. 1-10). Alternate Weapons Company Organizations As a result of battalion problem framing, battalion commanders frequently use the versatility of their weapons companies by making semipermanent changes to the company organization that best sup- port the most likely me thod of employment. In general, these methods either create maneuver pla- toons that maintain some form of indirect fire capability (CAAT variant) or they create a pure, fourth maneuver compa ny (mobile assault com- pany variant). Combined Antiarmor Team Variant One of the most likely modifications to the weap- ons company organization is the CAAT variant (see fig. 1-11). This variant (or some subset thereof) is most often used when problem framing indicates the need for additional maneuver ele- ments within the battali on. It also requires the maintenance of the battalion’s organic indirect fire capability. In this organizational scheme, the HMG and antiarmor platoons combine to create maneu- ver elements while the 81-mm mortar platoon is retained for its fire su pport capability. The likeli- hood of an antiarmor threat determines the actual composition of the resulting CAAT platoons. The CAAT platoon is created by combining ele- ments and equipment fr om the HMG and antiar- mor platoons. From the threat analysis, these platoons may have a balance of machine guns and antiarmor weapon systems, may be differently weighted in “heavy” and “light” configurations, or may possess no antiarmor systems whatsoever. Another variation is the weapons mix of machine guns and grenade launchers within each platoon. Decisions reached during problem framing should determine the exact structure of the platoons. Fig- ure 1-12, on page 1-14, represents an evenly weighted CAAT platoon. Mobile Assault Company Variant When employed as a fourth maneuver element within the battalion, th e weapons company will HMG Platoon Headquarters Platoon Commander Platoon Sergeant Messenger/Driver Ammunition Man/Driver First Lieutenant - 0302 Gunnery Sergeant - 0369 Private - 0331 Private - 0331 1st HMG Squad Squad Leader (Section Leader) Gunner Assistant Gunner Ammunition Man/Driver Sergeant - 0331 Lance Corporal - 0331 Lance Corporal - 0331 Private - 0331 2nd HMG Squad Squad Leader (Section Leader) Gunner Assistant Gunner Ammunition Man/Driver Corporal - 0331 Lance Corporal - 0331 Private First Class - 0331 Private - 0331 Figure 1-9. Heavy Machine Gun Platoon. --- Page 26 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 1-13 likely reorganize into a mobile assault company variant as seen in figure 1-13 on page 1-14. In this organizational scheme, the HMG and antiarmor platoons combine to create maneuver elements: one 81-mm mortar sectio n becomes a “platoon,” while the other is retained for its fire support capa- bility. A critical limitatio n to the number of maneuver elements is the number of qualified offi- cers and staff noncommissioned officers (SNCOs) available to serve as MAP leadership. Antiarmor Platoon Headquarters Platoon Commander Platoon Sergeant Messenger/Driver First Lieutenant - 0302 Gunnery Sergeant - 0369 Private - 0331 Javelin Section Section Leader Staff Sergeant - 0369 TOW Section Section Leader Driver/RO Staff Sergeant - 0369 Lance Corporal - 2531 Javelin Squad Squad Leader/Gunner Assistant Gunner Team Leader x 3 Assistant Gunner x 3 Sergeant - 0352 Lance Corporal - 0352 Corporal - 0352 Lance Corporal - 0352 TOW Squad Squad Leader TOW Gunner x 2 Assistant Gunner/Driver x 2 Sergeant - 0352 Corporal - 0352 Lance Corporal - 0352 Weapons Company Headquarters Company Commander Executive Officer First Sergeant Operational Chief Property NCO Messenger/Driver Messenger/Driver Major - 0302 First Lieutenant - 0302 First Sergeant - 8999 Master Sergeant - 0369 Sergeant - 0311 Corporal - 0311 Private First Class - 0311 81-mm Mortar Platoon Platoon Commander Platoon Sergeant Ammunition Technician Ammunition Man Ammunition Man/Driver First Lieutenant - 0302 Gunnery Sergeant - 0848 Lance Corporal - 2311 Private - 0341 Private - 0341 CAAT Platoon Platoon Commander Platoon Sergeant Messenger/Driver Driver/RO First Lieutenant - 0302 Gunnery Sergeant - 0369 Private - 0311 Lance Corporal - 2531 Figure 1-10. Antiarmor Platoon. Figure 1-11. Combined Antiarmor Team Variant. --- Page 27 --- 1-14 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 The MAP is created by combining elements and equipment from the HMG and antiarmor platoons. In a manner similar to the creation of CAAT elements, the actual com position of MAPs can range from pure uniformity to specific functions through the weighting and mix of personnel, vehicles, and weapons. For example, if an 81-mm mortar platoon was split between a maneuver CAAT Platoon Platoon Commander Platoon Sergeant Messenger/Driver Ammunition Man/Driver First Lieutenant - 0302 Gunnery Sergeant - 0369 Private - 0331 Private - 0331 HMG Section Section Leader Staff Sergeant - 0369 TOW Section Section Leader Staff Sergeant - 0369 TOW Squad (2 Squads per Section, 4 Vehicles per Squad) Squad Leader TOW Gunner x 2 Assistant Gunner/Driver x 2 Sergeant - 0352 Corporal - 0352 Lance Corporal - 0352 HMG Squad (2 Squads per Section, 4 Vehicles per Squad) Squad Leader HMG Gunner x 2 Assistant Gunner x 2 Ammunition Man/Driver x 2 Sergeant - 0331 Lance Corporal - 0331 Private First Class - 0331 Private - 0331 Figure 1-12. Evenly Weighted Combined Antiarmor Team Platoon. Mobile Assualt Company Headquarters Company Commander Executive Officer First Sergeant Operations Chief Property NCO Messenger/Driver Messenger/Driver Major - 0302 First Lieutenant - 0302 First Sergeant - 8999 Master Sergeant - 0369 Sergeant - 0311 Corporal - 0311 Private First Class - 0311 81-mm Mobile Assault Platoon (Mobile and Firing Sections) Platoon Commander Platoon Sergeant Ammunition Technician Ammunition Man Ammunition Man/Driver First Lieutenant - 0302 Gunnery Sergeant - 0848 Lance Corporal - 2311 Private - 0341 Private - 0341 Mobile Assault Platoon Platoon Commander Platoon Sergeant Messenger/Driver First Lieutenant - 0302 Gunnery Sergeant - 0369 Private - 0311 Figure 1-13. Mobile Assault Company Variant. --- Page 28 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 1-15 element and a section re taining its 81-mm mortar capability, the maneuver element would generally be tailored after a MAP section as represented in figure 1-14. Weapons Company Key Personnel Weapons company key personnel include the company commander, XO, first sergeant, and operations chief. The company commander—  Is responsible for everything the company does or fails to do.  Serves as the battalion FSC and is responsible for the planning, coordination, and deconflic- tion of fires in supp ort of the battalion’s scheme of maneuver.  Is responsible for the tactical employment, training, administrati on, morale, personnel management, maintenance, and sustainment of the company.  Knows the capabilities of the company’s per- sonnel, weapons, and eq uipment, and how to employ them.  Knows the capabilities of the MAGTF’s fire support systems and pl atforms, and how to employ them.  Seeks to know and unders tand the capabilities of the enemy, level of threat, and operational environment.  Knows, understands, and develops situational awareness across the company.  Coordinates with military and nonmilitary enti- ties across the battlespace and within the AOI.  Is prepared to execute actions across a range of operations and requests additional support as necessary.  Is responsible for the training of company FSTs and their proper integrat ion into battalion fire support SOPs. The XO—  Serves as the company’s second in command and is responsible for maintaining situational awareness of the company’s tactical situation during combat.  Assumes command in the company com- mander’s absence.  Plans and supervises the company’s CSS planning, requirements, and execution, includ- ing coordination with higher or other support agencies.  Supervises company preparations to execute training or combat missi ons in support of the company commander’s plans and goals.  Serves as the company training officer and supervises all aspects of unit training and UTM in support of the comp any commander’s train- ing plan and guidance.  Knows the capabilities of the company’s per- sonnel, weapons, and eq uipment, and how to employ them. Mobile Assualt Platoon Platoon Commander Platoon Sergeant Messenger/Driver First Lieutenant - 0302 Gunnery Sergeant - 0369 Private - 0311 Mobile Section Section Leader Staff Sergeant - 0369 Vehicle Squad (2 Squads per Section) Squad Leader Sergeant - 03XX Vehicle Team (2 Teams per Squad) Team Leader Gunner Assistant Gunner/Driver Corporal - 03XX Lance Corporal - 0331 Private - 03XX Figure 1-14. Evenly Weighted Mobile Assault Platoon. --- Page 29 --- 1-16 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1  Knows the capabilities of the MAGTF’s fire support systems and pl atforms, and how to employ them.  Serves as the battali on assistant FSC responsi- ble for the planning, coordination, and decon- fliction of supporting ar ms in support of the battalion’s scheme of maneuver. The first sergeant—  Serves as the senior enlisted Marine in the company and as the principal enlisted adminis- trative and tactical advisor to the company commander.  Serves as principal assistant to the company commander in supervis ing the administration of the company.  Supervises, inspects, or observes matters des- ignated by the commander.  Executes and supervises routine operations to include enforcing the tactical SOP; coordinat- ing and reporting perso nnel and administrative actions; and supervisin g discipline, field hygiene, and medical evacuation operations. The operations chief—  Serves as a technical and tactical advisor to the company commander, platoon commanders, and platoon sergeants.  Coordinates training, ope rations, and logistical support requirements for the company.  Assists the commander in the discipline, appearance, training, c ontrol, conduct, and welfare of the company.  Assists the commander in conducting ORM.  Directs the supply and resupply of the com- pany.  Coordinates and superv ises the setup, func- tion, and displacement of the battalion fire sup- port coordination center (FSCC) as well as other functional areas as directed.  Supervises and assists in company training support to include maintaining training re- cords, developing training plans and schedules, publishing letters of instruction, and supervis- ing range and training area requests.  Assists the commander in ensuring the estab- lishment of a perimeter defense, security/OPs, or a FP posture.  Coordinates and supervises the embarkation and debarkation of the deploying company.  Supervises and assists with FSCC actions.  Manages the flow of information provided through available C2 systems.  Supervises the control, dissemination, and destruction of classified information within the FSCC.  Supervises preparation of the operations jour- nal and journal file.  Establishes the watch bill for the FSCC.  Supervises the preparation and submission of messages and reports to the regimental FSCC. --- Page 30 --- CHAPTER 2 PLANNING Planning Fundamentals “Planning involves proj ecting our thoughts for- ward in time and spac e to influence events before they occur rather than merely responding to events as they occur. This means contemplat- ing and evaluating potential decisions and actions in advance.”(Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication [MCDP] 5, Planning) The key component of company leadership is the ability to make a decisi on and guide subordinates through the execution of that decision. Planning is simply anticipatory decisionmaking and occurs whether a decision needs to be made in 30 sec- onds or if considering a unit’s actions 6 months from now. The planning horizon is how far ahead the planning begins. Diffe rent types of problems and different planning horizons often require dif- ferent planning tools. Planning is a tool posse ssed by the user, not a user possessed by the tool. With this under- standing, company commanders must have the maturity and discipline to modify the planning tool appropriately. Pl anning processes should neither be abbreviated wh en thoughtful detail is required, nor rigidly adhe red to when expediency is more appropriate. Decisionmaking Methods There are two main decisionmaking methods— intuitive and analytical. Racing to out-cycle the enemy, reacting to a de veloping situation, or being lazy often leads decisionmakers to favor the intuitive solution. Su ch solutions can lead to victory or can spiral into disaster, depending on a company commander’s level of understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem. Intuitive and analytical decisionmaking are nec- essary and complementary. Intuitive Decisionmaking Since intuitive decisionma king involves the use of experience and instin ct to solve a problem, there are few intuitive pl anning tools. Success with this method relies upon extensive user expe- rience with the problem at hand and the environ- ment in which it occurs. Preparation includes actual experience with the conditions and issues as well as training, practi ce, reading, and discus- sion. A solid foundatio n, robust mental model, and intellectual frame of reference are the basics for intuitive decisionmaking. Analytical Decisionmaking Most planning tools are a ssociated with the other method of decisionm aking—the analytical model. These tools artificially design a mental model that leads a decisionmaker to a solution by creating the necessary unde rstanding of the prob- lem and environment. The analytical model helps EXAMPLE : As a person drives, he intuitively decides to change lanes when someone pulls out in front of him (because he has experience driving). However, intuitive decisionmaking is not sufficient to help him plan a trip across the state. Analytical tools would aid him in determining such things as his route, obstacles to traffic, or the limitat ions of his vehicle. Once on the road, however, he could intuitively change his route to bypass slow traffic because his study of the map gave him the experience needed to aid that decision. --- Page 31 --- 2-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 manage and organize information when the deci- sionmaker faces overwhelming data, is not famil- iar with the problem, or is trying to synchronize multiple actions and groups. The Value of Planning The value of planning oc curs within the context of two important consider ations: first, planning keeps infantry companies oriented on the future instead of remaining re active; second, by plan- ning in the present, infantry companies can shape a better future. While it is true that extremes exist, such as good planning resulting in failure or no planning at all resulting in success, these extremes are exceptions. Analytical planning today can enable intuitive planning tomorrow. All activities, from the execu tion of combat opera- tions to the assessment of training, benefit from some planning. Determinin g the amount of plan- ning necessary—given mission, time, and resources—constitutes the value and art of the planning process. Planning is often the esse ntial element in seizing the initiative. Planning he lps maneuver and sup- porting elements properl y identify opportunity within the context of the overall mission. It does not produce a script that commanders must fol- low; rather, the process helps commanders antici- pate the range of possibi lities, prepare for them, and facilitate execution. Planning decreases the time between decision and action, especially at higher levels of command— the further removed the decisionmaker is from the battlefield, the longer it takes a decision to result in action. By starting with a shared vision of future actions, possible reactions, and likely risks, the wait time for action is shorter, which keeps friendly tempo faster than that of the enemy. Planning becomes increasi ngly critical as situa- tions increase in complexity. The planning required to administratively land a company on a dock for further actions ashore is radically different from the pla nning required to land that same company ashore by amphibious assault. Planning builds shared situational awareness among the company’s leaders. By synchronizing everyone’s view of the problem and the environ- ment, subordinates can take greater initiative with an assurance that they are in line with the com- mander’s vision and end state. Planning also be comes increasing ly critical as experience decreases. For example, a company, having spent 3 months executing counterinsur- gency (COIN) operations , suddenly tasked with an assault upon a known enemy st rong point in complex terrain will require significant planning preparation. Moreover, as the company begins to deal with this new enviro nment, a solid plan will help commanders assess where they are succeed- ing and where they are falling short. Planning and Command and Control Planning is a part of co mmand and control. Both planning and command and control focus on determining what needs to occur and ensuring that the necessary actions happen to achieve the end state. Further, both begin with a central fig- ure, the commander, with whom the functions of planning and control are inherent responsibilities of command. Through his planning guidance and intent, the commander gu ides the planning pro- cess and supervises the execution. A fundamental challeng e to command and con- trol is coping with time and uncertainty. Given enough time to plan and gather information, com- manders can re duce, though never eliminate, uncertainty. Conversely, given enough certainty, commanders can more e fficiently use time dur- ing execution. However, ra re is the situation in which commanders possess the time and certainty they would like. For company commanders, wait- ing for certainty results in loss of tempo and ini- tiative. They can never achieve certainty because the enemy is already doin g something else. Plan- ning must be the mean s to balance time and uncertainty by anticipati ng decisions and actions. Planning allows commanders to decide and act effectively in the midst of uncertainty. --- Page 32 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 2-3 Since planning orients on the future, it enables command and control to ga in and retain the ini- tiative. The planning proc ess does so by creating understanding across the co mpany, lessening the amount of control nece ssary to operate, and enabling mission tactics to occur and succeed. Marine Corps Planning Process and Other Planning Tools To support the decision making of commanders, the Marine Corps created the MCPP. This flexi- ble process enables units and commands at every level to realize the inherent value of planning, use uniformly understood terms and procedures across the force, convey decisions to subordinates in recognizable and usable formats, and comple- ment joint and crisis action planning. The MCPP enables commanders to execute maneuver war- fare doctrine, gain and maintain the initiative, compress the time between decision and execu- tion, and balance time and uncertainty. Applica- ble across a range of military operations, the MCPP recognizes the co mmander’s central role as decisionmaker. The process begins wi th problem framing and ends with a transition of the plan from planning to execution. It is a planning process, an approach to decisionmaking. At its most basic level, the MCPP determines what must occur to achieve success, why it must oc cur, and what resources are available; develops potential options; weighs the pros and cons of those options; makes a choice; and enables execution. While figure 2-1 indicates a process that com- manders and planners can follow sequentially, many of the steps can a nd should occur simulta- neously. For example, although the actual writ- ten order for an operation begins with problem framing, it develops continuously throughout the MCPP. Modification of the Marine Corps Planning Process Company commanders must understand the opera- tional environment and th e planning process and have the maturity to ma ke proper decisions about how to use the process. Time is often the most pre- cious resource availa ble to a company com- mander and he must adjust his use of the MCPP to Problem Framing Course of Action Development Course of Action Wargaming Course of Action Comparison and Decision Orders Development Transition DESIGN Figure 2-1. Marine Corps Planning Process. --- Page 33 --- 2-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 protect that resource. The MCPP can be detailed or abbreviated as necessary, based upon resources, time, experience, and th e situation. It comple- ments both deliberate an d crisis action planning. Company commanders must know and under- stand the basics of th e MCPP before omitting, skipping, or otherwise modifying the process. Other Planning Tools There are a host of ot her planning tools avail- able, but some common ones discussed in the Marine Corps are the ra pid response planning process, recogni tional primed decisionmaking, systemic operational design, and the Army’s mili- tary decisionmaking proc ess. Each has strengths and weaknesses, as does the MCPP, but the MCPP provides a good bala nce between two ele- ments that often compet e—mental creativity and planning efficiency. Co mpany commanders must decide where to focus their planning time and effort, and they should consider the following:  Task assigned.  Time available.  Experience level with this type of problem.  The need for creativity.  Efficiency needed to ke ep planners and execu- tors on track as the plan is developed, dissemi- nated, and executed.  Access to resources for planning and execution.  Familiarity of leaders with the planning tools. The Marine Corps has ot her tools that support decisionmaking which are linked to MCPP. Table 2-1, on pages 2-6 and 2- 7, shows how these vari- ous planning tools link and support one another. Operational Planning Team As company commanders work to understand and find solutions to a problem, they can enlist the aid of other members of the company grouped into an operational pl anning team (OPT). An OPT can consist of a qui ck, small huddle of the company’s XO, first se rgeant, company gunnery sergeant, and the commande r, or a more deliber- ate meeting of all of th e company’s leadership. Much like the other tools used in planning, the commander’s determination of the size of the OPT depends on his experi ence and the time he has available. Planning Execution Problem Framing The purpose of problem framing is to enhance understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem while id entifying what the com- pany must accomplish and when, where, and why it must be done. These basics are required in order to proceed with planning. Problem framing is the most important step of the MCPP because no amount of effort or energy later on will help the infantry company solve a problem improp- erly understood. Using a design framework estab- lished by a company commander’s planning guidance, intent, and conc ept, the company seeks to analyze and answer the following questions:  What must the company accomplish? When? Where? Why?  What resources does the company need?  What resources does the company lack?  What information does the company need to disseminate? Inputs The primary input for the company is the HHQ order. When the infantry company is using a staff planning construct, the ne xt most important input is the company commande r’s initial intent and planning guidance. Other inputs into problem framing include an initial understanding of the sit- uation as informed by time available, intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), status checks of company resources, ca pabilities and limita- tions, and any changes to command relationships. --- Page 34 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 2-5 Process After receiving initial inputs, company command- ers and their staffs begin design activities that are focused on understanding the environment and the nature of the problem. These activities include—  Completing the IPB process (see chap. 4).  Developing intelligence requirements (IRs): What bridges can I use? Who is the local leader in the objective area?  Compiling facts (such as the status of units and enablers available) and requests for information.  Clarifying assumptions; fo r example, the river is fordable.  Understanding limitations, such as the rules of engagement (ROE), no-fire areas, and the requirement to coordinate with locals.  Understanding risk to force and risk to mis- sion, such as enemy in direct fire capability, inability to clear a support by fire (SBF) posi- tion prior to the assault, and potential for the enemy to negatively “s pin” the company’s information operations (IO).  Using red and green cells as able and if appro- priate.  Understanding shortfalls, such as the lack of suf- ficient amphibious assaul t vehicles (AAVs) to lift the whole company or the lack of translators.  Analyzing specified, im plied, and essential tasks.  Analyzing centers of gr avity and critical vul- nerabilities. Outputs The following five decisions, guidance, and prod- ucts come from proble m framing and they allow planning to continue, subunit planning to com- mence, and mission preparations to begin:  Problem framing brief. Company planners pres- ent a framing brief to the company commander to ensure shared situational awareness among the staff and to receive the commander’s approval of completed products, such as IPB, staff estimates, assumptions, and limitations.  Restated company mission statement . A restated company mission statement is based on task and center of gravity/critical vulnera- bility analysis. This statement also serves as the baseline for develo pment of the warning order (WARNORD), OPORD, and FRAGOs.  Commander’s intent and further planning guidance . Commander’s inte nt is the com- mander’s personal vision of the problem. It must be clear, concise, and easily understood two levels down. It should include an end state or commentary on conditio ns that, when satis- fied, accomplish the purpose. Proper com- mander’s intent enables subordinates to understand the larger c ontext of their actions and guides them in the absence of orders. It allows company personne l to exercise judg- ment and initiative in a way that remains con- sistent with and furthers their commander’s mission when the unforeseen occurs. This free- dom of action, within the framework of com- mander’s intent, creates tempo during planning and execution. Company commanders approve and disseminate their refined intent for the mis- sion and provide course of action (COA) development and other guidance to the staff for planning. When possible, commanders person- ally provide this inte nt and guidance to the entire staff in order to focus planning efforts.  Company WARNORD . Information regarding planning orders can be found in Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process.  Intelligence collection plan . The intelligence collection plan seeks to meet the IRs deter- mined during problem framing. A rough collec- tion matrix helps organize this effort, as does prioritization of IRs in to commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) and PIRs. The reconnaissance plan is a subset of the over- all intelligence collection plan that can involve many different sensor platforms and informa- tion sources. --- Page 35 --- 2-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 OODA Planning Progression Troop-Leading Procedure (BAMCIS) MCPP Tools Observe Orient Define or redefine the problem B—Begin planning A—Arrange for recon Problem framing METT-T IPB DRAW-D MCOO Adversary/situation templates Weather matrix ASCOPE DSF M—Make recon (visual, virtual, map) Reports (SALT, SALUTE, SPOT) PACE Discussions with HASS leaders Postcombat checks and inspections Unit debriefs COC status boards Collections plan (draft) or matrix Decide Find a workable solution(s) COA development MOOSEMUSS (principles of war) Warfighting functions C—Complete the plan Task/purpose Task organization chart TCMs/FSCMs Coordinating instruction list Synchronization matrix/fires matrix COA wargaming DSM/DST Improve the solution Synchronization matrix/fires matrix Decide on a solution Execution checklist COA comparison and decision (not usually applicable at company level) Table 2-1. Marine Corps Planning Tools. --- Page 36 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 2-7 Table 2-1. Marine Corps Planning Tools. (Cont’d) Act Disseminate the solution I—Issue the order Orders development SMEAC CCIRs/IRs Synchronization matrix/fires matrix Execution checklist Decision support matrix/template Collections matrix CONOPS graphics MOP and MOE Rehearsal and backbrief plan Ensure understanding S—Supervise Transition Rehearsals including ROC and CAR Backbriefs PCCs and PCIs Execute the decision Execution checklist CCIRs DST/DSM Reports matrix Assessment matrix Legend DRAW-D defend, reinforce, attack, withdraw, delay DSM decision support matrix DST decision support template HASS higher adjacent supporting subordinate MCOO modified combined obstacle overlay MOOSEMUSS mass, objective, offensive, security, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, surprise, simplicity OODA observe, orient, decide, act PACE primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plan PCC precombat check recon reconnaissance ROC rehearsal of concept SALT size, activity, location, time SALUTE size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment SMEAC situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics, and command and signal SPOT situation, position, observation, time TCM tactical control measure --- Page 37 --- 2-8 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Course of Action Development Problem framing answers the questions regard- ing what must be done, why it must be done, what is the environment in which it must be done, and what is available wi th which to do it; COA development answers questions regarding how to do it. The centerpiece of making a decision, COA development occurs wh en the company com- mander transitions from u nderstanding the prob- lem to solving the prob lem. While HHQ often develops more than one COA, the company com- mander usually has neither the time nor the assets to develop more than one. Inputs Inputs for COA developm ent consist of the out- puts of problem framing, products that contribute to the enhanced underst anding of the environ- ment and the nature of the problem, the restated company mission statement, and the initial array of forces and resources. Process Company commanders rely upon their under- standing of the environm ent and problem, their training, and their knowledge of the company and the level of threat to develop an idea about how to accomplish the mission . They build the idea into an actual COA that is feasible (can be ac- complished by the resour ces available), complete (makes use of all resour ces available across all warfighting func tions), and acceptable (accom- plishes assigned tasks with in acceptable risk and minimum expenditure of resources). As they do so, they develop—  Objectives.  Task organization, in cluding command rela- tionships.  Schemes of maneuver, including form of maneuver.  Tasks and purposes for subordinates and sup- porting organizations.  Tactical and fire s upport coordination mea- sures (FSCMs).  Timelines.  Coordinating instructions that synchronize but do not unnecessarily restrict initiative. Outputs Upon completing COA de velopment, company planners generate products that narrow the focus of the planning effort, continue to build the OPORD and associated products , allow for resolution of resource shortfalls to begin, and refine the simulta- neous preparation and work of subunits and com- pany leadership. These products include—  Concept of operation, which includes—  Updated mission statement.  Assigned objectives.  COA graphic.  COA narrative (translates into the CONOPS portion of the execut ion paragraph in the OPORD).  Task organization (including command rela- tionships).  Tasks to subordinates and supporting organi- zations.  Tactical coordination measures and FSCMs.  Coordinating instructi ons list, including a timeline or events list.  Concepts of support, which includes—  Command and control (translates into com- mand and signal paragraph in the OPORD).  Fires (translates into the fire support portion of the execution paragraph in the OPORD).  Administration (transla tes into a portion of the administration and logistics paragraph in the OPORD).  Logistics, including medical plans (translates into a portion of the administration and lo- gistics paragraph in the OPORD).  Intelligence collections plan (translates into tasks to subordinates and requests to HHQ).  Synchronization matrix, which is a tool used to capture all of the concepts of support and opera- tions items in an easi ly understandable format. The matrix helps to ensure that all work is com- pleted in unison. --- Page 38 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 2-9  Fire support execution ma trix, which is a tool that accomplishes the same purpose as the syn- chronization matrix but focuses on the details of the fire support pla n. When possible, fire support tasks are integrated into the synchroni- zation matrix. Course of Action Wargaming After deciding on a COA, the company’s leaders need to take a critical lo ok at their understanding of the environment and solution to the problem in order to identify gaps in the plan, discover poten- tially missed opportunities, and fix synchroniza- tion issues among warfighting functions and units involved in the operati on. The overall purpose is to remain externally fo cused, that is, focused on the problem. Additionall y, wargaming improves common understanding of the problem and assigned tasks through an interactive refinement process. While battalions and HHQs conduct for- mal processes to accomp lish wargaming, avail- able time and resources make such processes rarely used at the co mpany level. Normally, wargaming at the company level includes asking “what if” or asking other company and platoon leaders to review and backbrief their understand- ing of the plan. The COA is updated and improved by resolving identified discrepancies and issues. Inputs The COA wargaming process begins with the concepts of operations and support, the synchro- nization matrix, and a grap hical depiction of the area of operations (AO). Process The wargaming process at the company level is informal and focuses on ensuring that the COA is understandable and effective, accomplishes the mission, and makes sense. The enemy, mission, branch plans, sequel plans, and friendly ability should be considered. In COA wargaming, the ke y consideration is the enemy’s actions and reactions to the friendly plan. This methodology applies to stability operations as well, during which the ac tions and reactions of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), host na- tion (HN) partners, human environment, weather, and other factors will affect the friendly plan. Critically, wargaming ve rifies whether the COA solves the problem and accomplishes the mission within HHQ intent and specified limitations. It also verifies that the COA makes tactical sense within the principles of war and warfighting functions. Wargaming sh ould also highlight pos- sible impacts of the COA on HHQ and on adja- cent friendly, coalition, and host nation security forces (HNSF). If eno ugh time is available, wargaming should also provide the foundation for development of branch and sequel plans. Branch plans refer to po ssibilities or contingen- cies that change the mission, scheme of maneu- ver, or orientation of the company based on events. Since they are preplanned, the company possesses a better chance of success when encoun- tering difficulty execu ting the CONOPS. For example, if time is ava ilable, company planners might fully plan the acti ons required to use the secondary or even tertiary avenues of approach. Sequel plans refer to actio ns that follow the end of the current operation. If time is available, com- pany planners may preplan exploitation and pur- suit, or a hasty defense on the objective area. Wargaming should reveal weaknesses in the internal understanding or the ability to execute the COA. It should ensu re that subordinate units and leadership receive th e greatest latitude possi- ble to accomplish their mission. The following questions should be answered:  Did the company use all elements of available combat power to its best advantage?  Did the company plan for redundancy of capa- bility or does th e success of the plan rest on a single point of failure? --- Page 39 --- 2-10 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1  Is the scheme of maneuver understandable?  What are likely mistakes that the company might make? Are mitigation measures in place? Outputs At the end of the warg aming process, COA war- gaming produces an execution checklist, a decision support matrix, revisions to the CONOPS and sup- port, and revisions to the synchronization and fire support matrices. Course of Action Comparison and Decision Infantry company commanders rarely have the time to develop more than one COA, making the COA comparison and decision step unnecessary. Orders Development The orders development step involves articulating and disseminating the plan so that all units under- stand the commander’s vision and how to achieve it. Using the tools and pr ocesses listed previously should result in the or der being 80 percent com- plete as the company leadership reaches this step. Instructions must be communicated in a standard, recognizable, clear, and simple format. Orders production is not for those who write them; rather, those who produce the orders must condense everything done in planni ng and convert it into plain language for all to understand. The order is the most widely distributed document in the plan- ning process, so it must be simple and clear. There are many ways to package and distribute a plan, such as through a verbal or written OPORD, a FRAGO, a CONOPS briefing, or matrix orders. The format and dissemin ation means are deter- mined by—  Time available.  Personalities of the company’s leaders.  Experience, training, and knowledge levels of the company’s leaders.  Available resources.  Complexity of the operation.  Numbers and types of or ganizations/units that are being coordinated. Inputs The orders development process uses the COA wargaming results by incorporating the execution checklist, revised concepts of operations and sup- port, and the revised synchronization and fire sup- port execution matrices into the OPORD. Process Company commanders determine the format and method they will use to produce, brief, and dis- seminate the OPORD. They refine the situational awareness products from problem framing and COA development, ensuring that products and narrative supporting concep ts, tasks, and coordi- nation measures are easily understood. They rec- oncile and crosswalk the order. Orders reconciliation is a detailed editing process that ensures the validity of information and guid- ance across the order. If company commanders discover discrepancies between enclosures and the order, gaps in information, directed actions that do not support the mi ssion, and other similar issues, then they make the appropriate changes. In a constrained time environment, commanders ensure that the CONOPS and other supporting concepts (such as maneuver, fires, and support) support the commander’s intent, mission, and CCIRs. They also ensure that the intelligence col- lection plan supports PIRs and IRs. During the orders crosswalk, the commander compares the order with the orders of higher and adjacent commanders to achieve unity of effort and ensure that the supe rior commander’s intent is met. The crosswalk id entifies discrepancies or gaps in planning. If discrepancies or gaps are found, the company staff takes corrective action. Outputs The output of the orders development process is an OPORD or FRAGO complete with the following:  Task organization with command relationships.  Mission statement.  CONOPS, including the scheme of maneu- ver, fire support, IO, and civil-military opera- tions (CMO) plans. --- Page 40 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 2-11  Tasks to subordinates and supporting organiza- tions.  Tactical control measures and FSCMs.  Coordinating instructions, including a timeline or events list.  Intelligence collection plan.  Administrative support plan.  Logistical support plan.  C2 plan, including the communications plan.  Synchronization matrix if used.  Fire support execution matrix.  Execution checklist, which may include a deci- sion support matrix.  Rehearsal and backbrief or confirmation brief plan. Transition (Preparation for Operations) At the company level, the company commander and company leadership are responsible for both planning and overseeing the execution of the plan although HHQ often transitions a plan from those elements of the staff th at developed the plan to those elements of the st aff that will oversee its execution. Preparation for operations begins with issuing WARNORDs. After the OPORD reaches subordinates and supporti ng organizations, the company commander begins a supervisory pro- cess. This supervisory process consists of two parts—the intellectual and the physical. When supervising and inspec ting, company command- ers must ensure that enough time is allowed for correction of noted discrepancies. When performing intellectual supervision, com- pany commanders need to ensure that the mem- bers of the company pr operly understand the OPORD and associated pr oducts. After subordi- nates have the opportunity to understand the order, prepare their own orders, and continue preparations for the op eration, “understanding checks” can be accomplished through—  Rehearsals. Rehearsals can be very informal radio backbriefs or formal combined arms rehearsals (CARs) conducted on a large terrain model. Whatever the method, there are few excuses for not conducting a form of rehearsal.  Backbriefs/confirmation briefs. Backbriefs oc- cur informally and may be more topical, focus- ing on major movements and tasks. They may take place with the company commander indi- vidually or in a small group of essential leader- ship. Confirmation briefs are more formal, occur with all leadership or even the entire company present, and cover all the details.  Precombat inspections . During precombat in- spections (PCIs), company commanders can question individuals on various aspects of the order and plan in order to ensure that proper dissemination, orders processes, and under- standing occurred across the company. When performing physical supervision, company commanders supervise th e processes related to equipment accountability, radio and communica- tion checks, weapons f unctioning, maintenance, fueling, ammunition issue, and similar logistic functions to ensure units are equipped to accom- plish assigned tasks and deal with contingencies. They perform precombat checks (PCCs), during which company commande rs check key weapon systems, spot check equipment to determine read- iness, and inspect othe r gear and material to ensure adherence to orders and adequate prepara- tion for operations. Inputs Issuing the FRAGO or OPORD marks the begin- ning of transition and pr eparation for operations. All portions of the orde r directly support the company’s preparation to conduct operations. Process The transition phase consists of the company com- mander and company lead ership conducting and supervising rehearsals, briefs, PCIs, and PCCs. Outputs The output of the transition phase is the com- pany’s ability to execute assigned tasks. --- Page 41 --- 2-12 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Assessment and Reorientation An assessment is the c ontinuous moni toring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of an operation. Put another way, assessments allow company commanders to compare their visions with reality and make informed decisions accord- ingly—to ask and answer the question, “Are we on the right path?” Assessments can be such occurrences as formal and informal conversations and reports from higher, adjacent, supporting, and subordinate headquarters ; discussions with com- pany leadership; radio traf fic; battlefield circula- tion; or analysis of collected intelligence. There are three vital com ponents to assessing the situation: goals, feedback, and process. Company commanders must clearl y understand the goals they are trying to reach in order to have a bench- mark against which to compare their progress. Goals can consist of such things as tasks, objec- tives, and mission end states. Feedback presents co mpany commanders with the information they n eed to establish perfor- mance against the stated goals. In passing guid- ance on what information to gather, how to gather it, and how to present it, company commanders ensure that they do not protect themselves from unpleasant news. Feedback—  Is continuous. Feedback must flow as it devel- ops to provide the latest information of value.  Occurs at all echelons . Vital information from subordinate units down to the fire team level needs to reach the ri ght command echelon to allow for proper assessment and decisionmaking.  Is focused on objectives . Unrestricted feed- back can overwhe lm an information manage- ment (IM) system unless it is filtered to what is relevant. The primary guidance on relevance comes from the company commander and focuses on the informatio n that best supports determining whether the company makes prog- ress toward its objectives.  Is focused on decisionmakers. In the same way filtering of information is important to main- taining focus, presenting the filtered informa- tion in an understandable format is equally important for decisionmakers to make in- formed and timely decisions. Company commanders establish a methodology to measure feedback input against the goals of the company, unders tand what it means, and make decisions accordingly. Th is methodology is the process of assessment and should consist of basis of comparison, feedback mechanisms, analysis mechanisms, and decision recommendations. Basis for comparison is in tegral to the effective- ness of the assessment process. It is the require- ment to understand “what right looks like” and to compare what the feedback says about what the situation “looks like now.” If the company com- mander feels that the defensive security force must destroy at least five vehi cles in the enemy’s lead element and the security element has destroyed only three, then that comp arison serves as a basis for a decision about whethe r to accept risk to the security force to meet the destruction criteria. Feedback mechanisms, pe r the criteria of good feedback (focus on objectiv es), include effective and relevant collection and IM plans, which con- sist of external and internal mechanisms. External mechanisms of generati ng feedback consist of reports (such as situation reports or contact reports), discussions wi th external leadership (such as local, adjacent, and higher leaders), and operational debriefs (such as patrol, raid, or secu- rity debriefs [see chap. 8]). Internal mechanisms of generating feedback consist of reports (such as casualty, vehicle, mainte nance, or supply), dis- cussions with internal company leadership, pre- combat and postcombat checks and inspections, and critiques and afte r action reviews (AARs) (see chap. 8). Analysis mechanisms are necessary since com- manders must often asse ss far more complex situations than those just discussed. Such complex --- Page 42 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 2-13 situations especially occu r in stability operations, during which the human environment, infra- structure maintenance a nd development, threat activity over time, and a host of other possible criteria require assessment. As seen in figure 2-2, on page 2-14, assessment processes use measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effective- ness (MOEs). A MOP assess es the actions of the company against the company’s stated goals and objectives, while MOEs consist of detailed criteria that assess the nuances of how efficiently the company is reaching stated goals and objectives. The company commander uses assessment meth- odology to make in-str ide decisions about the actions the company is taking to achieve its objec- tives. Similar to decision points in COA develop- ment, he can establish predetermined performance and effectiveness triggers regarding how well any particular operation or effort is proceeding. Equally, he can take ac tion on unexpected situa- tions that arise as the mission progresses. Assessment Planning Just as decision points, destruction criteria, and event triggers are determined and planned during COA development in s upport of decisionmaking, so are assessments planned to support achievement of the overall purpose of the operation. As seen in figure 2-3, on page 2- 14, the development and planning of assessment tools and requirements occur alongside tactical planning and as part of the concept for command and control. Assessment planning consists of receiving the required goals (such as tactical tasks, objectives, and effects), determining the condition s necessary to indicate that goals have been met, and deciding who or what will observe and report the MOPs and MOEs related to condition and goal accomplishment. Input Goals and Establish Criteria The company commander turns goals into mea- surable criteria. If the goal of the company was to destroy an enemy motorized unit, the company commander establishes the measurable criteria that indicate when the company meets the goal. In this case, the comp any commander determines that the satisfaction of the company’s mission occurs with the incap acitation of 30 percent of the enemy unit’s personnel, mobility kills on 10 of the enemy’s 20 vehicl es, and the surrender or withdrawal of the enemy’s leadership. Establish Measurable Conditions Continuing with the previous example, once the company commander establishes what “right” looks like, he then asks what feedback informa- tion must be received in order to know if the company is meeting or has met the criteria and goals of the mission. In this case, burning hulks, blown tires, or abandoned vehicles may serve as the conditions that indicat e a mobility kill on an enemy vehicle. Therefore, the company com- mander will use the destruction criteria as the MOP and battlefield repor ting on the type and amount of damage inflicted upon the enemy as the MOE. Establish Feedback Capability One method of feedback is basic combat report- ing. If the company commander sought to destroy the enemy motorized unit over a defense in depth EXAMPLE : A company receives the mission to seize a hill. The MOE relates directly to the following questions: Did the company take the hill, did it fail to take the hill, or is it still in the progress of trying to take the hill? The MOP pertains to how efficiently the company is taking the hill. If company commanders are using casualties as a MOP, then light casualties signal the commander to continue the current assault. Heav y casualties indicate that the company “is doing the wrong things” and leads the company commander to make a decision as to whether to change the main effort of the assault, to change the form of maneuver, to use additional supporting arms, or to call off the assault altogether. --- Page 43 --- 2-14 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 using not only the assets available to the com- pany but also supporting arms and close air sup- port (CAS) in the security zone, then the company must determin e how to observe and gather feedback criteria on enemy destruction beyond the main battle area (MBA). A small security team forward in the security zone could serve multiple purposes, such as ensuring secu- rity, controlling supporti ng arms, and providing feedback to the company commander on enemy destruction criteria as the operation unfolds. The important thing for asse ssment planning is that some method exists to co llect the feedback for the company commander. Questions company commanders need to ask during assessment plan- ning include the following:  What will be assessed and to what detail?  By what criteria will the company assess a par- ticular task or objective?  How will the company ga ther feedback infor- mation to assess conditions?  Are the conditions, IRs, MOE, and MOP tied to a decision? Who is making that decision once conditions have been met? Are we doing things right? Are we doing the right things? MOEMOP (Measure of Performance) (Measure of Effectiveness) A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment (JP 1-02) Friendly focused e.g., number of medium machine guns that are full mission capable A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect (JP 1-02) Enemy and environment focused e.g., number of T-72s destroyed Observable Relevant Measurable Execution Planning Purpose Mission and end state Tactical tasks Objectives Conditions (to meet objectives) IRs that confirm/deny conditions Collections plan for MOE/MOP/IRs MEASURE DEVELOP Figure 2-2. Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness. Figure 2-3. Planning Versus Execution. --- Page 44 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 2-15 Analysis Tools Any tool that collects information regarding MOE and MOP, conditi ons, objectives, and, most importantly, decisi on criteria helps manage the assessment plan. Both the synchronization matrix and the decision support matr ix can sup- port management of this information. Table 2-2, on page 2-16, is an example of a modified deci- sion support matrix. The following external and internal assessment tool s can all be used infor- mally or may become fo rmal reporting require- ments that are used to feed higher and adjacent units’ assessment cycles:  External—  MOE/MOP.  Decision support matrix/decision support template.  Collections plan.  Synchronization matrix.  Intelligence assessments from reports and debriefs.  Internal—  AARs.  Inspection reports with analysis of the re- sults. Assessments are a vital component of effective decisionmaking, but assessm ents are usually the most neglected aspect of planning. For decision- making to be effectiv e, company commanders must determine where they want to be, where they actually are, and how they want to get to their objectives. --- Page 45 --- 2-16 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Table 2-2. Assessment Decision Support Matrix. Event Number Decision Point Number Event/ Condition Indicators MOE/MOP Commander’s Options Sensor Decisionmaker NAI/NPI Collector Trigger Authority 1 1 Enemy fixed MOP 1: Plts in blocking positions MOE 1: Enemy is still in town at H+3 MOE 2: Enemy is strengthening defenses A: Commence the attack B: Commit the reserve to a blocking position NAI 1-3 NPI 1 and 2 Plts Raven UA MOE 1 or 2 Co cmdr 2 2 Enemy unit destroyed MOE 3: 30 EKIA discovered MOE 4: Enemy signals surrender MOE 5: 10 enemy vehicles are on fire or have blown tires C: Continue the attack D: Commit the reserve E: Transition to consolidate Co obj 1 Plt block Persons Plts MOE 3 and 4 Co cmdr 3 3 Local leaders identified MOP 2: Plts have canvassed every street MOE 6: Locals agree with company’s list of leaders (developed by 1stSgt) MOE 7: Bn verifies with governor that list of leaders is correct F: Continue recon patrols with IR for identifying local leaders G: Transition the patrolling focus to security of the population Co obj 1 NPIs 5-15 Plts Co 1stSgt 44 I n i t i a l atmospherics identified MOP 3: Squad reports are all submitted MOE 8: Number of tips received by D+2 Rapid rise=positive Small rise=neutral No tips=negative H: Convene an IO working group I: Begin CMO projects Plt obj B and C Plts Co XO Legend bn battalion cmdr commander co company EKIA enemy killed in action 1stSgt first sergeant obj objective plt(s) platoon(s) recon reconnaissance UA unmanned aircraft --- Page 46 --- CHAPTER 3 COMMAND AND CONTROL As stated in MCDP 6, Command and Control , “command and control encompasses all military functions and operations , giving them meaning and harmonizing them into a meaningful whole.” Command and control is th e exercise of author- ity and direction by a properly designated com- mander over assign ed and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communi- cations, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, di recting, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1-02) The nature of war and the C2 elements are immutable and have remained cons istent from antiquity to the modern era. Authority, leadership, decision- making, information, communication, and struc- ture are all elements th at Alexander the Great would have understood as essential to command and control in war. Li kewise, modern command- ers must understand the na ture of war and master the enduring C2 elements if they are to succeed. However, the forms of wa r are evolving and the infantry company commander is now facing new challenges and responsi bilities that previously had been under the purview of higher echelons of command. Technological innovations in the war- fighting function of command and control can aid company commanders, but can also divert atten- tion from the fundamental C2 processes that are time tested and enduring. Command is the lawful exercise of a com- mander’s authority over subordinates. Command- ers command by exercising the three separate elements of command—  Authority.  Leadership.  Decisionmaking. The authority that a company commander law- fully exercises is conferred by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility to effe ctively use available resources and plan the employment, organiza- tion, direction, coordina tion, and control of mili- tary forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for the health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. The legal authority of the company commander is a powerful tool, but that authority is never sufficient to maximize the per- formance of a unit in the accomplishment of assigned missions. All commanders must mast er the art of leader- ship; however, the infa ntry company commander faces leadership challe nges unique to the com- pany level. Routinely, company commanders must exercise both direct and indirect leadership. Company commanders must be able to effec- tively and directly inspire and motivate individual members of their commands as well as be able to effectively lead through th eir subordinate leaders to increase their span of control and to achieve broader aims. At no other echelon of command is this intersection of direct and indirect leadership requirements as prominen t as it is at the com- pany level. Skil led company co mmanders bal- ance the need for exact and easily understood orders with the imperative to maintain the high- est degree of initiative and flexibility for their subordinates as dictated by the tenets of maneu- ver warfare. This balanc ing act is the acumen of leadership and tactical art as exercised by the company commander. It is in the realm of decisionmaking that com- manders set their comm ands up for success or failure. Decisionmaking and command and con- trol exist much as a supported and supporting --- Page 47 --- 3-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 relationship, with comma nd and control support- ing decisionmaking. Effective command and control supports decisionmaking by increasing a commander’s situational awareness and enabling a faster decision-to-execution cycle, which gen- erates the speed and tempo advantages neces- sary for dominating adversaries in the temporal realm. While the quality and timeli ness of deci- sions are usually a dire ct consequence of com- mand and control, the tremendous advantages of modern C2 systems are lost to a commander who has not mastered deci sionmaking. Commanders must master both the art and science of decision- making before they ma ster the in tricacies of modern C2 systems. Control is the iterative process of adjusting the guidance and directions given subordinate and supporting units based on situational awareness and feedback. Situationa l awareness is knowl- edge of the present en vironment, including knowledge of METT-T factors. Situational awareness permits the co mmander to make deci- sions with incomplete information—a less than perfect understanding—and is a personal perspec- tive or ability to de termine the relevance of unfolding events. Information and skill are th e two elements of sit- uational awareness. Highe r, adjacent, supporting, and subordinate elements provide analytical information in the form of feedback to help build the commander’s understa nding of the situation. The commander must provide the intuitive aspect of situational awareness in order to understand the situation in the abse nce of complete informa- tion. Skill is a personal element of situational awareness that is base d on the commander’s experience, education, judgment, and intuition. For a commander to exer cise control in the dynamic environm ent of military operations, he must have more than a fixed appreciation of the situation. He must have a timely flow of relevant information concerning the situation—feedback. Feedback is the information that allows command- ers to adjust their perceptions of the situation and modify command actions as needed. Feedback allows the commander to determine status by comparing established goals with the current situa- tion. Information in the form of feedback may come from anywhere in any form (such as intelli- gence about enemy actions, reactions, and coun- teractions; informatio n about the status of subordinate or adjacent units; or revised guidance from HHQ based on developments, battle damage assessments [BDAs], psychological surveys, source operations, tribal engagements, or some- thing as subtle as the in flection in a subordinate’s voice during a contact repor t). Feedback is the mechanism that allows commanders to adapt to changing circumstances, exploit fleeting opportu- nities, respond to deve loping problems, modify schemes, or redirect efforts. In this way, feedback is what allows a commander the situational aware- ness to control (see chap . 2 for more information on assessment and feedback mechanisms). The remainder of this chapter focuses on the three elements that comprise control:  People.  Information.  C2 support structures. People The personnel within a C2 support structure, such as the watch officer (W O), operations chief, clerks, runners, ROs, and analysts within a com- pany COC, are the sing le most important ele- ment of a C2 structur e. Therefore, commanders must make the training of those personnel their top C2 priority. Task Organization Infantry company commanders shape the fight and establish command and control primarily through their organization of forces. Proper task organization aids in dete rmining the level of ini- tiative available to subordinates and maintaining flexibility at each echelon (e.g., a reserve). It establishes the basis for feedback. The company --- Page 48 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 3-3 task organization should account for such consid- erations as the warfi ghting functions, assigned tasks, and the capabilities /limitations of leaders. Company commanders should consider—  Command and control: organization of the COC/command post (CP) (e.g., personnel, roles, responsibilities, and layout).  Maneuver: organization of platoons, attach- ments, and enablers (e.g., a MAP versus a weapons platoon configuration).  Fires: organization of a weapons platoon and the FST (e.g., to attach or retain sections at company level).  Intelligence: organizati on of patrols and the functioning of the CLIC.  Logistics: organization of the company trains.  Force protection: organi zation of such units as the weapons platoon or engineer attachments. Relationships A significant portion of organizing for combat is determining the relationships between individuals and units. There are two types of relationships for consideration: command relationships and sup- port relationships. Table 3-1 reflec ts the types of command relationships as they pertain to military units. While the only co mmand relationships rec- ognized within the Marine Corps are organic and attached, it is important that company command- ers understand the type s of command relation- ships used within the joint community and by other Services. External units can support the company without having a command relati onship. Tables 3-2 and 3-3, both on page 3-4, re flect these types of sup- port relationships. Transitions in Command and Control Structure As situations change, company leadership transi- tions the C2 structure to ensure that relevant information continues to be gathered, analyzed, and disseminated. Command and control organi- zations, processes, and systems will all adjust as the company transitions from dynamic to steady Table 3-1. Command Relationships. Type Definition Organic Those parts of a unit listed in its table of organization. Attached A unit that is bound temporarily to a command other than its organic command. OPCON The command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command and may be delegated within the command. TACON The command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands or the military capability or forces made available for tasking that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. ADCON The direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations with respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Supporting Support is a command authority—a support relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. DIRLAUTH That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult, or coordinate an action with, a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. NATO OPCON The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned and accomplish specific missions or tasks usually limited by function, time, or location. It further includes the deployment of units concerned and the retention or delegation of TACON to those units. It does not include administrative or logistic control. NATO TACON The authority normally limited to the detailed and specified local direction of movement and maneuver of the tactical force to accomplish an assigned task. It does not provide organizational authority or administrative and support responsibilities. Legend ADCON administrative control DIRLAUTH direct liaison authority OPCON operational control TACON tactical control --- Page 49 --- 3-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 state operations (and back) and shifts focus among offense, defense, and stability. Indicators that a change to the co mpany’s C2 structure is necessary include the following:  Change to mission . A change in the com- pany’s mission requires ev aluation of what C2 functions are necessary to enable the com- pany to change tasks, to move back and forth between static and dyna mic operations, and to transition between oper ational areas (e.g., defense to stability).  Changes in enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures . An enemy who is changing the manner in which he figh ts dictates changes to the information that is critical to company commanders, the decisions that are required of them and when they are needed, and the corre- sponding changes to the ways in which infor- mation is gathered and processed.  Additional functions. The addition or modifica- tion of functions required to operate in the bat- tlespace, such as CMO or fire support structure, changes command relati onships and informa- tion and decision flow paths. Such modifica- tions necessitate changes to C2 structure.  Changes in environment. A change in the com- pany’s operational envi ronment (such as a transition to ur ban, mountain, winter, or sum- mer climates) requires a change in the way the company conduct s operations and the manner in which those opera tions are commanded and controlled. Table 3-2. Support Relationships. Type Definition DS A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly the supported force’s request for assistance. GS That support given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. GS-R A mission requiring the supporting unit to furnish support for the force as a whole while augmenting the capabilities of another similar unit as a second priority; GS‐R is assigned only to indirect fire support agencies, principally artillery units. Reinforcing A support mission in which the supporting unit assists the supported unit’s mission. Only like units, such as artillery to artillery, intelligence to intelligence, or armor to armor, can be given a reinforcing/reinforced mission. Legend GS general support GS-R general support-reinforcing Table 3-3. Support Relationship Responsibilities. Commanded by Tasked by Positioned by Logistics from Liaison to Communication with Priorities Established by DS Parent unit Parent unit Parent unit Supported unit Parent unit Parent and reinforced unit Parent unit GS Parent unit Parent unit Parent unit Parent unit As required by parent unit Parent unit Parent unit GS-R Parent unit Parent unit Parent unit Parent unit As required by parent unit Parent and reinforced unit Parent unit Rein Parent unit Parent unit Parent unit Reinforced unit Parent unit Parent and reinforced unit Parent unit Legend GS general support GS-R general support-reinforcing rein reinforcing --- Page 50 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 3-5  Change of location . A new AO requires com- pany commanders to conduct significant prob- lem framing with corresponding changes to C2 structure.  Change to task organization . Any significant change to task organization (such as losses or gains, combat power, enablers, collections, and analysis capability) requ ires corresponding re- evaluation of C2 structure. Command and Control Transition Plans Responsibility for adjustin g C2 structure resides with the company command er, but is often dele- gated to the XO. As the si tuation changes, a tran- sition plan is developed and can include—  New functions the C2 system must manage.  New information requirements and decision points.  Changes to task organization.  Changes to command and support relationships.  Changes to C2 processes, such as battle rhythm, reports, or meetings.  Changes to C2 systems, such as to increase/ reduce use of various systems.  Timeline for changes.  Roles and responsibilities for changes.  Decision points during the transition.  COC displacement plan (if required).  Rehearsal or briefs on changes to relevant orga- nizations/personnel. Company Leadership Roles and Responsibilities in Command and Control All members of the comp any’s leadership and headquarters operating th e COC and maintaining the common operational picture have general roles and responsibilities to assist the company commander when determining CP and COC con- figurations in light of the company’s mission and resources. The company commander has the fol- lowing responsibilities:  Approve company COC SOP.  Provide training guidanc e to subordinate com- manders.  Develop and implement the company’s long- range plan.  Convene and lead OPTs.  Provide operational planning recommendations to the battalion operations officer.  Develop OPORDs.  Develop company CCIRs, PIRs, essential ele- ments of friendly info rmation, and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs).  Direct company targeting process.  Assess operational readiness (personnel, equip- ment, logistics).  Develop fire support plan (lethal and nonlethal fires).  Coordinate with higher, adjacent, and support- ing units. The XO has the following responsibilities:  Perform the duties of the company com- mander in his absence.  Establish and supervise the company COC.  Serve as the company COC’s senior WO.  Draft company COC SOPs.  Develop and enforce battle drills.  Integrate supporting fires.  Develop company level attack guidance matrix (lethal and nonlethal).  Participate in OPTs.  Administer and supervis e training of company COC personnel.  Develop and oversee exec ution of local secu- rity plan.  Establish and supervise quartering parties. The company first sergeant has the following responsibilities:  Participate in the supervision and conduct of IO.  Track casualties and ov ersee maintenance of the casualty tracking board in the company COC.  Maintain personnel status board.  Direct preparation of the morning report.  Assist in the developm ent of a mi ssing Marine plan. --- Page 51 --- 3-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1  Supervise company administration.  Participate in OPTs.  Participate in targeting board.  Track enlisted training proficiencies. The company gunnery sergeant has the following responsibilities:  Assist the XO in esta blishing and supervising the operation of the company COC.  Supervise the management of company com- munications assets.  Supervise local security.  Establish and maintain supervision of the com- pany armory.  Direct supply and resupply for the company.  Supervise the WO in tr acking logistic opera- tions and reporting.  Assist XO in establ ishing and supervising quartering parties.  Participate in OPTs.  Coordinate support requirements for the reserve.  Plan and supervise the casualty evacuation (CASEVAC).  Maintain accountability of company equipment.  Plan and supervise EPW/detainee handling. The WO has the following responsibilities:  Supervise all personnel in the company COC.  Supervise current ope rations and initiate appropriate action as the commander’s senior representative.  Ensure all missions are briefed and debriefed.  Conduct cross-boundary coordination.  Provide situational upda tes and briefings for key personnel.  Control entry and exit of friendly lines.  Obtain situational updates from company COC personnel.  Maintain situational awareness on all friendly and enemy activity.  Obtain information from the appropriate subor- dinate and supporting units.  Disseminate informati on to the appropriate subordinate and supporting units.  Notify the commander of any CCIR event.  Ensure all status boards in the company COC are current.  Commit the company reserve in accordance with unit SOP.  Coordinate and clear supporting arms in accor- dance with appropriate documentation.  Adjust and disseminate FSCMs based on the tactical situation.  Coordinate the movement of ground-based fire support.  Conduct turnover with oncoming WO. The operations chief/assistant operations chief (watch chief) have the following responsibilities:  Assist WOs in the perf ormance of their duties and the general operation of the company COC.  Supervise the company COC watchstanders and ROs.  Maintain the company’s common tactical pic- ture (CTP) by operatin g battle tracking and location systems to incl ude units entering and exiting the company’s battlespace.  Monitor and operate digital communications and electronic warfare (EW) systems.  Coordinate with higher, adjacent, and support- ing units on operations and intelligence-related matters.  Manage the status and receipts of CCIRs.  Maintain a digital and hard copy logbook.  Assist in the enforcement of active and pas- sive counterintelligence (CI) measures.  Publish daily primary and alternate challenge words and passwords, signs, and countersigns.  Display current FSCMs on company situation board.  Maintain the status of remaining air sorties allocated, aircraft on call, and all preplanned air missions for the next 24 hours. --- Page 52 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 3-7 The company’s intelligence specialist has the fol- lowing responsibilities:  Link between the company COC and the bat- talion intelligence section as well as nonor- ganic intelligence assets being employed in the company AO.  Conduct IPB, submit daily intelligence reports, and develop the company commander’s intelli- gence briefs.  Coordinate intelligen ce activities in the AO with nonorganic intelligence assets and HN forces.  Recommend PIRs and develop a company intelligence collection plan.  Operate COC systems.  Analyze enemy tactics, techniques, and proce- dures.  Provide indications and warnings of enemy attacks in the AO.  Support the targeting process through intelli- gence support a nd production of unit targeting packages.  Conduct friendly pattern analysis.  Process unit geospatial intelligence support requests and other intelligence requests for information to HHQ.  Monitor enemy activity throughout the AO and the AOI.  Provide guidance and s upervision on intelli- gence-related matters to the infantry Marines serving in the company COC.  Produce local area maps and imagery. If using a CLIC, Marines as signed to support the intelligence specialist by assisting in analysis, briefing, and debrief functions have the follow- ing responsibilities:  Focus on the current enemy threat, conduct appropriate mission brie fs, and provide indica- tions and warning of enemy attacks in the AO.  Brief all outgoing patrols.  Assist the intelligence specialist and opera- tions NCO in the production of the company commander’s intelligence briefs and daily intelligence reports fo r submission to sup- ported and supporting units.  Provide updates to the intelligence specialist and operations NCO for the CTP.  Update specific info rmation requirements, high-value target (HVT ) lists, and BOLO [be on the lookout] lists.  Produce and maintain company storyboards.  Alert the company COC upon receipt of CCIRs and PIRs.  Operate COC systems.  Monitor intelligence-related digital systems.  Track detainees for further exploitation.  Assist collections Marine in BDA. If utilizing a CL IC, Marines assigned to support the intelligence specialist by assisting in data col- lections have the following responsibilities:  Provide input to the company intelligence col- lection plan.  Conduct mission debriefs to support the collec- tion effort.  Input collected intelligence information into the appropriate system for analysis, produc- tion, and dissemination.  Assist in the production of daily intelligence reports for submission to higher, adjacent, and supporting units.  Alert the company COC upon receipt of any CCIR.  Give situation briefings/updates to key per- sonnel.  Process information gathered from tactical site exploitation, tactical questioning, document exploitation, detainee interrogations, and other sources.  Monitor any company organic or assigned intel- ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, such as ground sensors or unmanned air- craft (UA).  Operate, process, and conduct training on digi- tal camera and video assets.  Operate COC, biometric collections, and simi- lar systems. --- Page 53 --- 3-8 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1  Maintain and disseminate a record of targets fired on, BDA, and targets not engaged.  Forward the SHELREPs [shelling reports] and enemy order of battle overlays to counterfire headquarters to develop counterbattery and countermortar fire data. The MOS 06XX communications Marine has the following responsibilities:  Provide guidance on co mmunications, install and maintain voice and data communications, and maintain communications equipment.  Maintain all required communication records, such as accountability, circuit logs, and record jackets.  Conduct over-the-air rekey.  Employ communications security measures.  Coordinate communicat ions operations with the battalion communications section. The RO has the following responsibilities:  Assist the communications Marine with install- ing and maintaining vo ice and data communi- cations nets and equipment.  Operate voice and data communications nets within the company COC.  Maintain communications and position report status boards.  Record and disseminate all message traffic.  Employ communications security measures.  Maintain situational awareness of the CTP.  Alert the company COC upon receipt of any CCIR. Additionally, the follo wing company members have specific functions:  The ISR representative operates company level ISR platforms, such as unmanned ground vehi- cles, remote cameras, and UA.  The fires representative plans fire support and conducts fire support coordination in conjunc- tion with the FST and HHQ FSCC.  The IO representative plans and coordinates with public affairs (PA), military information support operations (MISO), and other IO elements. Information Information allows comma nders to make deci- sions beyond those that ar e purely intuitive. In a situation when a comma nder must make an instant decision, intuiti on and information previ- ously received will form that decision. In a situa- tion when a commander has the advantage of time between present dema nds and the need for a decision, the C2 architec ture should provide rele- vant and timely informat ion. Modern C2 systems can overload company commanders with infor- mation, which creates an environment in which the most relevant information is difficult to iden- tify. Therefore, information must also be priori- tized and organized so that the most important information is not overlooked or lost. Awareness and understa nding of the operational environment allow the company commander to anticipate future conditions, formulate CONOPSs, analyze the COA, and accurately assess risks. This aw areness and understanding can be obtained only th rough collecting, process- ing, analyzing, and asse ssing information. Infor- mation is, in a sense, th e raw material that fuels the entire C2 process. The ability of commanders to exercise command and control depends on their ability and that of their subordinates to man- age that information. Classes of Information Information is the facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form and the meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation. Informa- tion is what allows a commander to make deci- sions; however, it typically exists as a form of data before it is usable in decisionmaking. Data can lead to info rmation, but the two are very dif- ferent. Data normally pa sses through four classes of development before commanders use it to make decisions—raw data, processed data, knowledge, and understa nding. As information moves through the info rmation hierarchy, it becomes more valuable to the decisionmaker. --- Page 54 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 3-9 Raw data are the facts and individual pieces of information (data) that are the building blocks of processed information. Processed data come from organizing, correlating, comparing, processing, and filtering raw data and making it readily understandable to the potential user. Knowledge is the result of analyzing, integrating, and inter- preting processed data, which brings meaning and value to a situation or ev ent. Simply put, know- ledge is a representation of what is happening. Finally, understanding is the highest level of information and the most va luable; it is an appre- ciation for why things are happening. Understand- ing results when personne l synthesize bodies of knowledge and then apply their experience, judg- ment, and intuition to reduce gaps generated by uncertainty in order to arrive at a complete men- tal image of the situation. Information Characteristics Commanders must consider the quality of the information upon which they are acting. Informa- tion is susceptible to di stortion, both by the enemy (intended) and by friendly sources (unin- tended). All information must be evaluated to determine the quality of the data: unevaluated information from an unknown or potentially unreliable source can lead to unforeseen conse- quences, while quality information adds value to the decisionmaking process. Commanders may use the memory aid AR TCUBS when consider- ing all of the attributes of quality information:  Accuracy: information must be as accurate as possible.  Relevance: information must apply to the mis- sion, task, or situation; superfluous data only add friction and steal valuable time.  Timeliness: information must be available at the appropriate place and time to be useful.  Completeness: reports sh ould paint as full a picture as time permits.  Usability: the display or presentation of infor- mation to the user must be understandable and formatted to support decisionmaking.  Brevity: information is distilled to match time constraints.  Security: adequate protections must be in place to guard the integrity of information; however, the level of information safeguards employed must balance with the need to share information in a timely manner with those who require it. Managing Information Information management is the function of man- aging an organization’s information resources for the handling of data an d information acquired by one or many different sy stems, individuals, and organizations in a way that optimizes access by all who have a share in that data or a right to that information. Information that promotes under- standing of the battlespace enables commanders to better formulate and analyze COAs, make deci- sions, execute those decisions with adjustments to the plan as necessary, an d accurately understand results from previously made decisions. The goal of IM is to ge t the right information to the right person at the right time so he can make the right decision fast er than the enemy can. Infantry company commanders require quality information to understan d situations and events and to quickly control the challenges that con- front them. Management of this information is critical. The contemporar y operational environ- ment and the emerging concepts of tomorrow require force mobility, unit dispersion, and tacti- cal agility. In the 21st century, the infantry com- pany must be able to simultaneously share useful information with personne l at distant locations as well as support C2 pro cesses that satisfy deci- sions made throughout th e force. These require- ments contribute to the growing information challenge facing the infantry company. Fortu- nately, effective IM can deliver critical informa- tion in a timely manner to those who need it in a form they quickly understand. Information Management Actions Information management actions—collecting, sorting, storing, analyz ing, fusing, and sharing— --- Page 55 --- 3-10 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 are those steps that increase the value and avail- ability of information. They are the methods by which informat ion matures fro m raw data to understanding (see fig. 3-1). Information Management Techniques and Procedures The goal of IM is to facilitate a rapid, uncon- strained flow of useful information throughout an organization. As with any tactical process, IM requires codified and rehearsed techniques and procedures to achieve efficiency and effective- ness. Some common items that need to be tracked and managed include—  Tactical and FSCMs, such as boundaries, checkpoints, and restrictive fire areas (RFAs).  Command and support relationships.  Troop to task, including purposes.  Unit positions/actions, including nonorganic units with which the company may interact or from which the company may request support.  Event tracking (friendly, enemy, other).  Intelligence analysis.  Unit status informati on, such as logistics, administration, training, or skills.  Battle rhythm (meetings and reports).  IRs and FFIRs. The following importan t techniques and proce- dures help deal with the flow of this information:  CCIRs.  Information flow.  Information display.  Information reporting.  Briefings. Raw Data Raw Data Raw Data INFORMATION MANAGEMENT ACTIONS CLASSES OF INFORMATION Act Decide Disseminate Fuse Analyze Store Collect IED discovery LB 567 789 IEDs used to block QRF Move QRF to different zone Every time IEDs spike in zone the FOB is attacked IED activity up 78% in zone this week Raw Data Processed Data Knowledge Understanding Legend: QRF - quick response force Figure 3-1. Information Management Actions and Achieving Understanding. --- Page 56 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 3-11 Commander’s Critical Information Requirements The CCIRs are informatio n regarding the enemy and friendly activities a nd the environment iden- tified by the commander as critical to maintaining situational awareness, pla nning future activities, and facilitating timely decisionmaking. The two subcategories are PIRs and FFIRs. (Marine Corps Reference Publicat ion [MCRP] 5-12C, Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms ) Only a fraction of the information that is theoreti- cally available can be collected and processed rapidly enough to suppor t combat decisionmak- ing. The commander, ther efore, identifies CCIRs to focus and direct the collection and processing of information. Commander’s critical information requirements are always associated with key decisions the commande r expects to make to achieve desired results. Clearl y defining these information requirements is one of the most diffi- cult and important tasks of command. They not only influence the quantity and quality of infor- mation, but also have a direct impact on the workload of the staff and subordinate units (see fig. 3-2). Examples of PIRs include the following:  Indications and warnin g (I&W) that enemy forces reinforce.  I&W that enemy commits reserve; identifica- tion of enemy counterattack routes.  I&W of enemy indirect fire positions.  Composition/disposition of enemy forces.  Location of C2 nodes.  I&W of employment of weapons of mass destruction (chemical/biological) within the AO.  Location, composition, and size of enemy obstacles.  Intention/indication of asymmetric threat to rear area.  EPW size that is greater than a squad.  Severe weather warning or significant weather change that poses a threat to personnel or could have high impact on operations.  Any damage caused to civilian property.  Any unfavorable incidents with the local popu- lace.  Location of CBRN deli very systems, muni- tions, and facilities. Examples of FFIRs include the following:  Significant loss in friendly combat power (squad size or greater).  Loss of a piece of artille ry; tank; aircraft; light armored vehicle; tube-launched, optically- tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile; or breach- ing asset.  Total loss of communications for 30 minutes to any unit.  Loss of a sensitive item (such as a weapon or a pair of night vision goggles). CCIRS (enemy focus) PIRs (terrain focus) (friendly focus) FFIRs (enemy’s focus on us) EEFIPIRs Not a doctrinal CCIR High priority IRs Low priority IRs Legend: EEFI - essential elements of friendly informaion Figure 3-2. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements and Information Requirements Relationships. --- Page 57 --- 3-12 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1  Logistics/personnel probl em that significantly affects operations.  Serious injury/illness of Marine/Sailor or other attached Service members.  Critical Red Cross me ssage that requires immediate extraction of personnel from peace- time exercise/combat operation.  Any spillage of petroleu m, oils, and lubricants (POL) or other hazardous materials. The compromise or loss of an ISR asset could be either a PIR or FFIR. Information Flow Command relationships, task organization, and information needs influen ce the flow of informa- tion. Company leadership must decide what it needs to know and how in formation must flow as a precursor to developing the proper mix of per- sonnel, equipment, training, procedures, and infra- structure. The following principles can aid the commander in mapping the flow of information:  Tailor information for the commander.  Locate information in predictable locations.  Disseminate accurate and relevant information.  Determine what info rmation needs to be “pushed” and what in formation should be “pulled.”  Balance the use of multiple sources of informa- tion.  Ensure information flow protocols function in dynamic and steady-stat e operational environ- ments.  Create flexible and re dundant procedures and plans. Information Display Information must be tailored and displayed so that it fits the personality of the commander. Since people retain information learned in graphic pre- sentations at a rate four times greater than verbal presentations, informatio n should be provided in the form of maps, overlay s, and charts whenever possible (see fig. 3-3). Color-coded charts may reflect the status of a unit or system. Such displays may be generated by using either automated or manual means and should employ standard for- mats, terminology, and sy mbology in accordance with Department of De fense Military Standard 2525, Common Warfighting Symbology , and MCRP 5-12C. Additionally, operations maps and overlays should contain only the minimum infor- mation required for the commander to visualize the battlespace. Detail is time consuming and often hinders vice helps decisionmaking. Whether generated manually or with automated assistance, visual displays should do the following:  Display essential information.  Display information clearly and understandably.  Display information accurately, reliably, and in a timely manner.  Be designed for ease of update. Information Reporting Collection of information occurs in a variety of ways; however, most information comes in reports from subordinate units. One of the best techniques to track reporting requirements is the reports matrix (see table 3-4 on page 3-14). The matrix organizes required information needed by commanders and the reports that fulfill those requirements. It also helps manage reporting requirements by identifyi ng reports not linked to commander-designated needs. Reporting require- ments should—  Focus on collecting information identified as critical—the CCIRs.  Ensure that information collected is not redun- dant and that informati on of marginal utility is not collected.  Appreciate the impact of reporting require- ments on subordinate units.  Report on a “by exception” basis (subordinate units only send report s forward when certain events occur or threshol ds are reached, ensur- ing that routine inform ation does not obscure critical information).  Simplify and streamline reporting procedures. --- Page 58 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 3-13  Establish realistic dead lines and minimize the number and frequency of reports.  Ensure a two-way flow of information and establish procedures for reconciliation and vali- dation of information content. Briefings Briefings are designed for the rapid dissemination of information to a group of people. In garrison, briefings usually occur regularly—often weekly. In combat, briefings occu r as frequently as re- quired by the situation. Br iefings should follow a formal script or format to avoid omitting impor- tant information and/or including irrelevant infor- mation. Company tactical SOPs should include formats of the common briefs (see MCWP 3-40.2, Information Management , for further informa- tion). Common briefs are—  Situational update briefs , such as battle update briefs or operations/intelligence briefs.  Transition of control brief, such as watch change over briefs or COC transition briefs.  OPORD issuance.  Backbriefs/CARs/rehearsal of concept briefs.  Patrol/event debriefs, which are focused on identifying information on the enemy and the environment.  After action briefs, which are focused on iden- tifying friendly actions that need improvement. Command and Control Support Structures Command and control suppor t structures refer to the C2 facilities, organizations, processes, and systems used to exercise command and control. The structure a command establishes to exercise control over its subordinate and supporting units and to interface with its HHQ will, to a large degree, determine the speed and tempo a com- mand is capable of ge nerating. Command and control support structures facilitate the rapid dis- semination of relevant information up, down, and across the chain of command. Current map (COP) Current stats (unit locations, TCMs, etc.) CCIRs and collections plan Unit tracker (organic, HHQ, etc.) Status boards (log, comm, etc.) Battle rhythm and reports matrix Future plans (patrols, KLEs, etc.) Intel & sig events map Read boardLarge scale map (HHQ AO) Sig events list Legend: log - logistics sig - significant TCM - tactical control measures Comm - communications COP - common operational picture intel - intelligence KLE - key leader engagement Figure 3-3. Displaying Information Example. --- Page 59 --- 3-14 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Command and control support structure is more than advanced technology and equipment; it is the integrated use of capab ilities, procedures, and infrastructure to suppor t the command and con- trol and decisionmaking processes. Command and control support structures aid the people who cre- ate, disseminate, and us e information in order to achieve effective decisions . An effective C2 sup- port structure provides labor/time savings, dissem- ination, and graphic support: it is able to perform C2 processes, such as sorting information, more quickly than manual methods; it allows the simul- taneous transfer of information and knowledge to many users even if they are not in the same geo- graphic location; and an effective C2 support structure can take volumes of tabular data and transform it into a format that enables personnel to quickly gain meaningful and comprehensive understanding of the situation or event. Command Posts To exercise command a nd control in combat, units establish CPs. Co mmand posts provide the headquarters from which commanders and their staffs operate. Missio n, resources, and opera- tional environments will dictate the form of CP a company establishes, bu t the enduring require- ment is that commanders must have access to the information they need to make decisions and the communications necessary to disseminate those decisions. Company CP configuration must bal- ance capability requirements with the need for tactical mobility and the desire to directly/indi- rectly influence subordinates. Although designing a CP should be a functi on-centric activity, mobil- ity and resource constraint s will often dictate the final composition/design of a CP (see fig. 3-4). A subset of the CP is the COC. The heart of a CP, the COC is where the current fight is managed and through which most information flows. As an IM tool for the commander, the COC serves as a one-stop shop to gain s ituational awareness and to disseminate orders. Company Forward Command Post/Combat Operations Center In its most basic form, the company CP can consist of the company commander, the RO, and the FST. Table 3-4. Reports Matrix Example. Information Needed Originator Recipient Means of Dissemination Report Format (text, imagery, voice, visual, data, etc.) Time Required Remarks Readiness Status Platoons Co Cmdr Co TAC 1 Voi ce H-30 Ready to cross LD? SALT Report Unit in contact Co WO Any Any within 5 min- utes of contact PERSTAT Platoon 1stSgt mIRC Text 1700 Per bn format LOGSTAT Platoon Co GySgt mIRC Text 2000 Per bn format Debrief Patrols CLIC E-mail Text/imagery 1800 Focused on enemy and terrain Unit AAR Patrols XO E-mail Text/imagery 1900 Focused on improving friendly actions Legend bn battalion Cmdr commander Co company 1stSgt first sergeant GySgt gunnery sergeant LD line of departure LOGSTAT logistics status report mIRC multiuser Internet relay chat PERSTAT personnel status report SALT size, activity, location, time TAC 1 primary tactical control net --- Page 60 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 3-15 A forward CP sacrifices some capabilities, such as robust communications pathways and the ability to conduct detailed planning, to gain the advantages of mobility, proximity to the fight, and proximity to subordinate leadership. Common forward CP configurations include foot mobile, vehicle mobile, and semifixed. Figures 3-5 and 3-6, on page 3-16, and figure 3-7, on page 3-17, offer examples of each type of CP configuration. Company Main Command Post As an operational environment matures or as the mission and factors of METT-T dictate, the infantry company commander can choose to establish a robust CP that leverages the full avail- ability of C2 systems. While the size and capabil- ities of the CP ch ange depending on C2 requirements, a CP is typically considered a main CP when detailed pla nning can occur and all warfighting functions can be fully integrated. An example of a main COC is depicted in figure 3-8 on page 3-18. Company commanders consider the following factors and principles when establishing a CP:  Mission.  Operational environment.  Space and facilities available.  Lines of communications (LOCs) and LZs.  Functions to be controlled in the COC, such as the common operational picture, intelligence and targeting, fires, logistics, planning, and FP.  Security.  Power.  Sanitation.  Communications.  Logistical supportability.  Proximity to higher, adjacent, and supporting units.  Cultural and population factors. Increasing CP Size Decreasing Mobility COC jump Forward CP Main CP Sense of the situation Span of control Integration of enablers Thorough analysis Detailed planning Figure 3-4. Effects of Requirements on Command Post Configuraton. --- Page 61 --- 3-16 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 RO - Co TAC 1 FAC 81s FO Runner RO - BN TAC 1 FST Ldr Direction of Movement Co 1stSgt Co Cmdr Legend: Intel Rep Arty FO arty - artillery bn - battalion cmdr- commander co - company FAC - forward air controller intel - intelligence ldr - leader rep - representative sgt - sergeant TAC 1 - primary tactical control net RO - Co TAC 1 81s FO Arty FO FAC Co 1stSgt RO - BN TAC 1 FST Ldr Intel Rep Vehicle Cmdr Rear Hatch Co Cmdr Driver Legend: arty - artillery bn - battalion cmdr - commander co - company FAC - forward air controller intel - intelligence ldr - leader rep - representative sgt - sergeant TAC 1 - primary tactical control net Figure 3-5. Foot Mobile Combat Operations Center. Figure 3-6. Amphibious Assault Vehicle Combat Operations Center. --- Page 62 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 3-17 Driver/Runner Co Cmdr (traveling) RO - Co TAC 1 RO - BN TAC 1 Rear Hatch Co Cmdr (stopped) Intel RepCo 1stSgt Arty FO (stopped) FAC (stopped) FST Ldr (stopped) 81s FO (stopped) Driver/Runner FST Ldr 81s FOFAC Rear Hatch Arty FO Current map (COP) Unit tracker (organic, HHQ, etc.) Intel and Sig Events Map FST Map Legend: arty - artillery bn - battalion cmdr - commander co - company COP - common operational picture intel - intelligence ldr - leader rep - representative sgt - sergeant TAC 1 - primary tactical control net Figure 3-7. Vehicle Based Forward Combat Operations Center. --- Page 63 --- 3-18 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 COPCurrent stats CCIRs and collections plan Unit tracker (organic, HHQ, etc.) Status boards (log, comm, etc.) Battle rhythm and reports matrix Future plans (patrols, KLEs, etc.) Intel sig map events Read boardMap (COP backup) Sig events list ISR Intel Rep (collection) (analysis) Fires rep RO Ops NCO Ops Chief Co Cmdr WO Legend: Static COC Intel Rep cmdr - commander co - company comm - communications COP - common operational picture gy - gunnery sergeant intel - intelligence ISR - intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance KLE - key leader engagement log - logistics ops - operations rep - representative sig - significant 1stSgt - first sergeant Figure 3-8. Main Command Post. --- Page 64 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 3-19 Jump Command Post Typically, infantry companies cannot divide the command group or the CP into two elements due to resource constraint s; however, company com- manders often desire to project their presence forward of the company CP, forming a jump CP. The composition of the ju mp CP must facilitate command for a limited peri od but not necessar- ily full control. Company commanders must consider the effect that forming a jump CP will have on the ability of th e CP to exer cise control. In those circumstances when the mission requires the company to establish the capability to form main and/or forward command posts, or alpha and bravo command groups, the company will require personnel and equipment augmenta- tion. Table 3-5 addresses the advantages and dis- advantages of different COC configurations. Command and Control Processes Command and control pro cesses are the “rules” that govern command and control. Properly designed C2 processes ensure the accuracy, speed, and thoroughness of repetitive or antici- pated C2 events. One of the most important C2 processes, IM, was discusse d earlier in this chap- ter; other key C2 processe s that facilitate accu- rate, speedy, and thoroug h command and control are the battle rhythm and battle drills. Battle Rhythm There is too much info rmation flowing—in both peace and war—to process it all at once. To enable an orderly information fl ow that supports deci- sionmaking, the IM plan must determine when and how company leadersh ip receives informa- tion and disseminates de cisions. This manage- ment of information flow is a battle rhythm. It is a collection of recurring or singular command and staff actions. These actions include reports, meet- ings, inspections, rehearsals, planning events, and briefings. Command and staff actions requiring input, output, or partic ipation by HHQ and those of specified interest to the company leadership Table 3-5. Capabilities and Limitations of Combat Operations Center Configurations. COC Type Capabilities Limitations Jump Commander can DIRECTLY influence events or gain personal situational awareness and can readily guard/communicate on tactical nets Commander places himself at the point of greatest friction in order to influence the situation Small, light, fast Reactive Indirectly control fire support coordination Inherent security with tactical unit Loss of greater situational awareness both in scope (higher, adjacent, subordinate, support) and scale (depth of understanding) Cannot readily guard secondary nets Cannot make informed decision beyond the immediate fight Cannot directly supervise fire support coordination Requires adjusting unit’s normal security procedures Forward Can communicate with higher and adjacent commands, all subordinate commanders, and fire support assets Can be mobile Can use limited digital assets to assist in the control of the tactical situation Can conduct limited planning in context of coordinating consolidation and immediate follow-on actions Limited communication with higher, adjacent, and support Limited access to data Limited ability to conduct planning beyond immediate fight Number of key personnel limited by size/ space of facility/vehicle Requires external security Increased power requirements Main Can communicate with higher and adjacent commands, all subordinate commanders, and fire support assets Can directly supervise fire support coordination and all aspects of command and control Can conduct detailed planning Time intensive displacement Requires intense FP Increased power requirements --- Page 65 --- 3-20 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 become part of the batt le rhythm. The intended objectives of the battle rhythm are to—  Provide an opportunity for the company staff to synchronize its efforts.  Enforce standardized information reporting, briefing, and orders formats.  Enable timely communication.  Generate tempo and unity of effort.  Lower friction through shared situational awareness.  Facilitate the flow of information.  Facilitate effective time management in a cha- otic environment. While the company commander is responsible for an effective company ba ttle rhythm, the com- pany XO normally supervises its functioning and continually evaluates it for efficiency. Battle rhythms exist across several time horizons, such as daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annually; events occurring in one can have a cascading effect on subsequent events across all. Figure 3-9, on page 3-22, is an example of a daily company battle rhythm. Battle Drills Battle drills assist with IM and decisionmaking in COCs. Done correctly, battle drills accomplish the following:  Accelerate information flow.  Ensure thorough coordination.  Enforce proper sequencing of actions.  Raise situational awareness.  Preclude actions from being skipped or over- looked.  Allow less experienced personnel to deal with complex or simultaneous events.  Maintain and improve COC proficiency. Three significant battle drills are resynchroni- zation, transition of contro l, and critical events. Resynchronization must be part of a daily battle rhythm and an immediate action drill when company commanders dete rmine they and the company staff have lost situational awareness. Within the normal ba ttle rhythm, the battle update or operations an d intelligence brief ac- complishes the resync hronization function. The transition of control battle drill occurs when control of the current fight shifts from one person to another or from one CP to another; examples include the watch section change over and the CP transition checklist. Resynchronization . The commander should adjust the format and content as the phases or demands of the mission shift; however, the fol- lowing items are typically briefed:  Unit locations and act ions (past/present/ future).  Current company mission and assigned tasks.  Enemy status.  Environmental status, such as weather, terrain, and LOCs.  Human environment status, such as changes to leadership.  Significant events.  Tactical and FSCMs.  Synopsis of past actions.  Synopsis of planned future actions. Transition of Control Brief . A proper transition change requires a period of overlap between the oncoming and offgoing watchstander and COC in order to ensure continui ty of situational aware- ness. An example of a transition brief can be found in figure 3-10 on page 3-23. Critical Events Drills . Critical events drills (see fig. 3-11 on page 3-24) are immediate actions taken by the staff upon enemy, friendly, or envi- ronmental actions or changes. They include—  Unit in contact.  Missing Marine. --- Page 66 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 3-21  Attacks by the enemy.  Cross-boundary coordination, such as fires and maneuver.  Improvised explosive device (IED) discoveries.  Cache discoveries.  CASEVACs.  Intelligence alerts.  Downed aircraft or vehicle.  Chemical attack.  Loss of communications with a unit.  Fratricide incidents. Command and Control Systems The success of the infant ry company in today’s operational environment depends heavily on the effective employment of communications sys- tems. Communications systems speed and/or automate routine functions, freeing company commanders to focus on those aspects of com- mand and control that re quire experience, judg- ment, and intuition. Therefore, C2 systems and the personnel who operate and maintain them play a critical role in command and control. It is important to emphasize th at C2 systems do not replace a commander’ s knowledge and profi- ciency, but are tools to enhance rapid exchange of reliable information. Co mmand and control sys- tems facilitate—  Rapid dissemination of information and deci- sions.  Generation of relevant information.  Identification and prio ritization of time-con- stricted information.  Efficient informati on flow up, down, and across the chain of command. While individual C2-related systems change quickly, all fall into one of three basic catego- ries—voice-, text -, or graphics-based. Each cate- gory has advantages and disadvantages that are subject to change as new systems enter and leave the Marine Corps C2 architecture. Company lead- ers must understand systems well enough to make decisions on use (such as timing, volume, or prior- ities) but must not beco me reliant on any specific system(s). Changes to operations and environ- ments will increase or decrease the value of indivi- dual C2 systems and the value of these individual systems must be considered within the context of the whole C2 plan. For ex ample, e-mail is a good method of disseminating information in a static environment, but it is often unavailable or too slow in a dynamic fight. --- Page 67 --- 3-22 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Time Activity 2345 - WO changeover 2345 - RO changeover 0000 - CONOPS report due to HHQ 0000 - Operations and intelligence NCO prints digital watch log and places in binder 0530 - Platoon position reports due to company 0545 - Operations and intelligence NCO changeover 0600 - Platoon personnel updates due to company 0630 - Platoon logistic status due to company 0630 - Company position reports to HHQ 0645 - Company entry control point status reports due to HHQ 0730 - Collections element changeover 0745 - WO changeover 0745 - RO changeover 0745 - Analysis element changeover 0800 - Concept of operations report due to HHQ 0900 - Company targeting board 1130 - Platoon position reports due to company 1200 - Intentions message due to HHQ 1230 - Company position reports due to HHQ 1345 - Operations and intelligence NCO changeover 1400 - Company personnel updates due to HHQ 1430 - Company logistic status due to HHQ 1530 - Collections element changeover 1545 - WO changeover 1545 - RO changeover 1545 - Analysis element changeover 1700 - Situation update brief 1930 - Platoon position reports due to company 2000 - Intentions message due to HHQ 2030 - Company position reports due to HHQ 2345 - WO changeover Figure 3-9. Daily Company Battle Rhythm Example. --- Page 68 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 3-23 Location of friendly units Location of enemy units (CTP, map) Current SALUTE CCIRs: Company commander alerted IMMEDIATELY upon being reported Aviation: Status of A/C in support Information on friendly and enemy air defense Plans of units (anticipated movement times, etc.): Scheme of maneuver Designation of main/supporting units Fires: Ammunition situation: Current 60-mm round count Any unit ammunition shortages Location of 81-mm sections/platoon Location of artillery battery in the company AO Location of artillery units in range of the company AO Routes, times, destinations of displacing artillery units Location of 60-mm section FSCMs: All FSCMs in effect Planned FSCMs Target updates Communications: Check status of all nets in CLOC Immediately report to the bn S-6 loss of comm with units Logistics by class and status Personnel: PERSTAT Casualty status Locations: Legend: A/C - aircraft bn - battalion CLOC - company level operations cell comm - communications 1stSgt - first sergeant mm - millimeter PERSTAT - personnel status report SALUTE - size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment CO, XO, 1stSgt, Gunnery Sergeant, Operations Chief, intelligence representative, and FSC CASEVAC plan CP in good state of police Figure 3-10. Sample Watch Shift Brief (Transition of Control). --- Page 69 --- 3-24 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Figure 3-11. Critical Event Battle Drill. Mass Casualties Legend: ISR - intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance Ops - operations POSREP - position report RW - rotary wing SALUTE - size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment SIGEVENTS - significant events SPOTREP - situation, position, observation, time report TAC 1 - primary tactical control net BFT - blue force tracker C2PC - command and control personal computer co - company EFT - emergency flash traffic EMLCOA - enemy most likely course of action FS - fire support FW - fixed wing Scenario: Mass casualties (friendly and civilian) reported by a foot patrol via Co TAC 1. SPOTREP SALUTE report Contact report CASEVAC Reports to expect: Enemy situation? Number and type of casualties? Damage to infrastructure? Personnel detained? Nearest unit? Does contact information need to be replayed to nearest unit? RW and FW CAS available? Information requirements: Notify CO/XO of triggered CCIR Activate quick reaction force Alert battalion Alert corpsman of mass casualties Enforce River City Supervise information flow Executive mass casualty plan in accordance with unit SOP Manage information flow Relay information to higher, adjacent, and supporting as required Update BFT/send EFT message Verify friendly location Maintain SIGEVENTS log Update journal Update map board WO Coordinate ISR support Receive initial and follow-on reports COLLECTIONS Receive and plot POSREP Manipulate C2PC EMLCOA ANALYSIS Relay information to watch officer Monitor assigned nets RADIO OPERATOR Attention in the COC Repeat OPS/INTELLIGENCE NCO --- Page 70 --- CHAPTER 4 INTELLIGENCE The company’s intelligence specialist executes appropriate intelligence functions with the assis- tance of the Marines that form the company COC. These functions do not necessarily require a separate cell or group of Marines within the COC; however, when appropriate to the mission, the company commander may choose to aug- ment the intelligence sp ecialist with additional Marines to form a CLIC. The requirement for intelligence does not go away in a lethal fight or in situations when the mission dictates a rudimentary COC. Even in the most conventional methods of company employment, there are often other intelligence assets operating in the company comma nder’s battlespace. The company commander shoul d never assume that because the company does not control these assets that these other assets could not assist in the com- pany’s mission. Rather, the company commander should ensure that he plans for and coordinates the use of these assets. Often, when an opportunity to use a nonorganic asset occurs, the individual who possesses a ready plan will be able to seize that opportunity; whereas, the commander who does not loses the opportunity. Company Commander’s Role Intelligence is an inhere nt responsibility of com- mand, and the co mmander must remain closely involved in the daily activities of the COC. While the company’s intellig ence specialist supports this command function, he does not take respon- sibility for it and is supervised by the com- mander and company leadership. Evaluating Intelligence The commander should evaluate intelligence from both the COC and HHQ. A unit should not act on intelligence from H HQ without determin- ing if it makes sense based on the commander’s assessment of the battle space. To improve the quality of intelligence that commanders receive, they need to regularly coordinate with and pro- vide feedback to the inte lligence specialist, COC Marines, and the battalion intelligence officer. Establishing Priority Intelligence Requirements In addition to those received from HHQ, com- pany commanders need to designate their own PIRs. Company commanders should not simply restate HHQ PIRs; rather , they should determine what local PIRs best enab le them to support their portion of the mission—b oth horizontally with adjacent units and vertical ly with senior and sub- ordinate commands. A company’s PIRs are spec ific to its AO, aid the commander in making decisions, and should be adjusted and updated as the situation changes. Priority intelligence re quirements allow the com- pany commander to provide focus and direction to the company’s limited co llection assets. In the same manner that specified and implied tasks in problem framing are not automatically essential tasks, PIRs are not automatically CCIRs, though it is highly likely that CCIRs will be drawn from select PIRs. While there is not a limit to the number of PIRs a company commander can designate, it is not pos- sible for everything to be a priority. Company commanders should designate any number of --- Page 71 --- 4-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 information requirements, and then ruthlessly determine and aggressive ly evaluate the PIRs. This methodology, coupled with associating loca- tions and times with PIRs , will enable the COC and subordinate elements to focus their efforts. Integrating Intelligence Assets Company commanders need to integrate and coordinate the activities of all of the intelli- gence assets operatin g in their battlespace. Many of these will not work directly for the company; however, these assets still need to be aware of the company’s scheme of maneuver. The commander needs to develop an apprecia- tion for the capabilities and limitations of these assets to employ them properly. The battalion intelligence office r or an intelligence specialist, if assigned to the compa ny, can assist with the commander’s understanding. Staffing the Combat Operations Center One of the most impor tant decisions a com- mander will make is th e selection of Marines needed to augment the COC when necessary. The company commander should not plan on external personnel augmentation, but will most likely pick these Marines from with in the company. The value the company gets out of the COC depends upon the Marines who serv e there. As discussed in chapter 3, types and c onfigurations of C2 sup- port structure will vary with the mission. Infantry company commanders assume the need for a robust configuration and begin forming and train- ing the COC staff early in a unit’s training cycle. Once deployed, commanders may tailor the size according to the need. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace Intelligence preparation of the battlespace begins during problem framing and is a systematic and continuous process th roughout operations. By assisting the infantry company commander in understanding the nature of the problem, the environment, and the threat, IPB provides a start- ing point for further func tional and detailed plan- ning. The company’s intelligence specialist assists in developing a nd updating IPB products. Company commanders ma y choose to use such tools as key terrain, observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, and avenues of approach (KOCOA) to expr ess the results of the company IPB process to subordinate units. Before beginning the IPB process, company com- manders determine the time available for plan- ning and tailor their IPB priorities and guidance accordingly. In extreme cases, IPB may consist of mental and verbal proces ses only (see chap. 3 for further discussion of the use of intuitive decision- making). There are four steps of IPB:  Define the battlespace environment.  Describe the battlespace effects.  Evaluate the adversary.  Determine adversary COAs. Step 1: Define the Battlespace Environment The company commander normally receives an assigned AO from HHQ, which normally forms the basis for the compan y’s battlespace. As seen in figure 4-1, the battle space may be contiguous or noncontiguous. How company commanders further define and refine their battlespace is cru- cial to focusing the IPB efforts on those areas where activity will occur. Part of this definition is the identification of signi ficant characteristics of the physical terrain and human environment. Area of Influence Company commanders must then determine their area of influence (AI). The AI is the geographi- cal area that the co mmander can affect with maneuver and fire support systems normally organic to the company. Th is area can be deter- mined simply by overlaying range rings for all organic weapon systems. It is possible that the AI and AO are the same. Conversely, the AI may geographically extend beyond the commander’s defined AO. The AI is important to company commanders, as what occurs in areas around --- Page 72 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 4-3 them will usually influence the manner in which they execute their missions. Area of Interest To focus intelligence su pport on threat s that can influence the AO, the AOI is determined. As demonstrated in figure 4- 2, on page 4-4, this area includes the AO, the AI, and all other areas from which threats may originate that would affect cur- rent or planned oper ations. Geography, time, event, or various combin ations of these may ori- ent potential threats. De termining the appropriate size for the AOI is critic al; too small of an AOI results in missed reporti ng on threats outside of the AO and too large of an AOI results in infor- mation overload due to excess reporting. EXAMPLE: A company commander is defending a battle position as the battalion’s main effort. Within the range of the company commander’s 60-mm mortars is an adjacent company’s battle position. The nearby co mpany is a supporting effort assigned to protec t the main effort’s flank. During planning, the commander should consider the ability to influence this fight through disruptive or delaying fire from the company’s 60-mm mortars if the supporting effort was to fail. During execution of operations, the company com- mander should be interested in the success of this supporting effort and should have assigned, event-driven decision points regarding when and if to shift mortar fires outside of the company’s battlespace to a portion of the AI. Contiguous areas of operations Noncontiguous areas of operations Subordinate units receive AOs that do not share boundaries. The higher headquarters retains responsibility for the unassigned portion of its AO. Adjacent, subordinate unit AOs share boundaries. In this case, the higher headquarters has assigned all of its AOs to subordinate units. Unassigned area XX XX XXXX XX XXX XXX XX Figure 4-1. Areas of Operations. EXAMPLE : A company commander receives a mission to move into an area to conduct a cordon and search. While the assigned boundaries support the commander’s conduct of the operation on th e ground, the threat’s ability to mass and move people to conduct civil disturbances that would stress the company’s cordon will likely origi nate from a nearby village that lies in another battalion’s AO. This village lies outside the company commander’s AO and AI, but will form part of the AOI, since what occurs there will affect the cordon and search. During planning, the company commander should identify this portion of the AOI and develop PIRs and IRs that give early indications of a threat to the company’s cordon. --- Page 73 --- 4-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Step 2: Describe the Battlespace Effects Collecting and analyzing information on the envi- ronment determines its effects on friendly and enemy operations as well as the local populace. The environment consists of two distinct compo- nents—weather and terrain. Weather While HHQ provides weather forecasts, compa- nies are responsible fo r determining their own assessments of how weather impacts friendly and enemy operations. Tables 4-1 and 4-2 provide examples of graphical depictions of weather effects on operations. Area of interest Area of influence Area of operations Area of interest Area of interest Area of interest Figure 4-2. Relationship Between Area of Operations, Area of Influence, and Area of Interest. 16 Apr 08 17 Apr 08 18 Apr 08 19 Apr 08 20 Apr 08 Intelligence Maneuver Logistics C2 FP Fire support Air support Local populace Legend: No impact Marginal impact Adverse impact Table 4-1. Weather Effects on Operations Over Time. --- Page 74 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 4-5 Terrain The terrain evaluation conducted by HHQ directly affects the placement and assigned mission of the company. The company commander is responsible for continuing terrain evaluation at the company level, to include huma n environment and culture as appropriate. General considerations of physical terrain (such as slope, surface configuration, vege- tation, hydrology, soil t ypes, LOCs, and urban areas) help define avenues of approach and obsta- cles in all types of ope rations—offense, defense, 24 h Weather Impact: Friendly Forces Operation Valid as of: 48 h 72 h 96 h Deep air support Close air support Assault support AAW/SEAD Ground operations Airborne operations Communications CBRN/smoke UAVs 24 h Weather Impact: Enemy Forces Operation Valid as of: 48 h 72 h 96 h Deep air support Close air support Assault support AAW/SEAD Ground operations Airborne operations Communications CBRN/smoke Special forces Legend: AAW - anti-aircraft warfare SEAD - suppression of enemy air defense Unfavorable Marginal Favorable h - hours Table 4-2. Weather Effects on Friendly and Enemy Forces. --- Page 75 --- 4-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 and stability. Analysis of the human environment and culture begins with information available from the HHQ IPB process and is refined by the com- pany through turnover products, patrols, and other local intelligence-gatheri ng efforts. Figure 4-3 shows the flow of weather and terrain analysis and the products generated by that analysis. Step 3: Evaluate the Adversary Proper evaluation of th e enemy allows the com- pany commander to begin predicting likely enemy actions. Following the IPB process automatically produces adversary threat models with greater and greater detail, which is important to company commanders because planning time is always at a premium and it is impossible to plan for every contingency. If done co rrectly, company com- manders can walk away from the planning process at a moment’s notice with one or more predictions of enemy action around which they can plan. These models depict who, where, when, why, and how the adversary is likely to fight. Over time, adversaries de velop patterns that can be studied through their written doctrine and pub- lications and observed in their military exercises and battlefield actions. Graphical depictions of these operational patterns are adversary tem- plates. These baseline enemy threat models depict enemy actions without th e constraints of terrain and weather. As its name implies, the adversary template is a depiction of what the enemy would do if he followed his doctrine perfectly, such as where he would place ar tillery, where he would place logistic trains, and how he would organize the forward battlespace. Higher headquarters usu- ally disseminates advers ary templates to infantry companies (see fig. 4-4). When the enemy does not consist of conventi onal military forces, observed enemy actions generate adversary tem- plates that usually originate at the company level. The company’s intelligen ce specialist and CLIC collect data from enemy activities, assesses trends and patterns, and create s a common profile (see fig. 4-5 on page 4-8). The profile serves as the adversary template for these types of threats while identifying any gaps in current information that need to be satisfied through collection efforts. Step 4: Determine Adversary Courses of Action Combining adversary templates with the effects of terrain and weather produc es situation templates. KOCOA Key and decisive terrain Observation and fields of fire Cover and concealment Obstacles Avenues of approach ASCOPE Area Structure Capabilities Organizations People Events Analyze the environment Terrain analysis Identify area Weather analysis Civil considerations Describe the environmental effects on the threat, friendly capabilities, and COAs Figure 4-3. Weather and Terrain Analysis Flowchart. --- Page 76 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 4-7 Situation templates predict what the enemy would do if he applied his doctri ne to his current place and situation. Applying en emy threat models to the actual situation in or der to produce situation templates requires company commanders to make informed and reasonable decisions. The thought process behind these decisi ons is what allows the company commander to determine the enemy’s most probable and dangerous COAs (see fig. 4-6 on page 4-9). Company commanders must ask themselves the following questions:  What will terrain and we ather force the enemy to do?  Does terrain exist that would allow the enemy to do what he would mo st like to do? If so, where is that terrain? Legend: DAG - division artillery group Fwd - forward km - kilometers 10-15 km Up to 5 km X X 7-10 km X XX 2 km XXX X Main Fwd Rear Fwd (DAG) (DAG) (-) (+) Figure 4-4. Adversary Template Provided by Higher Headquarters. EXAMPLE : The adversary template predicts that the enemy will place his mortars 1 to 3 kilometers behind its forward positions. Considering the effects of terrain and weather, the company commander determines that to do so would mean the enemy placing his mortars in the middle of a swamp. In creating a situation template, the company commander determines that the enemy will probably place his mortars on the far side of the swamp, where they can more easily displace if necessary. In making this decision, the company commander is simultaneously creating a situation template and establishing possible enemy most likely and enemy most dangerous COAs. When the company commander completes the process, developing an effective plan for neutralizing or destroying the enemy mortars is easier and more accurate. --- Page 77 --- 4-8 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Event Templates Through the process of creating the situation template and determining enemy courses of action (ECOAs), company commanders must also determine how they think operations will unfold. If the situation template represents the initial array of threat forces in the battlespace, the event template seeks to predict movement and countermovement across time. From this analysis, company commanders can begin to determine what events, indications, and deci- sions are required at what times and in what places. Company commanders should draw annotations of time on the template to show what the enemy will be doing and where he will be doing it at a specific time. The longer and more detailed the operation, the greater the require- ment for multiple event templates. Total time depicted on event templates should at a mini- mum cover the duration of the company opera- tion. Figure 4-7, on page 4-10, is an example of an event template. Event Matrix To best depict phases of the event template, an event matrix that shows individual components in 100 m 1. Lead vehicle is destroyed by cmd-detonated mine. 2. Rear vehicle destroyed. 4. Antipersonnel mines and booby traps on natural survivability positions kill HN/US troops seeking cover. 3. Approximately 10 to 20 guerrillas open fire on remaining vehicles. 6. Platoons exfiltrate on pre-planned routes. 5a.5b. 2d ambush catches reinforcing HN/US troops. 3d ambush catches reinforcements. Note: Ambushes usually occur just before sunset, often on Fridays or weekends. 1. Lead vehicle is destroyed by cmd-detonated mine. 2. Rear vehicle destroyed. 3. Approximately 10 to 20 guerrillas open fire on remaining vehicles. Figure 4-5. Adversary Template Produced by the Company Level Intelligence Cell. EXAMPLE : Company F is planning to execute a cordon and search on a suspected bombmaking factory. Adversary templates indicate Company F can expect a sniper threat to become active within 20 minutes of setting up a cordon and that most sniper shots occur within 100 to 150 meters of the target. Through careful analysis of the terrain, the company commander and intelligence specialist create a situation template that indicates most likely positions from which snipers may engage the company’s cordon. The company commander and intelligence specialist then create an event template that predicts at what time and from where the snipers could become active. The event template includes preplanned and on-call adjustments to cordon positions to throw off potential sniper shots while assigning counter- sniper assets to overwatch identified, likely enemy sniper positions and ingress/egress routes. --- Page 78 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 4-9 chronological order is used. When faced with an unconventional threat, the event matrix is more useful than an attempt to template the profile. Like the event template that it may augment, the individual components of the event matrix aid the infantry company commander in determining when and where to assign collection assets in sup- port of critical decisions and events that will occur during the operation. Tabl e 4-3, on page 4-10, is an example of an event matrix. Named Area of Interest Named areas of interest (NAIs) focus collection assets on spots where they can best serve a com- pany commander’s decisionmaking. During a specific operation, NAIs may aid the company commander by validating or invalidating assump- tions made during the ge neration of situational and event templates, such as determining if the battalion’s artillery was successful in destroying the enemy mortars or if the enemy is massing for FIRE SAC FIRE SAC FIRE SAC FIRE SAC Enemy SOP for fighting (threat model) Environment (weather, terrain, population, etc.) Enemy COAs Legend: SAC - supporting arms coordinator Figure 4-6. Creation of Enemy Situation Template. --- Page 79 --- 4-10 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 a counterattack. During operations, NAIs help prioritize collection assets against satisfaction of IRs and PIRs. While there are no limits on the numbers of NAIs a co mpany commander can designate, there are limited resources upon which the company commander can draw to collect information on all NAIs. Figure 4-8 shows an NAI overlay. XX XX XX XX X XX X X X X X 10 km River - international border (fordable) Legend: 7 2 3 4 1 10 6 5 8 9 12 11 13 Figure 4-7. Event Template Example. Table 4-3. Event Matrix Example. NAI # No Earlier Than No Later Than Indicator 1 H‐7 h H‐2 h Engineer preparation of artillery positions 1 H‐2 h H‐30 min Artillery occupies firing positions 1 H‐1 h H‐15 min Artillery commences preparatory fires 2 H‐2 h H‐1.5 h Combat reconnaissance patrol conducts route reconnaissance 2 H‐1.5 h H‐30 min Rifle company (‐) in march formation Legend h hour min minutes --- Page 80 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 4-11 Named Person of Interest The named person of inte rest (NPI) is an emerg- ing concept that has proven useful in stability operations. The same prin ciples of NAIs apply to NPIs. An NPI is a pers on whose activities will satisfy a specific info rmation requirement. An NPI’s activity or lack of activity will help to con- firm or deny a particular threat COA. This con- cept is nondoctrinal and emerging at this time, but its usefulness is evident. Information Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace Fires planning is linked closely with the IPB process as part of pr oblem framing and COA development. In order for IO to be an effective asset in the infantry company fight, the IPB process must address, define, and refine specific IO considerations. XXX XX LOA LOA 5 km H + 10:30H + 10:30 H + 11:30H + 11:30 H + 9:30H + 9:30 H + 11H + 11 H + 11H + 11 H + 11H + 11 H + 10H + 10 # NAI River - international border (fordable) Legend: vegetation road - boundary - city H - hour km - kilometers LOA - limit of advance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 14 Figure 4-8. Named Area of Interest Overlay. --- Page 81 --- 4-12 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Within the IPB process, company planners must consider the information environment (IE) in order to properly apply IO to the battlespace. The IE is relatively abstract: a manmade construct that describes and characterizes an operational envi- ronment based on the existence of information and information systems. It consists of a physical dimension, an informati on dimension, and a cog- nitive dimension. The IE manifests itself in very real ways. It generates tangible results and IO must address them and their impact on operations. Within the IPB process, the company should con- sider physical, informatio n, and cognitive dimen- sions of the enemy and the local population:  Physical dimension: Wh at are the technologi- cal and human characterist ics that make up the AO and have an impact on information?  Information dimension: How does information flow in the battlespace and by what methods?  Cognitive dimension: How is information interpreted and used in terms of values, biases, perceptions and beliefs, and decisionmaking? The information IPB clos ely resembles the tradi- tional IPB process:  Define the IE.  Describe the IE effects.  Evaluate the enemy’s use of information.  Determine the enemy’s activities in the IE. In coordination with the company intelligence specialist, the FST surveys the three dimensions of IE and identifies signi ficant characteristics. As with the rest of IPB a nd intelligence collection, bottom-up refinement is continuous. Depending on the level of threat a nd the composition of the local population, the IE may not be homogenous throughout a company’s AO (see table 4-4). When describing the IE effects, the intelligence specialist and FST conduc t detailed analysis of significant IE characteristics identified in the first step. The combined effect s of this analysis form an understanding of their aggregate effect across the IE. To visualize the structure of the IE and the relationship between it s components, the FST places its analysis on a map in a similar manner as a modified combined obstacle overlay. This combined information overlay is a graphic depic- tion of where and how IE effects will impact company operations (see fig. 4-9). When evaluating the en emy’s use of informa- tion, the intellig ence specialist and the FST next identify the enemy’s information and informa- tion systems and profile their leadership and Significant &haracteristics Media Populace Communications Infrastructure Dimension /enV Effects on 2peration Cognitve Information Physical Cognitve Information Physical Cognitve Information Physical Cognitve Information Physical Cognitve Information Physical Believe that guerrilla forces are criminal Rely mostly on word of mouth 75% Arabic, 25% Christian Population has limited confidence in infrastructure Unreliable infrastructure makes communications slow and puts increased reliance on personal exchange Limited ground communications networks, uses cellular as primary Media is generally positive of military operations Media broadcasts reach 74% of population Available radio infrastructure Table 4-4. Information Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. --- Page 82 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 4-13 decisionmaking processes. Properly identifying the enemy persons and entities that actually make decisions is critical. In some cases, formal and public leadership might not necessarily be the decisionmakers or those who wield power. The following are some important considerations:  The enemy’s ability to disseminate propaganda.  The enemy’s ability to disrupt friendly com- munications.  The enemy’s ability to deceive friendly forces. When determining enemy act ivities in the IE, the FST and intelligence specialist define what the enemy must achieve in the IE to attain their objectives and the means he possesses to achieve it. The result of this pr ocess is iden tification of enemy weakness that can be exploited and enemy strengths that must be countered. This informa- tion, in turn, allows th e FST to determine and nominate any HVTs associat ed with the enemy’s capabilities, such as p hysical assets and dissemi- nation processes (see table 4-5 on page 4-14). Company commanders provide guidance on whether to attack nominated targets based on their analyses of operational gain versus intelligence loss; for example, an infantry company com- mander may choose not to attack enemy commu- nications because the intelligence gleaned from monitoring enemy traffic is of greater value than the inefficiencies the enemy may experience if they lost their communications ability. Gheg Impact of media: Favorable through most of the AO Parts of AO without any radio coverage We compete with hostile media We have no capability to counter hostile radio in some sectors Impact of culture: Cultural differences create flashpoints Serbs - Superior rhetoric, religious leaders are the key information conduit Albanians - Independence themes, village elders are the primary informa- tion conduit Gheg Serbian Gheg Serbian Content focuses on local news Tends to be neutral, willing to broadcast unit information Content generally about friendly force cultural mistakes Anti-US slant favors former regime Determine Combined Effects: Combined Information Overlay Legend: - key religious sites - cultural flashpoints GhegGheg Figure 4-9. Combined Information Overlay. --- Page 83 --- 4-14 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Intelligence Cycle The intelligence cycle describes the general sequence of activities involved in developing information into intelligence. The cycle does not prescribe a procedure to follow, but describes a process that generally oc curs. The cycle has six phases through which information is—  Planned (referred to as planning and direction).  Obtained (referred to as collection).  Assembled (referred to as processing and exploitation).  Converted into intelligence (referred to as production).  Provided to decisionmakers (referred to as dissemination).  Used in making decisions (referred to as utili- zation). These phases are discusse d in the following sub- paragraphs. Planning and Direction The company commander’s IRs are critical portions of design and are a primary driver for the planning process. Company commanders need to ensure that a ll available intelligence assets and all attachment s to the company, such as armorer and engineer attachments, are integrated into the pro cess to ensure the right information is being purs ued by the right assets. They might ask what the armorer and engineers need to know for a successful breaching effort or which intelligence assets are best used to get that information. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Publication 1540-002-95, Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook (GIRH), contains lists of IRs by mission profile and can provide significant assistance to the company commander. Upon receipt of planning guidance and direction from the company command er, the intelligence specialist and CLIC m onitor and execute the overall intelligence effort for the company. Intel- ligence planning and di rection is a continuous function and a command responsibility. Company commanders must ensure they provide coherent and actionable guidance and direction to the CLIC, as required. Collection Friendly forces obtain informa tion through the collection process. Comp any patrols are the only organic intelligence a ssets the company com- mander possesses, so ta sking patrols with valid and specific orders or requests to help answer pri- ority PIRs and IRs is cr itical. While planning to use their own patrols to meet the most critical IRs, company commanders should not make the mistake of ignoring extern al assets. These assets may not belong to or be in direct support (DS) of the company, but they are often available if requested. The assets can provide redundant col- lection for important IRs and fill gaps in the com- pany’s collection plan. Accessing these assets requires that the company intelligence specialist produce well written, thought out, valid requests. A well organized, efficient IPB process at the company level plays a vital role in providing the company commander the information needed to Table 4-5. Potential Information Operations Target Sets. Technical Human C2 systems Enemy leaders ISR systems Nontechnical command and control (couriers) Electronic attack systems Nontechnical media assets (reporters) Radio/TV/print outlets Civilian leaders (religious, tribal, civil) Discrete populace groups (villages, neighborhoods) Legend TV television --- Page 84 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 4-15 secure external intelligence support. The intelli- gence specialist and CLIC uses various tools, such as the collections ma trices seen in table 4-6 and figure 4-10, on page 4-16, to organize collec- tion assets against NAIs. Geospatial intelligence , signals intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), CI, measurement and signature intelligence, open- source intelligence, and technical intelligence dis- ciplines can support company operations. Geospatial Intelligence Geospatial intelligence is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visual ly depict physical fea- tures and geographically referenced activities on the earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery and geospatial information. It derives the information from multiple collection platforms of diverse capabilities, such as maps, patrol debriefs with pictures of the local leadership, UA feeds, or images from theater an d national assets. An example of company-generated geospatial intelli- gence is when document pictures are taken on a patrol with such information as time, location, names, and directions and are turned into the CLIC during the patrol debrief. Signals Intelligence Signals intelligence is derived from the intercep- tion, processing, and anal ysis of foreign commu- nications. Signals intellig ence can provide timely and accurate data on enemy forces that may include details on enemy composition, identifica- tion, and location. Companies can expect to work with detachments from th e radio battalion in the form of SIGINT support teams or radio recon- naissance teams. The company commander must discuss and understand the capabilities and limi- tations of these SIGINT teams to properly sup- port and employ them in the company’s intelligence colle ction effort. The SIGINT sup- port teams and radio reco nnaissance teams collo- cated with companies will normally have significant security clearance, physical security, and access control requirements. Human Intelligence Human intelligence is information coming from human sources. A number of entities provide a company’s HUMINT, from attached CI/HUMINT exploitation teams to national agency reporting. If a company commander fa ils to integrate CI/ HUMINT teams operating in the company’s AO with the intelligence collection effort and scheme of maneuver, the teams will default to HHQ reporting requirements. Careful evaluation of HUMINT is required to determine the accuracy and reliability of the in formation provided. It is important to recognize that, while any Marine can Table 4-6. Collection Matrix Example. Time 0001 0400 0800 1200 1600 2000 2400 Sniper 1 NAI 1 Sniper 2 NAI 1 Wasp On call Raven NAI 2 Scan Eagle NAI 1,2,3 CI/HUMINT team Meet source with 1/2 security element SST NAI 2 GSP NAI 1 TAC recon NAI 1 1st Plt 1st Sqd NAI 2 NAI 2 1st Plt 2d Sqd NAI 2 1st Plt 3d Sqd NAI 1 NAI 3 1st Plt 4th Sqd NAI 3 2-1 NAI 3 NAI 1 2-2 NAI 1 NAI 3 2-3 NAI 3 NAI 1 2-4 NAI 1 3d Plt Reserve 4th Plt FOB security Legend GSP ground sensor platoon plt platoon recon reconnaissance sqd squad SST signals intelligence support team TAC terminal attack controller --- Page 85 --- 4-16 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 conduct tactical questioning, only CI/HUMINT team Marines may task and run sources. Com- pany commanders should recognize the require- ment to provide CI /HUMINT teams with appropriate security and that CI/HUMINT teams cannot operate on their own without support from the company. Counterintelligence Counterintelligence is si milar to and often con- fused with HUMINT, as CI uses many of the same techniques for information collection. In addition, CI/HUMINT teams serve as the primary source for CI functions in the Marine Corps. Counterintelli- gence obtains information by or through the func- tions of CI operations, i nvestigations, collection and reporting, analysis, production, dissemination, and functional services. Among its functions, CI supports FP during all types and phases of mili- tary operations; detection, identification, and neu- tralization of espionage; antiterrorism; and enemy threat assessments. Measurement and Signature Intelligence Measurement and signature intelligence is infor- mation gathered by technical instruments, such as radars, passive electro-op tical sensors, radiation detectors, and remote ground sensors. Examples that a company commander would likely encoun- ter are ground sensor platoons and biometric automated tool sets. Open-Source Intelligence Open-source intelligence is information of poten- tial intelligence value that is available to the pub- lic, including periodical s, posters, radio and television broadcasts, and unclassified internet networks (blogs and ch at rooms). Open-source intelligence can provide a good baseline for local population and societal trends, attitudes, and demeanor. However, careful evaluation of open- source intelligence sources is necessary in order to determine the accuracy and reliability of the information provided. DP # 7 Legend: DP - decision point H - hour IMINT - imagery intelligence S-2 processing time WHEN decisionmakers need the intelligence Intelligence synchronization matrix collection strategy and deadlines IMINT HUMINT SIGINT H H + 1 H + 2 H + 3 H + 4 UA 2-9 CAV the information must START collecting WHEN collected information MUST be to G-2/S-2 collection time WHEN collector EstimatedWHO will collect Figure 4-10. Operation-Based Chronological Collections Matrix. --- Page 86 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 4-17 Technical Intelligence Technical intelligence is derived from the exploi- tation of foreign materiel and scientific informa- tion. Technical intelligen ce begins with the acquisition of a foreign piece of equipment (see app. C) or foreig n scientific/technological infor- mation. Specialized, multi- Service collection and analysis teams then expl oit the item or informa- tion. These technical intelligence teams assess the capabilities and vulnerab ilities of captured mili- tary materiel and provide detailed assessments of foreign technological thre at capabilities, limita- tions, and vulnerabilities . Technical intelligence is useful at the tactical level to see how the adver- sary is using technology, such as the building of IEDs, to drive friendly counteractions. While most technical intellig ence will be provided by multi-Service level teams, rudimentary technical intelligence at the company level can often come from battalion gunners or explosive ordnance dis- posal (EOD) units. Processing and Exploitation Information is assemble d through processing and exploitation. With the pot ential for vast amounts of information coming in to the CLIC, it is essen- tial that information is catalogued, organized, assessed, and prioritize d. Such processes allow relevant information to receive the focus of the intelligence specialist an d CLIC, potentially rele- vant information to be coherently stored for later retrieval, and irrelevant information to be dis- carded. Proper organizi ng and databasing also create superior turnov er products for follow-on units. Examples of the pr ocessing of information include the translation of documents or of for- eign writing on pictures ob tained during a patrol or the retrieval of sens itive inform ation from a seized computer or hard drive. Much obtained information requires expl oitation at higher levels of command that possess the necessary resources and assets. Companies should track the results of this exploitation. Since th e exploitation of much of the gathered information is beyond the capabil- ities of the comp any intelligence specialist, but perhaps very important a nd relevant to the com- pany in the form of inte lligence, it is essential that the intelligence specialist establish effective means of tracking the pr ogress and receiving the results of exploited information. The company intelligence specialist is responsible for ensuring that information delive red to HHQ for exploita- tion possesses the appropriate amplification and guidance to ensure that critical information is extracted and disseminated first. Production Production is the proces s of converting informa- tion into intelligence a nd assessing the value of the intelligence. Raw info rmation can assist with intuitive decisions, but information produced into intelligence can assist with analytical decisions. Production asks “So what ?” and “What does this information mean to th e company and its mis- sion?” During this step, information is—  Evaluated to determine pertinence, reliability, and accuracy.  Analyzed to isolate the significant elements.  Integrated with other re levant information and previously developed intelligence.  Interpreted to form logical conclusions that bear on the situation and support the com- mander’s decisionmaking process.  Placed into the product format that will be most useful to the eventual user. Dissemination Dissemination is the pr ocess by which intelli- gence is provided to decisionmakers throughout the chain of command, both vertically and hori- zontally. Dissemination must be timely, it must be in the appropriate format, and it must reach the right people. The infant ry company commander must ensure that the processes with which the CLIC disseminates intelligence are effective. The company intelligence spec ialist and CLIC face two concerns—the methods available to pass intelligence and the in telligence requiring dis- semination. Disseminati ng relevant and timely --- Page 87 --- 4-18 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 intelligence is more impo rtant than its format. Notifying a platoon outpost by radio that they will likely experience a small arms attack in the coming 12 hours is far mo re effective than delay- ing notification while attempting to send or deliver a large graphics file with supporting docu- mentation. The CLIC uses a combination of sup- ply-push and demand-pull methods as appropriate to the importance of the intelligence and the methods of dissemination available. Utilization Utilization is the proc ess by which intelligence helps to make decisions. Commanders may pro- vide direction on their IR s, information might be collected and converted in to intelligence, and the intelligence may be disseminated. However, unless that intelligence is exploited through deci- sion and action, all the ef fort serves no purpose. Intelligence has no value for its own sake. Its value lies in action. Ac tually, taking action based on intelligence begins th e whole cycle again by generating future IRs, which require the com- pany commander to provide planning and direc- tion guidance. Intelligence Support to Operations Intelligence is inseparabl e from operations. Intel- ligence drives operations by shaping planning and execution. Operationa l actions develop logi- cally from intellig ence and, in turn, drive new IRs. An infantry company commander with effec- tive intelligence knows th e nature of the terrain and weather conditions the company will encoun- ter, the composition and status of the infrastruc- ture in the AO, the make up and attitude of the population the company will encounter, and how the combined effects of these factors will influ- ence mission accomplishment. The relationship between intelligence and opera- tions should be as close and direct as that between intelligence and command. In addition to the influence of intellig ence on the conduct of operations by its identification of enemy capabili- ties and estimation of ECOAs and possible reac- tions to friendly COAs , intelligence provides important support to operations by helping to identify friendly critical vulnerabilities that the enemy may exploit. The relationship between operations and intelli- gence necessitates mutual support. Just as intelli- gence identifies opportunities for exploitation through operations, so ca n operations provide the stimulus for intelligence . Regardless of the pri- mary mission, all operations have an additional objective of gaining information about the enemy and the environment. Some operations possess this goal as the primary mission. For example, the objective of a tactical ma neuver, such as a recon- naissance in forc e, may be to learn more about enemy capabilities and di sposition or to solicit the enemy’s reaction to a specific situation. Intelligence Support to Planning Intelligence support is ne cessary in each step of the MCPP. Problem Framing During problem framing, the company intelli- gence specialist receives the HHQ order and related IPB products, the company commander’s initial intent and planni ng guidance, and other direction as necessary. Th e intelligence specialist and CLIC should particip ate fully in design and the overall problem fram ing process. At a mini- mum, the CLIC will assist in conducting IPB and provide the following:  Enemy situation (situation templates).  Weather and terrain analysis.  Possible ECOAs.  Requests for informat ion (enemy-focused intelligence gaps).  Recommended PIRs. --- Page 88 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 4-19 Course of Action Development Products developed through the IPB process pres- ent intelligence in the form of images that permit decisionmakers to visualize the situation, see pat- terns, and assess potential alternatives. As plan- ning moves forward, the company intelligence specialist aids in COA development through cre- ation of the reconnaissa nce and surveillance plan and an initial intelligence estimate. Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan At the company level, the reconnaissance and surveillance plan largel y consists of proper employment of the company’s organic patrol capability and aggressive ly seeks support from other available, external intelligence assets. The company intelligence specialist determines—  What information is needed.  Which asset can best obtain that information.  From where (physical location) the informa- tion can best be collected.  Routes to that location.  The best insertion means. Initial Intelligence Estimate The company intelligence specialist, as able, pro- vides an initial intelligence estimate based on the results of its work duri ng problem framing. The company intelligence specialist ensures that this estimate is updated as in telligence is gathered. Establishing operation-speci fic read boards, issu- ing changes, or provid ing regularly scheduled briefing updates ar e some of the ways that the company might maintain situational awareness among company decisionmakers and the COC. The company intelligence specialist should brief the following items:  Updated intelligence.  Possible ECOAs (most probable/most danger- ous).  Current situation templates. Course of Action Wargaming As discussed in chapte r 3, conducting formal COA wargaming at the company level is not usu- ally possible because of limits on planning time, personnel, or facilities. Should the company pos- sess the opportunity to wargame various COAs, the company intelligence specialist should con- tinue to identify and validate PIRs, IRs, and asso- ciated NAIs. Products, such as event templates and matrices, continue to be refined. Updated IPB products should include the following items:  PIRs with latest time intelligence is of value.  Refined NAIs.  HVTs.  Final situational templates. Course of Action Comparison and Decision The company will rarely have more than one COA; still, should the company commander wish to conduct COA compar ison and decision, the company intelligence spec ialist and CLIC should be prepared to provide the following:  Assessment of ECOAs on friendly COAs.  Assessment of the company’s ability to collect required information in support of the com- mander’s PIRs.  Updated IPB products, PI Rs, and intelligence estimates. Orders Development During the orders development step, the com- pany intelligence speci alist produces the in- telligence products required to support the company commander’s order. The company does not normally prod uce large OPORDs with detailed narratives. Rath er, the company intelli- gence specialist should e xpect to verbally brief weather and terrain (KOCOA), produce ECOA graphics, and answer the questions of the platoons and attachments. --- Page 89 --- 4-20 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Transition The company intelligence specialist assists in orders development and dissemination, which may include the following:  The order (OPORD or FRAGO).  Collection matrix.  Updated IPB. Intelligence Support to Execution Intelligence support to execution differs in signif- icant ways from intelli gence support to planning. First, while intelligence support to planning requires developing a large volume of basic intel- ligence and preparing broad-scope estimates to develop and analyze COAs , intelligence support to execution involves th e satisfaction of a much larger body of IRs in a significantly greater degree of detail. For example, a ground sensor platoon detachment alerts the CLIC to activity in its sector of responsib ility. The CLIC alerts the WO who tasks a UA to cover the area. Informa- tion from the UA is passe d to a nearby patrol. The patrol searches the area and confirms or denies the activity reported by the other sensors. A second major difference between intelligence support to planning and intelligence support to execution is the time av ailable for developing an intelligence product. Of ten days, weeks, and sometimes months are available to provide intelli- gence support to planning, but intelligence sup- port to execution must normally be developed in hours, minutes, or even seconds. Success in execu- tion often depends on the ability to provide imme- diate answers to critic al questions concerning enemy force dispositions, actions, and intentions. Intelligence support during execution focuses on providing the commander with practical knowl- edge that gives an expl oitable advantage over the enemy. Although elimina ting uncertainty during execution is impossible, focused intelligence operations can reduce un certainty by providing situational awareness an d identifying opportuni- ties as they present them selves in the battlespace. Intelligence support to execution provides indica- tions and warning of ne w or unexpected enemy activities, enhances effort s to engage the enemy through support to targeting, assists in protecting the force through CI me asures and operations, and supports the planning of future operations by providing timely and accurate BDA. Targeting Intelligence drives every step of the targeting pro- cess. Intelligence supports targeting by executing the following functions:  Identify the enemy threat, capabilities, and likely ECOAs.  Identify HVTs and high-value individuals (HVIs).  Identify where/when HVTs and HVIs are vul- nerable.  Focus collection assets. Assessment As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, feedback and assessment occur continuously in operations—dur- ing execution, current operations, and future oper- ations planning. The company intelligence specialist looks for feedback and intelligence that assess the effects frie ndly operations produce across all aspects of th e environment. Company leadership adjusts operat ions based on the effects produced and may expand the operation, continue it as is, halt it, execute a branch or sequel, or take steps to correct damage caused by a mistake. While traditional, lethal assessment metrics include destruction and neutralization criteria, non- lethal metrics include changes in the following:  Local attitudes.  Public perceptions.  Quality and quantity of information provided by locals. --- Page 90 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 4-21  Economic or political situation.  Insurgent activity. CARVER Evaluation The CARVER evaluation is a means of integrat- ing the efforts of intelligence and operations plan- ners to evaluate the value of potential targets. This method considers six aspects of a target and assigns a subjective wei ghted ranking to evaluate the relative merit of striki ng a particular target. The memory aid CARVER stands for—  Criticality: the importance of the target to enemy and friendly COAs.  Accessibility: the ability to get to the target and back.  Recuperability: the ability of the target to be easily replaced.  Vulnerability: a unit’s ability to produce effects on target.  Effect: the first and s econd order effects (posi- tive and negative) of engaging the target.  Recognizability: the ab ility to recognize the target under various operational conditions. Target Folders Tracking persons who are targets, such as HVIs, is often a more complicate d and difficult process than tracking other HVTs, such as enemy bridg- ing or C2 assets. Theref ore, while the method of using target folders can apply to any particular tar- get, target folders are more generally associated with persons. Though there is no standard format for developing HVI target folders, company com- manders can reasonably e xpect that their parent battalions or other HHQ will provide them with the requisite format. Elements most often found in target folders include the following:  A biographic profile with physical description.  A multidiscipline report on the target’s histori- cal background.  An estimate of the target’s importance.  Recent significant activity.  Known associates.  Known or suspected associated facilities.  Known means of communication.  Vulnerabilities.  Intelligence gaps.  Link analysis.  Significant event reporting chronology.  Assessments and supporting maps or imagery products. Company Level Intelligence Cell Training Intelligence training must be a continuous pro- cess. The battalion intelli gence section is respon- sible for providing su stainment and mission- specific training to intelligence specialists assigned to infantry co mpanies. If the company commander deems it necessary to create a CLIC, then the company’s intelligence specialist and the battalion intelligence section provide assigned Marines the necessary tr aining to perform their duties. The preferred method is to plan and train for a large CLIC because it is easier to have the trained Marines availabl e and not use them than to need them and not have them. Most skills acquired through schools are perishable if the graduate is not frequently required to perform those tasks. Th e following represent training opportunities for Marines assigned to the CLIC:  CLIC Course . The CLIC Course is provided through the Marine Co rps Intelligence School and introduces the Marines to IPB, analysis, collections, targeting, briefing, and debriefing skills in both an automated and nonautomated environment.  CLIC Systems Administration Course . This course is provided through the Marine Corps Intelligence School and introduces students (to include communicators) to the system adminis- tration skills required to establish an intelli- gence data communications path.  Sustainment training . Battalion intelligence sections aggressively se ek to execute regularly --- Page 91 --- 4-22 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 scheduled intelligence specialist and CLIC sus- tainment training. Battalion intelligence sec- tions and company commanders should actively seek to incorporate CLIC operations into regularly scheduled training and exercises.  Expeditionary Warfare Intelligence Course . The Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Pacific hosts this course. The curriculum offered provides students with additional expe- rience in conducting IP B in a broad range of expeditionary operations. Intelligence Training for All Marines The company commander uses the company intel- ligence specialist and other assets to ensure that intelligence training occurs for all Marines within the command in order to maximize the collection efforts at the company le vel. Sending out a patrol to satisfy various IRs will fail if the personnel comprising the patrol do not know what they are looking for, what other th ings they see that might be of value, and how to collect the information correctly. Patrols must possess a basic understand- ing of how the informa tion they collect will be exploited. The Marine Corps and its sister Ser- vices provide a wealth of classroom, practical application, simulator, a nd computer-based train- ing to assist in fantry companies with increasing the understanding of milita ry intelligence within the ranks of the company. Figure 4-11 indicates the types of intelligence-related training available and offers recommendations on whom in the infantry company should receive that training. Types of training that infantry company com- manders should consider for their company per- sonnel include the following:  Tactical site exploitation. This training teaches company personnel how to search facilities and properly retrieve and process materials discov- ered.  Unmanned aircraft and unmanned aircraft sys- tems training . As technology matures, it is increasingly likely that infantry companies will possess organic UA system s that will be used by company personnel.  Law enforcement-related programs. Many law enforcement skills, fr om detainee handling to developing awareness of community patterns, are useful to infantry companies, especially in stability operations.  Language training . Many language resources are available to assist commanders in develop- ing and sustaining relevant language training programs.  Biometrics training . Various biometric-based tracking and databasing systems exist that require trained personnel to operate.  Tactical questioning training . This training enables company personnel to more effectively speak with and question (vice interrogate) per- sons encountered in the community. --- Page 92 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 4-23 Individual training C2 systems BFT 4 days Ops/Intel NCO Individual training C2 systems BAT/HIIDE 2 days Collections element Individual training C2 systems C2PC or CPOF 3 or 5 days Analysis element WO/Co Ldrs Individual training C2 systems C2 System overview 1 days Legend: BAT - Biometric Automated Toolset BFT - blue force tracker C2PC - command and control personal computer CBT - computer based training Co - company Comm - communications CPOF - command post of the future HIIDE - handheld interagency identity detection equipment Intel - intelligence IROC - Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations Course Ldrs - leaders MCCES - Marine Corps Communications and Electronics School MISTC - MAGTF Integrated Systems Training Center Op - operating Ops - operations POC - point of contact Plt - platoon Rep - representative Sqd - squad TCM - tactical control measure TECOE - Training and Education Center of Excellence Individual training communications IROC 03XX Individual training BAT/HIIDE Plt/Sqd intel rep Individual training Tactical questioning Plt/Sqd intel rep Individual training Tactical site exploitation Plt/Sqd intel rep Individual training Detainee ops Plt/Sqd intel rep Rep 1 Individual training Language Plt/Sqd intel rep Individual training CBT Intelligence courses Co XO Ops/Intel NCO collections element analysis element Individual training CBT TCM Fire support coordinaton measures WO Rep 2 POC for event MCCES C2 TECOE (MISTC) Ops force unit Various Figure 4-11. Intelligence Training Flowchart. --- Page 93 --- 4-24 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 This Page Intentionally Left Blank --- Page 94 --- CHAPTER 5 COMPANY LEVEL FIRE SUPPORT The infantry company serves as the primary exec- utor of lethal and nonlethal fires in its battlespace. The FST plans and executes the company’s fire support tasks based on gui dance and direction from the company comman der and coordinates with HHQ fire support agencies. The FST will coordinate, plan, and co ntrol organic and nonor- ganic fire support assets to the company. While the FST may often reside with the company COC, it may just as likely deploy elsewhere within the battlespace to execute the company commander’s intent. The infantry company does not normally provide full range clearance of fires in its battlespace; however, there are unique circumstances when a company is required to coordinate its own fires. In these cases, the FST will require personnel and equipment augmentation, specific and detailed deconfliction procedures , and additional training. The following are some examples of when it may be appropriate to execute control of fires at the company level versus the battalion:  While conducting operations in a noncontigu- ous battlespace.  When greater situational awareness exists at the company level than at the battalion level.  When conducting distribut ed operations at the company level.  When temporary control of fires is granted to the company for a specified time, phase, or event. Roles and Responsibilities Company Commander Proper employment and c oordination of fires in support of the company’s mission is an inherent responsibility of the co mpany commander. Com- pany commanders must know and understand the roles, duties, functions, and capabilities of their FST and the fire support systems available to the company. Company commanders are also respon- sible for ensuring their FSTs are properly trained. The company commander must provide coherent, concise, and clear guida nce to the FST on the intent for fires and desired effects in order for it to plan and execute fires in support of the company mission. This guidance usually is in the form of one or more EFSTs (r efer to MCWP 3-16, Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat Ele- ment, and MCRP 3-16.6A, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Applica- tion of Firepower [J-FIRE] ), but must at least include the scheme of ma neuver, effects desired, and restrictions. It is essential that th e company commander en- sures synchronization and integration of the fire support plan with the sc heme of maneuver. He is also responsible for proper integration of the com- pany’s fire support plan with that of the parent bat- talion’s plan. Company commanders must ensure they fully understand the requirements from HHQ with regard to fire s upport and the planning con- siderations and execution of fires in support of the company. Using the company commander’s fire support guidance, the FST is the primary action element for coordination with the battalion. The FST submits lists of targets, requests fire support assets, and refines targets in support of the com- pany’s fire support plan and scheme of maneuver. The FST integrates battal ion-directed limitations into the company’s pl ans. The company com- mander must supervise this process and remain actively aware of potential changes to the fire sup- port plan. --- Page 95 --- 5-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Fire Support Team At a minimum, the FST will consist of a leader, an FO (mortar/artillery) , an RO, and a terminal controller. Depending on th e mission and the fire support systems allotted, a naval gunfire spotter, IO representatives, and CMO representatives may assist the FST or company commander. Roles and Responsibilities of the Fire Support Team The FST in the infantry company executes fire support functions, such as targeting coordination and fires integration. The FST may be required to conduct fire support coor dination. The team con- sists of the FST leader, artillery FO/scout/RO, joint terminal attack controller (JTAC)/forward air controller (FAC), shor e fire control party, and mortar FO. The FST leader is normally the company’s weap- ons platoon commander. Fi re support team lead- ers coordinate with th e FSC of HHQ for fires planning and to ensure support of the company commander’s intent for fi res. Fire support team leaders use the specialized experts within the FST to accomplish the mission. The FST leader—  Is responsible to the company commander for the proper planning and execution of fires in accordance with the company commander’s intent, guidance, desired effects, and direction in support of the company’s maneuver.  Advises the company commander on the capa- bilities and limitations of fire support systems and assets.  Supervises the FST in planning and execution of hasty and deliberate fires to create desired effects. Actions include targeting, product and orders development and dissemination, rehearsals, coordination with HHQ, fratricide avoidance, and effects assessment.  Organizes and integrates FST functions into the company COC to include serving as the infantry company COC’s primary means of conducting fires communications with subordi- nate, adjacent, and higher commands.  Ensures integration of all lethal and nonlethal fires with the intelligence collection effort and the scheme of maneuver.  Approves, coordinates, and disseminates tar- geting products and priorities, FSCMs, and other appropriate documents.  Is prepared, if tasked, to control fires in the company’s battlespace through approval, modification, and denial and recommend FST augmentation requirements to the company commander.  Is responsible to the company commander for fires training of organi c company fire support personnel.  Ensures assigned targets are refined, observed, rehearsed, and fired according to the scheme of fires.  Directs FST members in the execution of fires in support of the company to include managing battlespace geometry (BSG), tracking and updating friendly and enemy situations, and preventing fratricide. The artillery FO/scout/RO is responsible for the accomplishment of the following:  Requesting and controlling artillery fires.  Providing the company commander and the FST leader with recommendations regarding employment of field artillery.  Assisting the compa ny commander and FST leader with fire suppor t planning and artillery support.  Maintaining verbal and digital communications on doctrinal artillery fire and coordination nets.  Performing duties of the FST leader as directed or as needed. The JTAC/FAC is resp onsible for the accom- plishment of the following:  Providing terminal control of aircraft.  Orienting aircraft to the enemy situation and disposition of friendly forces.  Providing the company commander and the FST leader with recommendations regarding employment of aviation assets. --- Page 96 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 5-3  Providing the FST the cap ability to locate and engage targets through the use of aviation assets.  Maintaining communications on doctrinal avi- ation control and coordination nets.  Assisting the compan y commander and FST leader in fire support planning, submitting avia- tion requests, and maintaining situational aware- ness of special instructions (SPINS) and the air tasking order flow. The shore fire control party has the following responsibilities:  Controlling naval surface fire support (NSFS).  Providing the compa ny commander and the FST leader with recommendations regarding the employment of NSFS assets.  Maintaining communications on doctrinal NSFS control and coordination nets.  Assisting the company commander and FST leader in fire support planning and NSFS requests. The mortar FO has the following responsibilities:  Controlling 81-mm mortar fires.  Providing the compa ny commander and the FST leader with recommendations regarding the employment of mortars.  Maintaining communications on doctrinal mor- tar control and coordination nets.  Assisting the company commander and FST leader in fire suppor t planning and mortar requests. Fire Support Enablers The fire support enablers are the joint fires observer, the IO repres entative, and the CMO representative. In the case of IO and CMO, the company should seek formally trained personnel for these billets. Failing that, the company should seek to train personnel from within the company if these billets are needed. The joint fires observer is any Marine in the com- pany who has completed the Joint Fires Observer Course. Personnel with th is training can control fires within certain rest rictions. This capability adds to the company’s flexibility in employing supporting arms by re ducing the demand on the FST and increasing the number of observers and potential controllers th roughout the company, its platoons, and squads. The joint fires observer—  Requests, adjusts, and controls surface-to-sur- face fires.  Provides targeting info rmation in support of Type 2 and Type 3 CAS terminal attack con- trols.  Maintains communicati on with appropriate support and supporting ag encies, such as FST, artillery, mortars, JTAC/FAC, and FSCC. The IO representative is responsible to the FST for all company IO and has the following respon- sibilities—  Advise the company commander on IO plan- ning considerations.  Ensure that company IO plans are coordinated with the HHQ IO plan.  Coordinate all IO matt ers with higher, adja- cent, and subordinate units.  Recommend IO prioriti es and target nomina- tions.  Coordinate intelligence support to all IO.  Prepare and coordinate command information messages with HHQ.  Coordinate talking point s with higher and dis- seminate to subordinate elements.  Manage company broadcast system programs.  Compile subordinate unit reporting to provide IO assessment/population atmospherics. The CMO representative has the following re- sponsibilities:  Advise the company commander on CMO planning considerations.  Ensure that company CMO plans are coordi- nated with HHQ CMO plans.  Ensure the civil information gathered by com- pany personnel and any associated civil affairs --- Page 97 --- 5-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 personnel are incorpor ated into the overall company intelligence collections plan for anal- ysis and dissemination to HHQ.  Advise the company commander on project nominations and supporting project submission packages.  Track all company level projects and coordi- nate all projects in the company AO initiated by HHQ.  Advise the company commander on all United States Government interagency, NGOs, and international organizations operating in the company AO.  Coordinate activities of civil affairs team mem- bers. Fire Support Planning The goal of fire sup port planning, according to MCWP 3-16, is coordinating and integrating fires from armed aircraft, land -based and sea-based indirect fire systems, and electronic warfare sys- tems that directly support land, maritime, amphibi- ous, and special operation forces to engage enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in pursuit of tactical and operational objectives. Determining lethal and nonlethal fire support requirements (including ho w to combine them in a manner that creates a dilemma for the enemy and how to meet those re quirements with the fire support systems available), developing a fire sup- port plan, and integra ting it with both the HHQ fire support plan and the company scheme of maneuver is a difficult process. The FST’s leader and its members will execute most of the detailed work required to create a fire support plan; how- ever, it is essential th at the company commander devote appropriate energy to overseeing the pro- cess because the fire support plan is normally critical to the company’s mission success. The company commander best understands the ramifications of the fire support plan. For example, in a stability operation, the company commander is more likely to recognize that a succe ssful lethal strike could have unintended, negative effects on the local population and the company’s ability to accomplish the mission. Fires planning at the com- pany level may use the troop leading steps com- monly referred to as BA MCIS [begin planning, arrange for reconnaissance, make reconnaissance, complete the plan, issue the order, supervise] (see table 5-1). Actions may occur in sequence or simultaneously. The FST leader must organize the efforts of the FST to meet all these requirements in a time-constrained environment. Two questions should focus the efforts of the FST: Is the fire sup- port plan fully integrat ed with operations? How will fires support operations? Begin Planning During this phase, FST leaders participate in the company’s problem fram ing and design pro- cesses. Company comma nders provide the FST with the intent for fires and their desired effects to support maneuver. The FST leader works closely with the compan y intelligence specialist to understand the enemy and friendly situations and the environment (see chap. 4). The FST will begin coordination with HHQ and will work con- tinually to refine the fire support plan throughout the planning process. As problem framing moves forward toward COA development, the FST leader should be able to provide the company commander an initial con cept of fires—at least task and purpose—for inclusion in the com- mander’s WARNORD. In order to accomplish this goal, the FST leader considers the mission, coordination with and refinement of the HHQ fire support plan, the fire support resources available, and initial targeting. Mission The FST should ensure that the fire support plan- ning is not too complex. As products are briefed and disseminated, the FS T leader should use the task-purpose-method-effect format to ensure the company understands the fire support plan and its requirements. With re gard to the company’s --- Page 98 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 5-5 specific mission, the FST leader should consider the following:  What is the mission?  How much time is available?  What is the enemy situation and capabilities?  What is the scheme of maneuver?  What are the results of the IPB?  What are the desired e ffects and what criteria define success?  What maneuver and FSCMs exist? Higher Headquarters Coordination The company commander and FST must properly understand the HHQ fire support plan, guidance for fires, and the effects of fires on the company’s scheme of maneuver in order to produce a valid company level fire support plan. Initial answers to the following important questions exist within the HHQ plan:  What is the HHQ fires plan?  What is HHQ IO plan and what are the authori- ties for information related capabilities (e.g. PA, Table 5-1. Fire Support Actions in BAMCIS Format. Troop Leading Step Fire Support Actions Begin planning Update friendly and enemy situations Find out assets available, allocations, and FSCMs Obtain battalion’s target list worksheet, FSEM, and attack guidance Understand the battalion fire support plan and how it affects your company Identify fire support tasks for the company and brief the commander on above Receive the commander’s mission Receive the commander’s fire support guidance Participate in WARNORD Issue WARNORD to fire support personnel and mortar section on fire support issues Arrange for reconnaissance Conduct map analysis Plot obstacles and known enemy locations Plot all battalion targets List fire support tasks Advise the commander if guidance can/cannot be met with available assets and allocations Refine battalion targets, if necessary, and request additional assets as required Determine if battalion targets support commander’s guidance Plot targets necessary to support commander’s guidance (within target allocation) Determine purpose, engagement criteria, trigger points, and primary and alternate executors Develop target list worksheet Develop FSEM Brief commander on initial fire support plan Make reconnaissance Ensure battlespace observation is maintained Accompany maneuver leaders on reconnaissance Confirm or modify plan Verify target location, trigger points, and observation plan (primary and alternate) Complete the plan Modify the plan as necessary after reconnaissance Brief commander on the scheme of fires Emphasize observer movement, OP requirements, and triggers Receive approval for fire support plan Transmit target list worksheet and coordination requirements to battalion FSCC and company mortars Brief fire support personnel on fire support plan Issue the order Participate in company orders brief Ensure fire support representatives and mortar section leader attend orders brief if possible Supervise Conduct rehearsals Conduct inspections as required Continue to refine targets and triggers for actual location, ground reconnaissance, or new enemy information Continuously update and coordinate the plan as necessary Legend FSEM fire support execution matrix --- Page 99 --- 5-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 combat camera [COMCAM], MISO, cyber- space, EW)?  What is the HHQ shaping plan and does it ade- quately support the company scheme of maneuver?  Which of the battalion’s subordinate units is the main effort?  Who has priority of fires and when?  Will priority of fires or priority targets shift? If so, what is the trigger and what is the signal?  Are there limitations on supported arms in terms of ROE, collate ral damage, BSG, and fratricide mitigation? If so, what FSCMs are needed and do they support the scheme of maneuver and desired effects?  What is the approval process for fires? Available Resources A key factor in beginni ng the planning is deter- mining what actual fire support systems are avail- able to the company. The most readily available source for this informati on is the battalion’s fire support plan (Appendix 19 [Fire Support] to Annex C [Operations] of the battalion OPORD). Products, such as FSCMs, the fire support execu- tion matrix, and the target list, will provide guid- ance and direction on what and when a company can expect to use various types of fire support systems, to include IO capabilities and assets. When addressing availa ble resources, company commanders and their FST leaders consider the following questions:  Does the FST have the required personnel and equipment (e.g., JTACs, joint fires observers, FOs, IO representatives, laser designators, and appropriate communication platforms)?  What are the allocated fire support assets (e.g., artillery, mortars, or civil affairs teams)?  What are the allocated air assets (e.g., rotary- wing and fixed-wing CAS, assault support, and EW)?  What assets can acquire and track the targets? Initial Targeting The FST begins the targe ting process as early as possible and uses the deci de, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) targeting process (discussed later in this chapter). The IPB and initial intelligence esti- mate process will provide the FST leader with the preliminary information on how fires can support the company’s mission. The HHQ fire support plan will provide initial direction and guidance on targets. The FST combines these sources of infor- mation with the compa ny commander’s guidance to begin the company targeting process, nominat- ing targets when necessary and refining HHQ tar- gets as required. A coherent targeting process allows the development of the company’s EFSTs and effective input into the intelligence collec- tion plan. As initial ta rgeting proceeds, the FST leader considers the following questions:  What is the HHQ targeting cycle?  What is the air tasking order cycle?  What are the most likely avenues of approach?  What types of targets need to be attacked and when?  What are the priority targets?  What airspace coordina tion areas will affect the fire plan?  Are there any unique C2 or communications requirements?  How can targets and target locations be contin- uously refined? Arrange for Reconnaissance Within the planning pro cess, the FST continues to participate in prob lem framing and supports the transition to COA development. With the company commander’s intent and planning guid- ance, limitations, and task and purpose of com- pany fires understood, the FST leader must focus efforts on developing the details necessary to pro- duce the initial fire suppor t plan for use during COA development. Furthe r, in cooperation with --- Page 100 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 5-7 the company intelligence specialist, the FST inte- grates ISR requirements into the initial fire sup- port plan, including scout snipers, the collection and reconnaissance plans, observer requirements, and aerial reconnaissance. Of note, the process of arranging for reconnaissa nce includes analyzing maps, developing the initial fire support plan, and continuing coordination with HHQ. Conduct Map Analysis The FST should plot all known elements of BSG, to include obstacles, fr iendly and enemy loca- tions, and battalion target s. The FST coordinates this information with the company intelligence specialist and CLIC along with requests for infor- mation, target location refinement, and similar issues for inclusion in IPB development and the intelligence collection plan. The FST should also plot additional targets necessary to support the company commander’s gui dance within target allocation from higher. Develop the Initial Fire Support Plan With the results of problem framing and in con- junction with the company commander’s scheme of maneuver, the FST lead er should continue the D3A targeting process and analyze EFSTs. If necessary, EFSTs should be refined and, if resource gaps appear, the FST should request necessary additional assets. At this point in plan- ning, the FST leader shoul d advise the company commander on the ability or inability to meet the commander’s intent for fires given available assets and allocations. Id entifying issues early in the process enables th e company commander to advocate for grea ter resources to support the company’s scheme of maneuver more effectively. In addition, the FST should—  Determine purpose, engage ment criteria, trig- ger points, and primar y and alternate execu- tors of fires.  Refine targeting decide and detect measures.  Develop initial fire support plan products, such as the target list work sheet, company fire sup- port execution matrix, and any preplanned fire actions (such as leaflet drops, groups, or series).  Brief commander on initial fire support plan. Continue Higher Headquarters Coordination As the initial fire support plan is completed, it is critical that all elements of the FST continue to coordinate with HHQ and designated supporting agencies. As with intellige nce, logistic, and other support plans, the fire support plan will continue to undergo changes and modifications as bat- tlespace requirements ch ange and organizations external to the company complete their planning. With an initial fire su pport plan completed, the FST must be sensitive to changes that could alter the ability to execute that plan, such as the fol- lowing considerations:  What is the ammunition status of fire support agencies?  What is the planned ordnance load for aviation assets?  Is there a need for sp ecial munitions, such as smoke, illumination, or improved conven- tional munitions?  What special considerations for fuze/shell combinations apply in this situation?  Is there a requirement to register fire support assets?  What is the guidance on counterfire?  What is the guidance on suppression of enemy air defenses?  What is the nature of future plans or on order missions? Make Reconnaissance During this phase, the company commander and FST leader should confir m the fire support plan, whether lethal, nonlethal, or a combination of both. For lethal fires, the FST leader should ensure that battlefield observation is continuous --- Page 101 --- 5-8 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 for those who will be controlling fires and assess- ing their effects. The FST should confirm or deny the requirements of the intelligence collection plan and prepare to suppor t the plan with fires as necessary. At a minimum, if they cannot attend themselves, FST leaders sh ould ensure that per- sonnel who will control fires accompany the appropriate maneuver leaders when those individ- uals make their reconnaissance. Across the FST, target locations, trigger points, and the observa- tion plan (primary and alternate observers) should be refined and confirmed through personal recon- naissance, intelligence feedback, and close coor- dination with company commanders and their subordinate maneuver element commanders. Complete the Plan The next step after completing the reconnaissance steps will be to apply any modifications discov- ered or identified to th e initial fire support plan. As the plan is comple ted, the company com- mander’s concern trans itions from planning to execution. Accordingly, wi thin the fire support plan, the FST needs to pay close attention to observer movement, OP requirements (place- ment and security), and fire support triggers. With the approval of the company commander, the fire support plan is submitted to HHQ for final approval. Copies of these documents must go to any supporting arms units. Issue the Order During the company OP ORD, the FST leader briefs the fire support plan. The FST ensures that all available fire support representatives attend the orders brief. Supervise The FST leader should be prepared to conduct the CAR at the company level. If a formal CAR cannot occur, the co mpany commander must ensure that some form of rehearsal takes place, even if it consists of radio backbriefs from maneuver commanders and their assigned organizations, such as FOs, joint fires observers, or FACs. Within the FST, the FST leader conducts necessary inspections and backbriefs. Refinement of targets and triggers remains continuous based on possible fires registration, new enemy information, or ground reconnaissance. The fire support plan is never fini shed; it is continuously updated and coordinated. Targeting Targeting is a continual, decisionmaking process, MCWP 3-16 states. The publication continues to explain that commanders and key personnel (fire support, intelligence, operations and planning) must understand the functions associated with the process, be knowledgeable of the capabilities and limitations of acquisition, target intelligence development, and attack systems, and be able to integrate them. The entir e targeting process must be fully integrated into the tactical decisionmak- ing process. The primary purpose of targeting is to support the company commander’s intent for fires and desired effects by determining what people, equipment, infrastructure, or other things require acquisition and attack or influence. The follow- ing subparagraphs discus s the limited targeting process at the compa ny level using the D3A methodology. There ar e possible scenarios in which the company deploys into a larger and more dispersed battlesp ace than normal with accompanying expanded targeting and fire sup- port roles and responsibilities. In these cases, a larger and more complicated targeting picture emerges that requires expansion and augmenta- tion of the FST in order to execute mo re deliber- ate target processing. The company commander and FST must address th e proper employment of more and varied resour ces against the appropri- ate targets with the co rrect method of engage- ment and assessment. Th ey must also address increased staffing of th e FST, CLIC, and com- pany COC as well as that within subordinate maneuver elements so th at the expanded fire --- Page 102 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 5-9 support planning and targ eting requirements re- ceive adequate support. As MCWP 3-16 explains: Targeting must be comple tely integrated into the fire support planning pr ocess. For example, the priorities established by the commander in the decide phase are not for targeting alone, but in- clude his guidance for intelligence operations, fire support planning, and execution of fires. The four phases of D3A are inherently intertwined and overlapping. The Marine Corps’ doct rinal targeting methodol- ogy, D3A (see fig. 5-1), serves fundamentally as a thought process. The company commander and FST leader must remember that the D3A target- ing methodology is a tool fo r their use, not a set of lock step procedures that dictate their actions. However, as targeting responsibilities for an infantry company increase, D3A becomes a more formalized tool that requires greater detail, greater coordination, and the production of numerous tools and pr oducts to support all aspects of fire support planning and integration. Once begun, D3A is a cont inuous process that is fed by intelligence and operations functions and then feeds intelligence and operations functions. Company commanders should avoid artificial and unnecessary delays or missed opportunities due to inaction or waiting for perfect products. Decide The FST leader must supervise and provide guidance for the decide function. This function provides the overall fo cus for the targeting process and sets prioriti es for intelligence collec- tion and attack planning. It initially begins in problem framing and in conjunction with IPB with the establishment of enemy and friendly situations; the development of event and decision support templates; and the identification of NAIs, target areas of in terest, decision points, HVTs, and associated high-payoff targets. When executing the decide function, the company commander and FST leader consider the fol- lowing questions:  What targets should be acquired and attacked or influenced?  When and where will ta rgets likely be found and who will locate them?  How should the targets be attacked (artillery, precision muniti ons, information related capa- bilities)?  What effects need to be produced on the target (suppress, neutralize, destroy)?  Is BDA required? For ex ample, is a suppres- sion effect required befo re another phase of an operation begins? The company commander must take an active interest in supervising the coordination of the fire support, intelligen ce, and operation al plans. The company intelligence specialist’s development of the most likely and most dangerous enemy COAs drive identification of HVTs and appropriate high-payoff targets. In turn, targeting directly affects the company inte lligence specialist and the CLIC’s creation of the intelligence collection plan. Positioning the FST within the company COC best achieves this interaction and is the most preferred method when the company exe- cutes its wide scope of responsibilities. Detect During the decide function, the FST and com- pany intelligence specialist work together to determine targets, and th en refine those results into HVTs and high-payoff targets. The detect function consists of execution of the intelligence D3A Decide Detect Deliver Assess Figure 5-1. Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess Targeting Methodology. --- Page 103 --- 5-10 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 collection plan and integr ation of the results into the targeting process. During continuous opera- tions, the FST makes imm ediate determinations regarding what actions to take on refinement of existing targets or enga gement of newly identi- fied targets. Intelligence Collection Part of the intelligence collection process entails tasking sensors to detect, find, a nd track targets designated during the de cide function. There are many different means of target detection, consist- ing of a host of organic, nonorganic, joint, Ser- vice, and national leve l assets. While the company commander does not possess ready access to most of these, a properly trained and coordinated CLIC can use the request process to gain information from many of them. As dis- cussed in chapter 4, clear ly articulated, properly identified requirements provide the best opportu- nity for leveraging intel ligence assets outside of the company. Intelligence assets and their func- tions include the following:  Communications and di rection finding assets (such as radio battalion, counterbattery radar, and aviation EW assets) help locate enemy C2 nodes, their indirect fire assets, and their vari- ous communications nets.  Visual reconnaissance assets (such as company patrols, ground reconnai ssance units, and light armored reconnaissance) help locate enemy maneuver elements and direct fire assets.  Multi-sensor and aerial imagery assets (such as aviation platforms, satellites, and UA) help locate enemy C2, logis tic functions, and fire support systems.  Ground remote sensors help track enemy movement.  HUMINT assets (such as CI/HUMINT teams) help locate targets (s uch as enemy maneuver elements, insurgents, informers, and IED layers).  Civil affairs teams, IO, and similar assets help identify civic projects from advisory efforts to local employment plans. Essential Reporting Information When integrating the results of the intelligence collection plan with the targeting process, certain essential reporting require ments exist regardless of the method or asset used to gather intelli- gence. From a fire su pport standpoint, failure to capture these requirements may render the intel- ligence useless. Essent ial information includes the following:  Reporting agency.  Date-time group of acquisition by the sensor.  Description of the activity.  Size of the target.  Target location, altitude , and target location error.  Status (stationary or moving). Deliver The keys to success with in the deliver function are well-established pr ocedures for execution, coordination, and rehearsals within the FST and company COC. A perfect fire support plan that never leaves the FST or company COC is the same as not having a fire support plan at all. Fur- ther, as stated by Army General George Patton, “A good solution applied with vigor NOW is bet- ter than a perfect solution 10 minutes later!” Effective deliverance of fires relies upon all per- sons and agencies involv ed in the process having knowledge and understanding of the plan. It is an integral part of the FST’s responsibilities to ensure that such understanding occurs. The execution of fires should follow the at tack guidance created in support of the company commander’s plan, which consists of the following information:  Time of attack.  Desired effect.  Attack system.  Number and types of munitions.  Response time. Assess Determination of the e ffects of fires on desig- nated targets occurs with in the assess function of --- Page 104 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 5-11 D3A. The requirement for accurate assessment is similar to the requirement to assess the effects of all operations as discu ssed in chapter 2. This assessment allows the ta rgeting process to re- enter the decide functi on, during which decisions about re-engaging targets oc cur. Assessment is a continuous process relate d to the individual tar- gets, not the fire support plan as a whole. The formal method used is combat assessment, which measures effectiveness of force employ- ment during military ope rations. It is composed of three elements: BDA, munitions effectiveness assessment, and reattack recommendations. Battle Damage Assessment Battle damage assessment gives a timely and accurate picture of the generated effect of fires on the enemy and aids in dete rmining if a reattack is necessary. The requirement for a reattack is determined during the de cide phase. While BDA is primarily an intelli gence respon sibility, it requires coordination with maneuver and opera- tional elements to be e ffective. In order to be effective, there are thr ee principles of BDA that must be followed:  The assessment must be important to the com- mander, not just easily measurable.  The assessment must be objective.  Ideally, the assessment c onsists of information from more than one collection asset. Battle damage assessment consists of three as- pects to the target:  Physical damage inflicted by such effects as blast, fragmentation, or fire.  Functional damage, whic h is the attempt to determine if and to what extent the target can still operate.  Assessment of the target system as a whole. Munitions Effectiveness Assessment The second of the three components that make up combat assessment is munitions effectiveness assessment. As the name suggests, it is simply an assessment of how well the designated munitions performed against the ta rget engaged. This FFIR is fed into the intelligence community as a means of determining how well a given weapon per- formed. It drives modifi cations or evolution of such things as weapon me thodology, tactics, and employment parameters. While the company commander ensures that the FST records and for- wards this portion of comb at assessment, it is not necessarily a portion of the fight at hand. Reattack Recommendation The reattack recommendation provides direct feedback into the targeting cycle. Using BDA and munitions effectiveness assessment, the CLIC and FST determine whethe r fires produced the desired effects. The recommendation should address the target’s cri tical elements, the target system, and enemy force strengths. This recom- mendation feeds the decide portion of the D3A process during which the commander makes the final decision regardin g effects produced and whether a reattack is necessary. Fire Support Coordination Fire Support Coordination at the Company Level The ability for the infant ry company to operate across a broad range of operations often includes EXAMPLE : Either a group or series created a suppressive effect to allow maneuver in a par- ticular phase of the operation or it did not. If not, then a recommendation regarding refinement, reattack, or a modification to the duration of the fires is required. EXAMPLE : The local job program is achieving success or it is not. If not, is more money re- quired, more security wanted, or more incentive for participation needed? --- Page 105 --- 5-12 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 the requirement to ope rate semi-independently with augmentation. In th ese circumstances or in situations specifically designated by HHQ, the infantry company may control and coordinate fires. This level of re sponsibility often entails personnel and equipment augmentation to the infantry company. One of the immediate demands on the infantry company employed in this manner is the require- ment of the FST to maintain situational aware- ness at all times through direct integration with the company COC watch process. The FST must be aware of and track the following:  The position of all fr iendly units to include those transiting through or operating in the company’s battlespace; this includes aviation.  BSG for all friendly uni ts across the bat- tlespace.  The location and status of all fire support assets.  Theater-specific issues, such as ROE, collateral damage estimate, avia tion SPINS and routing, and all Appendix 19 (Fire Support) of Annex C (Operations) products from HHQ that affect the company battlespace. If the infantry company is operating an FSCC, it must do more than safely deconflict fires. In addi- tion to its normal role, it now must monitor, man- age, use, and provide input into the following:  The fires plans of the HHQ, company, pla- toon, and others.  Attack guidance matrices.  Management and utiliza tion of the air tasking cycle to include airspace control order, air task order, and SPINS.  Collateral damage esti mate determination and management to include ROE use.  FSCM management.  Management of the locat ion and status of all fire support assets to ensure continuous cover- age of the battlespace to include such things as ammunition and fire capability status. Clearing Fires at the Company Level Fires clearance procedures at all levels follow the same principles. The following subparagraphs regarding the process of clearing fires emphasize the need for company comm anders to clearly and carefully consider who w ithin the company lead- ership is authorized to clear fires and under what circumstances he is authorized. Upon receiving a request for fire and based on a complete under- standing of the guidance for fires and the afore- mentioned requirements for controlling fires, the approving authority plots the target location, con- sults the attack guidance matrix, conducts neces- sary coordination, clear s fires, completes the mission, and conducts counterfire procedures. Plot the Target Location The FST must determine how the fires will affect such things as friendl y units, FSCMs, airspace coordinating measures, or collateral damage con- cerns. The effects of fires is based on consider- ations that include target location error, weapons effects radius, estimated miss distances, and probability of incapacitation radius. Consult the Attack Guidance Matrix The FST consults the at tack guidance matrix or similar tool to ensure that the correct fire support platforms engage the correct types of targets. Clearance personnel mu st understand the attack guidance matrix and the methodology and assumptions used to create the document. Conduct Necessary Coordination The FST coordinates wi th lower, adjacent, higher, HN, or other ag encies, depending on the asset used and the mission’s specific require- ments. Only a complete understanding of the operational environment will ensure that the FST contacts the correct agencies through the correct channels with the correct information. --- Page 106 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 5-13 Clear Fires Decisions to approve, m odify, or deny fires involve numerous cons iderations. Only upon completion of all other steps and an analysis of the decision does the ap proving authority make its decision to approve, modify, or deny. Complete the Mission Fires clearance is not complete merely upon delivery of the first rounds on target. Refinements of fires, friendly mane uver, enemy action, and unexpected movements of civilians are actions that may cause any given mission to be denied or modified at any point during execution. Indeed, previously denied fire missions might receive approval depending on ch anging battlefield con- ditions, such as evacuation of civilians near the engagement. Approval authority must continue to monitor execution, record BDA, and disseminate information as appropriate in order to maintain control of fires. Conduct Counterfire Procedures Due to the automation of both incoming and out- going fires detection, count erbattery fires present unique considerations. These considerations do not supersede standard fires clearance proce- dures. In operations or theaters with significant ROE and collateral damage estimate limitations, the chief consideration will be clearing the enemy’s point of or igin—normally not under friendly observation. The company commander dictates the level of risk that is acceptable in con- ducting counterbattery fi re and includes proper guidance in the instructions to the company COC and FST. Information Operations While IO are not new to warfare and conflict, the ability of current and futu re technology to gener- ate, organize, and disseminate information results in information being a deci sive factor in today’s operational environment. Information operations are those things that a company does, both offen- sively and defensively, to protect its own infor- mation and to gain an advantage in the IE in order to create a positive effect in the operational environment. They are n onlethal fires delivered in support of the comp any commander’s scheme of maneuver and, therefor e, are nested and syn- chronized and contribute to the commander’s end state. Official definitions are provided in JP 1-02; MCRP 5-12C; and Secret ary of Defense Memo- randum 12401-10, Strategic Communication and Information Operations in the DOD. Information operations employment at the com- pany level primarily focuses on influencing and informing local target audiences, including adver- sary decisionmakers. The ability of the infantry company to conduct daily personal interaction with the audience is often the company’s greatest contribution to IO. Co mpany commanders must endeavor to inculcate the company with an under- standing of this impact. They should ensure that all Marines not only receive necessary training and messages in order to support the company’s IO concept, but also un derstand that operations occur under the constant scrutiny of a globalized media. The PCCs and PCIs should include current IO messages. What the individual Marine does or fails to do, good and bad, directly impacts IO. Planning of IO follows the top-down planning, bottom-up refinement philosophy. Accordingly, the FST assists company commanders in devel- oping and employing botto m-up IO that reflect local conditions nested wi thin top-down national and regional messages. Information operations rely upon decentralized development and imple- mentation. Decentralizatio n facilitates flexibility and initiative at the company level and allows closer integration with the company com- mander’s CONOPS while remaining consistent with strategic level messages. Information Operations Capabilities Information operations is not a discrete, stand- alone capability but is the integrated and coor- dinated, application of all information-related --- Page 107 --- 5-14 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 capabilities (IRC), both organic and nonorganic, to affect the decisionmakin g of adversaries and potential adversaries thereby creating an op- erational advantage. A number of discrete ca- pabilities (e.g., PA, cyberspace operations, COMCAM, space operations, MISO, special technical operations) and activities (e.g. operations security [OPSEC], military deception [MILDEC]) exist as specialty capabilities each with their own unique attributes. However, IO is not sy nonymous with these indi- vidual discrete capabilit ies or activities; much like fire support is not synonymous with artillery or aviation. As with tr aditional supporting arms assets that are applie d with a combined arms approach, the focus of IO is on integrating IRCs with all other capabilities in a way that best sup- ports the commander’s decisionmaking, the actions of subordinates , and mission accomplish- ment. More art than science, IO is focused on the human mind and seeks to influence behaviors to produce operationa l advantages. In many cases, operations that the co mpany performs may be heavily focused on influencing the adversary with information-related ca pabilities supported by kinetic actions. Computer Network Operations Computer network opera tions include both the offensive and defensive ca pability to attack and defend computer networks. Computer network attack and computer network exploitation address strategic assets that provi de an offensive capabil- ity against enemy comput er networks. Computer network defense focuses on agencies and pro- cesses that protect fr iendly computer networks from disruption and in trusion. Computer net- work operations commonly go unnoticed by com- pany staffs due to thei r highly sensitive nature and are coordinated by HHQ. Electronic Warfare Dedicated EW platforms within the EW commu- nity generally execute offensive and defensive activities. The EW community also provides varying levels of support to other commands. The three types of EW are electronic attack, electronic protection, and EW support. Electronic attack is a form of fires and receives the same considerations in planning and coordina- tion. Normally delivered by air platforms, it can support company operations by conducting tacti- cal jamming to deny or degrade enemy communi- cation capabilities and can help isolate company objectives. Certain electronic attack capabilities and operations can also support static and mobile FP missions. Electronic protection addresses electronic coun- termeasures and other pr ocedures that ensure continued company use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite enemy EW activities. The com- pany commander must give special attention to the types of electronic countermeasures employed by the company in relatio n to those employed by other Services and coali tion partners operating in the company’s battlespace to ensure deconflic- tion. The FST should coordinate frequency and spectrum deconfliction with HHQ’s EW officer. Infantry companies normally interface with EW support in the intelligen ce collection capacity. Electronic warfare community units, such as the radio battalion or other joint SIGINT collection assets, can provide sup port to company opera- tions with an ability to sear ch for, intercept, iden- tify, and locate or localize sources of intentionally and unintentionally radiated electro- magnetic energy, such as cell phones or wireless command detonation de vices. This capability enables the company to conduct immediate enemy threat recognition, targeting, and planning as well as to provide intelligence input into future operations (see MCWP 3-40.5, Electronic War- fare, for more information). Operations Security Operations security is the continuous action of analyzing friendly information and actions, deter- mining how the enemy ma y exploit vulnerabili- ties, and mitigating friendly activities accordingly. --- Page 108 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 5-15 From personnel releasi ng inappropriate informa- tion in e-mails to patrol s establishing predictable patterns, good OPSEC at the company level seeks to reduce the enemy’s ab ility to harm friendly forces by identifying friendly weaknesses early. The root of good OPSEC is discipline and avoid- ance of complacency. Company commanders must ensure that basic measures, such as adhering to communications plans, varying patrol routes and departure times, and self-censoring personal communications, become an integral part of the company’s thought patterns in order to avoid offering the enemy an easy target. Companies should ensure that thei r internal OPSEC nests properly with the HHQ O PSEC plan, to include close coordination with deception operations, to ensure their success. Ch apter 12 provides further information on OPSEC. Military Information Support Operations Currently, the Marine Corps possesses an organic MISO dissemination capability of three to four MISO detachments to support MISO. United States Army MISO team s may also support tacti- cal dissemination. Whether or not a MISO team is with them, infantry companies often support MISO. Company tactical operations, such as patrols, often provide a MISO campaign the mechanism with which to influence and persuade the target audience’s attitude and behavior. On patrol, a company’s Marines communicate approved messages (or ta lking points); dissemi- nate MISO products, such as leaflets, posters, or handbills; and conduct f ace-to-face interaction with the populace. In today’s IE, even MISO con- ducted at the company level can have strategic effects. Tactical MISO teams occasionally aug- ment rifle companies, but company commanders and their FSTs should expe ct to request these types of assets specifically when needed. Military Deception Military deception is highly sensitive in nature and executed via specific authorities, normally residing at the general officer level. Tactical deception occurs at the company level and requires careful planni ng and integration with OPSEC and detailed co ordination with HHQ MILDEC plans to produce the desired effect. Tactical deception plants seeds of doubt, disrupt- ing the enemy’s decisionmaking process and mis- leading the enemy regardin g friendly intentions. Objectives of the comp any’s deception plan can be to cause the enemy to draw false assumptions regarding force dispositio n, time and location of attack, or focus of the main effort. Public Affairs Public affairs can be particularly useful to the infantry company rega rding media engagement and dissemination of truthful, accurate informa- tion to foreign and dom estic audiences. Public affairs and IO ultimately support the dissemina- tion of information; howe ver, an important dis- tinction is that IO se eks to influence a target audience, while the purpose of PA is to inform a global media, a global audience, and counter enemy propaganda. This distinction is key when implementing these assets into the IO plan; more- over, PA personnel will li kely resist placement under the “IO umbrella” as it may compromise their legitimacy. Comp any commanders should use PA to publish accurat e information in order to counter enemy misinformation and disinforma- tion. Preplanned press releases, statements, and talking points should complement all operations. Combat Camera Combat camera can be useful to the infantry com- pany by capturing both video and still images of operations and engagement for historical docu- mentation as well as supporting imagery require- ments of other activities. Combat camera supports the commander’s imager y requirements and pro- duces timely products supporting the com- mander’s intent and mission objectives. Complete access to areas of operati ons and timely exploita- tion of collected imagery are key to COMCAM success. The COMCAM Marines support the commander’s situational awareness, IO, PA, and --- Page 109 --- 5-16 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 CMO objectives to include ISR, BDA, MILDEC, legal, and history functions. Civil-Military Operations Civil-military operations, by their nature, usu- ally affect public perceptions in their immediate locale. Using PA and MISO to disseminate infor- mation about CMO efforts and results can affect the perceptions of a broader audience and favor- ably influence key groups or individuals. Com- pany commanders should take an active interest in ensuring target audiences receive constant information on the activit ies, efforts, and posi- tive actions of the co mpany or company-sup- ported operations. Information Operations and Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess Information operations, ta rgeting, fires, and employment of IRCs foll ow the D3A targeting process (see fig. 5-2). The results of the infor- mation IPB analysis pr ovide the FST with the preliminary informati on on how IO can support the company’s mission and offer possible targets. The development of IRC employment follows the same methodology as th at of lethal fires. Employment and use of IRCs are included within the development of the company fire plan and EFSTs. Possible target s receive task, purpose, method, and effect anal ysis and development. Information operations fires requirements and capabilities are includ ed in the intelligence collection plan. Inclusi on of IRCs within the company fires plan adds maturity and depth to that plan in two ways: by accounting for the second and third order effects of lethal fires and by placing lethal fires in context through synchronization of IO effects with lethal engagement. The information IPB results provide the input for the development of targets, their task and pur- pose, and their contribution to the company’s End state Intermediate goals Who/how/when/where Decide Command engagement Religious engagement Direct communications Radio Print Persuade Deter Convince Empower Confuse Co-opt Lethal means MISO CERP CMO TV Deliver DetectAssess HVTs Insurgents Social groups Religions Sects Political groups Militias Neighborhoods Ethnicity Language Temperament Attitudes Perceptions Rumors Hostile actions Tips Insurgent activity Request for assistance MethodsMeans Legend: CERP - commander’s emergency response program TV - television Figure 5-2. Information Operations/D3A Targeting Cycle. --- Page 110 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 5-17 mission (see table 5-2 and fig. 5-3). Within the decide function of D3A, the FST continues plan- ning to include determining which targets to pros- ecute, coordinating w ith HHQ and IRC assets on nominated targets, and including those targets in the intelligence collectio n plan. A key challenge to the FST during the deci de function is marshal- ling, requesting, and inte grating the many vari- ous IRC assets and methods to achieve the assigned purposes. This task becomes increasingly more difficult as the size and complexity of a com- pany’s assigned battlespace grows. Another chal- lenge will be seeking to synchronize integrated IO efforts with lethal fires. In many instances, it is far easier to designate and pr osecute a lethal target than a target in support of an IO objective. Com- pany commanders must guard against any tenden- cies to neglect IO beca use it appears difficult. They must consider augmenting the company FST with IO personnel when conducting operations in an IO-demanding environment. Detecting targets that support IO objectives can be more difficult than detec ting lethal targets due to the requirement to use multiple organic and nonor- ganic sensors to develop a picture of the target. Therefore, it will require more work on the part of the FST and company in telligence specialist to Key leader engagement Media Broadcasts Table 5-2. Information Operations Essential Fire Support Task Example. Task: Decrease public support to enemy in Gonsol Village Purpose: Deny enemy sanctuary and freedom of movement in Alpha Co AO Method: Decide Detect Deliver Assess TGT set TGT LOC Asset Task Purpose Method When MOE Gonsol Village Mohammed Ishmail Gonsol Village EMT Influence local lead- ership to support Alpha Co operations Legitimize Alpha Co’s presence in Gonsol Village Radio broadcast/KLE TBD Public display of support and participation in Alpha Co operations Local religious leaders Mullah Sadik Gonsol Village Alpha Co Cdr Engage to report enemy activity in Gonsol Prevent enemy collection efforts KLE TBD Increase in intelligence on enemy activity Effect: Enemy influence on local population reduced Legend Co company Cdr commander EMT expeditionary military information support operations team KLE key leader engagement LOC location TBD to be determined TGT target Figure 5-3. Key Leader Engagement. --- Page 111 --- 5-18 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 determine an appropriate target within a group of tribal elders than it wi ll to place a scout sniper team in overwatch of a road intersection upon which enemy artillery assets may pass. Therefore, the FST must closely wo rk with the company intelligence specialist to ensure that IO require- ments are coherent, tracked, and properly detailed. Like the assessment of lethal fires, the assessment of IO efforts allows the targeting process to re- enter the D3A decide function during which deci- sions about re-engaging existing targets and prose- cuting new targets occur. The assessment of IO efforts is continuous. The assessment of nonlethal fires uses MOEs vice BDA and munitions effec- tiveness assessment (see chap. 2 for a full discus- sion of MOE methodology). Since IO assessments rely on both qualitative and quantitative data, company commanders ensure that feedback and assessment on the effects of IO efforts in the bat- tlespace occur with all company operations. For IO effort assessments to have value, it is impor- tant that the FST focus on the actual impacts of the IO effort vice the qua lity or quantity of the IO effort itself. The FST mu st also understand that establishing direct cause and effect relationships between IO efforts and responses in the IE is diffi- cult and can lead to erroneous interpretations. The best guard against such erro rs is to fully integrate IO within all company op erations as part of a holistic approach to success and not a single effort of its own. The following are possible methods of assessing IO effects:  External assets, such as CI, HUMINT, and human environment team s; special operations forces; civil affairs and MISO teams; and other interagency organizations.  District stabilization framework reports that also provide understanding of the sources of conflict to enable more structured and effective targeting.  Key leadership engagement reports.  Patrol debriefs, most especially those portions detailing atmospherics (see chap. 4 for dis- cussion of tasking patrols with collection requirements). Information Operations Execution The company FST integrates IO with maneuver operations to produce eff ects in their AO. Execu- tion of IO efforts, like all fires, must occur within the construct of combined arms. Information oper- ations efforts alone will fail unless combined with maneuver (action). Along with the numerous non- organic assets that may be available, the platoons and squads of the infant ry company represent the single best agents of IO because of their daily, face-to-face contact with the local populace. Both lethal and nonlethal fires are essential in cre- ating effects on the battlefield that will support the infantry company’s maneuver operations. The IE is an important and often decisive portion of the battlespace that needs to be understood and posi- tively influenced to achieve success. Employment of IO occurs within the combined arms paradigm, through organic and nonorgan ic capabilities and assets, and as an integrative tool that the company commander uses to addre ss information concerns in the operational environment. Influence of the Individual All actions can have IO implications. Every action or inaction can be broadcast immediately and have immediate stra tegic impact. Individual company personnel possess a face-to-face level of access that senior personnel do not have; the actions of junior Marines who are actually in con- tact with the local popu lace will normally have more of an impact in shaping the attitude of the --- Page 112 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 5-19 local populace toward fr iendly forces than IO messages developed by HHQ. Whether it is a conversation with the locals or a firefight with the enemy, individual Marines manage perceptions and can be the best weap ons or the worst liabili- ties of the IO effort. The company must ensure that company personnel understand the messages (talking points) associat ed with every operation: Who is the audience? What are the effects friendly forces are trying to achieve? How are those effects measured? Whether providing security for new school con- struction or assaulting a hill against a conven- tional enemy, Marines should be equipped to articulate what they did and why they are there. Proper execution depends on proper planning. The FST needs to consider the message, the messen- ger, and the medium used to deliver that message. Note: It is important for the members of the infantry company to understand the IE and consider the various methods and media they can use to support IO objectives. Influence of the Company Commander The responsibility for proper and effective IRC support across the compan y rests with the com- pany commander. The company commander should institute an IO training and education regi- men as soon as possible. Due to time and training constraints, linking IO into other training opportu- nities is an efficient way of conducting simultane- ous training actions. Whet her in the gas chamber or conducting nonlive fire squad attacks, Marines can receive and practice IO messages regarding what they are doing, w hy they are doing it, and how their actions contribute to the success of the operation. Similarly, the company commander must ensure the FST receives comprehensive and proper IO training for pl anning and executing all types of lethal and nonlethal fires. Hearts and Minds Winning hearts and minds does not necessarily mean being liked. Rath er, the term “hearts” means convincing the populat ion that the success of friendly forces is in their long-term best inter- est. Similarly, the term “minds” means convinc- ing the population of the eventual victory of friendly forces. In conjunc tion with IO fires, the infantry company best wins hearts and minds by establishing relationships and trusted networks. The principal emotive co ntent is respect, not affection, with the inte nt to promote trust and confidence that eventually can lead to greater intelligence collection. Nesting Command Messages In the same way that pr oper planning effectively nests both task and purpose horizontally (adjacent units) and verti cally (higher to subordinates), the company ensures that th eir messages are appro- priately nested. When s eeking to add specificity to HHQ messages for the local environment, the company commander and FST need to under- stand the amount of latit ude they may or may not have and the request pr ocess required to modify messages originating from HHQ. Further, compa- nies must coordinate messages (and modifica- tions) with adjacent units to avoid “information fratricide,” especially wh en friendly units share population groups. Publicity of Enemy Violence and Use of Terror The enemy’s use of viol ence, terror, intimida- tion, and other actions should receive appropriate publicity to discredit th em and deleg itimize their actions. Their disregard fo r civilian losses should also be exploited. Accu rate reporting of enemy actions carries the weight of legitimacy, so exag- gerations or rumors should be avoided. At the same time, successes of friendly units (to include --- Page 113 --- 5-20 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 HNSF) should be highlighted and positive results reinforced. Proper employment and integration of a combat camera capability with PA or MISO can help disseminate accurate and truthful informa- tion and influence and inform audiences. Quick Response to Enemy Propaganda When facing enemy forces that are widely dis- seminated and decentralized, the infantry com- pany faces challenges in responding to enemy propaganda as fast as it may appear. Delayed responses can let the en emy story receive wide- spread attention and acceptance, achieving enemy propaganda victory or ev en dominance of the IE. Company commanders, th eir FSTs, and those involved in the IO effo rt can do the following things to counter the en emy’s potential ability to spread propaganda quickly:  Develop preplanned, preapproved, and prepub- lished products that co unter most likely enemy actions, such as innocent civilian casualties due to an IED and intimidation attempts.  Develop internal comp any COC and FST bat- tle drills to rapidly initiate IO requests to HHQ.  Work with HHQ IO staffs and approval author- ity to streamline request and approval pro- cesses and to develop best practices, which ensure timely approval of new IO messages.  Inculcate members of the company with an IO mindset so that IO temp o is generated through information push to the company FST and COC vice information pull from the company FST and COC. EXAMPLE: The company COC receives reporting from 1st Platoon that they have just come upon a village where two teenage males have received injuries inflicted by the enemy for not being able to pay money during an attempted “shake down.” Looking to exploit the situation, the company COC instructs the platoon to provide medical care to the injured persons, ensuring that they take pictures of the treatment. They also advise the platoon commander to conduct a leader engagement with the local village elders, emphasizing the company’s commitment to the populace, and get further details of any other injustices done to memb ers of their village. The company also requests a follow-up engagement for a later date between the village and a civil affairs team. The company FST forwards the information (with interview details and pictures) to HHQ to produce psychological products (condemning the enemy acts of injustice) and provide information for public affairs press releases. The company commander uses the same information to prompt other respected leadership in the area of operations to denounce such actions via local ra dio broadcasts con-ducted each day at the forward operating base. EXAMPLE : Bravo Company’s mission is to clear village X, a village abandoned by its local population and occupied by only the enemy. The company intelligence specialist and CLIC confirmed this information through multiple sources. The FST, CLIC, and company command er know that the enemy consistently conducts false reporting and exaggerates civilian casualties to delegitimi ze friendly forces in the eyes of the local population. Anticipating that the enemy will attempt to do the same during the upcoming operation, the FST develops an IO EFST that addresses this likely enemy action: TASK: Highlight the lack of noncombatants in village X. PURPOSE: To deny the enemy the ability to accuse friendly forces of causing civilian casualties. The FST determines that they will r equest and integrate a combat camera team into the operation. The team will document the abandoned village using still and vid eo imagery and conduct recorded interviews with civic and tribal leadership of the displaced civilian populatio n, confirming they had fled the village and that it was in enemy hands. By synchronizing IO with company operation, by understanding enemy patterns, and by coordinating with HHQ in advance, Bravo Company can quickly respond and defeat any enemy propaganda attempt to discredit friendly forces. --- Page 114 --- CHAPTER 6 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS This chapter discusses the basic principles employed at the company level to gain contact with and attack the enemy. It includes the tactics and techniques used by the company commander when applying the princi ples of offensive com- bat. Various other publications, located in the ref- erences of this publicati on, offer guidance on the special considerations applying to warfare in jun- gle, deserts, and mounta ins, which this chapter does not address. Purpose of the Offense Among the three types of operations—offense, defense, and st ability—the offense provides the means of decision and that is why, as illustrated in figure 6-1, it is inherent to every possible oper- ation. In defensive op erations, the preplanned counterattack can serve to decisively defeat the enemy’s assault. In st ability operations, the offense results in aggressively pushing HA out into the community vice waiting for the populace to try and make their way to aid stations. Offensive operations seize the initiative and dic- tate tempo. They provi de freedom of maneuver and action while massing fires to achieve goals. Offensive operations focus on the enemy, the situation, and the proble m, but not seizure of terrain, occupation of fac ilities, or distribution of resources. The spirit of the offense demands that company commanders take every opportu- nity to dictate the term s of engagement by seiz- ing the initiative throug h offensive action. In sum, the offense allows company commanders to impose their will upon the enemy, the situa- tion, and the problem. Marine Corps Planning Process in Offensive Operations As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, the company commander uses an abbreviated version of MCPP appropriate to the time and resource limitations typical to an infantry company. The company commander must take the many products, for- mats, orders, and guidance received from HHQ; discern the miss ion through the design and prob- lem framing processes; a nd translate it into lan- guage relevant to the tr aining and experience of platoon commanders and squad leaders. The fol- lowing list represents the recommended thought, planning, and orders process for the offensive operations at the company level:  Understand the environm ent and the nature of the problem, the decisive point, and what must be achieved at that po int to accomplish the mission (problem framing) using the com- pany’s task and purpose received from HHQ.  Determine a concept for the main effort and the supporting efforts necessary to place the Joint Campaigns (Overseas) Defense Stability Offense Offense Stability Defense Defense Stability Offense Figure 6-1. The Offense Across a Range of Military Operations. --- Page 115 --- 6-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 main effort at the po int of decision (problem framing and COA development).  Create the task and purpose of the main and supporting efforts by dete rmining the essential tasks of each (COA development).  Task-organize combat power and resources to meet the needs of th e main and supporting efforts (COA development).  Assign command and control, such as platoon commanders and squad leaders, to the task- organized units making up the main and sup- porting efforts (COA development).  Establish control measur es to clarify and sup- port the operation (COA development).  Verify, using MCPP as a means of testing the concept, that the main effort is sufficiently weighted to accomplish the mission and that the mission of the main effort accomplishes the mission of the company (COA wargaming, COA comparison, COA decision).  Complete the movement, intelligence collec- tion, fires, logistic, and contingency (time per- mitting) plans (orders development). Characteristics of Offensive Operations Within the three operational areas in a range of military operations, there are four characteristics that apply to a ll offensive opera tions—surprise, concentration, controlling tempo, and audacity. Surprising the enemy di srupts his ability to respond effectively, induces psychological shock, confuses or overloads C2 systems, and reduces his defense coherence. Company commanders achieve surprise by—  Estimating the enemy commander’s intent and denying him the ability to gain situational awareness.  Attacking the enemy at a time and place he does not expect in a manner for which he is unprepared.  Acting in a bold and unpredictable manner. Concentration is mass ing the overwhelming effects of combat pow er and resources to achieve a single purpose. The art of concentra- tion is the company comma nder’s success in bal- ancing the defensive requirements of dispersion while ensuring the massing of fires at the proper time and place. In order to retain the initiative, the offense seeks to control tempo. All actions that seek to allow friendly forces to cycle through the OODA— observe, orient, decide, act—loop (see fig. 6-2) decision process more qui ckly than the speed of events or of a particular enemy contribute to con- trolling or dictating the tempo of the engagement and problem management. Audacity is a simple pl an of action, boldly exe- cuted, that inspires su bordinates to overcome adversity and danger. Company commanders apply audacity by developi ng bold and inventive plans that produce real results. They temper bold- ness and ruthlessness with strong leadership and sound judgment. They understand not only the difference between acceptable risk and foolhardi- ness, but also that a good plan executed now is better than the perfect plan executed too late. Orient Observe Act Decide Figure 6-2. The Observe, Orient, Decide, Act Loop. --- Page 116 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 6-3 Fundamentals of Offensive Operations While the characteristics of offensive operations are generalities, the fundamentals of offensive operations are the rule s that evolved as com- manders applied th e principles of war to accom- plish offensive missions. The fundamentals do not replace the principles of war; rather, they reflect general truisms resulting from the applica- tion of the principles to maneuver warfare doc- trine, task-organization capabilities, and a range of military operations. Orient on the Enemy Orienting on the enemy is the cornerstone of Marine Corps doctrine . The purpose of the offense is to use decisi ve action to force the enemy to react; it follows that the key to con- ducting offensive actions in the battlespace relies upon focusing those actions on influencing whatever entity constitute s the threat facing the infantry company. Such things as terrain, in- frastructure, or environm ent are not the focus of the offense, but become goals and objectives if they serve to enforce the commander’s will on the enemy. Gain and Maintain Contact In order to employ the offense as the decisive action in defeating an en emy or satisfying a cer- tain problem set, constant contact with the enemy or situation is critical. In order to seize or retain the initiative, company commanders must firmly grasp and understand the situation at hand. Whether pursuing a retreating enemy or arriving in the midst of humanita rian crisis, the company must gain contac t in order to de velop the situa- tion. Once in contact, th at contact must continue in order to deliver a stead y stream of intelligence on the enemy or situation, limit friendly vulnera- bility to surprise or unacceptable risk, and retain the initiative. Develop the Situation Developing the situation is an approach to resolv- ing complex problems and situations. It is both a philosophy and a method that seeks to take advantage of time available, experience, observa- tion, and other inputs to build understanding of the situation at hand. As commanders build this context, they recognize patterns, discern COAs, and take offensive action to positively influence the future. Concentrate Superior Firepower at the Decisive Time and Place Successful offensive action requires the massing of superior combat power, resources, or fires at the decisive place and time and the rapid applica- tion of this power to destroy the enemy or resolve the problem. Using fire and maneuver, avoiding the culminating point through maintenance of momentum, and developing the situation continu- ally are methods by which the company com- mander masses at the decisive point. Achieve Surprise Surprise is a fundamental of the offense in that it lays the foundation for su ccessful decisive action by paralyzing, delaying, or disrupting the threat’s ability to react effectively and coherently. Exploit Known Enemy Weaknesses Maneuver warfare doctrine is based on identifica- tion and aggressive exploitation of critical enemy vulnerabilities while avoiding enemy strengths. In a broader sense, company commanders resolve the situation or tactic al problem by seeking to gain the greatest advant age or resolution at the least cost. Whether expl oiting an enemy flank or an opportunity to develop common ground with a village population in order to overcome local opposition to establishi ng a refugee resettlement camp, the principle and requirements of com- manders are the same: a basic understanding of --- Page 117 --- 6-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 the situation and a fluid mindset to exploit known enemy weaknesses with maximum speed. Com- pany commanders must not hesitate to exploit weaknesses and opportunities. Seize or Control Key Terrain The successful accomplishment of the offensive mission across a range of military operations is often dependent upon the early control or neutral- ization of key terrain as identified during the IPB process (see chap. 4). The mere possession or dominance of key terrain, whether physical terrain or the human environment, is irrelevant unless exploited accordingly—t o the detriment and defeat of the enemy and to establish the conditions for further success and mission accomplishment. Gain and Maintain the Initiative A paramount objective of the commander in the offense is to seize and retain the initiative. By taking the initiative, company commanders dic- tate the terms of the battle or the resolution of the problem while forcing th reats to react on the commanders’ terms. Thr ough seizing and retain- ing the initiative, the fr iendly force imposes its will upon the problem and upon the enemy. Neutralize the Enemy’s Ability to React Company commanders must endeavor to disrupt and neutralize negative effects on the mission. While this effort applie s to both the enemy’s capability to react to the commander’s tactical dispositions and to maneuver, it also requires sig- nificant risk assessment and appreciation of con- sequences, including second and third order effects, in stability-related operations. Isolation of the battlefield and destru ction of or interference with enemy support an d reinforcement actions reduce their responsiv eness, mitigate risk, enhance the security of fr iendly forces, and assist in gaining and retaining the initiative. Under- standing the role of stakeholders, establishing effective feedback mechanisms, and leveraging local civic leadership increase the likelihood of success while protecting the force. Advance by Fire and Maneuver Fires (lethal, n onlethal, or both) without maneu- ver do not provide decisi ve results. Attempting maneuver without fires invites destruction or fail- ure. Fire and maneuver characterize the infantry company’s offensive actions. The company com- mander uses fire and maneuver to create a pre- ponderance of combat power and effects at the decisive point. Maintain Momentum Maintaining momentum is establishing a consis- tently higher operating tempo than the enemy or situation. In offensive actions, the company com- mander seeks to avoid or mitigate the culminating point—that point at whic h logistics, fatigue, or the enemy stops the attack or offense. When plan- ning, the company commander considers friendly weaknesses; mitigates th em; and, once in con- tact, makes every effort to gain and maintain momentum until securing the objective or achiev- ing the goal. Establishi ng a sustainable battle rhythm is essential to maintaining momentum and avoiding the culmination point in steady state and dynamic operations. Fl exibility and speed in the employment of combat power and resources are essential, but not at the cost of competency and efficiency. Act Quickly Speed is a weapon and a function of momentum. When acting quickly, the infantry company seeks to act and move faster than the enemy does. The ability to do so not only enables the offensive action to impose the co mmander’s will on the enemy, but also mitigate s risk and exposure of friendly forces to the reaction of the enemy. Exploit Success Because combat power and the ability to affect positive change on a give n problem are relative, commanders exploit any information, tactical success, advantage, or opportunity that accrues --- Page 118 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 6-5 during offensive action to generate a greater effect than merely that of local success. Upon achieving superiority at the decisive time and place, the company commander must be prepared to exploit success by avoiding the culminating point and leveraging un expected opportunities that present themselves . Speed of action, pre- planned pursuit and re supply, possession of a reserve of combat power and resources, and simi- lar measures aid exploitation. Be Flexible Flexibility is essential to the infantry company’s ability to adapt successf ully to changing battle- field conditions. Because the enemy exercises independent will and the company commander can never have complete knowledge of the battle- field, the plans and acti ons of offensive action must take into accoun t contingencies through simple, loosely coupled plans. Be Aggressive As the agent of decisive action, the offense is inherently aggressive and focused on the ener- getic pursuit of victory. Aggressive action is not the same as rash or reckless action; rather, it is characterized by bold in itiative, speed and endur- ance, and the willingness to succeed in the face of hardship, unexpected ob stacles, and the chal- lenge of facing an independent will. Provide for the Security of the Force Force protection is a warfighting function and the defense of the operational area is inherent to all activities across a range of military operations. Security is necessary whet her a force is in garri- son, moving, participating in security operations in permissive or hos tile environments, or in active combat. All units are responsible for their own security, regardless of the security provided by other units. Types of Offensive Operations There are four general types of offensive op- erations—movement to contact, attack, ex- ploitation, and pursuit. Though described in a logical or notional sequence, these operations may occur in any order or si multaneously throughout the battlefield (see fig. 6-3). A movement to contact may be so successful that it immediately leads to exploitation or an attack may lead directly to pursuit. Movement to Contact Movement to contact is an offensive operation conducted to develop the situation and to gain or maintain contact. A properly executed movement to contact allows the commander to make initial contact with minimum forc es and to expedite the Pursuit Movement to contact Attack Exploitation Figure 6-3. Types of Offensive Operations. --- Page 119 --- 6-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 employment and concentration of the force and resources whether within a combat or stability environment. It also creates favorable conditions for subsequent actions. Companies executing this task use the smallest fo rce possible to make con- tact and develop the situation. On contact, com- pany commanders have five options: take offensive action, take defensive action, bypass, delay, or withdraw. Th ey may use any means of transportation, but genera lly adopt some form of march column formatio n and organization (see fig. 6-4). Planning a ma rch requires significant preparations and attention to detail to ensure the movement takes place w ith minimum confusion and delay. At a minimum, a movement to contact consists of a security element (advan ce and rear guard) and the main body. Depending on METT-T, company commanders may place add itional security with each column or element and may use flank and rear security to screen the main body. For exam- ple, the commander of the main body element may choose to put a smal l “point element” for- ward to provide additional security for the main body and serve as a conn ecting file with the advance guard. In planning movements to contact, the company commander should consider—  Rapid movement.  All-around security.  Ease of control.  Direct control of the main body, which nor- mally is the decisive element.  Possibility of multiple teams finding the enemy.  Decision points and criteria for committing the main body. Within the overall OPOR D addressing the task and purpose of the movement to contact, com- pany commanders devote substantial effort to such things as the manner in which the movement will occur, the relationships between elements, and movement contingencies. The march order should consist of detailed instructions regarding route, destination, schedule, rate of march, forma- tion, and other control measures not covered by the unit’s SOP. When possible, these instructions are augmented with overlays, maps, march tables, and similar products. Movements to contact oc cur as either approach marches or search and a ttacks. Depending on the mission, companies may seek to engage and destroy an enemy or approach an AO in support of stability operations. They could use either method or a combination of the two. Approach March Company commanders choose the approach march method of conducti ng a movement to con- tact when the location of the threat, unstable situ- ation, or other conf lict is roughly known. Companies using an approach march do not wan- der around the battlespace; rather, they move for- ward aggressively along a route to the place of most likely contact. The company commander assumes that contact with an enemy is imminent. Units in the main body are task-organized and tactically grouped Advance Force Rear security Main body Flank security Flank security Figure 6-4. Movement to Contact. --- Page 120 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 6-7 for immediate deployment from the march col- umn. Mission-related co nsiderations outweigh other concerns and company commanders may choose to deploy the company into formations less efficient to movement than a tactical col- umn. Similar to other types of marches, the approach march is generally organized into an advance guard that provides forward security and reconnaissance as it seeks out the enemy or moves into an uncertain or chaotic situation, a main body from which deci sive action maneuver and action originates, and a rear guard that pro- vides security to the rear. The advance guard, which is normally a rifle pla- toon for a company-sized movement, is a security detachment that precede s the main body in order to provide forward security and reconnaissance. Divided into a point elem ent, an advance party, and a support element, the advance guard must possess enough combat power not only to seek out the enemy, but also to prevent an enemy or chaotic situation from enga ging or involving the main body until the co mpany commander wishes to commit that decisive element. The main body is the d ecisive element in the approach march. When encountering an enemy or reaching the destination for further operations, the advance guard deploys, reports, and develops the situation. The company commander forms and decides upon a COA and then uses the main body to execute that pl an. The main body con- tains the bulk of the company’s combat power and resources. From those resources, the main effort and any other supporting efforts are drawn. During movement, the ma in body groups itself tactically along the assigned route, generally forming a tactical column. The main body pro- vides its own flank security. The rear guard is a security detachment that fol- lows the main body in orde r to protect the rear of the movement. Normally consisting of a single squad, the rear guard is organized and tasked sim- ilarly to the advance guard. A fire team-sized rear point provides security and early warning of enemy threats. The rest of its parent squad forms the rear party that supports the rear point if neces- sary and delays enemy a ttacks until support from the main body arrives. The rear guard provides its own flank security. While conducting the approach march, the nature of the mission dictates speed, formation, and other variables. While th e purpose of the opera- tion is to gain and ma intain contact, company commanders should not let caution so slow the approach march that the enemy can avoid contact, dictate contact, or allo w unstable situations to worsen significantly. Similarly, company com- manders should not move so fast that their movement loses cohesion, blunders into un- expected threat situatio ns, or becomes unable to mass fires at the point of decision. As expected from offensive action, the ideal solution is to move aggressively, rely ing on good security and reconnaissance, and to find the enemy or deter- mine the threat situation first, thereby allowing the company to deploy as it pleases on ground of its choosing to resolve the problem when desired. Each major subdivisio n of the march column establishes security det achments that protect the flanks of the unit while on the march. Flank guards engage the enemy as required in order to prevent exposure of the company. The use of security elements and temporary OPs/ listening posts (LPs) ensu res security of the main body during halts. Flank guards occupy blocking positions located on tactically key terrain. Contact between the various elements of the tacti- cal march column is the responsibility of the senior unit. The main body is responsible for maintaining contact with the advance guard and rear guard in the same way that the support ele- ment of the advance gua rd is responsible for maintaining contact with the advance party. A battalion-sized moveme nt to contact may use a rifle company employed as the advance guard or as part of the main body. Regardless, the general considerations and missions of the ele- ments remain the same and company comman- ders plan accordingly. --- Page 121 --- 6-8 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Search and Attack While the approach marc h is a relatively direct method of movement to contact, infantry compa- nies employ the search and attack method when the location of the threat , unstable situation, or source of conflict is in an unknown location within a general area . A company commander employs this form of movement to contact when the enemy is operating as small, dispersed ele- ments, when the task is to deny the enemy the ability to operate in the battlespace, or when the company seeks to furthe r develop the situation within a given area. Some examples of search and attack situations are—  Protect the force. The enemy is prevented from massing for an at tack or other operations, such as disruption or dest ruction of friendly mili- tary or civilian opera tions, equipment, prop- erty, and key facilities.  Collect information . Information is collected about the threat, the human environment and physical terrain, and other intelligence required to support operations.  Destroy the enemy.  Deny the area . The enemy is prevented from operating unhindered in a given area that it might use as a base camp or for logistic support. The company commander assumes that contact with an enemy is highly likely. Units of the com- pany are task-organized into elements—reconnais- sance elements, manueve r elements, and support by fire elements—designe d to locate and fix the enemy and decisively resolve the issue. Mission- related considerations dictate whether the com- pany commander tasks subordinate elements with one or all of these vari ous tasks. A robust enemy threat might dictate that one platoon locates the enemy, another platoon supports by fire to fix the enemy, and a last platoon maneuvers to decisively finish the enemy. A lesser enemy threat might dic- tate that all rifle plat oons in the company deploy organized to carry out a ll three tasks themselves. Companies may employ subelements built around the rifle platoons to conduct a search and attack or they themselves may serve as elements of a battal- ion-sized search and attack operation. Battalions assist subordinate comp anies by ensuring the availability of supporting fires and other resources. Elements tasked with finding the enemy do so through patrols, OPs, tracking techniques that include locating enemies hiding among the popu- lation, approach march techniques, or a combina- tion of all of these. When the enemy is located or identified, the reconnaissance element reports to company headquarters, co ntinues to track the enemy or situation, and prepares for the arrival of follow-on forces or reso urces tied to fixing and finishing the situation. Based on likely locations as determined by IPB, elements of the company conducting reconnaissance functions receive spe- cific guidance on zones of operation, routes, actions upon contact, and/or engagement and dis- engagement criteria. When the reconnaissanc e element locates the enemy, the fix element deploys with enough com- bat power and resources to prevent the enemy from retrograding or reinforcing or to prevent cha- otic situations from furt her degrading or spread- ing until the main effort or finish element arrives. Elements tasked with finishing the enemy or resolving a situation se rve as the main effort tasked with accomplis hing the company com- mander’s desired end state. After the other ele- ments locate and fix the enemy, the assault element deploys to accomplish the mission. The company must enter the designated bat- tlespace to begin operati ons. In planning, the intelligence estimate will define the battlespace in such terms as areas of in terest and influence and NAIs. Using this estimate, the security threat, and the mission, the company commander enters the battlespace with the compan y either en masse or by infiltration:  En masse. Company commanders may choose en masse occupation in th e face of significant enemy threats, when forceful occupation of the battlespace is part of establishing dominance over the enemy or popul ation, or when speed and simplicity are required. --- Page 122 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 6-9  Infiltration. Company commanders may choose infiltration when the level of enemy threat is low and does not immediately threaten the survivability of an y part of the company, when surprise or stealth are desired, when avoiding intimidation or alarm of the populace, and when time is not necessarily a factor in the speed of occupation. Stealth, aggressiveness, flexibility, sustainment, rapidity of decisionmaki ng, and exploitation of opportunities characterize the daily actions of a search and attack operation. Company command- ers must not restrict themselves to certain meth- ods of employment; rath er, they must use good problem framing and design to determine the best way to locate, fix, a nd eliminate enemy threats and resolve conflict in th eir AOs. They must also task-organize combat power and establish employment techniques accordingly. Conducting search and atta ck operations requires a significant amount of detailed planning. Key planning consider ations are geomet ries of fire, control measures, intelligence update/dissemina- tion, communications, li nkup procedures, and logistical support. Crea ting an environment in which subordinate units safely and efficiently operate with maximum in dependence and initia- tive is difficult. An honest assessment of the com- pany’s abilities is required before employing this movement to contact technique and should include the following points:  HHQ desired end state.  ROE.  Succinct mission statements for subelements.  Engagement criteria and triggers.  Size of force required based on intelligence estimates.  Logistical support cons iderations based on mission duration and requirements.  Control measures.  Rehearsals.  FP. Attack Types Infantry companies atta ck known enemy threats and specific enemies, thei r positions, their means of support, and other pr essure points associated with their will to resi st. Attacks are offensive operations of coordinated movement that are sup- ported by fire and are conducted to seize or secure terrain or to defe at, destroy, or capture the enemy. While the offense is inherent in all opera- tions across a broad rang e of military operations and company commanders must always consider environment, ROE, and the presence of noncom- batants on the battlefield, the attack remains an aggressive, offensive action during which vio- lence is limited only by the enemy’s level of resistance and the law of war. There are eight types of attack—hasty, deliberate, spoiling, coun- terattack, feint, demonstr ation, reconnaissance in force, and raid. The am bush, an attack technique appropriate to the infa ntry company, is also included in this discussion. Hasty Hasty attacks seek to take advantage of the enemy’s lack of prepar edness by using boldness, surprise, and speed to achieve success with the forces immediately at hand and with minimal time devoted to preparation. Usually conducted as means of exploiting an opportunity, hasty attacks require only min imum coordination with higher and adjacent commanders. Deliberate Deliberate attacks normally occur due to the enemy’s preparedness to receive an assault. There- fore, deliberate attacks involve detailed reconnais- sance to pinpoint objectives, enemy positions, and obstacles in order to determine potential vulnera- bilities and appropriate supporting positions to exploit them. Company commanders follow the MCPP steps to determine the decisive point, orga- nize the available combat power, and designate main and supporting effo rts and a reserve, as --- Page 123 --- 6-10 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 appropriate. Breaching, supporting, and assaulting tasks are resourced; the direct and indirect fire support plans, to include CAS, are integrated into the scheme of maneuver ; and control measures and triggers are emplaced accordingly. Finally, company commanders deve lop plans for consoli- dation, reorganization, avoidance of the culminat- ing point, and exploitation. Spoiling Attack Spoiling attacks are limited objective attacks used to delay, disrupt, or destroy the enemy’s ability to attack. Spoiling attacks normally occur within the defense, though they may also occur to stop the enemy’s offensive acti on prior to launching a larger friendly attack. Company commanders produce these effects by striking the enemy dur- ing vulnerable moments in their preparations, such as in their assemb ly areas (AAs) or attack positions or while they are on the move. Spoiling attacks may be either hasty or deliberate and their conduct is similar to other types of attacks. Counterattack A counterattack is an of fensive action conducted by the defense to regain the initiative or to deny success of an enemy attac k. Similar to the use of a reserve, preplanned counterattacks integrated into the defensive plan are preferred to impro- vised counterattacks that risk reinforcing failure. Commanders conduct counte rattacks either with a reserve or with lightly committed forward ele- ments. Execution of the counterattack occurs after the enemy launches its attack, reveals its main effort, or creates an assailable flank. Planning and rehearsing counterattacks is similar to that of all other t ypes of attacks: combat power, tasks, supporting fires, routes , triggers, and similar measures are determined and assigned; moreover, co unterattacks planned as part of the defensive scheme of maneuver receive greater planning emphasis than those planned as contingencies. Well-plan ned counterattacks are likely to succeed given the defender’s superior knowledge of the terrai n, the ability of the defender to generate pari ty between forces at the point of attack, and the inevitable degradation of cohesion experienced by attackers as they pene- trate an objective. Feint Feints are limited scope attacks with an extremely specific objective intended to cause the enemy to either react in a particul ar way or delay or dis- rupt reaction, such as by repositioning forces, committing reserves, or shifting fires. An infantry company is unlikely to c onduct a feint internal to its own operations, but it is more likely to con- duct an actual, full scale attack on a limited objective that delivers a feint effect determinable by HHQ. The following are some of the planning consider- ations for the company commander:  The higher commander’s intent regarding force preservation.  Disengagement criteria and plans.  Assignment of limited depth and attainable objectives.  Clear follow-on orders th at ensure the feinting force is prepared to e xploit the success of the main attack, if necessary. Feints are successful on ly if the enemy believes that a full-scale attack is underway; therefore, it is essential that the feints occur with the same level of precision and violence as any attack. Higher headquarters must issue a clear task and purpose, including identification of the specific enemy action(s) the feint must trigger (or deny). Feints are most effective under the following conditions:  When they reinforce the enemy’s expectations.  When the attack appear s to present a definite threat to the enemy.  When the enemy demonstrates consistent early committal of their reserve.  When the attacker has several feasible COAs, any of which the enemy could confuse for the main effort. --- Page 124 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 6-11 Demonstration Similar to a feint, the de monstration is an attack designed to deceive the enemy about the location of the main attack; howe ver, the friendly force does not make contact with the enemy. Demon- strations may be an ec onomy of force measure. The company commander, when participating in a demonstration as part of a larger force, should consider the following:  Limit of advance . The limit of advance is a control measure that ensures the enemy can see the demonstration force but cannot effectively engage it with direct fires.  Security measures. Security measures, such as robust local security or a counterreconnais- sance plan, prevent engagement by the enemy.  Contingency plans . The demonstration force must be prepared to respond effectively to enemy direct or indire ct fires while avoiding decisive engagement.  Follow-on orders . Clear, specific follow-on orders must ensure that the demonstration force is prepared to exploit the success of the main attack if necessary. Reconnaissance in Force The infantry company is unlikely to conduct a reconnaissance in force attack on its own, but may participate in a reco nnaissance in force con- ducted at the battalion level or above. A recon- naissance in force is an attack designed to gain information and to locate and test enemy disposi- tions, strengths, and reactions. While it may share some similarities to a movement to contact, which is designed to leave a commander maxi- mum latitude for final disposition (transitioning to the offense or defense or avoiding decisive engagement), the reconna issance in force is an offensive action that seeks specific information and enemy reactions. While lacking the subtle ty of other methods, a reconnaissance in force tends to develop informa- tion more rapidly and in more detail than other types of reconnaissance. An infantry company participating in a reconn aissance in force may be tasked to conduct limited objective assaults that are designed to determin e the enemy’s situation and maintain pressure on him by uncovering his weaknesses or forcing him to commit planned fires and use of his reserve. Since the situation is unknown, the infantry company can expect to be part of a task-organized, combined arms force that is capable of dealing with a variety of situations. Raid A raid is a limited obj ective attack involving swift penetration into a hostile area and a planned withdrawal upon comple tion of the mission; the planned withdrawal separates raids from other types of attack. Raids may occur in permissive and uncertain/hostile environments. Infantry companies can conduct company-level raids or be task-organized to particip ate in them as an ele- ment of a larger force. Raids occur in daylight or in darkness and both with in or beyond the scope of supporting friendly units or su pporting arms. When a raid occurs beyond the reasonable sup- port of a parent unit, the raid force is an indepen- dent unit for the duration of the raid and receives resources accordin gly. Raid forc es receive spe- cific objectives to focus th eir efforts and assist in decision criteria. The primary differences between the raid as a type of attack and as a type of patrol (see chap. 8) are size and scope. The raid force should withdraw using a different route from that used to approach the objective. The company conducts raids to accomplish the following missions:  Capturing personnel.  Capturing or destroying C2 locations.  Destroying logistics, ca ches, and other means of support.  Obtaining information concerning enemy loca- tions, dispositions, stre ngth, intentions, and methods of operation.  Confusing the enemy and disrupting his plans. --- Page 125 --- 6-12 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 The raid force is normally task-organized into command, support, assau lt, and security ele- ments but may also contain reconnaissance and reserve elements. Specialized attachments nor- mally move with the assa ult force. There are four phases to a raid—  Movement to the objective area.  Isolation of the objective.  Actions on the objective.  Withdrawal from the objective area. When planning a raid, the company commander makes the following considerations:  Deception.  Selection of routes to and from the objective.  Lethal and nonlethal fires planning.  Specialized assets appr opriate to the mission, such as demolitions or site exploitation.  Method and resources to isolate the objective.  Emergency extraction or reinforcement plans.  CASEVAC plan.  Detainee processing plan.  Signal plan. Ambush An ambush is a surpri se attack from concealed positions designed to re duce the overall combat effectiveness of an enemy force, capture or harass a threat, and to destroy or capture equipment or supplies. Imagination, need, and the infantry company’s abilities and capabilities are the only limitations on the types, methods, and purposes of ambushes. Control, coordinated fire s, and surprise charac- terize an ambush. Company commanders usu- ally employ ambushes with in the context of a larger task and purpose. Ingress and egress routes, mounted or dism ounted movement, survi- vability of the am bush force, and a host of other factors affect how ambushes aid accomplish- ment of the mission. While the actual method used to conduct the ambush varies by the level of threat, the terrain, and the skill of the ambush force, there are two general types of ambush:  Point ambush, when the ambush force deploys to attack the enemy in a single kill zone.  Area ambush, when the ambush force deploys to conduct several point ambushes throughout an area. The ambush force is normally task-organized into assault, support, and security elements. The assault element executes the ambush. The support element fixes the enemy w ith direct fires; pro- vides additional personnel for tasks, such as litter bearers and detainee handlers; and may be responsible for controlling supporting arms. The security element secures the objective rally point, provides protection and early warning to the assault element, and isolates the ambush site. Regardless of how an ambush is employed, the general phases required to execute it success- fully are—  Tactical movement to the objective rally point.  Reconnaissance of the ambush site.  Establishment of ambush site security.  Preparation of the ambush site.  Execution of the ambush.  Withdrawal. Exploitation The ability to exploit su ccess for further gain is why the offense continues to be the form of deci- sion on the battlefield. Exploitation is an offensive action applicable across all of the operational areas within a range of military operations. Once the enemy is disorganized in depth following a successful offensive ac tion, exploitation multi- plies the initial success by destroying vulnerable assets and resources, pr eventing the enemy from successfully disengaging and re-establishing other means of resistance. Expl oitation helps to main- tain dominance of te mpo by exposing further --- Page 126 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 6-13 opportunities for exploita tion. Initiative, bold- ness, and the unhesitating employment of uncom- mitted forces characterize exploitation, which can occur physically or thr ough measures such as IO. Company commanders ensure that exploitation is a part of the planning process because the triggers for transition to exploitation require considerable judgment, intuition, and situational awareness. Premature transition to exploitation can result in unnecessary risk of failu re or casualties since the enemy’s ability to resi st or avoid engagement remains effective or the situation remains so unclear that use of force could adversely affect the local populace. Delayed tr ansition to exploitation can result in lost opportunities or unnecessary risk and casualties due to the enemy’s reconstitution of their ability to resist or successful escape and increased appearance of legitimacy. In the hasty attack, the force in contact normally continues the attack, tr ansitioning to exploita- tion. In the deliberate attack, the defense, or stability operati ons, the commander’s principal tool for exploitation is normally the reserve, appropriately co nstituted to execute the decisive action of the mission (such as combat forces, engineering assets, CMO or IO, or various combinations thereof). Use of the Reserve Company commanders retain only those reserves necessary to ensure flex ibility, continue momen- tum, and react to likely enemy re sponses to the exploitation. The reserve is positioned where it can exploit the success of the main or supporting effort(s). Exploitati on forces execute bold, aggressive, and rapid ope rations using the com- mander’s intent and mission tactics. Exploitation Objectives Typical objectives for th e exploitation force in- clude the following threat center of gravity assets:  C2 assets.  Reserves.  Key terrain.  CS and CSS units deep in the enemy’s rear.  Time-sensitive targets developed from action- able intelligence.  Opinion and attitude of the local population.  Infrastructure critical to the threat’s ability to operate in the area. Pursuit When the enemy’s ability to resist is broken and he attempts to escape, friendly forces shift to the pursuit. The infantry company is unlikely to con- duct its own pursuit, but will likely participate in a pursuit as a component of a larger force. The difference between exploitation and a pursuit is the condition of the enem y. The object of a pur- suit is to destroy the enem y force or the ability of the enemy to affect secu rity, the local populace, or civic government and processes. Like exploita- tion, pursuit requires broa d, decentralized control and rapid movement. Commanders may use organic and nonorganic asse ts to maintain obser- vation on the enemy. Maximum use of C2 and observation assets maintains momentum. Friendly forces task-org anize themselves into a direct pressure force a nd an encircling force. When necessary, a direct pressure force alone can conduct a pursuit, but th e preferred method is to apply both direct pressure and encirclement to ensure defeat of the enemy. Whether through application of combat power, use of security measures , IO, or other nonlethal means, the application of direct pressure seeks to prevent the enemy from reorganizing or taking any effective action to survive. Encirclement seeks to ensure the destruction of the enemy by preventing escape or reinforcement. The en- circling force must have greater mobility than the enemy. Offensive Maneuver Maneuver places the enemy at a disadvantage through the application of lethal and nonlethal fires and movement. --- Page 127 --- 6-14 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Organization of the Battlespace Doctrinally, when conduc ting offensive action, the Marine Corps organi zes the battlespace into deep, close, and rear areas. The infantry com- pany can expect to operate within these areas as part of a larger force and will likely receive an AO, axis of advance, rout e of attack, or similar control measure with wh ich to define the com- pany’s portion of the battlefield. Distribution of Forces Conducting offensive ac tion normally imposes multiple tasks on the commander. Such tasks may come in the form of ph ases, conditions, or ele- ments that are particular to any type of attack or form of offensive mane uver. These requirements directly affect the ma nner in which the com- mander divides the available combat power and resources in organizing for the offense. The com- pany’s combat power is normally organized into the main and supporting efforts and the reserve. Company commanders wei ght the main effort to ensure success at the d ecisive point, which often means that the main effort contains the greatest concentration of comb at power. The purpose of the main effort is to accomplish the company’s mission; the designation of a main effort allows the company to focus all of its energies, actions, and resources toward enabling the main effort to achieve success. As th e element that achieves the company’s mission, the task and purpose of the main effort should ne st directly with the company’s task and purpose. For example, in conducting an attack on a strong point, a com- pany commander is likely to task the company’s main effort with the duti es associated with the assault element. Supporting efforts enab le the main effort to achieve success at the decisive point. For example, in conducting an attack on a strong point, a com- pany commander may task one of the company’s supporting efforts with th e duties associated with the breach element. The mission assigned to sup- porting efforts must di rectly support the main effort’s purpose. Such nesting allows supporting efforts to exercise initiat ive to react on the battle- field in ways that would ensure the main effort’s success, including being prepared to assume the main effort’s mission. Supporting effo rts receive the combat power, attachments, and any other enablers needed to ac complish their mission in support of the main effort. Supporting efforts may use suppressive fires, se condary attacks, decep- tion, obstacle reduction, or other tactics to accom- plish the following:  Allow the main effort to maneuver to the deci- sive point.  Prevent the enemy from reacting to the assault.  Cause the enemy to dissipate his fire support or prematurely commit his reserves.  Prevent the enemy from surprising the main effort. The primary mission of th e reserve is to conduct decisive movement, take advantage of sudden opportunities, and rein force and exploit main effort success. Employment of th e reserve at the decisive moment is th e commanders’ principal means to influence the action. A reserve does not reinforce failure. The reserve must be large enough to exploit success, yet its size should not materially weaken the ma in effort. The reserve might constitute a small part of the company in the case of a deliberate assault. In a movement to contact, the reserve may constitute the bulk of command that is ready for commitment as a main effort upon locating the enemy. Company com- manders base their determ ination of the reserve’s size on the following:  Contemplated missions of the reserve.  Forces available.  Type of maneuver planned.  Terrain over which the reserve must travel.  Possible hostile reactions.  Clarity of the situation. --- Page 128 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 6-15 Forms of Offensive Maneuver For the infantry company in the offense, there are six forms of maneuver— frontal attack, flank attack, envelopment, turning movement, infiltra- tion, and penetration. Frontal Attack Frontal attack (see fig. 6-5) is a form of maneuver in which an attacking fo rce seeks to destroy a weaker enemy force or fi x a larger enemy force along a broad front by the mo st direct route. It is generally the least desi rable form of maneuver because it exposes the attacker to the concen- trated fire of the defender and limits the effective- ness of the attacker’s own fires. When conducting a frontal attack, the company commander must maximize the use of combined arms assets to mit- igate the vulnerability of the force. The frontal attack is often the best form of maneuver for an attack in which speed and simplicity are key; it is useful in overwhelming weak defenses, securing outposts, or disorganizing enemy forces. Flank Attack A flank is the right or left side of any military for- mation and is generally weaker in terms of combat power than the front of the formation. Therefore, a flanking atta ck (see fig. 6-6) is a form of offensive mane uver directed at either flank of an enemy force. It is different from envelopment in that envelopment directs its attack beyond the flank and toward the rear of the enemy. Moreover, both flank attacks and en- velopments are differen t from a turning move- ment in that, wh ile a turning movement seeks to force the enemy to move, flank attacks and envelopments seek to en gage the enemy in his current position. Exposed enemy flanks may be created by the attacker using fires or by a suc- cessful penetration. Flanking attacks are normally conducted by supporting efforts that fix the enemy’s front while the friendly main effort attacks the enemy’s flank. Due to their simplicity, flank attacks often serve as the form of maneuver favored by hasty attack s or immediate action drills during which speed and simplicity are paramount to maintaining battle tempo and, ultimately, the initiative. Envelopment Companies will normally participate in envelop- ment as part of a larger force. Envelopment is a form of maneuver in wh ich an attacking force seeks to avoid the prin cipal enemy defenses by seizing objectives to the enemy’s rear or flank in order to destroy him in his current position (see Objective A ENYENY Legend: ENY - enemy Figure 6-5. Frontal Attack. ENYENY Legend: ENY - enemy Figure 6-6. Flank Attack. --- Page 129 --- 6-16 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 fig. 6-7). A successful envelopment requires dis- covery or creation of an assailable flank. The envelopment is the preferred form of maneuver because the attacking forc e tends to suffer fewer casualties while having th e most opportunities to destroy the enemy. Envelopments focus on seiz- ing key terrain, destroying specific enemy forces, and interdicting enemy withdrawal routes. Turning Movement A turning movement is a form of maneuver in which the attacking force seeks to avoid the enemy’s principal defens ive positions by seizing objectives to the enemy’s rear (see fig. 6-8). This tactic causes enemy forces to move out of their current positions (as oppos ed to flank attacks and envelopments, during which the friendly forces seek to engage the enemy in his current location) or to divert major forces to meet the enemy. For a turning movement to be successful, the unit try- ing to turn the enemy mu st attack something that the enemy will fight to save, such as a supply route, artillery emplacement, or a headquarters. In addition to attacking such a target, the attacking unit should be strong enough to pose a real threat to the enemy. Th e turning movement is a type of envelopment in which the attacker attempts to avoid the defense entirely. Instead, attackers seek to secure key terrain deep in the enemy’s rear and along their LOCs. Faced with a major threat to their rear, the enemy is “turned” out of their defensive positions and fo rced to attack rear- ward. The company will li kely conduct a turning movement as part of a battalion. Infiltration Infiltration is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force conducts undetected movement through or into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage in the enemy’s rear while exposing only small elements to enemy defensive fires (see fig. 6-9). Moving and assembling forces cover tly through enemy posi- tions takes a considerable amount of time. A suc- cessful infiltration reaches the enemy’s rear without fighting through prepared positions. An infiltration normally oc curs in conjunction with and in support of another form of maneuver. A company may conduct an infiltration (dis- mounted or mounted) as part of a larger unit’s attack with the battalio n employing another form of maneuver. Company commanders also may employ maneuver by inf iltration to move their Objective A Legend: ENY - enemy ENYENY Figure 6-7. Envelopment. (-) (-) Figure 6-8. Turning Movement. --- Page 130 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 6-17 platoons to locations to support the battalion’s attack. A company may c onduct an infiltration in order to—  Attack an enemy-held position from an unsus- pected direction.  Occupy a SBF position to support an attack.  Secure key terrain.  Conduct ambushes and raids.  Conduct a covert breach of an obstacle. Penetration Penetration is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front to create both assailable flanks and access to the enemy’s rear (see fig. 6-10). Penetration occurs when enemy flanks are not assailable, when enemy forces are overextended, when weak spots in the enemy defense are identi- fied, and when time does not permit some other form of maneuver. As part of a larger force pene- tration, the company will normally isolate, sup- press, fix, or destr oy enemy forces; breach tactical or protective obs tacles in the enemy’s main defense; secure the shoulders of the penetra- tion; or seize key terr ain. A battalion may also use the penetration to se cure a foothold within a large built-up area. A penetration normally con- sists of the following three steps:  Breach the enemy’s main defense positions.  Widen the gap created to secure flanks by enveloping one or both of the newly exposed flanks.  Seize the objective. Phases of Offensive Action Generally, planning and executing an attack or other offensive action occurs in five phases—pre- paratory, conduct, consolidation and reorganiza- tion, exploitation, and pu rsuit. While the actual elements within each phase might differ regard- ing the nature of the offensive action, the phases remain valid. Preparatory During the preparatory phase, the company com- mander completes planning, intelligence, and reconnaissance efforts. Offensive action planning needs to incorporate nonlethal operations that may prove necessary throughou t the operation due to the presence of civilians on the battlefield and other similar considerat ions. The company con- ducts preliminar y operations, such as PCCs and PCIs, orientation, rehearsals, and movement and OBJMain effort Supporting effort ENY ENY Legend: ENY - enemy OBJ - objective Figure 6-9. Infiltration. OBJ OBJ OBJ ENY ENY Legend: ENY - enemy OBJ - objective Figure 6-10. Penetration. --- Page 131 --- 6-18 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 concentration, forward in the AA. Operations, such as passages of lines or reliefs in place (RIPs), commence in support of the attack. If planned, execution of deception opera tions, such as feints or demonstrations, occur while shaping or prepa- ratory fires commence. Assessment and refine- ment of all these actions are continuous. Finally, since movement toward or in close proximity of the enemy occurs during this phase, the company commander mitigates security risk through assess- ing the likelihood of contact. Conduct The conduct of the attack involves three separate stages, all of which focu s on successfully placing the main effort at the decisive point. Assembly Area to the Attack Position. The company departs the AA per the company com- mander’s plan. Departure may be simultaneous or staggered. Elements may move together toward the attack position or depart on varied routes. Pre- paratory fires and othe r shaping actions may commence. Upon arrival at the attack position— the last covered and concealed position prior to the line of departure—the company may or may not stop for final actions and coordination. Line of Departure to the Assault Position. If not underway, the FST be gins to execute the company’s fire support pl an to cover the move- ment of the various elem ents. Supporting efforts begin their missions. The main effort moves when indicated to the assault position—the last covered and concealed po sition before the objec- tive—where it deploys in to assault formations and conducts final coordi nation. Throughout the company, leadership moves to positions of obser- vation to assess the effect s of fires, confirm that conditions are set for the next event, verify routes, and enable co mmunications and signal plan efficiency. Movement From the Final Coordination Line Through the Primary Objective. When appropri- ate, the main effort assaults the primary objective, crossing the final coordination line and ceasing or shifting the supporting direct and indirect fires as required. Supporting effort s execute follow-on missions to include those actions necessary for the consolidation and reorganization and exploi- tation phases. Consolidation and Reorganization The purpose of consolidation and reorganization is to rapidly and efficien tly prepare th e attacking force for future action during the exploitation phase. Both actions ar e mutually supporting in that successful consol idation relies upon quick and efficient reorganiza tion, while successful reorganization requires the security provided by initial defensive efforts in consolidation. Com- pany commanders should no t neglect to plan for this phase as such pla nning maintains tempo and momentum over the enem y. The implementation of both civil and military operations and IO are vital at this stage of the operation. Consolidation pertains to all measures taken to organize and strengthen a newly captured posi- tion for its use agains t the enemy. Initially, assaulting elements assume a hasty defensive pos- ture to repel possible enemy counterattacks. Con- currently, the company as a whole immediately begins taking necessary action to occupy the objective or, following minimum essential reorga- nization, to continue the attack. Regardless of mission, emphasis is on rapidly creating an orga- nized effort through reor ganization. In planning the consolidation and reorganization phase, com- pany commanders include instructions on—  Security.  Displacement and posit ioning of forces, such as bringing supporting effort elements forward.  Fires planning (prepla nned fires in support of defending the objective, such as likely counter- attack AAs and fires in support of pursuit).  Reconnaissance (maintai ning contact with the enemy remains crucial through the immediate use of patrols, UA, and other assets). Reorganization includes all measures taken to restore internal communications and order in a unit after combat. Reorganization complements --- Page 132 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 6-19 consolidation and is the process by which the company is able to carry out further operations, whether coherently defe nding a recently seized objective, continuing the attack, or beginning the pursuit of the enemy. It includes the reporting of unit location and status to HHQ, redistribution of personnel and ammunition, CASEVAC, resupply, and restoration of control and communications. Exploitation The objective of exploitati on is to complete the destruction of the enem y following a successful attack. A company normally takes part in exploi- tations as part of a larger force; however, the company should exploit tactical success at the local level within the higher commanders’ con- cept of the operation. Pursuit The objective of the pursuit phase of an opera- tion is the total destruct ion of the enemy force. The company may take part in a pursuit as part of a larger force or, because of its organic transpor- tation, may act as the pursuit force that can close with and destroy the re mnants of the enemy force. A pursuit typical ly follows a successful exploitation and is designe d to prevent a fleeing enemy from escaping and to destroy him. Attack Considerations Elements of the attack are fire, maneuver, and close combat. The following subparagraphs pro- vide company commanders and their subordinate commanders with guidance in planning for, exe- cuting, and controlling th e fire, maneuver, and close combat inherent in the attack of infantry units. The commander must be prepared to estab- lish a detainee/EPW coll ection plan, a casualty collection plan, and a logistic support plan. Planning Considerations The battalion commander assigns missions to the infantry company, usually expressed in terms of terrain objectives to sei ze, control measures to follow, and designation of attached/supporting units. The infantry comp any may be the main or supporting effort or the reserve of the infantry battalion. It may be foot mobile , mounted, or helicopter transported in the attack. When it is a reserve element of the battalion, it may use any form of mobility. The AA is an area in which a command gathers and organizes preparator y to further action. In assessing potential AA s, company commanders make the following considerations:  Cover and concealment.  Adequate space for the dispersion of troops, equipment, and vehicles.  Ease of access and egress.  Adaptability to defensible position.  Location, preferably beyond the effective range of enemy mortar and light artillery fires. In the AA, preparations for combat are finalized. They are as complete a nd detailed as the avail- able time and the situation permit. Preparations include the following:  Conduct personnel, weapons, and equipment PCCs and PCIs.  Conduct final resupply of fuel, water, rations, and ammunition.  Stage equipment and personal effects not required for the operation.  Issue mission-specific special equipment for the operation.  Conduct a rest plan cons istent with security and preparations for the attack.  Continue planning and intelligence updates.  Designated attachments join the command.  Conduct specialized training and rehearsals. Tactical Control Measures Infantry battalion, infant ry company, and rifle platoon commanders control the maneuver elements of their respective units in the attack by using required control measures. To give --- Page 133 --- 6-20 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 subordinate echelons maximum freedom of action, only the mini mum control measures necessary to ensure that the attack progresses in the desired manner are used. See figure 6-11. Maneuver Maneuver is the use of movement in combina- tion with fire (or potential fire) employed to achieve a position of advantage over the enemy to facilitate the accomp lishment of the mission. When possible, the commander employs those techniques that avoid the enemy’s strength and conceal the company’s true intentions. Company commanders maneuver their platoons to close with the enemy, to gain positional advantage over them, and ultimatel y to destroy them or force them to withdraw or capitulate. Within the actual mechanics of co nducting maneuver, there are two elements:  Base of fire element . The combination of fire and movement first requi res a base of fire in which some elements of the company remain stationary and provide protection for the maneuvering forces by preventing the enemy from reacting to the movement.  Maneuver element. Under the protective over- watch or effective suppressive fires of the base of fire element, the maneuver element moves to a position advantage using whatever techniques and formations appropriate to the situation in terms of such factors as risk, speed, terrain, weather, and conditioning. Legend: ASLT - assault FCL - final coordination line LD/LC - line of departure is the line of contact OBJ - objective PD - point of departure PL - phase line PSN - position RP - release point LD/LC LD/LC PL JohnPL John PL Robert PL Robert (FCL)(FCL) ASLT PSN PEGGY ATTACK PSN BLUE ATTACK PSN GOLD OBJ OBJ OBJ KAI PAT ZEKE 3/3 1/5 X X 1MARDIV XX AXIS JAN 11 3 RP 2 PD 7 DIRECTION OF ATTACK JOAN Figure 6-11. Tactical Control Measures. --- Page 134 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 6-21 Fires In the attack, fires primarily occur when fixing or suppressing the enem y, when maneuvering against and assaulting th em, and when exploiting success. When planning fires, the company com- mander uses the following method: task, pur- pose, method, effect for constructing, and determining the validity of a fire support plan (both lethal and nonlet hal). Fire support team leaders use a briefing tool—purpose, location, observation, triggers, communications, and remarks—when preparing the fire support plan and order. While the FS T executes the fire sup- port plan, the company commander supervises that execution to ensure successful and appropri- ate prosecution of targets and the effectiveness of the created effects. Planning of fires occurs within the construct of top-down planning, bottom-up refinement. Accordingly, company commanders refine the fire plan that was initia lly published by HHQ to ensure that the relevant portion meets company requirements. Additiona lly, company command- ers ensure development of an appropriate intelli- gence collection and observation plan that supports triggers, decision points, and controls for initiating and shifting fires. In general, com- pany fire support plans should—  Suppress enemy weapon sy stems that inhibit movement.  Fix or neutralize bypassed enemy elements.  Obscure enemy observation or screen friendly maneuver. The company can take advantage of smoke in various maneuver situations, such as during a bypass or in deception operations.  Support breaching oper ations. Fires can obscure or suppress enemy elements that are overwatching reinforcing obstacles. They can also obscure or suppre ss enemy forces on an objective area during the co nduct of an assault breach.  Illuminate enemy positions. Illumination fires are always included in contingency plans for night attacks.  Conduct suppression of enemy air defenses. Limited Visibility Considerations Successful attacks during limited visibility depend on leadership, r econnaissance, training, planning, and surprise. While these fundamentals apply to daylight attacks, attacks during limited visibility require view ing these fundamentals with a greater emphasis on control (see fig. 6-12 on page 6-23). In this case, limited visibility does not mean a temporary st ate of reduced observa- tion as might apply to heavy rain, snow, or battle- field obscuration; rather , it refers to a severely degraded state of visi bility throughout the con- duct of operation, such as darkness or dense, per- sistent fog. Such reduced visibility normally applies to night operatio ns, but the term limited visibility is used because many of the issues dis- cussed in the following subparagraphs may apply to those occasional circumstances when com- pany commanders find themselves operating in environments of sustained, limited visibility. Units equipped with night vision devices (NVDs) may conduct limited visibi lity attacks very much like daylight attacks. The fundamentals for a day- light attack still apply fo r nighttime attacks. Con- ducting attacks in this manner requires the following criteria:  Personnel must be proficie nt in limited visibil- ity attacks and the use of NVDs.  Enough ambient light is available to employ the unit’s NVDs.  A successful reconnaissa nce of the objective area has been made.  Additional control measures and techniques are considered. Planning Considerations Due to the increased comp lexity and greater risk in conducting limited visi bility attacks, company commanders should make the following consid- erations when planning them:  Feints and other deceptions may be more effec- tive. --- Page 135 --- 6-22 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1  Infiltration techniques require smaller units than normally employed. This requirement places greater responsib ility and reliance upon the training and ability of junior leadership.  The control of mounted and dismounted for- mations (to include navigation) requires de- creased dispersion.  Illumination support a nd/or employment of NVDs must be planned.  Observing and controlling fires is more difficult.  Rest plans must be implemented in conjunction with night operations to mitigate effects of fatigue and other human factors.  Identification, friend or foe procedures are even more critical.  Negative communications are possible due to the nighttime conditions, especially high fre- quency radios.  All CSS functions, to include locating, treat- ing, and evacuating casualties, require more time than normal.  Linkups and passages of lines require increased planning and control measures.  Degraded visibility increases the difficulty of bypassing or breaching enemy obstacles.  Fire control techniques must be clearly estab- lished and easily understood. Illumination and Fires Company commanders alwa ys plan for illumina- tion methods and make them available in case the enemy either illuminates the battlefield or pos- sesses a night vision capability. The use of illumi- nation is also effective during consolidation and reorganization, particularly for CASEVAC. Illumination is available from artillery, mortars, grenade launchers, and hand-fired and aircraft flares. Illumination placed beyond the objective assists assaulting unit visibility by backlighting the enemy during their defense. Marines must be pre- pared to rapidly transition from conducting illumi- nated to nonilluminated operations and vice versa. In the orders process, company commanders issue specific guidance and cr iteria on the employment of illumination. Given the visibility av ailable by illumination, illuminated supported attacks are almost identi- cal to daylight attacks. These may be most effec- tive when speed is essential, when there is limited time for reconnaissance, or when the enemy is weak or disorganized. The commander must plan illumination time requirements and request suffi- cient ammunition to support the attack through its duration. Any break in illumination may reduce the effectiveness of supp ressive fire when the attackers need it most. In circumstances duri ng which the enemy is likely to use illumination or possesses a night vision capability, comp any commanders should consider using smoke to obscure the enemy in the same manner as a da ylight attack. As with normal obscuration fires, smoke effects are close to or on enemy positions to avoid restricting friendly movement. Shifting fires requires greater planning due to observer limitations, but has the potential for greater shock effect on the enemy in conjunction with ground maneuver. Strict adherence to meth- ods of synchronizing fires, such as time on targets or series timelines, is critical for both the main effort and supporting arms. Deconfliction of CAS is significantly more diffi- cult under limited visibility conditions and illumi- nation can disrupt a pilo t’s ability to accurately deliver muniti ons. Company commanders must ensure the company’s reporting discipline is good enough to allow the FST to deliver accurate iden- tification of friendly locations to CAS platforms. Limited visibility condi tions hinder target desig- nation for CAS and othe r supporting arms. In the company’s fires plan, the FST reinforces methods of positive identification and includes redundant means for target desi gnation should primary means fail or prove unable to see the target. --- Page 136 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 6-23 BTR - Bronetransportyor LOA - limit of advance MG - machine gun MGS - machine gun system OBJ - objective ORP - objective rally point PSN - position RP - release point Legend: MGS 12 C2 11 C (-) 3 1 2 (-) 3 (-) (-) 2 (-) 12 13 13 LOA ORP LOA OBJ 1 OBJ 10 ASLT PSN 1 2 X X X X X X X X X X X Map Symbols: 1st Event 2D Event 3D Event 4th Event BTR Light MG Heavy MG Bunker Trench OP Figure 6-12. Limited Visibility Attack with Night Vision Devices. --- Page 137 --- 6-24 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Reconnaissance and Rehearsals Reconnaissance is critical in every attack, but more so for attacks duri ng limited visibility. The reconnaissance plan shou ld include leaders down to the lowest level possible. While balancing the need for detailed informa tion against the risk of deception and surprise, company commanders ensure that reconnaissance, route rehearsal, place- ment of guides, and other similar control mea- sures occur during daylight, twilight, and times of limited visibility when po ssible. The intelligence collection plan should es tablish continuous sur- veillance of the objective in case the enemy repo- sitions units and weapons or prepares additional obstacles. On those oc casions when reconnais- sance proves unsuccess ful, company command- ers should request a delay in the attack time to allow for further reconnais sance. If a delay is not possible, they should c onsider an illuminated or supported attack. Subordin ate units rehearse all phases of the attack, paying particular attention to movement, position occu pation, BSG consider- ations, and other control measures. Simplicity The success of limited visibility attacks relies more on simplicity than on complex maneuvers. Attacks during periods of limited visibility do more than risk failure if compromised during the approach: a competent enemy taking advantage of such a vulnerable time will inflict consider- able damage on such an exposed unit. Limiting the potential of mischance is a function of limit- ing the complexity of the attack—commanders should keep their plan s simple. Accordingly, company commanders should try to use small and easily identified objectiv es that are approached by simple, well-marked and guided routes and are driven by a well-defined decisive point upon which the combat power of the company focuses. The company uses a simple, explicit signal plan that incorporates event driven methodology and includes controlling direct and indirect fires. Consolidation and Reorganization Consolidation and reorganization are the same as for a daylight attack with the following exceptions:  Guides lead trains a nd support elements for- ward to their positions.  Changes to task orga nization are avoided to keep the consolidation plan simple.  Locating and evacuating casualties and EPWs takes longer.  Unit positions should be closer together to ease control and improve mu tual support. Adjust- ment to positions occurs as visibility improves. Helicopterborne Operations Helicopterborne operations are tactical move- ments by helicopter that support a ground tactical plan. Helicopterborne oper ations are deliberate, precise combat op erations designed to allow the rifle company to strike over extended distances (regardless of terrain an d without dependence on ground LOCs) and to attack the enemy when and where he is most vulnera ble. Raids and assaults are the two primary missi ons for helicopterborne tasks forces. The use of helicopterbor ne operations occurs in situations that are limited in duration, require superior mobility or th e ability to influence in depth, and are typically against undefended or lightly defended objective s. Due to the complex- ity of these operations and the vulnerability of helicopterborne forces to ground fire and other air- craft, functional and detailed planning are central- ized and precise and synchronization of maneuver and fires is essential. Du e to the relative lack of tactical mobility onc e on the ground, ground forces normally land on or near the objective, may or may not operate in conjunction with other ground forces, and rely on planning and rehear- sals to overcome initial disorganization after debarkation. The enemy threat determines wave composition, to include the size and makeup of the --- Page 138 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 6-25 initial wave, follow-on waves, and preplanned contingency and logistical support waves. Helicopterborne operations provide a range of methods to exercise tactical deception, from the threat posed by the very existence of the capabil- ity to such overt method s as demonstration land- ing. Regardless of the mission and purpose, helicopterborne operati ons have five phases: planning, loading, air movement, landing, and tactical ground operations. Planning Considerations Centralized and precise functional and detailed planning and synchronization of fires and maneu- ver are essential. Among factors to consider are task organization, the enemy threat, CASEVAC, alternate LZs, and re-embarkation. Task Organization The battalion is the lowest level unit staffed with sufficient personnel to plan, coordinate, and con- trol helicopterborne opera tions. Therefore, when company-sized helicopterborne operations occur, most planning occurs at the battalion. When the battalion conducts helic opterborne op erations, it becomes a task-organized force called a helicop- terborne task force. Th is task organization com- bines ground and aviation assets to accomplish the ground tactical plan. Enemy Threat The composition of the enemy threat, to include mobility and air defenses, determines the size and composition of the initial assault wave, the likeli- hood of an active enemy defense of the LZ, and the fire support and av iation escorts required to mitigate the threat. GO/NO GO Plan The GO/NO GO plan applies not only to commit- ting the helicopterborne force, but also can equally apply to decisi on criteria throughout the operation. At a minimum, GO/NO GO plans have two components: first, enemy action or lack of action that meets predetermined criteria for acceptable risk and friendly action and composi- tion; second, resource criteria that meet predeter- mined criteria for acceptabl e risks. For example, movement of enemy air de fense assets into the proximity of an LZ meeting a NO GO criteria could result in cancella tion of the operations. Another example is two he licopters in the initial wave that are grounded for mechanical failure, but the five remaining me et the minimum criteria to allow the operation to proceed. Alternate Landing Zones When possible, commande rs should select other LZs that will still a llow mission accomplish- ment. The use of alternate LZs normally requires building contingency plans since the alternate LZ characteristics often chan ge such things as the number of airframes that can land at any one time or the routes of the ground force. Re-embarkation Re-embarkation plans occur in two ways. The first applies to a planned withdrawal as in a raid. The second applies to un foreseen contingencies and, like all withdrawals, may or may not occur under enemy pressure. Immediate extract mis- sions refer to re-emb arkation occurring under enemy pressure. Even in those cases when the ground force expects to link up with another ground force, planners still create re-embarkation contingency plans. Casualty Evacuation Plan The CASEVAC plan c onducted by the ground force is noticeably differe nt from plans the force might normally conduct on its own. First, the lim- ited tactical mobility of the ground force compli- cates movement of casualties over any appreciable distance. Second, the proximity of the enemy, the nature of the terrain, a nd other factors normally necessitate movement of casualties to some point where aircraft will be less vulnerable during extraction. Lastly, both of these factors indicate that CASEVAC might be delayed until medical augmentation of the ground force arrives. --- Page 139 --- 6-26 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Immediate Action Plan Immediate action plans normally apply to the ground force and constitute actions that can range from reacting to unexpected contact with the enemy to actions on the objective. As such, they may or may not include th e participation of the aviation element. Fire Plan for Assault In addition to the overall fire support plan for the ground tactical plan, th e most complicated por- tion are those fires occurring before and during the landing phase. Thes e fires may come from indirect ground and avia tion assets. They may necessitate the insertio n of ground observers sometime prior, the use of airborne observers, or both. They may occur along the aircraft ingress and egress routes. The success of these fires may directly affect the GO /NO GO criteria through shaping operations within the battlespace. Bump Plan Proper problem framing and solid GO/NO GO criteria determine the parameters of the bump plan. This plan simply determines the priority of the passengers remaining within the wave in the event of mechanical fail ure. If done correctly, when reduced to the absolute minimum number of aircraft for mission su ccess, the assault force will still consist of the ri ght number of the right skill sets to accomplish the mission. Ground Force Situational Awareness Stick leaders and ground force leadership within the assault waves should take advantage of such things as jump seats and extra aircraft helmets with intercoms to mainta in situational awareness of the operation and orientation of their particu- lar aircraft especially when landing. Key Billets and Duties There are four key leaders who command heli- copterborne operations—mission commander, helicopterborne unit commander, air mission commander, and marshalling area control officer. The mission commander is the senior ground force commander responsible for planning, coor- dinating, and executing the operation. If a com- pany will act as the grou nd force, the battalion commander is normally the mission commander. Whenever possible, the mission commander will be airborne in order to maintain communications with the helicopterborne forces, supporting arms, and their headquarters. The helicopterborne unit commander is the com- mander of the ground force. His unit makes up the helicopter landing for ce (LF) and he is re- sponsible for the accomp lishment of the ground tactical plan. As the commander of the aviation portion of the helicopterborne task fo rce, the air mission com- mander is responsible to the mission commander that all helicopter and support operations are con- ducted according to the needs of the ground tacti- cal plan. He is also re sponsible for establishing and executing the air movement plan. At the company level, the marshalling area con- trol officer (MACO) is normally the company first sergeant. During the planning phase, MACOs develop and coordinate the manifest and helicopter team wave and serial assignment table. During the extraction phase of the operation, they ensure the accountability of each wave and estab- lish “the gate” (a contro l point). The MACO col- locates with the FAC within the extract LZ and ensures full stick accountability prior to initiation of extract. Once extract begins, the MACO will coordinate the departure of various sticks through a control point. The MACO is the last to depart. Manifest/Helicopter Team Wave and Serial Assignment Table Building and maintaining the helicopter team wave and serial assignmen t table and manifest is one of the most demand ing and tedious proce- dures in the planning proc ess due to variations in aircraft availability and the METT-T impact on personnel requirements (see chap. 9 for exam- ples). In general, as time passes, fewer aircraft --- Page 140 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 6-27 and more ground force pe rsonnel become avail- able. Helicopterborne forces should prepare to land in two or more waves and create linkup plans accordingly. The command element and FST should land in the in itial wave to take con- trol of the fire plan. Th ere are two types of mani- fest building procedures: deliberate and hasty. The load plan should—  Maintain unit integrity as much as possible.  Spread load crew-served weapons (CSWs).  Spread load the command element. Supporting Fires Initial fires may begin as early as the loading phase to shape the batt lespace, such as by destroying or suppress ing enemy air defenses. They may continue du ring the air movement phase in support of the movement itself, while continuing in the obje ctive and landing areas. During the landing phase, fires address the areas immediately around each LZ and any threats that might influence the arriva l and departure of air- craft from those LZs. Fire plans address the entire landing phase (multiple waves), the execution of the ground tactical plan, planned re-embarkation, and any contingency plan s, such as immediate extract. Fire support pl ans developed to support the landing plan must address the following:  Will fires support a deception plan?  Will the helicopterborne task force use surprise fires or is the enemy threat robust enough to dictate a more deliberate approach? The fires plan addresses proper weaponeering to avoid creating obstacles to landing and maneuver through collateral damage to the LZ and the immediately surrounding area, such as undesir- able cratering, knocked down trees, and fires and obscuration. During planni ng, evaluation of the fires plan against the elements of BSG is continu- ous to ensure uninterrupted suppression during insertion of friendly forces. Fires planning includes avoiding task saturation of escort aircraft or determining a requirement for more escorts. Common ta sks for escort aircraft are employment during ai r movement, fires in support of LZ preparati on, and the possibility of use as CAS for the ground tactical plan. Escorts that must conduct enga gements during air move- ment and LZ preparation may not have enough ordnance left to support the ground force. Fires planning also includes battle handover drills and rehearsals between various observers throughout execution of the plan. Someone for- ward, such as a FAC (a irborne) or qualified ground based observer, c onducts initial shaping fires in the battlespace, to include such things as refinement and BDA. Soon after the arrival of the initial wave, the helic opterborne unit commander will take charge of the fires plan from that for- ward positioned observer. During extract, this process is reversed. Landing Zones/Pickup Zones Landing zones and pic kup zones (PZs) share many characteristics. The actual definitions indi- cate that an LZ is any designated zone in which an aircraft actually lands; whereas, a PZ is a place where troops or equipment are picked up. As seen in figure 6-13, on page 6-28, a PZ may consist of one or more LZs. Landing Zone Considerations The ground force provides security to LZs until abandoned. Preplanned la nding patter ns should support the mission commander’s designated scheme of maneuver and possess easily identifi- able and accessible staging points. If required, LZ selection should include suitability for establishing CSS functions, defensiv e positions, and similar ground requirements. C ontrol of the LZ and PZ occurs over primary and secondary frequencies. Pickup Zone Considerations The ground force provides se curity to PZs until abandoned. Planning of PZs is critical, to include the location of AAs and ea sily identifiable and --- Page 141 --- 6-28 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 accessible staging points. The MACO establishes PZs as planned, aided by a PZ control party that—  Prepares, maintains, and marks landing sites and removes or marks obstacles.  Is prepared, trained, and equipped to mark and provide initial terminal guidance at night, which includes proper selection of marking material for pilots with NVDs.  Is prepared, trained, and equipped to direct and control helicopter operations within the PZ and support helicopter units landing in the zone. Mounted Operations Marine infantry compan ies are foot mobile by design. When required, task-organized infantry companies may execute t actically across a range of military operations mounted in vehicles that are wheeled or tracked, armored or unarmored, or some combination th ereof. The following subparagraphs address mounted operations with armor in high intensity environments, such as general war. Many techniques associated with mounted operations, such as movement tech- niques and techniques associated with the task organization of tank an d mechanized units, are applicable across a broa d range of operations (see chap. 11 and chap. 13 for more discussion of mounted operations in other environments and operational areas). Regardless of the vehi- cles used, the c.urrent family of Marine Corps vehicles in which an infantry company may be mounted are not infantry fighting vehicles and should not be employed as such. They lack the armor protection, stabi lized weapons station, low silhouette, and mean s for the infantry to fight from the vehicle without exposing them- selves to direct fire. Mission requirements, le ngth of an operation, logistical support , and other considerations drive the methods by which infantry companies receive vehicular support. Such support can be internal, external, or by cross-attachment. GOLF-LZ NUTHATCH Wave 1 2506 2-22 2505 2-21 2508 2-24 2507 2505 2506 2507 2508 MACO 2-23 GOLF-LZ EGRET Wave 2 2602 2-26 2601 2-25 2604 2-28 2605 2-29 2603 2601 2602 2603 2604 2605 2-27 HA HA Assembly area PZC MACO Timeline: 0345 - Serials staged in PZ 0400 - AMC arrives PZ 0415 - SLAYER arrive PZ-load 0420 - SEAWOLF arrive PZ-load 0420 - DOGMA 0455 - AMC/MC/SLAYER/THUNDER depart 0505 - DOGMA/SEAWOLF depart Legend: AMC - air mission commander HA - holding area MC - mission commander PZC - pickup zone control N Figure 6-13. Pickup Zone Example. --- Page 142 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 6-29 When employing the internal support method, the infantry company physical ly possesses a suite of vehicles that may or may not be suitable to mount the entire company simulta neously. Internal sup- port usually requires the infantry company to train and provide its own drivers; conduct its own basic maintenance; and conduct other logistical operations, such as fueling, maintenance tracking, and accountability. When employing the exte rnal support method, a vehicular unit, such as a truck or assault amphib- ian platoon, supports th e infantry company. In general, enough vehicles arrive with the support- ing unit to accommodate the entire company. The support unit may be attached depending on the length of the operation. While the ve hicular unit provides the personnel, vehicles, and mainte- nance needs for the vehi cles, the infantry com- pany can expect such increased logistical requirements as life s upport and fuel. Regardless of the length of the ope ration or the command relationship between the vehicular unit and the company, it is critical that the company com- mander set an appropriat e tone and take positive action to develop teamwork between both units. Cross-attachment refers to the task-organization methodology that, though normally conducted at the battalion leve l, directly affects the infantry company. In this method, battalions will often trade units to increase the lethality and capability of both of the parent battalions. The most com- mon variation of cross-a ttachment th at infantry companies will experience is that of infantry and armor companies between infantry and tank bat- talions, resulting in a ta nk heavy battalion task force and an infantry heavy battalion task force. Within the infantry batta lion, the cross-attach- ment of tank and infantry platoons results in tank heavy and infantry heavy company teams—also known as team tank a nd team mech. Company commanders in command of team mech wield significant combat power, but must also prepare for and mitigate the chan ges in cohesion brought about by the arrival of a tank platoon and the introduction of vehicula r support units to mount the company. Planning Considerations The creation of mission-sp ecific task forces pro- vides exceptional flexibility for commanders in battle. However, the ability for units to attach, cross-attach, and conduct successful operations together on short notice requires exceptionally mature and knowledgeable junior- and company- level leadership—maturit y in dealing with new personnel and relation ships and knowledge in understanding the capabilit ies and limitations of new units. Task Organization A mounted task force is created by task- organizing mounted infant ry and/or tanks under the command of a single battalion or regimental commander. Air, artillery, light armored recon- naissance, motor transp ort, and other LCE units support the mounted task force. The fun- damentals in the following subparagraphs apply to task organization. Flexibility . When creating task forces, it is important that the resulti ng organizations possess similar degrees of mobi lity to allow those task forces to work together. For example, a battalion task force in which one company remains entirely foot mobile effectively removes it as a maneuver element. A second cautio n is to avoid frequent changes to task organization. Strive to establish habitual command and support relationships as much as possible. For ex ample, it would be bet- ter for one company in a battalion to be vehicle mobile, remain vehicle mobile, and receive all missions that require that mobility vice moving a truck platoon around from company to company. Unity of Command . Mounted forces normally operate at distances and at tempos that preclude centralized control of supporting units by the par- ent headquarters. Attaching support units, such as mortar sections, to base maneuver elements is a method that ensures positive control and unity of effort. To maximize the advantages possible on a mobile battlefield, maneuver commanders must --- Page 143 --- 6-30 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 have the means and authority to control the employment of their combined arms force. Self-Sufficiency . In a similar manner to main- taining unity of command on the mobile battle- field, HHQ should also assign sufficient LCE resources to accomplish the mission. The intent is to provide the maneuver elements with sufficient control of their own situa tions so that they can take advantage of battlefield opportunities as they present themselves. Tactical Integrity . To facilitate and simplify command and control, the commander should maintain the tactical inte grity of units when task- organizing. Maintaining ta ctical integrity of CS units is secondary to the tactical integrity of com- bat units. Cross-Attachment. Task-organizing a force for a specific mission on a temporary basis uses the cross-attachment method ology mentioned previ- ously. Since the company is the smallest element of a mounted force, its task organization using cross-attachment results in the creation of com- pany teams. The mix of tank and mounted infan- try define cross-attach ed units, bu t these units generally consist of a tank or infantry headquar- ters; a combination of se veral tank, infantry, and/ or light armored reconna issance platoons; and an attached assault amphibian unit supporting the infantry. It is possible, if the mission dictates, to cross-attach dismounted infantry platoons. Only rarely are assault amphibian units attached to units below the infantry battalion level. More often, battalions receive an assault amphibian pla- toon as an attachment and place it in direct or general support of one of the infantry companies. The company operationall y controls the assault amphibian unit. Assault Amphibian Platoon . Organized into four sections of three AAVs each, the assault amphibian platoon normally conducts operations attached to or in direct or general support of the infantry company. When attached to another organization or given a support mission, the assault amphibian platoon commander works directly for the supported company commander. The assault amphibian platoon commander directs the employment of the platoon according to the supported un it commander’s CONOPS. The assault amphibian platoon employs AAVs to:  Achieve mounted mobility.  Negotiate obstacles.  Support the commander’s direct fires plan.  Enhance the commander’s communications capability. See MCWP 3-13, Employment of Amphibious Assault Vehicles , for more information on AAV operations and capabilities. Combat Support Commanders must be aware of the combat assets available to them and their employment capabili- ties and limitations and co nsider that knowledge during the planning process. Antiarmor. When augmented, the company likely receives TOW or Javelin antitank missile sys- tems. These systems need to be coordinated with the use of company antiarmor weapon systems. The TOW missile engages enemy armor at ranges up to 3,750 meters and typically receives mis- sions to overwatch lead un its or to cover flanks. Commanders should take advantage of the TOW missile’s range, penetrat ion, and optical sight capabilities to engage the enemy at maximum allowable ranges. The Javelin engages enemy armor at ranges of 2,000 meters and more. The Javelin’s lock-on-before -launch, fire-and-forget capability increases the probability of a hit because the gunner is not exposed to enemy threats while tracking the missile to its target. Mortars. When augmented, the company receives 81-mm mortar support from the battalion (81-mm mortar can deliver immediate suppressive fires or target marking at ranges up to 5,800 meters and organic 60-mm mortars up to 3,500 meters). Mor- tar squads may depend upon supporting vehicles for transport during mounted operations. Because of their limited range, mo rtar squads normally --- Page 144 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 6-31 move well forward in the vehicle formation. If receiving the support of the entire 81-mm mortar platoon, the two sections will normally bound to alternating firing position s to keep the lead ele- ments of the force within their firing fan. Heavy Machine Guns . When augmented, infan- try companies receive .50 caliber and MK19 HMGs. In their mo unted role, and with ranges at 1,500 meters or more , HMGs may rapidly respond to enemy contact through the establish- ment of bases of fire, may cover withdrawals in a similar manner, and may cover flanks. Artillery . Because towed ar tillery cannot dis- place as rapidly as the mounted force can move, artillery must echelon firi ng units forward to pro- vide continuous covera ge for an advancing mounted force. The arti llery FO supporting the mounted force should ma intain constant commu- nication with it to remain aware of the exact sta- tus of artillery support. If mounted units advance while their supporting artillery is displacing, early coordination with other supporting arms can pre- vent gaps in fire support coverage. Reconnaissance . Reconnaissance is one portion of intelligence collection and ground combat units provide reconnaissance support. In mounted oper- ations, reconnaissance t eams use air or mounted means for insertion. Patr ols will normally patrol forward and to the flanks , not to exceed the sup- porting arms’ umbrella provided by the MAGTF. Commanders should also consider the availability of organic and nonorganic UA system assets when planning their reconnaissance. Combat Engineers. In mounted operations, engi- neers perform their tradit ional mobility, counter- mobility, and surv ival roles thro ugh significant breaching of and creation of obstacles, bridging, and other similar tasks. Combat engi neers travel well forward in the mounted task force in order to take immediate action if chokepoints, obstacles, and minefields are expected. A company com- mander may be required to establish an obstacle clearing detachment. Commanders must make follow-on considerations for engineers during the exploitation phase. Antiair . Air defense systems within a com- pany’s battlespace normally consist of low alti- tude air defense teams that provide point coverage and defense. Normally, these teams per- form their duties as part of an integrated air defense network that ma y include the company team. Most possess their own transport and they must move on the battlefield to those positions that allow them to accomplish their mission. Regardless of their primary mission, the mere presence of antiair teams on the battlefield pro- vides company commanders with significant air defense capabilities. Air . Fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft provide CAS to the mounted forc e. While both plat- forms can provide overw atch and reconnais- sance functions, rotary-wing aircraft generally have a greater loiter time . On the mobile battle- field, vehicle marking a nd friendly unit location information is at a pr emium. The company FST, to include attached FACs, travel forward in the formation to gain and maintain the greatest situa- tional awareness of the company fire require- ments and maneuver locations. Execution Considerations In many ways, mounted movement consider- ations do not radically differ from foot mobile considerations. Providing overwatch for cross- compartment bounding does not change, nor does providing security during movement through the selection of various formations. The differences company commanders must understand lie in the speed of operations, the increased distances over which engagements occur, the lethality of the weapon systems employed, the resulting increase in casualties and disruption caused by cata- strophic hits on loaded ve hicles, and the need for dismounted security. Combat Formations and Movement Within mounted operatio ns, combat formations apply to movement and ha lts at both the platoon --- Page 145 --- 6-32 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 and at the company levels . Platoons use five for- mations—column/staggered column, line, wedge, vee, and left/right eche lon. The selection and change of formations depends on enemy threat, control requirements, and terrain. Interval varies according to visibility, te rrain, or weapon ranges. Companies generally move in column or line for- mation and the platoons may or may not conform to the company’s forma tion. When antiarmor, HMGs, or some combination of the two operate with a company, they pr ovide front, flank, and rear security through continuous movement, overwatch, bounding, and ot her appropriate tech- niques. Light armored reconnaissance attach- ments execute any of the preceding roles. When conducting a halt, platoons and companies use coil or herringbone formations. Longer halts normally dictate the use of the coil wi th its all- around security and defe nsive nature. Shorter halts normally dictate the use of the herringbone formation, which allows for rapid transition back to movement. Any halt lasting more than five minutes requires deployment of dismounted infantry to sweep the ar ea to negate mine, IED, and enemy dismounted threats. The longer the halt, the more formal an d robust the defensive posture to include such things as occupation of high ground, establishment of overwatch, and a local patrol plan. Mounted Movement Techniques Mounted infantry may move and fight both mounted and dismounted. When mounted, forces move into combat usi ng techniques of movement known as traveling, tr aveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch. Traveling movement uses formations that maxi- mize speed and control. Units employ this method when speed is important and contact is unlikely. Units employ traveling overwatch when speed and massed moveme nt are important and enemy contact is possib le. A trail element pro- vides continuous overwatch of a lead element while on the move. Depe nding on terrain, visibil- ity, and weapon systems, the trail element remains close enough to th e lead element to pro- vide immediate support upon contact, but not so close as to risk decisi ve engagement and lose freedom of maneuver. Th e trail element has con- siderable flexibility to ad just speeds and conduct short halts and similar ac tions to maintain effec- tive overwatch of the l ead element without com- promising the overall speed of the moving unit as a whole. Lead and trai ling elements maintain good communicatio n and are ofte n subelements of the same tactical unit. Units employ bounding overwatch when contact is expected and speed is no longer a factor. Bounding overwatch diffe rs from traveling over- watch in two ways: first, movement is not contin- uous; second, lead and tr ail elements exchange roles with each bound, becoming an overwatch element and a moving el ement. When the over- watch element assumes a position with good observation and fields of fire, the moving unit then bounds past the over watch unit to, in turn, occupy the next position with good observation and fields of fire. Th e length of each bound should not exceed two-thirds of the maximum effective range of the overwatching element’s weapon systems. Overwatching elements must be able to react quickly to any enemy action against the bounding element. Company commanders should consider overwatch positions as interme- diate objectives and focus combat power and fire support toward each. In case of contact, over- watch positions possess de fensive characteristics as well. There are two types of bounding over- watch: bounding by platoon, which includes all platoons of the company, and bounding within the lead platoon, which generally indicates a main body traveling behind a lead element using bounding overwatch. Mounted Movement Considerations Mounted movement consid erations are similar to foot mobile considerat ions in many ways, but commanders must remember that speed is often relative, and that dismo unted infantry often play an integral role in mounted movement. --- Page 146 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 6-33 Antiarmor/Heavy Machine Gun Movement . Units designed around th e CAAT model provide forward security through areas, such as danger areas, defiles, or built up areas. Additionally, their relative speed, vers atility, and light weights make them ideal for cont act point and guide mis- sions and for linkups and passage of lines tasks. Commanders should be aware that wheeled vehi- cles cannot negotiate ro ugh terrain at the same speed as tracked or light armored vehicles and so should plan accordingly. Movement Across Open Areas (Danger Areas). Under the cover of overwatch, a platoon rapidly bounds across the op en area to secure the far side. On signal, the rest of the company bounds across the dange r area without stopping. The interval between vehicles may increase depending on terrain and situation. Movement Through Wooded Areas. When moving through wooded areas, the infantry should dismount and move in front and on the flanks of the supporting vehicles. Vehicle inter- vals are close enough to ensure visual contact. Movement Across Intervisibility Lines. Inter- visibility lines are small terrain contours that pre- vent observation. While the obstruction of observation that occurs al ong fingers, hills, and ridgelines is obvious, in tervisibility lines are less obvious until encounter ed. They are dangerous because they provide the enemy an opportunity to conduct antiarmor fires before friendly forces can observe or react. When enemy contact is probable or imminent, dismounted infantry or light vehi- cles should clear the in tervisibility line before allowing armor to proceed. Movement Through Defiles . A defile is a nar- row gorge, pass, or similar manmade feature (fre- quently found on highways) that restricts lateral movement. If enemy contact is imminent or prob- able and bypassing the defile is not possible, then dismounted infantry clear the defile prior to the passage of vehicles. Movement During Periods Of Limited Visibil- ity. The company decreases speed and reduces vehicle interval to maintain visual contact between vehicles. The company dismounts infantry for security and guides if necessary. Optics profi- ciency will dictate additional measures required. Movement Through Built-Up Areas . Built-up areas provide the enemy with excellent positions from which to engage a mounted force. If the company must move through a built-up area with an unknown enemy situation, the infantry dis- mounts and clears the area in advance of the vehi- cles. Company commanders should consider establishing dismounted overwatch positions along the route. Passage of Lines . A designated unit representa- tive conducts advanced coordination with the sta- tionary unit for both forward and rearward passage of lines. Once vehi cles enter the passage lane, they never stop and must bypass disabled vehicles to the best of their ability. The moving unit uses the traveling technique, moves through the passage lane in colu mn, and continues to ori- ent all weapon systems toward the enemy. Checkpoints Due to the speed, range, and length of a mounted column, extensive use of checkpoint control measures is essential. In addition to lead and rear trace elements, main body subelements should also report checkpoints to enable company lead- ership to maintain situ ational awareness of the column’s speed, dispositi on, location, and over- all status. Mounted Immediate Action and Battle Drills Like all immediate action drills, mounted imme- diate action drills allow un its to make effective, immediate responses to enemy contact without hesitation. They are simple, well-rehearsed, usu- ally event driven, and ba cked up by a simple sig- nal plan that uses brevity codes. Immediate action drills are not set rules or maxims and company commanders can modify ba sic drills according to environment, formations, terrain, enemy threat, and company capabilities. Immediate action drills --- Page 147 --- 6-34 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 do not exist to win th e encounter, though poorly executed drills can cert ainly lose the encounter. Rather, immediate action drills exist to provide the opportunity for unit le adership to execute the basic steps in addressing any chance contact or meeting engagement, to deploy and report, to develop the situation, to determine a COA, and to execute the COA. Battle dr ills exist at the vehi- cle and crew level, a nd represent those basic actions needed for the vehicle to perform as an effective part of the unit. Immediate action drills include the following:  Actions upon contact.  Antitank guided missile (ATGM) drill.  Incoming artillery drill.  Air attack.  IED or possible IED. Battle drills include the following:  Dismount drill (normal and rapid).  Disabled vehicle/roll over.  Disabled weapon and reload drills.  Incapacitated driver.  Hasty roadblock set up.  Destruction plan.  Vehicle recovery plan. Mounted Operations Planning Considerations Planning mounted operations requires more energy and diligence than planning for other operations due to the likelihood of multiple attachments and differing command relation- ships, the possibility of company ownership of vehicles, the increased comp lexity of fire support planning, the greater impact of logistical limita- tions, and the employmen t considerations of a wide variety of weapon and vehicle systems. The following factors should be considered when planning mounted operations:  Vehicle maintenance responsibilities to include the assignment or allocation of maintenance personnel.  Employment of combat engineers.  Communication planning wi th multiple inter- nal vehicle, subunit, and command nets.  ROE limitations on weapon, ammunition, and pyrotechnic employment.  Increased use of tactical control measures and enhanced planning and coordination to enable decentralized control over greater distances.  Reserve decisions to include establishment, combat power, employment triggers, and reconstitution planning.  Increased training requirements, such as com- munications, vehicle drivers, CSWs, counter- IED systems, and mounted land navigation.  Terrain and weather limitations.  Development of mounted operations SOP.  Logistic planning for increased POL use and maintenance requirements to include organic refueling capability. The capabilities of mounted units include the fol- lowing:  Speed/mobility.  Increased firepower.  Increased C2 capabilities.  Enhanced FP.  Increased lift capacity for self-sustainment. The limitations of mounted units include the fol- lowing:  Dependency on fuel.  Vehicle mishaps and recovery.  Vehicle maintenance.  Requirement for trained drivers.  Decreased number of dismounts available.  Limited mobility in restricted terrain. Tank/Infantry Operations The use of tanks in mo unted operations maxi- mizes the ground mobility , protection, shock action, and firepower of these armored vehicles to destroy the enemy’s will to resist. Generation of combat power occurs through the massed employ- ment of tanks and by enhancing the mobility of --- Page 148 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 6-35 infantry by mounting them on supporting vehi- cles. Refer to MCWP 3-12, Marine Corps Tank Employment, for more information on tank opera- tions with infantry and safety precautions. Task Organization As discussed previously in this chapter, the use of cross-attachment at the company level results in the creation of team ta nk and team mech teams. While countless variations are possible, such as dismounted infantry rece iving tank support or a tank company receiving a mounted infantry pla- toon, the general principles of tanks and infantry working together remain the same. Coordination Mounted operations dema nd effective coordina- tion between the tank unit and the infantry unit it is supporting. The tank commander is responsible to advise supp orted unit commanders on the best employment of tanks in support of their schemes of maneuver. The infantry commander’s plans should maximize use of a tank’s firepower, enhanced target acquis ition (including thermal sights), and effective armor protection capabilities. In addition to understa nding a tank’s capabilities and limitations, the tank unit leader must also understand the disparate capabilities of the mounted force and advise the infantry com- mander accordingly. Mutual Support To exploit the mounte d force’s ca pabilities, tanks and mounted infant ry must work together in pursuit of a common goal. Each element of the mounted force provides a degree of support to the other elements. Tanks support mounted infantry by—  Providing mobile, protected firepower.  Neutralizing or destr oying hostile weapons by fire and movement.  Clearing paths for dismounted infantry through obstacles.  Neutralizing fortified positions with direct fire.  Supporting dismounted infantry by direct fire.  Assisting in the consolidation of the objective. Mounted infantry assi sts tanks and supporting vehicles by—  Breaching or removing antiarmor obstacles.  Assisting in the neutralization or destruction of enemy antiarmor weapons.  Designating targets fo r tanks and supporting vehicles.  Protecting tanks and s upporting vehicles from enemy infantry and antiarmor weapons.  Clearing bridges and fording areas.  Clearing restrictive terrain, such as urban, swamp, or woodland areas.  Conducting dismounted security patrols. Employment Methods There are three general me thods to employ tanks and mounted infantry together in an attack: both arms together; the infa ntry supported by the fire of the vehicles; or a mu ltiaxis attack, which is a combination of the two. Tank and Mounted Infantry Attack Together . When both arms are employed collectively, tanks and mounted infantry ad vance together within mutually supporting distances of each other. Tanks normally lead th e formation unless such factors as the terrain or the complexity of the enemy defenses and obstac les require an infantry lead. The infantry may remain mounted if the enemy’s antiarmor threat is weak or easily miti- gated, the terrain is ope n and obstacles easily bypassed, and terrain and weather could provide trafficability. If planning to dismount, the infan- try remains in the vehicl es as long as possible, balancing the desire to dismount close to the enemy with the enemy’ s antiarmor capability. The following are advantages of this method:  Exploits the mobilit y, speed, armor-protected firepower, and shock action of the mounted force.  Reduces enemy reaction time. --- Page 149 --- 6-36 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1  Disorganizes the enemy’s defense by using tanks to breach obstacles prior to the arrival of the infantry dismounts.  Conserves the energy of the infantry by reduc- ing the distance to travel on foot.  Reduces the amount of exposure of the infantry to enemy fires. The following are disadvantages of this method:  There is a greater potential for casualties, espe- cially among the infantry vehicles, if bypassing or suppressing enemy antiarmor fires fails.  The entire mounted force can become vulnera- ble to enemy fires if obstacles are not breached quickly or bypassed. Tanks and Vehicles Su pport the Infantry by Fire Only. Based on METT-T, commanders may decide to assault with dismounted infantry while using tanks and other vehicles in attack by fire or SBF methods. Leading wi th dismounted infantry is most applicable in rest rictive terrain, in limited visibility, when bypassing or suppressing the enemy’s antiarmor threat is difficult, when com- plex and significant enemy fortifications and obstacles exist, or when trafficability is poor. Contingency plans for all operations should include the possibility of conducting this method of attack; that is, the ve hicles stopping well short of the objective and suppo rting the infantry with their fires. Causes for such contingencies may include unexpected en emy antiarmor assets, unidentified enemy positi ons, breaching failures, or unexpected obstacles. The following are advantages of this method:  Increases vehicle survivability while still employing the positive characteristics of its primary weapon systems to compensate for the lack of infantry armor and mobility.  Enables vehicles to bound forward and main- tain effective support after the infantry clears areas during its advance.  Potentially, increases infantry survivability in the face of significant antiarmor threats. The following are disadvantages of this method:  Communications difficulty increases between dismounted infantry and support vehicles.  Maintaining positive control of direct fires in relation to maneuver becomes increasingly dif- ficult as the infantry advances and the ability to see it decreases.  Risk to infantry survivability due to lack of armor and mobility is greatly increased.  Vehicle attack by fire and SBF positions risk becoming indirect fire ta rgets the longer those positions remain occupied. Dismounting Security drives the ba sic decisions about how, when, where, and why to dismount infantry. Despite all of the various considerations and tech- niques, the infantry and its vehicles provide mutual support. When the vehicles are vulnera- ble, infantry dismounts to protect them and prose- cute the mission, whether that is by conducting an IED sweep at a maintenance halt or by clearing bunkers and trenches in c onjunction with vehicu- lar firepower. Dismounted infantry nor mally assigns squads to each tank secti on. The infantry moves a few meters behind and to th e flanks of the tanks, overwatching the tanks and maintaining observa- tion to the flanks and above. When necessary, the infantry moves forward of the tanks to clear spe- cific obstacles, such as dead spaces or defiles. Movement speed decreases in direct relation to the amount of clearing required. In urban environ- ments where infantry must clear buildings or in complex environments i nvolving ridges and high fingers, movement slows considerably. When in contact, infantry marks targets for tanks using radio or tank-phone talk-ons; direct fire tech- niques, such as tracers or laser designators; or indi- rect fires, such as grenade launchers or mortars. In the assault, dismount points may be short of the objective, on the objective, or after passing through the objective. Timing is critical because dismount- ing too early slows the force’s momentum and --- Page 150 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 6-37 unnecessarily exposes the in fantry to hostile fire, while dismounting too la te exposes vehicles to that same hostile fire. Company commanders take into account the enemy threat, the function of speed providing security , and acceptable risk. Dismounted infantry should be aware of how to move in close proximit y to tanks, under tank machine gun fires, and around the tank main gun danger area. Dismounting on the Objective. Dismounting on the objective is a technique used when the mounted force has achieved surprise or when the enemy’s antiarmor defense is weak. The following are advantages of dismounting on the objective:  Greater speed and shock effect.  Mounted infantry rema ins protected longer from the fires of enemy small arms.  Supporting fires can continue while the mounted force approaches its objective since mounted infantry has greater protection against shell fragments and other small projectiles. The following are disadv antages of dismounting on the objective:  Difficulty orienting mounted infantry to spe- cific objectives.  Difficulty establishing control at the dismount point due to potentially close enemy fires.  Difficulty in directi ng supporting fires against enemy positions in clos e proximity to friendly dismounted infantry.  Vulnerability of infant ry vehicles to short- range antiarmor weapons.  High volume of accurate, suppressive fire is required to support dismounted infantry. Dismount Short of the Objective. The follow- ing identifies advantages of dismounting short of the objective:  Dismounted infantry is protected from small arms and indirect fires while dismounting.  Infantry achieves bett er orientation on the objective.  Unit cohesion is enhanced by establishing con- trol in the relative protection of the dismount point before committing to the assault.  Organic and supporting fi res can suppress the enemy while the infantry is dismounting. The following are disadv antages of dismounting short of the objective:  Dismounted infantry is exposed longer to enemy small arms and in direct fire while mov- ing forward in the assault.  Suitable dismount point s that are forward of enemy positions may be targeted by enemy direct and indirect fires. Dismounting Beyond the Objective. Dismount- ing beyond the objective occurs when company commanders desire to us e the speed and mobility of a purely mounted attack, most often when they achieve decisive surprise on an unprepared enemy. In this case, th e dismounted infantry serves to “mop up” after the desire d effects of the vehi- cles are produced. The enemy threat determines if dismounting beyond the objective is feasible. The following are advantages of dismounting beyond the objective:  Dismounted infantry fi ghts from an area and direction not expected by the enemy.  Unit cohesion is enhanced by establishing con- trol in the relative protection of the dismount point before committing to the assault.  Infantry achieves bett er orientation on the objective.  Shock effect on the enemy caused by a mounted force moving th rough its position is likely to be considerable. The following are disadv antages of dismounting beyond the objective:  Enemy reaction or unexpected defenses in depth may cause catastrophic failure.  Unexpected enemy resistance may lead to a requirement to dismoun t the infantry on the --- Page 151 --- 6-38 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 objective with associated lack of situational awareness.  Enemy indirect and direct fires might still tar- get suitable dismount points. General Considerations for Tank/Infantry Integration Tank platoons have two sections, each consisting of two tanks. Tanks fight as pairs and will only rarely entertain fighting as individual vehicles. A tank’s greatest vulnerabilit y is enemy infantry in restrictive terrain. Restrictive terrain provides en- emy infantry the greatest opportunity to approach and destroy tanks, while severely limiting tank mobility, vision, and weapons effectiveness. Company commanders should not plan to use tanks to haul personnel, equipment, or cargo; however, tanks can transport personnel short dis- tances, if needed, and ride points exist for that purpose. The presence of passengers on a tank severely restricts the employment of the tank’s weapon systems. Tanks can also recover other vehicles and even other tanks if a tank recovery vehicle is not available. Consolidation and Reorganization Like any other type of attack, consolidation and reorganization occur imme diately after seizing the objective. The focus of consolidation and reorganization remains reconstitution of the force to repel an enem y counterattack or con- duct exploitation and pu rsuit. While conducting the basic drills of cons olidation and reorganiza- tion is more complex with the presence of vehi- cles, the classic memory aid SAFE—security, automatic weapons, fields of fire, entrench- ment—still applies. The mounted force consolidates the objective by positioning tanks and other vehicles in overwatch positions focused on likely enemy avenues of approach during the plac ement of antiarmor and CSWs and dismounted infantry. Vehicles seek concealment and hull-defilade positions when pos- sible. Dismounted infantry normally designates tar- gets for the overwatching vehicles and uses organic and supporting fires to destroy any enemy resis- tance. After consolidati on, the infantry remounts and prepares to conduct follow-on missions. The mounted force reorganizes by conducting logistical resupply operations, especially refuel- ing of vehicles, which re quire the force to move back to a covered pos ition. The mounted force also conducts reorgani zation by arranging for medical evacuation of casualties and conducting EPW handling operations. --- Page 152 --- CHAPTER 7 DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS This chapter discusses the functional and detailed planning, preparation, and execution of defen- sive operations. These operations are temporary measures conducted to identify or create enemy weaknesses, protect the force, and create the opportunity to go on the of fense. While properly conducted defensive operations can defeat numerically superior forc es, the offense remains the form of decisive actio n. Infantry forces in the defense rely on terrain and surprise to support their defensive form of maneuver. They maintain an offensive focus and seek to avoid static defenses that surrender the initiative. Purpose of the Defense The purpose of the defense is to defeat an enemy attack, protect the force, stabilize a situation, gain time, economize forces and resources, and gain the initiative for offensive operations. As illustrated in figure 7-1, the defense and defensive functions are inherent parts of all ope rations across a range of military operations. While the defense may some- times be stronger than the offense and it may sometimes prevent enemy vi ctory, it rarely deliv- ers victory on its own—the offense provides the decisive form of action. For example, in stability operations, company co mmanders may assign forces to defend critical infrastructure that enables normalcy for the populace, but they will rely on offensive action to support the competent function- ing of local government. In offensive operations , a portion of the force may defend an exposed flank in order to allow the main effort to cont inue to pursue an enemy. The defense denies key or vital terrain and infra- structure to a threat while retaining similar criti- cal elements for friendly use. Defense operations seek to shape the situat ion for offensive action and victory either by attriting, canalizing, or fix- ing enemy forces, or by harboring resources, guarding the popul ace, and providing security. The defense demands th at company commanders demonstrate flexibility, adaptability, and agility since the end purpose is always to regain the ini- tiative. In conducting the defense, company com- manders protect vital forces and assets, disrupt the threat, and generate the effects necessary to set the conditions for successful offensive action. Types of Defensive Operations In general, the infantry company, as part of any defense, may defend, disrupt, delay, withdraw, counterattack, or conduc t any other defensive method as part of a larger type of defense. Indeed, company commanders may combine or phase between different t ypes of defense as part of their overall plan fo r mission accomplishment. Within these options, th ere are three broad types of defensive efforts—mobile defense, area defense, and retrograde. Joint Campaigns (Overseas) Defense Stability Offense Offense Stability Defense Defense Stability Offense Figure 7-1. The Defense Across a Range of Military Operations. --- Page 153 --- 7-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Mobile defense orients on the destruction of the enemy by allowing him to become vulnerable in his attack and then defe ating him through deci- sive offensive action by a striking force. The infantry company may us e any number of defen- sive methods to create the environment neces- sary for the success of the offense. Area defense concentrates on defeating the enemy by denying him access to designated ter- rain or infrastructure for a specified time. The infantry company may us e any number of defen- sive methods to accomplish its mission. Retrograde involves orga nized movement away from the enemy. A transitional operation, the retrograde defense occurs within a larger scheme designed to regain the in itiative from the enemy. Three specific defe nsive methods—delay, withdrawal, and retirement—are associated with the retrograde. Characteristics of the Defense The characteristics of th e defense are also defen- sive planning fundamental s for the infantry com- pany. These characteristi cs include maneuver, preparation, mass and concentration of fires, flex- ibility, use of terrain, mu tual support, depth, sur- prise, knowledge of enemy, and security. Maneuver Maneuver is as important in the defense as it is in the offense. While steadfastness and the tenacious holding of key terrain are essential in the defense, the defender must not become immobile. Defend- ers must maintain thei r freedom of maneuver. Maneuver is essential in generating the offensive power fundamental to a successful defense. Maneuver is essential to security operations, operations within the MBA, and rear operations. Units of all sizes ma neuver in depth, taking advantage of terrain and tactical developments to concentrate, disperse, a nd occupy positions from which they can bring effect ive fire to bear on the enemy. Examples include the security force delaying from a series of successive battle posi- tions (BPs) to disrupt the enemy prior to his arrival in the MBA or a supporting effort moving into an attack by fire pos ition in order to provide suppressive fires for a planned counterattack. Preparation Defenders arrive in the battle area before the attacker, which remains tr ue at the local level even within stability operations; hence, defend- ers must take advantage of this situation by mak- ing the most thorough pr eparations for combat possible in the time availa ble. By analyzing the factors of METT-T, the infantry company com- mander gains an understandi ng of the tactical sit- uation and identifies potential friendly and enemy weaknesses. Defenders then wargame friendly and enemy options and synchronize their CONOPS with all availabl e combat multipliers. Such defensive planning, depending on the condi- tions, can be either hast y or deliberate. These terms refer to the manner in which the infantry company prepares the defe nse; they are not types of defense. Hasty Defense A hasty defense is normally organized while in contact with the enemy or when contact is immi- nent and time available fo r organizati on is lim- ited. A hasty defense normally includes BPs, overnight perimeters, ha sty vehicle checkpoints, and cordons. Reconnaissance of the sector ceases and units assume the defe nse directly from their current positions. Dependin g on the situation, it may be necessary for co mmanders to initiate hasty attacks to seize terrain suitable to their defense. Commanders may employ a security force to delay the enemy while deploying the bulk of their force to more suitable defensive ter- rain. Improvement of the hasty defense is contin- uous as the situation pe rmits and may eventually become a deliberate defense. --- Page 154 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 7-3 Deliberate Defense A deliberate defense is normally organized when out of contact with the enemy or when contact with the enemy is not imminent and time for organization is available. A deliberate defense normally includes fortifications, strong points, forward operating bases (FOBs), permanent vehi- cle checkpoints, extensive use of obstacles, and fully integrated fires. Company commanders are normally free to make detailed reconnaissance of their sectors, select the terrain on which to defend, and decide the best tactical deployment of forces. Mass and Concentration Successful defenders concentrate combat power at a decisive time and place. By massing fires, they obtain a local advantage at points of decision. Offensive action and the use of surprise and deception are often the means of gaining this advantage in the defense. Concentration refers to combat power and its effe cts, not just numbers of personnel and weapon systems. To concentrate combat power, the defe nder may economize in some areas, retain a reserve, and maneuver to gain local superiority. Indirect fire can shift to critical points to rapidly generate destructive effects. Company commanders designate their main efforts based on their antic ipation of the enemy’s likely COAs and corres ponding vulnerabilities. The defensive scheme of maneuver takes advan- tage of terrain essential to the integrity of the defense while the reserve occupies a position that allows it to intervene quickly in support of the main effort. Since they usually cann ot determine with cer- tainty where the enemy will attack, commanders remain ready to rapidly shift their main efforts. The defender masses fires and concentrates com- bat power repeatedly to wrest the initiative from the attacker. Company commanders do this swiftly, since periods that allow them to develop superior combat power wi ll be brief. The com- mander may have to surrender some ground to gain the time necessary to concentrate forces. Flexibility Successful flexibility li es in sound preparation and effective command and control. The defender must be agile enough to counter or avoid the attacker’s blow and then strike back effectively. Flexibility results from detailed problem fram- ing, understanding the unit’s purpose, detailed planning for contingencies, aggressive reconnais- sance and security, preplanned counterattacks, uses of offensive tech niques, organization in depth, and retention or reconstitution of a reserve. Flexibility requires that the company commander “see” the battlefield, both physically and through timely and accurate reports. Supplementary posi- tions on secondary avenues of approach may pro- vide additional flexibility to the company commander. After proper analysis of the terrain and enemy situation, the commander can antici- pate enemy actions and prepare to act through the positioning of maneuver units or a reserve. Use of Terrain Company commanders ex ploit every aspect of geographic terrain, hu man environment, and weather to their advantag e. Terrain is only valu- able if a force gains a dvantage from its posses- sion or control. Through IPB, companies identify terrain that favors the a ttacker, such as covered and concealed routes, and seek to mitigate or neu- tralize the effects. When selecting friendly posi- tions to generate decisive effects on the enemy, the defender seeks to defend on terrain that maxi- mizes effective fire, c over, concealment, move- ment, and surprise. Obstacle integration mu ltiplies the effects and capabilities of firepow er. The combination of firepower and obstacles causes the enemy to conform to the friendly defensive scheme of maneuver. Obstacles magnify the effects of fire- power by increasing target acquisition time and by creating exploitable vulnerabilities. Obsta- cles not properly integr ated with maneuver and the fire support plan i nhibit friendly maneuver, waste resources, and have negligible effects on enemy maneuver. --- Page 155 --- 7-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Mutual Support The company commander obtains mutual sup- port in the scheme of maneuver by positioning units so they can reinfo rce each other by fire or movement. Mutual support strengthens any defense by preventing the enemy from isolating and massing on any one portion of the friendly defense. Mutual support forces attackers to dis- perse resources, fires, a nd effort away from their main objective. Defense in Depth A shallow defense is vu lnerable to a concen- trated attack at any point. Defense in depth uses mutually supporting defensive positions through- out the MBA to absorb and progressively weaken the attack, employs security efforts forward to defeat the enemy’s synchronization and under- standing of the defense, and establishes a maneu- ver area for the reserve. The greater the enemy’s combat power and the wi der the AO, the greater the depth of the defense must be. Defense in depth is necessary to—  Disrupt the momentum of the attack and pre- vent a breakthrough.  Force the enemy into engagement areas (EAs).  Allow the defender time to determine the enemy’s main effort and to counter it.  Force the enemy to commi t his reserves at a nondecisive point.  Disperse the effects of enemy fire. Defense in depth is achieved by—  Engaging the enemy at the earliest opportunity with security forces.  Using combined arms.  Employing weapons at maximum effective range.  Using blocking positions, obstacles, and sup- plementary positions throughout the MBA.  Positioning and moving re serves and fire sup- port units. Surprise The attacker possesses th e initiative and chooses the time and place of his assault. However, the defender achieves surprise with obstacles, fires, security forces, cover and concealment, mutually supporting positions , and defensive mobility to delay, disrupt, fix, an d eventually defeat the enemy. Deception, discipline, camouflage, and use of cover and concealment protect the force and preserve combat power by misleading the enemy as to the true location of friendly posi- tions and strength of forc es. The keys to surprise are concealment, counterreconnaissance, OPSEC, and thorough preparation. Knowledge of Enemy The defense is largely re active. What the attacker does or does not do dictates a company com- mander’s options. Wh en conducting problem framing, an understanding of the environment and a thorough knowledge of the enemy’s capa- bilities, operational concep ts and equipment, and weapons capabilities are essential to selecting a valid scheme of maneuver. For example, integrat- ing water features into an obstacle plan is useless if the enemy possesses significant amphibious and bridging capabilities; whereas, positioning on the reverse slope might be appropriate in the face of a large enemy indirect fire capability. Local Security All units provide their own local security. Ter- rain, communications, target acquisition capabili- ties, and the enem y threat determine the depth of local security. Passive Security Measures All units employ passive security measures to reduce exposure to the en emy, to include obser- vation, electronic exposure, and fires. Communi- cations procedures, camouflage, movement control, and other indi vidual continuing actions are strictly enforced. --- Page 156 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 7-5 Active Security Measures Active security measures include combat patrol- ling, sensors, target ac quisition radars, surveil- lance, and employment of false visual and electronic signatures. In addition, capability sets of certain units enhance the security posture of the organization. For exam ple, engineers contrib- ute to survivability, mo bility, and countermobil- ity—all of which contribute to security. Organization of the Battlespace The defensive sector in depth consists of three areas: the security area, MBA, and rear area (see fig. 7-2). These areas ar e equally applicable to linear and nonlinear battlespace environments. For any echelon of comma nd, the security area is forward of the forward edge of the battle area SECURITY AREA MAIN BATTLE AREA AA RESERVE X XX REAR AREA FEBA PL SCOUT FLOT FEBA PL SCOUT FLOT (+) (-) Legend: FEBA - forward edge of the battle area FLOT - forward line of own troops PL - phase line Figure 7-2. Organization of the Battlespace (Regimental Level). --- Page 157 --- 7-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 assigned to the security fo rces. It is where secu- rity forces execute assigned tasks. The commander adds depth to the defens e by extending the secu- rity area as far forward as is tactically feasible, which allows security forces to inflict the greatest possible damage and di sruption to the enemy attack by the time the enemy reaches the MBA. The MBA extends from the forward edge of the battle area to the rear bo undaries of the forward subordinate units. The commander positions forces throughout the MBA to destroy or contain enemy assaults. Reserv es in the MBA reduce penetrations, regain te rrain, or destroy enemy forces. The greater the depth of the MBA, the greater the maneuver spac e for fighting the main defensive battle that is afforded to subordinate commanders. The decisive defensive battle usu- ally occurs in the MBA. The rear area extends forward from a com- mand’s rear boundary to th e rear boundary of the MBA. This area exists primarily for CSS func- tions. Rear operations in clude those functions of security and sustainmen t required to maintain continuity of operations by the force as a whole. Organization of the Force In a similar manner to other functions across a range of military operations, conducting defen- sive action normally imposes multiple tasks on the commander. Such task s may be phases, con- ditions, or elements that are particular to any type of defense or form of defensive maneuver. These requirements directly affect the manner in which the commander divides the available combat power and resources in organizing for the defense. The conduct of the defense is built around the concept of se curity, MBA, and rear area forces. Maneuver warfare doctrine dictates that the tasks associated with these elements be assigned doctrinally to them. Main Effort Company commanders weight the main effort to ensure success at the decisive point. In the defense, this role often li es with the tasks associ- ated with the MBA force. This often means that the main effort contains the greatest concentra- tion of combat power, but not always. The pur- pose of the main effort is to accomplish the company’s mission, and the designation of a main effort allows the co mpany to focus all of its energies, actions, and re sources toward enabling the main effort to achieve success. As the element that achieves the comp any’s mission, the main effort’s task and purpose should nest directly with that of the company. For example, when conduct- ing a sector defense, a company commander is likely to charge the comp any’s main effort with tasks that will result in the achievement of deci- sive effects in the primary engagement area. Supporting Efforts Supporting efforts enable the main effort to achieve success at the decisive point. The com- pletion of tasks associated with security and rear area forces most often involve one or more sup- porting efforts. For example, in conducting a sec- tor defense, a company commander may task one of the company’s supporting efforts with disrupt- ing the enemy in the secu rity area in order to allow the main effort to achieve success in an engagement area in the MBA. The mission assigned to supporting e fforts must directly sup- port the main effort’s purpose. Such nesting allows supporting efforts to exercise initiative to react on the battlefield in ways to ensure the main effort’s success, including being prepared to assume the main effort’s mission. Supporting efforts receive the comb at power, attachments, and any other enablers needed to accomplish their mission in support of the main effort. Across all types of the defense, su pporting efforts may use BPs or successive BPs, delay and disruption, --- Page 158 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 7-7 deception, lane closures, suppressive fires, or other tactics to—  Allow the main effort to maneuver to the deci- sive point.  Prevent the enemy from reacting to the defense.  Cause the enemy to dissi pate his fire support, lose his formation cohe sion, or prematurely commit his reserves.  Prevent the enemy from surprising the main effort. Reserve The primary mission of th e reserve is to conduct decisive action, take advantage of sudden opportu- nities, reinforce main effo rt success, and exploit main effort success. The reserve is normally asso- ciated with the MBA forces and its employment at the decisive moment is the commanders’ principal means to influence the action. A reserve does not reinforce failure. The reserve must be large enough to exploit success, yet its size should not materially weaken the main effort. In a deliberate defense, the reserve might be a very small part of the com- pany; whereas, in a mobile defense, the reserve may constitute the bulk of the company, ready for commitment as the main e ffort’s counterattack. Company commanders cons ider the size of the reserve depending on the following:  Contemplated missions of the reserve.  Forces available.  Type of maneuver planned.  Terrain over which the reserve must travel.  Possible hostile reactions.  Clarity of the situation. Defensive Methods While the type of defense conducted—sector, BP, strong point, linear, perimeter, reverse slope, and retrograde—might be read ily apparent, the time available to prepare for that defense represents the most significant criteria in determining which defensive methods the company commander selects, followed closel y by such considerations as mission, enemy threat , terrain, and relative combat power. Sector A defensive sector allows a unit freedom of action to accomplish its mission within assigned boundaries (see fig. 7-3) . This form of defense normally orients on the enemy force and not on retaining terrain. The size of the sector depends on the situation, but should generally be no larger than what can be influenced by the unit; the strength of the sector comes from its flexibility. The defensive sector is effective because as enemy forces penetrate into the depth of the defense, they expose thei r flanks and critical C2 and logistic assets to assault from a unit defending within the sector. Co mpany commanders assign defensive sectors to platoons, giving them the flexibility to operate in a decentralized manner while using mission tactic s to provide the control Figure 7-3. Sector Defense. --- Page 159 --- 7-8 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 necessary to avoid confusion and synchronize the company’s operation. Company commanders favor platoon sectors when they cannot effectively see and control the company fight, such as in restricted terrain where mutual support among the company’s platoon BPs is difficult to achieve. Battle Position A BP is a defensive position oriented on the most likely enemy avenue of approach from which a unit may defend or attack (see fig. 7-4). It can deny or delay the enemy the use of certain ter- rain or an avenue of a pproach. It is a defensive method that is functional down to the squad level. A BP (as a graphic sy mbol) allows the com- mander to exercise more control over the force assigned the BP; however, the graphic itself does not dictate the physical bou ndaries of the BP, but merely depicts the genera l location and orienta- tion of the preponderance of the assigned force. The size of a BP can vary with the size of the unit assigned to defend it a nd may, in turn, consist of a number of subordinate BPs. Occupation is usu- ally hasty and improvements to the position are continuous. There are four types of BPs—pri- mary, alternate, supplem entary, and subsequent. The defensive method strong point bears many similarities with BPs and its relationship is shown in figure 7-5. Primary The primary BP is the best place to accomplish the assigned mission. It is frequently focused on the enemy’s most likely avenue of approach. Alternate The alternate BP is wher e a unit can still accom- plish its assigned mission, but that is occupied when the primary BP becomes either untenable or unsuitable. Viewed from a different perspective, alternate BPs can enable the use of maneuver within a defensive position by increasing surviv- ability and allowing the de fender to engage the enemy from multiple and varying positions. Supplementary A supplementary BP allows a unit to address branch plans or alternate enemy COAs. For example, a supplementary BP may cover the flank of the primary BP or cover an alternate ave- nue of approach into the AO. Subsequent A subsequent BP is a preplanned position to which a unit expects to move during the course of the defensive battle. A un it may have a series of subsequent BPs, each of which may have its own set of alternate and s upplementary positions. A BP 21 BP 8 EA HEN EA DOVEBP 7 BP 18 BP 23 Subsequent battle position Alternate battle positions Primary battle positions Supplementary battle position Strong point BP 17 Figure 7-4. Battle Position Defense. Figure 7-5. Battle Position Types. --- Page 160 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 7-9 company commander who executes a mobile type defense with a sector as his form of maneuver might choose to have a supporting effort use a series of subsequent BPs to set the conditions for a successful counterattack with the main effort. Strong Point A strong point is a fortified defensive position designed to deny the enemy certain terrain as well as the use of an avenue of approach. Unlike BPs, strong points are occupied for an extended period. Established on cr itical terrain, the strong point must be held for the defense to succeed. Strong points organize for all-around defense and should have sufficient supplies and ammunition to continue to fight even if surrounded or cut off from resupply. Linear The linear defensive meth od allows interlocking and overlapping observa tion and fields of fire across the company’s front (see fig. 7-6). It is most normally associated with the area type of defense. The bulk of the company’s combat power is well forward. Su fficient resources must be available to provid e adequate combat power across the sector to detect and stop an attack. The company relies on fighting from well-prepared, mutually supporting positions . It uses a high vol- ume of direct and indirect fires to stop the attacker. The main concern when fighting a linear defense is the lack of flexibility and the difficulty of both seizing the in itiative and seeking out enemy weaknesses. When the enemy has a mobility advantage, a linear defense entails accepting extreme risk. Ob stacles, indirect fires, and contingency plans are critical to this maneu- ver. The company depe nds upon surprise, well- prepared positions, and de adly accurate fires to defeat the enemy. The re serve is usually small, perhaps a squad. Perimeter Company commanders may choose a perimeter defensive method when conducting either area or mobile types of de fenses. A perimeter de- fense focuses the energy of the defense in all directions (see fig. 7-7). The infantry company might be called upon to execute the perimeter defense under a variety of conditions, including the following:  Providing FP.  Conserving or building combat power to exe- cute offensive or patrolling operations. Figure 7-6. Linear Defense. Figure 7-7. Perimeter Defense. --- Page 161 --- 7-10 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1  Holding critical terrai n in areas where the defense is not tied in with adjacent units.  Having been bypassed and isolated by the enemy and must defend in place.  Conducting occupation of an independent AA, bivouac, or reserve position.  Beginning preparation of a strong point.  Concentrating fires into two or more adjacent avenues of approach. Reverse Slope An alternative to defe nding on the forward slope of a hill or a ridge is to defend on a reverse slope (see fig. 7-8). In such a defensive method, the company deploys on terra in masked from enemy direct fire and ground observation by the crest of a hill. Although some units and weapons may emplace on the forward slope , the crest, or the counterslope (a forward sl ope of a hill to the rear of a reverse slope), most forces are on the reverse slope. When executing a reverse slope defense, the commander places special emphasis on—  A fire support plan to prevent the enemy’s occupation and use of the topographical crest.  The proper organization of the forward slope to provide observation across the entire front and security to the main BPs.  A counterattack plan th at specifies measures necessary to clear the crest or regain it from the enemy.  Fire support to destr oy, disrupt, and attrit enemy forces on the forward slope. Retrograde The retrograde is a form of defensive method that involves organized m ovement away from the enemy. The enemy may fo rce these operations or a commander may execut e them voluntarily. In Crest of hill Forward slope Platoons on reverse slope Reserve on counterslope Company mortars MGS OP OP Legend: MGS - machine gun system Figure 7-8. Reverse Slope Defense. --- Page 162 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 7-11 either case, the higher commander of the force executing the operation mu st approve the retro- grade. Retrograde operations improve tactical sit- uations, gain time, repos ition forces or conform to other movements, create conditions for offen- sive action by drawing th e enemy into an unfa- vorable situation, or prevent worse outcomes from developing. Companies normally conduct retrogrades as part of a larger force. There are three types of retrograde operations—delay, with- drawal, and retirement. Delay A delay is a retrograde in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing the enemy’s momentum an d inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without, in principle, deci- sive engagement. Delays gain time for friendly forces to establish defenses, cover defending or withdrawing units, protect friendly unit flanks, contribute to economy of force, draw the enemy into unfavorable positions, and determine the enemy main effort. Withdrawal A withdrawal is a planned operation in which a force in contact disengage s from an enemy force. Withdrawals may involve all or part of a commit- ted force. Commanders conduct withdrawals to preserve the force, release it for a new mission, avoid combat under undesirable conditions, or reposition forces. Enemy pressure may or may not be present during w ithdrawals. Withdrawing forces may be unassisted or assisted by another friendly force. Retirement A retirement is an opera tion in which a force out of contact moves away from the enemy. Another unit between it and the enemy normally protects a retiring unit; however, the retiring unit must establish security. Ofte n, a retirement immedi- ately follows a withdrawal. Sequence of the Defense As part of a larger element, the infantry rifle com- pany conducts defensive operations in a sequence of integrated and overlapping steps. Many of these steps, such as the use of a security force to counteract threat reconn aissance attempts, apply to any threat in any par ticular tactical environ- ment across a range of military operations. The following paragraphs focus on the tactical consid- erations and procedures involved in each step. Though this discussion illustrates an attacking enemy that uses depth in its operations, there will be situations during which a company must defend against an enemy that does not have a doc- trinal operational found ation. Such situations require more flexible pl ans that allow for more centralized combat power rather than spreading it throughout the company’s AO. The infantry com- pany may also conduct ba se camp or perimeter defense operations along with offensive and patrolling operations agai nst terrorist, insurgent, or guerilla forces. Reconnaissance, Security Operations, and Enemy Preparatory Fires At the beginning of the defense, company com- manders push a security force forward to immedi- ately challenge the enemy’s ability to determine or affect friendly actions. This security force nor- mally works in conjunction with the security plan of the HHQ. Under the pr otection of this security force, company commanders conduct reconnais- sance and begin developing the defensive scheme of maneuver. Most likely enemy actions during this period are aggressive reconnaissance, local attacks by enemy forward detachments and advance guard elements, enemy indirect fires to harass and interdict, and early attempts to breach or delay emplacement of obstacles. Security forces protect friendly MBA forces, counter the enemy’s reconnaissance plan, and allow defen- sive preparations to continue undetected and unmolested by the enemy. The use of screen, --- Page 163 --- 7-12 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 guard, or cover in a security force’s mission state- ment determines the amount of resistance the security force will offe r. Accordingly, the secu- rity force must receive the necessary resources to successfully accomplish its mission. Security Force The goal of the security force is FP for the main body, which is accomplished by providing early warning, destroying enemy reconnaissance units, and impeding and harassing enemy main body elements. The security force continues its mission until directed to displ ace. Battalion commanders also may use security fo rces in their deception efforts to give the illusion of strength in one area while positioning their true combat power in another. While conducting this type of security operation, the infantry company may have to pre- pare a defense within the MBA, such as creating BPs. Such preparations may result in time and resource management challenges for commanders and their subordinate leaders. Rearward Passage of Lines Since a security force is forward of the MBA, company commanders must make plans for a rearward passage of lin es—whether the security force is a squad-sized element or a sister com- pany within the battali on, or whether the com- pany is the stationary or moving unit. Since the enemy has the initiative and will dictate the time and place of the attack, planning for the rearward passage of lines begins as the security force moves forward because the passage of lines could happen at any time. Planning and preparation includes liaison, route pr eparation and reconnais- sance, passage point control measures, guides, and battle handover criteria. Occupation and Preparation During this step, the company begins to execute the defensive scheme of maneuver by reconnoi- tering and occupying its positions. This execu- tion usually includes mo vement from tactical AAs to the actual defe nsive AO, is led by an advance guard that clear s the defensive posi- tions, begins the preliminary priority of work, and establishes security forward. Remaining forces begin to develop EAs, prepare BPs, rehearse routes, and take other st eps appropriate to the choice of defensive method. Operational and tac- tical security is critic al during the occupation to ensure the company ca n avoid detection and maintain combat power for the actual defense. Marines at all levels of the company must thor- oughly understand their du ties and responsibili- ties related to the occupa tion; they must be able to execute the occupation quickly and efficiently to maximize the time ava ilable for planning and preparing the defense. Approach of the Enemy Main Attack As this phase begins, the security force executes its mission by observin g, reporting, and, if required, engaging the enemy with direct and indirect fires, EW, an d CAS (deep fight). The goal is to use these acti ons along with disrupting obstacles to shape the ba ttlefield, to slow the enemy’s advance, and to disrupt the enemy’s for- mations. As the enemy’ s main body echelon approaches the EA, the company may use sup- porting arms to further weaken it by attrition. As the enemy comes into close contact with friendly forces in the MBA, negating the use of some sup- porting arms, those assets shift their efforts to the enemy’s second echelon forces. Friendly forces occupy their defensive positions before the enemy reaches direct fire range; they may shift positions in res ponse to enemy ac tions or other tactical factors. Enemy Assault During an enemy assault, the enemy deploys to generate mass at a desi gnated point, normally employing both assault and support forces. This action may leave him vul nerable to the com- bined effects of obstacles integrated with direct and indirect fires. The enemy may employ addi- tional forces to attempt to fix friendly elements --- Page 164 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 7-13 and prevent their repositio ning. Friendly coun- terattack forces may be committed against the enemy flank or rear, whil e other friendly forces may displace to alternate, supplementary, or subsequent positions in support of the com- mander’s scheme of maneuver. All friendly forces should be prepared for the enemy to max- imize employment of combat multipliers, such as engineers, to creat e vulnerabilities. If so capable, the enemy may also use artillery, CAS, and chemical weapons to set the conditions for the assault. Counterattack Like all attacks, counter attacks may be hasty or deliberate. They may be in response to unfore- seen enemy actions or the appearance of sudden opportunities, or they ma y be preplanned as the decisive action that serv es to defeat the enemy attack. Regardless, count erattacks are a type of attack and conducted accordingly to include plan- ning, rehearsals, and well-understood commit- ment criteria (see chap. 6). Consolidation and Reorganization The company must secure its sector by reposi- tioning forces, destroying remaining enemy ele- ments, processing EPWs, and re-establishing obstacles. The company conducts all necessary CSS functions as it prepares to continue the defense. Even when enemy forces are not actively engaging it, th e infantry company must maintain awareness of the tactical situation and local security at all times during consolidation and reorganization. The company then must pre- pare itself for possible follow-on missions. Planning Considerations The six warfighting func tions provide a frame- work for addressing critical tactical considerations, reviewing plans, prepar ing for operations, and executing those operations . The synchronization and coordination of ac tivities within each and among all are critical to the success of the infantry company. The following subparagraphs discuss planning considerations in the defense using selected warfighting functions. Intelligence The company commander’s understanding of the environment and nature of the problem is an es- sential first step upon which all other planning hinges. When conducting the defense, company commanders must consider the following:  Where is the enemy? How mobile is he? What are the likely avenues of approach into the company’s defensive sector?  Where are the enemy’s tanks, artillery, antitank systems, and other dangerous weapon systems?  Where are the enemy’s critical combat enablers, such as engine ers, air defense, and bridging assets?  How will I determine which COA the enemy has selected? What are th e PIRs that will help determine the enemy’s actions?  Given the enemy’s most likely COA and most dangerous COA, where is the best place to destroy him and what is the priority of destruc- tion among his assets? Maneuver Maneuver is the founda tion for the employment of forces on the battlefield. It is the use of move- ment in combination with fire (or fire potential) that is employed to achieve a position of advan- tage with respect to th e enemy and to facilitate accomplishment of the mission. In the defense, effective weapons position ing is critical to the company’s success. The goal of effective weap- ons positioning is to en able the company to mass fires at critical points on the ba ttlefield and to enhance its survivability. To do this, company commanders must maximize the strengths of their weapon systems while minimizing the company’s --- Page 165 --- 7-14 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 exposure to enemy observa tion and fires. Plan- ning factors include—  The enemy’s capability to prevent the com- pany from disengaging, whether through supe- rior combat power, greater mobility, or some combination of the two.  The friendly capability to deliver direct and indirect fires to supp ress the enemy and sup- port the disengagement.  Availability of cover, concealment, and obscu- ration effects to assist disengagement.  Obstacle integration, including situational obstacles.  Positioning of forces on terrain that provides an advantage to the disengaging elements, such as reverse slopes or natural obstacles.  The time available to preplan and rehearse dis- placement routes, times, and sequences.  The size of the friendly force that must be available to engage the enemy in support of the displacing unit. Tactical considerations for weapons positioning include depth and dispersion, flank positions, and disengagement and displacement. Dispersing positions late rally and in depth helps to protect the force fr om enemy observation and fires. In additi on to maneuver space among posi- tions, maneuver space should exist within each position to allow for in-depth placement of weapon systems and infant ry elements. Engage- ment areas provide a me thod to mass the fires of different positions at critic al points on the battle- field. Sectors of fire di stribute and shift fires throughout the extent of an EA. The placement of positions supports the dire ct fire plan, sectors of fire, and EAs as appropriate. Flank positions enable a defending force to fire on an attacking force moving parallel to the defender’s forces. An effective flank position provides the defender with a larger and more vul- nerable target while leaving the attacker unsure of the defense’s location. Major considerations for successful employment of a flank position are the defenders’ ability to ac curately canalize the enemy into the proper area , secure the flanks of the defensive positions, and achieve surprise by remaining undetected. Effect ive fire control, frat- ricide avoidance, and BSG are critical to the suc- cess of flank positions. Disengagement and displacement allow the com- pany to retain flexibility and tactical agility in the defense. Disengagement refers to withdrawing from contact, such as when a security force achieves its mission, di sengages from the enemy, and conducts a rearward passage of lines in the MBA. Displacement refers to maneuver internal to the defense, such as movement among alter- nate, supplementary, and subsequent positions. Both types of maneuver can be extremely diffi- cult to execute in the face of a rapidly moving enemy force and, therefor e, require substantial planning and rehearsal und er varied conditions. Depending on the mission, the basic goals of dis- engagement and displaceme nt are to enable the company to avoid being fixed or decisively engaged by the enemy. The overarching factor in the success of each is to maintain a mobility advantage over the enemy. Disengagement criteria dictate to subordinate ele- ments the circumstances in which they will dis- place to alternate, suppl ementary, or subsequent positions. Battlefield ev ents and enemy action dictate the selection of cr iteria. For example, the enemy’s selection of one of two possible ave- nues of approach may be the criteria to commit the reserve. Disengagem ent criteria are unique to each specific situation and are developed and planned accordingly. Disengagement criteria are never part of a unit’s SOP. In order to conduct a successful disengagement, the attacking enemy force cannot bring effective direct and indirect fires to bear on the friendly force. Direct fires from a defensive base of fire element, employed to suppress or disrupt the enemy, is the most effect ive way to facilitate dis- engagement. The compan y may receive base of --- Page 166 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 7-15 fire support from another element in the battalion; however, in most cases, the company establishes its own base of fire elem ent. Having an internal base of fire requires car eful sequencing of the displacement of company elements. The company and subordin ate platoons use cov- ered and concealed routes when moving to alter- nate and supplementary positions. Regardless of the degree of protection the route itself affords, the company and platoons rehearse the movement prior to contact. Since re hearsals increase the speed at which units can conduct the move and provide an added measure of security, the com- mander must endeavor to allocate available time to rehearse movement in limited visibility and degraded conditions. Fires The defensive fires plan must support the defen- sive scheme of maneuver regardless of the opera- tional environment in which a company finds itself. In the lethal figh t, the fires plan supports the defense by reinforcing obstacle effects, delay- ing and disrupting the enemy, massing fires at the critical point, and other similar purposes. In order to generate these effects, considerable thought must accompany target selection and purpose. Such considerations as target placement and ori- entation, target engageme nt criteria, method of engagement, and weaponee ring ensure that the right ordnance is delivered in the right manner at the right time, allowing th e cumulative effect of various targets to achieve the purpose of the over- all plan. Indirect fires se rve a variety of purposes in the defense, including the following:  Slow and disrupt enemy movement.  Reinforce obstacle effects by preventing the enemy from executing breaching operations through destruction, disruption, or delay.  Disrupt enemy SBF elements.  Defeat attacks along infantry avenues of approach with the use of final protective fires.  Disrupt the enemy to allow friendly elements to disengage or conduct counterattacks.  Obscure observation to separate enemy eche- lons, to screen friendly displacement, or to sil- houette enemy formations to facilitate direct fire engagement.  When allowable, delive r scatterable mines to close lanes and gaps in obstacles, to disrupt or prevent enemy breaching operations, to dis- rupt enemy movement at chokepoints, or to separate or isolate enemy echelons.  Provide illumination as necessary.  Execute suppression of enemy air defenses. In developing the fire plans, the company com- mander must evaluate the indirect fire systems available to provide su pport. Considerations include tactical capabilities, wea pon ranges, and available munitions. Thes e factors help the com- pany commander and FST leader determine the best method for achieving the task and purpose of each target in the fire plan. The company’s fire su pport personnel not only contribute to developmen t of the fires plan, but also are essential to its successful execution. Effective positioning is critical. The company commander and FST leader must select positions that provide fire supp ort personnel with unob- structed observation of the AO. An FST vehicle should receive high prio rity for a position with enhanced survivability. Force Protection In addition to the other ch aracteristics of FP, this warfighting function includes survivability, mobility, and counterm obility. Regardless of whether friendly or enemy forces are mounted, engineering is an essentia l portion of the defense in order to increase the survivability of friendly forces while impeding the ability of the enemy to execute his plan of attack. Survivability Survivability positions ar e prepared to protect personnel and weapon sy stems. The longer friendly forces have time to prepare, the greater --- Page 167 --- 7-16 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 the sophistication and effectiveness of these posi- tions. Positions can be constructed and rein- forced with overhead c over to provide infantry and CSWs with protectio n against shrapnel from air bursts. In addition, the company may use dig- ging assets for ammun ition caches at alternate, supplementary, or subsequent positions. All lead- ers must understand th e survivability plan and priorities. Company comm anders should desig- nate one individual, such as the XO, to supervise and enforce the plan and priorities and to report and track completion status. Mobility Mobility operations in the defense ensure the ability to reposition forces, delay, and counterat- tack. Initial mobility e fforts focus on the ability to resupply, repositio n, and conduct rearward and forward passage of forces, material, and equipment. The initial efforts then transition to supporting the co mpany reserve, local counterat- tacks, displacement plans, and route development for the execution of HHQ-required maneuver. For the company commander, most engineer assets work initially on surviv ability and countermobil- ity requirements. At a set time or trigger, engi- neers disengage from obst acle and survivability construction and focus on mobility operations. The commander analyzes the scheme of maneu- ver, obstacle plan, and terrain to determine mobility requirements. Critical considerations may include—  Lanes and gaps in the obstacle plan.  Lane closure plan and subunit responsibility.  Route reconnaissance, improvement, and main- tenance. Countermobility For the company comma nder, countermobility addresses two aspects: obstacles that protect friendly forces in defens ive positions and obsta- cles integrated into a la rger plan that seek to influence enemy actions. Intent and desired effect are critical first steps in obstacle placement. In order for both types to produce their intended effects, company commanders integrate them into both direct and indirect fi re plans. Obstacles can- not meet a commander’s intent unless covered by some means of friendly observation and fire. Obstacle intent includes the target and desired effect (clear task and purpose) and the relative location of each obstacle within a larger group of obstacles (see table 7-1). For example, the amount and type of engineering effort required to disrupt enemy dismounted infantry versus enemy armored vehicles is significantly different. Obsta- cle purpose influences many aspects of the opera- tion, from selecting and designing obstacle sites to conducting the defens e. Planners must also consider time and resources available in develop- ing the countermobility plan. Company com- manders do not designate obstacle groups, though they may be the benefici ary of such a decision. Decisions on requirement, placement, and pur- pose of obstacle groups a nd effects occur at the battalion level. It is no rmally the mission of the company commander to conduct the execution of these decisions, such as siting the individual obstacles of an obstacle group with an EA. Tactical Obstacles. The battalion assigns obsta- cle groups. Battalion co mmanders tell company commanders and engineers what they want to do to the enemy, and then resource both groups accordingly. Scatterabl e minefield systems and submunitions are the pr eferred means of con- structing tactical obstacl es since their self- and command-destruct capabilities o ffer flexibility, aid in the trans ition from the offense to the defense, and are less res ource and time intensive to construct. When ROE or other considerations rule out the use of this asset, battalions normally request engineer and re source augmentation for the emplacement of conve ntional mines and con- structed obstacles. Obstac le intent includes the following elements:  Target: the enemy force, by such characteris- tics as size, type, ec helon, and avenues of approach, that the commander wants to affect with fires and tactical obstacles. --- Page 168 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 7-17  Obstacle effect: how th e commander wants to affect enemy maneuver, such as through block, turn, fix, or disrupt actions.  Effect location: where the commander wants the effect against the targeted enemy force. Protective Obstacles. Protective obstacles are local works, such as tac tical wire, tanglefoot, or modular barriers, that pr otect and increase the effectiveness of the immediate defenses of the company by disrupting, blocking, or canalizing an attacker closing on the company’s positions. Infan- try companies generally pl an and construct their own protective obstacles. For best effect, compa- nies tie protective obstacles into existing or tacti- cal reinforcing obstacles. The company can use Obstacle Effect DISRUPT Breakup enemy formations Interrupt the enemy’s time table and C2 Cause premature commitment of breach assets Cause the enemy to piecemeal his attack Cause the enemy to deploy early Slow part of his formation while allowing part to advance unimpeded Do not require extensive resources Difficult to detect at long range Slow an attacker within an area so he can be destroyed Generate the time necessary for the friendly force to disengage Cause the enemy to deploy into attack formation before encountering the obstacles Allow the enemy to advance slowly in an EA or AO Make the enemy fight in multiple directions once he is in the EA or AO Arrayed in depth Span the entire width of the avenue of approach Must not make the terrain appear impenetrable Force the enemy to move in the direction desired by the friendly commander The arrow points in the direction the obstacle should force the enemy to turn Prevent the enemy from bypassing or breaching the obstacle belt Maintain pressure on the enemy force throughout the turn Mass direct and indirect fires at the anchor point of the turn Tie into impassable terrain at the anchor point Consist of obstacles in depth Provide a subtle orientation relative to the enemy’s approach Purpose Fires and Obstacles Must: Obstacle Characteristics FIX TURN Stop an attacker along a specific avenue of approach Prevent an attacker from passing through an AO or EA Stop the enemy from using an avenue of approach and force him to use another avenue of approach Prevent the enemy from bypassing or penetrating through the belt Stop the enemy’s advance Destroy all enemy breach efforts Must tie into impassable terrain Consist of complex obstacles Defeat the enemy’s mounted and dismounted breaching efforts BLOCK Table 7-1. Types of Obstacles and Effects. EXAMPLE : A battalion commander might direct, “Deny the enemy access to our flank by turning the northern mechanized infantry battalion into our engagement area. Allow companies B and C to mass their fires to destroy the enemy.” --- Page 169 --- 7-18 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 mines and wire or it might receive additional mate- riel, such as man-portable submunitions systems. Protective obstacle pla nning considers time and resources available and the overall priority of work. The company keeps detailed records of pro- tective obstacle emplacement for reporting to HHQ, for assistance in RIPs, and to aid in safe and effective obstacle recovery. Chapter 11 discusses more references on planni ng guidance for protec- tive obstacle emplacement. In a manner similar to tactical obstacles, com- pany commanders position protective obstacles to achieve obstacle intent. Company commanders determine if the enemy threat to any particular defensive position will be mounted, dismounted, or both and they plan fo r mines, mine types, and wire accordingly. Company commanders also consider enemy weapon systems and their possi- ble effects on friendly po sitions. For example, in addition to targeting th e enemy with supporting fires, a company may choos e to disrupt or delay an enemy’s ability to occupy a possible SBF position using wire and mines. The result of the enemy threat analysis drives obstacle effect and loca tion. Despite the local, protective nature of thes e obstacles, they still serve to execute doctrinal effects, such as block or disrupt. A HESCO [Hercules Engineering Solutions Consortium] barrier may block possible egress into a company FOB; whereas, mines and wire may turn the enemy away from a BP’s exposed flank and back into its fires. Generally, protective obstacles are usually located beyond hand grenade distance and may extend out many hundreds of meters to ti e into tactical obstacles and existing restricted terrain. Obstacle Lanes. The company might be respon- sible for actions relate d to lanes through obsta- cles. These duties can include marking lanes in an obstacle, reporting locations of the start and end points of each lane, operating contact points, pro- viding guides for elements passing through the obstacle, and closing the lane. Situational Obstacle. A situational obstacle is planned and possibly prep ared before an opera- tion, but is executed only if specific criteria are met. It gives the comm ander the flexibility to emplace tactical obstacles based on battlefield development. Due to their “on order” nature, situ- ational obstacles usuall y depend upon the use of such weapons as submun itions and scatterable minefields, though scenar ios in which the use of demolitions to drop trees or rocks along canalized routes would also serve as examples of situational obstacles. Due to many variables beyond a com- mander’s control, defens ive schemes of maneu- ver should not re ly upon the use of situational obstacles for their success. Logistics Logistics often drives the “art of the possible” within any operation pla n. Prepositioning caches and the positioning of company trains are logistic considerations in the de fense that company com- manders should make in addition to those normal sustainment functions that apply to all operations. If the defensive scheme of maneuver is likely to require more ammunition than is available and the ability to resuppl y while conducting the defense is suspect, th en companie s preposition ammunition in caches. The caches, positioned to support the execution of th e defense (such as at alternate and/or subsequent positions), are dug in for protection and guarded. The company’s trains nor mally operate one ter- rain feature to the rear of the company in a cov- ered and concealed po sition. They are close enough to the company to provide responsive support, but not exposed to risk of destruction. The company trains con duct evacuation of per- sonnel, weapons, and eq uipment and conduct resupply as required. The company gunnery ser- geant or XO positions the trains and supervises sustainment operations. The company com- mander ensures all elemen ts know locations and routes to the company trains. --- Page 170 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 7-19 Engagement Area Development The EA is where th e company commander intends to contain and finish the enemy force using the massed fires of all available weapons. Depending on the size of the enemy force, com- pany commanders may reasonably expect to destroy the entire enemy force in their EA. If the likely size of the enemy fo rce is greater than the company can reasonably expect to finish, then the company must either receive additional resources or the comp any commanders must construct a defensive scheme of maneuver that allows for attrition of the enemy prior to his arrival in the EA. Th e success of finishing effects depends on ho w effectively the com- mander can integrate the obstacle plan, indirect fire plan, direct fire plan, and the terrain within the EA to achieve the company’s tactical pur- pose. Beginning with evaluation of METT-T and continuing throughout the IPB process, EA development follows these steps, which are am- plified in the subsequent paragraphs:  Identify all likely enemy avenues of approach.  Determine likely enemy schemes of maneuver.  Determine where to destroy the enemy.  Emplace weapon systems.  Plan and integrate obstacles.  Plan and integrate indirect fires (organic/non- organic).  Rehearse execution of operation in the EA. Identify Likely Enemy Avenues of Approach The following procedures and considerations apply when identifying the enemy’s likely ave- nues of approach (see fig. 7-9)—  Conduct initial reconnaissance . If possible, this should be done from the enemy’s perspec- tive along each avenue of approach into the sector or EA.  Identify key and de cisive terrain. This includes locations that afford positions of advantage over K1 K2 K2 K3K3 K4 K4 K5 K5 K1 MRB MRB AA1 AA2 Controll cross-mobility corridor and secure northern flank of enemy attack on AA1 and southern flank of AA2. Control cross-mobility corridors between AA1 and AA2. If under enemy control, provide SBF for breach on AA1 or AA2. As entry point to AA2, provide a fast and well- covered approach. 0 .5 1km Legend: AA - avenue of approach K - key (terrain) km - kilometer MRB - motorized rifle battalion Figure 7-9. Identify Likely Enemy Avenues of Approach. --- Page 171 --- 7-20 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 the enemy; positions the enemy may use to establish overwatch, base of fire, and OPs in support of their attack; and natural obstacles and chokepoints that restrict forward movement.  Determine cover and concealment . Determine which avenues of approa ch will provide cover and concealment for the enemy while allowing him to maintain his tempo. Determine what terrain the enemy is like ly to use to support each avenue.  Evaluate lateral routes . Evaluate lateral routes adjoining each avenue of approach that the enemy may use to enhance his flexibility. Determine Enemy Scheme of Maneuver When continuing IPB within COA development to determine relative combat power analysis and to develop most likely and most dangerous ECOAs (see fig. 7-10), the company commander must—  Determine how the enem y will structure the attack in terms of speed, formations, sequenc- ing, and placement of co mbat multipliers, such as engineering assets.  Determine how the enem y will use its recon- naissance assets to incl ude infiltration efforts and OPs for supporting arms. 11 11 12 12 K3 13 13 14 2121 AA1 AA2 Establish SBF with a company and antitank platoon to support seizure of K3. If enemy attacks on AA1 he will: If enemy attacks on AA2 he will: Establish firing line with a company and antitank platoon to support breach and assault vicinity 13. Attack to penetrate with a battalion. Continue to attack to the west. Establish SBF with a comany and antitank platoon to support seizure of K3. 22 22 23 23 24 Establish firing line for flank security and continue attack to the west. Attack to penetrate with 2 companies. Establish firing line with a company and antitank platoon to protect breach and assault vicinity 23. Legend: AA - avenue of approach K - key (terrain) 24 14 Figure 7-10. Determine Enemy Scheme of Manuever. --- Page 172 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 7-21  Determine where and when the enemy will change formations and establish SBF positions.  Determine where, when, and how the enemy will conduct his assau lt and breaching opera- tions.  Determine where and when the enemy will commit follow-on forces and reserves.  Determine likely enemy reactions to friendly counteractions. Determine Where to Destroy the Enemy After determining the enemy’s most likely COA, company commanders determine the place where the company’s combat power has the greatest opportunity to finish th e enemy (see fig. 7-11) and accomplish the following:  Identify and mark where the company will mass its fires on the enemy.  Identify target reference points (TRPs) that match the place where the company seeks to create the desired effect through the massing of fires.  Identify secondary TR Ps to allow the com- pany to rapidly mass fi res elsewhere in the EA should the enemy seek to maneuver in a differ- ent manner than expected.  Record the name and location of all TRPs.  Determine how many weapon systems must focus fires on each TRP to generate the desired effects.  Determine which platoons will mass fires on each TRP.  Develop the direct fire planning and control measures necessary to focus fires at each TRP. Emplace Weapon System After determining where to destroy the enemy, planners address weap on system placement to enhance weapon streng ths while minimizing weaknesses. Long-range antitank missile systems might seek positions at a distance from and on the enemy’s flank; whereas, tank attachments may focus their fires on the enemy’s front. Friendly positions are built around the placement of weap- ons. The following steps apply in selecting and TRP 01TRP 01 TRP 02TRP 02 TRP 03 TRP 04 TRP 06 TRP 05 Use this TRP to focus JAVELIN fires to destroy enemy tank. Use TRP 02 as a reference point. Use this TRP to focus fires of 2 infantry platoons to destroy enemy AT platoon establishing SBF. Use this TRP to focus fires of 3 infantry platoons to destroy remaining enemy at fixing obstacle. Use this TRP to focus fires of 2 infantry platoons to destroy enemy at turning obstacle. Use this TRP to focus on fires of 2 infantry platoons to destroy enemy at turning obstacle. Legend: SBF - support by fire TRP - target reference point Figure 7-11. Determine Where to Destroy the Enemy. --- Page 173 --- 7-22 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 improving BPs and empl acing CSW systems and infantry positions (see fig. 7-12):  Select tentative weapon positions with regard to the enemy’s most lik ely COA, the intent of the company commander to destroy the enemy, and the terrain available.  Select subunit BPs to support weapon emplacement.  Conduct a leader’s reconnaissance of the tenta- tive BPs.  Traverse the EA to confirm that selected posi- tions are tactically advantageous.  Confirm and mark the selected BPs.  Conduct BSG analysis to ensure that BPs and their fires do not conflict with those of adjacent units and that positions are mutually supportive.  Select primary, alternat e, supplementary, and subsequent fighting positions to achieve the desired effect for each TRP.  Ensure that platoon commanders, platoon ser- geants, and squad leaders position weapon sys- tems so that the required number of weapons and platoons effectively covers each TRP. When creating the direct fire plan, company com- manders consider the following questions:  Which enemy weapon and warfighting systems should be engaged first?  How will the company initiate fires?  Which company weapon systems will fire first?  What are the target pr iorities for the various company weapon systems? Legend: FSV - fire support vehicle TRP 01 TRP 02 TRP 03 TRP 04 TRP 06 TRP 05 FSV OP EA RED Task: Supporting effort 2 disrupts enemy at TRP 3 and fixes enemy (-) at either TRP 4 or both TRPs 5 and 6. Task: Supporting effort 1 disrupts enemy at TRP 1 or TRP 2, then displaces and destroys enemy at TRP 6. Task: Main effort to disrupt enemy at TRP 3 and destroy enemy at either TRP 4 or both TRPs 5 and 6. Figure 7-12.Emplace Weapon Systems. --- Page 174 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 7-23  What is the desired effect of fires from each platoon (platoon missions)?  How will the company distribute the fires of platoons to engage the enemy laterally and in depth?  On what will platoons focus their fires? How will platoons know where to engage? Will they be able to see and understand the control mea- sures?  How will the company ma ss fires to deal with multiple enemy threats and achieve the desired volume of fire?  How will company commanders position themselves to effectively control fires?  How will the company shift fires when neces- sary? How will the company focus fires on new targets?  How will the company address likely enemy reactions to company fires?  How will the company administer weapons control statuses?  Does the plan avoid overkill?  Is each company weapon system employed in its best role?  Are targets engaged when there is a high proba- bility of hit? Plan and Integrate Obstacles The goal of obstacle pla nning within the EA is to support the commander’s intent through opti- mum obstacle emplacement and integration with fires at the point when the company commander seeks to finish the en emy (see fig. 7-13). Obsta- cles must allow the enem y into the EA and then contain him there. The focus at the battalion level and below is the integra tion of fires and obsta- cles. At the battalion le vel, obstacle planning is very directive and detailed and it centers on Legend: FSV - fire support vehicle MGS - machine gun system TRP 01 TRP 02 TRP 03 TRP 04 TRP 06 TRP 05 EA RED Figure 7-13. Plan and Integrate Obstacles. --- Page 175 --- 7-24 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 obstacle groups. At the company level, obstacle planning deals with the actual sighting and emplacement of individual obstacles within the groups. The following st eps apply in planning and integrating obstacles in the company defense:  Site and mark individua l obstacle locations in coordination with the engineers.  Provide security for the engineering effort, which first marks the trace of the obstacles and then begins emplacemen t at points closest to the enemy first.  Verify that the marked trace of the obstacles meets the commander’s intent and is covered by fire.  Create and mark fire control measures, such as TRPs, in the EA.  Collocate the engineer squad/platoon leader and company commander in the defensive positions covering the obstacle.  Refine direct and indirect fire control measures.  Identify lanes and gaps.  Report obstacle locations and gaps to HHQ. Plan and Integrate Indirect Fires While fires planning is integral to development of the defensive scheme of maneuver, fires plan- ning is proofed and refi ned within EA develop- ment (see fig. 7-14). The following steps apply in planning and integrating indirect fires:  Determine the purpose of fires throughout the battle, from initial acti ons in the security area to destruction of the enemy at the point of deci- sion in the EA.  Develop EFSTs that support the purpose of fires.  Determine the places to accomplish the EFSTs.  Establish the observati on plan with observer redundancy for each target.  Establish triggers and assessment criteria. Legend: FSV - fire support vehicle MGS - machine gun system TRP 01 TRP 02 TRP 03 AB007 TRP 04 TRP 06 TRP 05 EA RED FSV OP MGS AB003 AB005 AB004 TARGET AB007 AB003 AB004 AB005 Suppress enemy in SBF. Suppress 2 enemy units to prevent breach of turning obstacles. Suppress AND disrupt enemy in engagement area. PURPOSE Figure 7-14. Plan and Integrate Indirect Fires. --- Page 176 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 7-25  Obtain accurate target location and conduct refinement by fire if possible.  Plan final protective fires.  Establish fire support coordination measures, such as RFAs and no-fire areas. Rehearse Execution of Operation in Engagement Area The purpose of an exec ution rehearsal is to ensure all company personnel understand the plan and all elements are prepared to cover their assigned areas with direct and indirect fires. Although the company commander has several options, the most common and most effective type of rehearsal is to replicate the enemy force. One technique for the rehearsal in the defense is to have the company trains, under the control of the XO, move through the EA as the enemy force allowing the commander and subordinate leaders to rehearse the battle in “real time.” The rehearsal should cover the following actions:  Rearward passage of security forces (as required).  Closure of lanes (as required).  Movement from hide positions to the BP.  Use of fire commands, triggers, and maximum engagement lines to initiate direct and indirect fires.  Shifting of fires to refo cus and redistribute fire effects.  Triggers for emplacement of scatterable mine systems.  Preparation and transmission of critical reports.  Assessment of the eff ects of enemy weapon systems.  Displacement to alternate, supplementary, or subsequent BPs.  Cross-leveling or resupply of ammunition.  Evacuation of casualties. Adjacent Unit Coordination The ultimate goal of ad jacent unit coordination is to ensure unity of ef fort across the companies so that the battalion accomplishes its mission. Items that adjacent units must coordinate include the following:  Unit positions, including locations of C2 nodes.  Locations of OPs and patrols.  Overlapping fires to ensu re that direct fire responsibility is clearly defined.  TRPs.  Alternate, supplementary, and subsequent BPs.  Indirect fire information.  Location and type of obstacles.  Air defense considerations, if applicable.  Routes to be used du ring occupation and repo- sitioning.  Sustainment considerations. Mounted Operations Chapter 6 discussed considerations, planning, and employment of Marine infantry with various types of tracked and whee led vehicles. Here, the focus is narrowed to address only the unique con- siderations when conduc ting mounted operations in the defense. Regardless of the vehicles used, the current family of Ma rine Corps vehicles in which an infantry comp any may be mounted are not infantry fighting ve hicles and should not be employed as such. They lack the armor protec- tion, stabilized weapons station, low silhouette, and means for the infantry to fight from the vehi- cle without exposing themselves to direct fire. When mounted infantry plan the defense, com- pany commanders seek th e best way to maintain the inherent ad vantage of vehi cle mobility, the best way to employ vehicle mounted weapon sys- tems, and the best way to maintain the survivabil- ity of their vehicles. Ju st as in the offense, vehicles and infantry work together. Infantry accompanies vehicles conducting offensive oper- ations as part of the defense and infantry occupies defensive positions to bo th receive the protection of and provide protection to vehicles. Company commanders stri ve to maintain one of the primary advantages of vehicles on the --- Page 177 --- 7-26 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 battlefield—mobility. Ev en within strong point or BP defenses, providing a vehicle with a hide position and two or thre e firing positions allows that vehicle to respond flexibly throughout the defensive position in a manner that both sup- ports the company commander and enhances vehicle survivability. In a similar manner, units, such as a tank platoon, can conduct multiple missions within a defense based upon their mobility. Tanks and antiarmor vehicles could assist the security force forward, conduct a rearward passage of li nes and occupy positions to support an EA, and conduct multiple displacements within the company’s battlespace as needed. While there ar e always instances that could require vehicles to occupy fixed positions in a defense, these should constitute exceptions vice the rule. With few exceptions, vehicle mounted weapon systems represent significant combat power addi- tions to what is normally available to the infantry company. Depending on the enemy threat and the defensive scheme of maneuver, company com- manders seek to position these weapon systems in such a manner that they cover suspected enemy avenues of approach, are able to deliver decisive effects in an EA, and play to the strengths of that particular weapon system (such as flank shots for antiarmor weapon systems). No vehicle is invincible. In order to use the flex- ibility, mobility, a nd lethality offered by vehicle- mounted firepower, vehi cles and their crews must remain health y. Company commanders maintain vehicle surviv ability by assigning rea- sonable missions, enabli ng mobility within the defense to allow vehicle displacement, creating survivable positions from which vehicles and their crews fight, and ensuring adequate dis- mounted infantry support. Planning Considerations When planning a mounted infantry defense, com- pany commanders consider the same organization issues that face them during the offense. Com- pany commanders may receive vehicles that they need to man and maintain; they may receive units in DS, such as a truc k or an AAV platoon, with their own organic personnel structure that requires integration into the company; or they may receive orders to cr oss-attach one of their platoons for an armor pl atoon. Some additional considerations include the following:  Increased use of tactical control measures and enhanced planning and coordination to enable decentralized control over greater distances.  Reserve decisions to include establishment, combat power, employment triggers, and reconstitution planning.  Terrain and weather li mitations, which affect vehicle operations and task organization of subunits for assigned defensive tasks.  Defensive task priorities for limited amounts of dismounted infantry to include retention of key terrain, protection of vehi cles in restricted ter- rain, manpower fo r defensive labo r tasks, and the counterreconnaissance effort.  Plans for and rehearsa ls of communications between dismounted infantry and vehicles and signaling methods in the defense to include such items as target designation and displacement.  Conduct of logistical functions and move- ment, to include engineering, within a com- pany’s defensive battles pace about which the enemy is actively seeking information and the opportunity to employ indirect fires.  Establishment of plans and triggers for rear- ward passage of lines to include vehicle mishap and recovery criteria. Task Organization As in the offense, there are some general princi- ples that company commanders consider when using the infantry and vehicle team in the defense. Regardless of the manner in which the infantry company is mounted, company commanders work to create company teams that are flexible, self-suf- ficient, and maintain the unity of command. --- Page 178 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 7-27 Company commanders ensu re that their com- pany and platoons mainta in similar degrees of mobility and that their task organization supports the defensive scheme of maneuver. In the defense, the less m ovement the enemy can observe, the better the chances of maintaining surprise. Company commanders seek to answer the greater logistical dema nd of their vehicles in the following ways:  By providing self-sufficiency through a combi- nation of prepositioning and assignment of logistical assets, such as refuelers, to subunits.  By masking movement by route and time.  By conducting resupply during times of limited visibility. As in the offens e, mounted forc es may conduct defensive schemes of maneuver that require sub- units to operate at distances and at tempos that preclude centralized control. Company com- manders assign and equip subordinate units accordingly. Antiarmor and tank forces, which operate in the security area to attrit an advancing enemy before he reaches the MBA, may work for one platoon commander who possesses an FO and JTAC to prosecute the fire plan. This unity of command provides th e company commander with the ability to affect the fight while allowing the units in the security area the flexibility needed to accomplish their missions. Combat Support Company commanders will most likely receive many of the same combat assets when conducting the defense with mounted infantry as they do when conducting offens ive operations, such as assault amphibian platoon, CAAT, supporting arms, security, and combat engineers. Assault Amphibian Platoon Infantry company commanders remain aware that assault amphibian platoons normally work for the company commander in a DS relationship and that they possess their own internal organization that must be integrated into the company. In the defense, AAVs offer the company greatly increased HMG firepower and offer significant increases in communicati on flexibility by using the multiple radios on e ach vehicle. Due to the light armor of the AAV a nd the lack of a stabi- lized gun system, company commanders weigh AAV employment and surv ivability against the priority of work in the defense. Employment of AAV firepower requires static firing positions, which may need to be dug before firing positions of more survivable armor, such as tanks. If using AAVs in conjunction wi th defensive maneuver, such as a counterattack or moving infantry in a sector defense, the cons iderations addressed in chapter 6 apply. Combined Antiarmor Team Mounted antiarmor assets, such as antiarmor and HMGs, often arrive as part of a CAAT that mar- ries ATGM systems wi th mounted HMGs. As part of CAATs, vehicl e mounted TOW or Jave- lin missiles great ly assist the mobile defense and offer company commanders further flexibility since their long ranges help to maintain surprise. Like other armor-destroying systems, such as the tank, mounted ATGM systems can fight through- out the defensive battlefi eld to accomplish multi- ple missions and tactical tasks. Survivability of both the weapons and the light armored vehicles that mount them remains a concern. Though these systems are ideal for mo ving around the battle- field, dismounting or placing these systems in defensive positions requires the same attention to survivability and the priority of work as applies to AAVs. In EAs, company commanders inte- grate the effects of th ese weapon systems with the rest of the antiarmor assets available to them. The HMGs provide the C AAT increased flexibil- ity to engage different ty pes of targets while pro- viding security for th e ATGMs. With ranges of both HMGs and ATGMs in excess of 1,500 meters, CAATs may attrit enemy forces in the security area, create ef fects in EAs, cover dis- placement, and screen flanks. --- Page 179 --- 7-28 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Supporting Arms Supporting arms are critical to such functions as destroying the enemy where designated by the company commander, de laying and disrupting the enemy, screening frie ndly displacements, and providing aerial reconnais sance and observation. When planning the defens ive fight, the company commander ensures that qualified air controllers, artillery controllers, and/or UA systems and simi- lar assets are positioned to conduct the com- pany’s fire plan. While chapter 5 addresses many defensive artil- lery fires techniques, company commanders must properly plan and phase de fensive fires against a mobile and moving enemy. Since artillery cannot “chase” a moving target, the company com- mander ensures that proper triggers are a part of the fires plan and that the FST remains disci- plined in staying ahead of the enemy. In the defense, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft CAS remain important combat multipliers for the company commander. As in the offense, vehicle marking and friendly unit location information is critical for combat id entification by friendly forces to reduce potential for fratricide. The com- pany FST, to include a ttached FACs, travel for- ward in the formation to gain and maintain the greatest situational awareness of the company fire requirements and maneuver locations. Security The requirement for an ag gressive security effort forward is the same fo r mounted or dismounted operations—just the methods differ. Depending on the terrain and enemy threat, the security fight may consist of mounted operations, dismounted opera- tions, or a combination of both. The company commander ensures that the leadership designated to conduct security operations possesses the matu- rity and judgment to operate alone. The company commander ensures that th e security effort can sustain itself, control the fires of supporting arms, and support the overall defensive scheme of maneuver. Company commanders do not limit themselves to organi c ground reconnaissance assets, but seek additional sensor support and inte- grate into HHQ security efforts as required. Combat Engineers In mounted operations, engineers perform their traditional mobility, c ountermobility, and sur- vival roles through obst acle emplacement, lane closing, route improvement, and survivability measures. Determining the engineer priority of work in the defense begins with a decision whether the company will conduct a hasty or deliberate defense; however, regardless of the type of defense, the company commander will face a time constraint that will dictate prioritiza- tion of the engineer effort. In the defense, gen- eral guidance is not enough. While some mechanics of execution can rely on company SOP (of which en gineers must be made aware), most guidance mu st be passed in some detail by the company commander and specific leadership, such as the XO. Defensive Planning Considerations for Forward Operating Bases and Combat Outposts When conducting stability operations, US forces operate from bases within the HN. All bases must be secure and defenda ble. Depending on the requirements of an oper ation, the presence of an enemy threat, and the natu re of that threat, base EXAMPLE : The company commander cannot merely dictate that entrenchment will occur before obstacle emplacement, he must also ask more specific questions: Will all entrenchment occur before obstacle emplacement, to include individual fighting positi ons? If only vehicle entrenchments, which types first? Have the vehicle positions been marked for entrenchment? Who is guiding the engineers? --- Page 180 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 7-29 security may range from basic FP measures to the ability to withstand direct assault and indirect fire. The size of any give n base varies in accor- dance with the size of the unit occupying the base and the mission of the uni ts using the base. All types of bases require clear command relation- ships. In counte rinsurgencies, FOBs and combat outposts (COPs) are two types of bases. General Base Defense Regardless of the ongoing operation, the type of base, or the location of a base, the characteristics of the defense do not ch ange. The best technique for base defense is the perimeter defense. Terrain Proper evaluation and use of the terrain in the area is essential to hold down the number of addi- tional forces required for base defense. Key ter- rain factors to consider include the following:  Use of the terrain’s natural defensive charac- teristics.  Use of artificial obstacles to enhance the ter- rain’s natural defensive characteristics.  Control of all roads and waterways leading into the base.  Control of military LOCs and civilian com- merce routes.  Control of land areas surrounding the base to a range beyond that of enemy mortars and rockets. Host Nation Security Forces The base commander should consider the integra- tion of HNSF in the overa ll base defense effort. Particular emphasis is on integration of host country forces in patrol ling and populace control activities. Both host and third country forces pro- vide local security for their own units. To ensure maximum benefit, effici ency, and avoidance of unnecessary redundancy, all such local plans should be coordinated and integrated with the base master defense plan. Communication Control is the ke y to a successful base defense. To achieve the necessary control, a communica- tion capability must be established between the base defense operations center and sector com- manders and between s ector commanders and their bunkers, towers, an d reserve. Bunkers or towers within each sect ion can communicate lat- erally within the sector: flank bunkers of one sec- tor can communicate wi th flank bunkers of adjacent sectors. Sustainment Depending on the mission and status of the bat- talion, the type of tr ansport available, the weather, and the terrain, resupply may be by air, water, or ground. The availability of LZs, drop zones, beach landing sites, or docks protected from the enemy’s observation and fire is the main consideration if selecti ng/organizing aerial or water resupply. Protection All units in the base area are responsible for pre- serving its fighting potential. Protective mea- sures reduce the probability (and the effects) of damage caused by hostile action. Responsibility for the conduct of protective measures is assigned to firefighting, chemic al, medical, and other units. In addition, all un its assigned to the base conduct passive defense activities, such as disper- sion, camouflage, blackout, field discipline, and use of shelters. Security Early warning of pending enemy threat actions gives the base commander time to prepare and react. Outposts, patrols, ground surveillance and countermortar radar, military working dog teams, and air reconnaissance and surveillance can pro- vide early warning. Information provided by civilians and actions of indigenous persons near the base are excellent indicators of pending --- Page 181 --- 7-30 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 enemy actions. All around security is essential and may require the following actions:  Declaring certain ar eas prohibited and restricted for civilian movement.  Stopping all movement except patrolling within the base after dark in some circum- stances.  Screening, supervising, or escorting local labor, which always constitutes a major secu- rity risk.  Varying the timing and methods of patrolling, changing guards and detachments, and other routine matters.  Fully using all forms of illumination, including floodlights; searchlights, if available; and illu- mination provided by mort ars, artillery, or air- craft depending upon the nature of the enemy threat.  Providing earthwork pr otection for vulnerable equipment and stores.  Using harassing fire to di srupt the activities of insurgents under certain conditions. Defense in Depth Alternate and supplementa ry positions, OPs, and mutually supporting strong points in front of the base forward defense ar ea extend the depth of the defense. The commander plans fires throughout the defensive area up to the maxi- mum range of availa ble weapons. Portable obstacles placed around critical targets during reduced visibility disrupt the enemy’s plan and add depth to the defense. Patrols Base defense operations to counter small groups of enemy forces include aggressive, frequent patrolling by squad- and platoon-sized forces to detect, capture, or dest roy small enemy threat groups. Military working do gs, if available, may be used to add security and additional detection ability to patrol operations. Patrols should operate within the range of indi rect fire support and be easily reinforced. Dismounted and mounted patrols should extend th eir operations out to the range of enemy indirect fire capabilities. Popu- lated areas near the base are sear ched as neces- sary, surprise checkpoints established, and known or suspected enemy positions raided. Maximum Use of Offensive Action Since the objective of base defense is to maintain a secure base, the defe nder maximizes the use of offensive actions to enga ge enemy forces outside the base. On initial occu pation of the base site, friendly forces take offensive actions to destroy enemy forces in the immediate area. The area commander employs patrols, raids, ambushes, air attacks, and supporting fires to harass and destroy any remaining enemy force. Once complete, a smaller force can defend the base. The base com- mander maintains constant liaison with major tac- tical unit commanders in th e area to stay abreast of efforts to remove the enemy threat. Mutual Support Defending forces use fi res, observation, and maneuver to ensure mutual support. Positioning for mutual support requir es careful planning and coordination since an outwardly focused perime- ter base defense makes mutual support more dif- ficult. Surveillance, obst acles, prearranged fires, and maneuver control gaps in support. All-Around Defense In defensive planning, the base commander must be prepared to de fend against enemy attack from any direction. Ther efore, defense plans must be flexible enough and rese rves positioned to react to any enemy threat. Base defense forces use primary and alternate positions and sectors of responsibi lity. All personnel are assigned duty stations or shelters and defensive measures are rehearsed. Responsiveness Attacks against a base may include long-range sniper, mortar, ground, or rocket fire, or suicide --- Page 182 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 7-31 bomber attacks. The enem y threat has the advan- tage of deciding when , where, and with what force they will attack. Defenders position their forces and plan fires an d movement so they can respond to the widest possible range of enemy actions. The defender prep ares plans, to include counterattack plans, and rehearses, evaluates, and revises those plans as necessary. Reserve The base reserve is a de signated organization for any immediate response requirement that occurs in a designated AO. A reserve increases the over- all flexibility of a base defense and is available for contingencies. Forward Operating Bases Normally, each AO possesses at least one FOB. The size of the area, its physical characteristics, and the number and size of the units operating within the area often require additional operat- ing bases. The FOBs es tablished by a regiment or battalion are often semipermanent and pro- vide deployed units with C2 and communica- tions system facilities, sustainment, personnel systems support, stagi ng areas, and intelligence activities. They provide units with relatively secure locations from wh ich to plan and prepare for operations. During COIN operations, they also aid in limiting in surgent mobility nearby and providing security to the local population. Some differences exist between regimental and battalion FOBs. Regimental FOBs are larger than battalion FOBs an d they provide a rear location for larger and more complex logistic and maintenance suppor t functions. A battalion FOB contains the minimu m personnel needed to operate and provide security. It maintains at least two methods for sustainment—road and either air or water. Combat Outposts A COP is a reinforced OP that can conduct lim- ited combat, stability, or other operations. In COIN operations, COPs are often company- and platoon-sized bases inside insurgent-influenced territory where they enable friendly forces to chal- lenge insurgent influen ce and power directly by providing a means to se cure the population. A COP provides security to its immediate area and enables direct contact with the local populace. These benefits are unavailable from remote bases. The strategy carries with it potential downsides, such as increased FP concerns and decreased operational flexibility; however, these weak- nesses are acceptable in light of the significant increases in population contact and security. Emplacing a company or platoon COP in sector is a deliberate operation that requires detailed prob- lem framing, site selection, and the expectation of requirements for additional logistical support. Outposts may be employed to—  Secure key LOCs or infrastructure.  Secure and influence the local populace.  Gather intelligence.  Assist the government in restoring essential services.  Force insurgents to operate elsewhere. Priorities of Work Since COPs, by the nature of their presence among enemy threat elements, face increased risk, consid- eration of placement, timing, and security through- out planning, construc tion, and occupation is critical. The following are some considerations:  Ensure the position is free of noncombatants. Avoid displacing people when possible and, if unavoidable, ensure that they receive timely and proper restitution. If necessary, place appropri- ate signage in local language to direct, redirect, warn, and provide any other guidance necessary.  Emplace key weapon systems. Select key weapon and CSW positions covering likely mounted and dismounted avenues of approach.  Create and support a dir ect fire plan. Company personnel clear fields of fire by removing ob- stacles and creating loopholes and similar mea- sures while preparing fi re control measures, such as range cards, aiming stakes, sector stakes, and TRPs. --- Page 183 --- 7-32 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1  Construct positions with overhead cover and use camouflage to break up outlines. Make target acquisition harder and counter sniper threats.  Identify and secure s upersurface and subsur- face avenues of approach, such as rooftops, sewers, basements, and stairwells.  Construct barriers a nd emplace obstacles to deny the enemy any access to streets, under- ground passages, and buildings that provide an advantage over the CO P. Obstacles should delay and disrupt enemy threat attempts to approach the COP.  Integrate barriers and obstacles with key wea- pons.  Improve and mark internal movement routes between positions as well as alternate and sup- plementary positions.  Stockpile ammunition, food, firefighting equip- ment, and drinking water. Counterinfiltration and Early Warning The key to any defense is detecting a threat be- fore it becomes a danger. Effective COP defense lies in identifying threats—the most dangerous threat is infiltration. Th e best defense against these threats is the popula tion that surrounds the COP. Internally displaced people, merchants, or shopkeepers are potential sources of intelligence about insurgent attacks on bases. One of the pur- poses of a COP is to place the company in direct contact with the popul ace; company personnel must take advantage of such proximity and talk with their neighbors. Combat Outpost Construction Considerations Building a COP is a comp lex task that must be well thought out, with a clear vision from the beginning for expansion and development. It is always best to have trained engineers, either mili- tary or civilian construc t the base. If the threat environment supports it, use of local companies and population is preferred. The following sub- paragraphs discuss critical considerations. Force Protection. All elements of COP con- struction, whether occu pying and modifying an existing structure or bui lding a brand new posi- tion, take into account enemy threat capabilities and internal security considerations. Enemy. Construction, modification, and renova- tion ensure the following:  Adequate coverage of dead spaces.  Creation of a safety z one to prevent rocket attacks.  Overwatch of potential IED emplacement.  All around observation.  Vehicleborne IED prevention measures.  Ability to deliver direct and indirect fires effec- tively. Security. Security measures augment survivabil- ity and FP and disrupt threat capabilities. Security measures include the following:  Concrete “T” walls, prefabricated barriers, and earthen berms for perimeter protection.  Concertina wire, both within the position (sim- ilar to strong points) and outside the position, for canalization and disruption of dismounts.  At least two entry cont rol points with signage and kits for such actions as enforcing traffic patterns, conducting escalation of force contin- uum procedures, and searching vehicles.  Guard towers at each corner that are reinforced with sandbags, ballis tic glass, and sniper screens.  Ground sensors and surveillance systems.  Chain link screens to protect positions from rocket-propelled grenades and hand grenades.  Counterbattery and countermortar radars. Work and Sleep Areas. Separate work areas from sleeping and eating areas should be de- signed and constructed for sanitation and health concerns. The potential for future expansion is part of COP design and construction, especially if HNSF will occupy part of the COP. In this case, separate, culturally-sens itive arrangements may have to be made. Depend ing on the size of the COP, the size of the occupying force, and the potential for expansion, planners make the --- Page 184 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 7-33 following considerations for facilities and then enable logistic and operational functions:  Medical treatment facility (MTF).  LZ.  Designated drop zone.  Detention facility.  Weapons range.  Local national meeting room.  HN force sleeping, eating, and hygiene facili- ties.  Vehicle staging/maintenance area.  Orders briefing area.  COC.  Sleeping quarters.  Laundry area.  Chow hall. Combat Outpost Equipment. Standard equip- ment for the base includes the following:  Kitchen sets.  Motor pool assets.  First and second echelon maintenance enablers and parts.  Power generators.  Earth-moving equipment.  Refrigeration equipment.  Communication equipment.  Morale, welfare, and recreation equipment.  Air conditioner/heater units.  Prefabricated barriers.  Barriers.  Bulletproof glass.  Kevlar blankets.  Entry control point kits.  Pest and rodent control.  Burn barrels.  Building material and tools.  Camouflage netting.  Maintenance tools.  Firefighting equipment.  Sound/alert system (indirect fire).  Clearing barrels.  Signs. Storage. Storage space is created by building appropriate structures, such as prefabricated stor- age containers. Despite operating in a tactical environment, commanders may not ignore the rules and regulations governing storage of ammu- nition, hazardous waste, and other items. Storage considerations include the following:  Waste storage.  Armory.  Ammunition.  Fuel.  Chow.  Water.  Supply.  Unexploded ordnance.  Valuables. Electrical. When developing the plan to power a COP, planners rely first on local power (main), second on generators (b ackup), and third on power converters off vehi cles (tertiary backup). Poor electrical planning and shoddy wiring present a substantial risk to FP due to fires and electrocution. Electrical considerations include the following:  Hire contract electricians or use qualified com- bat engineers.  Envision the proper wiring and layout of zone power grids.  Use generators for backup and ensure they are safely and properly linked into the power grid.  Create a proactive sustainment and mainte- nance process. Plumbing . Improper field sa nitation presents a substantial risk to FP due to the risk of disease. Plumbing considerations include the following:  The hiring of contract plumbers or use of qual- ified combat engineers.  Bulk water from locally drilled wells is typi- cally the main source of water.  Proper cleaning and main tenance of portable toilets and disposal of waste bags. --- Page 185 --- 7-34 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1  Proper cleaning and ma intenance of shower trailers and laundry facilities.  The creation of an eff ective sustainment and maintenance process. Fuel. Proper storage of fuel and protection of fuel assets against enemy action mitigate both opera- tional and FP risk. An a dditional consideration is fuel handling—the transfer of fuel from its storage container to the container or vehicle for use. Fuel considerations include the following:  Elevated fuel tanks for gravity-fed fueling.  Fuel pumps (manual or electric).  Fuel filters.  Hoses.  Required lubricants (transmission, steering, brake, and coolant).  Fuel cans.  Fire suppression assets.  Room to provide for se paration of living and working spaces from fuel storage locations. --- Page 186 --- CHAPTER 8 PATROLLING This chapter discusses the aspects of patrolling as they pertain to compa ny commanders and their staffs. It further descri bes the charac teristics of patrolling across a range of military operations and establishes guidance for the effective use of patrolling as an integral component of offense, defense, and stab ility operations. This chapter provides guidance and addresses certain patrol- ling characteristics; roles and responsibilities; as well as considerations for the planning, prepara- tion, and conduct of a patrol and postpatrol actions at the company level. Purpose of Patrolling A patrol is a detachment sent out to gather infor- mation and carry out a de structive, harassing, or security mission. The purpos e of a patrol is to provide a commander the organic means of man- aging his battlespace an d gathering information. The patrol is a tool used across all three opera- tional areas of a range of military operations (see fig. 8-1); that is, they are equally critical to offense, defense, and stability regardless of where or at what level a conflic t or crisis occurs. Com- manders create patrolling plans to meet their requirements and they are limited only by the inge- nuity with which they employ their patrols and the skill and aggressiveness of patrol members. Purpose and mission requi rements dictate patrol techniques, not vice versa. Patrols may be mounted, dismounted, or both. Though they may serve defensive purposes by using offensive techniques and may possess the means for violence, they provide stability in a peacekeeping environment. Patrols may employ any number of techniques and variations of techniques, from police-like community action to ambushing enemy units, to meet their assi gned purpose. They may seek to fulfill reporting requirements or none at all; they may require extensive additional skill sets and enablers or none at all. Managing their battlespace and gathering information remains the purpose of commanders’ patrolling plans. Tenets of Patrolling Patrols fall into categori es defined by objective and method of conduct. All patrols must have clearly defined objectives and with each objective comes a specific focus. Patrols may focus on the enemy, the security of the unit, or on the security of the population. Regardless of the objective and focus of individual patrols, the tenets of success- ful patrolling endure and apply across a range of military operations. Company leadership at all lev- els must conduct focused training, inspect prepara- tions, judge operational effectiveness, and base corrections on the tenets of successful patrolling. Joint Campaigns (Overseas) Defense Stability Offense Offense Stability Defense Defense Stability Offense Figure 8-1. Patrolling Across a Range of Military Operations. --- Page 187 --- 8-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Detailed Planning Every portion of the patrol must be planned, individual and subelement tasks assigned, special equipment identified, and all possible con- tingencies considered. At the company level, commanders must develop a comprehensive pa- trolling plan that addre sses the multiple tactical and informational demands within the battle- space while maintaining the capability and capa- city to respond to contingencies. Commanders must capitalize on the efforts within the CLIC and company COC to manage and prioritize collection and targeting efforts and apply these same functions to the development of a deliberate patrolling plan. Planni ng prioritizes specific informational and tacti cal demands and aligns priorities with availabl e forces, the amount of battlespace requiring patr ol coverage, and the resources available to re spond to contingencies. Patrol planning and contingency considerations are discussed later in this chapter. Productive Rehearsals Patrol members rehearse each phase of the patrol, beginning with actions in the objective area and working backward to ward departing from friendly lines. Whenever possible, patrol rehears- als occur on terrain and under environmental con- ditions similar to that of the objective area. Contingency rehearsals must be detailed and thorough enough to ensu re universal understand- ing within the patrol as well as within the sup- porting HHQ. At the company level, commanders must also rehearse contingency plans within the company COC. Watch officers and company COC personnel must develop battle drills for con- tingency responses that include known roles and functions, required HHQ and adjacent/support- ing unit coordina tion, and tactical nets/systems required to affect coordination. Thorough Reconnaissance Ideally, the patrol lead er conducts a physical reconnaissance of the patrol route and objective; however, this is not always possible. Maps, imagery, photographs, recent patrol debriefs, and intelligence briefings from HUMINT, SIGINT, and any other organic or nonorganic intelligence sources supplement the reconnaissance effort prior to executing a patrol. Positive Control The patrol leader must maintain positive control of the patrol. For small detachments operating alone, planning and executing well-rehearsed bat- tle drills are keys to a successful mission. Con- trol of the patrol is equally important during patrol preparations. It is important to “isolate” patrol members, removi ng them from their nor- mal duties or other demands so as to allow them to concentrate on patrol preparation. During the execution of a patrol, the company COC main- tains continuous awareness of patrol location, actions, and intentions in order to ensure an accu- rate CTP and streamlin e contingency response times. The primary mean s of enabling control is through detailed planni ng (appropriate overlays and fires/contingency pl ans), timely reporting, and efficient battle track ing. Manual and techni- cal processes support the control effort. Manual Control Procedures The company COC conducts control through the timely posting of patrol overlays, manual updates of patrol positions as reports are received, updates of priority targets and associated support- ing/firing agencies, and updates of the current sit- uation maps and the CTP. Technical Control Procedures Technical means, such as satellite-enabled posi- tioning and communicati ons systems, can assist in control, but require maintenance of redun- dancy through manual u pdates to ensure the company COC is capable of timely response to all contingencies. All-Around Security Security is continuous throughout the life cycle of a patrol. During mission preparation, security of --- Page 188 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 8-3 information regarding si ze, route, and purpose reduces risk to the patrol. During execution, the patrol maintains all-around security, varies routes, and avoids patterns wh ile the company adopts necessary procedures and contingencies to assist the patrol if needed. Upon completion of the patrol, security of patrol results reduce the ability of the enemy to predict future friendly action. Every Marine a Collector The ability to maximi ze the observation and reporting skills of the individual Marine is critical to successful patrol execution. Every patrol mem- ber observes critical information during every patrol and successfully captures those observa- tions because of proper training and disciplined debriefing techniques. It is the responsibility of the company commander to ensure the integra- tion of all information gl eaned from patrols into the company’s collection plan and common oper- ational picture. Patrol Types Although mission requirements determine the type of patrol conducted, every patrol has the sec- ondary mission of coll ecting inform ation about the enemy, the operationa l environment, the human environmen t, and physical terrain. The two main types of patrols are reconnaissance and combat. The patrolling unit requires a clear task and purpose and the patrol ’s mission must sup- port the overall company patrol plan. Reconnaissance Patrols A reconnaissance patrol collects information and can either confirm or di sprove the accuracy of information previously gained. Problem framing and the resulting collect ion plan normally drive the requirement for a reconnaissance patrol. Depending on the mission and the operating envi- ronment, reconnaissance patrols may be covert or overt. When facing a s ubstantial enemy threat, covert reconnaissance patrols use as few personnel and as little equipment as possible with regard to survivability, while seek ing to avoid enemy con- tact and close combat. In other operational envi- ronments, overt reconnai ssance patrols serve secondary purposes, such as security and presence. There are three types of reconnaissance patrols— route, zone, and area. Route Reconnaissance A route reconnaissance ga thers detailed informa- tion on the physical terra in and human environ- ment, capabilities and capa cities, and potential areas of threat influence along a designated route. Route reconnaissance might be oriented on a spe- cific area of movement (s uch as a section of road or trail) or on a more general area (such as an axis of advance). Route reconnaissance patrols should receive specific guidance on fulfilling informa- tion requirements. When information require- ments are technical in nature, patrols receive enablers (such as engineers) for specific pur- poses (such as bridge and road surface stability and applicability). Zone Reconnaissance A zone reconnaissance is a directed effort within specified boundaries to gain information about routes; human environment and physical terrain; enemy forces; and obstacles, including areas of chemical and radiological contamination. The reconnaissance unit receives maximum freedom of action within the bo undaries. Its efforts may focus on multiple, specific locations within the zone or it may se ek information across the entire zone. The compan y normally conducts a zone reconnaissance when the situation is vague or when trying to determine the size and scope of mission requirements. Time is the only limiting feature in the amount and detail of information collected. Critical tasks of the operation nor- mally include the following:  Find and report all enemy or potentially hostile forces within the zone.  Reconnoiter specific physical terrain and human environment within the zone.  Reconnoiter status of critical infrastructure and trafficability. --- Page 189 --- 8-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Area Reconnaissance An area reconnaissance ga thers detailed informa- tion about the physical terrain and human envi- ronment or enemy activit y within a prescribed area or point. The area can be any location criti- cal to the unit’s operations and is different from a zone in that it is mo re specific and directed. Examples include easily identifiable areas cover- ing fairly large spaces, such as towns or military installations; terrain featur es, such as ridge lines, wood lines, or chokepoints; or single points, such as bridges or buildings. The critical tasks of an area reconnaissance are th e same as those for a zone reconnaissance. Combat Patrols Combat patrols provide s ecurity to both friendly forces and local populations; maintain contact with friendly and enemy forces; and harass, destroy, or capture enemy troops, equipment, or installations. Depending on the mission and the operational environment, combat pa trols may be covert or overt. Covert combat pa trols are normally pre- ferred when seeking an enemy and engaging in close combat. Overt patrols tend to be more appro- priate when conducting op erations in permissive environments in which fa ctors, such as presence and contact with the local population, are mission critical. Because contact with an enemy is either the mission of the patrol or likely to occur, combat patrols task-organize personnel to include unit patrol members, mission enablers, and weapons and equipment required to perform expected and potential tasks. Combat patrols may carry special- ized munitions specific to the mission, such as demolitions and explosives. Since all patrols by their nature serve as the company commander’s intelligence collection asse ts, combat patrols also collect and report any information gathered during the mission, whether related to the combat task or not. The four types of combat patrols are raid, con- tact, ambush, and security. Raid Patrol The primary differences between the raid as a type of attack (see chap. 6) and the raid as a type of patrol are size and sc ope. For example, a com- pany-sized or greater raid force generally has an attack objective, while raids conducte d by forces smaller than a company normally occur as part of a patrol. Examples of raid patrols are the capture of local enemy personnel or documents for intel- ligence purposes; destruction of small enemy out- posts and LPs; and th e demolition of small portions of enemy infrast ructure, such as a bun- ker or footbridge. Like its attack counterpart, a successful raid relies on detailed planning, to include in-depth consideration of contingencies. Raid patrols may or may not make use of cordons or supporting arms to is olate the objective area. The raid patrol is a usef ul infantry company tool to achieve specific results, but requires significant supervision of the or ders preparation and rehearsal processes to ensure success. Contact Patrol Contact patrols establish/maintain physical or visual contact with frie ndly or enemy forces to the front, flanks, or rear of the parent unit. In many operational envir onments, contact with friendly forces could re fer to engagement with local civic leadership, foreign NGOs, and a host of similar entities. The purpose of the patrol and any potential enemy threat dictate a contact patrol’s organization a nd combat power. A con- tact patrol between friendly positions might require a small and relatively lightly armed force. A patrol tasked to establish contact with an enemy force might require the manpower, arma- ment, and equipment to fight through an enemy screening force to locat e their main body. A con- tact patrol conducting discussions with local lead- ers may require various enablers. Since all of these types of patrols of ten entail mature deci- sionmaking about how a nd where to move, what and what not to say, wh en to fight, and how to avoid decisive engagement, company command- ers choose patrol leadership and conduct the orders process accordingly. Regardless of pur- pose and operational environment, the tenets and principles of patrolling remain the same. --- Page 190 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 8-5 Ambush Patrol An ambush is a surprise attack from concealment on a moving or temporarily halted enemy target. It may consist of closing with and destroying the enemy (near ambush) or an attack by fire (far ambush). Ambushes occur with ferocity and vio- lence of action, seeking decisive effects in the opening moments of the engagement. Size of the enemy, orientation of the ambush site, BSG, security, and the size of the ambush element gen- erally dictate what means of employment patrol leaders choose. While ambushes do not seize or hold ground, information gathering constitutes an important secondary mission requiring appropri- ate planning and security measures. Company commanders and their staffs take into account all of these requirements when allocating combat power to an ambush patrol. Ambushes allow—  Smaller forces to gene rate decisive effects against superior, larger enemy forces, to in- clude use of supporting arms.  The reduction of the enemy’s effectiveness through the destruction and harassment of his forces.  The reduction of enemy morale and effective- ness as he suffers casualties at little cost to the ambushing elements. Security Patrol A security patrol fulfills offense, defense, and sta- bility functions across a full range of military operations. Just as the nature of security require- ments can be different in each of the operational areas, so can the manner in which security patrols are employed. Across all of the operational areas, security patrols meet cl assic internal require- ments of the pa rent unit by screening flanks, areas, and routes; protecting static positions from infiltration; providing early warning of enemy attacks; disrupting threat reconnaissance efforts; and preventing surprise. In the offense, security patrols protect moving units by screening flanks , the area through which the unit will pass, and the route over which the unit intends to move. In the defense, security patrols protect friendly positions and seek to deny the enemy’s reconnaissance efforts. In stability operations, security patr ols reduce the enemy’s freedom of movement, disrupt his operations, and weaken his influence on the local population while securing critical infrastructure. Security patrols are always prepar ed to fight, but avoid decisive engagement with units larger than them- selves, seeking rather to disrupt and delay vice destroy. Security patrols normally operate away from other friendly forc es for only limited peri- ods, returning fre quently to coordinate and rest. They do not operate beyond the range of commu- nications and supporting fires from the main body, especially mortar fires. Like contact patrols, man- power, armament, equipment, and enablers are determined according to mission requirements. Patrol Planning and Preparation Detailed planning is the fi rst tenet of patrolling. Company commanders use a company patrol plan, driven by the requirements and results of problem framing, as the primary tool to enable successful patrol planning and execution. The design and problem framing processes determine patrolling priorities with in the commander’s bat- tlespace. Information requirements and the result- ing intelligence collectio n plan, the intelligence collection requirements of HHQ, and the com- pany’s targeting requirements focus patrolling priorities on specific areas. Operations and secu- rity requirements deter mine the number, routes, and frequency of security patrols. A company commander’s failure to address these fundamen- tal planning steps results in an ineffective patrol plan devoid of purpose and focus and easily exploited by the enemy. After establishing the size and scope of the patrol requirements, com- pany commanders then balance those require- ments against the resources available. --- Page 191 --- 8-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Considerations for Developing a Company Patrol Plan The company patrol plan begins with determining the nature of the problem and understanding the environment and the co rresponding intelligence collection requirements and operational necessi- ties to realize the patrol’s goals. Problem Framing The task and purpose of the company provide the foundation for all other planning. An analysis of friendly and enemy centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities helps determine what patrols should look for and wh at patrols should guard against. Problem framing allows commanders to establish priorities for the patrolling effort—What must be known first? What must be guarded against immediately?—to avoid loss of focus in the patrol plan. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace The IPB process helps commanders to accom- plish the following:  Identify and prioritize PIRs and associated NAIs for inclusion in the intelligence collec- tion plan.  Identify resource shortfalls and seek augmenta- tion or support from other intelligence collection platforms to cover gaps in the collection plan.  Integrate and reinforce external intelligence collection resources in the patrol and operation plans.  Conduct continuous patter n analysis in terms of friendly forces, en emy actions, and geo- graphic terrain and human environment.  Locate and plot the proximity of indigenous boundaries to th e patrol, such as tribal, ethnic, religious, and HNSF. Development of the Patrol Plan Having established wher e patrols should go, when they should go, and what they should be doing, a patrolling conc ept becomes a patrolling plan. The following are c onsiderations regarding the patrol plan:  Balance the patrol plan against other opera- tional priorities and resource demands, such as construction of the defense.  Determine patrol limitations in terms of size, frequency, duration, an d range based on the company’s maneuver, fires, and logistic capa- bilities.  Conduct a risk assessment based on the company’s ability to accomplish such tasks as maintain a reserve, conduct CASEVAC and vehicle recovery, and maintain communica- tions. The assessment does not preclude patrols, but only indicates those circumstances in which the company may have to take additional steps to support patrols operating in certain areas at certain times.  Conduct a time-space anal ysis to support risk assessment and determine patrol limitations.  Identify and prioritize gaps in personnel and material assets. Fires Planning Fire support for patrols includes delivering not only supporting arms, but also nonlethal fires (such as IO themes) that support the presence of patrols among the populace. Chapter 5 contains more information on fire s planning. Fires plan- ning in preparation for a patrol helps to accom- plish the following:  Determine fires limitations in the battlespace, including ROE, risk es timate distances, collat- eral damage estimate methodology, the impact of physical terrain, and the human environment.  Determine potential fire support gaps in patrol coverage by analyzi ng and assessing current fires support in the battlespace in terms of organic fire support ra nge fans, external fire support range fans if available, fire support procedures, and FSCMs.  Plan fires to cover m ovement along the entire patrol route, to cover gaps in organic fires with external agencies, and to establish trigger lines --- Page 192 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 8-7 that assist the compan y COC in tracking what fire support agencies are available at any given time as a patrol moves along its route.  Determine, establish, and rehearse fire control procedures, including which units may clear and deny fires within the patrol area.  Ensure individual patrol s have the ability to direct and control fires in terms of both com- munications and the presence of enablers, such as qualified air and artillery observers. Maneuver Planning The actual execution of the patrol, both during movement and in the acco mplishment of its task and purpose, requires some thought regarding what steps and resources better enable its suc- cess. The following are co nsiderations in maneu- ver planning:  Depending on task and purpose, request addi- tional personnel and enabler support, such as engineers, military work ing dog teams, and a CI/HUMINT team.  Depending on task and purpose, request addi- tional resources and equipment, such as troop lift, biometric systems, communications plat- forms, and emergency aer ial resupply or ex- tract capabilities.  Consider adjacent a nd higher unit coordina- tion requirements for patr ols in contact with or in proximity to other friendly, partnered nation, and coalition units.  Consider EPW and detainee handling and evacuation plans and procedures.  Establish predeparture requirements, such as rehearsals and backbriefs, overlays and patrol plans, manifests and equipment density lists, PCCs, and PCIs.  Establish postreturn requirements, such as debriefs and AARs, PCCs and PCIs, and recon- stitution. Contingency Plan Considerations Planning for contingencie s is critical to patrol planning. Identifying and rehearsing actions from individual patrols thro ugh company headquarters during contingencies will highlight critical gaps and friction points in bot h the patrol’s plan of action and the ability of the company to effec- tively support patrol actions. Effective planning for contingencies also enables the company com- mander to identify risk and apply deliberate miti- gation measures. Underl ying the effectiveness of reactions to contingencie s is effective communi- cations and accurate and timely reporting. Plan- ning for contingencies sh ould include individual patrol actions and company COC actions. Patrol Actions Patrols establish and rehearse immediate action drills for unit responses (such as a reaction to a far ambush) and battle drills for internal actions (such as vehicle recovery and CASEVAC). Company Combat Operations Center Actions The company COC anticipa tes contingencies and remains prepared to effectively deal with them by maintaining communication and enforcing report- ing discipline among patrols; by accurately track- ing patrol location and in formation requirements; and by coordina ting with higher, adjacent, and supporting units to reduce response time. Additional Considerations The company COC cannot allow itself to be over- come by any single even t or contingency. Re- hearsals and well-understood procedures allow the company COC to handl e contingencies effec- tively while continuing to manage the rest of the battlespace. The existence of tools, such as priori- ties, reserve committal and reconstitution crite- ria, information requ irements, and resource triggers, allow the company COC to make sound and mature decisions about the priority of effort required by any particular contingency in light of the company’s other operations. Considerations for Mounted Patrols Vehicle considerations within mounted patrols are similar to those considerations that apply to --- Page 193 --- 8-8 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 all mounted infantry operations. Company com- manders consider METT-T , mobility versus sur- vivability, task organization and load planning, communications, logistics, and maintenance. Patrol Purpose When conducting problem framing, company commanders balance the advantages available when mounting infantry, su ch as speed, mobility, and survivability, with the patrol’s purpose. Proper understanding of the environment and problem reveals that missions may support mounted patrols, dismoun ted patrols, or both. Mounted patrols provide the increased flexibil- ity, speed, and mobility that are appropriate for large distances; multiply the effects of a small force; and occur in terra in that supports vehicle operations. Dismounted patrols enable stealth, are more capable of providing detail on specific areas and routes, operate effectively in complex terrain, and provide superior cont act with the local popu- lation. Combining m ounted and dismounted methods within a patrol is appropriate in in- stances when vehicles serve an approach march function that enables dismounted operations at the objective—whether th e objective is an am- bush, a meeting, or an area reconnaissance. Com- pany commanders are ca reful to avoid allowing their companies to fall into the worst habits asso- ciated with vehicular movement, such as disincli- nation to dismount, tacti cal discipline laziness, and tendency to leave mission critical gear on vehicles when dismounting. Mission accomplish- ment takes precedence ov er troop comfort, wel- fare, and FP. Armor and Force Protection Versus Maneuverability A key factor when considering armor versus maneuverability (discussed in detail in chap. 6) is that the increase in FP available through armor naturally affects some of the infantry’s basic strengths, such as all ar ound observation and the ability to maneuver thro ugh restrictive and com- plex terrain. Balancing considerations for the pro- tection of vehicles and crews, observation, the employment of weapons, and maneuverability is critical. Normally, heavily armored vehicles, espe- cially wheeled vehicles with extra min e-resistant armor, can limit crew and passenger observation in complex terrain. Reduced observation can also limit weapons employment at close ranges. Both rocket-propelled grenades and IEDs can defeat many armored vehicles and may defeat any wheeled vehicle, with or without an armor pack- age, at the point of detonation. Enemy forces often target vehicles with poor security, because these vehicles can appear eas ier to destroy and less likely to respond effect ively. Commanders must analyze mission demands, enemy trends, and recent events in their AOs before deciding on an appropriate level of armo r protection. Depending on the threat, heavier armor protection can provide for enhanced crew and vehicle survivability. Lighter armor protection can often provide more vehicular speed and mob ility resulting in greater offensive capability. In some situations, speed and mobility can offer a degr ee of protection itself. Other considerations include the following:  Can the vehicle crew and passengers provide security for themselves?  Can the vehicle crew se lf-secure the vehicle if the passengers dismount?  Can the vehicle crew and passengers quickly and safely mount or dismount? Can they do so under fire?  If the vehicle has a turret-mounted weapon sys- tem, does the gunner have enough protection? Does the turret afford the gunner adequate observation?  What are the enemy’s primary weapon systems and does the vehicle offer protection from them? Can vehicle crew s and passengers re- spond effectively to those weapon systems? What is the net effect for that protection in light of mission accomplishment? Task Organization and Vehicle Load Planning Even though mounted, patrols must still have the ability to accomplish all th e internal and external tasks associated with reconnaissance and combat patrols. Many of these tasks, such as security, are --- Page 194 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 8-9 more difficult due to the larger number of patrol personnel tied to the vehicles as crew. When planning to conduct oper ations in a mounted environment, planners apply considerable effort to manifesting and troop to task. The ground tac- tical plan serves as a st arting point in determin- ing the number of pers onnel required, which indicates the number, ty pe, and organization of the vehicles required. Further modification occurs as vehicles available, element integrity, bump plans, and cross-leveling of personnel and equip- ment are integrated into the plan. In all cases, commanders must balance vehicle and crew sur- vivability, vehicle weight and payload, the offen- sive capabilities of the crew and passengers, and their ability to quickly and efficiently mount and dismount the vehicle. Th e development and use of company SOPs aid this process. The company commander modifies these basic operating proce- dures as necessary to accomplish sp ecific patrol missions. Additional considerations for task orga- nization and vehicle load planning follow:  What types and numbers of vehicles are avail- able?  Are vehicle capabilities and limitations appro- priate to the mission?  Will the vehicles have organic crews or will the infantry platoon or co mpany provide drivers and crews?  What types of weapons will the vehicles mount? Are outside reso urces, such as HMGs required?  Does the commander anticipate dismounting the crew-served or au tomatic weapons from the vehicles at the objective or if in contact?  Will the unit maintain team and squad integrity within vehicles and vehicle sections or will the unit dedicate an element to vehicle crews and maintain squad and team integrity only when dismounted?  Will assistant gunners travel with their gunners in the same vehicle or in the same section?  Is the mission a mounted patrol in which dis- mounting is a battle drill or is the mission a mounted approach ma rch supporting dis- mounted operations, such as a search?  Does the commander anticipate using the vehicles’ CSWs as a base of fire or as an SBF element?  Do the vehicle recovery and emergency main- tenance battle drills su pport the mission driven bump plan priorities?  Does the load plan for personnel and equipment, especially mission-spec ific special equipment, use spread load and redundancy methodologies? Communications Vehicle crew communication is paramount to smooth vehicle operation. Commanders must consider how dismounts will communicate with the mounted or dismounted crew. Drivers and troop commanders can normally communicate by voice in most wheeled vehicles, but might not be able to do so if in c ontact. Passengers and gun- ners have a hard time communicating with the driver/troop commander under normal operating conditions and most likel y cannot do so during contact. Once passengers dismount, voice com- munications are nearly impossible. Commanders should consider the following:  If intercom systems are not available, equip the driver, troop commander, and gunner (if appli- cable) with headset ra dios for internal and external vehicle communication.  Use redundant hand and arm signals, flags, and pyrotechnics for basic critical signals, such as mount, dismount, shift and cease fire, and tar- get designation. Considerations for Patrol Bases A patrol base is a temporary position set up when the patrol unit halts for a period longer than a security halt, but shorter than what is necessary for a permanent position such as a COP or FOB. The patrol base is a defensive position and, as such, the fundamentals of perimeter defenses apply (see chap. 7). When the unit mu st halt for a long time in a place not protecte d by friendly troops, active and passive security measures are required. --- Page 195 --- 8-10 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Mission and enemy ca pabilities determine whether a patrol base is overt or covert. Covert patrol bases are occupied in stealth and are located in areas that are difficult to access, provide no tac- tical value to the enem y, are easily defendable, and from which hasty egress can occur if compro- mised. Conversely, overt patrol bases are readily visible. Their visibility is often a por tion of their mission, such as an over t patrol base among the population. Patrol bases are occupied only as long as necessary, but not fo r more than 24 hours— except in an emergency. The unit should not use the same patrol base more than once. Key Leader Responsibilities The company commander, XO, first sergeant, gunnery sergeant, fire s upport team leader, and WO each have specific responsibilities with re- gard to patrol planning and conduct. Company Commander Company commanders may be involved in patrol- ling in one of three ways: they may lead a com- pany-sized patrol; they may provide small patrols from their company as di rected by battalion; or they may send out patrols on their own initiative as a component of the overall company patrolling/ battlespace management ef fort. Regardless of the type of involvement company commanders have in individual patrols, the priority of their efforts are dedicated to setting the right conditions for success through de tailed planni ng, coordina- tion, rehearsals, and s upervision. When com- pany commanders plan to use a patrol to support a company operation, they identify its mission, organization, key times a nd places for departure and return, and possibl y its routes. Depending on the mission, commanders may assign the task, give their intent, and allow the platoon leader to plan the patrol. The company com- mander and members of the company headquar- ters assists in planni ng fire support, logistic support, and communica tions. Commander-spe- cific responsibilities incl ude, but are not limited to, conducting problem framing, conducting IPB, and developing the patrol plan. Conduct Problem Framing The company commander conducts problem framing, which serves as the foundation for developing a patrol plan. He determines mission, end state, and essential tasks of the patrolling effort; assesses and mitigates operational risk; and identifies personnel and resource limitations. Conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace The company commander uses the company intelligence specialist to assist in the development of PIRs, an intelligen ce collection plan, and in obtaining intelligence su pport for the conduct of patrols. Commanders supe rvise and approve the development of company essential elements of information and CCIRs, the synchronization of patrolling requirements w ith the intelligence col- lection plan, and the prio ritization of patrolling efforts in conjunction with the intelligence collec- tion plan and operational requirements. Develop Patrol Plan Company commanders may use planning support from within the compa ny leadership and the company COC, but they remain responsible for creating a patrol plan th at meets their intelli- gence collection and oper ational requirements. The commander also has the following associ- ated responsibilities:  Develops company patrol plan and associated OPORDs.  Issues WARNORDs to the designated patrol unit.  Initiates appropriate troop leading procedures.  Coordinates and assists in the development of detailed individual patrol plans.  Ensures the tasked element prepares, properly organizes, and equips itself for the mission. --- Page 196 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 8-11  Ensures critical contingency plans are thor- oughly planned, briefed, and rehearsed from the patrol through the company COC.  Assists the patrol lead er with preparations, coordination, and final inspections before the patrol departs.  Assesses operational re adiness (personnel, equipment, logistics).  Coordinates with highe r, adjacent, and sup- porting units.  Maintains and updates the CTP throughout the course of the patrol a nd ensures higher, adja- cent, and supporting units are informed.  Ensures patrol reports are properly received, recorded, and routed.  Supervises the coordination and execution of contingency plans.  Coordinates supporting arms in accordance with mission requirements.  Ensures that the appr opriate PCCs and PCIs have been conducted prior to patrol departure.  Ensures that patrol debriefs occur upon the return of the patrol and information gleaned from patrols is properly integrated into the overall intelligence effort and disseminated internally to higher, adjacent, and supporting units as required. Executive Officer The XO possesses the authority to act in the company commander’s na me and is frequently expected to exercise th at authority during the development, execution, and support of the com- pany’s patrol plan. He has the following duties:  Executes designated pa trol-related duties as assigned by the company commander.  Develops and oversees execution of the local security plan.  Develops and enforces battle drills/battle rhythm.  Participates in planning efforts.  Supervises the company COC’s timely and accurate updates of fr iendly and enemy situa- tions. First Sergeant As the senior ta ctical and administrative advisor to the company commande r, the first sergeant supervises patrol preparation and isolation, disci- pline, accountability, and postoperational actions. He has the following responsibilities:  Supervises tactical discipline.  Supervises personnel and equipment account- ability of each patrol.  Tracks CASEVAC operations and casualty sta- tus.  Assists in development, coordination, and rehearsal of contingency plans.  Participates in planning efforts.  Supervises the handling and tracking of EPWs and detainees.  Supervises the conduct of IO. Gunnery Sergeant The company gunnery sergeant oversees patrol preparation, logistical support, and efficient com- pany COC operations. His responsibilities follow:  Oversees company COC operations to include management of company communications assets.  Supervises patrol preparation to include rehearsals and PCC/PCIs.  Directs supply and resupply.  Supervises the local security plan.  Supervises the operations chief and WO in tracking logistic operations and reporting.  Participates in planning efforts.  Coordinates company re serve support require- ments.  Plans, coordinates, and supervises CASEVAC.  Plans, coordinates, and supervises EPW and detainee handling. Fire Support Team Leader The FST leader assists patrol leaders in fire sup- port planning, integrates patrol fires with the --- Page 197 --- 8-12 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 company fires plan, and conducts coordination with organic and nonorga nic fire support agen- cies. His responsibilities follow:  Develops targets and FSCMs for the company battlespace.  Integrates patrols into the company fire support plan.  Develops the company level attack guidance matrix (lethal and nonlethal).  Coordinates and clears supporting arms in accordance with mission requirements. Watch Officer Watch officers are normally sourced by the pla- toon commander and platoon sergeant responsi- ble for COP or FOB secu rity. The WO is the senior Marine in the company COC and main- tains awareness of all activ ity taking place in the company battlespace to include AIs and AOIs. The watch officer must be prepared to update the company leadership at any time. Some of his responsibilities follow:  Supervises all personnel in the company COC.  Supervises current ope rations and initiates appropriate action as the commander’s senior representative.  Ensures all missions are briefed and debriefed.  Conducts cross-boundary coordination.  Provides situational updates and briefings for key personnel.  Controls entry and exit of friendly lines.  Obtains situational updates from company COC personnel.  Maintains situational awareness of all friendly and enemy activity.  Obtains information from appropriate subordi- nate and supporting units.  Disseminates information to appropriate subor- dinate and supporting units.  Notifies the commander of any CCIR event.  Ensures all status boards in the company COC are current.  Commits the company reserve in accordance with unit SOP.  Coordinates and clear s supporting arms in accordance with appropriate documentation.  Adjusts and disseminates FSCMs based on the tactical situation.  Coordinates the moveme nt of ground-based fire support.  Updates the situation map with regard to friendly patrols and en emy activity during the last 48 hours. Postpatrol Actions After the patrol has been completed, leadership must account for all pe rsonnel and equipment, debrief patrol members, and conduct an AAR. Accountability Accountability is an important component of FP. Leadership at all levels must know the location and status of their personnel and equipment. Accountability also enforces discipline within a unit. Upon returning from a patrol, the element does not return to its billeting or similar facili- ties. Accountability, postcombat care of person- nel and equipment, and debriefs occur prior to releasing the patrol members. The commander verifies the location and status of all patrol members, at tachments, EPWs, and detainees. He verifies ac countability of all weap- ons, ammunition, munitions, and equipment. In the case of missing personnel, the company immediately institutes its missing man proce- dures. In the case of lo st or missing equipment, reports and appropriate in vestigations occur in a timely manner. Debriefs A Marine patrol is still the best means to build the company commander’s situational aware- ness, providing that all relevant and significant information from the patrol is captured during the debrief. The commander must conduct a thorough debrief with all members of the patrol. --- Page 198 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 8-13 Checklists of the material to be covered in de- briefs are important and should align with the prepatrol brief and assi gned IR/PIRs. To con- duct a meaningful and detailed debrief, com- manders should ensure the following:  Establish debriefing pr ocedures in company SOPs and update as needed.  Isolate the patrol from distraction so members can be debriefed without interruption.  Establish a “no rank” de brief atmosphere and avoid discouraging patrol member input.  Ensure that all relevant billet holders, such as the platoon commander, platoon sergeant, pla- toon/squad intelligence representative, ele- ment leaders, and recorder, are present.  Ensure that all items of interest collected by the patrol are present and displayed, such as pictures, recordings, sketches, and map im- provements.  Avoid a “story telling” atmosphere (objective versus subjective) and maintain the focus on drawing information fr om the individual or group being debriefed. Focus on the information requirements that formed the patrol’s tasking.  Avoid asking leading questions, searching for preconceived answers, or trying to confirm prepatrol assumptions.  Ask questions that require a detailed response and do not accept simple “yes” or “no” answers.  Track all “atmospheric” changes in the AO, such as new constructio n, new signs, things no longer present, and p opulation traffic pattern changes.  Save after action comme nts (critiques of the patrol) for the AAR. After Action Reviews No operation ever occu rs perfectly. There is always room for impr ovement. An important component of postpatrol actions is a meaningful AAR, especially after patrols involving contact or other significant events. The AAR normally occurs after completion of formal postpatrol requirements, such as de briefs, but before patrol members become absorbed in postcombat checks and equipment maintenance. Unit leadership should supervise AARs to ensure that appropri- ate information is incorporated into SOPs, les- sons learned, and sustainm ent training plans. The company commander is responsible for the tech- nical and tactical profic iency of the company and takes appropriate personal interest in the validity of the AAR process within the company. Com- pany commanders have a responsibility to ensure they accomplish the following:  Establish AAR procedures in company SOPs and update as needed.  Isolate the patrol from distraction so members can conduct the AAR without interruption.  Establish a “no rank” atmosphere and avoid discouraging patrol member input.  Ensure that all relevant billet holders, such as platoon commander, platoon sergeant, and ele- ment leaders, are present.  Avoid a “story telling” atmosphere (objective versus subjective) and maintain the focus on an item-discussion-recommendation format.  Record any debrief comments that might occur during the AAR and forward to the company commander for appropriat e inclusion into the intelligence collection plan. --- Page 199 --- 8-14 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 This Page Intentionally Left Blank --- Page 200 --- CHAPTER 9 AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS If historical migration pa tterns hold, most of the world’s population will soon live within 100 kilo- meters of a coastline. As long as the United States remains a maritime nati on and possesses the requirement to engage th e nations of the oceans’ littorals, it will need an amphibious force (AF) projection capability. This chapter provides a basic orientation for the infantry company and company commander ta sked to conduct an amphibious operation or deployment. It addresses: amphibious doctrine and platforms; command relationships; training tactics, techniques, and pro- cedures; phases of an am phibious operation; and considerations specific to shipboard life—all from the infantry company perspective. Fundamental principles and guidance on the planning and exe- cution of amphibious oper ations are contained in JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations . That publica- tion states that an amph ibious operation is a mili- tary operation launche d from the sea by an amphibious force, embarked in ships or craft with the primary purpose of introducing a landing force ashore to accomplish the assigned mission. In addition to the JP 3-02, the following refer- ences will complete the essential compendium of amphibious operations-related doctrine: JP 3-02.1, Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation ; MCRP 4-11.3G, Unit Embarkation Handbook ; and MCRP 4-11C, Combat Cargo Operations Handbook. For ship-to-shore movement planning refer to MCWP 3-31.5, Ship-to-Shore Movement. While the phases of amphibious operations—plan- ning, embarkation, rehear sal, movement, and action (PERMA)—are not necessarily successive, they always occur. For example, forward deployed AFs, such as amphibious ready groups, use the following sequence: embarkation, movement, planning, rehearsal, and action. Table 9-1 shows the various phases of an amphibious operation, a description of each, and considerations for the infantry company. Table 9-1. Phases of an Amphibious Operation. Phase Description Company Level Perspective Planning Continuous, concurrent process involving bottom-up refinement. Begins at the receipt of initiating directive and terminates with the completion of operational objectives Products that emerge from the planning phase are the LF CONOPS ashore, landing plan, loading plan, and AF tasking order Predeployment training Identify load out/cube requirements Generation of deliverables for use in constructing the landing plan Generation of SOPs/briefing shells Embarka- tion Embarkation of LF troops and equipment aboard amphibious ready group shipping Inspection of vehicles and containers Identification of troop spaces Loading of troops and equipment Stowage of equipment Rehearsal Conducted during movement to ensure feasibility, adequacy, and timing of the landing plan and readiness of the AF; test communica- tions; and validate procedures/assumptions Shipboard training Call aways Shipboard safety drills CARs Confirmation briefs Movement Amphibious force departs port of embarkation and proceeds to the amphibious objective area Troop regulations Shipboard life Inspections of troop spaces Maintenance Training Action Amphibious force is in position to initiate ship-to-shore movement and terminates upon completion of mission objectives. This phase includes supporting arms, ship-to-shore movement/ship-to-objec- tive maneuver (via surface, air, or a combination of both), logistics, and patient movement Assault support/landing craft considerations Establishment of beachhead/LZs Rearm/refit/refuel --- Page 201 --- 9-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Types of Amphibious Operations Amphibious operations include assaults, with- drawals, demonstrations, raids, and amphibious support to other operati ons. Amphibious assaults involve introducing a LF on a hostile or uncer- tain shore. Using seabas ing, fire support, and logistic functi ons, AFs can gain a foothold on a hostile or uncertain shor e by forcible entry. For example, when conducting Operation Chromite during the Korean War, sea-based mobility was used to execute a turn ing movement against North Korean forces and establish a LF at Inchon, deep behind the North Korean lead elements. An amphibious withdrawal is the extraction of forces by sea in ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shor e. For example, during the Korean War, after the 1st Marine Division successfully extracted itself from a Chinese counterattack at the Chosin Reservoir, it exe- cuted an amphibious w ithdrawal from the port of Hung-Nam. An amphibious demonstrati on is a show of force conducted to deceive w ith the expectation of deluding the enemy into a COA unfavorable to it. As a form of MILDEC, it uses the threat posed by an AF to accomplish this purpose. During Opera- tion Desert Storm, the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and ships of an amphibious strike group conducted such measures as raids, fire missions, mine and lane clearance, and beach reconnais- sance to successfully c onvince Iraqi commanders that the coalition’s main effort would be an amphibious assault against Kuwait City. This decision resulted in the Iraqis weakening their southern defenses to reinforce the seaward defenses of Kuwait City, making them vulnera- ble to the true, land-based coalition main effort. An amphibious raid is a type of amphibious oper- ation involving the swift incursion into or tempo- rary occupation of an objective followed by a planned withdrawal. Sea- based landing craft and aircraft execute the surface and air movement necessary to sup port this and the other types of amphibious operations. Amphibious support to other amphibious operations contri butes to confli ct prevention or crisis mitigation. Amphib ious forces routinely conduct amphibious supp ort to other operations, such as security cooper ation, foreign humani- tarian assistance (FHA) , civil support, non- combatant evacuation ope rations (NEO), peace operations, or recovery operations. Examples include the Liberia NEO and the foreign disaster relief effort in Bangladesh. Characteristics of Amphibious Operations Regardless of the type of amphibious operation, the characteristics discussed in the following sub- paragraphs apply to all. Integration Between Naval and Landing Forces Close coordination is required among naval forces, the LF, and othe r supporting forces. This coordination is critical because of the host of spe- cial skills and equipment associated with the complex nature of amphi bious operations. If the forces involved in the amphibious operation do not synchronize their ef forts and understand each other’s contributions, then the AF possesses a significant risk of failure. Rapid Buildup of Combat Power From Sea to Shore Gaining and maintaining access is key, particu- larly in the conduct of amphibious raids and/or amphibious assault forc ible entry operations. Continuous support to the LF ashore is critical for mission accomplishment. For example, during the World War II invasi on of Guadalcanal, the decision for naval shipping to retire in the face of an enemy naval threat led to insufficient logistical support and NSFS, strandi ng the LF for a long period of time. --- Page 202 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 9-3 Task-Organized Forces Amphibious forces task-organize based on a spe- cific mission or, in the case of forward deployed AFs, a series of most-l ikely contingencies. The inherent restricted lift capacity of amphibious shipping precludes carry ing equipment and per- sonnel for every conceiva ble mission. For exam- ple, during an amphibious-based FHA to typhoon ravaged Indonesi a and Thailand, the AF task-organized to address the requirements of ship-to-shore (STS) movement in a disaster area, specific humanitarian-related classes of supply, medical capabilities, and LCE forces. Unity of Effort and Operational Coherence Closely related to the need to integrate naval and LFs is the need for all components to fully under- stand their roles within the larger task and pur- pose of the AF. The naval force cannot be concerned only with transporting the LF just as the LF cannot only focus on operations ashore. The two components must operate as one whole—success during all PERMA phases is important to both components and requires mutual support. Readiness Readiness is determined by the maintenance level of the skills and equipment necessary for success- ful amphibious operations and by the status of forward deployed AFs that maintain a constant state of preparedness for employment. The first requires continual co ordination between the Marine Corps and Navy to maintain joint train- ing standards. The second recognizes that reac- tion times to crises are measured in hours and days not weeks. The re quirement for a NEO can come suddenly, as can a natural disaster, and fully prepared AFs can react immediately. Flexibility Amphibious forces are inhe rently flexible due to their ability to reconfigure and reposition. Given that much of the world’s population, political power, and critical infrastructure lie within 100 kilometers of the ocea ns, the AFs are ideal response platforms that possess significant capabil- ity to loiter. From forcible entry to show of force operations, AFs provide national leadership with a scalable force capable of a wide array of military operations across the range of military operations. Self-Sustainment Due to the ability of th e AF to conduct underway and on-station replenishment of personnel and cer- tain supplies and equipment, they are less reliant on land-based logistical infrastructure. Amphibi- ous forces also possess the organic capability to project forward logistic capabilities ashore, facili- tating throughput for follow-on operations. Mobility The ability to conduct stra tegic, operational, and tactical mobility allows AFs to position themselves to overwatch rapidly de grading situations and respond swiftly to contingencies when called upon. Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships Amphibious operations in clude the marriage of naval and ground forc es to achieve a military objective. Orders to c onduct amphibious opera- tions will establish co mmanders and command relationships, while iden tifying available forces and tasks. The following subparagraphs will pro- vide information about those Navy and LF person- nel with whom company personnel will interact aboard ship. More detailed information may be found in MCRP 4-11C and MCRP 4-11.3G. Shipboard Command Structure The command structure consists of those key indi- viduals aboard ship—co mmanding officer (CO), commanding officer of troops (COT), XO, and ship’s operations offi cer—who either exercise command authority or direct ly assist in its imple- mentation within the ship’s company and embarked forces. --- Page 203 --- 9-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 The CO is a ship’s highes t authority, responsible for the portion of the LF embarked aboard his ship. Both the ship’s company and embarked per- sonnel are subject to th e CO’s authority. The CO’s orders to embarked personnel are transmit- ted via the COT. The highest-ranking officer of embarked LF per- sonnel assumes the additi onal role of COT. On smaller amphibious ships, this individual could be a company commander. The key task of the COT is to facilitate integration of the LF into the ship’s functions and routines. Su ch integration includes coordinating embark and landing plans; assigning LF personnel to secondary duties, such as messing and laundry; and assisting the efficiency of ship- board life. The COT works closely with the CO to build the ship and LF into a cohesive military team through the following methods:  Using internal ship’s communications systems to promulgate briefings and all hands messages.  Integrating LF personnel into the ship’s work- force, to include fire fighters, damage control, flight deck crew, combat cargo, messing, main- tenance, and underway replenishment.  Integrating LF units into shipboard routines through such actions as joint berthing inspec- tion processes, training meetings, reporting processes, and published plans.  Integrating LF units into the social cohesion of the ship through such activities as recreation and competition.  Developing and implementing LF internal approval and control processes for operations and training so that the LF can speak effec- tively with one voice with naval counterparts. The second in command of the ship—the XO—is the direct representative of the CO for daily oper- ations aboard the ship. The XO is specifically concerned with the organi zation, health and sani- tation, discipline, employm ent, and efficiency of the crew and LF. Commanders of troops ensure that all troop spaces insp ections, such as armory, berthing, offices, stater ooms, and washrooms, are coordinated with th e XO. If possible, COTs should use their XOs to serve as XOs of troops who can work directly with the ship’s XO. On smaller amphibious ships, the XO may also serve as the debarkation control officer during offload operations. The ship’s operations officer is responsible for plans regarding the employ ment of the ship both externally and internally. The operations officer is responsible to the CO for developing plans relating to maneuvering and positioning the ship and landing and recovery operations. The opera- tions officer is also resp onsible to the XO for the coordination, deconfliction, and publishing of the ship’s daily, weekly, and long-range schedules for both the ship’s company and LF. The COT implements an internal approval process for all LF training and operations requirements to pre- clude the ship’s operations officer having to assume LF deconfliction duties. Other Shipboard Personnel The chief engineer, ship’s first lieutenant, air boss, combat systems officer, and supply officer are other key shipboard leaders. The chief engineer is th e naval officer who heads the engineering departme nt. The chief engineer and the engineer department exercise responsibil- ity for all matters pertaini ng to propulsion, auxil- iary/ancillary ship systems, and damage control. The COT engages with the chief engineer in two ways: identifying emba rked personnel require- ments for support of repa ir and damage control parties and coordinating work requests for berth- ing spaces and heads. The ship’s first lieutenant is a traditional title that applies in modern practice to the officer in charge of the deck department. The deck department exercises responsibility for all activities and main- tenance involving cargo, cargo spaces, deck sea- manship, the ship’s exterior, and ship’s boats. For embarked troops, the deck department and the first lieutenant are the primary points of contact for --- Page 204 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 9-5 such activities as star ting and moving vehicles, accessing embarked cargo, and all embarkation and debarkation requirements. The ship’s air officer, or air boss, is responsible to the ship’s CO for the safe conduct of air opera- tions, specifically launching and recovery, servic- ing, and handling of all ai rcraft and UA. The air boss is assisted by the f light deck officer, hangar deck officer, aviation fu els officer, aircraft han- dling officer, and aircraft ordnance officer. The combat systems office r is responsible to the ship’s CO for the superv ision, direction, and training of shipboard w eapon systems. The com- bat systems officer’s du ties include operation, care, maintenance, and training of personnel on the ship’s weapon system s and all matters per- taining to the stowage and inspection of ord- nance. The combat systems officer often serves as the embarked unit’s poi nt of contact for use of flight decks for live fi re training. In addition, many ships expect to or can use embarked Marines and CSW systems for ship defense. The combat systems officer in tegrates these Marines into the ship’s defensive plans. The supply officer is responsible to the ship’s CO for the procurement, receiving, stowage, and issu- ance of ship’s stores. These duties encompass the wardroom, general mess, barbershop, ship’s store, disbursing, and post office. Embarked units coordinate with the supply officer for such things as special meals, personal demand items, and embarked personnel support to the barbershop. Embarkation and Landing Personnel The embarkation and la nding personnel consists of the combat cargo officer (CCO), team embar- kation officer (TEO), LF air officer, and assault amphibian officer. The CCO is a Marine Corps officer or chief war- rant officer permanently assigned to the ship’s company. He is often assi sted in his duties by a permanently assigned Ma rine Corps SNCO who serves as the assistant CCO. He is directly responsible to the ship’s CO for all issues pertain- ing to the embarkation of personnel, LF supplies, and equipment. He advi ses the CO and COT on plans for loading and of floading of troop cargo, embarkation, communicati ons requirements, and the billeting and messing of troops. The CCO oversees the work of the TEOs. The CCO pro- vides direction and guid ance regarding the ships loading characteristics, embarked troop regula- tions, cargo capacities a nd inventories, and man- agement of the LF operational reserve material. In conjunction with the ship’s first lieutenant, CCOs and their assigned personnel directly supervise the onload and offload of LF personnel, supplies, and equipment. An embarkation team is a temporary, administra- tive term that refers to a group of personnel, sup- plies, and equipment eith er embarked or to be embarked. The COT appoints a TEO to handle all matters pertaining to cargo loading/offloading. The demands of the TEO are such that this should con- stitute the primary duty of the offi cer assigned. The TEO’s duties include preparation of load plans for assigned shipping, coordination and execution of the load plan, and assi stance in offload plan- ning. The TEO must be familiar with the ship’s loading characteristics, troop regulations, and the contents of the LF’s embarked material. The LF air officer is a Marine Corps officer attached to the ship’s company and responsible for overseeing the coordina tion of naval air oper- ations. When addressing air-related matters, the first point of contact for embarked units is the LF air officer. When embarked, the seni or assault amphibious unit leader also serves as a special staff officer who provides subject ma tter advice to both the ships company and emba rked personnel on all matters pertaining to AAVs. In this role, the assault amphibian office r’s duties include pro- viding supported commande rs with estimates of supportability, coordinatin g launch and recov- ery operations with app licable naval personnel, overseeing safety consid erations and emergency --- Page 205 --- 9-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 procedures, developi ng AAV-specific communi- cation plans, and assisting in the planning of subsequent operations ashore. Planning Amphibious operations require detailed plan- ning—from the approval of the CONOPS ashore to mission execution. The tenets of the MCPP, top-down planning, sing le battle concept, and integrated planning are essential for managing complex amphibious oper ations and specialized skill sets across the warfighting functions. The length and requirements of the planning process relate directly to the nature of the AF. A forward- deployed Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) that has mastered the basics of amphibious operations may more easily focus planning on a specific mission. A Marine expeditionary force preparing for an amphibious op eration would need to devote considerable planning time to actual train- ing and embarkation in addition to planning for actions ashore. Predeployment Training Whether preparing to participate in a forward- deployed MEU or a larg e scale amphibious oper- ation, company commanders must understand the special billets, individua l skills, and collective skills their companies must master to execute successfully. Table 9-2 provides some insight into the many training requirements the infantry company must address. For additional informa- tion refer to MCRP 4-11C and MCRP 4-11.3G. The Load Plan The mission ashore drives all planning. Without a valid concept of operations, it is impossible to determine resource requirements such as amphib- ious ships, landing craft, and aircraft. This is pre- cisely why amphibious embarkation planning begins in the first planning stage to identify pos- sible limitations and to begin making determina- tions of what and where personnel, vehicles, and equipment will be loaded, so that they can be transported ashore in the proper sequence to sup- port the CONOPS (i.e., the landing plan). Embarkation planners mu st familiarize them- selves with a host of issues—the cap abilities and limitations of ships, airc raft, and seaborne craft; their naval counterparts; and the personnel, sup- plies, and equipment to be embarked aboard naval shipping. Close, continuous coordination throughout planning and execution is required between operational plan ners and those responsi- ble for the embarkation and offloading of person- nel and materiel. For a dditional information on air and surface load planni ng considerations, see MCRP 4-11.3G, MCRP 4-11C, and JP 3-01.2. Infantry company commanders should familiarize themselves with the loadi ng characteristics of the ships upon which they wi ll be embarking. They should ensure that TEOs vi sit the ships regularly, attend all embarkation conferences, and regularly brief embarkation team commanders. Planning for embarkation requires the submission of deck diagrams from the TEO to the COT for approval, then to the ship’s CO via the CCO. As with any other amphibious planning, the load plan must be Table 9-2. Amphibious Related Training. Embarkation TEO course Embarkation representative training Gripe/ungripe training Combat cargo personnel training Embarkation conference Embark point staging rehearsals Shipboard Life Firefighting training Damage control training Water survival training Helicopterborne Operations Helicopter egress training HRST training HEED bottle training Dry drills/rehearsals Small Craft Operations Navigator training HRST training Assault climber’s course Coxswain’s course Small craft mechanic/maintenance training Legend HEED helicopter emergency egress device HRST helicopter rope suspension techniques --- Page 206 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 9-7 cross-walked through th e ship’s department heads, such as the first lieutenant or the chief engineer, prior to submission to the ship’s CO for final approval. The Landing Plan The landing plan addre sses the orga nization and sequence of placing the LF ashore based on com- mander’s guidance and assi gned tactical tasks (see app. D). The landing plan integrates naval and LF surface and airbor ne STS movement and platforms for two purpos es—rapidly building up LF assets ashore and conducting necessary logis- tical sustainment of forces ashore. Naval Planning Naval planning for STS movement focuses on availability of landing craft, hydrography, control of seaward/beach approa ches, and the geography of beaches being considered for use by the LF. Landing Force Planning Landing force planni ng for STS movement begins with receiving key outputs from the naval planning process, such as landing craft availabil- ity, and then focuses on sequencing and organiz- ing for landing so that t hose assets needed first arrive ashore first and th at the buildup of combat power and material occurs as rapidly as possible. In STS movement, the la nding plan is composed of certain specific documents that detail the num- bers of landing craft, aircraft, and other surface craft available for use and the exact personnel and equipment that will be loaded on each, along with embarkation and landing times. Some of these documents are applicable to amphibious operations of any size. Table 9-3 lists landing plan documents and re sponsibilities. While sev- eral of the documents listed in Table 9-3 are more applicable to Marine expeditionary brigade-sized amphibious operations, all are valuable tools for any size mission. The cr eation of a nd details in Table 9-3. Landing Priority Table. CATF’s Responsibility C LF’s Responsibility Naval Landing Plan LF Landing Plan Landing Craft Availability Table Amphibious Vehicle Availability Table Landing Craft Employment Plan Landing Craft and Amphibious Vehicle Assignment Table Debarkation Schedule Landing Diagram Landing Control Plan Landing Force Serial Assignment Table Medical Regulating Plan Landing Priority Table Amphibious Assault Bulk Liquids System and Offshore Petroleum Discharge System Plan Landing Force Sequence Table Approach Schedule Assault Schedule Assault Wave Diagram Amphibious Vehicle Employment Table Landing Area Diagram Helicopter Availability Table Transport Area Diagram Heliteam Wave and Serial Assignment Table Beach Approach Diagram Helicopter Enplaning Schedule Sea Echelon Area Helicopter Landing Diagram Helicopter Employment and Assault Landing Table Ground Combat Element Landing Plan Consolidated Landing and Approach Plan Aviation Combat Element and Landing Force Aviation Landing Plan --- Page 207 --- 9-8 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 these documents depend on the landing plans, CONOPS ashore, and the guidance provided by the amphibious task force and LF commanders. Detailed information a bout development of a landing plan, including serials and landing priori- ties, along with all the form, diagrams, and tables (with examples) depicted in Table 9-3 can be found in MCWP 3-31.5. Operational Risk Management In addition to the purpose, means, and methods of ORM (discussed in ch ap. 12), company com- manders must be aware of specific hazards asso- ciated with shipboar d life and amphibious operations. Many of thes e matters are addressed in the troop regulations issued by the CCO, which are often ship specific wi th respect to restricted spaces, activities, and safety requirements. Shipboard Safety Considerations Living and working aboard ship is similar to liv- ing and working on a factory floor. Unlike on cruise ships, utilities, pi pes, control boxes, and a host of other systems are exposed for ready access by the crew. Ther efore, in addition to expected controls on, fo r example, restricted or smoking spaces, company commanders and COTs can expect shipboar d safety considerations to focus on electrical and deck safety. Electrical Safety . Electrical safety will restrict what types of electri cal items the embarked troops can use, how many they can use at any one time, and where they can use them. Rigorous inspections and controls ar e a part of most ship- board electrical safety programs. Deck Safety. As naval ships are designed for util- ity and fighting first and creature comforts sec- ond, the areas in which crew and embarked units function, eat, and sleep ar e characterized by hard surfaces and steep angles. In addition to expected slip and fall hazards , company commanders should ensure that all company personnel under- stand the safety issues surrounding the following:  Moving on wet decks.  Moving heavy equipment through ship’s spaces.  Operating around vehicles and heavy equip- ment on well decks.  The extra hazards associated with “wet well” operations, such as moving around the well deck during times of embarkation and debarkation. Waterborne Safety Considerations Basic safety measures, such as proper manifest- ing, that apply to all t ypes of movement and con- veyances from busses to helicopters also apply on the water. Similar to he licopters, landing craft of various types possess thei r own sets of safety considerations, such as briefs regarding emer- gency procedures, use of li fe jackets, use of scut- tles and escape hatches, and man overboard drills. When conducting an amphibious operation, members of the LF shou ld also know “down boat” procedures and si gnals, the location and methods of rescue and ca sualty collection boats, and the location of safety and recovery boats along approach lanes. Embarkation Planning Considerations The success of the amphibious operation depends upon the manner in whic h troops, supplies, and equipment are loaded aboa rd ships. Embarkation plans begin at the battal ion or higher level, but require bottom-up input a nd refinement from the infantry company. Company commanders ensure that the battalion embark ation plan pr ovides for the rapid and orderly buildup of forces ashore in support of the landing plan and scheme of maneuver. Successful integration of the com- pany’s priorities for em barkation requires the constant involvement of the company gunnery sergeant with the battali on S-4; shipboard com- bat cargo personnel; and, when appropriate, the --- Page 208 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ 9-9 supporting combat logistic battalion. Understand- ing ship designs and conf igurations will greatly influence successful integration of company pri- orities into the overall embarkation plan. It is essential that the infantry company’s embar- kation process be organized and smooth. This occurs through proper coordination with appro- priate agencies in a timely and organized manner and a rigorous pre-emba rkation inspection pro- cess at the company, batta lion, and higher levels. Indeed, maintaining embarkation readiness in garrison is foundational to embarkation planning. See MCRP 4-11.3G for more information on unit embarkation programs and further details to sup- port surface, amphibio us, and air deployment preparations and execution. Storage and Shipping Containers Often called QUADCONs [quadruple contain- ers] and PALCONs [palle tized containers], the infantry company will r eceive some allocation of standardized embarkation containers from the battalion, which directly affects what the com- pany will bring and how it will organize and con- duct business aboard ship. What is in these containers and how it is safely stored are initial concerns. Beyond these concer ns is that, if prop- erly planned, many of thes e containers can serve as shipboard storage and work spaces. For exam- ple, upon approval, an infantry company might choose to use some of its storage containers as armory spaces. In addition to storing armory gear, the infantry company will seek to have these con- tainers embarked in such a manner that they are easily accessible as workspaces. Packing Lists and Labeling Proper packing and labeling of all embarked con- tainers ensures accountab ility, assists in inspec- tions, aids in embark ation, and ensures proper access upon stowage. The battalion S-4 distrib- utes packing guidance and formats as part of the pre-embarkation process. Security It is normal for the ship to require and the COT to mount an internal guard force on LF cargo. How robust this guard is de pends largely on the nature of the cargo being stored. Weatherproofing An amphibious environmen t is, by nature, a wet environment. Containers stored on exposed decks will be subject to s un and water and infantry companies need to carefully select what is stored and how it is stored accordingly. Containers on well decks are exposed to the water and spray generated by “wet well” operations in the well decks. Containers in “dry” areas may be tempo- rarily stored elsewhere as cargo is moved around the ship. In sum, the infantry company should never assume that cargo will remain dry because it is in a container. Hazardous Materials Appropriately, ship crews ruthlessly address any- thing that poses a signifi cant fire hazard to their ship and this scrutiny appl ies as much to hazard- ous materials as to electricity and other matters. During embarkation plan ning, infantry compa- nies must identify hazard ous materials to the S-4 and follow their guidance, in coordination with the CCO, on where and how to store such materi- als. Use of hazardous mate rials aboard ship, such as those used for vehicle maintenance, is also a source of concern and accessing, using, and restowing the materials requires coordination with the ship’s crew. Armory One of the first questi ons requiring an answer during pre-embarkation is the method the infantry company will use to store and access weapons. There are two concerns: first, CSWs, armory gear, tools, and parts; second, personal weapons. Early ship visits should be arranged or informa- tion requests sent to that battalion concerning expected armory capabilities. If a ship’s armory --- Page 209 --- 9-10 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 spaces prove unsuitable for storage requirements, companies must plan for alternatives, to include procuring and bringing al ong such items as pad- locks, using seals on certain armory spaces, and establishing an interior guard. Communications Equipment Communications equipment storage requires its own unique consideratio ns that are similar to those experienced ashor e: climate-appropriate storage spaces, security of sensitive communica- tions equipment, and h azardous material han- dling in the form of ba tteries. More than many other types of equipmen t, communications gear requires cool and dry storage. This necessity is complicated because most amphibious ships do not have designed spaces set aside for this pur- pose. Like armory storag e, communications stor- age needs to be weatherproof, secure, and easily accessible. An obvious technique is to combine armory and communications storage. Vehicles The number and type of vehicles potentially assigned to a company va ry widely depending on the mission and their most likely means of employment. Vehicles represent one of the major items the company posse sses that will end up going ashore as a stand-alone asset. The storage container holding the co mpany’s weapons may be buried deep within the ship because the con- tainer is not going ashore in an assault wave, but the radios are. On the other hand, company vehi- cles will be stowed in a manner that allows them to be placed upon appropria te landing craft per the landing plan. Consequently, the infantry com- pany embarkation personnel must pay particular attention to the storage of company vehicles to ensure that such storage meets the access require- ments mandated in the landing plan. Because of their unique place in the load and landing plans, vehicles are often among some of the last items embarke d. Company gunnery ser- geants, in their embarkat ion roles, closely super- vise the preparation, preventive maintenance checks and services (PMC S), labeling, and stag- ing of the company’s ve hicles. Infantry compa- nies should expect that the movement, staging, and loading of embarked unit vehicles present a significant endeavor. Sinc e the standard is that each vehicle is ready to move at any time in the embarkation process, each company vehicle must have its own driver and assistant driver who must remain with the vehicle until embarkation is com- plete. Depending on the load and landing plans, vehicles are stowed in the well decks, vehicle- turning areas, or are sometimes “preboated” aboard landing craft. Maintenance Assets Companies do not normally possess the authority or resources to conduc t their own maintenance. However, when re quired to do so, the infantry company must consider the needs and require- ments applicable to their parts, tools, and the con- duct of maintenance while embarked. A company tasked with maintaining a small boat capability represents the requirement to store parts and tools while conducting repa irs and maintenance throughout embarkation. Properly planned and coordinated, stor age containers can be used to embark maintenance assets and then become stand-alone workshops once underway. Training Aids If infantry companies do not bring particular items with them, they wi ll not have them. Some- times mission and storage limitations dictate hard choices. Regardless of whether embarking aboard amphibious shipping to conduct sustained, for- ward-deployed operations , or embarking for the purpose of moving immediately to an amphibious objective area, the company will have training requirements aboard ship and must prepare accordingly. Targetry, target building materials, target stands, sandbags , and silhouettes will not exist on ship unless the company bri ngs them. Other items, such as whit e boards, publications, computer simulations, an d other training prod- ucts, require embarkation as well. For planning --- Page 210 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 9-11 purposes, it is safe to assume that designated classroom space aboard ship s will be either non- existent or in extrem ely high demand. Company commanders, as part of problem framing, deter- mine the shipboard training requirements for the duration of embarkation and pass training guid- ance accordingly. Troop Spaces Traditionally, the desi gn of most troop space aboard amphibious shipping was predicated on the assumption that emba rked units would only be on board long enough to move from a staging area into a planned am phibious operation. While newer amphibious shipping takes into account embarked units conducti ng continuous opera- tions over some months, spaces remain utilitar- ian vice comfortable; for general use, vice specific function; and highly compartmentalized so as to better survive battle damage. As a result, companies can plan to have their personnel spread throughout the sh ip—officers in one por- tion of the ship, SNCOs in another, NCOs and junior enlisted in a th ird, and office and work spaces in yet another. Further, communications are slower, meetings re place e-mails and phone calls, daily business take s longer, and things are harder to organize and accomplish. The company gunnery sergeant and an advance party should embark some time prior to the re st of the com- pany, address all administrative requirements in coordination with the MAGTF TEO and with the ship’s crew, and prepar e to guide company per- sonnel from the pier to their berthing areas. Combat Rubber Raiding Craft Embarkation Unlike companies that mi ght plan to use helicop- ters or AAVs, infantry companies tasked with maintaining a small boat capability must pack and maintain their own form of transportation. The small boat company must work diligently with embarkation personne l from the battalion and the ship to ensure that space assigned for maintenance and storage of parts, combat rubber raiding craft (CRRC), a nd engines facilitate the requirements to build a nd inflate, stage, launch, recover, maintain, tear down, and restow small boats. As indicated, the small boat company pos- sesses a significantly great er load plan footprint than any other infantry un its do. It is important that the company clearly articulate and document its requirements to ensure they are met. The com- pany must understand that, given the specialized nature of its equipment, the procurement of repair parts through the normal s upply system is diffi- cult at best and can be impossible while under- way. Much of what a company anticipates needing must be embarked. Failure to do so could rapidly degrade the small boat capability to the point of mission failure. Figure 9-1, on page 9-12, illustrates loading and pa lletizing deflated small boats and engines. Rehearsals The rehearsal phase tests the feasibility of the landing plan, timing and sequencing of various operations, comm unications, and generally the combat readiness of participating forces. Rehearsals can be limited to squads or include entire MAGTFs and associated naval elements. Operational Rehearsals Since most amphibious ope rations preclude full scale rehearsals, company commanders can expect to participate in multiple rehearsals at the battalion level and higher, which sometimes require “cross-decking” to other ships. In the same manner, company commanders must make maximum use of availa ble planning spaces to conduct such activities as CARs, rehearsals of concept, or mock-up ex ercises without troops. There is no excuse to not adequately rehearse impending missions and there are numerous effective rehearsal techniques that companies can use aboard amphibious shipping. Call Away Rehearsals The primary way the infa ntry company tests and refines its portion of the landing plan and debar- kation timeline is to pr actice the call away. The --- Page 211 --- 9-12 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 call away refers to the calls made over the ship’s public address system fo r designated serials to move to their designat ed mustering location/ debarkation stations on the ship. The general steps the companies re hearse are the serial announcement, confirmation of manifests, equip- ment, weapons, and am munition issue and test fire, and movement to the assault or landing craft. The process, involving hundreds of personnel is time consuming and diffi cult and requires as much rehearsal as possible. Serial Announcement When serials are announced over the ship’s pub- lic address system, co mpany personnel muster by serial with all gear and equipment at prear- ranged locations/debarkation stations, such as the hanger deck or ramp to the flight deck. The company should establis h primary and alternate routes from berthing areas to the armory, muster point, and other destin ations. Weapons and gear are issued prior to cal l away and the company must possess an adequate understanding of how long these proce sses take and plan and rehearse them accordingly. Confirmation of Manifests Upon arriving at the mustering area, combat cargo personnel organize and segregate the company by serial, verifying manifest s in the process. Re- hearsal of these processes will greatly accelerate and smooth execution. The company should already know which pers onnel belong to which serials and should self-org anize in manifest order to ease accountability procedures. Ammunition Issue and Test Fire After confirming manifest s, the serials receive their ammunition. Combat cargo personnel guide company personnel by serial to the test fire area of the ship. Test firing is abbreviated and gener- ally consist of one or two rounds before serials are led back to their mustering areas. Movement to Assault and Landing Craft In accordance with commands from the ship and the debarkation schedule, combat cargo personnel lead serials from debarkation stations to the appropriate positions, which is usually the flight or well deck, to board their assigned aviation asset, assault, or landing craft. Ship Rehearsals and Drills Naval personnel conduct c ontinuous training and drills while underway acr oss all watches. Some drills necessitate embark unit participation, while others require nonengaged personnel to stand Pallet CRRCs CRRC Engines Figure 9-1. Combat Rubber Raiding Craft Palletizing. --- Page 212 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 9-13 clear. Ships and major amphibious elements pub- lish specific SOPs regarding how different types of drills will occur. Some of the major rehearsals and drills that affect embarked units are general quarters, man overboard, and abandon ship. General Quarters The purpose of general qua rters is to place the entire crew and ship in a state of readiness to meet either an external threat, such as enemy action, or an internal threat, such as a fire. All hatches and passageways are secure d; ventilation may cease; and, since the purpose of the order is to compart- mentalize the ship in ca se of damage, mobility is minimized. Other than some Marines who may participate in ship’s defense, the normal place of duty for embarked troops during general quarters is their berthing areas where they can expect to remain for the duration of the drill or emergency. Man Overboard Upon sounding the man ove rboard alarm, all ship’s crew and embarked personnel muster in their berthing areas where unit leaders establish positive accountability . The only personnel exempt from mustering in their berthing areas are key leadership and thos e on duty. A premium is placed on fast, expedient, and accurate account- ability, and infantry co mpanies should maintain berthing area rosters fo r this specific purpose. Embarked units report their accountability through the COT to the ship’s CO. Personnel can expect to remain in their berthing areas until the drill is complete, the individual is found and retrieved, or until the CO deems it prudent. Abandon Ship As part of the embarka tion procedure, embarked units will receive abandon ship training and brief- ings; learn the size, numbe r, and locati on of life- boats per unit; and esta blish lifeboat manifests. When manifesting, the company should endeavor to maintain unit integrity as much as possible and assign an SNCO or office r to each lifeboat to act as boat team commander. Company commanders and first sergeants should not serve in this capac- ity because their duties to account for the entire company and report to the COT and ship’s CO will preclude them from adequately meeting the responsibilities of the boat team commanders. Upon the sounding of th e abandon ship alarm, company personnel muster at their assigned life- boat stations with a pred etermined gear list, usu- ally consisting of a water source, sunblock, cover, and chemlights. Movement to the Objective Area For the LF, the movement phase of amphibious operations is characteri zed by maintaining not only the combat readines s of vehicles, weapons, optics, and gear, but by also ensuring that Marines and Sailors remain proficient in their skills and competencies. Continuing actions dur- ing movement to the obj ective area are vital to the infantry company’s combat effectiveness once ashore. Despite possible training and operat- ing limitations placed upo n the company while underway, company commanders still have a responsibility to ensure their company personnel, weapon systems, and equipment are ready and prepared for combat operations ashore. Training Commanders establish a training battle rhythm that uses the limited sp ace aboard the ship and prevents complacency . The commander must ensure the company traini ng plan is thoroughly coordinated with the sh ip’s crew in order to reduce friction and enable successful training to occur as scheduled. Trai ning schedule coordina- tion and deconfliction oc curs through the COT and ship’s operations of ficer. As is the case at home station, successful tr aining is well planned and scheduled early. Desp ite what may seem like many obstacles, training is still a function of a commander’s creat ivity. Some training consider- ations are live fire and physical training as well as classroom instruction. --- Page 213 --- 9-14 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Live Fire Training Live fire training aboa rd amphibious shipping normally occurs off the flight deck. This venue alone dictates deconfliction with the flight sched- ule. Further deconflic tion at the amphibious group level must occur for the ship to ensure it sails within the formation in a manner that avoids hazarding other vessels with the effects of its small arms fire. Since time is necessarily short, targetry must be alrea dy built and staged for quick setup and breakdow n. Cleanup and thor- ough foreign object and debris walk downs are essential tasks of the training unit. Live fire train- ing normally entails a briefing to the ship’s CO and typically includes—  Training objectives.  Timelines.  Types of weapons and munitions.  Scheme of maneuver.  Surface danger zones.  Safety personnel actions and locations.  Communications plan.  ORM. Physical Training Most physical training occurs at the squad or pla- toon level due to the lack of facilities and space. Even during times when th e flight deck is not conducting operations, operating in that space remains difficult due to the many demands on it from other individuals and units. Company physi- cal training plans should focus on exercises and workouts that do not re quire weights or large amounts of extra, specialized equipment. Compa- nies should consider em barking gym mats which are useful not on ly for general ex ercise, but also for martial arts training. Classroom Instruction Classrooms or such suita ble spaces are reserved through the COT in conj unction with the ship’s operations officer. Du e to size constraints of amphibious shipping co upled with the large numbers of personnel embarked, finding space to conduct classroom training may be challenging. Some ways to enhance opportunities are to—  Rotate platoons through small classrooms.  Use lounges in berthing areas.  Use open air deck space in good weather.  Coordinate with adja cent units for shared spaces.  Use learning resource centers and ship’s librar- ies. Underway Vehicle Procedures Vehicles will be stowed per the discussion ear- lier in this chapter. Moving vehicles is a time consuming and labor inte nsive process while the ship is underway. The TEO coordinates weekly maintenance periods, vehi cle startups, and fuel- ing. Adequate company representation must be present for these scheduled periods, since it will be unlikely that they will be repeated for individ- ual units. If a company mi sses one of these regu- larly scheduled periods, it will generally need to wait for the next. Shipboard Life Considerations Life aboard amphibious shipping can be a very dif- ferent experience from what Marines are tradition- ally accustomed. The Navy can drive daily routine to a large degree and it is essential for personnel to quickly assimilate to a new environment while still upholding the standards established and met on land. Company personnel require a basic under- standing of this environment and its associated requirements in which they will often be living and operating for considerable periods. The scope of these considerations, covered in the following sub- paragraphs, span command relationships and per- sonnel requirements, ORM and safety, and drills and rehearsals for the sh ip generally and specifi- cally for the operations for which the company was embarked. --- Page 214 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 9-15 Command Relationships It is important that all embarked company person- nel understand that the highest authority aboard ship is the CO of the ve ssel. All aboard, regard- less of Service, are subject to the CO’s orders. Inspections There are many inspecti ons to execute while underway. Berthing will re gularly be inspected by the ship’s XO and should additionally be inspected by the COT an d unit leaders. Internal to the embarked infant ry company, the com- pany commander impleme nts a regular inspec- tion and maintenance program of weapons, vehicles, and equipment. Hygiene Because of the restricted living spaces in troop berthing, hygiene is an important issue. Unit lead- ers and corpsmen need to regularly check on the health of company personnel and the level of san- itation in their berthing. In addition to the inspec- tions listed above, medical personnel need to play an active role in the prevention of disease: a quickly spreading virus could swiftly render a unit combat ineffective. Water Usage Because ships can only produce and store certain quantities of potable water at a time, all personnel practice water conservation. Embarked troops will find that showers often require a physical act of pushing a button to function. This encourages using only enough water to get wet, lather, and rinse. If the ship’s ab ility to produce water is threatened by a malfunction or water levels sim- ply drop too low, the ship’s CO will ban use of the showers as well as all physical training, since not showering after physical activity would create hygiene issues. Smoking Smoking aboard ship is restricted to a few de- signated areas. It is prohibited at such times as during drills, in emerge ncies, when fueling landing craft and aircra ft, and when conducting underway replenishments. Messing The ship publishes meal schedules. Depending on the size of the ship, meal schedules may be crew- and embarked unit-specif ic, down to mandated times by unit. Barring significant reason, these times are not adjusted. Therefore, many ship- board activities and training are scheduled around the chow hours because the demand of feeding so many people necessitates a strict schedule. Laundry Each company designates a laundry officer or SNCO to coordinate time s and dates for the unit to wash its laundry—typically one day a week. Due to the industrial natu re of the process, the company personnel should ensure they use strong mesh laundry bags and take care to mark all items of clothing. Manpower Requirements The ship’s CO and COT wo rk closely together to combine the ship and em barked troops into one fighting unit. As part of the ship’s company, embarked units take part in certain labor-inten- sive functions that serve the welfare of the entire ship. The duration an d requirements differ depending on the task. Other than LF troops required to augment co mbat cargo personnel, who are generally detached for the duration of the deployment, personnel return to LF units after a period of time or for op erations ashore. Some of the duties embarked pers onnel will have to aug- ment include—  Combat cargo.  Guard force.  Messmen.  Ship’s store.  Barbers. --- Page 215 --- 9-16 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Action The following subparagraphs provide information on the various assault cr aft the infantry company may encounter and deck cy cles for aircraft that inform the development of the landing plan. Landing Craft, Air Cushioned The landing craft, air cushioned (LCAC) is a high speed, nondisplacement la nding craft well suited for use in conjunction w ith assault support air- craft for over-the-horizon movement. It can oper- ate through surf zones and deliver its cargo well above the high water mark. Being designed to carry heavy loads, it is lightly armored and armed and is not planned for use with the initial assault waves. For more inform ation on the LCAC see MCRP 3-31.1A, Employment of Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC). The LCAC is not constr ained by most tidal con- ditions and hydrographic features, which makes it an ideal complement to other surface and air landing means. Although limited in the number of personnel it can carry without a passenger transport module on board, it complements the displacement landi ng craft utility well in trans- porting heavy loads ashore. Because the LCAC produces large volumes of sea spray, waterproof- ing of vehicles, mounted weapons systems, and mobile loads is vital. Landing Craft, Utility The landing craft, utility (LCU) is a versatile displacement craft that is capable of moving more personnel, vehicles , and cargo in one STS movement than the LCAC. It is considered the “work horse” of the AF . Although mu ch slower than the LCAC, its ability to loiter, execute ship- to-ship and open ocean s hore-to-shore transits thanks to crew messing and berthing makes it a valuable asset for use ac ross the range of mili- tary operations. Sea states and accurate hydrographical informa- tion about potential landing sites are critical to its employment. Although it possess no offensive combat capability, it ha s a high bow ramp and its steel construct provides a measure of protection against small arms fire. For more information on the LCU, see MCRP 4-11.3G or Navy Tactical Reference Publication 3-02.1.2, Naval Beach Group Support Element Operations. Amphibious Assault Vehicles The AAV moves the elements of the LF from amphibious shipping to the designated landing site. Possessing both offensive and defensive combat capabilities, having significant range, and being armored, it can c onduct mechanized opera- tions well inland once it gets ashore. The AAV’s tracks enable it to navi gate most tidal, hydro- graphic, and surf co nditions. The AAV’s slow rate of movement in the water coupled with the negative effects of sea state on crew and passen- gers makes them ill-su ited for prolonged STS movements. Additional considerations specific to employment ashore are found in chapters 6 and 7. For more information see MCWP 3-13. Helicopterborne Assault Considerations Helicopterborne assaults along with the types of operations that the in fantry company may con- duct using this method of movement are addressed in chapter 6. The following subpara- graphs focus on unique considerations that accompany the infantry company when it is using helicopters to conduct an amphibious operation from naval shipping. Deck Cycle The deck cycle is the time it takes to move, spot, load, launch, and recover aircraft on the flight deck. The biggest influe nces on deck cycle time are the number of deck spots and the type, model, series, and range s of the aircraft. An infantry company lift a nd the aircraft required to lift it, attack, escort, a nd bump aircraft is too --- Page 216 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 9-17 large to enable simultan eous staging and launch- ing. Company commanders must consider their ship’s deck cycle when developing their schemes of maneuver ashore. Mustering/Staging Combat cargo personnel c ontrol the debarkation of all landing serials, re gardless of debarkation means. For airborne la nding serials transiting from their designated mu stering locations/debar- kations to a crowded and seemingly chaotic flight deck, accountability and immediate and com- plete compliance to orde rs from combat cargo personnel is critical. Un like at an LZ, the infan- try company will not co ntrol its own movement from the debarkation station. Concurrent Air/Surface Operations Company commanders shoul d realize that during the creation of the land ing plan, naval planners consider concurrent use of the flight deck and the well deck. Activities on one or both of these can impair the ability of either to function at peak performance. Sea state, wind direction, and safety all play a role. Waiting will be the most likely effect on the infantry company. The company may launch in surface craft early to allow for unrestricted flight operations later or vice versa. Combat Rubber Raiding Craft Considerations When an infantry company plans to use CRRCs to conduct the action ph ase of an amphibious operation, the primary concern is preparing, load- ing, and launching the cr aft in conjunction with all other activities taking place aboard the ship. The earlier boats can be prepared and staged the better. Most small boat operations occur in such a manner that operational requirements, such as a night insertion, functionally deconflict the CRRC launch from other amphibious activities. In those rare cases when this is not the case, company commanders must ensure that planners fully understand the length of time required to prepare and launch the boats. Figure 9-2 demonstrates the ideal staging and launching method—an empty well deck. In practice, sm all boat companies may have to stack and build boats around other vehi- cles and landing craft. CRRCs Stern gate Figure 9-2. Combat Rubber Raiding Craft Staging. --- Page 217 --- 9-18 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 This Page Intentionally Left Blank --- Page 218 --- CHAPTER 10 STABILITY, CRISIS RESPONSE AND LIMITED CONTINGENCY, AND COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS Stability operations is an overarching term encom- passing various military missions, tasks, and activ- ities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. This chapter discusses the infantry company’s roles and responsibilities in conducting stability operat ions. As discussed in chapter 1 and represented in figure 10-1, stability operations join offense and defense as inherent activities within all military actions that brings sta- bility to unstable situations. The infantry company will conduct stability oper- ations in terms of on going activities, such as addressing the civil cons iderations inherent to METT-T. The company will also conduct spe- cific, stability-type operations, such as FHA. Sta- bility operations may be short-term responses to crisis or, occasionally, long-term developmental assistance. They may be permissive and nonvio- lent (such as supporti ng the Japanese tsunami disaster relief in 2011) or they may be nonper- missive and require signi ficant combat (such as the Iraq invasion and counterinsurgency from 2003 to 2011). The action arm for stabil ity operations is CMO. The company conducts CMO with and through the interorganizational agencies. Whether con- ducting specific stability-type operations (such as training HN security forces ) or stability activities (such as executing a refu gee plan), the military end state for stability oper ations is a transition to civil authority. The infa ntry company’s normal contribution to stability operations is security. General Principles and Considerations Experience in such operations as small wars, inter- ventions, counterinsurgenc ies, and disaster relief has allowed Marines to identify the following imperatives that apply to stability operations and activities across a range of military operations:  Manage information and expectations.  Use the appropriate level of force.  Learn and adapt.  Empower the lowest levels.  Support the HN. Joint Campaigns (Overseas) Defense Stability Offense Offense Stability Defense Defense Stability Offense Figure 10-1. Stability, Crisis Response and Limited Contingency, and Counterinsurgency Operations Across a Range of Military Operations. --- Page 219 --- 10-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 The infantry company faces numerous challenges in stability-related ope rations: varying threat environments, the likeli hood of distributed employment across a large AO, balancing troop- to-task requirements. For example, within a company battlespace, one platoon may be providing fixed-base security, one platoon may be executing a security patrol to conduct civil engagements, and anot her platoon may be con- ducting a cordon and s earch with HNSF. With many competing task s and requirements, company commanders must remain focused on their main effort. More than any other type of mission, stability operat ions tend to drive a diffusion of effort. Stability operations require versatile, well-trained units and tough, adaptive commanders. The infan- try company must be able to operate as part of a joint or multinational for ce, interacting continu- ously toward defined goals with partners, inter- agency and NGO representatives, contractors, and the HN. The compa ny may often interact semi-independently, requiring a well-executed analysis of METT-T and areas, structures, capa- bilities, organizations, people, events (ASCOPE) to allow the company commander to build a coherent framework with which to execute the tasks assigned. The end state for all stabil ity activities is a level of order that enables a tr ansition to civil author- ity. The infantry comp any most often provides security with a larger, more comprehensive approach in order to build a foundation for transi- tioning power to civilian control. When tasked and resourced to do so, the infantry company may support other agencies an d organizations by per- forming specific tasks th at support other func- tions, such as rule of law or governance and participation. For example, the company will most likely provide security to agricultural experts from the United States Department of Agriculture working to re store irrigation to a cer- tain area; moreover, th e company may receive equipment and training on how to help monitor these efforts. Categories of Stability Action Regardless of whether a stability operation is short or long term, it falls within three broad cate- gories, which may or ma y not occur as sequen- tial phases. The infantry company may find itself participating in only one particular aspect, such as initial response, before transitioning to civil authorities. The categories are—  Initial response . First responders provide a safe, secure environm ent and attend to the immediate essential servic e needs of the local population.  Transformation. Longer term efforts develop or re-establish enduring capability and capacity in the HN government.  Fostering stability. Long-term efforts capitalize on capacity-building and re construction activi- ties to enable sustainable development. Principles of Stability Operations The principles of joint operations apply to any military action in which the infantry company may participate. When conducting stability operations, it is prudent for th e company commander to emphasize the following principles over others:  Objective. Whether short or long term, the object of any stabilization effort is to achieve and maintain the stability necessary to meet the military end state. A ll military actions must move toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.  Offensive. Acting quickly, rapidly achieving understanding of the causes of instability, and seizing the initiative to mitigate them is key to stabilization efforts. Ceding the initiative to events or the threat creates vulnerability.  Mass. Concentrating power at the decisive time and place is critical fo r stability success. The infantry company must be cautious about unnecessarily disper sing its power and resources, especially when there is a significant threat or when the company is called upon to participate in stabilit y functions beyond pro- viding civil security. --- Page 220 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 10-3  Economy of force . Properly balancing offense, defense, and stability is crucial to ensuring that only minimal essential combat power is pro- vided to secondary efforts. Company com- manders should never assume that stability operations are secondary efforts.  Unity of command . The stability and combat operations of the infantry company are best served and synchronized under a single com- mander with the proper authority to employ the forces at his disposal . While the presence of enablers, subject matter experts, and interorga- nizational agencies are possible if not likely, the infantry company should endeavor to unify their efforts—ideally by subordinating them to one commander as applicable.  Restraint. Regardless of the threat or operational environment, the infantry company always seeks to apply overw helming, but proportion- ate, force. While it is tr ue that rules of engage- ment will be provided to the infantry company, the commander inculcates the personnel of the company with the principle of restraint to fur- ther the cause of stability not instability.  Perseverance. Regardless of whether facing stability operations in a crisis response or non- permissive environment or participating in development assistance over a period of years, the infantry company always takes the long view of stability actio ns. Throughout Marine Corps history, crisis areas often necessitate repeated operations: wh at occurred previously will directly impact what must occur now. A delicate balance is maintained between half- hearted or transitory engagement and creating a sense of permanence and dependency.  Legitimacy. The actions of the infantry company must sustain the legitimacy of the operation, whether evacuating noncombatants, imposing an internationally sanctioned mandate, or support- ing a government against an insurgency. The attitude of the populace and other observers to the battalion itself is less important than their attitude toward the legitimacy of its actions, the standing of the internatio nal body that directed its presence, or the HN government. Stability Operations The primary objective of any stability operation is stabilization of an un stable environment. The infantry company partic ipates in the missions, tasks, and activities conduc ted to create that sta- bility. It does so as part of a larger effort that nor- mally provides or executes security-related tasks. The end state of any stability operation is to transi- tion the military role to civil authority. The follow- ing actions drive successful stability operations:  Provide a secure environment.  Secure land areas.  Meet the critical needs of the populace.  Gain support from the HN government.  Shape environment for interagency and HN success. Stability Functions According to MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Opera- tions, the Marine Corps part icipates in stability operations through the ex ecution of five stability functions. These function s serve as a framework for HHQ to visualize the conduct of the stability actions in any operation, sequence the necessary activities within that operation, and develop appropriate priorities fo r those activities and resource allocation. Th e ground combat element and, in turn, the infant ry company possess only a limited ability to conduct many of the stability functions on its own wit hout significant augmen- tation. It is most succe ssful in approaching them as an integral part of a MAGTF. The five func- tions are:  Security.  Foreign humanitarian assistance.  Economic stabilization and infrastructure.  Rule of law.  Governance and participation. Stability Tasks Tactical units receive tasks. The execution of the five stability functions depends on units executing --- Page 221 --- 10-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 tasks that enable those fu nctions to occur. There are six stability tasks that enable the stability func- tions (see fig. 10-2). In the same manner that the stability functions relate to each other, so do the stability tasks. For example, it is difficult to estab- lish the rule of law without security, but security is also dependent upon the rule of law. Actions pur- suant to any one task in evitably create related effects in another; planned and executed appropri- ately, carefully sequenced activities complement and reinforce these effect s. For example, a com- pany will not focus most of its assets or time on supporting economic and infrastructure develop- ment if it faces a highly lethal insurgency; rather, it will direct efforts an d time toward establishing civil security (maintaining security at an accept- able level). These tasks apply across a range of military operations and could as easily be exe- cuted by the infantry co mpany in a conventional conflict as they could be in a domestic natural disaster. The following subparagraphs discuss the six stability tasks. Enable Civil Security Enabling civil security involves providing or assisting in the provisi on of a safe and secure environment for the HN and its population from internal and external thre ats. Enabling civil secu- rity can apply to a dive rse set of activities that Through By Means Of Stability End States Safe and secure environment Rule of law Stable governance Social well-being Sustainable economy Stability Functions Security Foreign humanitarian assistance Economic stabilization and infrastructure Rule of law Governance and participation Stability Tasks Enable civil security Enable civil control Restore essential services Support governance Support economic and infrastructure development Conduct humanitarian assistance As a Result Of Environmentally-Oriented Tactical Tasks Assess the population Build/restore infrastructure Coordinate with civil authorities Enable civil authorities Engage civil authorities Influence the population Liaison with civil authorities Transfer to civil control Figure 10-2. Stability End States to Tactical Tasks. --- Page 222 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 10-5 range from enforcing pe ace agreements to con- ducting disarmament, dem obilization, and reinte- gration. Such activities include providing security through transition and developing a HNSF. Enabling civil security is resource intense, requir- ing extensive amounts of manpower and material. Civil security is a necessa ry precursor to success in achieving other stability tasks. Infantry compa- nies can specifically expect the civil security mis- sion to include the following actions:  Enforce cessation of host ilities, peace agree- ments, and other arrangements.  Advise, mentor, and train HNSF.  Conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.  Conduct border control, provide boundary security, and monitor freedom of movement.  Establish and support identification programs.  Protect key personnel and facilities.  Clear explosive and CBRN hazards. Enable Civil Control Enabling civil control supp orts the rule of law and civil security by providing or supporting the provision of effective j udiciary, police, and cor- rective systems. It enco mpasses the key institu- tions necessary for a func tioning justice system, which include police, inve stigative services, the prosecutorial arm, and public defense. This task targets internal threats th at manifest as insurgen- cies, subversive elemen ts within the population, organized crime, or general lawlessness. The infantry company must be ready to execute the following activities, whic h are associated with enabling civil control:  Establish public order and safety.  Assist in establishing an interim criminal jus- tice system.  Support law enforcement and police reform.  Support public outre ach and community rebuilding programs. Restore Essential Services Restoring essential services consists of immedi- ate efforts focused on protecting and supporting the establishment or restor ation of basic civil ser- vices—food, water, shelter, and medical—until a transition to civil author ity occurs. In the after- math of major armed conf licts and disasters and during many stability op erations, military forces support efforts to establish or restore the most basic civil services to sustain the population until local civil services are restored (see fig. 10-3 on page 10-6). These effort s typically include pro- viding or supporting HA, providing shelter and relief for dislocated civilians, and preventing the spread of epidemic diseas e. Unless they receive specific skill set augmen tation, infantry compa- nies usually support th ese efforts with labor, security, local coordination, and civil engage- ment. A company commander can expect to sup- port the following activities:  Provision of essential civil services.  Assistance to dislocated civilians.  Famine prevention and emergency food relief programs.  Nonfood relief programs.  Human right initiatives.  Public health programs.  Education programs. Support Governance Military forces support governance by helping to shape the environment necessary to restore public administration and public services through a legitimate, functional, effective system of politi- cal governance. The support provided by mili- tary forces in the areas of civil control and civil security enables other partners to develop an open political process, a free pr ess, a functioning civil society, and legitimate legal and constitutional frameworks. An infantry company must be ready to execute the following actions, which are asso- ciated with supporting governance:  Support transitional administrations.  Support development of local governance.  Support anticorruption initiatives.  Support elections. --- Page 223 --- 10-6 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Support Economic and Infrastructure Development Economic and infrastructure development con- sists of mi litary support of mid- and long-term construction a nd engineering ef forts focused on transportation, telecommunications, energy, and other public services. This level of effort is differ- ent from that required to restore essential ser- vices, which is an imm ediate and short-term endeavor and requires some basic level of secu- rity and rule of law. The infantry company sup- ports economic and infrastructure development in four ways:  Enables civil security and civil control through active participation in operations and/or by supporting the HNSF.  Serves as a sensor in providing data to deter- mine economic and infr astructure develop- ment needs in the AO.  Serves as a collector for assessments regarding the effectiveness of ec onomic and infrastruc- ture projects.  Possesses a limited capab ility to employ funds and resources in support of HHQ-declared eco- nomic and infrastructure goals. Conduct Humanitarian Assistance Military forces conduct HA in short-term emer- gency crises, durin g other operations, or in long- term development assistance by providing or supporting the provision of access and delivery of basic needs—water, food, sh elter, sanitation, and health services. The task is deliberately broad as delivering HA is one of the most common sta- bility tasks that occur across a range of military operations, whether conducting a stability-type operation (disaster relie f) or responding to an earthquake during conventional operations or W E A T M S O Lines of effort Objectives End state S Sewage Essential services operational Critical positions staffed Infrastructure and populace secured Civil order attained Municipal sewage system fully operational Other considerations not already specified Water treatment plants functional/distributing Electrical plants open; all power lines intact All schools open, staffed, and supplied Trash service in place; city dump open Hospital and clinics open and staffed Vital law enforcement and fire protection ongoing Water Electricity Academics Trash Medical Safety Other considerations Figure 10-3. Essential Services Lines of Effort. --- Page 224 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 10-7 flooding in a COIN opera tion. The infantry com- pany supports this task in the following ways:  Providing security.  Providing manpower.  Assisting in determining need and assessments. Environmentally-Oriented Tactical Tasks The environmentally-oriented tactical tasks listed in appendix D enable the execution of the stabil- ity tasks. The company may receive these tactical tasks from HHQ or, more likely, it will choose to use these tactical tasks to enable its platoons and squads to execute actions and activities that fulfill the company’s larger mission. The following are environmentally-oriented tactical tasks:  Assess the population.  Build/restore infrastructure.  Coordinate with civil authorities.  Enable civil authorities.  Engage the civil authorities.  Influence the population.  Liaison with civil authorities.  Transfer to civil control. Civil-Military Operations Civil-military operations ar e the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, govern- mental and nongovernmental civilian organiza- tions and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate milita ry operations to consoli- date and achieve operational US objectives. Civil- military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions nor- mally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occu r, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-mili- tary operations may be performed by designated civil affairs personnel, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Civil-military operations is the action arm of sta- bility operations. For stability functions and tasks to occur, the infantry company conducts CMO. The company will often engage and coordinate with civic, gove rnment, and religious leadership as well as with the popul ace itself. Civil-military operations build and use relationships with peo- ple, governments, and NGOs to facilitate tactical tasks and military objectiv es and enhance the effective and thoughtful use of combat power. Civil-military operations are not the realm of civil affairs personnel alone. Civil affairs personnel may support infantry co mpanies, but will most likely work at the ba ttalion level and above. Therefore, CMO remains a commander’s respon- sibility and, as in the case of IO, all members of the company can and will execute CMO efforts. Civilian populations, orga nizations, and leader- ship add considerable va riables to the already chaotic and uncertain ba ttlefield environment. Since the actions of many of these elements can only be influenced rath er than controlled, com- pany commanders seek to mitigate this unpredict- ability through well-thought-out CMO plans. When planning CMO actions, company com- manders should consider the following:  Actions that generate and further stability.  Actions that minimize population interference with company operations while enhancing the legitimacy of friendly forces.  Actions that isolate the enemy from the popu- lation and put additional pressure on their oper- ations.  Actions that identify and coordinate acquisi- tion of local resources.  Actions that assist the company in meeting legal obligations to the local population.  Actions that analyze the CMO aspects and implications of current or planned operations.  Actions that gain and maintain situational awareness of the civil environment. --- Page 225 --- 10-8 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Conduct of Civil-Military Operations Like IO, intelligence gath ering, and similar func- tions, the company ensure s that reconnaissance and assessment of the civil environment is part of every operation. In so doing, the company com- mander can quickly gain a baseline concept of the “normal” civil environment, rapidly recognize sources of instability, and identify opportunities to address them. This ge nerality applies equally to a range of operations, from discovering and handling civilians in a conventional conflict to monitoring the effects of a formal peace agree- ment in a peacekeeping operation. Civil-Military Operations Mission-Essential Tasks The core CMO mission-essential tasks (METs) are those primary tasks th at Marine Corps forces, to include the infantry company, must be fully capable of planning, supporting, executing, or transitioning through, wit h, or by outside factors to mitigate or defeat civi l threats. As stated, the commander is ultimately responsible for conduct- ing CMO, but, in most cases, the infantry com- pany must receive resources enablers, such as the following, to do so:  Civil affairs personnel.  PA.  Engineers.  Health service support (HSS).  Transportation units.  Military police.  MISO. The CMO METs are discussed briefly below. For further information se e Navy Marine Corps Instruction 3500.108, Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Plans Tr aining and Readiness (T&R) Manual ; MCWP 3-33.1, Marine Air- Ground Task Force Civ il-Military Operations ; and MCRP 3-33.1A, Civil Affairs Tactics, Tech- niques, and Procedures. Facilitate Populace and Resources Control The infantry company pa rticipating in population and resources control as sists HN governments or de facto authorities with retaining control over their population centers to preclude complicating problems that may hind er mission accomplish- ment. Populace and resource control measures seek to identify, reduce, relocate, or access popu- lation resource s that may imped e or otherwise threaten success. Populace control provides for security of the pop- ulace and mobilization of human resources. It denies the enemy access to the populace or his ability to recruit from the populace. It also reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents and facilitates their detect ion by friendly forces. Resources control regul ates the movement or consumption of materiel resources, mobilizes materiel resources, and denies materiel to the enemy. Examples of populace and resources con- trol include:  Curfews.  Restricting movement, su ch as through obsta- cles and barriers or entry control point/vehicle checkpoints.  Biometrics and identification cards.  Ration controls. Facilitate Foreign Humanitarian Assistance The purpose of FHA is to relieve or reduce the results of manmade or natural disasters and other endemic conditions, such as disease, hunger, or privation, that might present serious threat to life or loss of property. It encompasses short-range programs aimed at ending or alleviating human suffering. It supplement s or complements the efforts of the HN civilian authorities or agencies that have the primary responsibilities for providing relief. The guiding princi ple is to do only what civilian authorities or huma nitarian relief organi- zations cannot do or to do what is mission essen- tial. Foreign humanitarian assistance may include relief supplies or logistical support to FHA opera- tions. Infantry company participation normally includes providing security and manpower. --- Page 226 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 10-9 Facilitate Nation Assistance Nation assistance is civil or military help (other than FHA) provided to a foreign country during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war. Such operations are normally part of a national- or the- ater-level long-term engagement strategy and occur through the auspices of the appropriate US ambassador’s country plan . Infantry companies normally support nation a ssistance by participat- ing in military training or providing security to medical, dental, or engineering-related projects. Manage Civil Information Managing civil informat ion relates to informa- tion and intelligence collection, normally through application of ASCOPE; it does not relate to IO. The infantry company participates in gathering and managing civil info rmation by conducting civil reconnaissance, providing information in accordance with HHQ ta sks and processes, and interorganizational agency coordination. Facilitate Support to Civil Administration Support to civil administr ation helps continue or stabilize management of a foreign nation’s civil structure by a governing bo dy. It assists an estab- lished government or establishes military author- ity over an occupied popul ation. Support to civil administration is often ma naged at levels above the infantry company. Th e company’s participa- tion often occurs in such ways as providing secu- rity, conducting assessments, or advising HNSF. Stability Operations Planning Considerations and Tools Planning Considerations Stability operations at the infantry company level require specific considerations for planning, orga- nizing, and training before and during combat operations. Extensive planning will occur at levels above the company, but company commanders are responsible for detailed pl anning in their areas of operations. Training before deployment will still focus on small unit tactics and individual skills; however, Marines must al so train to understand, consider, and execute CMO in support of stability. Task Organization Stability operations, especial ly if the focus of the mission, often require significant dispersion of the infantry company. Company commanders should include a relative combat analysis as part of prob- lem framing and COA development—troop to task is part of this pr ocess. In doing so, the com- pany commander seeks to develop an understand- ing of what capabilities the rifle platoons need for effectiveness. Compan y commanders may find that the requirement to increase the lethality, flex- ibility, and self-sufficien cy of the rifle platoons (through augmentation w ith CSWs, for example) dictates weapons plato on employment. Company commanders may have to weigh risk: Does the benefit of additional maneuver elements outweigh the threat posed by having less than desired com- bat power in each of those elements or vice versa? Company commanders can therefore employ the weapons platoon as a ma neuver element, dis- perse it across the rifle platoons, or retain the capabilities at the company level, weighting com- pany operations with weapons platoon assets as needed. If conducting a RIP during an ongoing operation, commanders co nsider how the cur- rently engaged company is employing its weapon platoon. The company commander should also seek to understand the reasoning behind the cur- rent method of employmen t before considering changing or adopting it. Dispersion of the company also results in a greater need for self-sufficiency in terms of material, equipment, and personne l resources. Often, this augmentation is most needed in command and control, intelligence, and logistics warfighting functions. Table 10-1, on page 10-10, lists types of assets that the company commander may require when conductin g stability operations. While these might not all be available at any given time, they do repres ent the types of assets company commanders will likely require. --- Page 227 --- 10-10 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Planning Horizons The company must inte grate the planning hori- zons of the battalion into their own long- and short-range plans. More so than in the offense and defense, the company can envision the desired sta- bility end state some we eks or months in the future. This planning horizon allows the company commander to assess operations and modify them so that progress continues. Failure to establish a long-range plan within which short-term planning occurs will leave the company constantly reacting to events and failing to achieve stability. Unity of Effort As planning begins, engaging and using HN and US civilian partners and stakeholders are critical to ensuring a unified plan with support and agree- ment from all partners. Understand Root Causes Understanding root causes is more than merely listening to the grievances of the people. It is the willingness and ability to separate and compre- hend causal and systemic factors and determine when and how to address those problems. If a particular village lost its water service, the imme- diate causal factor may be as simple as an unre- paired supply pipe. However, the reason the pipe remains unfixed may have to do with priorities being set at the water uti lity, which might be tied into corrupt officials, part y politics, or tribal alle- giances. It is the task of company commanders to understand the depth of the problem and then make decisions on how to help solve it given the resources available. Secure the Population Stability operations are about bringing order to an unstable situation—basic security is a fundamental aspect of stability and th e task in which the com- pany is most likely to participate. Regardless of the nature of the operati on, ensuring that friendly forces have a monopoly on force is a critical aspect of stability. Table 10-1. Company Task Organization Considerations. Organic Nonorganic Vehicle mechanics Reconnaissance unit/SF units Messmen CI/HUMINT exploitation team Armorers Military working dogs Communications/data Marines Combat camera CMCC manager Explosive ordnance disposal JTAC Army 120-mm mortars TACP Federal intelligence agencies Drivers (HMMWV, 7-ton, MRAP) Law enforcement professionals Logistical support (supply) Radio battalion Medical officers Interpreters Intelligence analysts Combat engineers/heavy equipment Communications/data Marines Shock trauma platoon Satellite communications technician Legend CMCC classified material control center HMMWV high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle MRAP mine-resistant, ambush-protected SF special forces TACP tactical air control party --- Page 228 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 10-11 Enhancement of the Legitimacy of the Host Nation Government The end state of every stability operation from FHA to COIN is a transition to civil authority. The infantry company mu st avoid putting an HN “face” on operations and ac tivities, and endeavor to create or re-establish real capacity. This pros- pect may be short term or long term, but a coher- ent, attainable, building block plan is necessary for success. Patience There is no decisive battle in stability operations. Often, it takes years to cr eate an environment in which an HN government can effectively govern its people and defend itse lf. Infantry companies must understand the diff erence between “good” and “good enough.” They mu st possess the train- ing and maturity to reco gnize that many nations and cultures can achieve success, deliver results, and execute legi timate governance without mim- icking and mirroring the way those things might occur in the United States. Secure Critical Infrastructure Regardless of the level of conflict in which the infantry company finds its elf, planning includes securing and endeavoring to retain the functional- ity of critical infrastructure, such as basic utilities. Critical civilian infrastruct ure also includes gov- ernmental, societal, and culturally sensitive sites. Win the Information War Not surprisingly, stabili ty operations and CMO are closely related to IO in that they leverage each other and frequently shar e resources, assets, and agencies. Every CMO action has potential IO impacts and vice versa. To counter threat narra- tives and/or meet the in formation needs of the population, coordination and synchronization of IO and CMO actions are critical as is mutual feed- back and assessment. In setting up the company COC planning cell’s proce sses, procedures, and briefing methods, company commanders should ensure they aid, assist, and enable IO and CMO personnel to work together and share information. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace and Stability Operations The IPB process remains equally important in supporting planning, deci sionmaking, targeting, and assessment in stabili ty operations. In con- ducting IPB within stability operations, the com- pany commander and company intelligence specialist consider the effe cts on civilians, of the environment on the population, and on intercon- nected systems. Amplified Importance of Civil Considerations When conducting IPB in support of stability oper- ations, the societal com ponent of the operational environment is at least as important as traditional terrain and threat analys is. Within the context of problem framing and the company’s task and pur- pose, the company command er must provide the company intelligence specialist and CLIC with guidance on how to we ight their IPB efforts. When analyzing civil considerations, the com- pany considers ASCOPE. Considered com- pletely, ASCOPE incr eases the company’s understanding of the environment in terms of societal relations, infra structure, capacity, and resources (ASCOPE is discussed in detail later in this chapter). Such an an alysis provides baseline data for assessments of company operations and efforts. Table 10-2, on page 10-12, lists signifi- cant terrain considerations often taken into account when addressing civilian considerations. Effects of the Environment on the Population The second step of IPB (describe the bat- tlespace’s effects) help s commanders understand how the environment enhances or degrades friendly and enemy forc es and capabilities. Within the context of st ability operations, com- pany commanders must al so understand how the environment supports th e population. For exam- ple, while it is good to know that the heat in the --- Page 229 --- 10-12 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 AO reduces enemy operations, it is also impor- tant to know that the heat drives civilian activ- ity late into the nigh t with corresponding late mornings. This informatio n in turn allows the company commander to make choices about when to conduct certain types of operations. An early afternoon sweep will catch most people at home; whereas, an ea rly morning sweep will catch most people in bed. Principle of Interconnected Systems When company commanders analyze the bat- tlespace in terms of civ ilian considerations, they must appreciate the interactions and reactions within the whole. Certai nly, infantry companies approach the enemy holistically as well: the enemy’s operation; his sy stems, capabilities, and resources; and his vuln erabilities. Commanders must understand how co mplex civil societies can be not a cause for paraly sis, but a stimulus for encouraging the company to analyze the societal portion of the battlespace carefully and to take into account possible second and third order effects when planning operations. Table 10-3 lists societal considerations that company planners should address. Stability Operations Tools The elements of the in fantry company leverage their ability to interact with the local population when conducting such activities as patrols, census operations, checkpoints, key leadership engage- ments, or interaction. During all such activities, the infantry company can gain information through Table 10-2. Significant Terrain Characteristics Common to Counterinsurgency Operations. Forms and Functions Construction and Placem ent Military Aspects of Terrain (KOCOA) Cores Industrial areas Toxic industrial material production and storage facilities Standard signs and markings for toxic chemicals Outlying high-rise areas Residential areas and shantytowns Commercial ribbon areas Forts and military bases Broad urban patterns Types Satellite Network Linear Segment Dominant or central hub (if any) Area covered (square miles) Street patterns Basic types Radial Grid Irregular (planned and unplanned) Variations Rayed radial ring Contour forming Combined Widths Construction Mass or framed Light or heavy clad Material (dirt, wood, stone, brick, cinder block, concrete, steel, and glass) Density and thickness (roots, floors, and interior and exterior walls) Load-bearing walls and columns Height (floors) Doors, windows, fire escapes, and other openings Interior floor plan (including crawl spaces, elevators, and stairs) Placement Random Close, orderly block Dispersed Ownership Key terrain Landmarks Buildings of cultural, social, political, historical, or economic significance Observation and fields of fire Smoke (fire), dust (explosions), and flying debris Rubble Engagement ranges (including minimum safe distances and backblast factors) and obliquity/angles (ricochets) Elevation and depression considerations Lasers and reflective concerns Cover and concealment Building protection Weapon penetration (single shot and multiple rounds) considerations Rubble and vehicles Obstacles Rubble and vehicles Steep embankments Medians Inadequate bridges and overpasses (destroyed, weight- restricted, or narrow) Tunnels and underpasses (destroyed or narrow) Mines and roadside IEDs Masking of fires Burning buildings or other fire hazards Rivers and lakes Avenues of approach (mobility corridors) Airspace Surface Suprasurface Subsurface --- Page 230 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 10-13 active and passive means, determine the tenor of the community (atmospherics), identify key lead- ers and trusted agents, and collect data that sup- ports the planning proce ss for future operations. All these may be considered tools of CMO and stability operations. Some others for specific con- sideration are ASCOPE, district stabilization framework, and CMO center. Population Demographics General population size Village Town City Metropolis Megalopolis Group size based on race, age, sex, political affiliation, economics, religion, tribe, clan, gang, criminal activities, or other significant grouping Significant US or coalition populations Distribution, densities, and physical boundaries and overlaps Majority, minority, and dominant groups Increasing or decreasing migration trends Dislocated civilians NGOs Local National International Languages (distribution, dialects, relationship to social structure) Educational levels and literacy rates Crime rates Birth and death rates Labor statistics and considerations Skilled and unskilled Imported and exported Unemployment Standard wages and per capita income Workday and workweek norms Health Diseases Nutritional deficiencies Local standards of care Pollution and environmental hazards (air, water, food, and soil) Health workers (types, numbers, and degree of skill)History General and for a specific group Internal or external Recent conflicts Relationship with allies and other participating multinational forces Applicable international treaties Status-of-force agreements Antagonists/protagonists Heroes Events, facts, and dates considered important or celebrated Urban area’s historical importance Table 10-3. Societal Considerations. --- Page 231 --- 10-14 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Leadership and Prominent Personalities Identification, location, and prioritization of influential leaders (exploitation, evacua- tion, protection, etc.) Affiliation (ethnic, religion, military, government, industry, criminal, or entertainment) Education attained Organization and distribution of power Associations among different leaders and groups Ethnicity and Culture Values, moral codes, taboos, and insults (verbal and nonverbal) Attitudes toward age, sex, and race (including same-sex interaction) Role of the clan, tribe, or family Biases between ethnic groups Privacy and individuality Recreation, entertainment, and humor Fatalism or self-determination Exchanges of gifts Displays of emotion Lines of authority Dating and marriage Greetings, leave-takings, and gestures Visiting practices Alcohol and drug use Important holidays, festivals, sporting, or entertainment events Eating and dietary practices Significance of animals and pets Urban-rural similarities and differences Driving habits ClothingReligion Sects, division, and overlaps Religious biases and problems Relationship and influence on government, politics, economics, and education Impact on ethnic and cultural beliefs Key events or celebrations (daily, weekly, monthly, or annually) Funeral and burial practices Table 10-3. Societal Considerations. (Cont’d) --- Page 232 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 10-15 Table 10-3. Societal Considerations. (Cont’d) Government and Politics Present and past forms Organization and powers (executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative divisions) Scheduled elections and historical turnouts Degree of control over the population Identification required Border crossing procedures Relations with US or multinational governments, national government, and criminal elements Political factions and boundaries Political traditions Grievances Censorship Nepotism and other clan, tribal, or social ties Civil defense and disaster preparedness (organization, plans, training, equipment, and resources) Legal system System of laws Applicable treaties Courts and tribunals Procedures Records (birth and deeds) Property control Monetary system (formal and informal) Domestic and foreign trade Taxation and tariffs Customs requirements Rationing and price controls Economic performance and contribution to gross national product Economic aid Perception of relative deprivation Trade unions Competition with the black market and organized crime --- Page 233 --- 10-16 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, Events The mnemonic ASCOPE provides a tool for the company to assess the civil environment in terms of its capacity and means to help, hinder, or affect military operations. It al so provides insight into the effect of military operations on civil consider- ations in the following ways:  Areas. The analysis of areas refers to key local- ities or aspects of th e terrain within a bat- tlespace that are not normally considered militarily significant, such as locations of gov- ernment centers; political boundaries; social, religious, or criminal enclaves; agricultural and mining regions; and traditional trade routes.  Structures. Studying structures includes an analysis of the locati on, function, capability, and application of existing civil structures, such as warehouses, sc hools, irrigation pump stations, mass media stations, utilities, and cul- tural sites.  Capabilities. The study of capabilities looks into what exists or is required to sustain the populace and infrastructure, including public administration, pu blic safety, emergency ser- vices, or food distri bution, and resources and services that can be used or contracted to sup- port the military mission. Such support may include interpreters, c onstruction materials, and heavy or transport equipment.  Organizations. The company should identify organized groups that may or may not be affili- ated with government agencies. Examples include religious, fraternal, nationalistic, and political entities; community watch groups; and NGOs.  People. The study of people includes all civil- ians that the infantry company can expect to encounter in the AO as well as those outside the AO but in the AOI, whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect military operations. Examples include all local nationals, civil authorities, key leaders, expatriates, contractors and foreign employees, and the media.  Events. The company must consider all civilian events that may affe ct military operations. Examples include reli gious/national holidays, harvests, elections, and recent conflict. District Stability Framework The district stabilit y framework (DSF) tool assists the company comma nder in creating sta- bilization plans, identify ing sources of instabil- ity, and supporting stabili zation efforts. As a planning and execution t ool, DSF helps users to identify local sources of instability ; prioritize them; and design, monitor, and evaluate the exe- cution of programs and activities to address them. With such knowledge, company com- manders can better plan, more wisely allocate resources, and conduct op erations that are more effective. While more information on DSF is located in MCWP 3-33.1 the basic steps are—  Situational awareness. Situational awareness is gained by viewing the circumstances through four lenses: operational environment, cultural environment, local perc eptions, and stability/ instability dynamics. The primary input of situ- ational awareness comes from the company’s IPB and the civil considerations.  Analysis. Analysis involves using the under- standing gained thro ugh planning and situa- tional awareness to iden tify potential areas of instability, their causes, the desired effects (tied to conditions and the objectives), and the MOE and MOP for assessing those effects. A key out- put of analysis is determining what actual sources of instability are important and relate to successful mission accomplishment. Griev- ances and problems that might be important dur- ing a long-term development assistance mission are unlikely to be important or even addressed in a short-term crisis response situation.  Design. In the design phase of DSF, the com- pany prioritizes and sync hronizes stabilization activities. It focuses on the sources of instabil- ity that it has chosen to address and has placed into a tactical stability matrix. This process --- Page 234 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 10-17 starts by brainstorming potential activities that will address each of the systemic causes of the sources of instability. These ideas are then screened and refined in light of the mission and resource availability.  Monitoring and evaluation . Like all assess- ment, monitoring and evaluation is directly tied into planning, executi on, and decisionmaking. The company uses assessment tools (see MCWP 3-33.1) to manage programs and help track output and impact of individual activities. Civil-Military Operations Center A CMO center is an ad hoc organization estab- lished by commanders to assist in the coordina- tion of activities of military forces and US Government agencies, NGOs, HN government, and the local civilian po pulation. A CMO center may be a permanent or temporary organization. It can be used for functions, such as the following:  Providing services to the local population, including adjudication of claims, project and contractor meetings, and issuance of identifica- tion documents/cards.  Providing a venue for me etings between local government and military personnel.  Enhancing and encouraging the coordination of activities among military personnel, NGOs, HN government, and US Government agencies. Assessing Stability Tasks Assessment is the cont inuous monitoring and evaluation of the effect iveness and progress of any particular effort, endeavor, and operation against the desired end state of the company com- mander. In short, assess ment answers those basic questions regarding wh ether the company’s efforts are making progress toward mission accomplishment: If it is not making progress, why not, and what must be done differently? As with all other operat ions, the infantry com- pany constantly assesses its success in stability tasks and activities. The types, methodology, and processes of conducting a ssessment at the com- pany level are discussed thoroughly in chapter 2. The following are examples of useful indicators to create MOEs and MOPs when addressing civilian considerations and stability operations:  Acts of violence . Numbers of attacks, friendly/ HN casualties.  Dislocated civilians . Dislocated ci vilian is a broad term primarily us ed by the Department of Defense that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. The number, population, and de mographics of dis- located civilian camps or the lack thereof are an indicator of overall security and stability. A drop in the number of people in the camps indicates an increasi ng return to normalcy. People and families exiled from or fleeing their homes and property a nd people returning to them are measurable and revealing.  Human movement and religious attendance. In societies where the culture is dominated by reli- gion, activities related to the predominant faith may indicate the ease of movement and confi- dence in security, people’s use of free will and volition, and the presence of freedom of reli- gion. Possible indicators include the following:  Flow of religious pilgrims or lack thereof.  Development and activ e use of places of worship.  Number of temples and churches closed by a government.  Presence and activity of small and medium- sized businesses. When danger or insecure con- ditions exist, these businesses close. Patrols can report on the number of businesses that are open and how many cust omers they have. Tax collections may indicate the overall amount of sales activity.  Level of agricultural activity . Answers to the following questions are indicators:  Is a region or nation self-sustaining or must life-support type foodstuffs be imported? --- Page 235 --- 10-18 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1  How many acres are in cultivation? Are the fields well maintained and watered?  Are agricultural goods getting to market? Has the annual need increased or decreased?  Presence or absence of associations . The for- mation and presence of multiple political par- ties indicates more i nvolvement of the people in government. Meetings of independent pro- fessional associations demonstrate the viabil- ity of the middle class and professions. Trade union activity indicate s worker involvement in the economy and politics.  Participation in elections. Such participation is an indicator of progress, especially when insur- gents publicly threaten violence against partici- pants.  Government services available . Examples include the following:  Police stations operat ional and police offi- cers present throughout the area.  Clinics and hospitals in full operation and whether new facilities sponsored by the pri- vate sector are open and operational.  Schools and universiti es open and function- ing.  Freedom of movement of people, goods, and communications . This is a classic measure to determine if an insurgen cy has denied areas in the physical, electronic, or print domains.  Tax revenue . If people are paying taxes, this can be an indicator of HN government influ- ence and subsequent civil stability.  Other indicators . Other indicators include industry exports, em ployment/unemployment rate, availability of el ectricity, and specific attacks on infrastructure. Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations The ability of the United States to respond to cri- ses around the world promot es regional security. Crisis response and limited contingency opera- tions may arise during or because of other opera- tions. Military units may respond unilaterally or as part of a larger inte ragency or multinational effort. Many of the missions associated with cri- sis response and limited contingency operations, such as disaster relief and FHA operations, do not necessarily require combat but may require basic security and FP measures . However, these types of events might occur in the midst of offense, defense, or stab ility operations as well, requiring a balance of combat preparedness and humanitar- ian response. Still, so me operatio ns, such as Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, can be extremely dangerous in their own right and require a significant effort to protect friendly forces while ac complishing the mission; there- fore, infantry companies must be prepared to con- duct the full range of MAGTF operations in support of crisis response scenarios. Types of Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations There are eight types of crisis response and lim- ited contingency operations in which the infantry company may participate: disaster relief, FHA, NEO, strikes and raids, embassy defense, recov- ery operations, defense su pport of civil authori- ties, and peace operations. Disaster Relief Disaster relief operations are actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resu lting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents. Disaster relief resulting in employment of the infantry company can occur both domestically or in foreign c ountries and either unilaterally or as part of a much larger mul- tiagency and multinational effort. Military units executing disaster relief will normally serve as a supporting force for civilian-directed responses. --- Page 236 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 10-19 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance The purpose of FHA is to relieve or reduce the results of natural or ma nmade disasters or other endemic conditions that pose a serious threat to life (disease, starvati on) or property. The US military typically supplements HN authorities along with US Govern ment agencies, NGOs, and unaffiliated individuals (see fig. 10-4 on page 10-20). Most FHA operations resemble di- saster relief operations. Noncombatant Evacuation A NEO is a Department of State-run operation that serves primarily to evac uate US citizens whose lives are in danger. It can also evacuate natives and third-world country nationals when directed to do so. The military supports the Department of State through swift insertion of forces and the temporary occupation of an objective, followed by a planned withdrawal. An infantry company participating in a NEO may task-organize to provide security, organizational and logistical support, detainee handling, or evacuation assistance. The company uses only the force needed to protect evacuees and defend itself. Strikes and Raids A strike is an attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capabilit y. Raids are a type of attack that include a planned withdrawal (see chap. 6). Forward deploye d forces, of which the infantry company may be a part, most often con- duct strikes and raids. Infantry companies may participate directly or may provide direct and indirect support. Embassy Defense When periods of civil unrest, revolution, and law- lessness exceed the HN’s abilities to contain, Marine Corps forces have often been called upon to defend US diplomatic posts and personnel against external danger (the Marine Corps Embassy Security Group provides internal secu- rity services). Embassy defense operations are frequently conducted in conjunction with NEOs. EXAMPLE: In 1991, 24th MEU (Special Operations Capable) provided security, shelter, food, and water to the dissident Kurdish minority in northern Iraq. The 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, during Operation Sea A ngel in 1991, assisted Bangladesh in the aftermath of a devastating tropical cyclone by distributing food and medical supplies and repairing the country’s transportation infrastructure. In late 2004 and early 2005, III Marine Expedi tionary Force units assisted Indonesia and neighboring areas following an earthquake and subsequent tsunami. EXAMPLE: Following Hurricane Andrew in Florida in 1992, the Special Purpose MAGTF established and maintained a temporary city for 2,500 displaced civilians, distributed supplies, and helped restore power to Dade County. Marines also supported relief efforts after Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana in 2005 and are called out almost yearly to fight wildfires in California. EXAMPLE: On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah conducted a rocket attack on northern Israel. The American embassy (Department of State) requested Department of Defense support on 14 July for a NEO of American citizens, resulting in a US Central Command execute order issued on 15 July. The order resulted in the following mission statement for 24th MEU: “On order, 24th MEU (Special Operations Capable) conducts the evacuation of ap-proximately 25 American citizens from the US Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, to Cyprus in order to support Department of State authorized departures. Be prepared to support follow-on evacuation operations of designated personnel.” EXAMPLE: In 1988, elements of a special purpose MAGTF destroyed two oil platforms in the Persian Gulf being used by Iran as staging platforms for attacks on merchant shipping. --- Page 237 --- 10-20 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Recovery Operations The Marine Corps maintains the ability to execute recovery of personnel, aircraft, and equipment. Often, particularly with personnel, these operations occur within the context of the Department of Defense Personnel Recovery System. The Marine Corps expects that personnel and aircraft recovery plans are inherent within the conduct of all opera- tions from patrols thr ough amphibious landings, which is why commanders at all levels plan drills and procedures, such as break contact, missing man, or escape and evasion. Due to its expeditiona ry nature, the Marine Corps is unique in having developed a specific operation—tactical recovery of aircraft and per- sonnel (TRAP)—to execute recovery tasks. The MAGTF normally designates a TRAP force, even if that force exists only on a contingency basis. The TRAP force consists of specially trained and briefed aircrews with a task-organized ground force. The infantry comp any or elements of the company form the basis of the ground force. The company focuses on the following:  Enemy threat.  Location of personnel, aircraft, and equipment to be recovered.  Composition of personnel, aircraft, and equip- ment to be recovered. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance To relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions Limited in scope and duration Supplements or complements efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing foreign humanitarian assistance Broad range of missions, such as relief missions, dislocated civilian support missions, security missions, technical assistance and support functions, and consequence management operations Operational Context US responds unilaterally US acts multinationally US acts coordinated by the United Nations Figure 10-4. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Purpose and Operational Context. EXAMPLE : In 1996, elements of the 22nd MEU (Special Operations Capable) simultaneously reinforced the American Embassies in Monrovia, Liberia (Operation Assured Response) and Bangui, Central African Republic (Operation Quick Response), providing security for some months and eventually evacuating 2,444 and 448 people respectively. --- Page 238 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 10-21  Troop to task, to include special skills or equipment of the TRAP force for the mission.  Insertion and extraction means, to include sec- ondary and tertiary assets and locations.  Expected time on the ground.  GO and NO-GO criteria.  Verification of SPINS.  Constitution of a reserve. The actual execution of a TRAP mission includes five phases—report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate. The infantry company commander can expect that information from the report and locate phases will drive the company’s TRAP participa- tion in the support and recover phases. The reinte- grate phase is beyond the scope of the company. Defense Support of Civil Authorities When permitted by law (Posse Comitatus Act) and when events overcom e the ability of local authorities to respond, domestic civ il authorities may receive temporary military support. Infantry companies tasked to provide this type of support may respond to a range of activities, such as aug- menting forest firefighting efforts, providing humanitarian relief to hurricane victims, and assisting in the restorat ion of law an d order dur- ing periods of civil disturbance. It is critical that the company leadership understand the differ- ences between conducting operations inside and outside of the United States. While the military may serve as lead agency outside of the United States, it will never do so within the United States. Both Active an d Reserve components of the Marine Corps are no t legally the same as civilian agencies or the National Guard. From the ground, guarding a moto r pool and handing out food in a foreign country appears very much like guarding a motor pool a nd handing out food in a US city, but they are not. It is important that the company understands the legal differences be- tween the two operational environments. Peace Operations Peace operations is a gene ral term that applies to all manner of internationa l and military missions seeking to contain confli ct, restore peace, create and sustain an environmen t of reconciliation and rebuilding, and facilitate transitions to legitimate governance. It encompasse s three general areas: operations in support of diplomatic efforts, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. The infan- try company may particip ate in peacekeeping or peace enforcement, but is unlikely to participate in operations supporting diplomatic efforts unless part of a larger force. Under the umbrella of these three general areas, peace operations are broken down further to include peacekeeping opera- tions, peace building, p eacemaking processes, conflict prevention, and military peace enforce- ment operations (see fig. 10-5 on page 10-22). Peace operations may occur under the auspices of the United Nations or other intergovernmental organizations, within a mission-specific coali- tion of nations, or unilaterally. Peacekeeping Operations. When participating in this mission, the infantry company monitors and facilitates the implementation of cease fires, truce negotiations, and other such agreements. The com- pany’s task organization, employment, and en- gagement with local leadership and populace focuses on assuring all si des in the dispute that the other involved parties are not taking advan- tage of settlement terms to their own benefit. The company concentrates on security and FP. It is quite possible that, as peacekeepers, the infantry company will lack acce ss to heavy weapons and EXAMPLE: On 3 September 1992, United Nations’ relief flight 2117, an Italian G-222 transport aircraft, crashed near Sarajevo airport from suspected hostile fire in the former country of Yugoslavia. The 26th MEU, operating aboard the helicopter carrier USS Iwo Jima in the Adriatic Sea, received a TRAP mission task to rescue or assist any survivors of the Italian G-222. EXAMPLE: In 1992, Marine Corps forces formed as a special purpose MAGTF to provide security and assistance to local law enforcement in response to riots in the city of Los Angeles. --- Page 239 --- 10-22 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 must build contingency plans accordingly. The infantry company most of ten observes and moni- tors or supervises and ai ds the parties involved in the dispute. Peace Enforcement Operations . When em- ployed to support peace en forcement operations, the infantry company conducts operations to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions assigned and to maintain or restore peace and order. The requirement to compel compliance may require combat, armed intervention, or physical threat of armed intervention. Under the provi- sions of an internationa l agreement, the infantry company may be employed to use coercive mili- tary power to compel compliance with interna- tional sanctions or resolutions. Conflict Prevention Peacekeeping Peacemaking Peace Enforcement Peace Building A peace operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and, when necesary, military means, to monitor and identify the causes of conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace, and order. The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to it. Stability actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure, and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Figure 10-5. Types of Peace Operations. --- Page 240 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 10-23 Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations Planning Considerations Company commanders must expect an uncertain, fluid, and chaotic operational environment when conducting crisis respons e and limited contin- gency operations. Gaini ng and maintaining an understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem is critical and leaders must stay flexible and understand th eir roles within the operation. The following are some planning con- siderations for the infantry company:  Understand the chain of command. For whom is the military working?  Develop an initial em ployment plan, which includes site reconnaiss ance and site security, for potential company operating bases.  Ensure that civilian agencies and counterparts understand the capabilities and limitations of an infantry company.  Possess a clear unders tanding of the opera- tional environment (hos tile, uncertain, permis- sive) and the ROE/escalation of force continuum (see app. E) and its implications on mission accomplishment.  Plan to establish communications and liaison with local authorities, such as government offi- cials, law enforcement agencies, and public works officials.  Determine processes and procedures necessary to coordinate, support, and get support from local authorities and agencies.  Identify key equipment, logistical, personnel, and external augmenta tion requirements as derived from problem framing.  Ensure that the company’s IPB process clearly takes into account the IE and civil consider- ations.  Establish CCIRs and PIRs that allow the infan- try company to best assess, validate, and deter- mine the requirements of the local populace.  Establish an assessment plan with valid MOEs and MOPs.  During COA development, ensure decisive points reflect the immediate actions necessary to stabilize the situation and the priority of those actions.  Plan and synchronize a robust IO fires plan.  Perform a civilian co nsiderations analysis based on METT-T. What external resources, such as engineers, MISO teams, interpreters, or civil affairs, are requ ired to accomplish the mission? Counterinsurgency Counterinsurgency is th e comprehensive civil- ian and military effort taken to simultaneously defeat and contain an in surgency and address its root causes. Participation in counterinsurgency might entail small teams conducting training in the relative security of an HNSF base, or it might require the commitment of significant ground forces and combat operations. Regard- less of the mission, an understanding of insur- gency and counterinsurgen cy, combined with a similar understanding of stability operations, enables successful mis sion accomplishment. Many of the tac tics, techniques, and procedures of the classic insurgent apply to other individu- als and organizations employing violence for various ends, such as or ganized criminal activity in disaster relief, active and passive resistance among a hostile population in general war, and asymmetrical threats from terrorist organiza- tions seeking to destabilize a country (see table 10-4 on page 10-24). Mari ne Corps Warfighting EXAMPLE : In concert with the US Government’s ongoing commitment to East Timor, 11th MEU/ Boxer Amphibious Ready Group deployed more than 500 Marines and Sailors daily 9-11 April 2002, from the USS Boxer, USS Harpers Ferry, and USS Cleveland to several locations in East Timor to conduct medical and dental assistance, airlift and sealift of humanitarian supplies, and assistance in community relations projects around the island. Marines and Sailors from 11th MEU and the Boxer Amphibious Ready Group safely and professionally performed three days of humanitarian assistance operations in the developing country of East Timor. --- Page 241 --- 10-24 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Publication 3-33.5, Insurgencies and Counter- ing Insurgencies , and Marine Corps Interim Publication 3-33.01, Small Unit Leader’s Guide to Counterinsurgency , provide detailed discus- sion of executing counterinsurgency operations. Dynamics of an Insurgency Insurgencies are the orga nized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing author- ity. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. Insurgencies are political movements that result from real or perceived gr ievances or neglect that lead to alienation from an established government and are differentiated fro m more formal forms of rebellion by their lack of belligerent status—they are not internationally r ecognized as belligerents. The following dynamics are common to insurgen- cies and understanding these dynamics will assist company commanders in planning and executing operations across a range of military operations:  Leadership.  Objectives.  Goals.  Ideology.  Environment and geography.  External support.  Internal support.  Phasing and timing. Elements of an Insurgency Insurgent organizations va ry in size and capabili- ties, but typically consist of five elements within a military and political framework: leaders, com- batants, political cadre, auxiliaries, and mass base. The proportions of each element depend upon insurgent strategy and the degree of active support obtained from th e populace. The duties and responsibilities of in dividuals within these elements can often blend, though the functions of the elements remain sepa rate. The visibility of these elements is a functi on of the strength of the HN government in any given area. Where the HN is weak, insurgent elements may exist quite openly, while they may exist clandestinely in areas of HN strength. Table 10-5 and table 10-6, on page 10-26, provide insight into insurgent strengths and weaknesses and how the counterin- surgent can defeat the strengths and exploit the weaknesses. Figure 10-6, on page 10-26, reflects the relationship of the insurgency elements to each other and the general population. Table 10-4. Counterinsurgency Best Practices. Successful Practices Unsuccessful Practices Emphasize intelligence Focus on the population, its needs, and its security Establish and expand secure areas Isolate insurgents from the populace (population control) Conduct effective, pervasive, and continuous IO Provide amnesty and rehabilitation for those willing to support the new government Place HN police in the lead with military support as soon as the security situation permits Expand and diversify the HN police force Train military forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations Embed quality advisors and special forces with HN forces Deny sanctuary to insurgents Encourage strong political and military cooperation and information sharing Secure HN borders Protect key infrastructure Overemphasize killing and capturing the enemy rather than securing and engaging the populace Conduct large-scale operations as the norm Concentrate military forces in large bases for protection Focus special forces primarily on raiding Place low priority on assigning quality advisors to HN forces Build and train HN security forces in the US military’s image Ignore peacetime government processes, including legal procedures Allow open borders, airspace, and coastlines --- Page 242 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 10-25 Insurgent Strengths Countermeasures Indigenous Insurgents are usually indigenous to the local area and have the support of at least some of the populace; therefore, they have the ability to blend in with them. In many cases, they have two roles—a local resident one moment, an insurgent the next. This enhances their capability to operate without discovery in a given area. The counterinsurgent force must separate the insurgent from the rest of the populace. This is best accomplished through the effective use of populace and resources control. Care must be taken to ensure that civilians are not injured or mistreated as a result of counterinsurgent operations. Knowledge Since most insurgents are indigenous, their knowledge of the local populace, customs, issues, language, and terrain is first hand. The insurgents use this understanding to develop working relationships with the populace. The insurgent can apply this knowledge to the effective use of propaganda. If insurgents can get some of the local populace to identify to some degree with their cause, they can win its support and gain new recruits. If insurgents cannot persuade locals to help or refrain from hindering, they may resort to coercion. The counterinsurgent force must overcome the insurgent’s advantage of local knowledge by fostering a strong relationship with government security forces, other counterinsurgent forces, and the populace. If possible, counterinsurgent forces should reside within the local area and include members of the local populace. Maintaining continuous counterinsurgent operations in a given area through a permanently stationed counterinsurgent force is important. The skillful use of local assets or creation of a local civilian defense force that has the support and backing of the government are some ways to accomplish this. Intelligence Operations The insurgent’s inherent advantage with the population normally allows them to develop intelligence networks and infrastructure within the government and population. These networks can provide insurgents with continuous and current information on government or counterinsurgent force dispositions, strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities. The counterinsurgent force must place counterintelligence operations, intelligence collecting, and intelligence analysis as high priorities. The use of compartmentalization, deception, operations security, and communications security must be constantly emphasized. Since insurgents are indigenous, their intelligence networks and infrastructures can be infiltrated to gather intelligence and turn insurgent operatives into double agents. Motivation Some insurgents may be devoted to their cause to the point of fanaticism. On the other hand, insurgents who wish to abandon the movement face major challenges—their ability to cease being an insurgent is difficult. The government and the local populace may not welcome them back and the remaining insurgents will view them as turncoats and threats. Motivation within the insurgency is usually kept high through intimidation and threats of violence on them and their families. The counterinsurgent force must therefore promote the belief that remaining an insurgent leads only to death and defeat while creating a viable method for “former” insurgents to return to normal life. Host government reintegration, reconciliation, and amnesty programs remain the important elements of this success. Focused Responsibility Insurgents do not have the responsibility to maintain normal governmental obligations toward society. This frees their efforts to conduct focused operations in support of their goals. However, they often provide some aid and services to the local community, especially where government services fall short, and they highly advertise this fact. Counterinsurgent forces can use the insurgents’ lack of provisions for the society as a tool to increase government support of counterinsurgent operations and to decrease the populace’s insurgent support. In addition, they can show that the insurgents have acted irresponsibly. Increasing the HN government’s ability to provide services to the population may marginalize insurgent efforts. Insurgent Tactics The insurgents can use a broad range of tactics, from conventional warfare to terrorism. They can escalate or de-escalate their activity in reaction to government or counterinsurgent activity almost at will. The counterinsurgents must remain flexible and adaptive to engage and, if possible, disband, defeat, or destroy the insurgent force while preventing the insurgent force from having tactical successes. They must also learn and adapt quickly. Enduring Hardship Insurgents often come from impoverished backgrounds, are young, and are in good shape. They can manage with less by both design and background. Successful insurgents are innovative in their tactics, techniques, and procedures. They learn and adapt to changes in the operational environment. The counterinsurgent forces must therefore establish controls and eliminate resource support. Tight security and control of arms and ammunition must be maintained, to include thorough destruction of unused, abandoned, and discarded equipment. Hardships are still hardships and the harder life is for the insurgent, the more likely he is to quit. Table 10-5. Insurgent Strengths and Countermeasures. --- Page 243 --- 10-26 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Insurgent Vulnerabilities Countermeasures Limited Personnel Insurgents operate in small bands to avoid detection by government and counterinsurgent forces. Due to the challenges of recruiting new insurgents, insurgent personnel losses are not easily replaced. Insurgent methods to recruit replacements can be identified and exploited. Limited Resources Because of their covert nature, insurgents must rely on resources that are stolen or clandestinely delivered from friendly entities, such as internal or external supporters. This is especially true for sophisticated equipment, cash, replacement parts, and expendable supplies. Insurgent equipment losses are not easily replaced and methods of resupply can be discovered, severed, or tracked to sources and destinations. Table 10-6. Insurgent Vulnerabilities and Considerations. General Population General Population Mass Base Mass Base Combatants UndergroundLeaders Auxiliaries Figure 10-6. Relationship Among Elements of an Insurgency. --- Page 244 --- CHAPTER 11 OTHER TACTICAL OPERATIONS This chapter discusses other operations that en- able actions across the ra nge of offens e, defense, and stability operations. Like all tactical opera- tions, they may be main or supporting efforts. Other operations include engineering, RIP, pas- sage of lines, linkup, reconnaissance, convoy, deliberate and hasty checkpoints, and the handling of detainees and captured personnel. Planning and preparing for other operations present the same challenges and requireme nts as for any type. Other operations executed by the infantry com- pany can occur in mounte d or dismounted roles, with or without enable rs, in contiguous or non- contiguous employment, a nd in a joint or coali- tion environment. Engineering Operations Engineers conduct four primary missions: mobil- ity, countermobility, su rvivability, and general engineering. The following subparagraphs expand upon discussions of mobility and countermobility in chapters 6 and 7. An obstacle is an ob struction designed or employed to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the move- ment of an opposing for ce while imposing addi- tional losses in personnel, time, and equipment on them. Obstacles can be na tural, manmade, or a combination of both. Mob ility operations seek to reduce obstacles to main tain freedom of move- ment for maneuver units, weapon systems, and critical supplies. Coun termobility operations endeavor to construct ob stacles to delay, disrupt, and destroy the enemy to slow or divert them; increase time for target acquisition; and increase friendly weapon effectiveness. Mobility Mobility applies to all engineering activities that enhance the ability of fr iendly forces to maneu- ver. A bridging unit conducts engineering mobi- lity in the same manner that an engineer squad creates a breach. Engineers conduct mobility operations across a range of military operations and, regardless of opera tional environment, the infantry company faces increasing numbers of widely varying types of obstacles from tank ditches to IEDs. To the infantry company, it is not a matter of if it will encounter enemy obsta- cles, but a matter of when and where. Therefore, company commanders plan , organize, and pre- pare their companies to perform mounted and dis- mounted mobility tasks using the full range of organic and nonorganic mobility assets available. Obstacle Crossing Obstacle crossing applies to those tasks associ- ated with traditional breaching and the crossing of all obstacles, such as rivers. Obstacle crossing can occur at the division level, such as the reduction of a complex obstacle be lt during Operation Des- ert Storm, or at the s quad level by breaching pro- tective wire to enter an enemy position or getting over a deep ravine. Obstacle crossing is a task that occurs often during of fensive operations and entails the employment of a combination of tech- niques, procedures, an d equipment to project combat power to the far side of an obstacle. Com- pany commanders must understand the chal- lenges presented by various types of obstacles and the capabilities and limitations of the assets the company can employ to defeat them. They must further understand the basi c tenets of obstacle --- Page 245 --- 11-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 crossing, obstacle breac hing, and the types of breaches the company may conduct on its own or as part of a larger force. Breaching In the planning and ex ecution of a breaching operation, the company commander applies the five tenets of breaching:  Intelligence.  Breaching fundamentals.  Breaching organization.  Mass.  Synchronization. When confronting simple or lightly defended obstacles, well-rehearsed battle drills, tactical SOPs, and breaching asset redundancy can offset a lack of obstacle intelligence; however, detailed obstacle intelligence is imperative for a success- ful breach of a complex obstacle. Company com- manders must remember th at the purpose of the enemy obstacle is to disr upt, turn, fix, or block the company. If the comp any lacks intelligence on how to defeat the obstacle and associated defenses, it is perfor ming in the manner the enemy desires and faces disastrous conse- quences. At a minimum, effective obstacle IRs for breach and maneuver planning should identify the following:  Bypasses and gaps . The requirement for a breaching operation depends on the existence of adequate bypasses. Existing gaps may influ- ence the type of breach used.  Obstacle location and orientation . These fac- tors affect the approach to the breach and the scheme of maneuver that supports the breach.  Obstacle composition and depth . These factors determine required breaching resources; how long the breach will take ; the amount of expo- sure friendly forces will experience while pass- ing through the breach; and the combat power required to emplace, main tain, and exploit the breach. Further considerations include the loca- tion of enemy direct fire weapons and the topography and soil composition. There are five basic step s that form a part of every breaching operation—suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault (SOSRA):  Suppress. A company’s fail ure at this step ensures the failure of the rest. The infantry company uses all available organic and non- organic combat power to deny the enemy the ability to place effectiv e fires on the breach and assault forces for the duration of the breaching operation.  Obscure. The infantry company employs screening or obscuring smoke to prevent or disrupt enemy acquisition of friendly elements. Plans must be made to ensure the obscuration lasts for as long as it is needed.  Secure. Under the cover of suppression and obscuration, the infantry company secures the breach site to prevent enemy interference with obstacle reduction or the movement of friendly forces through the cleared lanes. When con- ducting task organizat ion, assigning combat power, and creating th e scheme of maneuver, the company commander must ensure that security at the breach si te can defeat all types of enemy actions, such as counterattack forces, that could threaten the breach.  Reduce. With the risk of enemy action miti- gated by the previous first three steps, the breaching force physically reduces the obsta- cle, creates lanes fo r movement, and guides friendly forces through the breach.  Assault. During the assault phase, the infantry company exploits the breach by passing through combat power that assaults the objective, destroys enemy forces capable of bringing direct or indirect fires on the breach, and sets the con- ditions for further exploitation and pursuit. To conduct a breach, the infantry company must perform three functions—support, breach, and assault—and generally organizes itself in that manner. How company commanders organize their available combat po wer is not as important as effectively accomplishing the three functions:  Support force . The support forc e establishes necessary SBF and observation positions to --- Page 246 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 11-3 suppress the enemy with direct and indirect fires to prevent effectiv e fires against friendly forces. It employs obscuration to screen breach and assault forces.  Breach force . The breach force searches for bypasses, establishes br each site security on both sides of the obstacle as required, reduces the obstacle, and proo fs and marks lanes or bypasses.  Assault force . The assault force exploits the breach to assault the objective and set condi- tions for follow-on acti ons. It is prepared to assist the support for ce in suppressing the enemy, assist the breach force in securing the far side of the breach site, and conduct assault breaches of protective obstacles. The infantry company masses combat power at the breach site by focusi ng all resources and assets on isolating and fixing the enemy in posi- tion. The company commander should plan for at least a 50 percent redunda ncy in obstacle breach- ing assets. The company commander synchronizes complex breaching operations through detailed reverse planning, clear instructi ons to subordinate ele- ments, effective comm and and control, and extensive rehearsals (see fig. 11-1 on page 11-4). Basing planning around SOSRA and using reverse planning met hodology, company plan- ners consider—  Actions on the objective. The planned actions on the objective influence the size and composition of the assault force and the number and location of lanes required of the breach element.  Breach requirements . Lane requirements, topography, and the type s of obstacles deter- mine the type and number of reduction assets required by the breach force.  Breach site security . The ability of the enemy to interfere with the breach determines whether fires, force, or both secure the breach site.  Suppression requirements . The enemy’s abil- ity to mass fires at the breach site dictates the nature of the required suppressive fires, including the composition of the support force and the type, amount, a nd duration of support- ing fires. In planning this step, company com- manders develop asse ssment criteria to determine when to commit the breach force.  Support positions . The location of the enemy and the availability of clear fields of fire deter- mine the location of th e support force and its SBF position. Though there are two types of breaches at the company level and above—hasty and deliber- ate—the bypass method is the first thing a com- mander should consider before committing to an actual breaching operation. At this level of opera- tion, the company will of ten (but not always) serve as a support, breach, or assault force for the parent battalion. Bypass. When a unit bypasses an obstacle, it physically changes dir ection and moves along a route that avoids the obst acle. While the desire to maintain momentum encourages bypassing obsta- cles whenever possible, company commanders must ensure that bypassing an obstacle provides a tactical advantage without exposing the unit to unnecessary danger. A reconnaissance should allow commanders to consider the following:  The limits of the obstacle.  Physical aspects of th e bypass route, including location, availability of cover and conceal- ment, and key terrain influencing the route.  Confirmation that the bypass route takes the company where it needs to go, but not where the enemy wants it to go, such as into possible ambush sites or kill zones. Hasty Breach. Companies and battalions employ the combined arms hasty breaching technique to overcome unexpected or lightly defended obsta- cles quickly; they may also use the technique when the obstacle or enem y situation is unclear. Company commanders and battalion command- ers prepare their units for a combined arms hasty breach by task-organizi ng subordinate battalions or companies (as applicable) with the additional --- Page 247 --- 11-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 forces necessary to conduct the operation. As with the combined arms deliberate breach, the battalion commander may direct the company, probably task-organized with one or more attached engineer platoo ns, to conduct the com- bined arms hasty breach on its own. The com- pany commander assume s responsibility for designating support, br each, and assault forces and for synchronizing SOSRA actions. Deliberate Breach. When confronting known, complex, or heavily defended obstacles and when no other reasonable tactical alternatives exist, the combined arms deliberate breach is conducted. The combined arms deliberate breach is a stand- alone operation specifically designed to reduce an obstacle, allowing the uni t to continue the mis- sion. Thorough reconnaissance, detailed plan- ning, and extensive preparation and rehearsals Size of support force Amount of suppression and obscuration Overwatching enemy Size of breach force Number and location of lanes Action at obstacles Size of assault force Actions on the objective Isolate Suppress Obscure Reverse-planning sequence Legend: LD/LC - line of departure is the line of contact OBJ - objective WPN - weapon OBJ CAT WPN WPN Secure Reduce Penetrate Exploit LD/LC Figure 11-1. Reverse Planning—Breaching. --- Page 248 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 11-5 characterize the deliber ate breach. Subordinate elements are tasked to perform the roles of sup- port, breach, and assault forces. River Crossing Unfordable rivers exert considerable influence across a range of military operations by impos- ing restrictions on movement and maneuver. The wider, deeper, and swif ter the current of any given river, the stronger th at river is as an obsta- cle. Infantry companies will most likely partici- pate in river crossings as part of a larger force that conducts a centrally planned and controlled offensive operation. Rive r crossings are resource intensive, usually requiring external means of crossing. The operation it self concentrates on successfully crossing th e gap, establishing a beachhead, rapidly building up combat power on the far side of the river, and then sustaining fur- ther combat operations. A hasty river crossing will use the means at ha nd and seek to ford the obstacle by seizing an intact crossing site, such as a bridge or ferry. As the name suggests, a deliber- ate river crossing requires extensive planning and detailed preparations. Role of Engineers in Mobility Operations Engineers reduce obstacles as part of company breaching operations and must be prepared to perform mounted and dismounted reduction tasks using manual, mechanical, and explosive reduc- tion means. Through reverse breach planning, the supporting engine er identifies critical mobility tasks, allocates reduc tion assets, and recom- mends a breaching task organization to the com- pany commander. Keys to allocating reduction assets include identify ing all reduction tasks within the zone or axis, matching specific reduc- tion assets to each tas k, and planning redundancy in reduction assets for each task. Since the breach force must have the capability to secure the breach site locally, engi neers must receive ade- quate maneuver combat po wer to destroy or sup- press enemy forces in the immediate vicinity of the breach site. Other mobility tasks are route clearance operations and mobility planning. Route Clearance Operations. Regardless of employment or operatio nal environment, the infantry company can exp ect to conduct routine route clearance. Companies may conduct route clearance as part of normal operations, such as IED identification or natural debris removal, or the company may receive a specific route clear- ance mission. The latter form of route clearance is a combined arms op eration normally assigned to an infantry ba ttalion or compan y that is task- organized with combat engineers and LCE assets as required. As such, it requires the detailed inte- gration and synchronization found in typical breaching operations. Mobility Planning in the Defense. Mobility operations in the defe nse enhance the ability of the infantry company to reposition forces, con- duct delays, and launch counterattacks. As dis- cussed in chapter 7, mobility planning is a key component of any defensive scheme of maneu- ver. The company commander determines mobil- ity requirements as th e defensive scheme of maneuver evolves. Critic al considerations may include the following:  Lanes and gaps in the defensive obstacle plan.  Lane closure plan and subunit responsibility.  Route reconnaissance, improvement, and main- tenance. Countermobility While mobility seeks to enhance the ability of friendly forces to ma neuver, countermobility seeks to degrad e and deny the enemy maneuver. Both apply across the op erational continuum. As mobility operations assi st a company defense, countermobility can assist in protecting the flanks of an attacking force. In the same manner, as countermobility may canaliz e civilian traffic pat- terns into controlled area s in stability operations, mobility may allow for successful emplacement of a bridge in a contested river crossing. Given the complex nature of planning, siting, syn- chronizing, and emplacing obstacles, combat --- Page 249 --- 11-6 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 engineers perform signifi cant obstacle planning and provide detailed integration and resourcing information to the supported commanders. Combat engineers assist commanders by using obstacles to develop EAs, protect frie ndly vulnerabilities, and counteract enemy reactions to friendly maneuver. Obstacle plans must support the scheme of maneu- ver, maximize subordinate flexibility, and facilitate future operations. The advent of scatterable, remotely delivered minefield systems greatly eased labor and time demands on obstacle emplacement while greatly increasing a commander’s flexibility on the battle- field. While use of mines may still apply to high- intensity conflict, most operational environments preclude such use of min efields. Further, the United States does not employ nonself-destruc- tion antipersonnel land mines. Consequently, time continues to remain the single biggest consider- ation in developing and implementing countermo- bility plans. Obstacle Groups, Belts, and Zones Figure 11-2 demonstrates the interaction among obstacle groups, belts, and zones. All seek to create specific effects on the enemy, whether to disrupt, fix, block, or turn. Beginning at the company and battalion level, one or more indivi- dual obstacles are integr ated with direct and indirect fires to create an obstacle group with a specific effect. Groups, in turn, combine their in- dividual effects to create a specific effect at the regimental level and above. Obstacle Intent Chapter 7 addresses EA and defensive scheme of maneuver development. Wh en integrating barri- ers, obstacles, and mines into the defensive scheme of maneuver, company commanders con- stantly consider the ad vantages and disadvan- tages of their employment. When determining the intent of any ob stacle or set of obstacles, com- manders consider the following:  Creating uncertainty in the enemy.  Using obstacles to free friendly combat power for other tasks.  Exploiting geographic features.  Inflicting significant personnel, equipment, and psychological damage on the enemy with mini- mal risk to friendly forces.  The enemy’s ability to bypass, breach, or clear friendly obstacles. Obstacle Zone Obstacle Belts Obstacle Groups Figure 11-2. Obstacle Groups, Belts, and Zones. --- Page 250 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 11-7  Amount of friendly time and resources avail- able to create obstacle effects.  The effects on potential friendly maneuver, such as a counterattack and pursuit.  How obstacles will be removed or made safe after use. Using a commander’s intent for obstacles provides a simple framework to issue countermobility guid- ance and facilitates common understanding and coordination between maneuver and engineer forces. This method is applicable across offen- sive, defensive, and stability operations. It applies whether the enemy is a conventional mechanized infantry battalion or an asymmetrical terrorist cell working within the population. The intent for obstacles is the foundation of the obstacle integra- tion process that include s target, obstacle effect, and relative location. The target is that portion of the enemy— who— that the commander wants to affect with fires and tactical obstacles. The commander identifies the target in terms of size, type, echelon, avenue of approach, or any combination of these. The obstacle effect portion of the intent describes how the commander wants to attack enemy maneuver with obstacles and fires. Tactical obsta- cles block, turn, fix, or disrupt the enemy. See fig- ures 11-3 and 11-4, 11-5 on page 11-8, and 11-6 on page 11-9. The obstacl e effect drives integra- tion by focusing on the relationship between obstacles and both direct and indirect fires. The relative location is where the commander wants the obstacle effect generated against the targeted enemy force. Whenever possible, the commander identifies the location relative to the terrain and maneuver or fire control measures to initiate the obstacle integration process. Obstacle Planning Process The obstacle planning proc ess is an integral part of employing countermobility effects across a range of military oper ations. It correlates Enemy direction of attack Original enemy direction of attack Turned enemy direction of attack Figure 11-3. Turn Effect. Figure 11-4. Fix Effect. --- Page 251 --- 11-8 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 directly with subunit maneuver and positioning, EA development, and en emy actions. It includes the following key components:  Direct and indirect fires analysis.  Obstacle intent integrati on (target, effect, rela- tive location).  Method of emplacement (conventional or scat- terable).  Obstacle effect priority.  Mobility requirements.  Obstacle design and resourcing.  Marking and reporting obstacle locations. Figure 11-7, on page 11-10, demonstrates proper planning/integration of obstacles into the EA of development. It shows the following information:  Obstacle gaps exist to allow egress from for- ward positions.  Turning obstacles on both flanks tie into terrain features, receive reinfo rcement by direct and indirect fires, and fo rce the enemy into the company fires.  A fix effect obstacle re inforces the company’s main effort by enhancing the effects of destruc- tive direct and indirect fires. Mine Dump Operations Methods and processes fo r obtaining countermo- bility supplies are addre ssed in chapter 13; how- ever, specific to the resource-hea vy demands of countermobility operati ons is the use of mine dumps. Mine dumps norma lly contain resources for a single obstacle group, but may contain only the resources for individu al obstacles if the dis- tances between obstacles in a group are exces- sive and may waste an inordinate amount of transportation time. The company commander, in coordination with the supporting engineer, locates mine dumps wher e they best support obstacle construction with in the AO. If a com- pany is assigned more than one obstacle group, it may have more than one mine dump. In light of the austere engineer organization within the force, it is imperative th at the infantry company provide leadership and manpower to operate the mine dump, allowing engineers to construct tacti- cal obstacles more efficiently. Cordon Operations A cordon is a temporar y, enabling operation that isolates a target area of some size to conduct fur- ther operations within the cordon. Such opera- tions could consist of ra ids, searches, visits, meetings, or some combination of all of these. Once operations within the cordon are complete, it collapses. Company commanders can extrapo- late the guidance on cordon and search to cordons in general and any othe r operations that may occur within the cordon. Enemy direction of attack Figure 11-5. Disrupt Effect. --- Page 252 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 11-9 Cordon and Search Operations Cordon and search operations are one of the most likely a company may conduct. They isolate a tar- get area and search susp ected buildings and areas to capture or destroy po ssible insurgents/contra- band. They may be conducted in any type of environment and the prin ciples remain the same whether in a jungle or in a city. Cordon and search operations are by no means limited to, but often are associated wi th, clear-in-zone actions conducted during clear-hold-build COIN opera- tions. Depending on the threat and the accuracy of intelligence leading to the operation, a cordon and search may appear similar to a movement to contact, raid, deliberate at tack, or area reconnais- sance. Regardless of appearances and similarities, the cordon and search orients on finding the threat and their caches. Cordons may involve mounted or dismounted tr oops or a combination of both. Organization Four elements perform the major tasks of a cor- don and search: command, security, support, and search and assault. In general, the headquarters element provides command and control, the secu- rity element sets up in ner and outer cordons, the support element acts as reserve and overwatch, and the search and assault element acts as the main effort for actions within the cordon. Command Element The command element provides command and control and generally collocates with either the support or search and a ssault elements where it can best provide oversight to th e entire opera- tion. The composition of the command element may be as small as the commander and an RO or may include security ve hicles, interpreters, female engagement teams, and HN officials. The command element remains mobile so it can quickly displace as neces sary. Depending on the size of the operation, th e command element may provide direct oversight of integration with other security forces, detainee handling, tactical ques- tioning, evidence handling, and damage claims. Security Element Using inner and outer co rdons, the security ele- ment isolates the target area through both con- tainment and interdiction, which limits or prevents threat or civilia n influence from outside of the cordon and preven ts targets from escaping the cordon. Such security normally entails decen- tralized employment to cover multiple avenues of approach, blocking positions, and OPs. The secu- rity element may employ local patrols to cover Enemy direction of attack Figure 11-6. Block Effect. --- Page 253 --- 11-10 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 gaps and requires enou gh combat power and logistical resources to accomplish its mission. Support Element The support element serves as a reserve, prepared to augment or assume th e missions of any of the other elements. The support element requires iden- tification and prioritizatio n of potential tasks for purposes of planning and preparation. Such tasks could include reinforcing the cordons; clearing and searching buildings ; conducting CASEVAC; and securing and safeguarding civilians, detain- ees, and captured material or equipment. Search and Assault Element The search and assault element serves as the main effort for the cordon an d search. It accomplishes the purpose of the operation by securing, clearing, and conducting site exploitation of the target. The element normally organizes itself internally into assault, search, secur ity, and support teams to facilitate its SBF, secu rity, breaching, searching, and other similar tasks. The search and assault ele- ment must possess explosive and nonexplosive breach capabilities and, re gardless of whether there is resistance, enou gh combat power to clear target structures using standard entry and building clearing battle dr ills. The search and assault ele- ment may create the following specific subteams:  Detainee team (support team), consisting of at least two personnel.  Field interview team (support team), a CI/ HUMINT team with interpreter.  Documentation team (search team), a team large enough to take pict ures of structures and rooms, evidence and c ontraband, and detain- ees; determine resident status and occupancy; and handle and document evidence.  Mine detection/demolition team (search team), the search team lead that looks for mines, IEDs, and other potential threats to the security and assault element.  Breach/demolition team (assault team), a team capable of conducting explosive and nonexplo- sive breaches as well as providing the assault element with a mine detection capability.  Tunnel reconnaissance team (assault team), a team capable of investigating such confined spaces as tunnels and subbasements. TRP 01 TRP 02TRP 03 AB0007 TRP 04 TRP 06 TRP 05 EA RED OP AB0003 AB0005 AB0004 Figure 11-7. Successful Obstacle Planning and Integration. --- Page 254 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 11-11 Execution The cordon and search cons ists of five phases: planning and reconnaissa nce, movement to the objective area, cordon, act ions on the objective, and withdrawal. Planning and Reconnaissance During the planning and reconnaissance phase, the mission is received or initiated and problem framing begins to develop the task and purpose of the cordon and search. In itial friendly forces and support, possible enemy threats, and the nature of the target and objective areas are identified. A tentative scheme of ma neuver is established, WARNORDs are issued, and generic rehearsals begin. Planning and reconnaissance generally occur simultaneously as they depend and build upon each other. Planni ng serves to focus reconnaissance collecti on efforts by identifying what to look for and wher e to look for it, while reconnaissance helps refine the plan by providing current and detailed information. The planning and reconnaissance phase ends with the issuance of a complete order, conduct of final rehearsals, and completion of PCCs and PCIs. Movement to the Objective Area The movement to the obje ctive area phase begins with departure from the AA. The infantry com- pany may use multiple AAs or routes depending upon the scheme of maneuver. There are two methods of moving to th e objective area: single point and multidirectional ingress. The single point of ingress method of approach to the target area facili tates command and control, timing, and deconfliction of fires (see fig. 11-8). However, it produces a larger movement signa- ture, is a slower method of establishing a cordon, and makes the entire force vulnerable to enemy threat actions. Pond Crops Crops C4 C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 S2S1 S1 S2 C4 N Legend: C - cordon force S - search force TCP unit Figure 11-8. Single Point of Ingress Method of Approach. --- Page 255 --- 11-12 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 The preferred method of approaching the target area is from multiple directions, which provides a lower movement signatu re while allowing for almost immediate emplacement of the cordon (see fig. 11-9). However, multidirectional ingress approaches make command and control more dif- ficult, increase the risk of fratricide in the event of contact, and increase the risk to temporarily isolated units. All operations should include MILDEC—any technique that makes the cordon and search force appear to have a diffe rent mission or objective will aid in success. Co mmanders are limited only by their imagination an d practicality. Possible techniques include infiltr ating elements into the area under the guise of local security patrols, increasing operating tempo in the area a few days prior to the actual operation, and masking move- ment by following a regularly scheduled convoy. Cordon The movement to the objective area phase should transition smoothly into the cordon phase. Depending on the method of approach, the transi- tion is either sequential (single point) or nearly simultaneous (multidire ctional). While the cor- don itself is an enabling operation, it is important that leadership effectiv ely integrate the cordon technique within the larg er operation to maintain momentum and focus. It is also important that FP measures be considered and implemented as cor- don forces are generally static for the duration of Pond Crops CropsC1 C2 C3 S2S1 N C4 Legend: C - cordon force S - search force TCP unit Figure 11-9. Multidirectional Ingress Method of Approach. --- Page 256 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 11-13 the operation, which increases their chances of being targeted by such threats as snipers or sui- cide bombers. There are two portions to the cor- don. The outer cordon th at generally focuses on external influences and threats and the inner cor- don that generally focuses on preventing escape from the target area. Proper coordination be- tween the two should be a central focus of the security element. Outer Cordon. The outer cordon isolates the objective area through cont ainment and interdic- tion to prevent threat or civilian influence in the objective area (see fig. 11-10). It is normally in place prior to the inner cordon. The outer cordon is likely to focus on terrain in terms of controlling avenues of approach and egress. It establishes con- trol using hasty traffic control points, blocking positions, OPs, sniper employment, FP measures, and local patrols and sc reens. The outer cordon deconflicts BSG with other elements and makes use of any aviation assets that are available. The keys to success for the outer cordon are detailed reconnaissance and terra in study, planning, re- hearsals, and vigilance. Inner Cordon. The mission of the inner cordon is to prevent escape from the target area and to provide security and overwatch to the search and assault element (see fi g. 11-11 on page 11-14). If opposed by a hostile forc e, the inner cordon pro- vides supporting fires to the search and assault elements as they maneuver . Portions of the secu- rity element that establ ish the inner cordon do so by setting up mutually supporting positions that isolate the target area through overlapping sectors Pond Crops Crops School Mosque N Legend: TCP Security screen Unit OP Area isolated by inner cordon Patrol P P P 300 m outer cordon Figure 11-10. Outer Cordon. --- Page 257 --- 11-14 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 of fire and observation. Given the often com- pressed nature of the target area, BSG awareness and deconfliction is critical. Force protection con- sideration and measures fo r the inner cordon are similar to those for the outer cordon. The success of the inner cordon al so depends on detailed reconnaissance and terrain study, planning, re- hearsals, and vigilance. Actions on the Objective The search and assault element initiates actions on the objective once th e outer and inner cordons are in place. If the target area is large or the objective area contains mu ltiple target areas, the support element may prov ide additional over- watch and security to the search and assault ele- ment and its subteams. The search and assault element accomplishes its mission by gaining a foothold on or in the target to clear all threat and noncombatant personnel and by conducting a systematic search of the target. These areas may be searched selectivel y (only specific rooms/ buildings/blocks) or syst ematically (everything within a given area). The search and assault and support elements resolve the disposition of cap- tured and detained material and personnel. For example, a large cache of explosives may be destroyed on site after documentation or it might be removed for further exploitation. Members of the search and assault elements must be extremely judi- cious in their use of for ce due to the proximity of noncombatants and friendly forces (see fig. 11-12). Withdrawal When actions on the objective are complete, the cordon and search forc e withdraws in reverse order: the search and assault element, support ele- ment, and command elem ent pull off the objec- tive followed by the co llapse of the inner and outer cordons. The method of retrograde mirrors those of approach—either single point of egress or multidirectional—but care needs to be taken to avoid using the same rout es out that were used going in. The key to the retrograde is the assess- ment criteria for the operation established by the commander. The operation could be over in a Legend: Unit OP Area isolated by inner cordon Inner cordon isolates the target area Inner cordon isolates the target area Target houseTarget house Figure 11-11. Inner Cordon. --- Page 258 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 11-15 matter of hours or, if sizable caches are discov- ered, security may need to remain on the site for some days. Commanders plan for all eventualities prior to committing the force. Relief in Place Operations A RIP is an operation directed by HHQ that tasks one unit to partially or completely relieve or replace another unit in an assigned area. The relief can take place at once or over some period, ideally during periods of reduced visibility or at night, and in such a phased manner as to maintain tacti- cal security throughout. Depending on the nature of the relief, commander s may also execute a transfer of authority. Tr ansfers of authority, or RIP-TOAs, tend to occu r during stability opera- tions or crisis response and limited contingency operations, during which units accumulate signifi- cant resources, logistic tails, and responsibilities. Throughout the operation, reconnaissance, liai- son, coordination, and cooperation are essential as is a clear definition of command relationships and passage of control. Critical Tasks Control and authority are the primary issues dur- ing a RIP. Defensive posi tions and the ability of subordinate units to defend them are relatively simple matters; howev er, understanding who is exercising command and control of the whole at any given time is the crucial matter. Conse- quently, during a RIP, it is critical that units—  Develop a liaison plan.  Maintain the time schedule.  Monitor progress of subordinate units. Legend: 1 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 Road Road Road Road Search/Assault element Target house Entry point Security team Support team Assault team Search team 1 - security element (outer cordon force) 2 - inner cordon force 3 - search/assault element 2-3 Man OP gun truck search/assault element teams inner cordon sector of observation Figure 11-12. Actions on the Objective. --- Page 259 --- 11-16 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1  Notify HHQ upon relief.  Establish AAs for the outgoing unit in order to maintain control of movement.  Report new position of outgoing unit to HHQ.  Maintain accountabil ity of personnel and equipment. Planning Checklist When planning a RIP, pl anners should consider the liaison plan, command relationships, CPs, fire support, and control measures. Liaison Plan Once HHQ orders a RIP, the incoming unit sends liaison parties capable of addressing all the war- fighting functions to the outgoing unit. These liaisons familiarize themse lves with the tactical situation, conduct necessary reconnaissance, act as guides for the rest of th e incoming unit, and brief the incoming unit on the tactical situation. Command Relationships When the relieving unit a rrives at the start point, it comes under the tactical control of the unit being relieved until C2 transfer. Before beginning the RIP, the commanders of both units determine when the relieving unit takes control and main- tains this arrangement, even if contact occurs dur- ing the relief. Battle handover checklists are developed and distribute d. The unit conducting the relief generally defe rs to the recommenda- tions of the unit being relieved in these and simi- lar matters because th e outgoing unit possesses the best understanding of the area and the enemy. Command Posts One of the first events to occur during a RIP, before the movement of any subordinate units, is the collocation of the unit CPs to better facilitate command, control, and coordination. Fire Support The authority for control of fire support is with the outgoing unit until control of the sector is passed to the incoming unit. Then, the incoming unit assumes responsibility for control of fire support. Schedule and Control Measures Depending on the nature of the HHQ order, plan- ning either begins with a time to commence the relief or occurs in reverse from the time the relief must be complete. Plans, such as routes, march control measures, priori ty of movement, AAs, and contact points, ar e developed to ensure smooth movement both in and out of the bat- tlespace. Depending on the enemy situation, units should consider transferri ng mortar base plates, machine gun tripods, field phones, antennas, or even entire weapon system s. Mortar base plates already sunk, machine gu n tripods already set according to range card s, already functioning field phones, and similar measures can be valu- able in the face of an aggressive enemy. Execution Checklist When executing a RIP, planners should consider the outgoing and incoming units. As the unit most familiar with the area and the enemy, the outgo- ing unit should drive the relief process. Com- manders and their senior staff members should be the last to leave so they can ensure accountability of their unit and provide guidance or advice until the last moment. The outgoing commander—  Contacts the incoming unit commander.  Reconnoiters and validates the terrain and routes for use during the relief.  Briefs the incoming unit on the existing defen- sive plan, including fi re support, barriers, counterattack plans, an d friendly and enemy activities.  Plans the relief to ta ke place at periods of reduced visibility, to in clude the possible use of obscuration.  Establishes the time or circumstances when command passes to the incoming commander.  Maintains radio listening silence of the reliev- ing unit while the relie ved unit continues nor- mal traffic.  Employs indirect fires to cover the sound of vehicles if necessary. --- Page 260 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 11-17  Limits the size and composition of reconnais- sance parties.  Plans and employs fire support, if necessary, during the relief.  Completes relief rapidly to reduce enemy detection and reaction time.  Meets incoming element at designated point.  Guides incoming element to new position in the determined sequence of relief: small arms elements, CSWs, and then fire support.  Affects transfer of equipment as required.  Remains in charge until RIP is complete and incoming element is in place and is prepared to assume the mission.  Plans transfer of excess ammunition, wire lines, POL, and other materials to the incoming unit.  Reports completion of relief.  Reports outgoing unit is clear of old area of operations. The incoming unit generally defers to the tactical arrangements of its pred ecessor unless extraordi- nary circumstances dictate otherwise. The incom- ing unit can make changes as it sees fit upon the completion of the RIP, but must learn as much as it can from the outgoing unit before its departure. The incoming unit’s commander has the follow- ing responsibilities:  Begins operation under radio listening silence.  Receives guides from the outgoing unit to lead the incoming unit to its new positions.  Positions unit CP next to outgoing unit’s CP and trains with him.  Ensures the outgoing unit commander remains in place until relieved of responsibility by incoming commander.  Once in position, breaks radio listening silence and transmits appropriat e traffic to maintain the pattern of the out going unit’s communica- tions.  Reports change of cal l signs and completion of RIP.  Ensures movement is rapid, orderly, and com- pleted on schedule without detection by the enemy. Passage of Lines Operations When a moving unit cannot bypass the positions of another friendly unit, it moves through it by conducting a passage of lines. The movement may be forward to continue the assault or rear- ward, a retrograde and battle handover. A passage of lines is not merely an administrative move- ment between two units. It is an operation that involves units moving and transferring responsi- bility for the battle. Th e HHQ of the involved units plans, coordinates, and tasks the passage of lines. The commanders of the two units conduct detailed planning, liaison, and coordination. The essential element of a passage of lines is main- taining the momentum of the moving element. Requiring the moving unit to stop, conduct coor- dination, and then move defeats the fundamental point of this enabling operation. Types Although not a separate t ype, passage of lines planning methodology is applicable to the move- ment of units within each other’s battlespace in stability operations. When a company or battal- ion is passing through th e battlespace of another similarly sized unit, th e units should coordinate routes, guides, engagement criteria, and control of fires. Simple answers, such as the stationary unit escorting the moving unit, may resolve many issues. However, if operating tempo pre- cludes such involvement, the units should ap- proach the problem using the passage of lines operation as a guideline. Forward Passage of Lines In a forward passage of lines, the passing unit occupies its AA first and conducts passage of lines coordination as part of its preparation for the attack. Such coordi nation normally entails stationing liaison personnel with the stationary unit CP, establis hing a battle ha ndover checklist, receiving current intelligence on the enemy, and conducting reconnaissanc e. At the designated --- Page 261 --- 11-18 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 time, the moving unit de parts the AA and moves tactically through desi gnated passage lanes. Movement occurs expedi ently with the moving unit seeking to reduce it s vulnerability in the passage lanes to a minimum. The moving unit holds its fire until forw ard of the ba ttle handover line (BHL). Once forward of passage lane restric- tions, the moving unit deploys as necessary and conducts its designated mission (see fig. 11-13). Rearward Passage of Lines During a rearward passage of lines, the moving unit may or may not be under enemy pressure. Further, the moving unit either is conducting a planned movement as pa rt of the defensive scheme of maneuver or is conducting an unplanned or earlier than expected movement. The conditions of the movement affect the amount of planning time available and the risk of fratricide, which is alwa ys significantly higher in a rearward passage of lines. The passing unit con- tacts the stationary unit while it is still beyond direct fire range and cond ucts coordination, liai- son, and reconnaissance. It creates the battle handover checklist. Coordi nation emphasizes far and near recognition signa ls as well as the loca- tion of the BHL, which is normally established at the limit of the stat ionary unit’s direct fire capa- bilities. The units use additional control mea- sures, such as RFAs or restrictive fire lines, as RP SP SP SP SP RP RP RP PP 5 PP 3 12 Attack position 2 Objective Attack position 1 PL JOE (BHL) LDLD PL JOE (BHL) 1 X 2 2-10 2-91 Stationary unit engages enemy positions; lifts or shifts direct fires when passing unit crosses the BHL. Indirect fires and CAS directed by stationary unit commander until passing unit crosses the BHL, then directed by passing unit commander. Contact points and lane guides provided by stationary unit. Legend: LD - line of departure PL - phase line PP - passage point RP - release point SP - start point Figure 11-13. Forward Passage of Lines. --- Page 262 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 11-19 necessary to further minimize the risk of fratri- cide. Following coordi nation, the passing unit continues tactic al movement to ward the passage lanes. Weapons remain or iented in the direction of the enemy and the pa ssing unit is responsible for its own security until it passes the BHL. The passing unit minimizes vu lnerability in the pas- sage lanes by moving quickly through them toward some designated location well to the rear of the stationary unit (see fig. 11-14). Planning Considerations In planning the passage of lines, infantry compa- nies remain mindful of the purpose of the passage of lines. They focus thei r planning efforts on two crucial keys to success: passing responsibility for the battle from one unit to another and maintain- ing the momentum of the moving unit. Battle Handover Regardless of the directi on of the movement, the responsibility for fighting the battle transfers from one unit to another. In the case of a forward pas- sage of lines, the stationary unit passes control to the advancing unit. In the case of a rearward pas- sage of lines, the retrograding unit passes control to the stationary unit. Both units rely upon clearly defined battle handover criteria and procedures from HHQ, to include the roles of both the passing unit and the stationary un it and the use of direct and indirect fires. If necessary, HHQ specifies a RP RP RP 1 4 3 SP SP SP PP 1 PP 4 PP 3 PL FRANK (BHL) PL FRANK (BHL) PL JIM (FEBA) PL JIM (FEBA) Route Groucho Lane Larry Lane Moe Lane Curly Route Zeppo Route Harpo Legend: FEBA - forward edge of the battle area PL - phase line PP - passage point RP - release point SP - start point Figure 11-14. Rearward Passage of Lines. --- Page 263 --- 11-20 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 BHL, normally the line of departure for a forward passage of lines and the limit of the stationary unit’s direct fire weapon s for a rearward passage of lines. A forward pass age of lines is complete when the passing unit deploys and crosses the BHL. A rearward passage of lines is generally complete when the passing unit is clear and the stationary unit is ready to engage the enemy. Passage Lanes The passage should facilitate transition to follow- on missions using multi ple lanes or lanes wide enough to support doctri nal formations for the passing units. The stationary unit marks passage lanes and provides guides, to include briefing and coordinating obstacles. Units should coordinate passage times, number of elements, and number of troops and vehicles per element. These are especially critical for rearward passage of lines where accountability of fr iendly forces is essen- tial to avoid fratricide or enemy infiltration. Command and Control To enhance command and control during the pas- sage of lines, units shou ld collocate CPs for the duration of the operation. Intelligence Planners and liaison offi cers should ensure that intelligence on the current and future enemy situ- ation is part of the battle handover checklist. In a forward passage of lines , the statio nary unit enhances the advancing unit’s chances of success by providing continuous updates on the enemy situation to thei r front. The moving unit should provide similar updates on the enemy situation as it retrogrades and passes control of the battle to the stationary unit. In all cases, units should closely monitor HHQ co mmand frequencies to track the progress of the battle. Use of Deception Units use deception to e nhance the success of the passage of lines. Stationary units can create mul- tiple lanes, to include dummy lanes, and conduct increased internal troop and vehicle traffic to mask the movement of an advancing unit. A re- trograding unit seeks to mask the location of the stationary unit’s positio ns through delay and dis- rupt techniques. All ma y make use of smoke, obscuration, and masking terrain to create uncer- tainty for enemy forces. Air Defense In those environments th at possess an air threat, whether in the form of attack or mere observa- tion, the passage of lines represents a vulnerable and valuable chokepoint. Normally, the station- ary unit is responsible fo r providing air defense, allowing the passing unit’ s air defense assets to move with it. Logistics Since both units already possess necessary logisti- cal support, the logistical coordination required in a passage of lines applies to vehicle recovery and CASEVAC in the passage lane. An advancing unit will normally handle these issues because the pas- sage lanes quickly become a rear area for it. Con- versely, when conducting a retrograde, the stationary unit will likely assist or execute evacua- tion actions to enable it to quickly clear and close the lanes in preparation for conducting the defense. Linkup Operations Linkup is an operation that entails the meeting of friendly ground or helic opterborne forces. The infantry company cond ucts linkup activities semi-independently or as part of a larger force. When conducting a linkup, one of the units must be stationary. If both are moving, one must occupy temporary pos itions to conduct the linkup. The HHQ directing the linkup will dic- tate command relationships. Within a larger unit, the company may lead th e linkup force. The dif- ferences between linkups at the platoon level and below and at the comp any level and above involve levels of comple xity. Regardless of the --- Page 264 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 11-21 size of the units conducting a linkup, whether divisions or squads, all require communication, coordination, and planning. They begin with con- tact at the smallest un it levels—two patrols mak- ing contact at a linkup point. Linkup operations usually occur when the following occurs:  Advancing forces reach an objective area pre- viously secured by air assault or infiltrating forces.  Units conduct coordination for a RIP.  Cross-attached units move to join their new organization.  A unit moves forward to conduct a follow and support or follow and assume mission.  A unit moves to assist an encircled force.  Units converge on the same objective during an attack.  Units conduct a passage of lines. Execution As an operation, the linkup generally consists of an approach, the prelimin ary linkup of the units, and the transition to subsequent operations. The linkup procedure begins as the stationary unit halts, unless already in position. At a designated time, the stationary unit sends an element to occupy the linkup point. The moving unit halts at a predetermined spot, su fficiently far enough away to allow it to defe nd itself without risking fratricide with the stati onary unit. Once halted, the moving unit sends an element to affect a linkup at the linkup point. The linkup elements conduct standard small un it near and far recogni- tion procedures. Once both elements make physi- cal contact, the units rapidly execute those planned actions, such as confirming positions, deconflicting battlespa ce, exchanging liaison officers and guides, con ducting join t reconnais- sance, and fulfilling other requirements to transi- tion to subsequent operations. Linkup Planning Linkups occur for many reasons and under many different conditions. No t every planning consi- deration applies to ever y possible linkup. The indirect fire control planning required by two units approaching each other from different directions is entirely different from any that might need consi- deration during a RIP. Planners should review the conditions in the following subparagraphs when conducting planning. Follow-On Actions Since linkups are seldom an end, the HHQ order- ing the linkup should prov ide both units the task, purpose, coordination, a nd subsequent actions of the operation. While devoting significant effort to the mechanics of approa ching and linking up, planners cannot forget to adequately plan for fol- low-on actions. For example, if two battalions are conducting a linkup as part of a double envelop- ment, then both battalions will have follow-on missions that require them to coordinate actions to prevent enemy efforts at breaking out or reliev- ing the encirclement. To maintain momentum, the battalions cannot wait until the linkup occurs to plan their follow-on missions. Site Selection Site selection refers to picking the linkup point (a primary and alternate site) where elements of the linkup units will conduct initial contact. Linkup sites should be easy to fi nd at night, have cover and concealment, and be off natural lines of drift. They must be defensible and offer both access and escape routes. Recognition Signals Units use near and far re cognition signals to pre- vent fratricide. Dependin g on the tactical situa- tion, units conducting the linkup should avoid radio communications as a means of recognition due to the threat of co mpromise. Instead, visual and voice recognition signals should be planned. Direct and Indirect Fires Direct and indirect fires must be planned in detail before a linkup. Lack of planning could lead to fratricide or he sitation in the face of enemy action resulting in casual ties. The stationary unit --- Page 265 --- 11-22 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 controls fires near the linkup point. While the moving unit does not give up control of fires in its battlespace, it does near the linkup point and sta- tionary unit. Both units use RFAs, restrictive fire lines, and phase lines to shift and control fires as the moving unit approaches the stationary unit. Contingency Plans Unit tactical SOPs, or the linkup annex of OPORDs, should address what to do if enemy contact occurs before, dur ing, or after the linkup. They should also determine actions if units fail to linkup and alternate linkup and rally points. Reconnaissance Operations Successful reconnaissance is a focused collection effort that is aimed at gathering timely, accurate information about the enemy and the terrain in the AO. As stated in MCDP 1-0: Reconnaissance is a missi on—aerial, ground or amphibious—undertaken to obtain, by visual or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of the enemy or to se- cure data on the met eorological, hydrographic, electromagnetic, or geog raphic characteristics of a particular area. More simply, reconnaissance obtains information about the characteristics of a particular area and any known or potential enemy within it. In many ways, reconna issance is a continuous effort. It is the responsi bility of every infantry company commander to en sure such reconnais- sance occurs to gain the information needed to ensure the success of the company. This effort, combined with IPB an d other collaborative efforts, yield greater si tuational understanding of the operation or area. The infantry company may conduct reconnaissance as ordered by HHQ. As discussed in chapter 4, the mere act of execut- ing operations, such as patrols and convoys, serves a secondary purpose of reconnaissance. Accordingly, the company commander should inculcate the company with a reconnaissance mindset. At a larger level, a company movement to contact is a reconnaissance operation that seeks to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. The company may participate in a battalion reconnais- sance in force to gain information and exploit enemy weaknesses. These operations demon- strate that passive re connaissance through aerial or ground surveillance or even aggressive patrol- ling may not provide th e information necessary for a commander to defeat the enemy. It is some- times necessary to move against the enemy with a robust, highly flexible force that makes the enemy react in a manner that reveals key com- mand and control and weapon systems. Even in stability operations, su ch actions as shows of force or area sweeps are reconnaissance activi- ties that seek the threat and attempt to force an enemy reaction. Regardless of methodology, all reconnaissance falls into one of four type s: route, area, zone, and force-oriented missions . Within these types, reconnaissance orients e ither on the enemy or on the terrain as its primary purpose. A route reconnaissance focuses on gathering detailed information about a specific route as well as on all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route. Route reconnaissance may be oriented on a specific area of movement, such as a road or trail, or on a more general area, such as an axis of advance. Area reconnaissance focuses on gathering detailed information co ncerning the terrain or enemy activity within a specific prescribed area vice a zone. The area can be any location that is critical to the unit’s operations, such as a town (large area), a ridgeline (medium area), or a bridge (single point). A zone reconnaissance focuses on gathering detailed information conc erning all routes, ter- rain, enemy forces, and obstacles within a defined zone. Zone rec onnaissance is used most often --- Page 266 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 11-23 when the enemy situation is vague or when the company requires information concerning cross- country trafficability. Force-oriented reconnaissance focuses on not only gathering detailed information on a specific enemy asset, bu t also on conducting surveillance on that asset. Reconnaiss ance assets focus on the target; they move when required to maintain observation on the target and report the elements of information tasked. Control Points Control points are define d as positi ons along a route of march at which Marines are stationed to give information and inst ructions for the regula- tion of supply or traffic. More specific to the infantry company, a traffic control point (TCP) is a designated spot on the ground, road, or trail net- work used to control and influence the flow of pedestrian, vehicular, or boat traffic to support tactical tasks and their effects. Traffic control points can be hasty or deliberate in nature and can be friendly, terrain, enem y, or environmentally oriented. The purpose of TCPs can be further delineated with prefixes , such as entry, vehicle, or pedestrian. The infantry company enforces cir- culation control measures, laws, orders, and regu- lations on vehicle and pede strian traffic by using hasty and deliberate TCPs . Across a broad range of military operations, in fantry companies should expect to employ TCPs regularly. The TCP is critical for pl anning because it deter- mines combat power and resources assigned to the task. A series of hasty, temporary TCPs designed to disrupt the en emy require little mate- rial as opposed to a terrain-oriented TCP that seeks to strictly regulat e movement into a given area. Friendly-oriented TCPs serve such pur- poses as controlling friendly movement and con- ducting FP through inspections of vehicles. Terrain and environmentally-oriented TCPs serve such purposes as restricting movement into certain areas, demonstrating the presence of peace forces, or enforc ing the terms of peace agreements. Enemy oriented TCPs serve such purposes as disruption an d interdiction of move- ment, prevention of smugg ling, and interference with communication. Control point layout, co nstruction, and staffing should reflect METT-T factors, including the pur- pose and amount of time available for emplace- ment. The following considerations for control points require the greatest amount of planning, logistics, and combat power (see fig. 11-15 on page 11-24):  Positioning. Infantry companies position TCPs where they are visible and where traffic can- not turn back, get off the road, or bypass the control point without observation.  Establish control . In designing the TCP, the infantry company should endeavor to create an environment that deters resistance. Such deter- rence is best achieved through overmatching combat power, such as with visible CSWs or armored vehicles, which are not merely dis- played, but are woven into the overall scheme of the control point.  Obstacles. Obstacles are placed in the road to slow and canalize traffi c into search areas and bypass lanes as appropriate.  Communications. The TCP should rely on wire as its primary means of communications.  Search areas . Search areas should be below ground or heavily fortifie d to keep the effects of blasts or small arms internal to the search area. The design of se arch areas allows for general searching areas ; facilities appropriate for more detailed searches that require privacy; and, as appropriate, search areas segregated by gender. They should also afford some means of FP for the personnel conducting searches.  Enablers. Control points should receive special skill sets appropriate to their missions, such as female search teams, interpreters, HN liaisons, or military working dog teams. --- Page 267 --- 11-24 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Sign Lane barriers Lane barriers Speed bump Speed bump Gate Gate Foxhole Telephone Telephone Telephone Telephone line EPW holding areaEquipment holding area Light set Light set Fighting position (foxhole) Friendly convoy bypass Concertina wire Head M966 M966 M966 M966 Tent (sleep area) US checkpoint 100 meters Figure 11-15. Traffic Control Point. --- Page 268 --- CHAPTER 12 FORCE PROTECTION PLANNING The purpose of Marine Corps leadership is mis- sion accomplish ment and troop welfare. While mission accomplishment takes priority, troop welfare has always been included because, with- out effective, capable troops at the point of deci- sion, there can be no mi ssion accomplishment. The inclusion of FP wi thin the Marine Corps warfighting functions is formal recognition of the increased complexity of the concept of troop wel- fare. Force protection is not a directive or pre- scription for paraly sis or nonaction—the warfighting and maneuver warfare tenets of Marine Corps doctrine demand otherwise. Force protection is taking r easonable measures to ensure that the infantry company retains enough capability to accomplish the mission assigned. This chapter discusses ORM and external and internal FP measures fro m the infantry company commander’s perspective. Force protection is defi ned as preventive mea- sures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and criti- cal information. (JP 1- 02) Further, MCRP 5-12C amplifies the joint defi nition with “actions or efforts used to safeguard own centers of gravity while protecting, concealin g, reducing, or elimi- nating friendly critical vulnerabilities.” Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. The purpose of FP is to ensure that com- manders possess the troops, equipment, and facil- ities necessary to accomplish the mission. While the semantics, processes, and procedures may be new, the concept of FP is as old as warfare. From march rates to load wei ghts and from restricting operations to traditiona l “campaign seasons” to basing invasion routes on the availability of food and fodder, commanders fro m antiquity to pres- ent always considered the measures necessary to ensure that they arrive d on the battlefield with enough healthy people who possess the right weapons and are equipped with functioning gear to defeat the enemy. Wh en determining and exe- cuting FP measures, infantry company command- ers face a task that is no different from the one their predecessors faced. Force protection applies inwardly and outwardly: while internal protection measures protect the force against its own acti ons, external protection measures protect it from the enemy. Examples of these types of measures include antiterrorism bar- riers, OPSEC, engineer ing survivability mea- sures, and body and vehicle armor. Examples of internal FP include weapons safety, proper BSG, proper clothing for the environment, rest plans, and unit hygiene. Operational Risk Management Risk management pro cesses and methods pro- vide tools to help commanders balance the demands of mission accomplishment against the risk they can accept in terms of combat power. The Marine Corps uses ORM, a process that applies to any mission or environment, for this purpose. Operational risk management is a five- step process that helps identify and control haz- ards to protect the for ce. Operational risk man- agement serves to help identify and control risk, not necessarily eliminat e risk. While eliminat- ing risk is always pref erred when possible, it cannot be a goal in itself since the only way to truly eliminate risk is to take no action at all. Company commanders use ORM as a tool to assist them in balancing risk, not as a lock-step process that dictates COAs. Similarly, the Marine Corps expects its company commanders to possess the maturity and judgment to under- stand the importance of ri sk management in mis- sion accomplishment. --- Page 269 --- 12-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 The basic principles of ORM underline its impor- tance as a tool and thought process, rather than an outcome-generating methodology:  Accept risk when benefits outweigh the cost.  Accept no unnecessary risks.  Anticipate and manage risk by planning.  Make risk decisions at the right level. The critical input necessa ry for the ORM process is identification of hazar ds. The company identi- fies hazards through gu idance from the company commander, during the planning process, and during execution. The METT-T with civilian con- siderations methodology he lps to identify haz- ards not only across the operational areas of a broad range of military operations, but also in training and garrison environments:  Mission: specified, implied, essential, and sub- tasks determine what the company must do and how it may do it.  Enemy: how and what the enemy can do to affect the force directly impacts FP.  Terrain and weather: th e terrain and environ- ment in which the comp any must operate will dictate hazards that must be mitigated in order to operate effectively.  Troops and support avai lable: the condition, training, experience, and readiness of troops and equipment affect the risk of certain COAs.  Time available: the amount of time available to plan, rehearse, and ex ecute a mission impacts the amount of risk a company commander might accept.  Civilian considerations (as appropriate): the effects of the company’s actions and combat power on noncombatants is often a critical hazard for which company commanders seek mitigation. The five steps of ORM apply to each identified hazard individually:  Identify the hazard to the force.  Assess the impact of the hazard.  Develop controls and make a risk decision.  Implement controls.  Supervise and evaluate. External Force Protection External FP refers to ou tside challenges to the balancing of mission and troop welfare. Company commanders view these ex ternal threats through the lens of ORM thought, asking the following questions: What must th e company do? What are the risks entailed in executing the mission? What is the company doing to mitigate or eliminate those risks? During the conduct of the planning process, COA development and wargam ing provide critical inputs into ORM in terms of enemy hazards to the force. Many hazard controls that apply to the enemy are tactical in nature. For example, the use of a SBF position is a ha zard control that miti- gates enemy risk to the assault element. Simi- larly, the creation of both branch and sequel plans are hazard control measures that mitigate the risk of the enemy taking diffe rent actions than those most likely. While comp any commanders might not choose to use a formal ORM tool for mitigat- ing the enemy threat, th ey are still required and expected to seek ways to mitigate enemy hazards. Operations Security Operations security is the method company com- manders use when determining whether the enemy can observe or acc ess friendly actions and information and whether the enemy can use any of the friendly information they gather. This method helps commanders implement controls to block the enemy’s attempts to gain friendly infor- mation or mitigate dama ge from any friendly information they are able to gather. Operations security is nothing less than constantly seeking to thwart and subvert the enemy’s intelligence col- lection efforts. This e ndeavor takes both active --- Page 270 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 12-3 form, such as frequently changing frequencies and call signs, and passi ve form, such as safe- guarding the personal in formation of the com- pany’s personnel. As with all risk mitigation, company commanders inte grate OPSEC consid- erations into the company’s planning processes. The OPSEC process involves five steps:  Identification of critical information.  Analysis of threats.  Analysis of vulnerabilities.  Assessment of risk.  Application of appropriate countermeasures. When conducting oper ations, company com- manders continually eval uate threats to OPSEC that range from company actions visible to the enemy to the control of visitors, HNSF, and coalition partners within the company area. Man- aging risk is always a su bjective decision of the commander who must weigh six factors in pursuit of mission accomplishment, which are discussed in the following subparagraphs. Critical Information Company leadership identifies and safeguards critical information (such as the date and time of an attack). Such inform ation, if possessed by the enemy, would present an im mediate threat to the success of the mission. Indicator Management The mere presence of th e infantry company and its daily actions serve as indicators to the enemy intelligence collection effort. Balancing OPSEC against paralysis, comp any commanders seek to manage detectable frie ndly actions. An example might be hiding the delive ry of additional sup- plies for an attack with in habitual movements or during periods of darkness. Similarly, in conduct- ing a reconnaissance for a potential COP, the patrol and accompanying en gineers might visit a variety of sites to conf use the enemy regarding which point the company will place the position. Threat Analysis What the enemy can obse rve or coll ect directly impacts what OPSEC measures the company takes. Company command ers institute OPSEC measures as a matter of SOP and, when in doubt, they err on the side of giving the enemy too much credit. Threat analysis should also include consid- ering the enemy’s ability to analyze and act on information he gathers. Analysis of Vulnerability Like all other se curity measures, supervision is constant as is assessme nt of how well the com- pany is performing OPSEC: What information are company members sending home, e-mailing, or posting on the Internet? Analysis of vulnerabil- ity also applies in a mission-specific way: What, if any, unique OPSEC concerns apply to an upcoming mission and are control measures in place to safeguard the actions and information? Risk Assessment The OPSEC process is a way to balance mission accomplishment with FP risk. Company com- manders must balance all considerations to deter- mine what OPSEC contro l measures to institute in keeping with mission accomplishment. Appropriate Countermeasure Application Once decided upon, whether habitual actions taken by the company (such as routine shredding of documents containing personal information) or mission-specific measures (such as creating a BP at night), company commanders institute OPSEC control measures and supervise their application. Antiterrorism Antiterrorism is an official security program used by the Marine Corps across a broad range of oper- ations both at home and abroad. While most com- monly associated with th e security of facilities (such as bases, air stations, and FOBs) with regard to terrorist threats, the tenets of antiterrorism apply --- Page 271 --- 12-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 beyond terrorism and mere fixed site security. These tenets represent a security mindset that seeks to make “hard targets” of all activities, from social functions and trai ning exercises to COPs and headquarters buildings. Considerations In conducting antiterrori sm assessments, com- pany commanders consider the nature and degree of possible threats by ge ographic location, criti- cality and vulnerability of the target, and level of hostile intent. In most cases, company command- ers can expect to receive significant antiterrorism assessment support from HHQ. Such support does not alleviate comp any commanders from considering their own loca l vulnerability or from conducting antiterrorism assessments when exe- cuting semi-independent operations. Collect and Analyze. Using a combination of information sources, including HHQ, turnover with previous units, law enforcement, local threat assessments, and inspections, company command- ers make a risk assessme nt of the likelihood and type of possible threat actions against their compa- nies. Just like planning for any operation, company commanders then consider the best friendly responses to threat acti ons. Using antiterrorism methodologies, company commanders assess the vulnerability of their company personnel and posi- tions in terms of physical security, personal protec- tion, threat capabilities, and OPSEC. Plan and Prepare. Based on the antiterrorism collection and analysis results, company com- manders develop counte rmeasures and controls to mitigate or eliminate ri sks of terrorism or sim- ilar threat actions. During planning, the com- pany determines resource shortfalls and seeks augmentation as necessa ry. During preparation, company personnel receive training on new pro- cedures and processes, the company implements IO education campaigns if required, and engi- neers conduct surveys and draw up plans for physical security augmentation. Implement. The company commander either includes FP measures with in the OPORD or pre- pares an antiterrorism-specific order in cases involving significant and detailed antiterrorism processes, procedures, and countermeasures. In addition to various pro cedures, an antiterrorism order contains guidance for operating within the context of larger operatio ns, such as the require- ments of HHQ, emergency response actions and reporting, and a threat and vulnerability assess- ment. The issuing of the order marks the start of implementation to incl ude the introduction of physical security measures and facility hardening if needed. Threat Metrics There are a wide variety of terrorist threat levels, security conditions, and ot her assessment metrics used by different US Government entities. While all seek to classify terrorists, threats, and expected friendly actions, many are subject to change, revi- sion, or elimination. The following three subpara- graphs address those th reat conditions company commanders most likely will encounter. Department of Defens e Force Protection Con- ditions. The Department of Defense has identified and standardized the FP conditions in table 12-1. Commanders may adopt higher FP condition mea- sures than ordered by th e chain of command if local conditions warrant greater security measures. Table 12-1. Department of Defense Force Protection Conditions. NORMAL General threat of possible terrorist activity exists but warrants only routine security. ALPHA General threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel and installations; nature is unpredictable. BRAVO Increased/more predictable threat activity exists; must be able to be maintained for weeks without undue hardship. CHARLIE An incident occurs or intelligence indicates terrorist action is imminent. DELTA Terrorist attack has occurred in the area or intelligence indicates attack is likely. --- Page 272 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 12-5 Antiterrorism Security Conditions. Commands use the following metrics to report antiterrorism security conditions and postures:  Condition Red: Denotes the actual in progress or identified imminent th reats to force person- nel. All force personne l are alerted and must stand to. All access poin ts to areas of opera- tions are closed.  Condition Yellow: Indi cates probable hostile actions or unidentified activity that warrants investigative actions by security personnel. All security personnel are alerted.  Condition Green: Acti vity is normal. No actions are required. Rear Area Security Threat Response Levels. Infantry company commanders may encounter the metric outlined in table 12-2 in relation to a threat assessment conducted by rear area secu- rity personnel. Company Commander Responsibilities Company commanders execute the requirements mandated in the latest ve rsion of the antiterror- ism order. In general, they can expect to—  Act in accordance with HHQ antiterrorism direction.  Institute and maintain antiterrorism threat assessments, plans, or ders, and control mea- sures.  Incorporate antiterrorism countermeasures and risk assessments into physical and fixed site security, training plans, OPORDs, and com- pany planning and execution methodology.  Coordinate and synchr onize antiterrorism, OPSEC, and information security requirements.  Appoint a company FP officer in accordance with the latest versio n of the antiterrorism order to manage antite rrorism programs within the company.  Ensure that the company and its personnel meet current antiterrori sm individual and unit training requirements pe r the latest version of the antiterrorism order.  Ensure that the company determines the nature of and conducts any additional antiterrorism training required for deployment to specific areas as defined both geographically and by threat condition. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear For infantry companies operating in a CBRN haz- ard environment or CBRN threat environment, the most important consideration is maintaining the force for further operations. Company com- manders meet FP requireme nts in this challeng- ing environment primarily through contamination avoidance to include time ly warning and report- ing, effective individual protection measures, well-trained CBRN reconnaissance and surveil- lance, and decontamination teams. These teams are normally managed at the battalion level. Per unit SOPs, a percentage of Marines in companies are trained by th e battalion CBRN section to be CBRN team members. Threat Analysis Infantry companies receive information regard- ing the potential for ope rating in a CBRN envi- ronment from HHQ, whet her that environment results from terrorist action or from the introduc- tion of CBRN warfare into the operational envi- ronment. Depending on the threat, HHQ may—  Issue additional equipment such as individual protective, decontamination, and detection equipment. Medical may issue antidote kits.  Test CBRN warning and reporting system by sending and receiving CBRN reports. Table 12-2. Rear Area Security Threat Assessment Levels. Level I Those threats that can be defeated by local defenses. Level II Those threats that are beyond the capabilities of local defense, but that can be defeated by reaction forces. Local defenses must be able to contain Level II threats until the arrival of reaction forces. Level III Those threats that require the commander to employ combat units to defeat them, which is normally a tactical combat force. --- Page 273 --- 12-6 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1  Conduct additional traini ng for reconnaissance and surveillance teams and decontamination teams.  Establish control measures and resources, such as separate routes for contaminated and decon- taminated units, or primary and alternate decontamination sites.  Modify operational time lines to account for slower tempo in a CBRN environment. Threat Conditions The CBRN threat conditions listed in table 12-3 are used to quickly provide information about cur- rent threat and protective measures to be taken. Company Actions Infantry companies ensu re mission accomplish- ment in a CBRN envi ronment by conducting Table 12-3. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threat Conditions. Threat Condition Attack Probability Enemy Indicators Civil Indi cators Minimum Protective Actions White: Zero probability (serial 1) Negligible No CBRN offensive capability in the AOI No known industrial hazards or nuclear reactors in the AOI Verify CBRN equipment Conduct routine maintenance Green: Low probability (serial 2) Possible Offensive CBRN capability No indicators of potential employment in the next 24 hours Confirmed presence of hazardous industrial materials or nuclear reactors in the AOI Take all of the above actions Conduct CBRN training and rehearsals Conduct CBRN equipment PMCS, to include vehicle and shelter filters Establish shelter/overhead cover plan Review MOPP considerations Amber: Medium probability (serial 3) Probable Enemy moving, dispersing, or prepositioning CBRN munitions forward or near delivery systems Enemy wearing protective gear or moving/dispersing decontamination systems Increased OPSEC of delivery means Hazardous industrial practices reported Hazardous conditions in storage facilities detected Combat operations being conducted near sites with confirmed hazards Take all of the above actions Emplace alarms Cover equipment/supplies Verify alarms/warnings Brief CBRN teams Verify mask seals/MOPP Prepare decontamination site Erect collective shelters Issue medical countermeasures Conduct reconnaissance Red: High probability (serial 4) Imminent Enemy ready/certain to employ CBRN munitions CBRN munitions used in AOI; no local contamination hazard present Localized spill or accident confirmed HN authorities direct limited precautionary evacuation or declare hazard area Take all of the above actions Implement MOPP considerations based on METT-T Monitor continuously Use vehicle overpressure Conduct reconnaissance overwatch of NAI Black Attack occurred CBRN contamination present in AO Germs/toxins detected in AO Major industrial accident/incident Take all of the above actions Mark contaminated areas Find clear routes Resupply CBRN equipment NOTE: The CBRN threat levels and serial numbers used for assessment purposes are according to NATO Standardization Agreement 2984, 1995 Graduated Levels of Nuclear Biological Threat and Associated Protection. --- Page 274 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 12-7 contamination avoidance. After a CBRN inci- dent, Marines continue accomplishing the mis- sion through effect ive use of individual survival measures. Companies coordinate reconnaissance and surveillance and de contamination opera- tions with HHQ. Since companies do not have CBRN defense officers or CBRN defense spe- cialists, the CBRN subjec t expertise available to the infantry company re sides at the regimental and battalion level. Mission-Oriented Protective Posture. Like other similar orders and directions, company command- ers may not lessen a mi nimal mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) level dictated by HHQ, but may adopt a more protective posture if necessary. In general, when addressing MOPP levels, commanders take into account the mis- sion, level of threat, e nvironment, temperature, work/rest rate, performance degradation, and physical conditioning of the company’s personnel (see table 12-4) by considering the following:  What is the mission? Is it offensive or defen- sive?  What is the likelihood of employment?  What is the expected warning time?  How physically and mentally demanding is the work to be performed?  What is the expected duration of the mission?  What are the weather, terrain, and time of day?  Has the company accounted for degraded per- formance of even simple tasks? Are work and rest cycles planned? Reconnaissance and Surveillance Teams. The infantry company does have Marines trained in CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance, but such Marines are typical ly trained as teams at the bat- talion level. Companies will be directed by HHQ to execute reconnaissan ce and surveillance team operations. The CBRN re connaissance and sur- veillance operations locate, identify, and track CBRN hazards. Decontamination Teams. The infantry com- pany has Marines traine d in decontamination; however, they are typical ly trained/organized as teams at the battalion le vel. Companies will sup- port HHQ decontamination efforts with Marines that have been designated as decontamination team members. Decontamination Operations There are three types of decontamination: immedi- ate, operational, and thorough. Individuals, as the situation allows, perform immediate decontamina- tion of themselves and their personal equipment to minimize casualties, prevent the spread of contam- ination, and keep the maximum amount of combat power engaged in operations. A company can per- form immediate decontamination, MOPP gear exchange, and MOPP gear drop per MCWP 3-37, MAGTF Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations . Thorough and operational decontamination are organized by HHQ. Table 12-4. Mission-Oriented Protective Posture Levels. MOPP Equipment MOPP Levels MOPP Ready MOPP 0 MOPP 1 MOPP 2 MOPP 3 MOPP 4 Mask Only Mask Carried Carried Carried Carried Worn1 Worn Worn Overgarment Ready2 Available3 Worn1 Worn1 Worn1 Worn Boots Ready2 Available3 Available3 Worn Worn Worn Gloves Ready2 Available3 Available3 Available3 Available3 Worn Notes 1—In hot weather, coat or hood can be left open for ventilation. 2—Must be available within two hours. Second set available in 6 hours. 3—Within arm’s reach. --- Page 275 --- 12-8 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Warning and Reporting The primary means of warning units of an actual or predicted CBRN hazard is the CBRN Warn- ing and Reporting System . Higher headquarters normally transmits CBRN warnings or alarms in the form of CBRN 3 reports and CBRN 5 reports. Higher headquarters will direct what MOPP level a company will use based on analysis performed. Companies will generally only send CBRN 1 observers reports to H HQ. See MCRP 3-37.2A, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Proce- dures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Contamination Avoidance, for infor- mation regarding CBRN warning and reporting. Internal Force Protection Internal FP measures refers to such things as frat- ricide, negligent discha rges, equipment or com- munications failure, and other items within the company’s control that can negatively affect troop welfare and mission accomplishment. Com- pany commanders view thes e internal issues just as external issues—through the lens of ORM— asking the following questions: What must the company do to accomplish the mission? What are the risks entailed in co nducting the mission in terms of internal failur es? What is the company doing to mitigate or eliminate those risks? Guardian Angel The guardian angel method uses the overwatch concept to provide conti nuous security for a unit, function, activity, or fa cility. When conducting a security halt, a squad leader may place a pair of Marines on the roof of a nearby building to pro- vide overwatch for the patrol. When conducting a change of command ceremony, a fire team of Marines may position themselves unobtrusively at vantage points overwatc hing the formation and avenues of approach. Guardian angels are mature, alert, and trusted indivi duals who use an ambush mentality to watch over a unit’s security. Whether armed or unarmed, they must have the means to convey a threat (sound the alarm). Guidelines for employment of guardian angels are:  Personnel and equipment remain tactically alert to ensure security, protection, and early warn- ing until a trained guardian angel is emplaced.  Guardian angels will be given guidance and training regarding the us e of deadly force and local ROE and escalati on of force continuum procedures. Guardian angels rehearse the immediate actions required of them.  Units will employ the appropriate communica- tions gear to ensure th at guardian angels can provide proper early warning of a threat.  Guardian angels remain vigilant and alert to potentially hostile acti vities and actions near their units.  Guardian angels should be rotated in order to maintain the highest levels of awareness.  Guardian angels are em ployed at all unit evo- lutions, regardless of si ze or operational envi- ronment. Fratricide Prevention and Battlespace Geometry Fratricide represents a re al threat to FP and mis- sion accomplishment. Fratricide happens when friendly weapons and munitions are used to destroy the enemy, but th e effects of those weap- ons and munitions impact other friendly forces instead. While some definitions of fratricide include such words as unintentional and unfore- seen, most friendly fire incidents result from human error or loss of situational awareness. Company commanders can implement substantial controls to significantly reduce the risk of fratri- cide. The basis of such controls are schemes of maneuver and tactical control measures that miti- gate the chance of fratricide; maintain situational awareness across the company; and train company personnel to understand their weapons, the effects of their weapons, and the principles of BSG. --- Page 276 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 12-9 Tactical Control Measures Control measures deconf lict fire and maneuver, assign responsibilities, and control combat opera- tions. They may apply to the scheme of maneuver and operations or they ma y apply to internal pro- cedures. They may be ve rbal, graphic, or both. Tactical control measures reinforce the company commander’s scheme of maneuver, help prevent fratricide, are easily u nderstood, and are tied to readily recognizable terr ain features as appropri- ate. Examples of tactical control measures are—  Maneuver, such as axis or direction of attack, EAs or BPs, and attack and SBF positions.  Command and control, such as contact and control points, boundari es and phase lines, rally and passage points, and limit of advance.  Internal control measures, such as day and night visual markings, challenge and pass- words, and brevity codes. Battlespace Geometry As seen in figure 12-1, on the combined arms battlefield, BSG requires awareness of eight ele- ments of information. While every individual in the company cannot track all elements of BSG, they can be trained for awareness. If individual members of the compa ny understand how BSG FW attack RW attack 400m 1000m 2000m Initial tank SBF POS Mortar POS R/W BP Threat ring 4000m FW attack RW attack 400m 1000m 2000m Initial tank SBF POS Mortar POS RW BP Threat ring 4000m EXECUTION Legend: FW - fixed wing m - meters POS - position RW - rotary wing Figure 12-1. Battlespace Geometry (Training Distances) Example. --- Page 277 --- 12-10 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 works for both small a nd combined arms and if they understand how the different combined arms platforms, such as CAS or artillery, operate, then they are much more likely to recognize unsafe situations and act acco rdingly. The individual rifleman or squad leader might only know that he can expect rotary-wing CAS support from the east, but that small amount of information will make him aware that heli copters are in the bat- tlespace, the direction from which they can be expected, and that the infantry should be prepared to check their fires if something unexpected occurs. The eight elements of BSG are—  Friendly positions and as sociated surface dan- ger zones.  Enemy positions.  Enemy threat ring.  Ordnance minimum safe distances (training) or risk estimate distance (combat).  Artillery gun-target lines.  Mortar gun-target lines.  Fixed-wing CAS attack cones.  Rotary-wing CAS BPs. Weapons Safety The ability for company personnel to understand the functioning, employment, and effects of their weapons is crucial to av oiding fratricide. A good understanding of BSG helps prevent poor employment of a weapon system, but Marines must also understand the effects of their weapons in terms of maximum ra nge, penetration depth, beaten zone, and blast ef fects to avoid engaging the enemy in such a manner as to endanger friendly troops. Further, understanding the func- tioning of a weapon and mature and engaged leadership prevents fratr icide resulting from neg- ligent discharges. Most negligent discharges do not happen in combat, but happen during training, weapons clearing and cleaning, or because of horseplay. The Marine Co rps uses the following five safety rules as the basis for weapons safety:  Treat every weapon as if it were loaded.  Never point a weapon at anything you do not intend to shoot.  Keep your finger straight and off the trigger until you intend to fire.  Keep your weapon on safe until you are ready to fire.  Know your target and what lies beyond it. Combat Checks and Inspections A unit that has a well-established system of checks and inspections will more consistently perform to standard (see table 12-5). The com- pany commander establis hes checks and inspec- tions that support the unit’s operational tasks. Once established, the company commander must ensure that the checks and inspections happen before and after combat operations. Checks and inspections fall into the following categories: PCCs, PCIs, postcombat checks, and postcom- bat inspections. Precombat Checks Precombat checks help th e leader to prepare his unit for combat and include checks for individu- als, vehicles, weapons, and equipment. While these checklists are generic, they can be easily tailored to fit a unit’s specific needs. Leaders at all levels use these checklis ts to plan and prepare instructions to their subordinate leaders. Precombat Inspections Precombat inspections validate that the PCCs occurred. They are a le ader’s primary means of ensuring that essential equipment is present and ready and that subordin ates understand the order and the mission. Leaders must plan their time and that of the unit to ensure that inspections happen. Time must also be available for corrective actions should an individual or it em fail the inspection. Leaders cannot delegate this responsibility; they must be the inspectors. This demands that they be competent in the mainte nance and care of the unit’s equipment. The standards a commander sets and to which he in spects will determine the unit’s ability to perform in combat. --- Page 278 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 12-11 Postcombat Checks Postcombat checks are id entical in form to PCCs but differ in substance. Individuals, vehicles, weapons, and equipment ch ecks still occur; how- ever, the focus changes to repairing and refitting these items to be reusable. Expendable items may need replenishing and lost items require replac- ing. Units replace thei r basic load items and ensure that equipment ha s its full complement of POL. Damaged and nonope rational equipment is evacuated for repair. In lower priority, individual needs, such as rest, ref itting, medical, and moral problems, receive attention. Postcombat Inspections In the same way that PCIs require unit leaders to verify PCCs, postcomba t inspections require leadership to inspect postcombat checks. Since postcombat operations are maintenance ori- ented, unit leaders s hould employ inspection teams consisting of vehicle, communication, sup- ply, and other appropriate personnel to assist them. As well as helping with the inspection, these per- sonnel can also make on-the-spot corrections. Inspections must focus on serviceability. Sufficient time is necessary to perform these inspections to accommodate the required attention to detail. In depth, postcombat actions increase the speed and efficiency of precombat actions. Body Armor Protective Level In many cases, company commanders can expect some sort of guidance regarding body armor pro- tective level (APL) posture from HHQ. This direction usually aligns APLs with general enemy threat conditions or activities, while providing guidance on company commander authority for modification, waiv er authority, or waiver proce- dures. When determining APL requirements, commanders must, as with all FP considerations, Table 12-5. Sample Precombat Inspection Checklist. Vehicle preparations  Loaded according to the load plan  Vehicle refueled  Water cans full, Class I stowed  Equipment cleaned and stowed  First aid kit/combat-lifesaver bag complete and stowed  Vehicle dispatched, technical manual present, vehicle tool kit stowed  Basic load of ammunition stowed Communications equipment  Radios operational, mounted, and secured  Connections and receptacles cleaned and frequencies set  Antenna matching unit(s) operational  Communications security equipment operational  Telephones operational and stowed  OE-254 antenna complete, operational, and stowed  All required nets entered and monitored CBRN  CBRN equipment accounted for and serviceable  CBRN equipment stored/employed as appropriate  Individual CBRN equipment is issued as appropriate Optics  NVDs and binoculars cleaned, operational, and stowed Maintenance  PMCS conducted on all equipment  Department of Army Form 2404(s), Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Worksheet, completed on all equipment Armaments  All weapons cleaned and test fired --- Page 279 --- 12-12 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 balance mission accompl ishment against troop welfare. During the s imultaneous conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, APL requirements dif- fered in each AO. In Afghanistan, commanders accepted risk and reduced APL requirements in order to accomplish a mi ssion that placed great demand on dismounted mob ility. In Iraq, with a significantly heavier ur ban and road environ- ment, commanders placed greater emphasis on survivability and incr eased the APL posture. Regardless, the current Marine Corps family of personal protective equi pment is deliberately scalable to allow commanders flexibility in APL posture (see table 12-6). Environment Risk Mitigation Since the Marine Corps continues to operate in “every clime and place, ” the effects of various environments on the pe rsonnel and equipment of the infantry company remain a key component of FP. When determining how to mitigate those effects, company commanders consider prevent- ing, mitigating, and recove ring from the effects. Environmental effects are hot or cold, dry or wet, high or low, and many combinations thereof. Using this methodology, some of the mountains in Indonesia would be c onsidered hot, wet, and high; whereas, the Gobi Desert would be consid- ered cold, dry, and high. Hot or Cold The temperature of the body is regulated within very narrow limits: ove rheating can cause heat exhaustion and heat stroke; overcooling can cause hypothermia. Both conditio ns can occur in either hot or cold environments. Rather than approach the environment in terms of its temperature range, company commanders enact FP measures by approaching the environment in terms of the tem- perature of the compan y’s personnel and equip- ment. For example, disc iplined use of layering garments prevents heat exhaustion when conduct- ing physical exertion in the cold in the same man- ner as it prevents hypoth ermia in the desert at night when at rest. While acclimatization assists the company when operating in extreme tempera- ture environments, it is not a cure all. Measures, such as work rotation to manage physical exertion in both hot and cold, shel ter availability (whether sunshade or a heating tent), hydration and diet regardless of temperature, and proper equipment maintenance, are appropriate considerations for the company commander. Wet or Dry While not readily apparent, the presence or lack of moisture in an envi ronment can have just as many effects on personnel and equipment as tem- perature. Rather than a pproach the environment in terms of its humidity, rainfall, or aridness, company commanders enact FP measures by approaching the environment in terms of the humidity required by personnel and equipment. In wet environments, co mpanies focus on keep- ing personnel as dry as possible to avoid fungal infections and disease, while keeping equipment lubricated to prevent rust. Companies may accomplish this through simple measures, such as dry socks, personnel shelters above the ground, and air conditioners to protect sensitive electronic equipment from moisture. While high humidity and the presence of large amounts of water pres- ent the greatest problems to the infantry com- pany, overly dry environm ents can also cause issues that company commanders seek to mitigate through hydration of personnel and lubrication and maintenance of equipment. High or Low Altitude presents significantly greater concerns than other environments due to its immediate effects on the human body. Low altitudes present little or no problems for the infantry company; Table 12-6. Armor Protective Level Chart. APL Description Level 0 No body armor worn Level 1 Vest/plate carrier with soft armor only Level 2 Vest/plate carrier with front and back hard armor plates Level 3 Vest/plate carrier with front, back, and side hard armor plates --- Page 280 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 12-13 however, as companies be gin to operate in eleva- tions over 6,500 feet, the effects of elevation on company personnel become an increasing chal- lenge. Above 8,000 feet, companies can expect cases of altitude-related illness, which can result in death if left untreat ed. While gradual acclima- tization to slowly increasi ng altitudes is a viable method for preventing a ltitude-related illnesses, companies may not have that luxury. In addition to deploying healthy and fit Marines, companies deploying into elevations above 6,500 feet should expect to have altitude-related casualties and con- duct appropriate medical training for all com- pany personnel. --- Page 281 --- 12-14 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 This Page Intentionally Left Blank --- Page 282 --- CHAPTER 13 LOGISTICS The company commander is responsible for logistics, its associated functions, and the proper use and disposition of supplies and equipment. The relationship betwee n logistics and military operations, accordin g to MCDP 4, Logistics , is that logistics sets the outward limit on what is operationally possible. If logistics sets the limits, MCDP 4 continues, it follows that one of our key objectives must be to en sure that limits imposed by logistics do not inhibit effective operations. As a result, the publication instructs commanders to consider logistics in the development of plans and the allocation of resources. In the austere logistic environment of the Marine infantry company, sustaining the company in combat provides compan y commanders with one of their greatest challenges and operational limits. Company commanders must be innovative and resource conscious in adopting company pro- cesses and techniques for supply, maintenance, and casualty treatment and evacuation. Supervi- sion and key leadership en gagement at all levels is critical. As discussed in chapter 1, the company staff supervises and execu tes administrative and logistical tasks at the company level. Company commanders who supervise and ensure the proper task organization and division of labor of the company staff will enable the company’s success. Logistic Functional Areas Tactical logistics consists of six functional areas: supply, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health serv ices, and services. Table 13-1, on page 13-2, prov ides detailed informa- tion on the six functions of CSS and their associ- ated subfunctions. Supply The supply function is a cyclic process of acquir- ing, issuing, and accounti ng for materiel used to sustain the company. This materiel may be con- sumable and expendable items, such as rations and cleaning supp lies, or durable materiel, such as weapons and vehicles . Logisticians normally calculate requirements for each class and subclass of supply. Figure 13-1, on page 13-3, provides detailed information on the ten classes of supply. Maintenance Maintenance involves pr eventive maintenance (actions taken to keep materiel in serviceable condition) and corrective maintenance (actions required to return materi el to serviceable condi- tion). By grouping maintenance tasks by levels of support, commanders determine who performs what maintenance. Co mpany commanders must maintain situational awareness of the readiness of company assets, particul arly since companies have larger tables of equipment than in the recent past. Typically, the co mpany XO will manage and track company readiness via the battalion maintenance management officer. Table 13-2, on page 13-4, depicts the three levels of maintenance and their associated echel ons of maintenance. In general, organizational and limited intermediate maintenance are the levels of maintenance found at the company and battalion level. Health Service Support Health service suppor t seeks to minimize the effect that wounds, injuries, and disease have on unit effectiveness, readiness, and morale. The two requirements for HSS are a preventive medicine --- Page 283 --- 13-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 program that safeguards personnel against poten- tial health risks and a system that provides medi- cal support from the point of wounding, injury, or illness through evacuation . An infantry company will typically have a me dical section of 11 corps- men, one of whom being a petty officer who serves as the senior corpsman. General Engineering General engineering is distinct from combat engi- neering. General engineering is a CSS function, such as engineer support battalion, that addresses such things as construc tion, operation, repair of facilities, and terrain modification. Conversely, combat engineering is a CS function, such as a combat engineer battalion. In a more traditional combat environment, company commanders are likely to encounter gene ral engineering assets when those assets augment combat engineers to support large combat engin eering efforts, such as obstacle groups, strong point construction, or sig- nificant bridging. When employed in a more independent role, comp anies will frequently interact with general e ngineering assets in sup- port of CMO, FOB, ro ute clearance, mainte- nance, and other functi ons. Use of general engineering assets often involves more detailed planning and preparation and higher standards of design and construction than typical combat engi- neer tasks. Table 13-1. Functional Areas of Logistics. Supply Maintenance Transportation Determination of requirements Inspection and classification Embarkation Procurement Service, adjustment, and tuning Landing support Storage Testing and calibration Port and terminal operations Distribution Repair Motor transport Salvage Modification Air delivery Disposal Rebuilding and overhaul Freight/passenger transportation Reclamation Materials handling equipment Recovery and evacuation General Engineering Health Services Services Engineer reconnaissance Health maintenance Command services Horizontal/vertical construction Casualty collection Personnel administration Facilities maintenance Casualty treatment Religious ministries support Demolition and obstacle removal Temporary casualty holding Financial management Explosive ordnance disposal Casualty evacuation Communications Bridging Billeting Messing Band Morale, welfare, and recreation CSS services Disbursing Postal services Exchange services Security support Legal services support Civil affairs support Graves registration --- Page 284 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 13-3 CLASS VIII Medical materials CLASS VI Personal demand items CLASS V Ammunition CLASS II Clothing, individual equipment, tools, administration supplies CLASS IV Construction Material CLASS VII Major end items: racks, pylons, tracked vehicles, etc. CLASS III Petroleum, oils, lubricants CLASS I Subsistence CLASS IX Repair parts CLASS X Material for nonmilitary programs A - nonperishable C - combat rations R - refrigerated S - nonrefrigerated W - water A - air B - ground support material E - general supplies F - clothing O - electronics M - weapons T - industrial supplies A - air delivery W - ground A - medical material E - blood fluids A - air B - ground support material O - admin vehicles G - electronics K - tactical vehicles L - missiles M - weapons N - special weapons T - industrial material X - aircraft engines A - air B - ground support material O - admin vehicles G - electronics K - tactical vehicles L - missiles M - weapons N - special weapons T - industrial material X - aircraft engines A - construction B - barrier A - petroleum for aircraft W - petroleum for surface vehicles P - packaged petroleum SYMBOLS SUBCLASSES Figure 13-1. Classes and Subclasses of Supply. --- Page 285 --- 13-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Transportation Transportation is moving something from one location to another by railway, highway, water- way, pipeline, ocean, or airway. The term “throughput” defines the amount of cargo and personnel passed through the transportation sys- tem. The term “transportation system” refers to the means and the contro ls for managing the means of transportation. All of these terms and definitions generally appl y to all levels of sup- port, although the actual execution of transporta- tion will vary at each le vel. At the operational level, the means of tran sportation might consist of ships and planes, wh ile it might consist of trucks and helicopters at the company level. Con- sequently, though trans portation is a logistic function, the company co mmander often finds it to be a CS function that uses organic, attached, or supporting transportation assets. Services The services function accounts for all those things that affect the effectiv e administration, manage- ment, and employment of military organizations and are generally administrative in nature. Com- mand services, such as chaplains who provide reli- gious support or morale, welfare, and recreation funds that allow a company to buy gym equip- ment, are those services provided by the com- mand themselves. Combat service support services, such as legal support or a post exchange, are those services provided by LCE units. Logistic Preparation and Planning Infantry companies engage with all six functions of CSS in the execution of their missions. The fol- lowing subparagraphs highlight logistic consider- ations that a compan y commander and staff should take into accoun t when planning opera- tions. When conducting lo gistical planning, com- panies should always adhere to the seven principles of CSS:  Flexibility: the ability to tailor and rapidly change how logistic structure is set up to meet new missions, situations, and operations.  Simplicity: the ability to foster efficiency in both planning and execu tion through mission- type orders and standardized procedures.  Attainability: the ability to meet the basic and essential logistic requi rements needed to con- duct combat operations.  Sustainability: the ability to maintain adequate and effective logistic support for all parties throughout the AO.  Economy: stewarding resources to enable mis- sion accomplishment th rough the most effec- tive logistic support at the least cost.  Responsiveness: ensuring the correct support arrives at the right time in the right place.  Survivability: using various measures, from dispersion to fortifica tion, to safeguard and protect logistical assets and resources. Table 13-2. Levels and Echelons of Maintenance. Levels of Maintenance Echelons of Maintenance1 Organizational—Authorized at, performed by, and the responsibility of the using unit. Consists of cleaning, servicing, inspecting, lubricating, adjusting, and minor repair. First—Limited action performed by crew or operator as prescribed by applicable manuals. Second—Limited action above the operator level performed by specialist personnel in the using unit. Intermediate—Performed by designated agencies in support of the using unit or, for certain items of equipment, by specially authorized using units. Includes repair of subassemblies, assemblies, and major end items for return to lower echelons or to supply channels. Third—Component replacement usually performed by specially trained personnel in owning or CSS units. Fourth—Component and end item overhaul and rebuilding performed by CSS units at semipermanent or fixed sites. Depot—Major overhaul and complete rebuilding of parts, subassemblies, assemblies, and end items. Fifth—End item overhaul and rebuilding performed by industrial-type activities using production line techniques, programs, and schedules. 1—Equipment technical manuals and stock lists specify echelon of repair for each item. --- Page 286 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 13-5 General Considerations The battalion normally accounts for the baseline CSS requirements of the companies. The basic planning unit is the combat day. From this base- line and through the planning process, the infantry company determines other CSS requirements and uses the battalion’s request process to submit them to the battalion logistic section. Company com- manders and their sta ffs must include CSS requirements and a support plan as part of problem framing and COA development by considering the following factors:  Mission. The mission will dictate special equip- ment requirements, possible transportation needs, and CASEVAC augments.  Enemy. The enemy’s most likely COA, disposi- tion, and other characteristics will dictate ammunition requirement s (such as consump- tion and type), breaching requirements, and EPW considerations.  Terrain. Terrain not only dictates mobility requirements, but also has immediate impacts on the means and ability to conduct all CSS functions. For example, jungles and similar foot-mobile environments drastically shrink the battlespace into term s of meters vice kilo- meters and, therefore, affect such things as the placement of casualty co llection points, the means and rapidity of resupply, and equip- ment evacuation.  Weather. In the same manner as terrain, weather directly affects the CSS plan. Examples include rain-generated mud that impedes mobility and the impact of dry heat on increased water con- sumption and equipment maintenance.  Transportation. The presence of transporta- tion is an obvious logi stic consideration, but company commanders an d staffs must take into account how transportation, if available, will operate in the battlespace. Helicopter resupply in a forested environment may appear simple until the company considers the re- quirement to cut LZs out of the forests and adds chainsaws and othe r special equipment to the prescribed load.  Ease of resupply. Ease of resupply requires the company commander to consider all factors that influence the sustainment of the company and the direct effect on operations. The effect of distance and time on CASEVAC may limit how far the company ca n travel in its bat- tlespace without augmentation. The amount of ammunition that each Marine carries in a mountain environmen t might limit the com- pany’s ability to maintain the assault or how much water can be carrie d in an arid environ- ment. The ability to exploit success might require prestaging of CSS resources. Supply Through problem framin g and COA develop- ment, the company commander determines and prescribes the supply lo ad for the company and requisitions supplies acc ordingly. The prescribed load is not a fixed qua ntity and may change to meet new tactical and logistic conditions. When planning the prescribed load, company com- manders and their staffs analyze the means of transportation. Companie s should optimize the basic load for all supp lies, including Class IX repair parts. The unit’s load should not exceed the commander’s anticipated requirements, even if additional quantities could be carried. When con- sidering supply, comp any commanders always remember the big three— subsistence, fuel, and ammunition (see fig. 13-2 on page 13-6). Class I (Subsistence) Company planners must take into account the amount of water and food that company members will consume during opera tions, how to transport these items, and the meth ods of resupply. Higher headquarters often provid es the means and guid- ance for infantry companie s to meet their Class I needs, leaving infantry companies to plan only “by exception.” However, wh en company command- ers employ their compan ies semi-independently and dispersed, company pl anners take an active role in Class I management. --- Page 287 --- 13-6 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Water. When developing load plans for company personnel and vehicles, infantry companies should expect each member of the company to carry no more than a one -day supply of water— less in some situations. Planners use averages (see table 13-3) in their calculations. Note: In arid climates, consumption and plan- ning rates will increase by roughly a gallon per day for drinking and marginally in other categories. Vehicle maintenance may require water from time to time for PMCS and water will need to be set aside to treat heat casuali- ties in an arid or tropical environment. Food. Infantry companies must consider the length of an operation and a feed plan to determine food consumption requirements. A feed plan is a predic- tion of what types of meals company personnel will consume and when. In a limited duration tacti- cal environment, the co mpany might use combat rationing consisting of three meals, ready to eat per day—two per day in extreme situations. In a more permanent FOB, the comp any might plan for hot meals in the morning a nd evening and a meal, ready to eat for lunch. In fantry companies should limit combat rationing to only those situations that truly require it. Whenev er possible, companies should provide unitized group rations to offer com- pany personnel a diet variety. The types of unitized group rations are A, B, and “heat and serve/tray rations.” Unitized group ration B and tray rations are well suited for expeditionary and austere envi- ronments but require some preparation by trained food service personnel. The battalion S-4 can pro- vide this type of sup port; one trained cook aug- mented with company mess men can meet an infantry company’s needs. Class II (Clothing, Individual Equipment) The infantry company iden tifies all requirements and submits requests fo r delivery through HHQ. In the case of specialized, newly identified items, such as gloves, pads, or some other specific piece of gear for which the company commander deter- mines a requirement, the infantry company will need to submit a justific ation to HHQ in addition CLASS V Ammunition CLASS III Petroleum, oils, lubricants CLASS I Subsistence This is what logistic officers push. Figure 13-2. The Big Three. Table 13-3. Average Water Planning Rates Per Marine Per Day in Gallons. Function Sustaining Minimum Drinking 2.0 1.5 Hygiene 1.5 .5 Feeding .8 .3 Waste .4 .2 Totals 4.7 2.5 --- Page 288 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 13-7 to the request itself. Un iform items, clothing, and individual equipment are the Class II items of most interest to the infantry company, though a company possessing a substantial vehicle fleet may also require tool k its depending on the level of maintenance authorized. Class III (Petroleum, Oils, Lubricants) Infantry companies normally serve as customers for HHQ Class III use and distribution plans. The fundamental basis for an infantry company’s Class III needs is the co nsumption rate of equip- ment and vehicles assigne d, attached, or in DS of the company. If employe d semi-independently, company planning staff wo rk closely with HHQ logistic staffs in dete rmining Class III require- ments, including storage and distribution. In such cases, the company commander can assume a need for such augmenta tion to the company as personnel (such as bulk fuel personnel), techni- cal manuals, tools, and repair parts. In cases when the infantry company mu st store its own POL resources, HHQ and companies determine stor- age capacity by multiplyi ng daily usage by days between resupply. Class IV (Construction Material) The method of an infant ry company’s employ- ment dictates if and ho w Class IV supply issues will affect company pl anning. Initial planning guidance originates from the battalion operations and logistic sections, while engineers provide expert advice. Survivability. The mission and enemy threat determine the company’s requirements to build and maintain positions. A company conducting a search and attack may carry only a few sand- bags per Marine for basic night defense. A com- pany tasked with build ing and securing a strong point may have sandbags, timber, prefabricated barriers, concertina wire, and many other Class IV requirements. Countermobility. During proble m framing and COA development, company commanders determine the number, de pth, and complexity of obstacles needed to gene rate the effect required. Significant Class IV requirements will accom- pany companies given a block mission in an armored vehicle threat environment, while wire tanglefoot may be sufficient for night patrol base security. Habitability. The more significant and perma- nent the position, the more equipment needed for life support. Fixed positi ons often generate con- tinuous life support development, which then cre- ates a greater CSS requirement. Company commanders should guard against “CSS creep,” which can often change a company’s operations if left unchecked. For example, austere outposts that gain greater creature comforts require more resupply and maintenan ce, which diverts more company combat power from other missions to support convoys, contractors, and other sustain- ment activities. Storage. Company planners understand that the more developed the pos ition, the greater the maintenance requirements and the need to prep- osition Class IV supplies. This requirement applies as equally to a strong point exposed to frequent enemy i ndirect fire impa ct as to well- developed FOBs. Class V (Ammunition) Ammunition planning f actors for each weapon system is in the most recent version of Marine Corps Order (MCO) 8010.1_, Class V(W) Plan- ning Factors for Fleet Marine Force Combat Operations, (commanders should use the assault planning factors when planning urban opera- tions). When planning for ammunition consump- tion, usage, or storage, company commanders need to ensure that they have coordinated with the battalion gunner and batta lion ammunition chief. The ammunition ch ief will help infantry compa- nies comply with storage, transport, and handling regulations of specific ammunition types as mois- ture and other environmental conditions can have an adverse effect on the performance of certain ammunition items. Follow -on considerations for --- Page 289 --- 13-8 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Class V are lift and handling requirements and ammunition driver training qualifications. Class VI (Personal Demand Items) Infantry companies rout e all Class VI require- ments and requests th rough HHQ. Particular items of interest to a company commander in this category include sundry packs, post exchange items, and waste bags for field sanitation use. Class VII (Major End Items) An infantry company manages all Class VII issues with HHQ, whether replacing company equipment from the table of equipment or equip- ment density list or identifying a need for a major end item not normally assigned to the company. Class VIII (Medical Materials) Medical personnel assigned to the infantry com- pany possess complete me dical and first aid kits. The company’s senior corpsman coordinates Class VIII resupply thro ugh the BAS. The senior corpsman also serves as the company com- mander’s senior medical representative for medi- cally-related planning. The primary Class VIII planning consideration for the company is the replenishment of high de mand items in the indi- vidual first aid kit. Th e company should ensure that it possesses enough li tters to provide one per squad or section. Class IX (Repair Parts) The infantry company does not normally stock Class IX repair parts but may if separated from HHQ. Regardless of the method of employ- ment, companies will nor mally seek to possess small amounts of pre-expended bin items, which are low cost/high use pa rts for armory, commu- nications, and motor tran sport assets. The infan- try company requisitions all required Class IX items through battalion supply. The greater the amount of logistic suppor t pushed to the infan- try company, the greater the need for the infan- try company to possess appropriate personnel augmentation. Company commanders and their planners may request the assistance of subject matter experts, such as motor transport or com- munications personnel, at the company level. Maintenance With the increase in weapon and vehicle density within an infantry co mpany, the importance of conducting and tracking maintenance becomes vital to mission accomplishment. The more aus- tere the environment, the more important PMCS becomes to a successful operation. At a mini- mum, a company must conduct periodic and scheduled PMCS on its equipment and vehicles in addition to maintaining appropriate logs and records. The company commander should con- sider assigning a Marine to the XO to serve as a liaison with the battalion’ s logistic section and track company maintena nce requirements and activities. Finally, infa ntry companies will fre- quently receive equipment under warranty or with contracted maintena nce support. A focused maintenance effort wi thin the company will ensure that company pe rsonnel receive appropri- ate training on the equipment, that unauthorized maintenance does not occu r, that proper mainte- nance does occur, and that coordination with con- tracted maintenance occurs properly. General Engineering Since an infantry compan y does not have organic engineering assets, most engineering tasks require external support. An important planning step for a company is to identify its engineering require- ments. Doing so may require subject matter experts from supporting engineer units, to include EOD. In the realm of general engineering, the infantry company faces it s greatest challenges in terms of resources, resource management, and per- sonnel augmentation when tasked with building and managing FOBs, COPs , expeditionary patrol bases, and other similar fixed sites. The company considers a variety of ge neral engineering issues when dealing with these types of facilities. --- Page 290 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ 13-9 Vertical and Horizontal Construction (Camp Commandant Functions) When building, maintaining, or overseeing new construction, the relationship of buildings and functions to each other and to living spaces is critical. Ammunition, for example, needs a berm and access control featur es, standoff (depending on net explosive weight), and protection from the weather. Table 13-4 lists similar considerations for other functions. Vehicle Staging Area In addition to considerati ons listed in table 13-4, company planners also consider vehicle mainte- nance functions, such as location and protection from the weather, ease and safe movement of vehi- cles in the maintenance area, and the ability to effectively conduct main tenance in the space. Other considerations in clude hazardous material and POL storage and spill containment. Field Mess Location of the field mess includ es being sepa- rate from but practically accessible to berthing areas. The company should require a trained elec- trician to conduct a survey of power requirements and a regularly scheduled review of power usage. The field mess should not only have protection from the elements, but also overhead cover if possible. If storing peri shables, refrigeration requirements are identified as well as the mainte- nance of these assets. Hygiene Facility While obviously kept separated from berthing and messing, hygiene facili ties receive the same consideration in terms of power and protection. Further, company plan ners consider water requirements, how water is delivered, and how wastewater is removed. Hygiene facilities might require placement such that heavy trucks can access them regularly. Forward Collecting Point Forward collecting point s must meet certain standards for treatment of detainees and EPWs. These standards include protection from the effects of combat (such as indirect fire), reason- able protection from th e elements, clean water sources, and adequate hygiene facilities. These requirements occur within the context of proper security and segregati on from friendly berth- ing, C2, medical, and other sensitive areas. Fig- ure 13-3, on page 13-10, provides an example of a hasty forward collecting point. Weapons Storage The infantry company can approach weapons storage in two ways. The first is the system and procedures by which individuals secure their per- sonal weapons. Depending on the operational and threat environment, indi viduals may carry their weapons. Similar to shipboard berthing, individu- als may have their weapons stored and secured in living areas. Finally, it is possible that individu- als will store their wea pons in an armory. The armory is the second a pproach to we apons stor- age. Regardless of ho w the infantry company handles individual wea pons storage, there will always be some requirement for an armory to store weapons for maintena nce or evacuation and to hold extra weapons. The armory should be close to C2 areas and be securable. Table 13-4. Facility and Function Standoff Distances. Keep These This Far From These Food waste 30 m Food preparation area Water source Portable toilets, burn latrines 30 m and downwind Water sources Billeting Portable toilets, burn latrines 100 m and downwind Food preparation area Garbage collection 100 m and downwind Food service area Garbage pit/landfill Safe distance and downwind Water sources POL Safe distance and downhill Water sources Food preparation area Laundry soakage pit/shower area 100 m Food preparation area Laundry soakage pit/shower area 30 m Billeting Water sources Hazardous materials collection 100 m Food preparation area Water sources --- Page 291 --- 13-10 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Force Protection Chapter 12 discusses FP issues in depth. For gen- eral engineering plan ning purposes, however, infantry companies consid er a number of surviv- ability issues. Most surviv ability issues at posi- tions similar to a FOB require hea vy equipment and engineers for such items as prefabricated bar- riers; defensive barriers; guard tower vertical construction; and semiper manent facilities, such as field messes. In add ition to these items, the company must conduct position improvement as a continuing action. Position improvement and maintenance includes fil ling sandbags, maintain- ing sandbag positions, an d establishing concer- tina wire fences and maintaining that wire. Infrastructure Infrastructure applies to the systems with which a facility operates. Water is such a system, as are power and communications . After water, the infantry company’s next major concern is power. While HN power may be available as a conve- nient option, it is often unreliable so it becomes critical to maintain a tact ical backup in the event of a power failure. Also , most countries operate on a different voltage an d phase power than the United States, which requires transformers to avoid destroying assets. Environmental Controls. The infantry com- pany first determines power requirements and then fulfills those re quirements by means of W W L L Construction Supplies Concertina Barbed wire Long and short pickets Staples and anchors Water cans (5 gallon) triple conertina trech or cover water cans/lyster bag latrine Figure 13-3. Forward Collecting Point. --- Page 292 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 13-11 prioritization. Communi cations and command and control represent priorities ahead of secon- dary requirements, such as billeting. Generators. Generators affect the logistic sys- tems through POL and maintenance require- ments. The number of generators needed for a company position is greate r than that determined purely by electrical needs. Planners consider fuel- ing schedules, power loading, and maintenance rotation to ensure that the necessary number of generators runs at all times. Other generator con- cerns are spill containment, noise shielding, cable protection, and protection from the elements. Communications. Not surprisingly, communica- tions is a major infrastru cture concern. In addi- tion to power requirements, company planners consider the requirement s to keep key systems cool, to store and recharge batteries, and to prop- erly locate antenna farms. Transportation Commanders should use organic capability before soliciting additional support or resources for transportation. As a rule, when requesting external transportation assets, infantry compa- nies provide what a nd who needs movement when, while the logistic experts determine the means of movement. Company commanders work closely with their logistic support in those other cases when operational concerns may influ- ence transportation requests. For example, FP requirements might dict ate the use of hardened vehicles. The mission may include GO/NO GO criteria that dictate the de dication of extra trans- portation assets for a “bump” capability. When requesting transportation, company planners con- sider the following:  Cube, weight, and types of cargo, such as haz- ardous materials, explosives, and compatibility.  Number of passengers and their combat equipment.  Infantry companies normally receive light or medium lift assets.  Close coordination with transportation units to account for altitude, li ft capabilities, off-road lift limitations , and other considerations that may require the company to move in multiple trips or may require a dditional transportation assets if the mission dictates otherwise. The unit movement control center controls move- ment through a battalion or HHQ AO. Because of the nature of its work, the center is generally located within or near the COC though it is staffed by the S-4. The unit movement control center is the battalion’s single point for move- ment coordination with HHQ. It manages and coordinates logistical m ovements within the bat- talion AO and tracks logi stical movements com- ing into the AO from ot her units. Nonorganic units moving through the infantry company’s zone or sector should coordinate their movement (start point, route, and release point) with the company operations center and the battalion unit movement control center. The embarkation section of the battalion S-4 will create and manage the battalion’s embarkation scheme of maneuver (tra nsportation of people and things). Comp any planners contribute to the success of the battalion’s embarkation plan by providing an accurate and validated equipment density list. The comp any commander’s consoli- dated memorandum of receipt is a good baseline from which to build the equipment density list. The company appoints one of its personnel to serve as the company em barkation representative who coordinates directly with the battalion embarkation chief and company XO. Services The company commander requests most support- ing services needed by the company through the battalion S-4. The battalion makes decisions on how to meet these reques ts and, in some cases, may use contracted services to support the com- pany. In these cases, it may be necessary to appoint and certify a cont racting officer’s repre- sentative to oversee co mpletion and execution of --- Page 293 --- 13-12 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 contracts. The appointment and training of this individual is coordinate d with the battalion S-4. Services tend to be cr itical low-density capabili- ties that are often not readily available in an aus- tere environment or early on in combat operations. Health Services Fielding healthy Marines directly affects the com- pany’s ability to condu ct operations. While CASEVAC often receives the most attention, pre- ventive medicine and health services do not. Health services consist of everything from avoid- ing immersion foot or malaria in a jungle environ- ment to maintaining a rudimentary aid station and monitoring water quality in a FOB. The senior corpsman in the company, in addition to other duties, serves as the company’s “special staff offi- cer” for HSS and is tasked and positioned accord- ingly. The ability to exercise HSS within a company depends primarily on coordination with the battalion logistic section and BAS. As always, the first line of HSS is always the individual Marine, followed immediately by the vigilance of small unit leaders. Compan ies should ensure that their personnel receive the training and opportu- nity to practice self-aid and buddy aid skills. As briefly discussed in this chapter, the com- pany’s senior line corpsman will be the com- pany’s interface with th e BAS. The abilities of this individual can direct ly affect the company and he should re ceive appropriate supervision. Specifically, the senior corpsman—  Acts as the company commander’s “special staff officer” for medical care.  Works with the BAS to coordinate the replen- ishment of medical supplies and consumables.  Coordinates the evacuation of routine and non- emergency cases to higher levels of care.  Maintains company medical and dental records and coordinates for routine care, such as den- tal exams, medical exams, and vaccination updates.  Conducts preventive medicine inspections. Health Maintenance Proper execution of heal th maintenance ensures the company and its pers onnel are medically pre- pared for combat operations. It begins at home sta- tion with maintenance of such records as dental health, immunizations, and scheduled physicals and continues while depl oyed through identifica- tion of hazards and mitigation, regular health inspections, and immuniza tion maintenance. The company develops a regular health inspection plan of the company’s positions by the battalion’s pre- ventive medicine techni cian. If deployed semi- independently, company commanders should seek augmentation of their staff with a preventive med- icine technician or seek additional training for corpsmen assigned to the company. Casualty Collection Casualty collection is th e assembly of casualties at a designated point and treatment site. Casualty collection points should—  Be located in an area far enough from combat operations that the casu alties are not in danger of being further injured.  Provide a higher level of care than what is immediately available at the combat site.  Prepare casualties for evacuation to higher lev- els of care.  Provide protection to the casualties with avail- able forces to prevent overrun and capture. Casualty Treatment Casualty treatment includ es triage and all levels of care from self-aid to buddy aid to resuscitative care. It begins at the point of injury and contin- ues until the injured i ndividual leaves the com- pany’s control by CA SEVAC. Triaging and classification of casualties begins with the first corpsmen on site and is a continual process. The levels of triage are—  Routine (evacuation typically within 24 hours).  Priority (evacuation typically within 6 hours).  Urgent (immediate ev acuation; “golden hour” requirement). --- Page 294 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 13-13 Casualty Evacuation The evacuation of casual ties is the movement of sick, wounded, or injured personnel from the point of injury or onset of disease to BAS or MTFs. It also includes the movement of personnel between MTFs. The parent battalion or HHQ provides the infantry company with direction and guidance regarding CASEVAC pro cedures. All units have an organic means to evacuate casualties. Golden Hour. When addressing CASEVAC means and limitations, it is imperative to under- stand the “golden hour” requirement for urgent casualties. The golden hour begins at the point of injury and does not end until the arrival of the casualty at an MTF with a surgical capability (Level II or Role II North Atlantic Treaty Organi- zation [NATO]). While HHQ will provide the infantry company guidance on CASEVAC proce- dures and requirements, company commanders must understand how their operations add or sub- tract from the golden hour and plan accordingly when they are operating semi-independently. The company commander should not let the golden hour restrict operations; rather, he should seek augmentation of personnel or assets to mitigate it. A company commander might request forward deployment of CASEVAC as sets to cover a criti- cal period of an operation when the assets nor- mally available would fa il to meet the golden hour. Shock trauma assets normally do not have a surgical capability and are Level I. Additional augmentation with assets, such as armored ambu- lances to get ca sualties safely to a designated LZ or ambulance exchange po int, can also contrib- ute to meeting golden hour requirements. Vehicles. Any vehicle can serve as a means for evacuating casualties. A medical ambulance is the preferred surface means of transportation for casualties and transfer to that type of vehicle should occur as soon as practical in a ground- based CASEVAC plan. The battalion designates casualty and ambulance exchange points for removing casualties from company care and quickly returning ground CASEVAC assets to company control. Air Casualty Evacuation. The use of aerial assets to conduct CASEVAC is a function of the enemy’s air defense threat. Often, ground CASEVAC removes casualties to areas where aircraft can safely extract wounded pe rsonnel. For planning, aeromedical evacuation should replace surface means as soon as practical—especially for priority and urgent casualties. Temporary Hospitalization Temporary hospitalization refers to military treat- ment facilities that ho ld sick, wounded, and injured Marines for a lim ited time, usually not more than 96 hours. Whil e at the MTF, patients are either released or are prepared for further evacuation to treatment centers. In combat, surgi- cal companies or fleet hospitals often serve as centers for temporary hospitalization. Load Planning Company commanders may increase or decrease individual loads based on the specifics of the mis- sion, the requirements of environment, the dura- tion of the operation, and the timing and means of resupply. The basic rule for individual load plan- ning is to carry only those things necessary to accomplish the mission; the company neither has enough time to plan fo r every contingency, nor can it carry everything it could conceivably need. Unit Sustainment The following subparagraphs cover various logis- tic actions taken by the infantry company during sustained operations, including those relating to reporting, distribution, convoys, and command and control. Reporting During operations, a comp any will be required to submit various reports. Th ese reports provide the battalion and HHQ with in formation needed to make logistical and ope rational decisions. In a high operating tempo environment, accurate --- Page 295 --- 13-14 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 reporting is even more cr itical due to potential resource constraints. The risk in taking shortcuts in reporting is that a company will not get the support that it requires in a suitable timeframe. The adage “garbage in, garbage out” applies to reporting. Especially as reporting becomes increasingly digitalized, accurate reporting allows the company commander to more easily use his- torical data to accurately plan and predict future usages and requirements. The logistics status re port (LOGSTAT) provides the battalion a picture of the infantry company’s overall logistic status. It includes personnel and key equipment availability as well as food, water, fuel, and ammunition levels. This report provides a snapshot of the overall readiness of the com- pany. It also allows the battalion to plan and act proactively to resupply a company. Submitting the LOGSTAT can occur vi a C2 systems, e-mail, courier, or radio and is typically done daily. Other supporting reports or supplements to a LOGSTAT include the a mmunition expenditure report and the rapid request. The ammunition expenditure report provides the Marine Corps a detailed list of ammunition issued, expended, and turn ed in. This report is required by MCO 8010.1_. Th is report is submit- ted through electronic or paper means with appro- priate signatures required. During combat operations, this report becomes supplemental to the LOGSTAT that incl udes overall levels of ammunition. Regardless, certain items, such as Category I ammunition (rockets), are closely tracked by serial number, even in combat. Serial numbers of expended rockets must be provided either in the ammunition expenditure report or in the ammunition portion of the LOGSTAT. A rapid request is an infantry company’s method of requesting supplies and logistic services from the battalion or DS element of the LCE (typically a combat logistic batta lion at the infantry com- pany level). Submission of the rapid request can occur via courier, radio, e-mail, and increasingly via various computer-based applications. The LCE will provide the formats for rapid requests. Distribution Methods There are various methods to resupply a company and for a company to re supply platoons during operations. Most often, a company receives its resupply from the battal ion combat trains. Other means of resupply, such as air, combat logistic convoys, or vertical repl enishment, depend upon the proximity of a compa ny to the battalion, the terrain, and the enemy situation. Battalion Combat Train The push method of resupply consists of the sup- porting element automatically sending supplies to a supported element ba sed on LOGSTATs and other reporting. A “push” is generally a predeter- mined amount of suppli es based upon historical data or prior requests. The pull method of resupply involves the supported element requesting spe- cific items from the supporting element. In the pull method, requested items are either delivered to or picked up by the supporte d element. Most often, battalions use a combination of push and pull resupply to support the infantry companies. The method of resupply used depends upon a variety of factors, such as tran sportation assets available, the nature of the supplies provided, and the nature of the operation (offensive or defensive). Company Resupply. The infantry company must closely supervise its supply status in light of cur- rent and future operations. If future operations necessitate movement, then the company must plan to avoid having surplus quantities beyond the company’s ability to lift. Conversely, future operations dictate the types and quantities of sup- plies needed, so the comp any must possess those before the operation begins. Platoon Resupply. In general, the infantry com- pany holds all assets at its position until a pla- toon requests them using the pull resupply method; however, modi fication ca n occur in instances of distributed operations, but platoons normally have less ability to accumulate, move, and handle supplies in quantity than do compa- nies. In some cases, a company may have its own --- Page 296 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 13-15 organic combat train, which can consist of sev- eral light and medium lift assets with trailers. Repair and Replenishment Point There will be times when a company may resupply itself from a repair and replenishment point (RRP). The company may provide its own security and move the supplies in organic transportation or have the supporting unit drop supplies at company and platoon positions. There are two standard configu- rations for an RRP: tailg ate and service station. Both methods apply whet her the infantry com- pany is mounted, dismounted, or both. Tailgate Method. A company usi ng the tailgate method deploys its elemen ts and vehicles into a perimeter defensive posture. The logistic element conducting the resupply then moves around the interior of the perimeter delivering all supplies to the “tailgates” of each ve hicle and element. This method is typically less effective and more time consuming but ma y be more prud ent due to the security situation on the ground. A commander would typically prefer this method during the consolidation phase of a battle when elements cannot leave their respective positions due to security concerns (see fig. 13-4). Service Station Method. A company using the service station method of resupply approaches the RRP as a column of vehicles and elements. Within the RRP, the logist ic element establishes separate areas for each class of supply. As the company’s elements and vehicles move through the RRP, they stop at each area to pick up requested supplies or re ceive maintenance sup- port. This resupply method is usually preferred as it is more efficient and quicker than the tailgate Ammunition Ammunition Road Road Supply Truck Feeding Area Medic Tool truck Prescribed Load List Truck Group Maintenance Area Graves Registration Area EPW Holding Area Command Fuel Fuel Tank Retriever Ammunition Ammunition Road Road AFV Supply Truck Feeding Area Medic Tool truck Prescribed Load List Truck Group Amphibious Assault Vehicle Amphibious Assault Vehicle Maintenance Area Graves Registration Area EPW Holding Area Command Fuel Fuel Tank Retriever Legend: AFV - armored fighting vehicle Figure 13-4. Tailgate Resupply Method. --- Page 297 --- 13-16 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 method. The service station method becomes especially useful when the company is pressed for time and needs to get supplies and mainte- nance in the most expedient manner possible. It is also a good opportunity to take advantage of backhauling. Back hauling is a way to make the most use of vehicular or manpack capabilities moving rearward. Backhauling returns supplies, equipment, or trash to the rear for disposition (see fig. 13-5). Air Delivery In remote and inaccessible areas, due to terrain or enemy situation, there are times when resupply via airdrop is the only so lution. Airdr ops need to be coordinated with th e battalion S-4 section. Additionally, a suitable drop zone will need to be established and secured. Typical container deliv- ery systems are GPS [global positioning system]- guided and have low cost parachute systems. Local policies and proced ures will determine if the infantry company must recover any portions of the container delivery system. Depending on the size of the cargo dropped, companies may need materials handling equipment augmentation, such as cranes or fork lifts, to move the cargo. Emergency air delivery is reserved for extraordi- nary situations. As a rule, normal air delivery missions typically take several days for planning and preparation. Companie s should expect a cer- tain amount of damage to supplies delivered in this manner. Vertical Replenishment or Helicopter Support Teams Missions Resupply may occur via assault support aircraft that carry equipment and supplies either internally or externally. Such support requires prior coordi- nation and external supp ort from a DS LCE with trained landing support personnel. Companies will Supply truck Medic Maintenance holding area Graves registration area Inspection area EPW holding area Tank retriever Fuel Fuel Ammunition Ammunition Figure 13-5. Service Station Resupply Method. --- Page 298 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 13-17 need the augmentation of LCE personnel or choose members of the company for appropriate training. These personnel will assist in receiving the supplies safely and recovering slings and cargo nets used to carry extern al cargo. This method of resupply can be used in emergencies as long as the antiair threat is not too high. Emergency Resupply Commanders will encounter situations in combat when supplies run out fast er than anticipated for various reasons, some which are beyond anyone’s control. Emergency resupply usually focuses on the “Big Three”—food, fuel, and ammunition. Commanders should push these requests up through appropriate C2 means for immediate action by the S-4. Situati ons will dictate whether the resupply comes by air, ground, or a combina- tion of the two. Emerge ncy resupply focuses on items that, if not received, will adversely affect the company’s ability to conduct its assigned mis- sion. Sometimes a technique called cross-level- ing will be required as an interim solution. Cross-leveling is a redi stribution of supplies throughout the unit. Usually done automatically between fire teams a nd squads after every engagement, the company may cross-level sup- plies among platoons when resupply cannot occur. In some instan ces, supplies may be weighted vice evenly redistributed. For example, during preparation for an assault of an enemy trench system, the platoon with the task of SBF may be required to give its hand grenades to the platoon with the task of clearing the trench. Convoys Convoys differ from mounted movement or motorized patrols based on size and purpose. A convoy is a large, orderl y, movement of vehicles for a logistical or administrative purpose. Con- voys may operate in permissive or uncertain envi- ronments. Convoys are no t designed for combat operations, but may conduct combat operations as a function of accomplish ing their larger purpose and mission. The infantry company may receive the mission to provide the combat power to a convoy through an escort mission. Convoy Organization The convoy possesses a headquarters element, a security element, a transport element, and a sup- port element. Because of its size, the convoy orga- nizes these elemen ts into a head, main body, and tail. The convoy escort mirrors this organization: an advance guard with the head of the convoy, an escort main body with th e convoy’s main body, a rear guard with the convoy’s tail element (see fig. 13-6 on page 13-18). The escort commander may designate an additional reserve as necessary. Each convoy is led by a convoy commander. The company commander may fi ll that role; how- ever, if he does no t, then he serves as the convoy security or convoy es cort commander. Tasking the company commander as the convoy com- mander greatly simplifies command and control, especially if enemy contact is likely or imminent. Conversely, tasking co mpany commanders as convoy commanders tasks them with the mission of the convoy, which could consist of hundreds of vehicles belonging to different organizations with various CS and LCE attach ments. So, in addition to managing the company, the company com- mander must manage th e convoy. The convoy’s mission and size and the likelihood and nature of enemy contact should drive decisions about which persons occupy which roles in a convoy’s command and control. The advance guard reconno iters and proofs the convoy route. It search es for signs of enemy activity, such as ambush es and obstacles. Within its capabilities, it attempts to clear the route. The distance and time separation between the advance guard and the main body should be sufficient to allow the lead element to react to problems with- out involving the main bo dy. However, the sepa- ration should be shor t enough that the enemy cannot interdict the rout e between the passage of the advance guard and th e arrival of the main body. The advanc e guard should be task-orga- nized with reconnaissance and mobility assets. --- Page 299 --- 13-18 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Advance Guard Escorted vehicles 1stSgt Fuel Ammo Escorted vehicles Battalion reserve on call Infantry platoon w/ MGS vehicle Translator/ linguist End of main body element Main body lead vehicle Rear guard element Convoy commander CA/linguist 5-10 minutes apart MGS MGS (-) (-) (-) (-) Legend: 1stSgt - first sergeant ammo - ammunition CA - civil affairs MGS - machine gun system Figure 13-6. Convoy Organization. --- Page 300 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 13-19 The company commander may choose to inter- sperse security elements with the vehicles of the convoy main body. These elements may include combat elements (includi ng the rear guard), the convoy commander, add itional linguists, mobil- ity assets, and medical and maintenance support assets. Depending on METT-T, the convoy escort commander may also consider the employment of flank security. The rear guard generally se rves as a reserve posi- tioned to react forward as a maneuver element against enemy actions or threat contact. Located in the convoy tail, the rear guard moves with var- ious additional mobility, medica l, and mainte- nance support assets that increase its flexibility and effectiveness. Convoy Planning Convoy planning takes into account the mission, the makeup of the convoy, the route required (bridges and underpasses may dictate certain routes and eliminate ot hers), and the enemy threat. These preliminary factors dictate the size and composition of an escort; C2 arrangements; and the ability, way, an d means with which the convoy will react to situations it encounters. An exceptionally large c onvoy consisting of con- tracted drivers without ra dios from various other countries is unlikely to be able to do more than go or stop. The convoy, escort, and support ele- ment commanders must consider this when choosing routes. They al so consider pass times (the amount of time it takes the convoy to pass one point) and plan the methods with which they will react to such things as enemy actions and mechanical failure. Prior to the convoy, the convoy commander issues a complete OPORD. Ideally, the OPORD is issued to all the ve hicle commanders in the convoy, but, at a minimum, to all element lead- ers. In the order, the convoy commander addresses command and control, order and routes of march, actions at halts, actions on contact, actions for a break in the convoy, marshalling plan, and dispersal plan upon arrival. Due to the purpose of a convoy, enablers are likely to be different than those normally associ- ated with the infantry company. While the com- pany will benefit fr om the presence of interpreters, a convoy is not a combat operation, so military working dog teams, CI/HUMINT exploitation teams, and similar assets are super- fluous. However, the company commander should be interested in the presence of wreckers, maintenance contact team s, medical support, and route clearance assets. In particular, if the opera- tional environment does not support reasonable response times for route cl earance assets to move to the assistance of a co nvoy, then the company commander should seek to have those assets aug- ment the convoy. If a convo y must wait for route clearance assets, securi ng the convoy for a long period of time becomes another consideration for the company commander. A convoy is large, unwieldy, and slow to respond; conversely, an infantry company places a premium on finishing the fight and operates in a mounted environment in which every vehicle is a weapon and participates in combat. The infantry company commander task ed to escort convoys must reconcile these divergences. The actions the escorting infantry comp any takes upon contact must place the safety and continued movement of the convoy as its priority. When reacting to an am bush, the company com- mander seeks to accompli sh three things: sup- press and fix the enemy, maintain an open window through which the convoy commander can push the convoy, and prevent fratricide. This is generally accomplished by placing the infan- try’s combat power between the enemy and the convoy and—by either leapfrogging other secu- rity elements forward or conducting battle hando- vers between sequential security elements—to continue to provide conv oy security as it passes the ambush. The convoy escort finishes the fight through either the destru ction of the enemy or by breaking contact. Depending on the operational environment, com- pany commanders esco rting convoys may --- Page 301 --- 13-20 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 encounter many different forms of obstacles, including deliberate roadblocks, IEDs, and large groups of demonstrators. Ideally, route reconnais- sance and the advanced guard will identify and dispose of obstacles early or find bypasses. If that is not possible, then the company commanders must quickly reduce or bypass the obstacle and provide security for th e halted convoy. The lon- ger the convoy sits, the gr eater the security risk it assumes. If the obstacle presents a greater chal- lenge than the convoy can handle organically or no bypass or negotiable solution is possible, then aerial overwatch, route clearing assets, and secu- rity augmentation should be requested. During halts, the infa ntry company escort remains vigilant regardless of what the rest of the convoy does. The company provides 360-degree security in the best manner possible, taking advantage of terrain to provide clear, interlock- ing fields of fire and observation. The company should endeavor to move at least 100 meters from the convoy to provide so me standoff from enemy small arms. Logistic Command and Control The requirements associated with distributed company operations dictate a more robust C2 capability for the company commander. This capability plus the increased responsibility for CSS that exists at the company when conducting semi-independent operations result in the com- pany exercising logis tical functions normally associated with the battalion and above. The use of computer-based logist ic systems requires the same attention to detail and accurate reporting needed by radio and paper-based systems. Indeed, as the ability to more effectively track and collect information increases, the require- ment for accurate reporting increases. It is more important to put energy into properly using all reporting systems and getting CSS support in a timely manner, than to at tempt to circumvent or shortcut the system and waste the company’s energies on mitigating the inevitable poor effects. Planning The existence of logistic C2 systems and the capability to use them do not automatically trans- late into the ability to do so. As the communica- tions plan is develope d during problem framing and COA development, company leadership must ensure the battalion co mmunications section is aware of the company’s requirements. The battal- ion’s communicators must account and plan for the additional computer assets, additional soft- ware and network requir ements, and additional bandwidth demand the comp any will require. If the company does not plan appropriately, it will be unable to access desi red systems or, in doing so, find that all other C2 systems are degraded. In-Transit Visibility Systems In-transit visibility syst ems allow a us er to track the actual location of supplies and equipment while they are shipped. The system allows for tracking items embarked on ship, located in stag- ing areas, and moved ac ross the AO. Addition- ally, by tracking the loca tion of specific items, the company can track the location of the assets carrying them, such as the location of the com- pany’s trains or other logistic vehicles transiting the company’s battlespace. As with any similar system, the quality of th e information input into the system affects the qua lity of the information from the system. In this case, a key component to the system is radio freq uency identification tags assigned to items; poor or nonexistent labeling results in poor or nonexistent information. Request Management Systems Request management systems allow for the orga- nized, automated management and tracking of a company’s CSS-related requests across support- ing agencies and func tions. The company may track the progress of a request through its lifecycle without the need to call or radio back to the sup- porting element. It allo ws the company to view where the request is in its cycle, follow up if noth- ing has happened, view who has acted on it, and provide historical data after an operation. This, of --- Page 302 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 13-21 course, is only possible with the appropriate level of automated equipment and connectivity. Consolidation and Transition The following subparagraphs address logistic considerations that acco mpany consolidation on the objective, transition to follow-on operations, and transition to redeployment. Battle Damage Repair After an operation, the company commander must conduct an immediat e assessment of the company’s equipment a nd supply. The battalion logistic section must receive a rapid report on equipment damaged beyond the company’s abil- ity to immediately repair and place it back into service. Timely reporting leads to more effective repair and replacement of damaged equipment, but it also allows for dropping equipment deemed a “combat loss,” such as captured, destroyed, abandoned, or lost equipment, from the com- pany’s property records. In many cases, the loss or degradation of certain pieces of equipment is one of the battalion CCIR s, which also dictates timely and accurate repo rting. Accurate docu- mentation and aggressive follow-up with the bat- talion supply officer is sometimes necessary to ensure that lost assets are properly removed from a company commander’s pr operty records, such as the Consolidated Me morandum of Receipt or Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane Report, prior to the next reconc iliation or turnover to a relieving unit. It is best to document a loss and ensure the correct steps are taken to reconcile it while the memory of the events leading to that loss is still fresh and can be accurately recorded. Equipment Accountability and Turnover Company commanders are responsible to their battalion commanders for accurate accounting and maintenance of company equipment. While com- pany commanders and their staffs frequently work with the battalion’s logi stic, maintenance, and supply officers for technical and procedural issues related to company equi pment records and files, those officers work on behalf of the battalion commander who will hold company commanders responsible for success or failure in this regard. Relief In Place Equipment Turnover By their expeditionary na tures, infantry compa- nies often deploy and fall in on equipment already forward deploye d, whether in peacetime or in combat. Sometime s this equipment might originate from a maritime prepositioning ship or because of a turnover with a unit in place. There is a good chance that company commanders might turn over substantial amounts of equipment and supplies, such as Clas s I or Class V, to a unit relieving them. Reliefs in place are difficult oper- ations, made more so when the relieved unit is in contact with the enemy. It is undesirable to com- plicate the operational s ituation with distracting logistical issues. Having accurate property records and knowing the status and location of all the company’s equipmen t and supplies prior to the RIP is essential to a successful turnover. Criti- cal items that can cause delays and even disci- plinary action include the following:  Serialized small arms accountability. Ensure records are accurate and that the serial numbers on the weapons match them. Regular inspec- tions, combat loss re porting, and other mea- sures ensure accuracy.  Electronic key manageme nt system equipment accountability.  Serialized ammuniti on accountability. Keep detailed inventory record s of all rockets and missiles and track their expenditure by serial number. Equipment Record Jackets In addition to the actual equipment, companies must ensure the turnover of all relevant record jackets, PMCS records, pending maintenance, and supply transactions/re quests to the relieving unit. This precludes the follow-on force from having to recreate historical data. --- Page 303 --- 13-22 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Redeployment Operations Most of the factors alr eady discussed in previ- ous paragraphs apply to companies preparing to redeploy; however, redeployment does offer sev- eral other unique factor s to consider, such as environmental washdown , ordnance removal, and maintenance. On those occasions when a company is redeploy- ing with its equipment, a washdown of that equipment is required, re gardless of whether embarked aboard naval ships, commercial lift, strategic lift, or mariti me prepositioning force assets. In order to enforce various rules and regu- lations, certifie d agricultural inspectors will supervise and inspect th e washdowns. While the battalion logistic section will normally coordi- nate these actions, company commanders can expect to provide the manpower and supervision to conduct the washdown. Through proper leadersh ip, company command- ers create an environment in their companies that encourages proper st orage, handling, and accountability of ammunition and ordnance. In addition, a rigorous and thorough inspection must occur in order to ensure that all ammunition and ordnance is removed from equipment prior to redeployment and embarkation. As practical, commanders should identify and mitigate all equipment maintenance issues prior to embarkation. Broken equipment, equipment leaks, and other issues may result in embarka- tion delay. Orders Process and Logistics Commanders can enhance th e quality of the sup- port they receive by working closely with unit logisticians and providi ng requirements for sup- port, but not necessar ily requesting specific assets. Additionally, re gularly referencing unit SOPs and thoroughly re ading OPORDs, particu- larly Paragraph 4 (Admin istration and Logistics) of Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service Support), will provide logistical situational awareness. Logistics is a commander’s responsibility and sets his operational limits. When company command- ers develop their OPORDs, they do not omit para- graph 4, reference annex D, or state “by SOP” because not everyone will always know the SOP, and SOPs cannot cover every possible situation. Within paragraph 4, the lo gistic portions consist of a logistic paragraph (subparagraph B) and a medical services paragraph (subparagraph G). At the infantry company level, especially when con- ducting semi-independent or dispersed opera- tions, it is not enough to only consider the four Bs—beans, bullets, Band-Aids, and bad guys— that are often sufficient at lower echelons. The company commander, at a minimum, addresses the concept of logistic support that covers who, what, when, where, why, and how. The logistic concept of support should read simi- larly to an operational concept of support and should address logistic issues before, during, and after the mission. It sh ould describe how the infantry company will be supported, the relation- ship between the LCE a nd the infantry company, the use of organic assets (if any), and days of sup- ply issues. In addition, company commanders offer guidance on the following:  Logistic and transportation assumptions, if any.  Sustainment priorities and resources.  Priority and movement of major logistic items for each phase of the concept.  HN, joint, and coalition support as applicable.  Location and priority of main resupply points.  Transportation policies, guidance, and proce- dures.  Detailed planning requirements and subordi- nate unit tasking. In addition to the logistic concept of support, com- pany commanders add the following guidance:  Prescribed load.  Planned resupply.  CASEVAC procedures and control points.  Repair/recovery procedures. --- Page 304 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 13-23  EPW handling and collection points.  Mortuary affairs guidance.  CSS request methods. Captured Personnel Captured personnel are EPWs and detainees. The two groups are legally different categories, though both groups are tr eated in accordance with the law of war and the Geneva Conven- tions. Enemy prisoners of war, detainees, and captured enemy equipment and materiel often provide excellent comb at information. This information is of tactical value only if the infan- try company processes and evacuates captured personnel and materiel to the rear quickly. The infantry company can expect detailed and spe- cific guidance from HHQ on handling captured personnel and material. All persons captured, detain ed, or retained by the infantry company during the course of military operations are consider ed “detained” persons until their status is determined by higher military and civilian authorities. Higher echelons of com- mand possess military police units to take control and evacuate detainees; however, for practical purposes, the infantry company mu st provide professional initial processing and handling of captured personnel and equipment. Detainee han- dling is a resource intensive and politically sensi- tive operation that requ ires detailed training, guidance, and supervision. Detention Methodology Figure 13-7 addresses the procedures and meth- odology executed by the infantry company from the decision to detain an individual through his final disposition. The actu al time associated with this methodology can vary widely depending on the theater, operation, and guidance of HHQ. Detention Criteria The infantry company can detain any person who is a security threat or identified as a HVT or HVI. Detention of women, children (normally defined as 15 years old or yo unger), and religious and political leaders must be approved by HHQ. Tac- tical patience and discrimination on the part of the commander needs to be employed. Since a pattern of detaining and releasing persons for no apparent purpose can create far more problems than it solves, detentions should only be con- ducted when there is a considerable amount of evidence of wrongdoing or the detainee is caught in the act. “First, do no ha rm” is a principle that applies here. Time of capture Detainee at battalion Detainee at company Detainee at RDF Detainee at RDF Decision: Keep or Release Initial Questioning Detailed Interrogation Detailed Interrogation 6 HR 24 HR 72 HR 14 Days Decision: Keep or Release Decision: Keep or Release Send to TIF Legend: HR - hours RDF - regional detention facility TIF - theater internment facility Figure 13-7. Detainee Timeline Example. --- Page 305 --- 13-24 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Apprehending the Detainee While subject to some modification, handling of personnel generally follows the same process— search, silence, safeguard, segregate, speedy evacuation, and tag. At th e point of detention, photographs are taken of each of the captured personnel; any evidence a ssociated with them; and any suspicious things in the vicinity, such as firing ports in a wall. Detainees are flexcuffed and blindfolded (not hoo ded) with blacked-out goggles, engineer tape, or something similar and guarded by not less than two Marines (injured detainees are guarded as we ll). If at all possible, the company solicits statements from witnesses (preferably more than one ) present at the time of the detention. Vehicles or similar items that belong to captured pers onnel, but do not possess evidence value, are secure d and left at the point of detention. Photographs will be taken of such items. Vehicle photographs include license plates and any special or notable features. These photo- graphs are essential for countering any false claims of abuse or damage from the enemy. Detention Facility Procedures Depending upon the operational environment, the infantry company may no t have a “facility” per se. At a minimum, the co mpany will establish a holding area with at least the same level of com- fort and shelter as that enjoyed by the company itself. The company logs the arrival of captured personnel per the format in table 13-5. After being logged in, each deta inee receives a medical screening by the senior line corpsman. The corps- man administers another medical screening when a detainee exits the company area, whether released or forwarded to the next HHQ. This screening is also important to counter false claims of abuse. The company mu st also follow specific rules regarding chain of custody; reports; and the treatment, evacuation, and release of detainees. The company tags all evidence with a custody doc- ument to facilitate track ing the chain of custody. When transfers occur, the receiving unit provides a receipt for the detainee , their possessions, and associated evidence to the transferring unit. At the point of deten tion, the detaining unit reports the occurrence immediately to the com- pany COC in terms of who, what, where, when, why, and how. The company COC immediately informs battalion headqu arters and proactively follows up with relevant additional information as it becomes available. In turn, the battalion WO follows local reporting requirements to HHQ and appropriate intelligence, judge advocate, medi- cal, and detention elements. While local conditions may dictate specific requirements, all capture d personnel are treated with respect and dignity and given water and cul- turally appropriate food. Marines use “touch and tell” translation graphic aids to enable communi- cation regarding medical requirements, life sup- port, and hygiene needs. Marines assigned to the company holding area or detention facility receive use of force and fa cility procedures train- ing, and they must sign to acknowledge receipt of the training. If assigned for anything more than short duration, thes e Marines will receive regular sustainment training. Companies operat- ing detention facilities fo r any appreciable length of time should develop written manuals to prop- erly codify procedures. Table 13-5. Company Detainee Logbook Format. DETAINEE # DETAINEE NAME DTG OF DETENTION REASON FOR DETENTION DD 2745 # WITNESS NAMES 2/7-E0001 2/7-E0002 2/7-E0003 Legend DTG date-time group --- Page 306 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________________ 13-25 If the decision is to reta in the captured personnel, the company evacuates th em to HHQ as soon as possible. Depending on the operational environ- ment, there may be specific periods associated with how long a detainee may remain at each level of command. In op erations with high vol- umes of captured personne l, HHQ will generally push forward to evacuate EPWs and detainees to relieve the company from extraordinary transpor- tation requirements. Upon arrival at the battalion, captured personnel undergo a similar acceptance process as that at the co mpany level. The battal- ion follows the chain of custody procedures out- lined previously. The manner in which de tainees are released is just as important as how they are detained and handled during detention. Companies should develop a “release plan” that provides for the detainee’s immediate ne eds upon release from custody and places their detention in context. The detainee receives an ex it medical screening from the company’s senior co rpsman. Both entry and exit screenings, along w ith all associated docu- mentation, is retained by the company. Upon release, the company makes a reasonable effort to return the detainee to th e point of detention. The company may do this thro ugh physical transpor- tation or may release the detainee to local secu- rity forces, civic leader ship, or family members. Simply releasing detainee s without any consider- ation of their personal needs generates anger and resentment and is a good way to make another enemy if the person was not one in the first place. --- Page 307 --- 13-26 _________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 This Page Intentionally Left Blank --- Page 308 --- APPENDIX A ENVIRONMENT The infantry company is deployable worldwide and, therefore, compan y commanders expect the requirement to operate in “every clime and place.” As discussed in chapter 12, environments generally are hot or cold, wet or dry, and high or low in altitude. Within th ese general classifica- tions are rural, urban, jungle, mountain, or desert settings and conditions. To approach all of these various conditions, the Marine Corps produces a family of warfighting pub lications that address each. This appendix covers the most common environments. Finally, co mpanies must train and plan as able for the environments they are likely to encounter. At a minimum, company command- ers should seek to ensure that their companies—  Possess cadres of pers onnel with specialized skills sets, such as assault climbers, jungle leaders, and urban warfare specialists.  Conduct environmentally appropriate medical training, such as how to recognize and treat altitude sickness, various jungle diseases, and parasites.  Possess a fundamental understanding of unique equipment requirements, such as assault lad- ders, cold weather cl othing, and jungle appro- priate footwear. Urban Operations Since urban areas have tr aditionally held enemy centers of gravity, such as government, wealth, concentrations of popu lation, and communica- tions infrastructure, and the worldwide trend is toward increased urbanizat ion especially in the littorals, it is likely th at infantry companies can expect to operate across a range of military oper- ations in urban environments. Urban Considerations The urban environment is complex and challeng- ing, combining manmade features with the terrain and climate of nature. In general, the concentration of structures, facilities, and populations make an environment urban. Popu lation centers, such as villages, towns, and citie s, are all urban environ- ments. Commanders use METT-T and civil con- siderations when planning for urban environments. Mission As expected, the compan y’s mission, along with HHQ intent and end state, is a critical starting point for urban mission planning. Planners must determine specific aspects of the mission, such as whether the tactical task “clear” means every building along a route or just key terrain, or whether the company needs to leave behind secu- rity detachments along a route. Company com- manders consider the concept of the three-block war, command and control, and movement. Three-Block War . Commanders must determine if the company is prepared to execute within the three-block war concept. Missions that begin against prepared enemy positions, requiring repet- itive explosive breach ing against barricaded rooms, can quickly dema nd precision engage- ment due to the unexpected presence of civilians on the battlefield. Simila rly, company members must possess the necessary equipment to move from permissive searching of a city block to high- intensity operations if, for example, they discover an enemy safe house. Am ong the many consider- ations regarding the three-block war are BSG, the penetration effects of weapons, and plans for han- dling refugees and displaced persons. --- Page 309 --- A-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Command and Control . Due to the dispersed nature of urban operatio ns, command and control is difficult and radio a nd verbal communications, line of sight, and various pyrotechnic signals are made more complicated. While the defense, even a mobile defense, can mitigate some of these issues through such tec hniques as field tele- phones, the company co mmander must generally rely on a combination of mission tactics and top- down planning to exerci se effective command and control. Extensive use of tactical control measures, such as boundaries, phase lines, check- points, and event-driven brevity codes, help build situational awareness across the force. In addi- tion to operatio n-specific rehearsals, a well- rehearsed company SOP (that addresses such rou- tine activities as contact drills, building entry and clearing, linkup procedures, CASEVAC, and resupply) simplifies operations, builds confi- dence, and avoids adding further confusion to the urban environment. Movement . Due to the heightened three-dimen- sional nature of the ur ban environment, the dan- ger of movement in the open becomes ever greater in proportion to the level of threat. Terrain study is the first critical step in determining what movement is necessary and where and which structures require such actions as occupation, overwatch, suppression, or obscuration in order to provide an advantage to the infantry company. Company commanders allow subordinate ele- ments to take maximum advantage of covered and concealed routes within the urban area. If mounted, infantry uses tanks or other armored vehicles to assist its movement through the fire- power and armor shielding of the vehicles. Enemy Key factors that affect the company comman- der’s problem framing are the type of enemy force expected in the urban area, the enemy’s probable COAs, and the ROE. Rules of engage- ment that are more rest rictive work to a defen- der’s advantage; conversely, less restrictive ROE work to an attacker’s advantage. An enemy working in a permissive or uncertain environ- ment directly influences the company com- mander’s choices on move ment techniques, FP, and use of firepower; su ch choices would change in a hostile environment. The urban environ- ment often enhances the inherent advantages of the tactical defense: if the infantry company is defending, it benefits; if company commanders are executing offensive or stability operations, they must acknowledge the defender’s advan- tage and plan ac cordingly. The enemy defending in an urban environmen t can quickly teach a company commander the difference between bold and calculated COAs and rash COAs based on chance. Terrain The urban environment consists not only of the natural terrain upon which it is built—hills, val- leys, flat land—but also layers of manmade terrain both above and below ground. Commanders and subordinate leaders must consider all aspects of terrain, environment, a nd climate when conduct- ing urban operations across the conflict continuum. Maps may neither provide enough detail for urban terrain analysis nor reflect significant infra- structure, such as sewer, water, and gas systems; subways; railroads; and electrical and communi- cation infrastructure. For all types of operations, satellite and grid refe rence graphic imagery is preferred. When availabl e, commanders should use such aids as building or city plans, engineer- ing prints, aerial photographs, or tourist maps that may assist them in their analysis of the terrain. Key and decisive terrain are not always the same. Key terrain may consis t of buildings, high ground, and other aspects that provide security, overwatch, and fields of fire; it enables safer movement. Decisive terrain may refer to control of a local market that is surrounded by high buildings and is extremel y vulnerable to multiple avenues of approach. Cont rol of decisive terrain may require identification and control of the key terrain that affects it. --- Page 310 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ A-3 In addition to major rout es of movement within the urban area, infantry companies must gain awareness and, when pos sible, intimate knowl- edge of alleys, throughway s, footpaths, and other covered and conceal ed routes within the built-up area. Intentional or unintentional rubbling is another route consideration. Troops and Support Available In large scale, conventional operations against sig- nificant urban areas, in fantry companies conduct offensive and defensive tasks within the context of battalion operations. Fo r most other situations, companies work semi-independently and the com- pany commander assesses the company’s relative combat power in the same manner as for other operations. Working in urban environments gen- erally requires company augmentation in terms of combat engineers, medical capability, translators, and firepower from HMGs, ATGMs, tanks, and occasionally even direct fire artillery. The urban environment is complex an d the hazards, such as electricity, gas leaks, wa ter, and weakened struc- tures, are greater than merely the enemy. Com- pany commanders should seek necessary support beyond the company. Across a range of military operations, the urban environment demands mo re troops than other environments do. In the o ffense, this need is par- ticularly acute to meet relative combat power requirements and to accomplish the number of other tasks required, such as clearing buildings, providing security, controll ing civilians, evacuat- ing casualties, and conducting resupply. Due to the complexities of employing supporting arms within the urban environment, fire support coordination tends to occur at HHQ levels where such issues as collateral damage, weaponeering, and airspace coordination are more easily resolved. Collateral da mage estimates in the urban environment take into account the diffi- culty of tracking friendly unit location, ROE and the presence of civilians, and the general desire not to rubble the urban environment (from both the standpoint of future use and the desire not to aid enemy defensive ef forts). Weaponeering issues to consider are not only collateral damage estimates, but also penetration, building composi- tion, and changes to airspace controls due to high trajectory artill ery fires. The FST is an integral component in planning offensive, defensive, and on-call fires and their associated communication, target identification, and control issues. Regardless of the type of operation, armor often proves a valuable tool due to its firepower, ability to shield dismounts, psychological effect, and lift capability. The basics of armor and infantry coor- dination apply in the ur ban environment as well. If tanks and in fantry cooperat e to mitigate armor’s vulnerability to enemy antitank weap- ons, then armor can greatly assist the company commander’s requirement s to isolate and sup- press objectives since it is able to expose itself in open areas where infant ry could not survive. Company commanders s hould work closely with attached armor to ensure that tanks bring the right ammunition mix into the urban environment. Time Despite the deceptive presence of roads and the traditional fast pace of li fe associated with urban areas, combat ope rations in built- up areas have a slower pace and operating tempo than those in other environments. As the level of threat increases, so does the need for security, which slows down movement; bounding overwatch is inherently slower than traveling overwatch. Clear- ing and searching multip le buildings, rooms, garages, yards, or alleys is slow even without the presence of a defending enemy. Finally, the mere physical exertion and stress associated with urban combat quickly fatigues and slows company per- sonnel. Commanders must plan accordingly in order to mitigate these factors and to maintain rel- ative momentum and speed over the enemy, who must also deal with th e same problems. Slow- downs are mitigated by keeping plans simple: pre- planning resupply, rotating the main effort frequently, and maintaining and using a reserve. --- Page 311 --- A-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Civil Considerations When conducting operati ons across a range of military operations in ur ban environments, con- tact with some portion of the populace will occur. In stability and similar operations, contact with the populace is desired and sought. In these opera- tions, civilian considera tions, such as legitimate governance or quality of lif e, become part of the commander’s mission. In conflicts of higher inten- sity, contact with the population is likely to come in the form of displaced persons or refugees. Pop- ulations may be friendly, neutral, or hostile. Infan- try company commanders mu st plan to encounter civilians on the battlefield and remain flexible, using combat power accordingly. Commanders must provide a plan and specific guidance to com- pany personnel regarding civilians. Offensive Considerations In the attack, the company commander focuses planning on how best to get the main effort to the decisive point. Actions on the objective often splinter into small unit engagements, when intent and purpose provide the uniformity needed for what becomes a squad fight. The urban en- vironment is no differen t. Committing to offen- sive operations in an urban environment results from situations in which the particular area offers the following:  Tactical advantage . Road or railway infra- structure increases friendly mobility or reduces enemy mobility.  Political advantage. The possession of the ur- ban area itself represents an IO victory or might increase the legitimacy of the HN government.  Economic advantage . Perhaps the designated urban area contains an important banking center or a key industry that, if denied to the enemy, directly impacts his ability to wage war.  Potential threat to further operations. A poten- tial threat, such as the enemy presents in the urban area, represents too great a threat to by- pass or perhaps the terra in canalizes friendly operations and makes bypassing an urban area infeasible. Regardless of the opera tional area (offense, defense, or stability), infantry company com- manders consider the miss ion and its related exe- cution points when cond ucting offensive actions in an urban environment. The doctrine of maneuver warfare finds some of its greatest applicability in the urban environ- ment when limited resour ces coupled with unit isolation place a premium on leadership, task and purpose, and commander’ s intent. The use of attachments and enablers, such as combat engi- neers, medical augmentation, and translators, are critical. Regardless of where they find themselves along a range of military operat ions, company commanders can generally expect to execute the following missions either individually or in con- junction with other companies and battalions: iso- lation of an urban objective, attack of an enemy outpost, attack of a block or group of buildings, assault of a building, mo vement to contact, sei- zure of key urban terrain, and raids. Isolation of an Urban Objective Unlike a cordon, which oc curs in a permissive or uncertain environment, isolation of an urban objective more closely resembles the isolation requirements for attack ing a strong point. The company may serve as the isolation element for a battalion-sized attack or the company commander may assign this mission to a platoon for a com- pany assault. Th e purpose of isol ation is to limit the enemy’s options on the objective by cutting off his escape or rein forcement. Company com- manders and their platoons use observed fire, direct fire, physical oc cupation, or appropriate combinations thereof to achieve the isolation effect. In hostile envi ronments, company com- manders remain mindful of how they move to and occupy assigned posi tions in order to pre- serve surprise and avoi d the risk of moving in open areas. Attack of an Enemy Outpost An infantry company ma y encounter enemy out- posts, checkpoints, or strong points in its advance. --- Page 312 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ A-5 A company may conduct a hasty attack over a substantially weaker enemy, it may bypass the outpost, or it may attack and reduce the outpost using classic strong point reduction tactics—iso- late, suppress, breach, and assault—in conjunc- tion with urban tactics, techniques, and procedures regarding such actions as urban movement, build- ing entry, and room clearing. Attack of a Block or Group of Buildings Companies may attack a block or group of build- ings. The size of the block or group of buildings determines the compan y’s mission. A suburban, residential block consis ting of single-family dwellings might be an appropriate mission for a company to isolate and clear on its own. However, even in an uncertain or permissive environment, an infantry company is unlikely to receive a mis- sion to clear a city bloc k with multiple buildings of varying constr uction and size on its own. In such cases, the company will more likely serve as the main effort or a supporting effort, such as an isolation force, for a battalion operation. Assault of a Building Companies normally conduct this mission as part of a battalion operation wh en the building is too large for a platoon to assault and clear (vice search). The company must enter the building, gain a foothold, and clear the building. This action could be the main effort of the battalion or the company could conduct this mission as part of a supporting effort, such as passing the main effort company through the newly cleared building so they can assault the main objective beyond. Movement to Contact Companies may use one of the two movement to contact methods in urban operations. One of the principal considerations of the company com- mander is command and control and the nature of the enemy threat. Using search and attack method- ology in an urban environment risks significant C2 issues. If used against a strong and organized enemy force, a search and attack may prove prob- lematic to the survival of the company’s elements. On the other hand, while an approach march tech- nique greatly reinforces command and control, company commanders face the fact that a smaller, defused enemy threat in an uncertain environment will easily evade this method. Seizure of Key Urban Terrain Companies may seize key te rrain in order to pro- vide an advantage to friendly forces. Key terrain may be overpasses, building complexes, traffic circles, surrounding natu ral terrain, bridges, or transmitters. The compan y usually conducts this mission independently to facilitate movement or other operations. Raids Companies may perform raids on urban terrain, which they plan similarly to raids on other ter- rain. Objectives may be located in built-up areas and the company may ha ve to move through urban and other terrain in order to arrive at them. The company normally conducts this mission independently, but it may also conduct a raid in support of a battalion area raid. Defensive Considerations The general considerations for establishing the defense in an urban envi ronment are no different from those covered in chap ter 7. The urban envi- ronment greatly favors the defender, especially a defender who possesses th e time to prepare and intimately knows the terrai n he is defending. The reasons an infantry co mpany may de fend in an urban environment are—  Tactical advantage . Retaining an urban area may allow friendly forces to control key ave- nues of approach, block movement, or threaten the enemy’s flank or rear if bypassed. Further, continuing to hold an urban area with important rail and road networks increases friendly mobil- ity while restricting the enemy’s movement.  Deny the enemy an im portant strategic or political objective . Even though any particular urban area may lack tactical importance, it may possess important political, psychological, --- Page 313 --- A-6 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 cultural, and national morale factors that are worth denying the enemy or retaining for friendly purposes.  Retain economic capacity . An urban area may possess key industry, po rt, finance, and other wealth-related capacity that is important to retain.  Economy of force . Since the urban area favors the defender, who can effectively engage a numerically superior at tacker, a defense in an urban environment can free friendly forces for offensive action elsewher e. Similarly, by forc- ing the enemy to co mmit large amounts of resources to an assault in an urban environ- ment, the enemy must weaken forces else- where, creating opportunities for friendly action.  Logistics. Cities often form logistical hubs due to the presence of port, rail, and air facilities. In addition, due to the complex nature of the ter- rain, CSS units can increase concealment and survivability by moving th eir functions into an urban environmen t. Such resources, once cre- ated, often drive a re quirement for defense since they are not easily displaced or recreated elsewhere. Patrol Considerations Patrolling in the urban environment accomplishes all of those tasks discussed in chapter 8 in addition to remaining the comp any commander’s only organic intelligence collection asset (see chap. 4). Whether conducting patr ols in a peacekeeping operation or conducting a reconnaissance on a pre- pared enemy position, the company’s patrol plan in the urban environment faces the same chal- lenges present in all urban operations—command and control and movement. In the case of patrol- ling, company commanders must determine how the company maintains co mmunications with its dismounted or mounted patrols and how it moves to support those patrols in both routine and emer- gency matters. Company commanders should con- sider increased contact with the populace, use of the reserve, and communications. Increased Contact with the Populace Regardless of the level of conflict in which the company is participatin g, patrols are likely to encounter the local population. In many opera- tions, the entire purpose of the patrol is to make such contact. It is important that patrols leave with detailed, specific instructions on how to deal with friendly, neutral, and hostile populations. Use of the Reserve Company commanders make difficult patrol plan decisions about how, wh en, and if to support patrols with the use of a reserve. In stability oper- ations, COIN, and similar environments, commit- ting a reserve to take a dvantage of a contact or discovery made by a patrol or to extricate a patrol from an enemy threat be yond its ability is a mat- ter of course. However, at the higher end of the conflict continuum, that may not always be the case. Regardless, if committing the reserve in support of patrols is part of the patrol plan, then such issues as urban movement, command and control, CASEVAC, and linkup procedures must receive the attention of the company planners. Communications The urban environment already challenges radio communications within the company. This prob- lem increases considerably with the use of dis- mounted patrols moving any appreciable distance from the company lines. Company commanders must consider the ways in which they can estab- lish continuous communic ations coverage, such as by conducting a co mmunications survey as part of patrol route planning, requesting addi- tional communication assets, or bulking up patrols with additional personnel to establish retransmission points. Mountain Warfare Major mountain ranges are found across the world in desert, jungle, and cold climate areas. Traditional operations in the mountains focus on controlling heights and passes, since mountains --- Page 314 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ A-7 normally presented an obs tacle to mobility and were not objectives themselves. Even when con- ducting stability, COIN, or similar operations, the focus on control of local heights and passes has not changed significantly. Infantry company commanders operating in mountainous environ- ments must expect significant limitations on operations; specificall y, the impact on the com- pany and its equipment of severe environmental conditions and the extrao rdinary challenges to ground mobility. Mountain Considerations The complex, compartm entalized nature of mountainous terrain changes the fundamental nature of tasks, techniques, and procedures across all six of the warfighting functions and aviation. Units and personnel may require specialized training in such skills as military mountaineer- ing, snow mobility, and appropriate field craft. Mountain considerations can also be thought of in terms of METT-T and its effects on civilians. Mission When conducting problem framing, infantry company commanders must remember that the mountain environment not only slows move- ment, but also increases the difficulty of provid- ing normal levels of support and conducting simple tasks: patrolli ng becomes more support intensive; the na ture of the terr ain significantly influences patrol route selection and effective- ness; and the altitude and the nature of airflow in the mountains may preclude UA support. On the other hand, due to limits on mobility and canali- zation caused by terrain, such items as avenues of approach and key terrain become easier to ana- lyze than in environments that are more open. Since terrain limits VHF [very high frequency] communications, infantry companies will rely on HF [high frequency] and satellite communications assets that drive a training requirement for the company commander’s consideration. Increased use of retransmission sites, HF, and satellite communications will mit igate communication difficulties, but will al so drive greater FP re- quirments and create a need for more com- munication resources than the infantry company normally possesses. Movement becomes more difficult in a mountain- ous environment, but it does not become impossi- ble. Similar to other co mplex terrain, mountain movement is methodic al, well thought out in advance, well supporte d, and slower. Since the mountains penalize all movement equally, infan- try company commanders can maintain tempo and momentum dominanc e over the enemy, but must adjust their timeline expectations and fully appreciate the support in terms of resources now associated with even simple movements. Due to limited mobility corridors and canalization, com- pany commanders consider the ability of units to mass combat power if they are widely spread out. The amount of time the company has to prepare for mountain operations is an important planning consideration. Company commanders tailor oper- ational expectations accordingly. An infantry company deploying direct ly into a high altitude environment, for example, will suffer from fail- ing to conduct the prefe rred methods of gradual high altitude acclimatization. In such a case, com- pany commanders would modify their opera- tional expectations becau se company personnel would initially be ineffective due to oxygen depletion and potential altitude sicknesses. Enemy The enemy faces the same issues as the infantry company when operating in mountainous environ- ments. Regardless of whether enemies are natural mountain warriors or not, they must resolve and mitigate the limitations of mountain warfare in the same manner as the infa ntry company. They are just as likely to seek the easiest paths of movement and to balk at and require technical resources to climb cliff faces. In determining likely enemy COAs, the company co mmander takes into account the enemy’s effectiveness in dealing with mountainous environments and his capabilities, such as training and equipment necessary for cliff --- Page 315 --- A-8 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 assaults. As in all operations, the company com- mander strives to be more effective at these same tasks than the enemy so as to seize or maintain the initiative and dictate tempo. Terrain and Weather Infantry companies oper ating in the mountains prepare for increased casualties. Complex terrain always generates addition al casualties, especially lower-body musculoskeletal injuries. At altitudes above 8,000 feet, company commanders can expect some altitude-rel ated illnesses among the company’s personnel. If not considered in planning, the combination of these factors plus casualties occurring as part of combat operations can rapidly overwhelm medical response and CASEVAC capacity, especially when the moun- tain environment alread y reduces the effective- ness of that capacity. Training, clothing, and proper resources can mitigate these terrain- and climate-related issues. Troops and Support Available Company commanders w ho may operate in the mountains seek specialized and general training for their company and a dditional equipment and personnel resources. T hough task organization of the company remains largely unchanged, com- manders consider the employment of critical skills and enablers. Fo r example, company com- manders should ensure that all company subele- ments include trained mountain leaders and that company commanders task-organize skill special- ties, such as animal packers or assault climbers, to support specific company functions. The terrain, a relatively small force-to-space ratio, and generally uninhabited nature of the moun- tainous environment dictates decentralized fire support techniques. Companies must train to develop the ability to co ntrol both indirect and direct fires in terrain where the firing agency, target, and observer are at different altitudes. De- centralization applies to nonlethal fires in the same manner. Due to the nature of mountainous terrains, a relatively small area can contain numerous population groups who require specifically tailored IO messages. Motor vehicles can operate in mountainous envi- ronments, but are normally restricted to specific areas and routes. Even sp ecialized vehicles, such as snowcats and off-road vehicles, experience such terrain limitations as slope and ground and snow composition. Vehicl es operating at the extremes of their operating parameters are more likely to break down, requiring greater preven- tive maintenance and increased resources. The higher the altitude at which the infantry company operates, the gr eater the limitations on some forms of aviation support, specifically rotary-wing support in term s of lift capacity and access. The ability of fixe d-wing aircraft to work at high altitudes helps o ffset this loss, but com- pany commanders need to consider and request the extra personnel and tr aining resources needed to make effective use of fixed-wing support as aerial delivery. A dismounted infantry company operating in the mountains will automati cally consume greater quantities of such expe ndables as food, water, and medical supplies. Adding to the burden of logistics in mountainous environments are restrictions imposed by the terrain and altitude that affect the means of resupply and movement. Company commanders mitigate these issues through prepositioning and stockpiling supplies; methodical and well-tho ught-out operations; use of pack animals, porters, and other means of sup- ply movement; and increa sed resources in terms of personnel, such as corpsmen and mechanics, to achieve higher levels of self-sufficiency. Time Overcoming the many obstacles and challenges in a mountain enviro nment demands increased planning time. Moving tr oops and supplies, pre- staging caches, and preparing routes all demand increased preparation time for any type of opera- tion. When conducting m ovement, the planning assumption is that movement will be slow. Even if the company’s inclus ion of trained assault --- Page 316 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ A-9 climbers open up mobility “possibilities,” the existence of a new way to approach the enemy does not negate the slow , methodical nature of conducting that appr oach. Company command- ers must, even if portions of the movement occur mounted, make accurate time-dista nce planning assessments when deter mining their own move- ment rates and those of the enemy (see fig. A-1). Civil Considerations The complex and compartmentalized terrain of the mountains often results in large numbers of diverse people grouped in a relatively small, two- dimensional area. Since easy mobility between the different groups is limited, populations tend to develop in different ways, particular to the land they occupy. Even when population groups in the mountains can be lumped into large population, tribal, or language groups, company command- ers should not assume that these groups are there- fore homogeneous. They possess extensive knowledge of local terrai n, including routes that might not appear on maps . Civilians living in the mountains tend to cluster in valleys, near any ara- ble land, and along mobility corridors. Straight Distance (M) 0 0 1000 20 2000 40 3000 1hr Time (Min.) 5 10 5 30 5 50 3 KPH TDF 1 2 2 4 3 6 4 8 6 2 7 4 8 6 9 8 1 2 2 4 3 6 4 8 6 2 7 4 8 6 9 8 1 2 2 4 3 6 4 8 6 2 7 4 8 6 9 8 ' H V F H Q W 0---0 3---40 6---80 9---120 12---160 15---200 18---240 21---280 24---320 27---360 30---400 33---440 36---480 39---520 42---560 45---600 48---640 51---680 54---720 57---760 1hr--800 Time Distance 0 0 2 4 4 8 6 12 8 16 100 20 2 24 4 28 8 36 6 32 2 44 200 40 300 1hr 4 48 6 52 8 56 LEGEND Kph Kilometers per hour TDF time-distance formula Figure A-1. Mountain Time-Distance Formula Chart. --- Page 317 --- A-10 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Offense Considerations In a mountainous environm ent, the infantry com- pany generally executes attacks and movements to contact because exploitation and pursuit remain exceptionally difficult due to terrain and altitude restrictions on movement, resupply, and command and control. Offensive operations avoid frontal attacks, s eek surprise, try to place friendly forces on the flank or rear of enemy posi- tions; they attempt, when ever possible, to attack downward from heights. Mountain warfare tends to center on terrain that supports mobility, such as passes and LOCs, and th e terrain that controls that mobility, such as ridges, chokepoints, and high ground. Due to th e methodical nature of operations dictated by mountain restrictions, infantry company comma nders tend to seek objectives that are impor tant for setting success- ful conditions for the next step of the battle. Other considerations include the following:  Conduct operations in limited visibility to maximize surprise.  Focus on mobility and survivability both in the assault and during cons olidation and reorgani- zation.  Maintain friendly LOCs while destroying those of the enemy.  Maintain a robust rec onnaissance and security posture throughout the of fensive action to pro- tect friendly actions from discovery.  Mitigate difficulties in concentrating combat power through centralized planning and decen- tralized small unit actions.  Seek to mitigate such issues as supply and environmental FP by executing operations of short duration and violent execution. Defense Considerations Complex terrain favors the defender and the same applies in the mountainous environment. While an attacker seeks key an d decisive terrain impor- tant to the next phase of the battle, the defender seeks to retain that terra in in order to deny it to the enemy and preserve it for use in taking the offense—the decisive me thod of war. Observa- tion, fields of fire, abilit y to fortify, opportunity to stockpile supplies, an d preparation of internal routes for the quick move ment of troops within the defense all work to the defender’s advantage. In the defense, infant ry company commanders also consider the following:  Using camouflage and concealment exten- sively to retain surprise.  Conducting a careful analys is of the terrain to determine avenues of approach and guard against enemy use of impossible or unlikely routes.  Conducting an aggressive reconnaissance effort to prevent surprise while denying the enemy that ability to discover the nature, loca- tion, and strengths of the friendly defense.  Determining the requirement for perimeter defenses to defend against an assault from any direction.  Using delaying tactics to disrupt the attacker as delaying tactics are part icularly effective in complex terrain.  Developing routes, rehearsals, and mobility resources. Patrol Considerations While the formations and fundamentals of patrol- ling do not significantly change in a mountain- ous environment, additional planning and supervision by company commanders will ensure that the task and purpose of the patrolling plan is met while the effects of terrain, weather, and alti- tude are mitigated. When conducting stability or defensive operations, it is likely that company commanders will make increased use of OP/LP or mountain pickets to overwatch avenues of approach, dead space, a nd critical pieces of ter- rain within the defense. The patrolling and recon- naissance plan should integrate these types of positions to shorten the le ngth and ease the diffi- culty of patrol routes; to provide overwatch of patrols; and to provide temporary patrol bases for --- Page 318 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ A-11 FP, supply, and emergencies. In addition, leaders must make the following considerations:  Due to the inherent risk s of inclement weather, it is necessary that the commander possesses both a meticulously pl anned extract and an alternative sustainment pl an, such as identified food and water sources along patrol routes.  The company’s patrol pl an includes detailed, rehearsed, and properl y resourced secondary and tertiary communications plans to mitigate the effects that mountai nous terrain will have on all communications assets.  Patrols receive necessary fire control augmen- tation in the form of equipment and personnel in order to allow fire control at the lowest level possible. Desert Warfare Deserts or arid environments make up a larger portion of the world’s vari ous climates than any other, making it very likely that infantry compa- nies will deploy into desert environments. As the term arid suggests, deserts are defined by their lack of water and moistu re and not by their tem- peratures, which can vary (sometimes within a matter of hours) from ex treme cold to extreme heat. Deserts are genera lly open, sometimes rug- ged, terrain that dema nds mobility. From the beginning of warfare, the lack of restricted terrain in the desert has favore d horsemen over foot sol- diers and armor over infantry. Infantry company commanders expecting to operate in the desert must plan and train for the impact of dry, arid, rugged, and dusty conditions on personnel, equip- ment, and vehicles. Desert Considerations From the sweeping opera tions of Bedouin tribes- man in World War I to the North African tank bat- tles of World War II an d the modern mechanized warfare of Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Free- dom, the open terrain of th e desert is ideal for mobile maneuver warfare between opposing con- ventional forces. It is fa r less suitable for COINs, as it offers no real pe rmanent sanctuary. The suc- cesses that desert-based insurgencies have achieved have been against static enemies who, for a variety of reasons, largely ceded the desert ter- rain to the insurgents. Any force capable and con- fident enough to journey into the desert effectively either forces battle or drives smaller enemy threats into the population centers to seek shelter there. Commanders must consid er METT-T and civil considerations when planning desert operations. Mission Infantry companies part icipate in major offen- sive and defensive operati ons as a maneuver ele- ment for the parent battalion. In stability operations, companies will more frequently act semi-independently. When conducting problem framing, infantry comp any commanders must first consider mobility i ssues. First, the type of vehicles provided to companies influence the capabilities and survivabil ity tactics the company commander can choose. Second, the type of vehi- cle and the nature of the trafficability of the des- ert affects mobility. De serts can contain wadis, deep sand, salt marshes, and similar features that can quickly bog down wh eeled and tracked vehi- cles. When addressing various mission profiles in offensive, defensive, and stability operations, company commanders next consider environmen- tal FP for the company’s personnel (such as water, food, and shade) and maintenance support for vehicles (such as parts, fuel, and recovery). The relatively open nature of the desert, the advan- tages provided by vehicu lar and aerial mobility, and the ability to employ weapon systems at their maximum effective ranges offer opportunities and challenges for defender and attacker alike. Attack- ers possess superior initiative while defenders ben- efit from a mobile defense with its inherent chances for offensive action. Company command- ers operating in the desert must ensure that subor- dinates are thoroughly capable of conducting both aided and unaided land navigation across large and featureless areas. Formations for movement --- Page 319 --- A-12 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 stress flexibility and the ability to rapidly respond to contact to the front and flanks. The more static the opera tional stance of the infantry company, the easi er the support consid- erations. Stability operations with significant, complex, and mature logistical nets ease the com- pany commander’s burden s though such infra- structure carries the risk of self-imposed paralysis and lack of aggression. Conversely, the infantry company in the attack in the deep desert must bring its support with it , often over considerable distances. In desert warfare, the defender tends to fall back on supply sources while the attacker continues to move away from them. While vehi- cles increase the amount of resources the com- pany can haul, there is a limit to their haul capacity. Also, the mere presence of vehicles adds considerable limitati ons in terms of mainte- nance and fuel. Reconnaissance re mains important to the com- pany commander in the desert as elsewhere. However, without domin ating terrain features from which to achieve ob servation points, com- pany commanders must use aggressive patrolling for both reconnaissance a nd security purposes as well as aerial platforms and imagery to see the enemy in depth. Given the chaos possible with multiple maneu- vering units, the dust and obscuration associated with desert movement, and the lack of interven- ing terrain that might li mit the effects of weap- ons, fratricide is of even greater concern on the desert battlefield. Accurate location reporting, schemes of maneuver that limit the chances of fratricide, and effective methods of identifying friendly vehicles and troops are important. Enemy An enemy capable of ma tching the technical and tactical prowess of the infantry company in the open desert is a dangerous foe. Such an enemy is likely to make extensive use of antitank weapons, obstacles, and fire suppor t in conjunction with maneuver. They are likely to possess counterbat- tery fire capabilities that will require not only fre- quent displacement of fri endly artillery, but also more detailed planning and coordination in order to maintain friendly fire support during displace- ment. Less robust enemy forces will likely use the desert as a mobility corridor and temporary sanctu- ary. They will seek to mass unexpectedly to achieve local combat superiority, create decisive effects, and disperse us ing their relatively unob- servable routes as a form of concealment. Terrain and Weather Heat and arid environmen ts can adversely affect all sorts of equipment, but communications and computer equipment is particularly vulnerable and must be guarded and maintained accord- ingly. While the desert is generally open terrain, it is rarely as trackles s and featureless as it appears. Company comm anders must consider the natural and manmade features of the desert. Natural desert features can make visi bility and determining distance cha llenging. Distances in the desert are deceptive du e to the lack of terrain features available to prov ide scale, wh ich affects combat reporting and control of supporting arms. Company commanders must consider distance in terms of how far they can travel from reliable combat logistic support. Finally, infantry compa- nies must appreciate th at desert distances and openness enable the empl oyment of weapon sys- tems at their maximum effective ranges. Dust clouds, the reflection of sunlight off vehi- cles, and daylight use of headlights can make friendly forces visible for vast distances. Night movement, though concea ling, carries with it its own risks, such as separated vehicles due to dark- ness and dust. Such desert features as wadis, oases, sand dunes, salt marshes, rocks, and flooding during rainy sea- sons all impact desert operations. All can contain considerable tactical value, such as an oasis as a population center and wa ter source or a flooded --- Page 320 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ A-13 salt marsh protecting a fl ank. Many of these fea- tures shift based on weat her patterns and do not appear on maps. Finally, company commanders should not discount the presence of microterrain. While not on a map and ma ybe not visible at a distance, the presence of a ten foot sand dune can conceal a friendly or an enemy vehicle. Manmade terrain features in the desert consist of improved water sources, su ch as canals or wells, roads, airfields, or population centers, that create tactical and support cons iderations in what might have otherwise been open desert. Troops and Support Available When conducting desert operations that favor mobile operations, comp any commanders do not discount the requirement for dismounted infan- try. Dismounted infantry, when properly sup- ported by antiarmor weapons, survivable fortifications, obstacles, an d fire support, are the force of choice for stro ng point operations and the defense of logistical nodes or fixed sites. In the offense, dismounted infantry is critical to armor survivability in th e close assault and can often precede armor to infiltrate and weaken enemy defenses. Company teams also receive greater combat engineer support as the need is greater in desert operations due to heavy demands for mobility, countermobility, and survivability. Supporting arms in the de sert greatly assist the infantry company in creating the suppressive effects necessary to sa fely enter and transit through enemy weapon system threat rings that, in the open desert, can reach into the thousands of meters. Company commande rs plan their opera- tions carefully to avoid outrunning indirect fires. Aviation in the desert environment greatly aids company reconnaissance efforts and fire plans. Due to the inability of ground-based observers to see into the depth of enemy positions, aviation assets aid reconnaissance and, with the use of FAC (airborne) capabilitie s, infantry companies can enhance the effectiv eness of their company fire plans. Close air supp ort in its different roles can aid fire suppo rt gaps create d by displacing artillery or mortar assets . Used creatively, assault support assets can add fl exibility and depth to friendly plans. They can conduct limited emer- gency resupplies and create supply caches in sup- port of offensive opera tions. With the ability to lift troops, light vehicles, and even artillery, assault support can insert friendly fo rces into the rear area of the enemy to create significant block- ing positions. Company commanders must confront the much greater logistical requi rements associated with mobile warfare and maintaining forces in the des- ert. The quantities requir ed for sustained desert operations dictate ground over aerial movement as the rule. Ground moveme nt is always vulnera- ble to enemy attack, especially in COIN or “behind the lines” operations. The more complex the logistical infrastruc ture and the greater the enemy’s ability to disr upt it, the greater the demand on friendly secu rity elements to secure logistic trains. Time Available Company commanders carefully consider time and speed in the desert, especially as they relate to supporting arms. In th e attack, the company commander must consider the speed of maneu- ver elements in order to avoid driving into sup- porting fires or lifting supporting fires too soon. In the defense, the use of TRPs and similar man- made features help time supporting arms so that they fall on to moving enemy targets instead of ahead of or behind them. In addition to these con- siderations, the mobile na ture of desert warfare generally leads to a sign ificantly higher operat- ing tempo than that found in other environments. The result is the risk of fatigue in both personnel and vehicles. Limited onl y by supply and enemy action, units can quite easily conduct continuous operations. Company comm anders must consider rest plans, incorporati ng them into operations in the same manner as such actions as refueling, resupply, and security halts. --- Page 321 --- A-14 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Civil Considerations While the desert is not empty of population, those peoples who live in the desert tend to be nomadic. Like mountain environm ents, permanent popula- tions tend to cluster ar ound terrain favorable to life, such as oases, trade routes, seasonal water sources, or narrow agricu ltural strips on rivers. Since the nature of desert warfare often lends tac- tical value to population centers and their associ- ated manmade terrain, such as airfields or roads, infantry companies should expect to encounter civilians across all types of operations. Offense Considerations The focus of offensive action, like other environments, is the destruction of the enemy or the bending of his will. As is the case in many harsh environments where support is a constant issue, the goal of th e infantry company in offensive combat frequen tly centers on seizing objectives that enable further offensive action, such as airfields, co mmunication and logistical nodes, and water sources. Company commanders in the offense must plan to avoid the culmination point, while maintainin g mobility, suppression, and the defense. Avoid the Culmination Point As the attack progresses, friendly forces become further and further removed from their supply bases and, therefore, vu lnerable to enemy coun- terattacks and actions against friendly supply lines. When planning offe nsive actions as part of a battalion or when con ducting semi-independent operations, company comm anders must plan on how to overcome an early culmination point in the attack. Maintain Mobility Company commanders main tain mobility in two ways—through the maintenance and supply of their vehicles and through a robust breaching capability to maintain mobility against fortified enemy positions. The company must be able to conduct local breaches of protective obstacles down to the platoon leve l. In addition, the com- pany may serve as the ba ttalion’s breaching ele- ment, providing security for an obstacle-clearing detachment that is cr eating a breach in the enemy’s defense. Maintain Suppression Because of the open nature of desert terrain and the ability for weapon syst ems to engage at their maximum ranges, suppression of enemy defenses as friendly maneuver closes in on them is criti- cal. Establishing direct fire suppre ssion alone risks a survivability fight in which friendly forces opposing dug-in, well-equipped enemy forces are likely to lose. The fire support plan for the com- pany must take into account suppression, destruc- tion criteria, and similar considerations that allow the infantry company to maneuver in relative safety to the objective and assault it successfully. Maintain the Defense Defensive tasks are inherent in the offense. In the mobile desert fight and when engaging an enemy likely to defend in dept h and maintain a counter- attack capability, companies will need to consider flank security. As part of a battalion, the com- pany may conduct screen or cover missions as a supporting effort. When conducting their own operations and as the en emy position is pene- trated, company commanders consider posting flank security as part of the scheme of maneuver. Defense Considerations For the same reasons that an attacker seeks des- ert terrain that furthers his operations against the enemy, the infantry company in the defense seeks to deny those same assets to the enemy by retain- ing them. In the defense, the infantry company commander considers mobile defense in depth. When assigned missions no t associated with ter- rain or fixed sites, the company commander makes maximum use of depth and mobility to attrit, dis- rupt, and draw the enem y deep into his sector before executing decisive offensive actions, such as counterattacks, to de stroy him. When assigned --- Page 322 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ A-15 defensive tasks that orient on terrain or if in a dis- mounted role, company commanders rely on extensive use of such tactics as obstacles, fire sup- port, and antitank weapons to disrupt the enemy in the security area and destroy him in a series of EAs, ideally sited in depth. Whether part of a bat- talion defense or conducting their own operations, company commanders make maximum use of obstacles and any exis ting terrain to limit the maneuver options of the enemy. Patrol Considerations Though UA may be avai lable, company com- manders should cont inue to plan much of their reconnaissance efforts based on their own, organic patrol capability. Since the desert lacks terrain from which to observe the enemy, friendly patrol- ling is aggressive. Patr ols may often combine mounted and dismounted methods to get close enough to enemy positions to conduct reconnais- sance without risking the destruction of friendly vehicles. Due to the same survivability concerns, company commanders should consider patrolling at night and in conditions of limited visibility. Jungle Warfare Army Field Manual 90-5, Jungle Operations , observes the following: Jungle fighting is not new to US soldiers, nor does the enemy have a monopoly on jungle know-how. US units adapted well to jungle fighting, and when we operated against the North Vietnamese Army along the Cambodian border we found that they had as much difficulty operating in the area as we did. The prisoners we captured were, as a rule, un- dernourished, emaciated, and sick with malaria. They stated that almost everyone in their unit had malaria, and many had died from it. The jungle environment oc curs on or near the equator. Large swaths of this environment lie in the littorals and suppo rt large populations throughout Africa, Centra l and South America, Indonesia and northern Au stralia, and in south- ern and southeast Asia. Because of their loca- tion along the littorals and near very large population centers, jungles remain very likely environments in which Ma rine Corps forces will continue to operate. Jungle Considerations Jungles generally consist of thick foliage and per- sistent heat and, though varying by location, all jungles receive significant rainfall. Jungles along the equator experience rainfall throughout the year; whereas, jungles further from the equator, such as those in southeast Asia, have distinct monsoon and dry seasons. Combat in the jungle consists of long periods of looking for the enemy followed by short periods of violent, close com- bat. The jungle’s limitati ons on maneuver, speed, and visibility significan tly influence combat in this environment. Infant ry companies find them- selves in jungles when—  Protecting important ec onomic, political, and psychological assets requires engaging a jungle based enemy force.  Denying the jungle as an enemy sanctuary or means of cover and concealed movement.  Using the jungle as a covered and concealed route to approach and engage an enemy force. Commanders must consider METT-T and civil considerations when planning jungle operations. Mission Whether operating semi-ind ependently or in con- junction with a parent battalion, most company operations occur without physically tying into units on the flanks or to the rear due to the nature of the jungle environment. Regardless of employ- ment methodology, the pr imary issue facing the infantry company comma nder in the jungle is either finding the enem y or avoiding being found by the enemy until he c hooses to be found. This applies across a range of military operations. When conducting operatio ns within the jungle, --- Page 323 --- A-16 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 infantry companies use mis sion tactics to estab- lish control, remain flexible, and stress security and intelligence. Because of the limited vi sibility and restrictive terrain, most jungle fighting takes place at close range. Whether defending or attacking when fac- ing a conventional, insurgent, or asymmetrical foe, finding the enemy is often the task and pur- pose of the infantry co mpany. Actual movement is slow and units disperse to find the enemy. Mis- sion type orders, immediate action drills, and “marching to the sound of the guns” allow units to rapidly concentrate when contact occurs. Because the jungle limits the use of vehicles and the effec- tiveness of heavy weapons, the tactical face of the infantry company often comes to resemble that of the enemy—light infantry relying on small arms, mortars, and artillery. The infantry company com- mander can use rotary-wing CAS to ease fire sup- port limitations and assault support aircraft to add significant mobility. As in all preparations for environments contain- ing climatic extremes, healthy and fit company personnel provide a base line for deployment to the jungle—such fitness includes swimming skills. Company comma nders should develop jungle and field craft skil ls within a select cadre of personnel in case preparation time for the com- pany is short. When possible, company com- manders seek to acclimate the company to the new environment before committing them to operations. The keys to preparation for the jungle environment remain the same as elsewhere: develop aggressive patrolling and field craft skills; individual and un it discipline; solid SOPs continually adapted and improved upon; and tough, focused leadership. Enemy Most potential enemies in the jungle, regardless of organization, purpose, and equipment, consist of light infantry augm ented with mortars and, perhaps, artillery. The en emy operating in the jungle faces the same challenges as friendly forces do. They seek to camouflage their activities and use infiltra tion and breaching op- erations in the attack. Company commanders can expect that the enemy will maintain the offensive, close with US forces, infiltrate, use periods of limited visibility, and use surprise. Maintain the Offensive . The enemy recognizes the superiority of the offense as the decisive action on the battlefield, and defends only to gain time or survive to gain an advantage elsewhere. Close with US Forces . The enemy will exploit close jungle contact due to limited visibility in an attempt to mitigate the e ffects of US supporting arms. By remaining within hand grenade range of friendly forces, the enemy seeks to create a situa- tion in which the use of supporting arms will likely endanger Marine Corps forces as well. Infiltrate . Regardless of the enemy’s combat power, he will make every effort to use the jungle to his advantage, to include infiltration vice attacking into possible friendly strengths. Use Periods of L imited Visibility . The enemy uses every advantage of fered by the jungle and nature to close with fr iendly positions and ne- gate the infa ntry company’s st rength in support- ing arms. Use Surprise . Enemy forces will use surprise, especially those enemy forces for whom meeting the infantry company on equal terms is not possi- ble. Enemy forces will choose to remain dis- persed, mass to conduct raids or ambushes as it suits them, and then disperse again. Terrain and Weather The jungle environment contains many different types of landscapes, including dense forest, swamps, savannahs, bamboo thickets, plan- tations, and other form s of vegetation. Other considerations of the j ungle terrain and weather are key terrain, observat ion, moisture, disease, and navigation. Traditional definitions of key terrain, such as high ground, do not posse ss the same importance --- Page 324 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ A-17 in the jungle due to thick vegetation precluding observation and fire. Terra in features that sup- port mobility and resupply, such as roads, rivers and streams, LZs, clear firing positions, and ford- ing sites, are likely key terrain in the jungle fight. Line of sight and observ ation distances are mini- mal in the jungle. Regard ing visibility, night in jungle regions is roughly 12 hours long. Coupled with the density of ju ngle canopies in primary jungle, nights are extremely dark. Company com- manders plan to use NVDs to take advantage of this darkness. Jungle climates are characterized by high tempera- tures, high humidity, an d the potential for heavy rain throughout the year. All three seriously affect company personnel, equipment, weapons, vehi- cles, maintenance, and tactics. Company com- manders must plan meth ods to keep personnel, weapons, and equipment dry, such as frequent changes in clothing and construction of surviv- able shelters above gro und. Since much of the technology, such as radios and individual laser sights, that increase the lethality of the infantry company are vulnerable to moisture, the company prepares and trains to operate without them. Jungles contain various wildlife that may be harm- ful to company personnel; however, the chances of being injured are remote, especially if the com- pany is trained on and remains disciplined about basic field craft and precau tions, such as looking before sitting or checking boots before wearing. A larger and more signif icant menace to the com- pany is insect-carried, waterborne, and fungal dis- eases as well as the threat of heat-related illnesses. Preventive medicine, fiel d craft discipline, super- vised use of prophylaxis, and the availability of potable water demand the attention of company leadership when conducting operations. Navigating through the j ungle environment is challenging even for th e most proficient land navigator and frequent ly requires advanced techniques, such as offset s, terrain association in limited visibility, and “hand-railing” ridgelines and contours. The abil ity to use electronic assistance, such as GPS, is frequently limited or blocked altogether by the thick jungle canopy that prevents satellite reception. Troops and Support Available The primary jungle weapon s of the infantry com- pany are their small arms and mortars, since artil- lery can be difficult to employ effectively in the jungle environment. There may be an insuffi- cient number of clearings available to position artillery units and the jungle canopy provides nat- ural cover for enemy forces, diminishing the effectiveness of artillery fires. Rotary-wing avia- tion assets can be of great assistance in position- ing and resupplying artillery units and can provide observation of fire s. However, the jungle can provide covered avenue s of approach for the enemy to attack artill ery firing pos itions with small arms. The company commander considers organizing personnel who normally employ heavy weapons, such as antitank missiles or HMGs (largely inef- fective in the close jung le fight), as additional infantry maneuver elements. Since the techniques by which an infantry company organizes itself and conducts movement in the jungle environment can mean the difference between success and failure, commanders must consid er the following when planning to use any movement technique:  Centralized control of direction and goal.  Ability to rapidly deploy in order to maneuver or reinforce.  Ability to ease moveme nt by dispersing along different, if parallel routes.  Maintenance of 360-degree security during movement and at halts.  Multiple and redundant navigational aids.  Ability to transition between different forma- tions at danger areas. Due to limited visibility and tricks of sound in foliage, fire support is difficult to observe and adjust. Depending on the nature of the jungle, the ability to fire through th e canopy can make indi- rect fire support questio nable. Company mortars --- Page 325 --- A-18 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 must possess overhead clearance, in all probable firing directions. Given the propensity of the enemy to attempt to get close enough to friendly positions to render fires ineffective, fires must be accurate and adjusted out and then toward friendly positions. Friendly defe nsive positions must also be survivable with overhead cover. The flexibility, responsi veness, loiter time, and ability to more easily identify friendly positions and signals makes rotary-wing aviation an ideal asset to make up for fire support gaps and lack of infantry heavy weapons. These benefits to the company commander’s combat power must be weighted against the survivability of these air- craft against enemy small arms; however, the ability for rotary-wing guns hips to rapidly iden- tify enemy firing positi ons and destroy them should not be discounte d. In addition to rotary- wing CAS, assault suppor t often plays an inte- gral role in troop lift and resupply, both of which can add significant mobility to friendly forces. Aerial resupply is the major way of supplying infantry companies an d conducting CASEVACs in the jungle environment, even when operating in relative proximity to a battalion. While operating in a light infantry e nvironment in some ways eases the resupply burden, the lack of an extensive all-weather transportatio n network in many jun- gle areas makes the logistic mission more diffi- cult and often requires animal or human portage if aerial assets are unava ilable or inappropriate to the situation, particul arly with communications equipment and weapons. Most radios, computers, and similar data sys- tems are extremely vulnerable to the moisture prevalent in the jungle environment. Companies must consider ways to protect these assets and be prepared to fight without them. In jungle environments, weapons will quickly rust. In addition, optical, sensor, laser sighting systems, and other weapon augmentation will be vulnera- ble to the conti nuous wet environment to which they are exposed. Maintenance on these systems is continuous and the company must be pre- pared to fight without them. Time Available Jungle movement, even if aided by aerial troop lift, is slow. When planning on how to use available time, company commanders must make consider- able allowances for movement and security. This may leave less time for planning and preparation. Civil Considerations As with other challenging environments, infantry companies are not likely to encounter civilians deep in the primary jungl e. They may encounter plantations and agricultur al cultivation as they approach population cente rs. If the population is the company’s center of gravity, then the com- pany’s operations in the jungle will be a function of the requirement to pr otect the population by challenging the enemy’s ability to move and seek sanctuary in the jungle. Offense Considerations While the added mobility and firepower of rotary- wing CAS and assault su pport can dramatically increase the overall tempo of jungle operations— the requirement to find the enemy as a precursor to attacking him remains. Wh en fighting in the jun- gle, orientation is on the enemy rather than on ter- rain. Reconnaissance remains paramount. Once the enemy is found, he must be destroyed or he will have to be found again, as discussed in Marshall’s Bird: The Christmastide Battle: It is a situation that t oo frequently occurs in the Vietnam fighting. The forward element, losing men and becoming pinned down, compromises the po- sition of all others. What has started out as an at- tack loses all form and de teriorates into a costly rescue act. Reconnaissance The difficulties of locating the enemy, even a heavily armed conventiona l enemy, in the jungle should not be underestima ted. Even if the gen- eral location of the enemy is known, such as a sanctuary in a valley, the nature of jungle terrain --- Page 326 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ A-19 and vegetation foil aeri al imagery and direct observation, and can result in the details of the location remaining hidden until contact is made. This inherent camouflage, coupled with an active enemy willing to begin th e fight in his security area, makes it clear that company commanders must make every effort to discover the nature and depth of enemy positions prior to the assault. Meeting Engagements Even in the major conven tional jungle battles of World War II and Vietnam, combat in the jungle environment did not c onsist of conventional attacks against conventiona l defenses so much as it consisted of a running series of ambushes, raids, and meeting engage ments. Victory in such warfare goes to the side that responds more quickly, more effectively, more aggressively, and more violently to contacts. Successful attacks in the jungle combine sur- prise, dispersion, and the ability to rapidly con- centrate when contact occurs. Because seeing and engaging the enemy at distances more than 50 meters away are rare, normal tactics, such as emplacing SBF positions or using refined artil- lery preparations, are in effective. So , even when reconnaissance reveals th e position of the enemy and uncovers some de tail about his position, prudence still dictates that the company conduct a dispersed approach marc h and expect that the opening moments of co ntact will re semble a meeting engagement. Once contact is made, the company closes from diff erent directions, mass- ing combat power while offering mutual sup- port among the different elements. Since the jungle is largel y a light infa ntry fight, infantry companies should actively employ the classic tactics availabl e to the rifleman in restricted terrain—infiltration, rear area harass- ment, ambushes, aggressive use of surprise, and periods of limited visibility. The infantry com- pany, aware of the limits of technology in the jungle environment, uses the technology it has to multiply the effects of, not displace, light infan- try tactics. Defense Considerations The infantry company in the defense uses exten- sive camouflage of its positions, designs its posi- tions to trap the enemy in prepared fields of fire, and conducts aggressive security operations to disrupt and delay the enemy’s attack. Defensive Maneuver Since uncertainty and surprise are an attacker’s greatest enemies in the jungle, company com- manders plan their defenses to increase those fac- tors. Simultaneously, since the jungle limits friendly observation while providing the attacker many different avenues of approach, the infantry company plans for all-around defense, even when defending as part of a larger battalion position. Within the defensive position, routes take advan- tage of cover and concea lment, while resupply, preparations, and other housekeeping chores take place during periods of limited visibility. A small, centrally located reserve enables the company commander to react to penetrations of the defense or counterattack opportu nities. The reserve must rehearse day and night movement throughout the defensive position. Patrolling In the defense, the in fantry company patrols aggressively. While the at tacker patrols to find the company’s defense, the infantry company in the defense patrols to foil this effort, to disrupt and delay the attacker’s movements, and to defeat attempts at infiltration. Company commanders make appropriate use of OP/LPs to augment their patrolling effort and to provide advanced warning of enemy attacks. Visibility and Camouflage Regardless of the operat ional environment, cam- ouflage, deceiving the enemy, and hiding friendly intentions and movements always play an impor- tant role in the defense. More than most other places, however, the jungle’s requirements for individual position and uni t camouflage are para- mount. Since most enga gements are at close --- Page 327 --- A-20 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 range and relatively un expected, good use of camouflage provides the company a critical advantage in the opening moments of contact with the attacker. Bunkers and positions are built low to the ground to make them difficult to see and decrease the ability of the attacker to engage them effectively. Vege tation may be cleared below the waist to provide fields of fire for small arms and principal directi ons of fire for machine guns, while hiding those measures from a stand- ing enemy. Patrol Considerations Expertise in field craft characterizes successful patrolling in the jungle. Most combat in the jungle is short, intense, unexp ected, and conducted by opposing bands of soldie rs and Marines who actively move through the environment seeking to do harm while avoiding harm. The force that wins the jungle fight possesse s the discipline to move without being seen; detect without being detected; react without causing a reaction; and, when neces- sary, act swiftly and vi olently at a place of its choosing. Infantry co mpany commanders must prepare their companies to be that force. Route Planning In planning patrol routes, company commanders consider the slow and often exhausting demands of jungle movement, the ability to support patrols requiring assistance or ex traction, and the ability of the patrols to maintain communication. As in other demanding environments, depending on the enemy situation and company resources, patrols might need to receive the task organization to self-extract. Different ki nds of patrol techniques, such as satellite patr ols from a central patrol base, offer a classic wa y of providing patrols with enough combat powe r and logistical re- sources to support themselves temporarily, while still being able to take advantage of small unit stealth and concealment. Communications Communications is difficul t in the jungle envi- ronment, where heat, obstructions, and foliage can derail VHF assets a nd preclude radios that require clear lines of sight. Communication is critical so the patrol can contact supporting arms or conduct a CASEVAC. Company commanders consider measures, such as emplacing retransmis- sion sites and using OP/LPs to assist in communi- cations. Other measures might be maneuver based, such as sending ou t patrols that are large enough to set up temporary patrol bases. These bases maintain overall communications with the company while sending out smaller satellite patrols that only need to communicate with the patrol base. --- Page 328 --- APPENDIX B TRAINING MANAGEMENT Training consists of learning and, from an instructional perspectiv e, teaching a skill or skills. Use of the word “training” over other terms for learning, genera lly denotes the involve- ment of practical experience or application. In the same way doctors learn th eir profession but train on certain surgical sk ills, Marines learn many things through the professional military education system, but train on billet, rank, and occupational specialty skills. Within the infantry company, the priority of the compa ny commander is training. Coherently and efficientl y determining the train- ing requirements of the company, meeting those requirements through th e correct application of time and resources, and maintaining proficiency in those requirements constitutes the practice of training management. Training management is the methodology by which company commanders use training sys- tems to ensure their co mpanies are mission capa- ble. Done correctly, training management balances time, resource s, and mission require- ments to produce the most efficient results possi- ble within local limita tions. Done improperly, poor training management results in the loss of time, the squandering of re sources, and a failure to produce a mission capa ble infantry company. Proper training manage ment requires energy, focus, and discipline from the company com- mander who sets the tone for success or failure within the company. Company commanders must ensure that they do not confuse efforts with results. While the combi- nation of hard work and failure does produce learning among the staff, consistently ineffective training will result in mission failure within the company. Training ma nagement methodology allows the company commander to measure the effectiveness of company training and prevent poor training. Training management allows company com- manders to confront the fa ct that there will never be enough time or resources to train to perfection. Training management allows commanders to determine training priorities and find the time and resources to produce a company capable of accomplishing the tasks assigned to it. A com- pany commander facing deployment to a peace- keeping environm ent would be more likely to spend precious training time and resources on tactical road marches and fixed site security than on attack of a strong point or conducting an explosive breach. By maintaining a positive training management environment, company commanders create multi- echelon training opportunities and develop subor- dinates. In such an environment, an event as simple as a combat pistol course can encompass opportunities to practic e COC procedures, con- duct tactical road marche s, and meet ancillary training requirements dur ing downtime. Subordi- nates, by planning, prep aring, executing, super- vising, and assessing the training event at all levels of responsibility, receive valuab le lessons on leadership, resource ma nagement, risk mitiga- tion and consequence management, and the train- ing management process. Marine Corps Training Principles For a company commander’s purposes, MCRP 3-0A, Unit Training Management Guide , lists the following eight training principles:  Train as you fight.  Commanders are responsible for training.  Standards-based training.  Performance-oriented training.  Mission-oriented training.  Train the MAGTF to fight as a combined arms team. --- Page 329 --- B-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1  Train to sustain proficiency.  Train to challenge. Train as You Fight This principle undergirds all others because it is the reason for the existence of the Marine Corps: to fight and win the country’s battles. This applies to matching a unit’s physical training pro- gram with the types of tasks expected of it in combat, such as indivi duals wearing the actual combat load required of a training skill in com- bat conditions or ensuring that the combat engi- neer squad with which a company will deploy is present for company traini ng exercises. Depend- ing on the skill set, the training environment may be an important portion of this principle, though company commanders must understand that the training environment does not necessarily yield good training. Commanders at all levels must also remember that they sometimes constitute the training audience and s hould not remove them- selves from these opportunities. Commanders are Responsible for Training Company commanders are ultimately responsible for the training of their companies. This responsi- bility includes not only th e internal training the company commander can di rectly affect, but also ensuring that the company takes proper advantage of those opportunities afforded by various courses and exercises sponsored by higher and service headquarters. The failu re of a company com- mander to ensure all company personnel qualify on their personal weapons is just as egregious as failing to ensure the company sends the right per- sonnel to foreign language courses or is prepared to take advantage of Service-level exercises. Standards-Based Training Training to standards represents one of the largest challenges for company commanders because the demands of time, resources, and understanding tempt many to either ig nore standards or modify them inappropriately. Good organizations train to standard, not time. Co mpany commanders must understand the requirements for standards and how standard development occurs. Such understanding not only ensures their companies can actually per- form the skills for which they are training, but also allows company commanders to develop their own training standards when necessary, such as training personnel to execute a uni que set of ROE in their deployment theater. Training standards provide measurements for performance, foster flexibility by reducing the need for complex orders, and teach Marines to respond to changes in combat reflex- ively and automatically. Performance-Oriented Training Company commanders make certain that quality training is conducted by the company. Perfor- mance-oriented training refers to the proper selec- tion and prioritization of training tasks within the company training plan and ensures those tasks are oriented on mission accomplishment. Perfor- mance-oriented training refers to conducting qual- ity training that is prope rly resourced, led, and supervised and that produces the results desired. Mission-Oriented Training One of the initial challe nges facing the company commander is balanci ng those requirements demanded for successful mission accomplishment with the time available, the company personnel available, and the many training requirements necessitated by Service order and HHQ policy. Prioritization is not enough. Only through a well- thought-out training management system can com- pany commanders meet external requirements and those internal training requirements necessary for the company to perform the most likely missions required of it. Company commanders understand that their focus is training for the METs directed by their battalion commanders—not trying to exe- cute the exhaustive list of company tasks listed in the Navy/Marine Corp s Publication (NAVMC) 3500.44, Infantry Training and Readiness Manual. --- Page 330 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ B-3 Train the MAGTF to Fight as a Combined Arms Team The combined arms team is the cornerstone of the way the Marine Corps fights. At the infantry com- pany, combined arms training focuses on gaining and retaining those skills that integrate lethal and nonlethal fire support, co mbat logistic support, aviation, and other elements with the company’s weapons and maneuver ca pabilities. Company commanders work diligently to exercise these capabilities whenever po ssible, develop the skill sets within the company to integrate them, and work directly with the units that provide them. Train to Sustain Proficiency Good training manageme nt ensures that both learning and retention occur. Company com- manders ensure that their training plans provide for remediation and sustainment. A variety of factors, such as stand- alone events, multiechelon training, exercises, or a combination of all of these, may meet remediation and sustainment requirements. While th e company headquarters may practice setting up the COC on its own ini- tially, the company comma nder ensures that the headquarters personnel become and remain profi- cient in setting up, operating, and redeploying the COC and its systems by requiring a functioning COC at every training event in which the com- pany participates, to include ranges. Train to Challenge Good training challenges and inspires company personnel by building upon current skills, increas- ing the complexity of training problems, and demanding progressively greater levels of perfor- mance. This is not a prescription for automatically moving forward on a training schedule regardless of past performance; it is a caution against unnec- essary repetition, failure to apply standards as a measurement of success, unimaginative static and lecture-based instruction, and ill-prepared train- ing. Members of any unit instinctively recognize wasted time the same way that they reflexively flourish when challenged to excel. Training Management Terminology Not surprisingly, training management possesses its own language a nd terminology. Important terms and brief definitions are discussed in the following subparagraphs. Systems Approach to Training As the name indicates, systems approach to training (SAT) represents an orderly, organized, and coherent process fo r conducting training (see fig. B-1 on page B- 4). The Marine Corps, throughout its training a nd doctrine publications, uses SAT methodology exclusively. In addition to providing a framework for the company’s training, the company commande r can use SAT while analyzing and designing training. He can de- termine if the proposed training event honestly nests with the company’s training priorities or if it is merely training occurring for the sake of saying it occurred. Mission-Essential Task A MET is a specific, collec tive task at which the infantry company must be proficient to accom- plish its combat mission. The company com- mander should expe ct guidance from the battalion commander rega rding MET priorities based on the battalion commander’s analysis of the battalion’s operational mission. While there is a list of core METs in the NAVMC 3500.44, company commanders ma y receive nonstandard METs specific to unique missions the parent bat- talion might receive. Mission-Essential Task List As the name indicates, a list of METs forms a mis- sion-essential task list (METL). Depending on the mission, the commander is assigned METLs by HHQ from three potential sources: the core METL (used to develop the tr aining and readiness); named mission METL (e.g., Operation Enduring Freedom); or an operation METL associated with a major operation or c ontingency plan. The core METL lists all of the METs that infantry compa- nies must demonstrate to achieve competency in --- Page 331 --- B-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 their basic combat missi on. Lacking any other guidance, company commanders should build their training plans ar ound the core METL. The named mission or operation plan METL provides all of the METs that a unit must demonstrate to achieve competency for a specific mission. A company whose parent battalion is a reaction force for domestic crisis response operations will likely Analysis Phase Implementation Phase Evaluation Phase Development Phase Design Phase Analysis Phase Review Marine Corps doctrine: Campaign plans Contingency plans T/O mission statement for type of units Combat plans Review higher headquarters, supported unit, and supporting unit MFTLs Determine all specified and implied tasks for all units Select METL Design Phase Relate mission-essential tasks to MPSs from MCCRES volumes List coIIective and individual tasks for subordinate units and Marines that support METL tasks Evaluate/assess unit strengths and deficiencies Prioritize training of mission-essential tasks Design appropriate training plans for units and individuals Ensure that all training tasks/objectives are stated as performance, condition, and standards statements Development Phase Develop training materials arid secure support Train the trainers Staff rehearsal of training plans and lesson plans Implementation Phase Implement training plans Conduct battle staff exercises, unit exercises, FTXs, drills, and individual training as scheduled Evaluation Phase Conduct internal after-action reviews Review MCCRES/external evaluation feedback Review training deficiencies of subordinate units and individuals. Reprioritize tasks in training plans based on assessment of deficiencies. Additionally, evaluation is conducted concurrently throughout all phases. Legend: FTX - field training exercise MCCRES - Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System METL - mission-essential task list MPS - mission performance standards T/O - table of organization Figure B-1. Training Cycle. --- Page 332 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ B-5 have training based on named mission or opera- tion plan METL. Training Plans, Tasks, and Standards The training plan is the baseline document a com- pany commander creates to outline how the con- duct of individual and collective training will occur over time. At a min imum, the training plan provides short- and long- term guidance. Training bulletins, letters of inst ruction, and other similar local documents provide planning guidance to execute the short- and mid-term training plan. This document provides immediate and short- term training execution guidance and is usually published weekly or monthly. While the schedule should receive broad dissemination, version control constitut es a continuous chal- lenge. At a minimum, training schedules should provide information on the personnel receiving training; training subjects; instructors; references for instruction; date, time, and place of in- struction; uniform and equipment; and any ad- ministrative comments. When determining what training needs to occur, the company commander begins with tasks. In technical terms, a task is measurable work per- formed in a short period with a fixed beginning and ending that is necessary for unit perfor- mance. Training tasks ar e not training standards. Training tasks determine what training needs to occur; training standa rds determine what is needed and what level of performance is required to train to thos e tasks. Tasks with an “E” designator (an E-c ode) require evaluation, which means that individuals and units must receive this training. It is for this reas on that the “E” designator is sometimes confused as an indi- cator for “essential.” Fo r the infantry company, “conduct an attack” is an E-coded event. Training standards are not training tasks. A train- ing standard relates to a specific task and delin- eates how and how well that task is performed. Standards may apply to an individual or they may apply to an organizati on or unit (collective). Regardless of the audience, standards consist of six parts:  Code: the unique training standard designator.  Task: the specific task to which a standard refers.  Condition: in what environment with what equipment or material a task is performed.  Standard: how well the specific task must be performed.  Performance steps: the various steps that are taken to perform the task.  References: publications and other sources of information on the task. Individual and Collective Training Training focuses on either the indi vidual or the collective unit. For individuals, training tasks and standards fall into thre e categories: rank related, billet related, and occupational specialty related. A company commander w ill personally possess both Service and infant ry tasks appropriate to captains and infantry task s appropriate to an in- fantry company commander. Similarly, collec- tive tasks and standards fall into two categories: type of unit and size of unit (see table B-1 on page B-6 and fig. B-2 on page B-7). Based on the type of unit, an infantry squad will have specific collective tasks th at differentiate it from a com- bat engineer or machine gun squad. Based on the size of unit, the task “conduct an attack” for the squad will consist of diffe rent requirements and performance steps than the same task at the com- pany or battalion level. Task Chains and Branches In the same manner that unit missions nest verti- cally (the main effort) and horizontally (support- ing the main effort), determining what unit tasks must occur in order to gain proficiency in col- lective tasks results in similar nesting. Within SAT terminology, th is is chaining and branching as seen in figures B-3, B-4, B-5, and B-6 on --- Page 333 --- B-6 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 pages B-8 through B-9. Such nesting ensures proficiency across the force. It allows multiech- elon training to occur. Additionally, when used during analysis, the company commander can readily create the outline of a training plan, to include time and resources required. 5002. INDEX OF COMPANY COLLECTIVE EVENTS BY FUNCTIONAL AREA Event Code Eval Code Event Page MANEUVER INF-MAN-6101 Process detainees (D) 5 - 5 INF-MAN-6102 Conduct obstacle breaching (D) 5 - 6 INF-MAN-6103 Conduct a Passage of Lines (POL) (D) 5 - 7 INF-MAN-6105 Occupy an assembly area (D) 5 - 8 INF-MAN-6106 Support by fire/Overwatch (D) 5 - 9 INF-MAN-6107 React to a meeting engagement (D) 5 - 10 INF-MAN-6108 Conduct a patrol (D) 5 - 11 INF-MAN-6109 Occupy a patrol base (B) 5 - 12 INF-MAN-6110 Conduct a relief in place (RIP) (B) 5 - 13 INF-MAN-6111 YES Conduct an attack (B) 5 - 14 INF-MAN-6112 Conduct a night attack (B) 5 - 15 INF-MAN-6113 YES Conduct a raid (B) 5 - 16 INF-MAN-6114 YES Conduct a mot orized attack (B) 5 - 17 INF-MAN-6115 YES Conduct tank-inf antry integration (B) 5 - 19 INF-MAN-6116 YES Conduct a mec hanized attack (B) 5 - 21 INF-MAN-6117 YES Conduct a helicopt er-borne assault (B) 5 - 22 INF-MAN-6118 Consolidate and reorganize (B) 5 - 24 INF-MAN-6120 Conduct a movement to contact (B) 5 - 25 INF-MAN-6132 YES Conduct a defense (D) 5 - 26 INF-MAN-6133 Conduct a withdrawal (D) 5 - 27 Table B-1. List of Company Collective Tasks Example. --- Page 334 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ B-7 INF-MAN-6111: Conduct an attack (B) SUPPORTED MET(S): 1 EVALUATION-CODED: YES SUSTAINMENT INTERVAL: 12 months CONDITION: Given a unit, equipment, a mission, and commander’s intent. STANDARD: To accomplish the mission and meet commander’s intent. EVENT COMPONENTS: 1. Conduct planning, inspections, rehearsals, and preparations. 2. Task organize. 3. Employ reconnaissance and surveillance elements to detect enemy forces, positions, movement, and obstacles, and submit reports in a timely manner. 4. Initiate preparatory fires, if applicable. 5. Occupy assembly area. 6. Cross the line of departure at the specified time. 7. Employ appropriate formations and tactics to approach the objective. 8. Bypass or rapidly breach obstacles encountered enroute to the objective. 9. Occupy attack position and conduct final preparations and leader’s reconnaissance. 10. Use/coordinate indirect and direct fires to suppress enemy during final maneuver to objective and to gain and maintain fire superiority during the assault. 11. Leaders position themselves to observe and assess fires/suppression, and control timing, distribution, and rates of fire to best integrate fire and maneuver. 12. Position crew-served weapons, maximizing the effectiveness of their fires with respect to the target/ground. 13. Employ supporting arms to engage targets of opportunity. 14. Displace crew-served weapons to provide continuous support. 15. Establish communications/signal plan for initiation, shifting, and ceasing of fires. 16. Treat and evacuate casualties. 17. Handle detainees. 18. Reduce fortified positions and clear trench lines, if applicable. 19. Conduct consolidation or continuation of the attack. 20. Issue fragmentary order, as necessary, to alter the plan of attack. 21. Send and receive required reports. CHAINED EVENTS: INF-MAN-5111 RELATED EVENTS: INF-MAN-6112 INF-MAN-6114 INF-MAN-6115 INF-MAN-7111 INF-MAN-6117 INF-MAN-6118 INF-MAN-6120 INF-MAN-6116 REFERENCES: 1. FMFM 6-4 Marine Rifle Company/Platoon Figure B-2. Company Collective Task. --- Page 335 --- B-8 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Conduct an attack Reduce a fortified position Employ supporting arms Support by fire Engage a target with a M249 Company Platoon Squad Team Individual 0331-MMG-1006 Engage targets with a medium machine gun 0331-EMPL-2004 Direct the employment of a machine gun team INF-0331-5102 Emplace MMG section ISO offensive operations Collective event INF-0331-4102 Emplace MMG squad ISO offensive operations Collective event INF-0331-3102 Emplace MMG team ISO offensive operations Collective event Individual events Legend: ISO - in support of MMG - medium machine gun Figure B-3. Tasks in a Chain Sequence. Figure B-4. Tasks in a Chain and Branch Sequence. --- Page 336 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ B-9 Roles and Responsibilities As discussed in chapter 1, members of the com- pany staff and platoon leadership possess important training responsibilities. Primary responsibility for training continues to rest with the commander who ove rsees success. The company commander—  Provides clear intent and guidance throughout the training process.  Clearly identifies training objectives. INF-0351-4103 Employ assault squad ISO urban ops INF-0351-3101 Employ rockets ISO offensive ops INF-0351-3102 Employ demolitions ISO offensive ops INF-0351-3103 Employ rockets ISO defensive ops INF-0351-3105 Employ breaching/demolitions ISO urban ops Higher event Subordinate events Legend: ISO - in support of Ops - operations INF-MAN-5102 Breach an obstacle INF-OFF-5105 Occupy an assembly area INF-0331-5102 Employ MMG ISO Off Ops INF-MAN-5106 Support by fire/overwatch INF-MAN-5111 Conduct an attack INF-MAN-6111 Conduct an attack Legend: ISO - in support of Off Ops - offensive operations Figure B-5. Tasks in a Branch Sequence. Figure B-6. Tasks in a Branch Sequence. --- Page 337 --- B-10 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1  Plans training events and activities.  Arranges for support.  Ensures that resources needed to conduct train- ing are available.  Ensures that training is conducted.  Supervises and evaluates individual and unit proficiency.  Supervises and evalua tes training sessions, instructional quality, and UTM procedures. The XO—  Supervises company preparations to execute training in support of the company com- mander’s plans and goals.  Serves as the company training officer and supervises all aspects of unit training and UTM in support of the comp any commander’s train- ing plan. The first sergeant—  Is the senior tactical and technical advisor to the company commander.  Ensures the training a nd mentoring of SNCOs, NCOs, and junior Marines.  Ensures a quality training environment to include balancing and deconflicting company administrative requirements with company training events as much as possible.  Ensures training readin ess of the company’s personnel.  Is always present at major training events. The company gunnery sergeant—  In training, continues role as a tactical and technical advisor to the company and platoon commanders and platoon sergeants.  Serves as company duty expert on all weapons organic to the company.  Coordinates operational and support require- ments in support of the company’s training plan. The platoon commander—  Is responsible for the training of the platoon.  Determines platoon, squad, and individual training requirement in support of the company commander’s training plan. The platoon sergeant—  In training, continues role as the senior tactical and technical advisor in the platoon.  Assists the squad lead ers in training their squads.  Assists the platoon commander in identifying platoon training requireme nts and planning for them.  Coordinates operationa l and support require- ments in support of the platoon’s training. The squad leader—  Serves as a primary trainer/instructor within the platoon.  Is responsible for the act ual training of indivi- dual and collective events within the squad. Conducting Unit Training Management Training management cons ists of an understand- ing of training required; a plan to execute and eval- uate that training; and a record system that allows the company commander to track what training the company conducted, when it was conducted, who attended, the level of proficiency achieved, and a prediction of sustainment requirements. Sources of Training Requirements Company commanders face a large demand on their training time due to multiple training re- quirements from multiple sources. An awareness of the sources of these training requirements will assist training planners in properly identifying all of them and integrating them into the company --- Page 338 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ B-11 training plan. Training planners should identify the following training requirements:  Predeployment.  Formal.  Ancillary.  Professional military education.  Marine Corps common skills. Reference Tools In addition to Service doctrine, company com- manders and trainers have a large numb er of ref- erences at their disposal to address all of the training requirements de manded of them. Many of the following references also include the required information for the creation of nonstan- dard and mission-specifi c training requirements not addressed in the Mari ne Corps’ Training and Readiness Manual system. Unit Training Management Specific Doctrinal Publications The MCRP 3-0A, and MCRP 3-0B, How to Con- duct Training , are the core doctrinal references on conducting training and training management in the Marine Corps. They are replete with exam- ples and specific systematic instructions. Training and Readiness Manuals The Marine Corps devel ops training and readi- ness manuals for most sk ill sets found in the Marine Corps. Just because a particular skill set does not exist in NAV MC 3500.44A does not mean it does not exist elsewhere. An infantry company deploying to c onduct crisis response and limited contingency op erations might find many appropri ate standards within NAVMC 3500.10B, Military Police and Corrections Training and Readiness Manual. Technical Manuals Marine Corps technical manuals provide ready sources for performance steps and standards on equipment-related training needs. Marine Corps Reference Publications Marine Corps reference pu blications contain sig- nificant practical reso urces on how to conduct tasks from managing training to conducting mechanical breaching. These publications can serve as ready source ma terial for classes and training, provide insight into performance steps and evaluations, and act as the basis for nonstan- dard training. Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned deploys representatives at all major commands, bases, Service-level training organizations, and forward deployed operati ng forces. The purpose of the organization is to cull, validate, and publish lessons learned across the six war- fighting functions. Thei r publications and Web site provide a means of maintaining currency of instruction and training for specific theaters. Other Service Publications The Marine Corps partners with the United States Army on many publica tions and documents and actively endorses and uses joint publications. For company commanders operating with other Ser- vices or conducting missions not normally associ- ated with the Marine Corps, joint and other Services’ publications an d manuals prove invalu- able. Some such publications are—  Army field manuals and tactics, techniques, and procedures. These publications are similar and often shared with MCWPs and MCRPs.  Air Land Sea Application Center publications . This organization sp onsors multi-Service pub- lications, of wh ich many are recognized as Marine Corps Service doctrine.  Joint doctrinal publications . Joint publications are foundational documents for the Services.  Center for Army Lessons Learned publications. The center is similar to the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned and provides an extensive list of documents, pamphlets, and Web-based information. --- Page 339 --- B-12 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Event Training Development Developing training, to in clude a training plan spanning a company’s deployment cycle, is based upon the analyze, design, develop, implement, and evaluate training cycle, which was shown in fig- ure B-1. The following subparagraphs address the cycle at the specific training event level. The cycle discussed assumes that a proper, intelligent, and comprehensive training plan already exists. Analyze As the long-term training plan becomes mid- and short-term planning, evaluation and assessment of previous training and unit/individual profi- ciency is a continuous process. In designing the next logical training even t in the training plan, company commanders assess the ability of the individual or unit not only to conduct the training, but also to reach proficienc y in it (see tables B-2 and B-3). Training planners identify any deficien- cies and develop review and refresher training as part of the event. Subordinate commanders receive guidance on prep aring for the event, to include prioritization, an d specific branched and chained events the plat oons will address on their own prior to the training event. Finally, training planners analyze time, ra nges, facilities, logis- tics, and other administrative requirements to ensure proper support. Develop After analysis validates the necessity and applica- bility of a training event, development continues. Required Resources . Training planners initially determine required resources by reviewing such information as training standards, their condi- tions, and their perform ance steps. As they develop the training event, the resource require- ments translate into such things as—  Facilities, such as clas srooms, simulators, and maintenance bays.  Ranges specific to the training, such as those appropriate to the ma neuver, ammunition, or weapon systems.  Equipment, such as el ectronic media devices and practical application platforms.  Personnel, including the target audience, spe- cial skill instructors, an opposing force, or role players. Table B-2. Platoon Proficiency Example. Company B Proficiency Assessment for INF-MAN-6111, Conduct an Attack Event 1st Platoon 2d Platoon 3d Platoon Weapons Platoon INF-MAN-5111 Conduct an attack (chained event) PUPU INF-MAN-5102 Breach an obstacle (branched event) PUPT INF-MAN-5106 SBF overwatch (branched event) UPPT INF-MAN-5107 React to a meeting engagement (branched event) PPTU INF-0331-5102 Employ MMG ISO offensive operations (branched event) UUPT INF-MAN-5133 Conduct a withdrawal (branched event) UUUU Legend ISO MMG P T U in support of medium machine gun partially trained trained untrained --- Page 340 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ B-13 Limitations . In keeping with the MCPP, training planners identify what must be done (such as train- ing standards) and what cannot be done (such as range restrictions). Failur e to identify limitations and conduct mitigation pla nning has direct and immediate negative impact on training execution. Administration . Identifying th e administrative requirements for a trai ning event and publishing those requirements early allows subordinate ele- ments and members of th e training audience to properly prepare in order to gain the most effect from the training time and resources expended. Prepared units understand the following:  Personal protective equipment and uniform requirements.  Target audience (the pers ons or units that will participate).  Prequalification, refres h, or review require- ments prior to the event.  Document publication, such as an event-spe- cific letter of instru ction and upda ted training schedule with appropria te version controls in place. Logistics. Logistics will ofte n determine the suc- cess or failure of training. Great classes, superior instructors, and an out standing range may be worthless if ammunition or transport to move the training audience do not arrive. The following are logistic considerations:  Transport.  Ammunition.  Targetry.  Feed plan.  Weapons.  Safety equipment. Communications . Training planners concern themselves with large amounts of communica- tion requirements—sometimes beyond the abil- ity of the company to resource organically. Planning must meet ad ministrative communica- tion requirements that address the ability to speak to HHQ, range control, and instructor and con- troller nets. Planning must also address training communication requirement s that allow training units to communicate with in the context of the training event. Inspections/Supervision . Rehearsals, the safety plan, and the personnel that will oversee and supervise these functions should be considered early in the planning process because they will drive their own personne l, communications, and logistic requirements that are then integrated into Table B-3. Squad Proficiency Example. 1st Squad, 3d Proficiency in Individual Events for INF-MAN-4111 Event Squad Proficiency 0311-PAT-2001 Lead a fire team as an element of a patrol 33% 0300-PAT-1009 Conduct aided observation 44% 0300-PAT-1009 Perform immediate actions 50% 0311-PAT-1002 Perform individual actions 55% 0311-OFF-2007 Lead the breach of an obstacle 22% 0300-WPNS-1002 Engage target with a light antiarmor weapon 44% 0300-DEMO-1004 Probe for a mine 55% 0300-DEMO-1002 Engage targets with an M67 hand grenade 55% 0311-OFF-2001 Control a fire team in the offense 22% 0311-OFF-1001 Perform individual actions in a fire team 55% 0300-M16-1026 Engage targets with an M16 at unknown distances 66% --- Page 341 --- B-14 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 the overall training plan. Recognizing these needs too late often delays or cancels training. Design If the analyze and development phases of train- ing development resemble the problem framing step of the MCPP, then the design phase is COA development. Just like the MCPP process, large portions of training design may leap out immedi- ately during development. A live fire presentation drill automatically genera tes a requirement for a range; experienced trainers will rapidly recog- nize what the range will look like, how it will operate, and what local ra nges will best serve the training purpose. However, the more compli- cated the training event, the more important the design phase becomes, especially for teasing out additional resource re quirements not immedi- ately identified during the development phase. Reconnaissance . Training planners and, ideally, those principle persons tasked with executing and controlling the training sh ould endeavor to visit the ranges, facilities, an d training areas available to determine how best to proceed and use the resources available. Lanes . Planners should co nsider the following questions regarding lanes:  Will the training even t require individual or unit lanes?  How will the lanes be phased and timed?  Can the lanes run simultaneously or must skills develop sequentially?  What physical lay down is necessary and how much terrain is required overall?  How will lanes be controlled and movement between lanes monitored and tracked (see fig. B-7 and figs. B-8 thro ugh B-11 on pages B-15 and B-16)? Downtime Plan . Every training event has down time. Training planners must determine the down time acceptable for rest , organization, and effi- ciency, and the time that should become part of the training plan. After Action Plan . Unorganized after action events can quickly become aimless and general and are usually of little value. Such an event is unacceptable, especially during UTM when the effectiveness of any give n training must be mea- sured in order to determine whether the training plan can continue or should be modified. Rehearsal Retraining Execution Next Lane AAR Assembly area Figure B-7. Basic Lane Layout. --- Page 342 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ B-15 Rehearsal, link-up with PSOs, ammunition issue Retraining 0300-M249-1006 Next Lane Evaluation, performance recorded Event introduction, orientation, instruction Legend: PSO - position security officer Line of departure Enemy contact AAR Close with enemy to limit of advance Event introduction, orientation, instruction Rehearsal, link-up with PSOs, ammunition issue 0300-PAT-1009 Perform immediate actions upon contact 0300-M16-1026 Engage targets at an unknown distance with an M16 0300-PAT-1013 Perform actions from a hasty firing position 0300-M16-1016 Execute mutiple target engagements Legend: PSO - position security officer Figure B-8. Single Event Lane. Figure B-9. Multiple Event Lane. --- Page 343 --- B-16 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Throughout the training ev ent, effectiveness and proficiency is collected and, upon its completion, a guided AAR is conducted. Performance Evaluation Checklist . Performance evaluation checklists (PECLs) provide evaluators and controllers with a pe rformance step checklist with which to determine the proficiency of a unit or individual at a given task (see table B-4 and table B-5 on page B-19). Training planners nor- mally find PECLs within the training and readi- ness publications or create them from appropriate references or subject matter experts. If the analysis and development has failed to locate appropriate AAR 0300-M249-1007 Fire the squad automatic weapon basic course 0300-M249-1008 Engage targets with M249 squad automatic weapon 0311-M249-1001 Qualify on the multiple target engagement course 0311-M249-1002 Qualify on the fire and movement course Assembly area Rehearsal INF-MAN-3102 Breach an obstacle INF-MAN-3111 Conduct offensive operations INF-MAN-4111 Conduct an attackAssembly area Rehearsal MCWP 3-11.3 Scouting and Patrolling AAR AAR AAR Figure B-10. Multiple Firing Points. Figure B-11. Collective Event. --- Page 344 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ B-17 existing PECLs, then loca l creation is necessary. Regardless of origin, pe rsonnel selected to assess and evaluate the training must receive instruction on what they ar e assessing, how they are assess- ing it, and the function of the PECL in the process. Remediation Plan . For a variety of reasons, from logistical limitations resu lting in delayed or can- celled training to lack of unit or individual profi- ciency, it is likely that some remediation must occur. During the devel opment phase, planners determine the amount of remediation required and the resources available. The remediation plan is formalized during the design phase. Conduct Operational Risk Management. Training planners conduct ORM according to MCO 3500.27B, Operational Risk Management (ORM), and develop/implement appropriate risk controls within training design. Range and personnel safety briefs, instructions to key personnel, and other similar actions fall within ORM. Implement Planning is continuo us and the actual im- plementation of traini ng will contain some planning and briefing requirements, such as training and briefing of key personnel and occupation of the traini ng area. The following are roles and responsibi lities of key personnel during implementation:  Officers in charge . Depending on the size and nature of the event, officers in charge may include NCOs through field grade officers who are responsible for the overall safe and effi- cient conduct of the training event.  Range safety officer . Local range regulations and MCO 3570.1B w/Ch 1, Range Safety , determine which personne l may serve as range safety officers; regardless, these safety officers are nontraining persons directly responsible for the safe conduct of the training event.  Position safety officer . Position safe ty officers may also serve as cont rollers and assessors. They are also responsible for the safe conduct of training within thei r specific position, such as an SBF position or a portion of a lane.  Ammunition NCO. Normally NCOs, these per- sonnel do not participate in training. Instead, they ensure the safe storage, issue, and deissue of ammunition and the proper separation of ammunition, dunnage, and trash. Table B-4. Single Standard Performance Evaluation Checklist Example. INF-0331-4100: Deliver machine gun overhead fire Condition: A machine gun unit is supporting offensive operations. The unit has been tasked to deliver overhead fire. The machine guns are mounted on tripods. Standard: Per the references. Reference: MCWP 3-15.1, Machine Guns and Machine Gun Gunnery GO NO GO Component Events: GO NO GO 1. Identify target(s) and estimate range to within 50 meters. GO NO GO 2. Select a safety limit after the exact positions of the guns have been established and identify a readily identifiable terrain feature that corre- sponds to the safety limit. GO NO GO 3. Prepare a sketch of the overhead fire situation. GO NO GO 4. Deliver effective overhead fire (between ranges of 350 and 850 meters only) until friendly troops reach the safety limit on the ground, ceasing or shifting fires as directed. GO NO GO 5. Employ overhead fire in a safe and controlled manner, using depres- sion stops, observing the safety limit, and not firing if the gun-target range exceeds the maximum effective range of the gun. GO NO GO Mastered Not Mastered --- Page 345 --- B-18 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1  Instructors/trainers. These personnel may also serve as position safety officers. They are the primary agents who conduct the training for units or individuals.  Controllers. Controllers do not necessarily train or instruct, but se rve during larger unit exercises to help facilitate the training and con- duct of the exercise. Quite often, they execute position safety officer functions as part of their duties.  Demonstrators. As required, de monstrators do not participate in tr aining, but work with instructors and trainers to demonstrate proper techniques prior to the beginning of a particular training event; they ma y also serve other train- ing functions as required. Even with a reconnaissance, the occupation of a range or training area lead s to some modification on the ground. For those training events conducted in the field or on a range, planners must consider the following aspects of the range:  Staging area: an area in which the training audience or units ca n assemble and conduct basic internal procedur es without disrupting or being disrupted by training.  Ammunition staging area: a physical area that ensures proper ammunition control and separa- tion. It is often reinforced with some sort of temporary barrier, such as fencing or concer- tina wire.  Targetry: may consist of actual targets, but often refers to effects, simulators, and other such devices that fac ilitate training. Such devices must be controlled, placed, and main- tained throughout the training event.  Physical control measures: those methods, bar- riers, and instructions that ensure the smooth flow of training while preventing disruption by personnel or units inadvertently moving through or occupying an area. --- Page 346 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ B-19 Table B-5. Event Perfomance Evaluation Checklist Example. Event: Conduct combat tracking Condition: Given a unit wearing fighting loads, a mission, and an area containing tracks Standard: Gain contact with the enemy or gather actionable information, mitigate enemy countermeasures, mitigate the enemy’s ability to track or obtain actionable information, and satisfy the commander’s intent. References: 1. Combat Hunter Program of Instruction CID M10KZ1M 2. NAVMC 3500.44, Infantry Training and Readiness Manual 3. MCWL 3-35.3X, Combat Hunter; Observe, Move and Act 4. Randy Merriman (Combat Tracker) Performance Steps: 1. Identify the three dynamics of a footprint GO NO GO a. Primary impact point GO NO GO b. Foot roll GO NO GO c. Terminal point GO NO GO 2. Interpret action indicators GO NO GO 3. Determine the number of quarry GO NO GO 4. Apply the ten rules of tracking GO NO GO a. Tracker sets the pace GO NO GO b. Record the ICP GO NO GO c. Always know where you are GO NO GO d. Always confirm on aerial spoor GO NO GO e. Maintain visual contact of all team members GO NO GO f. Never force a track GO NO GO g. Never walk on top of ground spoor GO NO GO h. Never overshoot the last known spoor GO NO GO i. Get into the mind of your quarry GO NO GO j. Correctly identify the tracks you wish to follow GO NO GO 5. Identify observable indicators GO NO GO 6. Identify unobservable indicators GO NO GO 7. Demonstrate proficiency in all assigned positions of a tracking team GO NO GO 8. Apply the correct tracking team formations under current conditions and terrain GO NO GO 9. Conduct lost spoor procedures or shortcuts GO NO GO 10. Correctly identify antitracking techniques GO NO GO 11. React to enemy actions with proper encounter actions GO NO GO 12. Correctly submit a LNDATA report GO NO GO a. Location GO NO GO b. Number of quarry GO NO GO c. Direction of travel (quarry) GO NO GO d. Always confirm on aerial spoor GO NO GO e. Age of spoor GO NO GO f. Type of print GO NO GO g. Amplifying remarks GO NO GO 13. Use proper hand and arm signals GO NO GO 14. Track the quarry GO NO GO 15. Employ antitracking techniques against the enemy GO NO GO Mastered Not Mastered Legend ICP LNDATA MCWL initial commencement point location, number, direction, age, type, amplifying Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory --- Page 347 --- B-20 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 This Page Intentionally Left Blank --- Page 348 --- APPENDIX C FOREIGN WEAPONS CAPABILITIES This appendix addresses the general char acteristics and capabilities of the most common weapon variants found among enem y forces. This appendix is not all inclusive, nor does it address the NATO or US weapons and their variants that enemy forces may also carry. AK Series Weapons Figure C-1. AK-47. Figure C-2. AK-74. --- Page 349 --- C-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Caliber: 7.62 x 39 mm (AK-47/AKM); 5.45 x 39 mm (AK-74) Action: gas operated, rotating bolt with 2 lugs Overall length: 870 mm Barrel length: 415 mm Weight: 3.14 kg empty Magazine capacity: 30 rounds (40-round box magazines and 75-round drums) Maximum range: 800 m (AK-47); 1,000 m (AKM/AK-74) Maximum effective range: 300 m (AK-47/AKM); 500 m (AK-74) Cyclic rate of fire: 600 rds/min Practical rate of fire: 90–100 rds/min Muzzle velocity: 2,345 fps (AK-47/AKM); 2,953 fps (AK-74) Stock: fixed or collapsible Mikhail Kalashnikov designed the AK-47 (Avtomat Kalashnikova model 1947) assault rifle in 1947. The Russian ma nufacturer Izhevsk Machine-Building Plant produced the weapon, which saw use in many Eastern bloc nations during the Cold War. Compared to the rifles used in World War II, the AK-47 was lighter and more co mpact, with a shorter range , a smaller 7.62 x 39 mm car- tridge, and capable of selective fire, ma king it one of the first assault rifles. It was also produced in greater numbers th an any other assault rifle in the 20th century, with more than 100 million manufactured. Front sight Muzzle Gas tube Barrel Ejection port ForearmSaftey/Selector Pistol grip Takedown button Top cover Rear sightButt stock Folding stock Magazine Magazine release Magazine well Trigger/ Trigger guard Figure C-3. AKM. --- Page 350 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ C-3 AKS-74U Caliber: 5.45 x 39 mm or 7.62 x 39 mm Action: gas operated, rotating bolt with 2 lugs Overall length: 735 mm (490 mm with folded buttstock) Barrel length: 210 mm Magazine capacity: 30 rounds standard Weight empty: 2.71 kg Effective range: about 200 meters Cyclic rate of fire: 650–735 rds/min The AKS-74U is a modified version of the AK-74 assault rifle with a much shorter barrel (210 mm versus 415 mm) and a conical flash suppressor instead of a muzzle brake. Like the AKS-74, it has a folding metal stock. The overall length of the submachine gun is only 490 mm with stock folded or 735 mm with it extended. The rear sight is a flip-type U-notch; the fr ont sight is a cylindrical post. The Soviets designed the AKS-74U as a weapon short enough to be han- dled easily when the crew enters and exits vehicles. The device at the end of the barrel functions as an expansion chamber to bleed off gases, which would other- wise cause exce ssive recoil. With a loaded we ight of 3.106 k g, the AK-74U is considerably lighter than the AK-74 and has a somewhat higher rate of fire. Figure C-4. AKS-74U. --- Page 351 --- C-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 SVD Sniper Rifle Caliber: Russian 7.62 x 54 mm rimmed Operation: gas operated, short stroke, rotating bolt; semiautomatic Capacity: 10-round detachable box magazine Weight: 4.31 kg empty with telescope Length: 1,225 mm Barrel length: 620 mm Maximum range: iron sights 1,200 m; scope 1,300 m Maximum effective range: 1,300 m Maximum rate of fire: 30 rds/min Aimed rate of fire: 3–5 rds/min Muzzle velocity: 2,526 fps Scope type: PSO-1 with illuminated reticle Accuracy: less than 2 minutes of arc at 600 m Stock: fixed Evgeniy Fedorovich Dragunov developed the SVD in 1965. It entered service in 1967 and was the standard Soviet sniper weapon. One squad in each motorized rifle platoon has an SVD; se lected riflemen receive re gular, centralized sniper training on it. Largely due to its open buttstock, the SVD is lighter than older sniper rifles. The 4x PSO-1 optical sight has a 6-degree field of view. It contains an integral, infrared detection aid and an illuminated rangefinder reticle. The SVD is effective in daylight against point targets or at night against active infra- red emitters, such as night driving aids and weapon sights. Figure C-5. SVD Sniper Rifle. --- Page 352 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ C-5 RPK Light Machine Gun Caliber: 7.62 x 39 mm Action: gas operated, rotating bolt with 2 lugs Weight: 5 kg Overall length: 1,040 mm Barrel length: 591 mm Magazine capacity: box magazine 30 or 40 rounds, drum 75 rounds Maximum range: 1,000 m Maximum effective range: 800 m Cyclic rate of fire: 600 rds/min Muzzle velocity: 2,444 fps Practical rate of fire: 100–140 rds/min Stock: fixed The RPK is a variant of the AKM assault rifle. It has a l onger, heavier barrel (591 mm versus 415 mm); a stamped metal bipod; and a heavier type of fixed, wooden buttstock. The modified receiver of the RP K can accommodate its larger diameter barrel . The RPK normally feeds a mmunition from either a 40-round curved box magazine or a 75 -round spring-loaded drum magazine; however, it can also us e the 30-round curved box ma gazine of the AKM, if necessary. It has a chrome-plated barrel, chamber, and gas pi ston. It also has a cyclic rate reducer built into the tr igger mechanism. Because the RPK fires from a closed bolt, it te nds to “cook off” its cartr idges after prolonged firing. Since the barrel cannot be changed, the sustained rate of fire must not exceed about 80 rounds per minute. Figure C-6. RPK Light Machine Gun. --- Page 353 --- C-6 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 RPD Light Machine Gun Caliber: 7.62 x 39 mm Action: gas operated with locking wings Weight: 6.6 kg Overall length: 1,037 mm Barrel length: 520 mm Magazine capacity: drum 100 rounds Maximum range: 1,200 m Maximum effective range: 800 m Cyclic rate of fire: 650 rds/min Sustained rate of fire: 150 rds/min Muzzle velocity: 2,297 fps Stock: fixed Figure C-7. RPD Light Machine Gun. --- Page 354 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ C-7 PKM Machine Gun Caliber: 7.62 x 54 mm rimmed Action: gas operated, rotating bolt with 2 lugs Weight: 8.99 kg on bipod (PK); 16.48 kg on tripod (PKM) Overall length: 1,173 mm Barrel length: 658 mm Feeding: belt 100-, 200-, or 250-round drums Maximum range: 1,500 m Maximum effective range: 1,200 m Cyclic rate of fire: 700–850 rds/min Sustained rate of fire: 150 rds/min Stock: fixed The 7.62-mm general pur pose machine gun Pulemyot Kalashnikov is a gas- operated, belt-fed, sustained-fire weapon . The Soviets based its design on the Kalashnikov assault rifle. Notable differ ences from the assaul t rifle are the gas cylinder below the barrel and the hollow -frame stock resembling that of the SVD sniper rifle. The PK M fires 7.62 x 54R rimmed cartridges, using a metal nondisintegrating belt. The PKM is an impro ved, lighter version (8.4 kg) of the PK, using stamped metal co mponents instead of mach ined metal. An assault magazine attached to th e rails under the receiver can carry 100 cartridges. Either 200- or 250-rou nd belt boxes can also feed the PKM. The PKM, when tripod-mounted, is designated PKMS. Figure C-8. PKM Machine Gun. --- Page 355 --- C-8 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Grenades and Launchers Figure C-9. RPG-7V with PG-7 Grenade and Booster Element. Figure C-10. PG-7VL Heat Grenade. Figure C-12. TBG-7V Thermobaric. Figure C-13. OG-7V Fragmentation Grenade. Figure C-11. PG-7VR (Antiactive Armor). --- Page 356 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ C-9 The following characteristics refer to figures C-9 through C-13: Caliber: 40-mm launcher; 40-, 70-, a nd 105-mm warheads, depending on the grenade model Type: recoilless launch plus rocket booster Weight: 6.3 kg unloaded, with PGO-7 telescope sight Overall length: 650 mm Maximum range: 950 m (high explosive antitank [HEAT] round self-destructs at approximately 200 m) Maximum effective range: 200–500 m, depending on grenade type Arming distance: 3–15 m Armor penetration: 250 to 800 mm rolled homogenous armor (HEAT round) Effective casualty radius: 15 m (antipersonnel round) Adopted in 1961, the RPG-7 is a relo adable, shoulder-fired, muzzle-loaded, recoilless antitank and antip ersonnel rocket propelled grenade launcher. It launches fin-stabilized, oversized rocket-assisted HEAT grenades (85 mm in the PG-7 version, 70 mm in the PG-7M) from a smooth bore 40-mm tube. The launcher with optical sights weighs 6.9 kilograms. Among the production gre- nades are the PG-7V, PG-7VL, PG-7 VR, OG-7, and TBG-7V. The PG-7V rocket has a penetration capability of 330 mm of steel armor. The PG-7VL anti- tank grenade can penetrate up to 600 mm of rolled homogeneous steel. The PG- 7VR is a tandem warhead designed to penetrate explosive reactive armor and the armor underneath. The OG-7 and OG-7M are high-explosive antipersonnel gre- nades. The OG-7M is a 2-kg, 40-mm fragmentation warhead that is effective at a range of 350 m with a kill radius of 15 m. The TBG-7V thermobaric round uses a 4.5-kg 105-mm warhead effec tive at a range of 200 m (maximum 700 m). The kill radius of this rocket is 10 m. --- Page 357 --- C-10 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Mortar Caliber: 82 mm Weight: 92.3 pounds Muzzle velocity: depends on type of round Maximum range: 3,000 m Minimum range: 82 m Sustained rate of fire: 25 rds/min The 82-mm mortar fires two types of high explosive rounds, both of which pro- duce an average of 305 lethal fragments. The first has six stabilizing fins with attached “boat type” powder incremen ts. The second has ten stabilizing fins and uses three “ring type” powder in crements. The 82-mm smoke round also produces lethal fragments (about 210) and a smoke cloud 20–25 yards wide and 15–25 yards high. Figure C-14. 82-mm Mortar. --- Page 358 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________________ C-11 Pistols Caliber: 9 x 18 mm Type: double action, semiautomatic, blowback Overall length: 161 mm Weight unloaded: 730 grams Barrel length: 93.5 mm Magazine capacity: 8 rounds The Makarov was the result of a compet ition held to design a replacement for the aging Tokarev TT-33 semiautomatic pistol. The TT had been loosely derived from the popular M1911 and was, by 1945, felt to be too large, heavy, and unreliable for a general service pistol. Rather than building a gun around an existing cartridge, Nikola i Makarov designed a new round, the 9 x 18 mm PM based on the popular Browni ng .380 Automatic Colt Pist ol cartridge. In the interests of simplicity and economy, the Makarov pistol was to be of straight blowback operation and the 9 x 18 mm ro und was found to be the most power- ful that could be fired safely from such a design. Although the given dimension was 9 mm, the bullet was actually 9.3 mm in diameter—shor ter, wider, and, therefore, incompatible with pistol s chambered for the popular 9-mm Luger/ Parabellum round. This meant that So viet ammunition was unusable in NATO firearms, so, in a conflict, NATO forces would not be able to gather ammuni- tion from fallen Soviet soldiers or Soviet stockpiles. Rear sight Hammer Decocker Frame Front sight Muzzle Slide Trigger guard Magazine release Trigger Slide stop Magazine well Figure C-15. Makarov Pistol. --- Page 359 --- C-12 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Caliber: 9 x 19 mm parabellum Type: double action, semiautomatic, locked breech Overall length: 186 mm Weight unloaded: 625 grams Barrel length: 114 mm Magazine capacity: 17 rounds The Glock 17 was the first pistol de signed and manufactured by the Austrian company Glock. It is a locked breec h, short recoil 9-mm Luger semiautomatic pistol with a standard maga zine capacity of 17 rounds of ammunition. It uses a modified Browning barrel locking syst em. The G17 showed up in the early 1980s for the Austrian Army weapons trials. It en tered service under the desig- nation P80. The pistol does not have any external safety lever, hammer, decocker, or any other operation controls that must be deactivated prior to mak- ing the weapon ready to shoot. By merely pulling the trigge r to the rear, the three independent safeties (tri gger safety, firing pin safety, and drop safety) are automatically deactivated and reactivated when the trigger is released. Figure C-16. Glock Pistol. --- Page 360 --- APPENDIX D TACTICAL TASKS Enemy-Oriented Tactical Tasks Ambush A surprise attack by fire from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy. Attack by Fire Fires (direct and indirect ) to destroy the enemy from a distance, normally used when the mis- sion does not require or support occupation of the objective. Note: This task is us ually given to the sup- porting effort during offensive operations and as a counterattack option for the reserve during defensive operations. The assigning commander must specify the intent, such as destroy, fix, neutralize, or suppress. Block To deny the enemy access to a given area or to prevent enemy advance in a given direction or on an avenue of approach. It may be for a speci- fied time. Note: Units assigned this task may have to retain terrain. Breach To break through or s ecure a passage through a natural or enemy obstacle. Bypass To maneuver around an obstacle, position, or enemy force to mainta in the momentum of advance. Previously unr eported obstacles and bypassed enemy forces are reported to HHQ. Canalize To restrict operations to a narrow zone by the use of existing or rein forcing obstacles or by fires or bombing. Contain To stop, hold, or surround enemy forces or to keep the enemy in a given area and prevent his with- drawing any part of his forces for use elsewhere. Defeat To disrupt or nullify the enemy commander’s plan and overcome his will to fight, thus making him unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted COA and yield to the friendly commander’s will. Destroy To physically render an enemy force combat inef- fective unless it is reconstituted. Disrupt To integrate fires and ob stacles to break apart an enemy’s formation and te mpo, interrupt his time- table, or cause prem ature commitment or the piecemealing of his forces. Exploit To take full advantage of success in battle and follow up initial gains, offensive actions that usu- ally follow a successful attack and are designed to disorganize the enemy in depth. Feint An offensive action invol ving contact with the enemy to deceive him ab out the location or time of the actual main offensive action. Fix To prevent the enemy fr om moving any part of his forces, either from a specific location or for a specific period of time, by holding or sur- rounding them to prevent their withdrawal for use elsewhere. --- Page 361 --- D-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Interdict An action to divert, disr upt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. Neutralize To render the enemy or his resources ineffective or unusable. Penetrate To break through the enemy’s defense and dis- rupt his defensive system. Reconnoiter To obtain, by visual ob servation or other meth- ods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy. Rupture To create a gap in en emy defensiv e positions quickly. Support by Fire A tactical mission in wh ich a force engages the enemy by direct fire to support a maneuvering force using overwatch or by establishing a base of fire. The supporting force does not capture enemy forces or terrain. Friendly Force-Oriented Tactical Tasks Breach To break through or s ecure a passage through a natural or friendly obstacle. Cover Offensive or defensive actions to protect the force. Disengage To break contact with th e enemy and move to a point where the enemy ca nnot observe or engage the unit by direct fire. Displace To leave one position an d take another. Forces may be displaced laterally to concentrate combat power in threatened areas. Exfiltrate The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control. Follow The order of movement of combat, CS, and CSS forces in a given combat operation. Guard To protect the main force by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information. Protect To prevent observation, engagement, or interfer- ence with a force or location. Screen To observe, identify, an d report information and only fight in self-protection. Terrain-Oriented Tactical Tasks Clear To remove enemy forces and eliminate orga- nized resistance in an assigned zone, area, or location by destroying, cap turing, or forcing the withdrawal of enemy forc es that could interfere with the unit’s ability to accomplish its mission. Control To maintain physical influence by occupation or range of weapon systems over the activities or access in a defined area. Occupy To move onto an objective, key terrain, or other manmade or natural terr ain area without opposi- tion and control the entire area. Reconnoiter To secure data about the meteorological, hydro- graphic, or geographic characteristics of a partic- ular area. Retain To occupy and hold a terr ain feature to ensure it is free of enemy occupation or use. --- Page 362 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ D-3 Secure To gain possession of a position or terrain fea- ture, with or without fo rce, and to prevent its destruction or loss by en emy action. The attack- ing force may or may no t have to physically occupy the area. Seize To clear a designated area and gain control of it. Environmentally-Oriented Tactical Tasks Assess the Population To evaluate the situation and attitudes of the civil population inhabiting the AO; this will likely be an ongoing task that friendl y forces use to deter- mine how and to what ex tent its own or enemy actions or environmenta l events are likely to affect the actions of the population. Build/Restore Infrastructure To construct, rebuild, or repair local infrastruc- ture (roads, bridges, po wer/sewage plants, etc.), usually after a natural disaster or after major operations are complete, in order to win local support/cooperation and/or to support friendly force operations. Coordinate with Civil Authorities To harmonize military activities with those of other (nonmilitary) government agencies, NGOs, and national or local HN government entities in order to achieve unity of effort and facilitate meeting objectives. Enable Civil Authorities To support or assist loca l or national HN govern- ment or other civil entities to effectively govern in their respective jurisd ictions or to carry out other legitimate functions. Engage the Civil Authorities To interact with, coordi nate with, an d influence HN civil authorities or members of the local pop- ulation (with or without official titles) who can direct or influence popular attitudes or actions. Influence the Population To persuade the civil population of the AO to support or cooperate with operations by friendly forces or at least to accept the friendly force pres- ence in the AO. Liaison with Civil Authorities To maintain communica tion (including personal contact) with key members of US Government agencies, HN government entities, and NGOs to ensure mutual understanding and unity of pur- pose or action. Transfer to Civil Control The handover of civil government responsibili- ties from friendly force military authorities to civil authorities. Civil authorities may include representatives of US Government agencies, intergovernmental orga nizations, and/or HN government entities. --- Page 363 --- D-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 This Page Intentionally Left Blank --- Page 364 --- APPENDIX E RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND FORCE CONTINUUM The manner and degree with which force is or is not applied is a function of how the force contin- uum is formed by the na ture of the applicable ROE, the authorization of the use of force, and the appropriateness of deadly force (see fig. E-1). Rules of engagement provide the general decision framework for the use of force in any given situa- tion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff provide a set of standing ROE, such as the inherent right of self- defense. This standing se t of ROE provides the baseline from which co mbatant commanders cre- ate ROE specific to a given theater or operation. Rules of engagement might be extremely permis- sive or restrictive, or they may be modified by changes in the operational environment. The Marine Corps escalates and de-escalates force along the force continuum using the con- tinuum of force model. Th is model serves as the basis for escalation of force continuum proce- dures, which guide Mari nes in applying ROE and determining whether and how much force to use. Procedures used to escalate and de-escalate force need not be followed sequentially; rather, they serve as guidelines to effectivel y align the threat at hand with th e force necessa ry to miti- gate it. It is the comp any commander’s responsi- bility to train the comp any’s personnel to know, understand, and properly use ROE within the force continuum. Company personnel employing ROE must under- stand them and the esca lation of force. When doubt exists, the comp any commander must take those steps necessary to address and mitigate con- fusion and misunderstanding. Rules of Engagement and the Continuum of Force Model Rules of engagement and the continuum of force model possess typical ter minology that, if under- stood, enables the proper application of force along the force continuum. Use of Force The use of force refers to the right of an individual or authority to settle co nflicts or prevent certain ROE Use of Force Deadly Force Force Continuum ROE Use of Force Deadly Force Force Continuum Figure E-1. Force Application Relationship. --- Page 365 --- E-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 actions by applying measures to dissuade another party from a particular COA or physically inter- vene to stop it. Force Continuum The force continuu m is the wide range of possi- ble actions, ranging from voice commands to the application of deadly forc e, that may be used to gain and maintain control of a potentially danger- ous situation. Escalation of Force Continuum The escalation of force c ontinuum refers to the escalation and de-escalation of force within the force continuum. The Marine Corps uses the con- tinuum of force model as a guide to executing escalation of force continuum procedures—mak- ing the determinations and conducting the actions associated with the esca lation and de-escalation of force. While often pr esented as a series of “steps,” there is no requirement to execute escala- tion of force continuum procedures sequentially. Rather, personnel assess th e threat posed and use the guidelines to determ ine an immediate and proper response. Continuum of Force Model The continuum of force model is the holistic guide to executing escala tion of force continuum procedures. Actual escala tion of force continuum procedures may vary widely among various the- aters and operations. Th e continuum of force model represents the basics of thought and action—the fundamental c onsiderations of esca- lation and de-escalation—that the Marine Corps uses to establish continuum of force procedures. Deadly Force The actual procedural employment of deadly force and the decision process to employ non- lethal, less than lethal , and/or lethal means of force result from use of force and ROE consider- ations. Within this contex t, deadly force is used to cause or create a subs tantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm. The use of deadly force is justified only as a last resort, when all lesser means have failed or cannot reasonably be employed. Deadly force can only be employed under one or more of the following conditions:  Self-defense or the defense of others.  Defense of assets involving national security.  Defense of assets not involving national secu- rity, but inherently dangerous to others.  Protection of public health or safety.  Prevention of serious offenses against persons.  Arrest or apprehension.  Criminal escapes. Positive Identification Establishing positive identification is determin- ing, to a reasonable certainty, that the person/ object is a legitimate military target. Hostile Act A hostile act is any use of force against friendly forces or designated persons or property. An adversary’s use of force to obstruct the mission of a friendly force is also a hostile act. Hostile acts generate the right of proportional response, to include an armed response. Hostile Intent Hostile intent is the threat of the imminent use of force against US forces or designated persons or property. Hostile intent also generates the right of proportional response, to include an armed response. Properly identi fied hostile intent, using the reasonable certainty principle, allows friendly forces to act in a proactive, proportional manner vice passively accepting attack and risking casu- alties, before responding. Proportionality Proportionality refers to using the minimal amount of force necessary to successfully address the threat. Understood prop erly, proportionality nei- ther dictates automatic application of an “equal” amount of force (7.62-mm rifle for 7.62-mm rifle --- Page 366 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ E-3 or semiautomatic wea pon for semiautomatic weapon), nor requires inaction if the resources on hand are inappropr iate (a sniper remains unen- gaged because the only readily accessible friendly weapon is a HMG). In this manner, within force continuum and the ROE, personnel can reasonably protect the force, resolve conflict, and escalate or de-escalate as necessary. Reasonable Certainty Reasonable certainty refers to a high probability of likelihood; for example, when a professional base- ball player throws a ball to a fellow player, there is reasonable certainty that the ball will be caught. The test of reasonable certainty is far greater than mere possibility; such terms as “maybe” or “prob- ably” fail the test of reasonable certainty. Employment The entire purpose of the force continuum and the procedures and models that govern actions within it is to employ the pr oper amount of force com- mensurate with the threat at hand. The expectation is that company commanders employ the mini- mum amount of force nece ssary to resolve a con- flict successfully, an e xpectation that accounts for escalation and de-esc alation. When designed and used correctly, escala tion of force continuum procedures can de-escal ate situations by con- vincing or persuading individuals and groups to stop their action well shor t of lethal force. Com- pany commanders should consider the purpose of the continuum of for ce model, why continuum procedures are needed, and when they are and are not used. Infantry companies will rarely operate in “empty battlefields” populated only by opposing com- batants. Company commanders can expect their operational actions to be among noncombatants, whether those noncombatants are hostile, neu- tral, friendly, or some combination thereof. The requirement to employ on ly that force necessary to resolve a conflict dictat es that infantry compa- nies must have processes and procedures to determine the intent of individuals or groups they may encounter. Whenever friendly forces do or may come into contact with noncombatant s, escalation of force continuum procedures ap ply. Threat assessment and local ROE will de termine the posture of friendly forces and when escalation of force con- tinuum procedures might be employed. An infan- try company that is ex ecuting support to civil authorities in a domestic crisis response and is surrounded by friendly nonc ombatants will prob- ably find the threshold for escalation of force continuum procedures ve ry high, since the most likely threat will probabl y consist of small level criminal activity or civi l disorder. Conversely, an infantry company opera ting among an actively hostile population migh t have a much lower threshold when determ ining how close and in what manner individuals, groups, or vehicles might approach friendly forces. Most obviously, escalati on of force continuum procedures do not occur wh en the intent of any individual or group is not hostile. Less obvi- ously, escalation of force continuum procedures do not occur when hostile intent meets reasonable certainty or when a hostile act occurs. It is impor- tant for company personnel to understand that escalation of force continuum procedures repre- sent tools used to ensure use of the minimal, pro- portional force necessary. Escalation of force continuum procedures are not designed to dictate a sequential series of actions that must occur ahead of deadly or lethal force. Self-defense, rea- sonably certain hostile intent, and a hostile act all demonstrate situations in which the processes and procedures associated wi th escalation of force continuum would not be used. The continuum of force model, upon which esca- lation of force continuu m procedures are based, contains a decisionmaking loop or cycle. The loop is continuous—the key to successfully exe- cuting escalation and de-escalation of force pro- cedures. Since the purpose of the procedures is to resolve potential conflict with the minimum force --- Page 367 --- E-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 necessary, the results of each step taken require assessment before any furt her steps toward esca- lation or de-escalation occur. For example, if a vehicle is approaching a checkpoint and the ROE and escalation of forc e continuum procedures dictate control of that approach, a Marine may wave warning flags to sl ow and stop the vehicle. The Marine will use a d ecision cycle to assess whether the flags prove effective or not, which, in turn, results in a decision to either stop the proce- dure or proceed to the next step—perhaps use of a pyrotechnic warning device. Methodology Escalation of force continuum procedures are based on the continuum of force model. The model consists of sequent ial considerations and general actions that begin with nonlethal force measures and graduate to lethal measures. The model allows for escalation and de-escalation and does not require steps to be followed sequen- tially. The rapidity of escalation and the measures that may constitute escalation are determined through mission and threat analysis, the limita- tions imposed by the ROE, and result in the esca- lation of force continuum procedures specific to a theater or operation. Continuum of Force Model While the model depicted in figure E-2 is an appropriate baseline for all situations, the actual escalation of force continuum procedures derived from it are not. Companies executing major oper- ations will likely find very liberal and rapid esca- lation of force continuum procedures; whereas, a company augmenting local law enforcement in a defense support of civil au thorities operation will find extremely restrictive procedures. The continuum of force model has the following five levels:  Level 1 compliant (c ooperative) (nonlethal force) . The subject responds to and complies with verbal commands, hand and arm signals, or flags.  Level 2 resistant (passi ve) (less than lethal force) . The subject resists verbal commands but complies immediatel y with any contact controls. Contact controls for persons in vehi- cles might include pyr otechnics, lasers, or other similar warnings.  Level 3 resistant (ac tive) (less than lethal force). The subject initially demonstrates physi- cal resistance. Use of compliance techniques, such as holds, joint manipulation, and stunning Assaultive (Serious bodily harm/death) Assaultive (Bodily harm) Resistant (Active) Resistant (Passive) Compliant (Cooperative) Deadly Force Defensive Tactics Compliance Techniques Contact Controls Verbal/Visual Commands Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Figure E-2. Continuum of Force Model. --- Page 368 --- Infantry Company Operations _________________________________________________________________________________ E-5 blows, are necessary to control the situation and force a subject to comp ly. Compliance tech- niques for vehicles wo uld include the use of stun grenades and/or spike strips.  Level 4 assaultive (bod ily harm) (lethal force) . The subject may physically attack, but does not use a weapon. Defensive tactics that may result in bodily injury, such as blocks, strikes, and kicks, are used to neut ralize the threat. In the case of vehicles, other defensive tactics would include warning and disabling shots.  Level 5 assaultive (lethal force) . The subject usually has a weapon and will either kill or injure someone unless stopped immediately and brought under control. Use of deadly force, either with or without a weapon, is necessary to establish control. Based on the continuum of force model, the Marine Corps further refined and developed basic pedestrian and vehicle applications of the model. While subject to the actual ROE and escalation of force con tinuum procedures devel- oped by competent author ity for a given theater or operation, these app lications represent a good starting point for training, preparation, and gen- eral purpose application. Procedures for pedestrian s follow a pattern simi- lar to the five levels out lined previously and both methodologies are fundamentally the same:  Shout (notify) (nonlethal) . This step serves to gain the attention of pedestrians. It may consist of signs, cones, and similar equipment, actions, and indications delivered by company person- nel (such as verbal commands, hand and arm signals, or a combina tion of both) to notify pedestrians to follow upcoming commands. Assessment of pedestrian actions is continu- ous—threat, not a threat, or undetermined.  Show (impede) (less than lethal) . This step causes pedestrians to stop. It may consist of physical barriers (such as gates or pedestrian containment areas), ac tions and indications delivered by personnel (such as demonstrating intent to use a weapon ), or a combination of both. Assessment of pede strian actions is con- tinuous—threat, not a threat, or undetermined.  Shove (disable) (less than lethal or lethal) . This step represents application of force to cause a pedestrian to stop. It may consist of physical barriers (such as gates or pedestrian lockouts), actions or i ndications delivered by company personnel (such as stun grenades, pyrotechnics, wa rning shots, and the applica- tion of physical restrain t), or a combination of both. Assessment of pede strian actions is con- tinuous—threat, not a threat, or undetermined.  Shoot (destroy) (lethal) . This step represents application of force to destroy or incapacitate a pedestrian and occurs b ecause of his failure to respond to previous step s or his demonstration of hostile act/intent. A ssessment continues as dead or wounded pede strians may remain a threat due to their own actions or the actions of others (such as remotely detonated explosive devices or sniper overwatch). Procedures for vehicles follow the memory aid NIDD [notify, impede, disable, destroy]:  Notify (nonlethal). This step serves to gain the attention of drivers. Si gns, cones, and similar equipment notify drivers to follow upcoming commands. Assessment of driver actions is continuous—is the vehi cle a threat, not a threat, or undetermined?  Impede (less than lethal) . This step serves to cause drivers to stop. It may consist of physical barriers (such as a gate), actions and indica- tions delivered by company personnel (such as pyrotechnics), or a combination of both. Assessment of driver actions is continuous— threat, not a threat, or undetermined?  Disable (less than lethal or lethal) . This step represents application of force to cause a vehicle to stop, which may consist of physical barriers (such as pop- up barriers and spike strips), actions deli vered by company per- sonnel (such as warning and disabling shots), or a combination of both. Assessment of driver actions is continuous—thr eat, not a threat, or undetermined? --- Page 369 --- E-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1  Destroy (lethal) . This step represents applica- tion of force to destro y a vehicle and occurs because of the driver’s failure to respond to previous steps or his demonstration of hostile act/intent. Assessment co ntinues, as vehicle destruction may or may not result in similar effects to drivers and passengers who will remain the subject of assessment—do they remain a threat, not a threat, or undetermined? Training As a function of comma nd responsibility, com- pany commanders must train their companies to effectively and correctly employ ROE and escala- tion of force continuum procedures. They cannot rely upon briefings, pocket cards, and similar pas- sive training measures when addressing escala- tion and de-escalation training within the company. Company personnel must conduct “sit- uation” and “react” drills that place them in the most likely scenarios they will encounter when executing the mission. They must understand the difference between a good decision made now and the best decision made too late. These skills require sustainment training to maintain currency and to address updates to changes in the ROE and escalation of force continuum procedures. --- Page 370 --- GLOSSARY SECTION I. ACRONYMS AA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . assembly area AAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . after action review AAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . amphibious assault vehicle AF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . amphibious force AI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .area of influence AK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Avtomat Kalashnikova AKM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Avtomat Kalashnikova Modernizirovanniy AKS . . . . . . . . Avtomat Kalashnikova Skladnoy AO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .area of operations AOI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . area of interest APL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . body armor protective level ASCOPE . . . . . . . . .areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events ATGM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . antitank guided missile BAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . battalion aid station BDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . battle damage assessment BHL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . battle handover line BP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .battle position BSG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . battlespace geometry C2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .command and control CAAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . combined antiarmor team CAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combined arms rehearsal CAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . close air support CASEVAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . casualty evacuation CBRN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear CCIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . commander’s critical information requirement CCO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat cargo officer CI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .counterintelligence CLIC . . . . . . . . . . company level intelligence cell CMO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .civil-military operations CO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . commanding officer COA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . course of action COC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat operations center COIN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . counterinsurgency COMCAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat camera CONOPS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . concept of operations COP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat outpost COT . . . . . . . . . . . commanding officer of troops CP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . command post CRRC . . . . . . . . . . . . combat rubber raiding craft CS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .combat support CSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat service support CSW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .crew-served weapon CTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .common tactical picture D3A. . . . . . . . . decide, detect, deliver, and assess DS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . direct support DSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . district stability framework EA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .engagement area ECOA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . enemy course of action EFST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .essential fire support task EOD . . . . . . . . . . . . explosive ordnance disposal EPW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . enemy prisoner of war EW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .electronic warfare FAC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . forward air controller FFIR . . . . friendly force information requirement FHA . . . . . . . . . .foreign humanitarian assistance FO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . forward observer FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .forward operating base FP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . force protection fps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . feet per second FRAGO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .fragmentary order FSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fire support coordinator FSCC. . . . . . . . . . fire support coordination center FSCM . . . . . . . fire support coordination measure FST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fire support team HA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . humanitarian assistance HEAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . high explosive antitank HHQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . higher headquarters HMG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . heavy machine gun HN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . host nation HNSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . host nation security forces HSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . health service support HUMINT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . human intelligence HVI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . high-value individual HVT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . high-value target I&W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . indications and warnings IE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . information environment IED . . . . . . . . . . . . . improvised explosive device --- Page 371 --- Glossary-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 IM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . information management IO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . information operations IPB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . intelligence preparation of the battlespace IR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .intelligence requirement IRC . . . . . . . . . . . information-related capabilities ISR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance JP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint publication JTAC. . . . . . . . . . .joint terminal attack controller kg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .kilogram(s) KOCOA . . . . . . . . . .key terrain, observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, and avenues of approach LCAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . landing craft, air cushion LCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . logistics combat element LCU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . landing craft, utility LF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . landing force LOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . line of communications LOGSTAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . logistics status report LP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . listening post LZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . landing zone m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . meter(s) MACO . . . . . . . . marshalling area control officer MAGTF . . . . . . . . . Marine air-ground task force MAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mobile assault platoon MBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . main battle area MCDP . . . . . . Marine Corps doctrinal publication MCO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps order MCPP . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps Planning Process MCRP . . . . . .Marine Corps reference publication MCWP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps warfighting publication MET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .mission-essential task METL . . . . . . . . . . . . . .mission-essential task list METT-T . . . . . . . . . . . . . mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available MEU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary unit MILDEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . military deception MISO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . military information support operations mm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .millimeter(s) MOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . measure of effectiveness MOP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .measure of performance MOPP . . . . . .mission-oriented protective posture MOS . . . . . . . . . . mili tary occupational specialty MTF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . medical treatment facility NAI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . named area of interest NATO . . . . . . North Atlantic Treaty Organization NAVMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Navy/Marine Corps departmental publication NCO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .noncommissioned officer NEO . . . . . . .noncombatant evacuation operation NGO . . . . . . . . . . .nongovernmental organization NPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . named person of interest NSFS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .naval surface fire support NVD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . night vision device OP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . observation post OPORD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operation order OPSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operations security OPT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operational planning team ORM . . . . . . . . . . . . operational risk management PA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . public affairs PCC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . precombat check PCI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . precombat inspection PECL. . . . . . . . .performance evaluation checklist PERMA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .planning, embarkation, rehearsal,movement, action PIR . . . . . . . . . . priority intelligence requirement PK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pulemyot Kalashnikova PKM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pulemyot Kalashnikova Modernizirovanniy PM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pistolet Makarova PMCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . preventive maintenance checks and services POL. . . . . . . . . . . . petroleum, oils, and lubricants PSO . . . . . . . . . . . . Pritsel Snaipersky Optichesky PZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pickup zone rds/min . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . rounds per minute RFA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . restrictive fire area RIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . relief in place RO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . radio operator ROE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . rules of engagement RPD. . . . . . . . . . Ruchnoy Pulemyot Degtyaryova RPK. . . . . . . . . Ruchnoy Pulemyot Kalashnikova RRP. . . . . . . . . . . .repair and replenishment point S-2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . intelligence officer S-4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .logistics officer --- Page 372 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________ Glossary-3 SAT. . . . . . . . . . . . . systems approach to training SBF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . support by fire SIGINT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .signals intelligence SNCO . . . . . . . . . .staff noncommissioned officer SOP . . . . . . . . . . . . .standing operating procedure SOSRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, assault SPINS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .special instructions STS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ship-to-shore SVD . . . . . . .Snayperskaya Vintovka Dragunova TCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . traffic control point team mech . . . . . . . infantry heavy company team team tank. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tank heavy team TEO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . team embarkation officer TOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided TRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel TRP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . target reference point UA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . unmanned aircraft UTM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . unit training management WARNORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . warning order WO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . watch officer XO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .executive officer US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United States --- Page 373 --- Glossary-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 SECTION II. DEFINITIONS amphibious force —An amphibious task force and a landing force together with other forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibi- ous operations. Also called AF. (JP 1-02) antiterrorism —Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and prop- erty to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02) area of influence —A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or control. (JP 1-02) area of interest —That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the ac- complishment of the mission. Also called AOI. (JP 1-02) area of operations—An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and mari- time forces that should be large enough to accom- plish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (JP 1-02) assault position—That position between the line of departure and the objective in an attack from which forces assault the objective. Ideally, it is the last covered and co ncealed position before reaching the objective (primarily used by dis- mounted infantry). (MCRP 5-12C) assembly area—1. An area in which a command is assembled preparatory to further action. 2. In a supply installatio n, the gross area used for col- lecting and combining components into com- plete units, kits, or as semblies. (Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C.) attack position —The last position occupied by the assault echelon befo re crossing the line of departure. (JP 1-02) battle damage assessment —(See JP 1-02 for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) The timely and accurate estimate of the damage resulting from the application of military force. Battle damage assessment estimates physi- cal damage to a partic ular target, functional damage to that target, and the capability of the entire target system to continue its operations. Also called BDA. (MCRP 5-12C) battle position —1. In ground operations, a defensive location oriented on an enemy avenue of approach from which a unit may defend. 2. In air operations, an airs pace coordination area containing firing points for attack helicopters. Also called BP. (MCRP 5-12C) battlespace geometry —A dynamic, multifac- eted and multidimensiona l environment in which military operations occur. It is determined by such factors as intelligence preparation of the battlespace, time, sust ainment, command rela- tionships, boundaries, fire support coordination measures, rules of engagement, and political considerations that coul d affect ope rations. Also called BSG. (MCRP 5-12C) casualty evacuation —The unregulated move- ment of casualties that can include movement both to and between medical treatment facilities. Also called CASEVAC. (JP 1-02) civil-military operations —Activities of a com- mander performed by desi gnated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous popula tions, and institutions, by directly supporting the attainment of objec- tives relating to the reestablishment or mainte- nance of stability within a region or host nation. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02) --- Page 374 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________ Glossary-5 close air support —Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to fr iendly forces and that require detailed in tegration of each air mission with the fire and moveme nt of those forces. Also called CAS. (JP 1-02) combat cargo officer —An embarkation officer assigned to major amph ibious ships or naval staffs, functioning primarily as an adviser to and representative of the naval commander in matters pertaining to embarkat ion and debarkation of troops and their supplie s and equipment. Also called CCO. (JP 1-02) combat operations center —The primary opera- tional agency required to control the tactical oper- ations of a command that employs ground and aviation combat, combat support, and logistics combat elements or portio ns thereof. The combat operations center conti nually monitors, records, and supervises operations in the name of the commander and includes the necessary personnel and communications to do the same. Also called COC. (MCRP 5-12C.) combat outpost—1. A security force established at the regimental leve l during defensive or stationary operations. 2. A reinforced observa- tion post that can conduct limited combat, stabil- ity, or other operations. (Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C.) combat service support—The essential capabili- ties, functions, activities , and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of all operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Also called CSS. (JP 1-02) combat support —Fire support and operational assistance provided to combat elements. Also called CS. (JP 1-02) command and control —(See JP 1-02 for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) The means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropri- ate actions are taken. Command and control is one of the six warfighting functions. Also called C2. (JP 1-02) commander’s critical information require- ment(s)—(See JP 1-02 for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) Information regard- ing the enemy and friendly activities and the environment identified by the commander as crit- ical to maintaining situational awareness, plan- ning future activities, and facilitating timely decisionmaking. The two subcategories are prior- ity intelligence require ments and friendly force information requirements. Also called CCIRs . (MCRP 5-12C) commanding officer of troops —On a ship that has embarked units, a de signated officer (usually the senior embarking unit commander) who is responsible for the administration, discipline, and training of all embarked units. Also called COT. (JP 1-02) command post —In operations or exercises, a location from which comman d is exercised. Also called CP. (Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C.) common tactical picture —An accurate and complete display of relevant tactical data that integrates tactical information from the multi- tactical data link networ k, ground network, intel- ligence network, and sensor networks. Also called CTP. (JP 1-02) counterinsurgency —Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. Also called COIN. (JP 1-02) counterintelligence —Information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelli- gence activities, sabotag e, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons or their agents, or inter- national terrorist organiza tions or activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02) --- Page 375 --- Glossary-6 ___________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 course of action —1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A scheme developed to accomplish a mission. 3. A product of the course-o f-action development step of the joint operation planning process. Also called COA. (JP 1-02) decisive action —Any action the commander deems fundamental to achieving mission success. (MCRP 5-12C) defense support of civil authorities —Support provided by US Federal military forces, Depart- ment of Defense civilians, Department of Defense contract personnel, Department of Defense component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enfor cement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also called DSCA. Also known as civil support. (JP 1-02) direct support —A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance. Also called DS. (JP 1-02) electronic warfare —Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called EW. (JP 1-02) final coordination line —A line used to coordi- nate the ceasing and shifting of supporting fires and the final deployment of the assault echelon in preparation for launching an assault against an enemy position. Also called FCL. (MCRP 5-12C) fire support coordinator—The officer in charge of the fire support coordination center. He is the direct representative of the landing force com- mander for the planning and coordination of all available fire support. Also called FSC. (MCRP 5-12C) fire support coordination center —A single location in which are centralized communica- tions facilities and personnel incident to the coor- dination of all forms of fire support. Also called FSCC. (JP 1-02) fire support coordination measure—A measure employed by commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of target s and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. Also called FSCM. (JP 1-02) fire support team —A field artillery team pro- vided for each maneuver company/troop and selected units to plan an d coordinate all support- ing fires available to th e unit, including mortars, field artillery, naval surface fire support, and close air support inte gration. Also called FIST. (JP 1-02) Note: Marine Corps uses the acronym FST. force protection —(See JP 1-02 for core defini- tion. Marine Corps am plification follows.) Actions or efforts used to safeguard own centers of gravity while protecting, concealing, reducing, or eliminating friendly cr itical vulnerabilities. Force protection is one of the six war-fighting functions. (MCRP 5-12C) foreign humanitarian assistance —Department of Defense activities c onducted outside the United States and its territories to relieve or reduce human sufferi ng, disease, hunger, or privation. Also called FHA. (JP 1-02) forward air controller —An officer (aviator/ pilot) member of the tactical air control party who, from a forward ground or airborne position, controls aircraft in cl ose air support of ground troops. Also called FAC. (JP 1-02) forward observer —An observer operating with front line troops and trained to adjust ground or --- Page 376 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________ Glossary-7 naval gunfire and pass ba ck battlefield informa- tion. In the absence of a forward air controller, the observer may cont rol close air support strikes. Also called FO. (JP 1-02) fragmentary order —An abbreviated form of an operation order is sued as needed after an opera- tion order to cha nge or modify th at order or to execute a branch or sequ el to that order. Also called FRAGORD . (JP 1-02) Note: Marine Corps uses FRAGO. friendly force information requirement —(See JP 1-02 for core definitio n. Marine Corps ampli- fication follows.) Information the commander needs about friendly forc es in order to develop plans and make effective decisions. Depending upon the circumstances, information on unit loca- tion, composition, readiness, personnel status, and logistic status could become a friendly force information requirem ent. Also called FFIR . (MCRP 5-12C) health service support—All services performed, provided, or arranged to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well- being of personnel, wh ich include, but are not limited to, the management of health services resources, such as manp ower, monies, and facili- ties; preventive and cura tive health measures; evacuation of the wounded , injured, or sick; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; bl ood management; medical supply, equipment, an d maintenance thereof; combat and operational stress control; and medi- cal, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometric, nutrition therapy, and medical intelligence services. Also called HSS. (JP 1-02) high-value target —A target the enemy com- mander requires for the su ccessful completion of the mission. Also called HVT. (JP 1-02) host nation—A nation which re ceives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be locat ed on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02) human intelligence —A category of intelli- gence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Also called HUMINT. (JP 1-02) improvised explosive device —A weapon that is fabricated or emplaced in an unconventional manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to kill, destroy, incapacit ate, harass, deny mobil- ity, or distract. Also called IED. (JP 1-02) information environment —The aggregate of individuals, organizati ons, and systems that collect, process, disse minate, or act on informa- tion. (JP 1-02) information management — The function of managing an organization’s information resources for the handling of data and information acquired by one or many different systems, individuals, and organizations in a way that optimizes access by all who have a share in that data or a right to that information. Also called IM. (JP 1-02) information operations —The integrated em- ployment, during military operations, of informa- tion-related capabi lities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries wh ile protecting our own. Also called IO. (JP 1-02) intelligence preparation of the battlespace — (See JP 1-02 for core de finition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) The systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. Also called IPB . (MCRP 5-12C) intelligence requirements —(See JP 1-02 for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) Questions about the enemy and the environment, the answers to which a commander requires to make sound decisions. Also called IR. (MCRP 5-12C) --- Page 377 --- Glossary-8 ___________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 landing force —A Marine Corps or Army task organization formed to conduct amphibious opera- tions. The landing force, together with the am- phibious task force and other forces, constitute the amphibious force. Also called LF. (JP 1-02) landing zone —Any specified zone used for the landing of aircraft. Also called LZ. (JP 1-02) line of communications —A route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an operating mili- tary force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. Also called LOC. (JP 1-02) line of departure —1. In land warfare, a line designated to coordinate the departure of attack elements. Also called LD. 2. In amphibious warfare, a suitably marked offshore coordinating line to assist assault craft to land on designated beaches at scheduled times the seaward end of a boat lane. Also called LOD. (JP 1-02) logistics combat element—The core element of a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) that is task-organized to prov ide the combat service support necessary to accomplish the MAGTF’s mission. The logistics combat element varies in size from a small detach ment to one or more Marine logistics groups. It provides supply, main- tenance, transportation, general engineering, health services, and a variety of other services to the MAGTF. In a joint or multinational environment, it may also contain other Service or multinational forces assigned or attached to the MAGTF. The logistics combat element itself is not a formal command. Also called LCE. (MCRP 5-12C) main battle area—That portion of the battlespace in which the commander conducts close opera- tions to defeat the en emy. Normally, the main battle area extends rearward from the forward edge of the battle area to the rear boundary of the command’s subordinate units. (MCRP 5-12C) Marine air-ground task force —The Marine Corps’ principal orga nization for all missions across a range of military operations, composed of forces task-organized under a single commander capable of responding rapidly to a contingency anywhere in the world. Th e types of forces in the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) are func- tionally grouped into f our core elements: a command element, an aviation combat element, a ground combat element, and a logistics combat element. The four core elements are categories of forces, not formal comma nds. The basic struc- ture of the MAGTF never varies, though the number, size, and type of Marine Corps units comprising each of its four elements will always be mission dependent. The flexibility of the orga- nizational structure allows for one or more subor- dinate MAGTFs to be assigned. In a joint or multinational environm ent, other Service or multinational forces may be assigned or attached. Also called MAGTF. (MCRP 5-12C) Marine Corps Planning Process —A six-step methodology that help s organize the thought processes of the commander and staff throughout the planning and execut ion of military opera- tions. It focuses on the mission and the threat and is based on the Marine Corps philosophy of maneuver warfare. It ca pitalizes on the principle of unity of command a nd supports the establish- ment and maintenance of tempo. The six steps consist of problem frami ng, course of action development, course of action war game, course of action comparison and decision, orders devel- opment, and transition. Also called MCPP . (MCRP 5-12C) Marine expeditionary unit —A Marine air- ground task force (MAGTF) that is constructed around an infantry battalion reinforced, a compos- ite squadron reinforce d, and a task-organized logistics combat element. It normally fulfills Marine Corps forward se a-based depl oyment re- quirements. The Marine expeditionary unit pro- vides an immediate reaction capability for crisis response and is capable of limited combat opera- tions. In a joint or mu ltinational environment, it may contain other Service or multinational forces assigned or atta ched to the MAGTF. Also called MEU. (MCRP 5-12C) --- Page 378 --- Infantry Company Operations ________________________________________________________________________ Glossary-9 measure of effectiveness —A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment th at is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called MOE. (JP 1-02) measure of performance —A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called MOP. (JP 1-02) medical treatment facility —A facility estab- lished for the purpose of furnishing medical and/ or dental care to eligible individuals. Also called MTF. (JP 1-02) military deception —Actions executed to delib- erately mislead adversar y military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inacti ons) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Also called MILDEC. (JP 1-02) military information support operations — Planned operations to convey selected infor- mation and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emoti ons, motives, objective reasoning, and ult imately the behavior of foreign governments, organi zations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the origi- nator’s objectives. Also called MISO. (JP 1-02) mission-oriented pr otective posture —A flexi- ble system of protection against chemical, biolog- ical, radiological, and nuclear contamination in which personnel are required to wear only that protective clothing and equipment appropriate to the threat level, work rate imposed by the mission, temperature, an d humidity. Also called MOPP. (JP 1-02) named area of interest —(See JP 1-02 for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) A point or area along a particular avenue of approach through which enemy acti vity is expected to occur. Activity or lack of activity within a named area of interest will help to confirm or deny a particular enemy course of action. Also called NAI. (MCRP 5-12C) naval surface fire support —Fire provided by Navy surface gun and missile systems in support of a unit or units. Also called NSFS. (JP 1-02) night vision device —Any electro-optical device that is used to detect visible and infrared energy and provide a visible image. Night vision goggles, forward-looking infrared, thermal sights, and low-light level television are night vision devices. Also called NVD. (JP 1-02) noncombatant evacuation operations —Opera- tions directed by the Department of State or other appropriate authority, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreig n countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens as designated by the Department of State. Also called NEOs. (JP 1-02) nongovernmental organization —A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedi- cated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environm ental protection, human rights, and conflict resolu tion; and/or encourag- ing the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. (JP 1-02) operation order —A directive issued by a com- mander to subordinat e commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Also called OPORD. (JP 1-02) operations security —A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02) pickup zone—The zone in which helicopters land to pick up troops and supplies for movement to the landing zone. (MCRP 5-12C) priority intelligence requirement—(See JP 1-02 for core definition. Mari ne Corps amplification --- Page 379 --- Glossary-10 __________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 follows.) An intelligenc e requirement associated with a decision that will critically affect the over- all success of the command’s mission. Also called PIR. (MCRP 5-12C) public affairs —Those public information, command information, and community engage- ment activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Depart- ment of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02) relief in place—An operation in which, by direc- tion of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit and the responsibilities of the repl aced elements for the mission and the assigned zone of operations are transferred to the incoming unit. (JP 1-02) repair and replenishment point —A combat service support installati on, normally in forward areas near the supported unit, established to support a mechanized or other rapidly moving force. It may be either a prearranged point or a hastily selected point to rearm, refuel, or provide repair services to the supported force. Also called RRP. (MCRP 5-12C) restrictive fire area —An area in which specific restrictions are imposed and into which fires that exceed those restrictions will not be delivered without coordination with the establishing head- quarters. Also called RFA. (JP 1-02) rules of engagement —Directives issued by competent military author ity that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States for ces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encoun- tered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-02) ship-to-shore movement —That portion of the action phase of an amphibious operation which includes the deployment of the landing force from the assault shippi ng to designated landing areas. (JP 1-02) signals intelligence—1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronic intelli- gence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelli- gence, however transmitted. 2. Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals. Also called SIGINT. (JP 1-02) situational awareness —Knowledge and under- standing of the current situation th at promotes timely, relevant, and accurate assessment of friendly, enemy, and other operations within the battlespace in order to facilitate decisionmaking. An informational perspec tive and skill that foster an ability to determine quickly the context and relevance of events th at are unfolding. Also called SA. (MCRP 5-12C) stability operations —An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infr astructure reconstruc- tion, and humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02) standing operating procedure —A set of in- structions covering thos e features of operations that lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. The procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise. Also called SOP. (Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C) tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel —A Marine Corps mission perfo rmed by an assigned and briefed aircrew for the specific purpose of the recovery of personnel, equipment, and/or aircraft when the tactical situat ion precludes search and rescue assets from responding and when survi- vors and their location have been confirmed. Also called TRAP. (JP 1-02) tactical tasks —Actions a comm ander may take to accomplish the missi on. They are assigned based on unit capabilitie s and may be specified, implied, or essential. (Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C.) --- Page 380 --- Infantry Company Operations _______________________________________________________________________ Glossary-11 traffic control point —A designated spot on the ground, road, or trail network used to control and influence the flow of pedestrian, vehicular, or boat traffic to execute t actical tasks and generate effects. A traffic control point is hasty or deliber- ate in nature. Its purpos e is friendly, terrain, enemy, or environmentall y oriented. Also called TCP. (MCRP 5-12C) unmanned aircraft —An aircraft th at does not carry a human operator an d is capable of flight with or without human remote control. Also called UA. (JP 1-02) warning order —1. A preliminary notice of an order or action that is to follow. 2. A planning directive that initiates the development and evalua- tion of military courses of action by a supported commander and request s that the supported commander submit a commander’s estimate. 3. A planning directive that describes the situation, allo- cates forces and resour ces, estab lishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guid- ance, and initiates subord inate unit mission plan- ning. Also called WARNORD. (JP 1-02) --- Page 381 --- Glossary-12 __________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 This Page Intentionally Left Blank --- Page 382 --- REFERENCES AND RELATED PUBLICATIONS Federal Publication United States Code, Title 18, Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus, Section 1385 Department of Defense Directives (DODDs) 2000.12 DOD Antiterrorism Program 5205.2 DOD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01B Standing Rules of Enga gement for U.S. Forces Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Guide 5260 A Self-Help Guide to Antiterrorism Secretary of Defense Memorandum 12401-10 Strategic Communication and Info rmation Operations in the DoD Joint Publications (JPs) 1-0 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 3-0 Joint Operations 3-02 Amphibious Operations 3-02.1 Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation 3-07 Stability Operations 3-09.3 Close Air Support 3-10 Joint Security Operations in Theater 3-13 Information Operations 3-15 Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations 3-16 Multinational Operations 3-28 Civil Support 3-29 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance 3-50 Personnel Recovery 3-57 Civil-Military Operations 3-68 Noncombatant Ev acuation Operations 5-0 Joint Operation Planning --- Page 383 --- References-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 Navy/Marine Corps Publications (NAVMCs) 3500.10 Military Police and Corrections Training and Readiness Manual 3500.44 Infantry Training and Readiness Manual 3500.108 Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Pl ans Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) 2521 Allied Tactical Publicat ion ATP 3.8.3, Conduct of CBRN Defense in Operations 2984 1995 Graduate Levels of Nuclear Biologi cal Threat and Associated Protection Department of Defense Military Standard (MIL-STD) 2525 Common Warfighting Symbology Army Publications Army Doctrine Publications (ADPs) 3-0 Unified Land Operations 5-0 The Operations Process 6-0 Mission Command Army Doctrine Reference Publications (ADRPs) 3-0 Unified Land Operations 5-0 The Operations Process 6-0 Mission Command Army Field Manuals (FMs) 3-06 Urban Operations 3-07 Stability Operations 3-21.8 The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad 3-21.10 The Infantry Rifle Company 3-21.11 The SBCT Infantry Rifle Company 3-21.20 The Infantry Battalion 3-21.21 The Stryker Brigade Combat Team Infantry Battalion 3-24 Counterinsurgency 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency 3-90-1 Offense and Defense, Volume I 3-90-2 Reconaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks 3-90.5 The Combined Arms Battalion 3-97.6 Mountain Operations 90-5 Jungle Operations 90-7 Combined Arms Obstacle Integration (with change 1) Marine Corps Publications Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs) 1 Warfighting 1-0 Marine Corps Operations --- Page 384 --- Infantry Company Operations ______________________________________________________________________ References-3 1-3 Tactics 2 Intelligence 4 Logistics 5 Planning 6 Command and Control Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs) 3-1 Ground Combat Operations 3-11.1 Marine Rifle Company/Platoon 3-11.2 Marine Rifle Squad 3-11.3 Scouting and Patrolling 3-11.4 Helicopterborne Operations 3-12 Marine Corps Tank Employment 3-13 Employment of Amphibious Assault Vehicles 3-14 Employment of the Light Ar mored Reconnaissance Battalion 3-15.1 Machine Guns and Machine Gun Gunnery (under development as MCWP 3-15.1, Machine Gun Employment) 3-16 Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat Element 3-16.6 Supporting Arms Observer , Spotter, and Controller 3-17 Engineering Operations 3-17.8 Combined Arms Mobility Operations 3-31.5 Ship-to-Shore Movement 3-33.1 Marine Air-Ground Task Fo rce Civil-Military Operations 3-33.5 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies 3-33.8 Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations (Peace Ops) 3-35.1 Mountain Warfare Operations 3-35.3 Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) 3-35.6 Desert Operations 3-35.7 MAGTF Meteorological and Oceanographic Support 3-35.8 Tactical Boat Operations 3-37 MAGTF Nuclear, Biological, a nd Chemical Defense Operations 3-37.2 Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Protection 3-37.3 Multiservice Tactics, Techni ques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Decontamination Operations 3-40.1 Marine Air-Ground Task Force Command and Control 3-40.2 Information Management 3-40.4 Marine Air-Ground Task Fo rce Information Operations 3-40.5 Electronic Warfare 3-43.1 Raid Operations 4-1 Logistics Operations 4-11 Tactical-Lev el Logistics 4-11.1 Health Service Support Operations 4-11.3 Transportation Operations 4-11.4 Maintenance Operations 4-11.6 Petroleum and Water Logistics Operations --- Page 385 --- References-4 ________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 4-11.8 Services in an Expeditionary Environment 5-1 Marine Corps Planning Process Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs) 3-0A Unit Training Management Guide 3-0B How to Conduct Training 3-02H Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery 3-11.01 Combat Hunter (under development) 3-16C Tactics, Techniques, and Pr ocedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander 3-16.6A Multi-Service Tact ics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower (JFIRE) 3-31.1A Employment of Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) 3-31.4B Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations 3-33.1A Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-35.1A Small Unit Leader’s Guide to Mountain Warfare Operations 3-35.5 Jungle Operations 3-37.2A Multi-Service T actics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Contamination Avoidance 3-40.6B Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 4-11C Combat Cargo Operations Handbook 4-11.3F Convoy Operations Handbook 4-11.3G Unit Embarkation Handbook 4-11.3H Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations 4-11.4A Recovery and Battle Da mage Assessment and Repair 5-12C Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 6-3 Marine Infantry Battalion Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-5 Small Wars Manual Marine Corps Interim Publications (MCIPs) 3-17.02 MAGTF Counter-Improvised Expl osive Device (C-IED) Operations 3-33.01 Small Unit Leader’s Guide to Counterinsurgency 3-35.01 Tactics, Techniques, a nd Procedures for Reduction of Urban Area Strong Points Marine Corps Orders (MCOs) 3400.3 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, a nd Nuclear Defense Training Requirements 3500.27 Operational Risk Management (ORM) (with erratum) 3570.1 Range Safety (with change 1) 8010.1_ Class V(W) Planning Factors for Fl eet Marine Force Combat Operations P5102.1 Navy and Marine Corps Mishap and Safety Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping Manual (with change 1) --- Page 386 --- Infantry Company Operations ______________________________________________________________________ References-5 Marine Administrative Message (MARADMIN) 415/09 Establishment of Body Armor Protection Levels MAGTF Staff Training Program Pamphlets 4-01 Movement Control 4-02 A Logistics Planner’s Guide 5-02 MAGTF Planner’s Reference Manual Marine Corps Warfighting Lab X-files 3-40.1X Enhanced Company Operations (E CO), Forward Operating Base (FOB) 3-40.3X Enhanced Company Operations (ECO ), Combat Operations Center (COC) 3-35.3X Combat Hunter; Observe, Move and Act Navy Tactical Reference Publication 3-02.1.2 Naval Beach Group Support Element Operations Miscellaneous Center for Army Lessons Learned, Armor, Nov/Dec 93, Direct Fire Planning The Long War. Send in the Marines. A Marine Corps Operational Employment Concept To Meet An Uncertain Security Environment Department of the Army Form 2404, Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Worksheet Graphic Training Aid 21-3-11, Individual Protective Measures Marine Corps Institute ORM 1-0, Operational Risk Management Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) Publication 1540-002-95, Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook (GIRH) Marshall, S.L.A., Bird: The Christmastide Battle, New York: Warner Books, 1989. Province, Charles M., The Unknown Patton, New York: Random House, 1988. Tactical Training Evaluation Control Group, Deliberate Assault Course (DAC) Handbook Wade, Norman M. & Larsen, Christopher, The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, Lakeland, FL: The Lightening Press, 2008. --- Page 387 --- References-6 ________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-11.1 This Page Intentionally Left Blank