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Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1998-12-01
SPEC FI: the United States Marine Corps and
Special Operations
Walker, Robert G.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/8989


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S3SS&-


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NAVALPOSTGRADUATESCHOOLMonterey,California
THESIS
SPECFI:THEUNITEDSTATESMARINECORPSANDSPECIALOPERATIONSbyRobertG.WalkerDecember1998ThesisAdvisor:JohnArquillaSecondReader:GordonMcCormickApprovedforpublicrelease;distributionisunlimited.


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REPORTDOCUMENTATIONPAGEFormApprovedOMBNo.0704-0188Publicreportingburdenforthiscollectionofinformationisestimatedtoaverage1hourperresponse,includingthetimeforreviewinginstruction,searchingexistingdatasources,gatheringandmaintainingthedataneeded,andcompletingandreviewingthecollectionofinformation.Sendcommentsregardingthisburdenestimateoranyotheraspectofthiscollectionofinformation,includingsuggestionsforreducingthisburden,toWashingtonHeadquartersServices,DirectorateforinformationOperationsandReports,1215JeffersonDavisHighway,Suite1204,Arlington,VA22202-4302,andtotheOfficeofManagementandBudget,PaperworkReductionProject(0704-0188)WashingtonDC20503.
1.AGENCYUSEONLY(Leaveblank)2.REPORTDATEDecember19983.REPORTTYPEANDDATESCOVEREDMaster'sThesis4.TITLEANDSUBTITLE:SPECFI:THEUNITEDSTATESMARINECORPSANDSPECIALOPERATIONS6.AUTHOR(S)Walker,RobertG.
5.FUNDINGNUMBERS
7.PERFORMINGORGANIZATIONNAME(S)ANDADDRESS(ES)NavalPostgraduateSchoolMonterey,CA93943-5000
8.PERFORMINGORGANIZATIONREPORTNUMBER
9.SPONSORING/MONITORINGAGENCYNAME(S)ANDADDRESS(ES)N/A 10.SPONSORING/MONITORINGAGENCYREPORTNUMBER
11.SUPPLEMENTARYNOTESTheviewsexpressedinthisthesisarethoseoftheauthoranddonotreflecttheofficialpolicyorpositionoftheDepartmentofDefenseortheU.S.Government.12a.DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITYSTATEMENTApprovedforpublicrelease;distributionisunlimited.12b.DISTRIBUTIONCODE
13.ABSTRACT(maximum200words)Throughoutitshistory,theUnitedStatesMarineCorpshasdemonstrateditselftobeahybridforce,capableofconductingoperationswithinboththeconventionalandunconventionalrealmsofwarfare.ThistraditionhascontinuedtothepresentdaywiththecurrentMarineExpeditionaryUnit(SpecialOperationsCapable).ThepurposeofthisthesisisfirsttoassessMarineCorpshybridoperationsinspecifichistoricalcasesinordertoratetheMarineCorps'historicalperformanceinsuchroles.Secondly,thethesiswillprovideanassessmentofthecurrentMEU(SOC)program,withemphasisplacedonitsrelevanceincurrentandfutureoperations,aswellasdeconflictionwithestablishedSpecialOperationsForces(SOF)thatfallundertheauspicesoftheUnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand(USSOCOM).14.SUBJECTTERMSMarineCorps,MEU(SOC),SpecialOperations,HybridWarfare,IrregularWarfare15.NUMBEROFPAGES11716.PRICECODE17.SECURITYCLASSIFICATIONOFREPORTUnclassified
18.SECURITYCLASSIFICATIONOFTHISPAGEUnclassified19.SECURITYCLASSIFICATIONOFABSTRACTUnclassified
20.LIMITATIONOFABSTRACTULNSN7540-01-280-5500 StandardForm298(Rev.2-89)PrescribedbyANSIStd.


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11


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Approvedforpublicrelease;distributionisunlimited
SPECFT:THEUNITEDSTATESMARINECORPSANDSPECIALOPERATIONS
RobertG.WalkerLieutenant,UnitedStatesNavyB.A.,NorwichUniversity,1991
Submittedinpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeof
MASTEROFSCIENCEINDEFENSEANALYSIS
fromthe
NAVALPOSTGRADUATESCHOOLDecember1998


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DUDLEYKNOXLIBRARYABSTRACTNAVALPOSTGRADUATESCHOOLMONTEREYCA83943-51G1Throughoutitshistory,theUnitedStatesMarineCorpshasdemonstrateditselfto
beahybridforce,capableofconductingoperationswithinboththeconventionalandunconventionalrealmsofwarfare.ThistraditionhascontinuedtothepresentdaywiththecurrentMarineExpeditionaryUnit(SpecialOperationsCapable).Thepurposeofthis
thesisisfirsttoassessMarineCorpshybridoperationsinspecifichistoricalcasesinorder
toratetheMarineCorps'historicalperformanceinsuchroles.Secondly,thethesiswill
provideanassessmentofthecurrentMEU(SOC)program,withemphasisplacedonits
relevanceincurrentandfutureoperations,aswellasdeconflictionwithestablishedSpecialOperationsForces(SOF)thatfallundertheauspicesoftheUnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand(USSOCOM).


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VI


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TABLEOFCONTENTS
I.INTRODUCTION 1A.BACKGROUND 1
B.METHODOLOGY3C.HYBRIDWARFARE 41.Definitions 42.History 53.Future 7D.HYBRIDFORCE 9
II.THESEMINOLEWARS 13A.BACKGROUND 13B.THEFIRSTSEMINOLEWAR 14C.THESECONDSEMINOLEWAR 151.Background 152.TheEnemyasaHybridForce 173.ConventionalOperationsagainsttheSeminole204.SpecialOperationsagainsttheSeminole 225.MarineCorpsHybridOperationsagainsttheSeminole24a.ConventionalAspectsoftheHybridForce 25b.UnconventionalAspectsoftheHybridForce 27D.CONCLUSIONS 29
III.WORLDWARII:THEPACIFICTHEATER 31A.BACKGROUND' 31B.THEENEMYASAHYBRIDFORCE 34C.CONVENTIONALOPERATIONSAGAINSTTHEJAPANESE37D.SPECIALOPERATIONSAGAINSTTHEJAPANESE39E.MARINECORPSHYBRIDOPERATIONSAGAINSTTHEJAPANESE421.UnconventionalAspectsoftheHybridForce 422.ConventionalAspectsoftheHybridForce 463.HybridOperations 47F.CONCLUSIONS 51IV.VIETNAM 55A.BACKGROUND 55B.THEENEMYASAHYBRIDFORCE 56C.CONVENTIONALOPERATIONSAGAINSTTHEVIETNAMESE59D.SPECIALOPERATIONS 61E.MARINECORPSHYBRIDOPERATIONS641.UnconventionalAspectsoftheHybridForce 66a.CAPProgram 66b.ForceRecon 712.ConventionalAspectsoftheHybridForce 723.HybridOperations 73F.CONCLUSIONS 75
vn


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V.THEMARINEEXPEDITIONARYUNIT(SPECIALOPERATIONSCAPABLE)77A.INTRODUCTION77B.HISTORY 77C.POLICY 79D.ORGANIZATION79E.TRAINING 82F.MEU(SOC)CAPABILITIES85G.MEU(SOC)LIMITATIONS86H.REDUNDANCIESWITHSOF:REALORPERCEIVED86VI.ASSESSMENTSANDCONCLUSIONS89A.CASESTUDYANALYSISANDRELEVANCE....89B.REMAININGRELEVANT 91C.MARINECORPSLIMITATIONS93D.MEU(SOC)ANDSOCOM 94E.MEU(SOC)ANDNAVSPECWARCOM96F.CONCLUSIONS 98BIBLIOGRAPHY 101INITIALDISTRIBUTIONLIST 105
Vlll


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I.INTRODUCTIONA.BACKGROUNDFollowingthefailedhostagerescueattemptinIranatDesertOnein1980,theDepartmentofDefenseappointedaninvestigativepanelchairedbytheformerChiefofNavalOperations,ADMJamesL.Holloway,touncoverthecausesoffailureandtoproviderecommendationsforimprovingAmericanspecialoperationscapabilities.1ThedebacleatDesertOnewastheculminationofadecade-longperiodofneglectanddegradationofAmericanspecialoperationsforces(SOF).ThisperiodwasmarkedbysignificantbudgetcutsforthespecialoperationscommunityandincreasinglevelsofdistrustbetweenSOFandconventionalmilitaryforces.TheHollowayCommission'sfindingsledtoarenewedeffortwithintheAmericanmilitarytorestructureandimprove
itsspecialoperationscapabilities.ThebombingoftheMarinebarracksinLebanonandtheclumsysuccessofcombinedelementsofSOFandconventionalforcesinGrenadain1983,werefurtherindicationsoftheneedforimprovementsinAmericanspecialoperations.Consequently,"in1983.theSecretaryofDefensedirectedeachmilitaryserviceanddefenseagencytoreviewtheirexistingspecialoperationscapabilitiesanddevelopaplanforachievingthelevelofspecialoperationscapabilityrequiredtocombatbothcurrentandfuturelowintensityconflictsandterroristthreats."3TheculminatingeffectofthisdirectionwastheestablishmentoftheUnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand(USSOCOM)andthe
'UnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand:10'AnniversaryHistory,HQUSSOCOM,1997,p.1.2Ibid.3MarineCorpsOrder(MCO)3120.9A,Nov24,1997.
1


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implementationoftheMarineAmphibiousUnit(SpecialOperationsCapable)[MAU(SOC)]concept,bothin1986.RedesignatedasMEU(SOC)sin1988,thiscombinedarmspackage,trainedandequippedtoconductcertainspecialoperationsinadditiontoabroadrangeofconventionaloperations,hasbecomethecornerstoneuponwhichtheexpeditionaryNavy-MarineCorpsteamisbuilt.Whilenotdesignatedspecialoperationsforcesperse,
theseunitsprovideregionalCommanders-in-Chief(CINCs)withtheabilitytoconductmissionsthroughoutthespectrumofconflict,frompeacekeepingtolarge-scaleconventionalcombat..ItisthiscapabilitythatmakestheMEU(SOC)conceptunique.Whilepossessingconventionalcharacteristics,theMEU(SOC)maintainsanabilitytoexecutecertainspecialoperationsanddosoasanindependententity,fromthesea,withouttheneedtoawaitsupportfromoutsidetheareaofoperations.Assuch,theMEU(SOC)presentsitselfasa"hybridforce."Thatis,aforcecapableofconductingoperationswithinboththespecialandconventionalrealms.Thepurposeofthisthesisistoexaminethehybridmodelofwarfare,andtoassesswhetherahybridforceisbettersuitedtoengaginginsuchwarfare,asopposedtoaconventionalforceteamingwithaspecialoperationsforcesolelyforthepurposeofconductinghybridmissions.ThiswillbeaccomplishedbyexaminingtheMarineCorpshybridmodel,evaluatingitsstrengthsandweaknesses,andassessingitsabilitytosatisfypresentandfuturemilitaryrequirements.Further,itwilladdressthedebatesurrounding
4ALMAR023/88announcedthechangeinMAGTFdesignationsfrom"amphibious"to"expeditionary'"tomoreaccuratelyreflectMarineCorpsmissionsandcapabilities...arenotlimitedtoamphibiousoperationsalone." 2


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thespecialoperationscapabilitiesoftheMarineCorps,includinggeneralargumentsadvancedbytraditionalSOFproponents.B.METHODOLOGYAfterfirstdefininghybridwarfareandhybridforces,anhistoricallongitudinalstudyofMarineCorpshybridoperationsisconductedinordertoexaminethecontentionthathybridwarfareandthehybridforceconceptarenothingnewtowarfighting,ortotheMarineCorps.ThecasesselectedforstudyareTheSeminoleWars,WorldWarII,andtheVietnamWar,asthesecampaignsbestrepresentthoseinwhichtheMarineCorpsdisplayedeffectivenessinbothspecialandconventionaloperations.Furthermore,thecasesarerepresentativeoftheentirespectrumofconflict,rangingfromlow-intensityconflict(LIC)tohigh-intensityconflict(HIC)andrepresentconflictsinwhichtheMarineCorpshybridforcewasinextricablylinked,operationallyandlogistically,totheUnitedStatesNavy.Assuch,thecasesserveastoughtestsforthehybridmodeltheoryandprovideinsightintotheviabilityoftheMarinehybridmodelinfutureconflict.Thisis
possibleconsideringthattheMarinehybridmodelwillcontinuetoprepareforoperationsthroughoutthespectrumofconflictandwillremaininextricablylinkedtotheUnitedStatesNavy.Eachstudywillprovideadescriptionandassessmentofboththeconventionalandspecialcharacteristicspresentwithineachconflict,followedbyanassessmentoftheeffectivenessofthehybridforcecomparedtothatofthestand-aloneconventionalandspecialforces.Thiscomparativeanalysiswillserveasthemeasureofeffectivenessforthehybridmodel.ThishistoricalstudywillprovidethebasisforassessingtheMarineCorps'effectivenessasahybridforce,asthesuccesses/failuresofthepastmayprovideinsightintotheabilityofsuchaforceinthepresentandonintothe


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future.Followingthecasestudies,MEU(SOC)history,organization,andtrainingwillbediscussed.Finally,theconclusionwillprovideanassessmentoftheMarineCorpsasahybridforce,includinganexplanationofthelimitationsandcapabilitiesthereof,andrecommendationsregardingfuturestructure,employment,andinteroperabilitywithNavalSpecialWarfareCommand(NAVSPECWARCOM)andUnitedStatesSpecialOperationCommand(USSOCOM).C.HYBRIDWARFARE
1.DefinitionsInordertoprovideasatisfactorydefinitionofhybridwarfare,itisnecessaryto
firstdefinethetwoelementswhich,whencombined,comprisehybridwarfare.Theseelementsarespecialandconventionaloperations.SpecialoperationsasdefinedbyJointPub1-02areOperationsconductedbyspeciallyorganized,trained,andequippedmilitaryandparamilitaryforcestoachievemilitary,political,economic,orpsychologicalobjectivesbyunconventionalmilitarymeansinhostile,denied,orpoliticallysensitiveareas.Theseoperationsareconductedduringwarandoperationsotherthanwar,independentlyorincoordinationwithoperationsofconventionalorothernon-specialoperationsforces.Political-militaryconsiderationsfrequentlyshapespecialoperations,requiringclandestine,covert,orlowvisibilitytechniquesandoversightatthenationallevel.5
Conventionaloperationsdifferfromspecialoperations"indegreeofphysicalandpoliticalrisk,operationaltechniques,modeofemployment,independencefromfriendlysupport,anddependenceondetailedoperationalintelligenceandindigenousassets."Hybridwarfare(Fig.1)isthatwhichliesintheintersticesbetweenspecialand
5JointPub1-02,"DepartmentofDefenseDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms,"1December1989.6Ibid. 4


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conventionalwarfare.Thistypeofwarfarepossessescharacteristicsofboththespecialandconventionalrealms,andrequiresanextremeamountofflexibilityinordertotransitionoperationallyandtacticallybetweenthespecialandconventionalarenas.
2.HistoryThereisnothingnewabouttheconceptofhybridoperationsortheirutilityinconflict.Thecombinationofcloselycoordinatedspecialandconventionaloperationshasimpactedtheoutcomesofnumerousmilitarycampaigns.AnAmericanhistoricalexampleofanextendedcampaignwhereinhybridwarfareprovedcrucialtosuccessistheAmericanRevolution.
HybridWarfareFigure1.TheHybridModelofWarfare.
ManyhistoriansarguethattheUnitedStateswouldhavedonebetterandperhapshavewontheAmericanRevolutionmorequicklyhadtheyfoughtstrictlyaguerrillacampaignagainsttheclearlyconventionalBritishforces.Indeed,officersintheContinentalArmydebatedtheissuewithGeneralWashington."WashingtonrejectedthecounselofMajorGeneralCharlesLee,whobelievedthatawarfoughttoattain


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revolutionarypurposesoughttobewagedinarevolutionarymanner,bycallingonanarmedpopulacetoriseinwhatalatergenerationwouldcallguerrillawar.Washingtoneschewedthewayoftheguerrilla,andwherehewasinpersonalcommandtherevolutionariesneverresortedinanysignificantmeasuretoblurringtherulesofwar."'Washingtonbelievedthathisabilitytofieldauniformedandorganizedforcewasessentialtobuildingaperceptionoflegitimacyintheeyesoftheworldcommunity."Washington'sinsistenceoncreatingaEuropean-styleprofessionalarmytowagewarontheEuropeanpatternreflectedhisapparentfearofthetendencyofirregularwar,withits
violationsoftheinternationalrulesofwar...aswellashisspecificconcerntoguardthedignityoftheAmericancauseasanessentialpartofthenewnation'sclaimtoequalityofstatusamongthenationsoftheworld."'Moreover,whiletheAmericanforceslostmoreconventionalengagementsthantheywon,whentheydidwinithadamuchgreaterimpactontheperceptionsoftheinternationalcommunity.Thesignificanceofthevictory
atSaratogaindrawingtheFrenchandSpanishintothewarontheAmericansideiswellknown.ItisnotclearthatthissupportwouldhaveexistedhadtheUnitedStatesconducteditsmilitaryoperationsinanunconventionalmanner.MajorGeneral-NathanaelGreene,however,maintainednosuchreservationsinemployingirregularforces,andhiscombinationofhisregularswithirregularforcesofFrancisMarion,ThomasSumter,andAndrewPickens,servedasthefirstAmericanexampleofhybridoperations."Greenepointedoutthattheguerrillasandtheregulararmycouldteamuptohelpeachother.TheguerrillascouldharassCornwalliswithswift
RussellF.Weigley."AmericanStrategyfromItsBeginningsthroughtheFirstWorldWar,"inPeterParet(ed.),MakersofModernStrategy:FromMachiavellitotheNuclearAge,Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.1986,p.410.


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raidsagainsthisfar-flungoutpostsandlonglinesofcommunication;atthesametime,Greene'sarmycouldposeenoughofathreatsothatCornwalliswouldnotriskturningall
hispowerupontheraiders."TheutilityofsuchacombinationprovedincrediblyvaluableduringtheAmericancampaigninthesouth.Inthepoliticalandmilitaryenvironmentoftoday'sworld,itisnotunlikelythatafutureenemywillactinamannersimilartothatofthehighlysuccessfulGeneralGreene.
3.FutureAsweapproachthe21stcentury,manyhistoriansandtheoristshaveattemptedtopredictwhatfuturewarfarewilllooklike.SomeofthemostwidelyregardedmodelsoffuturewarfarehavecomefromsuchpeopleasMartinvanCreveldandAlvinandHeidiToffler,tonameafew.Thesemodelsoftendescribeaworldinwhichconflictsareincreasinglyfoughtbetweenstatesandnon-stateactors,aswellasbetweentechnologicallyandmilitarilydevelopedstatesagainstunderdevelopedoremerging
states.Thefutureofwarfareasdescribedbytheseauthors,aswellasmanyothers,possessesanumberofunconventionalcharacteristics,includingtheuseofguerrilla
tactics,terrorism,andperhapsinformationwarfareorevenweaponsofmassdestruction(WMD).Inordertofightsuchawar,theAmericanmilitaryofthefuturewillneedtobeabletorespondtosuchthreatsinanequallyunconventionalmanner.Theneedforconventionalforcesandcapabilities,however,willnotgoaway.Thethreatofaconventionalengagement,whilenotnecessarilylikelyinthenearterm,is
notoutofthequestion,asthepotentialexistsforstatestoemergewithlargeconventional
*Ibid.,p.412.9JohnArquilla(ed.).FromTroytoEntebbe:SpecialOperationsinAncientandModernTimes,Lanham,MD:UniversityPressofAmerica,1996,p.85.


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armies.Thepossessionofsuchforcesbyemergingcountriesoftenprovidesthemlegitimacywithinworldpolitics,aswitnessedinthecaseoftheAmericanRevolution.A
statesolelyemployingunconventionaltacticsmayquicklybecharacterizedasa"rogue"
state,andconsequentlysufferfromalackofrespectandlegitimacyintheworldcommunity.Veryoften,however,statesthatpossesslargeconventionalforces,whether
inadditiontoorinlieuofunconventionalforces,willbeviewedbytheworldcommunityasbeingalegitimatemilitarypowerinitsownright.Theabilitytoorganize,train,andequiplargeconventionalarmiessayssomethingaboutastate'seconomiccapabilities,its
abilitytomaintainorderanddiscipline,andit'sperceivedmilitarypower.Thisblendofconventionalandspecialmethodscanbeemployedthroughoutthe
strategic,operational,andtacticallevelsofwar,andisdescribedasfollowsinFMFM-1(FleetMarineForceManual),Warfighting:Low-intensityconflictsaremoreprobablethanhigh-intensityconflicts.Manynationssimplydonotpossessthemilitarymeanstowagewaratthehighendofthespectrum.And,unlessnationalsurvivalisatstake,nationsaregenerallyunwillingtoaccepttherisksassociatedwithwarsofhighintensity.However,aconflict'sintensitymaychangeovertime.Belligerentsmayescalatethelevelofviolenceiftheoriginalmeansdonotachievethedesiredresults.Similarly,warsmayactuallyde-escalateovertime;forexample,afteraninitialpulseofintenseviolence,thebelligerentsmaycontinuetofightonalesserlevel,unabletosustaintheinitiallevelofintensity.Assuch,theforceoftomorrowhastobepreparedtofightandwinincombatenvironmentspossessingvaryingdegreesofconventionalandunconventionalcharacteristics.Furthermore,Icontendthathybridwarfarewillbethemodusoperandiformostemergingandbelligerentstatesandnon-stateactors.Thishybridwarfare
10SeeMartinvanCreveld,TheTransformationofWar,NewYork:FreePress,1991;andAlvinandHeidiToffler,WarandAnti-War:SurvivalattheDawnofthe21s'Century,NewYork:WarnerBooks,1993.8


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environmentmaybebestconfrontedbyahybridforce,thatis,aforcecapableofconductingmissionswithinboththeconventionalandunconventionalrealmsofwarfare.D.HYBRIDFORCEThroughoutAmericanmilitaryhistorytherehasoftenbeenareluctancetoemployunconventionalforces.Thisreluctancecanbeattributedtoanynumberofreasons,including:doubtsabouttheutilityofSOFbyconventionalcommanders,dueto
organizationalculturedifferences;ignoranceofunconventionalcapabilities;andthebeliefthatconventionalforcesarejustascapableofcompletingparticularmissions,etc.
AutonomousorganizationsexperienceddifficultyinintegratingoperationswithGPFbecauseofbureaucraticrivalriesandoverspecialization.SOFemployedinimmatureorganizationsexperiencedhighlevelsofintegration,butsufferedheavilyfrommisuse.ThecurrentdivisionofSOFandGPFintodistinctorganizationshasincreasedeffectiveintegrationindeliberateoperations.However,organizationalbarriersstillexistwhichhinderthefullintegrationofforceswithinthemoredemandingarenaoffullcontingencyoperations.13
Asaconsequence,unconventionalandconventionalforcesbothhavebeenutilizedinappropriatelyfromtimetotime.Theseproblems,however,havenoterasedtheutility
ofemployingspecialandconventionalforcestogether.Indeed,inmanycasesitis
requiredformissionsuccess.Forexample,"fewSOFunitspossessthesupportstructureforsustainedoperationsandmostdependonGPFforatleaststrategicmobilityandlogisticalsupport."14Astandinghybridforce,however,shouldbelesssusceptibletoeitherbeingmisusedorunderused.Maintainingbothviableconventionaland
"Warfighting,FMFM-1,Washington,DC:Headquarters,UnitedStatesMarineCorps,1989,p.21.12Foradiscussionon"TheMilitaryandPoliticalCostsofEliteUnits,"seeEliotA.Cohen,CommandosandPoliticians:EliteMilitaryUnitsinModernDemocracies,HarvardCenterforInternationalAffairs,1978,pp.53-79.ljCaptainMichaelM.Kershaw,TheIntegrationofSpecialOperationsandGeneralPurposeForces,
MastersThesis,NavalPostgraduateSchool,1994,p.xiv.,4Ztarf.,p.l. 9


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unconventionalcharacteristics,thehybridforceisunifiedinitsculture,bureaucracy,and
itsmissiongoals.Moreover,missionsassignedtoahybridforcecanbedeterminedbythecommanderswithintheforce,vicepoliticiansorhighrankingofficersofastrictly
conventionalorunconventionalbackgroundwhoinvariablydisplayagreatdealofpreferenceforthetypeofforcefromwhichtheycame.Assuch,thereisagreaterlikelihoodthattheunitwithinthehybridforcethatismostcapableofsuccessfullyconductingthemissionwillactuallybeassignedthemission.Organizationallyspeaking,theAmericanmilitaryservices,withtheexceptionoftheMarineCorps,arenotstructuredashybridforces.TheArmy,Navy,andAirForceeachmaintainconventionalandspecialelementsseparately.ThedistinctivenessofSpecialOperationsForcesisfurtherindicatedbytheexistenceofaspecificunifiedcommand,theUnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand(SOCOM).Consequently,whenconductingmissionswithinthehybridrealm,theseservicesmusteitherextendthetypicalmissionlimitsofthespecialorconventionalassets,orintegrateelementsfromeachforthepurposesofthehybridmission.Whiletherearenumerousexamplesofsuccessfulintegratedoperations,15suchoperationsmustovercomebureaucraticobstaclesaswellaspersonalbiasesinappropriatelyemployingtheelementsfromboththespecialandconventionalareas.TheMarineCorpsMEU(SOC)ontheotherhand,presentsitselfasamobile,logisticallyindependent,sea-basedhybridforcecapableofperformingmissionsthroughoutthespectrumofconflict.Throughoutitshistory,theMarineCorpshasbeenassignedmyriadmissionsthathavebeenconsideredspecialinnature.Clandestineraids,
15SeeKershawforathoroughstudyofintegratedoperations.10


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riverinewarfare,andcounter-guerrillawarfare,arebutafewsuchmissions.Theirhighlydisciplinedandversatilebrandoffightinghasoftenmadethemtheforceofchoiceinconflictsthataredefinedintoday'stermsasMilitaryOperationsOtherThanWar(MOOTW)andSpecialOperations.Today'sMarineCorpscontinuestoemphasizetheimportanceofbeingabletoconfrontsuchchallenges.TheMarineCorps,asthenation'sforceinreadiness,musthavetheversatilityandflexibilitytodealwithmilitaryandparamilitarysituationsacrosstheentirespectrumofconflict.Thisisagreaterchallengethanitmayappear;conflictsoflowintensityarenotsimplylesserformsofhigh-intensitywar.Amodernmilitaryforcecapableofwagingawarofhighintensitymayfinditselfill-preparedfora"small"waragainstapoorlyequippedguerillaforce.ThishistoricalandcurrentrelationshipwithMOOTWandspecialoperations,however,hasnotdetractedfromtheirconventionalcapabilities.Today'sMEU(SOC)servesasamodernreminderofthistradition.Whilealaterchapterisdedicatedtothehistory,organization,capabilities,andlimitationsoftheMEU(SOC),itisappropriateatthistimetodefinethetermforthesakeofclarity.TheDoDdictionarydefinestheMarineExpeditionaryUnit(SpecialOperationsCapable)asAforwarddeployed,embarkedUSMarineCorpsunitwithenhancedcapabilitytoconductspecialoperations.TheMarineexpeditionaryunit(specialoperationscapable)isorientedtowardsamphibiousraids,atnight,underlimitedvisibility,whileemployingemissioncontrolprocedures.TheMarineexpeditionaryunit(specialoperationscapable)isnotaSecretaryofDefense-designatedspecialoperationsforcebut,whendirectedbytheNationalCommandAuthoritiesand/orthetheatercommander,mayconducthostagerecoveryandorotherspecialoperationsunderinextremiscircumstanceswhendesignatedspecialoperationsforcesarenotavailable.
16Warfighting,FMFM-1,p.22. 11


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Itsorganizationissuchthattheforceswhichwillbeutilizedforspecial,conventional,andhybridmissionscomefromthesamebackgroundandtraining,havenobureaucraticobstaclestoovercome,andarelesssubjecttomisusebyacommanderduetopersonalbiasesorignoranceofforcecapabilitiesandlimitations.Havingspecificallytrainedtogetherasahybridentitypriortodeploying,thestrengths,limitationsandcapabilitiesofeachcomponentoftheMEU(SOC)ismorelikelytobeknownandappreciatedbyits
commanderthaninanadhocintegratedforce.Consideringtheabovediscussion,thechaptersthatfollowwillanswer,bymeansofcomparativecasestudy,thefollowingquestions:
1.Asahybridforce,aretheMarinescapableofsuccessfullyconductingmissionswithinboththeconventionalandspecialwarfarerealms,anddoestheirhistoryinsuchoperationsprovidethemthefoundationuponwhichtobuildfuturesuccessinhybridwarfare?2.WhatarethelimitationsoftheMarineCorpsincarryingoutsuchmissions?3.DoredundanciesexistbetweentheMEU(SOC)andcertainSOFelements,andifsoaretheseredundanciesdangerouslyambiguousoracomplementaryexpansionofresourcesforacombatantcommandertoemploy?4.HowcantheMarineCorpsandSOCOMimproveissuesofinteroperabilityinordertobetterfightwhatinthefuturewillbeaninherentlyjointapproachtocombat?5.IstheMEU(SOC)hybridwarriorconceptonethatshouldbeadoptedasamodelforfuturewarfightingbytheotherservices?
12


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II.THESEMINOLEWARSA.BACKGROUNDIntheearlynineteenthcentury,Americanexpansionistslookedeagerlytothelandstothesouthandwestofthem.TherecentlyacquiredlandsoftheLouisianaPurchasewerestillbarelytouchedand,withtheendoftheWarof1812,thegovernmentcouldagainfocusonexpandingtheterritoryoftheUnitedStates.Thisexpansionism,however,wasmetwithresistancebythemanyAmericanIndiantribesstillinhabitingmuchofthis'"unsettled"territory.Inthesouth,violentterritorialdisputesbetweenAmericancitizensinGeorgiaandIndiantribes(namelytheSeminoles)intheSpanishterritoryofFloridaoccurredwithincreasingregularity.TheGeorgians,eagertosettlethe
fertilefarminglandsofFlorida
...feltthatFloridabelongedtotheUnitedStatesasafootbelongstoaleg.Moreover,theSpanishgovernmentwasresponsiblefortheIndiansbutlackedthepowertocontrolthem.SincetheUnitedStatesgovernmentcouldnot,ordidnot,restrainitssettlersalongtheFloridaborder,therewerenumerousclashesbetweentheAmericanwhitesandtheIndianslivinginSpanishterritory.
SouthernAmericanswerefurtherangeredbytheSeminolepolicyoflendingassistancetoescapedslaves.EscapedslaveshadsettledinFloridasincethelate18century,andexistedamongtheSeminolesinseparatecommunities,aswellasslaves,inwhathasbeendescribedasa"benignsortofbondage."18
Theseborderclashesincreasedinfrequencyandmagnitudeduringtheseconddecadeofthe19thcenturywithbothsidesenjoyingvaryinglevelsofsuccess.UnfortunatelyfortheSeminoles,theirsuccessesdidlittlemorethanangerthewhite
'JohnK.Mahon,HistoryoftheSecondSeminoleWar,Gainesville.FL:UniversityofFloridaPress,1967,p.19.18Ibid.,p.20. 13


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settlersandprovokethemintofurtherskirmishes.ThedisputesculminatedinwhatwastobecometheFirstSeminoleWar.B.THEFIRSTSEMINOLEWARTheFirstSeminoleWarcommencedinNovemberof1817andlasteduntil1819.Whilecontinualborderskirmisheswereperhapsthepredominantfactorinstartingthewar,twospecificeventsprovidedthesparksrequiredtoigniteawarbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheSeminoleIndians.ThefirstwasanattackonasupplyshipanditsnavalescortboundforFortScottinsouthwestGeorgiaviatheApalachicolaRiverthroughFlorida.FortScottwasmaintainedforthepurposeofguardingtheborderwithFlorida.Locatedinthickwilderness,itwasmosteasilyaccessiblebymeansoftheApalachicolaRiver.TheattackwasconductedfromafortalongtherivermannedbyAfrican-AmericanalliesoftheSeminoles.ThefortwassubsequentlydestroyedbytheAmericans,resultinginadevastatinglosstotheSeminolesof300alliesinadditiontothe
fortitself.19
ThesecondeventwastherefusaloftheAmericanstocomplywithanultimatumissuedbyChiefNeamathlaoftheMikasukisectoftheSeminoletribe.TheultimatumstatedthatanyAmericanscaughttryingtocrosstheFlintRiverfromFortScotttotheIndianheldvillageofFowltownwouldbeannihilated.ThesubsequentAmericanchallengetotheultimatumledtotheinitialfirefightoftheFirstSeminoleWar.ThewarcontinuedfortwoyearsandwasfoughtprimarilythroughconventionalmeansundertheleadershipofGeneralAndrewJackson.Withaforceof3,500,ofwhich
19Ibid.,p.24.20Ibid.,p.24. 14


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2,000wereCreekwarriors,JacksonovercametheSeminoleoppositionrathereasily.21
TheSeminoles,shortonarmsandammunition,wereunabletosustainastrongresistanceagainstJackson'sforce.Consequently,"JacksonbecamefreebylateApril,1818,todirecthisforcetowardwhatinhiseyeshadalwaysbeenthemainbusinessoftheexpedition:totakeFloridaawayfromSpain."ThisgoalwasattainedinMay1818whenJacksoncapturedthecityofPensacolaandunseatedtheSpanishgovernment.AftermanydebatesinWashingtonoverthepoliticalramificationsofkeepingthenewlyacquiredterritorywithregardtorelationswithSpain,FloridabecameU.S.territoryin1819.Colonistsimmediatelybeganenteringfromthenorth,forcingtheSeminolestomovesouthintoregionsunsuitablefortheiragriculturaleconomy.ThetransitionoftheterritoryfromSpanishtoAmericanhandswouldeventuallyleadtothedecimationoftheSeminoletribeinFlorida.
C.THESECONDSEMINOLEWAR
1.BackgroundTheSecondSeminoleWarcommencedin1835andwouldcontinueforsevenyears.TheprimarycauseofthewarwasIndianresistancetotherelocationpolicyoftheUnitedStates.HavingsucceededinconfiningtheSeminolestoareservationattheconclusionoftheFirstSeminoleWar,problemsoccurredthroughoutthe1820sthatdemandedamorepermanentsolutiontotheIndian"problem"inFlorida.TheseproblemscenteredondisagreementsbetweentheIndiansandthewhitesovertheTreatyofMoultrieCreekandtherestrictionsoftheIndianstotheirreservation.Whitemenillegallyhuntingonthereservation,Indianswanderingoffthereservationinsearchof
21Ibid,p.25. 15


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food,etc..ledtoincreasedtensions."AsteadyflowofpetitionsfromwhitecommunitieskeptbeforethefederalgovernmenttheurgentneedtogettheIndiansoutofFlorida.AtthesametimetheIndians'costtothegovernmentranhigh,forCongresscontinuedtoappropriatemoneytokeepthemfromstarving.""Consequently,negotiationswiththeSeminolesopenedupagain,concludingintheTreatiesofPayne'sLandingandFortGibson.Underthetermsofthesetreaties,theSeminolesweretovacatethelandsallottedthemintheTreatyofMoultrieCreekwithinthreeyears,unitewiththeCreekIndiannation,andmovetoterritorywestoftheMississippi.TheSeminolesdidnotembracethetreatieswithopenarms.Confusionanddisagreementoverthetruemeaningsofthetreatiesledtoaccusationsonbothsidesthattheotherwasnotkeepinguptheirendofthedeal.TheIndians,reluctanttomovetothereservationinthefirstplace,becameincreasinglyirritatedandhostileatthepropositionthattheyrelocate.Ultimately,theSeminolesrefusedtoabidebythetreatiesandanewwarerupted.24
Thenatureoftheensuingwarwaslargelyunconventional,astheterrainandclimateofFloridawere,by-and-large,incompatiblewithconventionaloperations.Floridawaslargelyunpopulatedwildernesswithrivers,swampland,andstreamsdominatingthelandscape.'"Asidefromafewpointsalongthecoastandfewerstillinthe
interior,itwasscarcelybetterknownthanAfrica.'^Suchgeographywouldprove
difficulttotheconventionalAmericanarmyinmaneuveringtheirlargeforcesaboutthe
terrain."Equalwithterraininimpactuponthecourseofthewarwastheclimate."Thesummers,withtheirhightemperaturesandhumidity,fatiguedtheAmericansoldiers
"Ibid.,p.25.23Ibid.,p.73.24Ibid.,p.86. 16


--- Page 32 ---
greatlyandcontributedtoagreatdealofillnessspreadingthroughoutthetroops.OtherseasonswereonlyslightlybetterinprovidingtheAmericansasuitablefightingclimate."Nothingabouttheweatherwascertainexceptthatitwouldnotsnow."Theterrainandclimateinfact,provedmoredeadlytotheAmericansthantheSeminole."Of4,191U.S.regularswhoparticipatedinthewar,350werekilledinactionand1,116sufferednon-battledeaths.""Furthermore,theAmericanssufferedgreatlogisticaldifficultiesduetotheirunfamiliaritywithworkinginsuchlargenumbersinsuchaharshenvironment.HiredIndiansorAfrican-AmericansaccomplishedmostoftheAmericanscouting.Whilefamiliarwiththeterrain,thesescoutscouldnotalwaysbetrustedfortheirmotives.TheSeminolesontheotherhand,alongwiththeirAfrican-Americanallies,wereintimatelyfamiliarwiththeterrainandusedittotheiradvantage.TheSeminolesenjoyedtheabilitytochoosewhereandwhentoengagetheenemy,andveryoftenwereabletoescapefromanengagementmore-or-lessintact.Assuch,theSecondSeminoleWarpossessedallofthecharacteristicsofatypicalcounter-guerrillaconflict.Nevertheless,fightingasahybridforce,theSeminoleskepttheAmericansmilitarilybewilderedandwereabletostaveoffdefeatforsevenyears.Eventhen,itwasstarvationthatforcedthemintosubmission,ratherthanmilitarydefeat.
2.TheEnemyasaHybridForceTheSeminoleIndianswereskilledwarriorscapableofposingathreatasbothalarge-scaleconventionalandsmallsizedguerrillaforces.
25Ibid.,p.\29.26Ibid.,p.129.27Ibid.,pp.129-130.28MarkFreitasandBraddockW.Treadway,StygianMyth:RiverineOperationsAgainsttheGuerrilla,MastersThesis,NavalPostgraduateSchool,December1994,p.43.17


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TheSeminolesusedunitsofvarioussizestoconducttheirguerrillacampaign.Initially,largeforceswereemployedtoconductoffensiveoperationsagainstsettlementsandforts.OncetheU.S.commencedthegroundoffensivecampaign,theIndiansshiftedtowardssmallunitdefensiveoperationswhichusedtacticsofterror,ambush,andtheraid.However,theIndianswerestillcapableoflaunchingmajoroperationswithriverineforcesthatnumberedasmanyas200warriors.9
TwoearlyconfrontationsinthewardemonstratedtheIndianability,orwillingness,tofightconventionally.ThefirstofthesewouldcometobeknownasDade'sMassacre.30EnroutetoFortKingMajorFrancisL.DadeandhisdetachmentofeightofficersandonehundredenlistedmenwereambushedonDecember28,1835,byabandofonehundredandeightyIndians.31TheIndianskeptupsoheavyafirethatthetrunksoftreeswerelaterfoundtobefulloflead,andthelogsofbreastworkssolidwithriflebulletsofsmallcaliber.Underthishotblast,thedefendersdroppedonebyone,shotintheforeheadorneck.Thelivingstoodinblood...Finally,byfouro'clock,notawhitemanwasleftstanding.ThesecondexampleofIndianconventionalcapabilityoccurredthreedayslaterat
theBattleofWithlacoochee.GeneralDuncanClinch,inanefforttoemploytheservicesofvolunteerswhoseenlistment'swereduetoexpireonJanuary1st,attemptedtoconductasurpriseattackagainstIndianslocatedinthevicinityofFortDrane.HiscombinedforceofregularsandvolunteerspursuedanIndianbandthat,unbeknownsttoClinch,waslayinginwaitontheoppositesideoftheWithlacoocheeRiver.TheIndianswaiteduntilhalfofClinch'sforcehadcrossedtheriverbeforetheyattacked.Havingeffectivelysplit
Clinch'sforces,250warriorsattackedthosethathadcrossedtheriverastheyrestedinaclearing.WhileafewsuccessfulbayonetchargesweremadebytheAmericans,the
19Ibid.,p.42.30'ForathoroughaccountofDade'sMassacre,seeMassacre!byFrankLaumer,Gainesville,FL:UniversityofFloridaPress,1968.18


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Indians,"becauseoftheirbetteruseofcover. ..heldtheircasualtiesfarbelowthewhites,3killedand5woundedagainst4whiteskilledand59wounded."3TheBattleofWithlacoochee,coupledwithDade'sMassacre,broughthostilitieswiththeSeminolestotheforefrontofconcernsinWashington.TotheSeminoles'benefit,theseengagementsalso"...createdinthearmytheerroneousimpressionthattheIndianscouldbebroughttofightinlargegroups,moreorlesswhite-style."OncetheconventionalAmericangroundoffensivebegan,theSeminolesdirectedtheiroperationsinapredominantlyirregularmanner.Usingtheterraintotheiradvantage,theSeminolessuccessfullyexecutedsmallunittacticsthroughoutthewar.Raidsandambushesofspecificforcesandsupplybasesprovedveryeffective.Asdescribedbyonesoldierinvolvedinthewar,"theIndianswerenotsodullastobeswallowedupbyanoverwhelmingforce!Theirmodebeingtoattackonlysmallbodies,andtoallowthelargercompaniestopassthrough.""Aswillbeseeninfollowingparagraphs,SeminoleunconventionaltacticspuzzledandfrustratedeventhemostadeptAmericanmilitarycommanders.Asahybridforce,theSeminoleswerecapableofconductinghybridoperationswithconventionalandunconventionaltacticsbeingemployedsimultaneously."OnAugust6,1840,theIndianslaunchedanamphibiousraidafternightfallover30milesofopenwater.Onehundredandthirty-fiveSeminolesattackedasupplybaselocatedon
31Mahon,pp.104-106.32Ibid.,p.106.33Ibid.,p.lll.
J4Ibid.,p.112.j5JohnBemrose,ReminiscencesoftheSecondSeminoleWar.ed.byJohnMahon,Gainesville,FL:UniversityofFloridaPress,1966,p.89. 19


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IndianKeyIslandandrepelledthesubsequentreliefeffort."36ItisimportanttonotethattheSeminolesveryrarelyoperatedatnight.DoingsounderthesecircumstancesandsucceedingisatributetotheSeminoles'versatilityandhybridcapabilities.
3.ConventionalOperationsagainsttheSeminoleConventionaloperationsagainsttheSeminolesprovedineffectivethroughouttheSecondSeminoleWar.TheconventionaltacticsfailedatdefeatingtheIndiansinaconventionalmilitarycampaignastheyweredesignedtodobysuchprominentmilitarytacticiansofthetimeasGeneralWinfieldScott.However,theycontributedtothedefeatoftheIndiansbycausingattritionamongthewarriorsanduseofscarceammunitionstocks.AmericanconventionaloperationsinthewarwereepitomizedbytheactionsofGeneralScott.AppointedascommanderofforcesinFloridainearly1836,Scotthadprovenhimselfaneffectivemilitarycommanderandtactician,but...hewasneithertrainedfornoramenabletoIndianwarfare.Scottdidnotfavortheroughdressofthewoodfighters,nordidheapproveoftakingtotreesasthenativesdid.HehadafterallcopiedfromtheFrenchthedrillmanualsthenusedbytheUnitedStatesArmy,andwasthoroughlysteepedinEuropeanmethodsofwarfare.Hehadnoexperiencewithanyotherkind.Scottpursuedanendtothewarbymeansofaone-time,large-scale,definitivecampaign,designedtoflushthehostileIndiansintothenorthernpartoftheterritorywheretheycouldbemoreeasilyengagedbywhitetroops.Inpursuitoftheseends,threegrandcolumnsweretoconvergeonthepointwherethemainbodyofSeminolewarriorswasthoughttobepositioned.Impededbyterrain,hamperedbySeminole
36FreitasandTreadway,pp.43-44.37Mahon,pp.140-142. 20


--- Page 36 ---
harassmentandtheirunwillingnesstoengagethewhitesasaconcentratedforce,andlackofcommunicationbetweenScottandtheothertwowings,Scott'scampaignfailed.EachofthethreewingssufferedfromthedifficultyofterrainanddidnothavetheopportunitytoengagelargebandsofIndiansasplanned.'Thegrandcampaignhadnotresultedin
thedeathofasmanyassixtyIndians...Asforhiscommand,thehorseswerebrokendownbyweatherandharduse,measlesandmumpswererampantamongthevolunteers."Scott'scampaignwasseeminglydoomedfromthestart.
TheIndiansweretoomobileandtoovigilanttobecaughtbetweentheslow-moving,noisycolumnstryingtoconvergeuponthem.TohaveendedthewarinonecampaignwouldhaverequiredtheinventionofanewmethodofusingsoldiersagainstIndiansonalargescale.Itwouldhavebeennecessarytoundoallthetrainingofboththeregularsandthevolunteers.Smallpartiesofrangers,equippedtoliveoffoftheland,tooperateseparatelyyetkeepintouchwitheachother,wereprobablytheonlysolution.Andtheywereallbutoutofthequestionatthatdayandtime.Consideringthenoveltyoftheproblem,thelackofknowledgeofterrain,theunpreparedstateofthemilitary,theneedtogatherlargequantitiesofsuppliesinahurry,theterribleconditionsoftransport,thefoulweather,andthedeterminednatureofthefoe,itissurprisingthatScottgothisthreewingsintothewildernessandbackagainatall.40
Scott'scampaign,initsfailure,didlittlemorethanexpendvaluableresourcesandinstill
confidenceintohisIndianadversaries."Theplanprovedanutterfailure,thegeneralhavingdrawnituponthecarpetbeforehiscomfortablefire,allowingfornoimpassablecountry,therebyshowingagreatlackofthetacticsneededforIndianbushfighting."41
SeminoletacticsfrustratedScottandprovedeffectiveinthwartinghisefforts.
"Unwillingtostrikeinstrengthatoneofthemainwings,theyhitallthreearoundthe
™Ibid.,p.\43.39Ibid.,p.157.40Ibid.,p.166.41Bemrose,p.88. 21


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edges.
-"42TheinabilityofanyofScott'swingstoengagetheenemyinmassledtothebreakdownofhisentirecampaign.Ironically,whileherealizedtheineffectivenessofhiscampaign,hewascertainlynotgoingtoalterthetacticsthatheemployed."Thekindofwarheunderstoodwasthatinwhichonedidnotfireattheenemyexceptwhenhehadofferedhimselfinbattle.
"
4jThethreewingsreturnedtoFortBrookefatigued,frustrated,andunsuccessfulinendingthewarinonegrandcampaign.
4.SpecialOperationsagainsttheSeminoleSpecialoperationsagainsttheSeminolewereperhapsbestrepresentedbytheexploitsofColonelWilliamS.Harney.IntwospecificinstancesHarneyconductedspecialoperationswithsomesuccess.ThefirstsuchinstancewasinApril1838.OrderedbyGeneralJesuptopursuetheSeminoleleaderSamJones,Harneytookonehundredmenintotheswamptoaccomplishthemission.Theytraveledonhorsebackastheterrainwouldallowandshiftedtologcanoestotraversethemurkywaterwaysoftheswamp.OnApril24,1838,Harney'smenspottedandengagedtheIndiansastheysatatacamp.BoththewarriorsandHarney'smentooktothetreestofight."Afterabriefgunfight,thedefendersbegantoyieldground,andfinallybrokecoverandran."44ThebattleresultedinonlyoneIndiankilledandonecaptured.Harney'stroopswereexhaustedduetotheheatanddifficultyof
terrain.Whilethebattledidnotyieldthedesiredcasualties,itdidprovetheeffectivenessofarelativelysmallforceoperatingindependentlythroughunconventionalmaneuvertosurpriseandengagetheenemy.
42Mahon,p.158.43Ibid.,p.152.44Ibid.,p.239. 22


--- Page 38 ---
Harneycontinuedhisunconventionalpractices,aswitnessedbyhisactionstwoyearslaterinthewar.HavingbeenoverrunbytheSeminolesin1839whileheandhistroopswereatatradingpostneartheCaloosahatcheeRiver,HarneyyearnedforrevengeagainsttheSeminole."DuringDecember1840,thecolonelmadeuseofarunawayblackslave...toplanaraidagainsttheunsuspectingIndians.Acquiring16canoesfromtheNavy'sriverineforce,Harneyembarked90menforapunitiveexpeditiondeepinsidetheEverglades."5Alongtheway,HarneyencounteredanumberofpartiesofSeminolesincanoes.Afterovertakingandcapturinganumberofthecanoes,Harneyorderedthewarriorshangedonthespot.ItisalsosaidthatattimeswhenHarney'sguideseemed
lost,Harneyforcedcapturedsquawstoleadthewaybythreateningtohangtheirchildren.Tohiscredit,henevercarriedthroughonthisthreat.46DiscoveringtheconcentrationofSeminoleshehadhopedtofind,HarneydisguisedhismenasSeminoles(inspiteofordersprohibitingsuchactivity)toensuresurprise.Anhourortwoaftersunrise,Harney'sforceengagedtheSeminolesonanislandintheEverglades.Thinkingthewhite-manincapableofpenetratingsofarintotheEverglades,theIndiansweretakenbycompletesurprise."Theriverineforcekilledmostofthewarriorsanddestroyedtheencampment.Upondeparting,thecolonelhungthedeadbodiesoftheIndianleadersfromnearbytreesasareminderofthemassacreattheCaloosahatcheeRiver."Harney'sexpeditionlastedtwelvedaysandaccomplishedwhatmostotherAmericanforceswereunabletodo:striketheSeminolesdeepintheirownterritorybycompletesurprise.
45FreitasandTreadway,p.28.46Mahon,p.283.47FreitasandTreadway,p.28. 23


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TheunconventionaltacticsemployedbyHarneycertainlymetwithsomesuccess.Thesmallunitirregulartactics,particularlyintheriverineenvironment,provedveryeffectiveinbringingtheSeminoletobattle.TheSeminoleswereveryoftentakenbysurprisebytheseforcesastheydidnotexpectthewhitementofightinsuchamanner.Havinggrownusedtoseeinglargeawkwardcolumnsadvancinginthewilderness,theSeminolesweresurprisedbysuddenlybeingchallengedintheenvironmentthathadalwaysprovidedthemrefuge,theswampsandriversofFlorida.Harney'stactics,whileeffective,didsufferfromafewlimitations.TheselimitationswerehisrelianceoncapturedordefectedSeminolesforintelligenceandfieldguidance,andhisinabilitytoengageinsustainedoperationsinexcessofmorethantwoweeksorso.Thefirstproblemresultedinwhatwasoftenquestionableinformation,andalwaysraisedthepossibilitythattheinformantorguidehadulteriormotivesinleadingHarneyandhismenonewayoranother.ThesecondproblemresultedinaninabilitytomaintainpursuitoftheIndiansaftertheirdispersalfromabattlearea.Harneyandhismen,inconductingindependentirregularoperations,wereseparatedfromallsupport
activities.Consequently,theirenduranceinthefieldwaslimitedtowhattheirplanscalledforasopposedtowhatthecircumstancesmayhaveoffered.
5.MarineCorpsHybridOperationsagainsttheSeminoleMarineCorpsoperationsintheSeminoleWarpossessedbothconventionalandspecialcharacteristics.WhiletheoperationalcommandoftheconventionalandspecialelementsoftheMarineCorpswasseparate,theSeminoleWarcaseremainsvalidinassessingtheMarineCorpsasahybridforce.Theiradministrativechainofcommandwasthesameand,duetothesizeoftheMarineCorpsanditsdesireforemployment,the24


--- Page 40 ---
MarineCorpspresenteditselfasahybridforcecapableofworkingasanintegratedteamwithboththeArmyandtheNavy.ColonelArchibaldHenderson,theCommandantoftheMarineCorps,hadbeenstrugglingforsometimeinWashingtontobetterdefinetherolesandmissionsoftheMarineCorps,aswellastobringtheCorpstherespecthefeltit
deservedfromthebureaucratsonCapitolHill.WiththeonsetofhostilitiesagainsttheSeminoles,HendersonsawtheopportunitytodisplaythevalueoftheMarineCorpsincombat."HavingsuccessfullyexploitedMarinecorpsbraveryintheWarof1812fortwentyyears,HendersonknewthatthemostimpressiveargumentforhisCorps'survivalwasthatMarinescouldfight."AproponentoftheMarineCorpsmaintainingits
traditionalmissionsasshipsguardsandNavyyardsentries,HendersonalsobelievedhecouldenhancethereputationoftheCorpsbyemployingitinrolesinvolvingactivefield
service.4Consequently,MarineCorpsparticipationinthewarhadadualcharacter.TheshipsguardsonNavyvesselsonpatrolandblockadedutyparticipatedinlandingoperations,afunctionalreadywelldeveloped...ThesecondtypeofMarineCorpsmissionwasmorenovel-extendedlandserviceasatemporarypartoftheArmy.50
a.ConventionalAspectsoftheHybridForceColonelHendersonhimselfledtheconventionalelementsoftheMarineCorpsintheSecondSeminoleWar.ArguingthattheuseofaMarineCorpsregimentwouldsavethegovernmentmoneyinitswareffort.PresidentJacksonassignedtheMarinestoBrigadierGeneralThomasJesup'sarmyatFortMitchell,Alabamawhoatthe
48AllanR.Millett,SemperFidelis:TheHistoryoftheUnitedStatesMarineCorps,NewYork:TheFreePress,1991,p.70.49Ibid.,p.70.50Ibid.,p.70. 25


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timewereengagedinfightingtheCreeks.51AshostilitieswiththeCreeksweredrawing
toaclosebythetimeofhisarrival,HendersonwaspreparedtoreturntoWashingtonwhenJesupdecidedtotaketheMarineregimentwithhimtofighttheSeminoles.After
all,"Henderson'smenhadprovedcapableoffieldservice;theircampdisciplinewasexcellentandtheirdiseaseproblemsminimal."ThecombatcapabilitiesofHenderson'smenwereonlytestedonceduringhistimeinFloridaintheBattleofHatcheelustee.OrderedbyJesuptopursueabandofSeminolestakingrefugeintheBigCypressSwamp,HendersoncommandedacompositebrigadeofArmyregulars,Marines,Georgiavolunteers,andIndians.5OrganizedastheSecondBrigadeoftheArmyoftheSouth,HendersonandhismenengagedtheSeminolesonJanuary27,1837inthevicinityofHatcheelusteeCreek."Thevolumeof
firewhichensuedwasbattle-size,butotherwisetheactionwasformless.ThesoldiersoverrananIndiancampwheretheycapturedonehundredponies,halfofthemloadedwithpacks."54ThebattlecontinuedastheMarinespursuedtheIndianbandintotheBigCypressSwamp.ThebrigadethenengagedtheSeminolesacrossastream,withanumberofofficersheroicallyfordingthestreamonaloginpursuitoftheenemy.The
resultofthebattle,asfarasenemycasualtieswereconcerned,wasfiveIndiannon-combatantsandtwenty-threeformerslavescaptured,withthewarriorssuccessfullyescaping.3"Marinecasualtiesweresixkilled."Henderson'sownconducteventuallywonhimabrevetpromotiontobrigadiergeneral,andhismenfoughtwithskilland
51Ibid.,p.70.52Ibid.,p.71.53Ibid.,pJ\.54Mahon,p.198.55Ibid.,p.198. 26


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enthusiasm."5ThebattlealsoresultedinnegotiationswithimportantleadersoftheSeminoletribeatwhich"bothsidesagreedtoasuspensionofhostilitiesuntilFebruary18."57
b.UnconventionalAspectsoftheHybridForceThespecialelementsoftheMarineCorpsintheSecondSeminoleWarwerethoseservingassecurityguardsaboardthevesselsoperatingintheriverinewarfareenvironmentasmembersofthesocalled"MosquitoFleet"underthecommandofNavyLieutenantMcLaughlin.McLaughlin'sMosquitoFleetwasahybridforceinitsown
right,possessingelementsfromthenavy,army,andMarineCorpscapableofconductingsustainedriverineoperations."Riverinewarfareisaspecializedformofcombatneithernavalnormilitary,butablendingofthetwo,conductedinariverineenvironment."Thenatureof
thisenvironmentdemandedahybridforcetoensuresuccess.TheconventionalaspectsoftheMosquitoFleetliedprimarilyinthelogisticalandcommandandcontrolcapabilitieswhichwerecontributedtothefleetbyconventionalnavyassets,whiletheunconventionalassetswerethecombinednavyandMarineriverinestrikeforcethatwouldsweepthroughtheIndianvillages.McLaughlinrecognizedtheimportanceofexertingforceandpressureontheSeminolewithinhisownterrain.Todothisinasustainedmanner,McLaughlintookoperationalcommandovernotonlytheriverinestrikeforce,butalsothevesselsoftheoffshoreandcoastalblockadeforce."Forthefirsttimesincethebeginningofthewar,
56Millett,p.71.57Mahon,p.199.
27


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thenavalcommandercoulddirectalloperationswithinhisareaofoperations,whichnowincludedtheEverglades."5ThiscentralizedcommandandcontrolallowedMcLaughlintheflexibilityrequiredtodealwiththeSeminoles.McLaughlinwasabletousecoastalassetsforsurveillanceandgunfiresupport,aswellasdrawtheminforlarge-scalepincertypemovementswhentheopportunityavaileditself.Simultaneously,hewasabletocoordinatethemovementsofhisriverineforceinavarietyofdifferentsizedboatsandcanoes.McLaughlinwasalsoabletoconductjointoperationswithColonelHarney,resultinginaveryeffectivecounter-guerrillaforce.ThisintegrationprovidedfortheabilitytotakefreenavigationoftheriversawayfromtheIndians,andtohittheircampsandvillages."ThisunifiedriverineforcecapabilityexploitedalltheelementsofthecombatprocesstostrikeattheSeminoleIndiansnervecenter.Thisnervecenter[centerofgravity]wastheIndiansociety:thepeople,thevillage,thecrops,andthecattleherds."60
ThehighlightoftheMosquitoFleetcameduringitsfinalexpeditioninFebruary1842.BysimultaneouslydeployingtwoseparateunitsfromthewestandeastsidesoftheEverglades,McLaughlin's"TaskForce"plannedtoconductapincermovementoverthecourseof60days.Livingindug-outcanoesandforagingforfoodfromtheinterior,theriverineforcedemonstratedacapabilityforsustainedoperationsthatdemoralizedtheIndians...This"totalwar"againsttheSeminolenationdeepwithinitssanctuary,reducedtheIndianstobasicfoodgatheringtechniquesforsubsistence.61
58GeorgeE.Buker,SwampSailors:RiverineWarfareintheEverglades,1835-1842,Gainesville:TheUniversityPressesofFlorida,1975,pp.5-6.59FreitasandTreadway,p.34.60Ibid.,p.49.61Ibid.,p.29. 28


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D.CONCLUSIONSAswehaveseen,theSeminoleWarspossesscharacteristicsthatrangethroughoutthespectrumofconflict.TheSeminoles,asahybridforce,werecapableofpresentingthemselvesinmanywaystotheAmericanenemy.Whiletheirtacticslargelyreliedonunconventionalguerrillamaneuvers,theydidprovequitecapableinconventionaltacticsaswell.Ifnothingelse,SeminoleconventionaloperationsforcedtheAmericanstocontinuetooperateinlargecumbersomenumbersinordertobepreparedtofightaconventionalengagementifnecessary.Indeed,theSeminoleconventionaloperationsperhapsservedbestatperpetuatingAmericanmilitarywishfulthinkingthatalarge-scaleconventionalengagementcouldbehadwiththeSeminolesinwhichtheirwarriorscouldbedefeatedonceandforall.
AsfortheAmericans,whileconventionalandspecialoperationsconductedindependentlywereeffectiveincontributingtotheultimatedefeatoftheSeminoles,itis
clearthatthemosteffectiveforcewasthehybridexampleoftheUnitedStatesMarineCorps.ConventionaloperationsasconductedbyGeneralWinfieldScottprovedutterlyineffective.AsstatedbyJohnBemroseinspeakingofScott,"...thereisnodoubtofhisgeneralshipagainstawell-disciplinedarmy...buttheIndianswerealwaysattackingandharassingtheskirtsofhisarmyandhewasnotthemantodescendtotheirlowcunningandunchivalroussystemofwarfare.IthinkitevidentthatGen.Scottsoughtto
subduethembytheweightandsightofhisarmies.
"
(ThespecialoperationsofColonelHarneycertainlymetwithgreatersuccess.HarneywasabletobringtheSeminolesto
battle,andprovedtotheSeminolethatthefightcouldbebroughttohimintheveryarea
62Bemrose,p.92. 29


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thathehadfeltmostsecure.Thesuccessofthesespecialoperations,however,wereoverlydependentuponintelligencefromquestionablesourcesandwereincapableofsustainedoperationsshouldtheneedarise.Thehybridforce,however,enjoyedthegreatestamountofsuccess.TheconventionalcomponentsoftheMarineCorpsunderthecommandofColonelArchibaldHendersonprovedtobeeffectiveinextendedfield
operationsthatprovedessentialinproducingnegotiationswiththeSeminoles.TheunconventionalcomponentsservingwithinLieutenantMcLaughlin'sMosquitoFleetprovedinvaluableinuprootingtheSeminolesfromtheriverineenvironmentandforcingthetribeintocapitulation.Thereasonsforthehybridsuccessincomparisontothe
strictlyconventionalandspecialtacticsaretwofold.Thefirstreasonisthattheunifiedcommandandcontrolofthehybridforceallowedformoreproductiveengagementsandgreatercontroloftheforcesinvolved.Secondly,thehybridforcepossessedthe
flexibilitytocopewiththeSeminolesinsituationsacrossthespectrumofconflict.This
flexibilityincludedtheabilitytodrawfromsuppliesandobtainrequiredlogisticalitemsfromsupplyelementsassignedtothemspecifically.
30


--- Page 46 ---
III.WORLDWARII:THEPACIFICTHEATERA.BACKGROUNDThePacificTheaterofWorldWarIIsawtheUnitedStatesanditsalliespittedagainstthecapableandefficientJapanesewarmachine.FollowingtheirseizureofShanghaiandNankinginChina,theJapaneseturnedtheirsightsonnumerousislandsspreadthroughoutthePacific.TheJapaneseplacedgreatvalueinacquiringtheseislands,forthreeprimary-reasons.First,thepossessionoftheislandsinthecentralandsouthPacificwouldprovidethemnaturalresourcesthathadrecentlybeendeniedthembytheUnitedStatesinresponsetoJapaneseaggressioninChina.Second,theJapanesehopedtostiflecontinuedChineseresistancebycuttingoffsuppliesandsupportreachingtheChinesebywayofallied-heldislands.Finally,theJapaneseplannedtoestablishadefensiveperimeteraroundtheirnewconquestsfromwhichtodefendagainsttheinevitableattacksoftheUnitedStatesanditsallies.ByMayof1942,sixmonthsafterbeginningthewarwithasurpriseblowagainsttheU.S.NavyatPearlHarbor,theJapanesehadtakenpossessionofHongKong,theGilbertIslands,GuamandWakeIsland.Singapore,theNetherlandsEastIndies,andthePhilippines.ConfidentthattheirattackonPearlHarborprecludedaneffectiveAmericanresponseforatleastayear,theJapaneseextendedtheboundariesoftheirdefensiveperimeterinthenorthtotheAleutianIslands,toMidwayIslandintheeast,andinthesouthtotheSolomonIslandsandNew-Guinea.TheAmericanresponsetotheattackonPearlHarboroccurredmorequicklyandwithmuchgreaterzealthantheJapanesehadanticipated.Withtheircarrierandsubmarineforceunscathed,theAmericanswereabletocommenceretaliatoryefforts
31


--- Page 47 ---
againsttheJapaneseshortlyaftertheattackonPearlHarbor.WhiletheAmericansenjoyedlittlesuccessinthesixmonthsfollowingtheattack,theirresponsewastimelyandsignificantenoughtopreventtheJapanesefromfullyfortifyingtheirnewconquestsanddefensiveboundaries.Consequently,itwasatMidwayandintheSolomonIslandswheretheAmericanstooktheoffensiveinthePacificcampaignagainsttheJapanese.63
ThepurposesoftheAmericancampaignweremany.First,initialAmericanaimsweretohaltJapaneseadvancesandpreventthemfromseizingthePhilippinesandotherAmericanterritories.OfadditionalconcernwereBritish-heldterritoriesthatwerevaluableinprovidingmilitaryresourcestothealliedwareffortagainstGermany.64
Second,theAmericanshadbecomeincreasinglyconcernedwiththesecurityofAustraliaandNewZealand.ThevalueofthesealliesindefeatingJapanwasgreat,specificallywithregardtotheiroperationalandstrategicvalueinprovidingalocationfromwhichtolaunchairstrikesagainsttheoutermostJapaneseholdings."ArmyplannerssawAustraliaasa'secondBritain,'anislandbastionfromwhichtomountairandnavalattacksontheJapaneseforcesthrustingintotheNetherlandsEastIndies."65Third,theAmericanshopedtodenytheJapanesetheindustrialandmilitarybenefitsofthenaturalresourcesthatwereprovidedbytheseislands.Lastly,withtheseizureofeachislandtheAmericanswereabletorobtheJapaneseoftheirabilitytoforwardstagemilitaryassets(primarilyairandnaval)insupportoffurtherconquests.Simultaneously,theAmericanswereprovidingfortheirowndevelopmentofairfieldsandseaportsfromwhichtoattackJapaneseholdingsandultimatelymainlandJapan.
6jForathoroughdiscussionontheWarinthePacific,seeRonaldH.Spector,EagleagainsttheSun:TheAmericanWarwithJapan,NewYork:TheFreePress,1985.64Millett,p.352. 32


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ThenatureofthewarinthePacificwasveryconducivetohybridoperations.ThejungleterrainofthePacificTheater,aswasthecaseintheSeminoleWars,wouldproveverydifficultformaneuveringandengagingtheenemywithlargeforces.Furthermore,theterrainwaswellsuitedtotheconductofhybridtacticsbytheenemy,andwascumbersomeforstrictlylarge-scaleconventionalforces.Largeforcesweredesired,however,duetotheattritionalnatureofthecampaigns
inthePacific.TheamphibiousassaultsthatweretotakeplaceinthePacificweredevastatingly'attritionalandrequiredagreatdealofforceinordertobeeffective.WhiletheMarineCorpsapproachedthisbrandofwarfarewithagreatdealofforethought,beginningwithprewarplanningasearlyasthe1920s,practicalapplicationofthenewdoctrinewithnewtechnologiesdidnotoccuruntiljustbeforethecommencementof
hostilitieswithJapan.66AswasthecasewithriverinewarfareintheSecondSeminoleWar,thetechnicalexecutionofamphibiousoperationsinthePacificwouldproveaschallengingasthefoehimself.ThischapterwilladdressthecampaigninthePacificagainsttheJapaneseintermsoftheenemyasahybridforce,andwillprovideacomparativediscussionofAmericanconventional,unconventional,andhybridresponsestotheenemy.Wewill
see,asinthecaseoftheSecondSeminoleWar,thatitisagaintheMarineCorpshybridmodelthatenjoysthemostsuccessagainsttheenemy.
65Ibid.,p.357.
33


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B.THEENEMYASAHYBRIDFORCEAsstatedpreviously,theterrainoftheislandsintheSouthPacificcampaignswaswellsuitedfortheutilizationofhybridtacticsbytheJapanese.Whiledefendingabeachheadagainstanamphibiousassault,theJapanesecouldfightinlargenumbersutilizingallavailableconventionalassetstostaveofftheoncomingassault.Theseassetsincludedartillery,armor,aircraft,andlargeformationsofconventionalinfantry.Fromthesedefensivepositions,theJapanesecouldretreatintothemountainousjungleterrainthatwastypicaloftheSouthPacificislandsandwageguerrilla-typeoperationsagainstthealliedforces.ReferringtotheJapanesetactics.LieutenantColonelMerritt"RedMike"Edsonwasquotedassaying,"WhattheyhavedoneistotakeIndianwarfareandapplyittothetwentiethcentury.TheyusealltheIndiantrickstodemoralizetheirenemy."Inadditiontothethickbrushofthejungleenvironment,theislandsalsopossessednumerouscavesthattheJapaneseusedtodeviseundergroundnetworksandhideoutsfromwhichtheycouldstagedeadlyambushesandbanzaiattacks.TheJapaneseusedthesetacticswithgreateffectivenessindefendingtheislandsofPeleliu,IwoJima,andOkinawa.Havingestablishedstrongdefensivepositionsoneachoftheseislands,theJapanesewouldwaitfortheMarinestolandonthebeachbeforeunleashingtremendousfirepoweragainstthem.Theeffectoftheirpatiencewastwofold.First,itprovidedtheMarinesafalsesenseofsecurityastheirwavesproceededtothebeach.Describingtheship-to-shoremovementoftheMarinesatIwoJima,AllanMillettsays,"Underapaleblueskyfleckedwithclouds,andcooledbyastrong,saltybreeze,theinvadingMarines
56ForaninterestingdiscussiononMarineCorpsinnovationwithregardtoamphibiouswarfare,seethesectionon"PeacetimeInnovation"inStephenPeterRosen'sWinningtheNextWar:InnovationandtheModernMilitary,Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1991.34


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mighthavethoughtthelandingwasapainlessmaneuver."68Secondly,itforcedtheMarinestolandlargeamountsofmenandequipmentinasmallareathatprovidedtheJapaneseseeminglylimitlesstargetsatwhichtoconcentratetheirfire.OnIwoJima,theMarinespackedalmostthirtythousandmen,hundredsofguns,vehicles,andtonsofsupplies,allunderheavyartilleryfireintoabeachheadthatmeasured3,000yardslongandbetween1.500and700yardsindepth.69Bynightfallofthefirstday,theMarineshadsufferednearly2,300casualties.70Realizingthatcounterattacksagainstsuchnumbersashorewouldbefruitless.JapanesecommanderswouldeventuallyconcedethebeachtotheMarinesandwageadeadlyunconventionalwarfoughtfromthecavesandpillboxesthatcoveredtheislands.TheJapaneseprovedveryefficientinconductingnightraids,ambushes,andsuicideattacks.ThesetacticsplaguedthealliesastheyattemptedtocleartheislandsofJapanesedefenders.PerhapsthemosteffectiveunconventionaltacticoftheJapanesewastheuseofspecial-attacksuicideoperations,ortheTokko,whichwereconductedbyland,sea,andair.71Thougheffective,thistacticwasemployedtoolateintheconflicttopreventJapan'sultimatedefeat."TheKamikazes,theonlysizableTokkoforcesused,
firstwentintoactioninlate1944andshoweddevastatingpotential,withAmericanandBritishnavalunitsneverabletodeviseasounddefenseagainstthem...Ifdeveloped
earlier,asthefortunesofthewarshiftedagainstJapaninlate1942,theTokko...might
D/JeterA.IselyandPhilipA.Crowl,TheU.S.MarinesandAmphibiousWar:ItsTheory,andItsPracticeinthePacific,Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1951,p.145.68Millett,p.429.69Ibid.,p.429.70Ibid.,p.42971D.ClaytonJames,"AmericanandJapaneseStrategiesinthePacificWar,"inParet,p.718.35


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conceivablyhaveprovensocostlytotheAlliesthatanegotiatedpeacewouldhavebeenpossible.Combiningthetacticsofalarge-scaleconventionalforceandaguerrillaforcein
thismanner,theJapanese,thoughultimatelyunsuccessful,tookaheavytollonthealliedforces.Utilizinghybridtactics,theJapaneseprovedtobesuperiortothealliedforcesin
manyfacets."Theyprovedmoreadeptatnightfightingbothonthegroundandatsea,utilizedahigherproportionoftheirpersonnelincombatratherthaninserviceandsupportroles,'andgenerallydemonstratedastrongerwilltofightthandidtheiradversarieswhenforcesofsimilarsizeandfirepowerengagedeachother."TheJapanesedidnotlimittheiremploymentofhybridtacticstotheislandsofthesouthPacific.IntheChina-Burma-India(CBI)theateritwastheJapaneseemploymentofhybridmethodsincapturingBurmathatultimatelyinspiredWingate'snotionof"forminghighlymobileunits(long-rangepenetrationgroups[LRPGs])thatwouldbeinserteddeepbehindtheJapaneselinesbyglidersandtransportaircraftandsuppliedfromtheair.ItwasassumedthatthismethodwouldallowtheLRPGstooutmaneuvertheJapaneseandattacktheirlinesofcommunicationsatwill."74TheJapanesehadprovenverycapableofconductingoutflankingmovementsagainstthecumbersomealliedunitswithhighlymaneuverableforces.Indeed,throughoutthecampaignintheCBITheater,theJapanese18thDivision,utilizingconventionalandunconventionaltactics,
existedasaconstantmenacetotheMerrill'sMarauders.
72Ibid.,p.718.13Ibid.,p.718.
36


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C.CONVENTIONALOPERATIONSAGAINSTTHEJAPANESEThelarge-scaleconventionalamphibiouslandingsconductedbytheMarinesduring1944-45exemplifiedconventionaloperationsagainsttheJapanese.Ironically,it
wasatthisstageofthewarthattheJapaneseweremosteffectivelyemployinghybrid
tactics.TheoperationswerepredominantlyconductedwithouttheuseoftheRaiderBattalionsthathadprovensovaluableatGuadalcanalandBougainville.Consequently,conventionalinfantryhadtoperformclearingmissionsagainstwell-defendedcavesthatmayhavebeenbetterclearedbythehighlymobileandwell-armedRaiderunits.Additionally,theuseofRaidersforthesepurposesmayhaveallowedfortheclearingofthecaveseitherbeforeorduringtheconventionallanding.TheMarineCorpsassaultonPeleliuin1944servesasanexcellentexampleofthehighcostthatresultedthroughtheemploymentofastrictlyconventionalforceagainstahybridenemy.AssistingtheJapaneseintheirdefenseofPeleliuwasthegeographyandclimateoftheisland.ThesefactorsplayedasdeadlyaroleinthebattleasthebraveryandtenacityoftheJapanesedefenders.Peleliu'sterrainandtheJapanesedefenseforcecombinedtomakethe1st
MarineDivision'scampaignoneofthemosttryingofthePacificwar...
Avolcanicislandoflimestoneandcoral,PeleliuprovidedtheJapanesewithatracklessmazeofsmallhills,cliffs,caves,andpinnaclesfromwhichtocovertheflatsouthendoftheislandwithfire.Swamps,thickjungle,andheavyscrubmademovementdifficultforattackingtroops.Thegroundwassohardthatfoxholescouldnotbedug,andtheheatandhumidityhoveredaroundthe100degreemark.Todefendthisparadise,theJapanesehadsentacrackinfantryregimentwithtanksandlightartillery.Includingnavalbasetroopsandserviceunits,thePeleliugarrisonnumberedtenthousandandcoulddrawreinforcementsfromneighboringislands...TheJapanesehadbuilthundredsofcaveandbunkerpositionswithconnectingtunnelsandmultiplefiringpositions...
'"GaryJ.Bjorge,Merrill'sMarauders:CombinedOperationsinNorthernBurmain1944,FortLeavenworth,KS:CombatStudiesInstitute,U.S.ArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege,1996,p.6.37


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TheJapanesedefenseplan,moreover,didnotanticipatemassivecounterattacksoradecisivestruggleatthebeaches;knowinghecouldnolongercountonairandnavalrelief,theJapanesecommanderdecidedtowageawarofattritionagainsttheMarinesfromthecaves.SuchtacticswouldnullifymuchoftheadvantagesofAmericansupportingarmsand7Smakethebattleinfantryagainstinfantry.TheassaultonPeleliubytheMarinescommencedonSeptember15,1944."Weatherwasexcellent;theseawascalmandtherewasalmostnosurf.Inadditiontonavalgunfirethetroopsenjoyedthebenefitofdirectairstrikesonthebeachesimmediatelypriortothelanding.'"Onceashore,however,conditionsfortheMarinesdeterioratedrapidly.Amphibioustractors(amtracs)weremetwithdevastatingfireastheyhitthebeachcreatingadifficultsituationforfollow-on-wavesofvehiclesandtheoffloadingofinfantrymen."Artilleryandmortarspunishedtheamtracsfromthereeftothebeach,andthemarinesscrambledfromtheirvehiclesintothefaceofheavymachinegunfireandmoreshelling.'"ThesituationonthebeachgrewincreasinglyprecariousfortheinvadingMarinesasthefireoftheJapanesecreatedatrafficjamofsortsonthebeachhead.Withvehicles,equipment,andmencrowdingthebeachoveranapproximate4,000-yardarc,theJapanese"poundedthepositionwithmortarfire,scourgeditsfrontwithmorefire,andthrewtanksagainstthemostadvancedpositions.Bythetimethefirst
dayended,thedivisionwasbarelyholdingandhadlostnearly1,300men,ormorethantwiceasmanyasitsstaffhadpredicted."7WhiletheJapanesetookaheavytollofMarines,theywereultimatelybeatenbackfromthebeachandforcedtofightfromtheirwell-establisheddefensivepositions.Viciousfightingcontinuedoverthenexttwoweeks
75Millett,pp.420-421.76IselyandCrowl,p.403.77Millett,p.421.78Ibid.,p.422. 38


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astheMarinesfoughttocleartheislandoftheJapanesedefenders."ToeliminateprobablysixthousandJapanesedefenders,thedivisionlostnearlyfourthousandofits
ownmen.andthe1stMarinesceasedtoexistasacombatregiment."79
TheJapanese,nowclearedfromthesouthernandnorthernportionsoftheisland(includingtheairfield),commencedadeadlyunconventionalcampaignagainsttheMarinesfromcavernousmountainsoftheUmurbrogolRidge.AgainsttheUmurbrogolcaves,therewerenoeasyapproaches.Whentanksandartillerycouldreachacave,theywereusedwitheffect,andMarineCorsairsanddivebombers. . .flyingfromPeleliu'sairfield,poundedthecaveswithbombsandnapalm.80Nevertheless,thefinalbattlesfelltotheMarineinfantry,whichsealedthecaveswithdemolitionsandflamethrowers.Amidtheshatteredscrubtreesandcrumblingcoralcliffs,bittersmall-unitbattleserodedbothAmericanandJapanesestrengthandendurance.Whenthe1stMarineDivisionfinallyleftthefight...thedivisionhadlost6.336Marinesandhadspentnearly1,600roundsofQ1
infantryandartilleryammunitiontokilleachJapanesesoldier.TheemploymentofhybridtacticsbytheJapaneseprovedtobeverycostlyfortheconventionally-orientedMarines.Abletoresorttounconventionaltacticsonceconventionaldefenseoftheislandfailed,theJapaneseprovedveryeffectiveincausingagreatnumberofcasualties.Thoughultimatelyunsuccessfulintheirdefenseoftheisland,theJapanesehybridmodelwaseffective,deadly,andwouldprovemenacingfortheremainderofthewar.D.SPECIALOPERATIONSAGAINSTTHEJAPANESEAmericanspecialoperationsagainsttheJapanesearebestexemplifiedbytheactionsofMerrill'sMarauders.HavingbeeninspiredbythesuccessofWingate'sChindits,theJointChiefsofStaffauthorizedtheestablishmentofthe5307thProvisional
79Ibid.,p.422.80Emphasisadded. 39


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regimentasanall-volunteerforcecode-namedGALAHAD.The53071wouldsoonbecomebetterknownas"MerriirsMarauders'"inhonoroftheircommander.BrigadierGeneralFrankD.Merrill.ComposedofthreebattalionsofvolunteerswhomhadpreviouslyservedintheSolomon-NewGuineacampaigns,theMaraudersengagedinandwonfivemajorbattlesandseventeenminorengagementsagainsttheJapanese.83
TheMarauderswereassignedtotheAsianTheaterformanyreasonsboth
politicalandmilitary."TheUnitedStatessawChina'sgeographicpositionsandlargemanpowerpoolasgreatassets.AmericabelievedthatitwaspossibletoimprovetheChineseArmysothat.itcouldmakeapositivecontributiontothecomingoffensiveagainstJapan."Furthermore,
...AmericanandBritishplannersenvisionedChineseforcesandU.S.forcesinthePacificconvergingontheCanton-HongKongarea.Onceemplacedthere,theseforceswoulddrivenorthtoliberatenorthChinaandestablishstagingareasforoperationsagainstJapan.Theyear1947wassetforoperationsagainstJapanproper.RetakingnorthernBurmaandconstructingtheLedoRoadsouththroughMyitkyinatotheoldBurmaRoadwasafundamentalpartofthisstrategicplan,inthattheroadwouldbringsuppliesfortheChineseforcesthatwouldmovetowardCantonOffromthenorthwest.AlsoworthnotingiscampaigncommanderLieutenantGeneralJosephStilwell'scontemptfortheBritisheffortsintheChina-Burma-India(CBI)theater.DisagreementsbetweentheAmericansandBritishintheCBITheaterbeganwiththedevelopmentofcommandrelationshipsandcontinuedthroughoutthecampaignonnumerouslevels.
ManyAmericans,includingStilwell,alsoquestionedBritishmotivesandenthusiasmin
81Millett,pp.422-42382Arquilla,p.282.8"JoelNadelwithJ.R.Wright,SpecialMenandSpecialMissions:InsideAmericanSpecialOperationsForces1945tothePresent,London:GreenhillBooks,1994,p.24.84Bjorge,pp.2-3.85Ibid.,pp.5-6. 40


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theCBITheater.TheBritishplacedlittlevalueinthistheaterduetotheirlackofconfidenceinChinesetroopsandtheirbeliefthatthatChineseparticipationwouldnotsignificantlycontributetotheeffortagainsttheJapanese.ConvincedthattheBritishwereconcernedmorewithmaintainingtheircolonialpossessionsthandefeatingtheJapanesebythemostexpedientmeanspossible,Stilwellsetoutonself-initiatedcampaignofdiscreditingtheBritishpoliticallyandmilitarily.FurthercomplicatingmattersforStilwellwashisneedtodealgingerlywithcoalitionforcesfightingunderbrutalcircumstancesagainstanequallybrutalenemy.AstheonlyAmericancombatunitwithinthecombinedforce,GalahadcouldnotavoidbeinggiventhespecialburdensthatcamefrombeingAmericans.Theirpresencewasrequiredtoformviablemultinationaltaskforceswhentheunitsofothercountriescouldnotorwouldnotworktogetheralone.Theirparticipationinoperationswasnecessarytoencouragetheunitsofothernationstostayinthestruggleandtofighthard.86
Asaconsequenceofthesepoliticalandmilitarycircumstances,theMarauderswerecondemnedtoaseriesofassignmentswhichresultedintheirbeingoverused,misused,andabused.TheMaraudersinitiallydemonstratedtheirremarkableworthinengagingtheJapanese18thDivisionintwoarduousjunglebattlesatNampyekNhaandNhpumGa.EachofthesebattlesweighedheavilyontheMaraudersastheywereinconstantpursuitoftheenemyandveryshortonnutritionandrest.FollowingtheirsurprisingsuccessesagainsttheJapanese,theMaraudersweredueawell-deservedperiodofrest.This
respite,however,nevermaterialized.UnderpressurefromtheJointChiefsofStaffandmembersofthecoalitiontoseizeandholdMyitkyinain"thisdryseason,"Stilwellwas
86Ibid.,p.45. 41


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forcedtoactfast."SincethetacticalsituationandnatureoftheforcesunderhiscommandmeantthatMyitkyinacouldonlybereachedandattackedbyataskforceleadbythe5307th,thediewascast."5'Asquicklyastheyhadsatdown,theMarauderswereoffagaintoseizethestrategicallyvaluableairfieldatMyitkyina.Aftercrossingthe6.000-footKumanMountains,theMaraudersarrivedatMyitkyinawithinthreeweeksOQcatchingJapanesedefendersoffguardandseizingtheairfieldwithlittledifficulty.
Themenofthe5307ththoughtthatthisvictorymeanttheywouldbereleasedformtheirhardship,but-despiteearlierpromises-itwasnottobe.Again,tacticalnecessityandthenatureofcombinedoperationsmadeitimpossibletorelievethem.Insteadofbeingflownout,theywerecommittedtoapositionalbattleagainstagrowingJapaneseforcethatwasvigorouslydefendingthetownofMyitkyinaandthreateningtorecapturetheairfield.90
Miraculously,theMaraudersagainemergedvictorious.Malnourished,diseasedandcompletelyexhausted,theMarauderswererenderedinoperative.TheMaraudershadsufferedover400battlecasualtiesandnearly2,000casualtiesfromdysentery,typhus,malaria,psychoneurosisandotherdiseases.91"AweekafterMyitkyinafell,on10August1944,the5307th,utterlywornoutanddepleted,wasdisbanded."92
E.MARINECORPSHYBRIDOPERATIONSAGAINSTTHEJAPANESE
1.UnconventionalAspectsoftheHybridForceMarineCorpsspecialoperationsorganizationswerelargelyinspiredandmodeledafterthesuccessfulCommandosofGreatBritain'sRoyalMarines."TheBritishcommandosexecutedraidsagainstGermaninstallationsontheEuropeancontinentandin
87Ibid.,pp.32-33.88Ibid.,p.33.89Arquilla,p.285.90Bjorge.p.40.91Nadel,p.2592Bjorge,p.2. 42


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Africa.TheraidssuggestedacertainaudacitywhichhadanimmediateappealintheUnitedStates,especiallyafterPearlHarbor,duringthesixmonthswhenAmericanfortuneswereverylow."OneofthegreatestproponentsfortheestablishmentofspecialunitswithintheMarineCorpswasnoneotherthanPresidentRoosevelt."Whenwarcame,PresidentRooseveltwantedcommando-likeformations.HewasinfluencedinthisbyPrimeMinisterChurchilland,nodoubt,byCaptainJamesRooseveltUSMC(thePresident'sson),who,inJanuary1942,wrotetohisCommandantproposingmarineunitsofcommandos,stressinginhisletterthevalueofguerrillasinChinaaswellasBritishexperience."94ThePresident'ssupportofspecialunitswasmetwithagreatdealofresistancefromMarineCorpsleadership.Generalofficers,fromtheCommandantdown,criticizedtheideacitingissuessuchasmanpowershortagesandredundancyasbeingreasonstonotestablishtheunits.TheCommandant,MajorGeneralThomasHolcomb,statedthat,
Theorganization,equipment,andtrainingofinfantryunitsoftheMarineDivisionsshould,inpracticallyallrespects,beidenticaltothatofthe'Commandos"...Ingeneral,itmaybestatedthatthetrainingofallunitsinthetwoMarineDivisionspreparesthemtocarryouteitheroffensiveoperationsonalarge-scale,orsmall-scaleamphibiousraidsofthetypecarriedoutby'theCommandos.'"
EchoingthenegativesentimentsoftheCommandantwasMajorGeneralHollandM.Smith,commandingGeneral,AmphibiousForce,Atlantic.GeneralSmith"opposedtheraiderconceptonphilosophicalgrounds,notingthatallAmphibiousForce,Atlantic
9jCharlesL.Updegraph,Jr.,U.S.MarineCorpsSpecialUnitsofWorldWarII,Washington,D.C.:HistoricalDivision,Headquarters,U.S.MarineCorps,1972,p.l.94JamesLadd,CommandosandRangersofWorldWarII,Trowbridge,GreatBritain:DavidandCharlesPublishers.1989.p.122.Updegraph,p.2. 43


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Marinescouldbetrainedinraidingtechniquesbytheirownofficersifitweredeemedimportant."1 Inessence.GeneralSmithwassuggestinguaviewthatwouldbecomeincreasinglycommonamongseniorMarineofficers,namely,thattherewasnotaskthatQ7the"elite"raiderunitscouldperformanymoreeffectivelythanregularlineunits."GeneralAlexanderA.Vandegrift,atthetimeCommandingGeneralofthe1stMarineDivision,lamentedoverthetakingofvaluableofficersandmen."MerrittEdson,armedwithappropriateorders,arrivedtocombourunitsforofficersandmendeemedsuitableforhis1stRaiderBattalion...NeitherGeneralHolcombnorIfavoredformingeliteunitsfromunitsalreadyelite...Edson'slevyagainstourdivision,comingatsuchacritical
time,annoyedthedeviloutofme,buttherewasn'toneearthlythingIcoulddoabout
it."98
DespitetheresistancefromMarineCorpsleadership,theraiderbattalions,
initiallyformedasthe1stand2ndSeparatebattalionsonJanuary6andFebruary41942."Theformationofspecialunitsdidnotendwiththeestablishmentoftheraiderbattalions.TheParachuteBattalions,theGliderGroup,theBarrageBalloonSquadrons,andtheDefenseBattalionswerealldevelopedinanefforttoprovidetheMarineCorpstheabilitytorespondtoanycontingency.ManyoftheseunitswereinspiredbythesuccessesofsuchunitsintheEuropeanTheater.AstheBritishcommandoshadinspiredthebirthoftheraiders,GermansuccesseswithparatroopsandgliderunitsencouragedthedevelopmentofsimilarunitsintheMarineCorps.DuetothegeographicalchallengesandthenatureofwarfareinthePacificTheater,however,onlytheraidersandthe
%Ibid.,p.2.97Ibid.,p.2.98Ibid.,p.5.
44


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parachutebattalionswereemployedeffectively.Withregardtothelatter,theparachutebattalionsfoughtgallantly,oftenatthesideoftheraiderbattalions,butnevermadeonecombatjumpduringthewar."Thebasicmissionofthetwonewraiderunitswasthreefold:tobethespearheadofamphibiouslandingsbylargerforcesonbeachesgenerallythoughttobeinaccessible;toconductraidingexpeditionsrequiringgreatelementsofsurpriseandhighspeed;andtoconductguerrillatypeoperationsforprotractedperiodsbehindenemylines."1°Chosentoleadthese'twounitswereLieutenantColonelsMerritt"RedMike"A.Edson(1st
RaiderBattalion)andEvansF.Carlson(2ndRaiderBattalion)."EdsonhadservedinFranceinWorldWarI,hadbeenaMarinepilot,captainoftheMarineRifleandPistolTeam,andanobserveroftheSino-JapanesehostilitiesaroundChaipei,China.CarlsonhadtraveledextensivelywiththeChinese(Communist)EighthRouteArmyguerrillasandhadobservedtheirtacticsandorganizations."101
Oneofthegreatestassetsoftheraiderbattalionswasthattheyprompted:aconstantreappraisaloftrooporganization,andanabilitytorealignforceseitherpermanentlyorforspecificshort-termobjectives.Theraiderunitswerecharacterizedbyintensereviewofweaponsandtacticsandawillingnesstoadapttorapidlychangingcircumstances.Raideroperationswereenvisionedasrequiringforcesinincrementsofcompanystrength,hencethealignmentaroundacompanybaseoffirebyorganizingweaponsplatoonsineachcompany.102
ThenumberofMarineraiderunitswouldincreaseasthewarprogressed.Beforetheendofthewarthe1stMarineRaiderRegiment,the2nMarineRaiderRegiment(Provisional),andfourMarineRaiderBattalions(l551-^)wouldbeformedandseeactioninthePacific
99Ladd,p.122.100Updegrap',0,/^.,p.3. 45
Laaa,p.izz.100Updegraph,pp.3-4.101IhMn1


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Theater.Oftheseunits,the1stand2"RaiderBattalionsunderEdsonandCarlsonenjoyedthemostsuccess.
2.ConventionalAspectsoftheHybridForceConventionallyspeaking,theMarineCorpshaddevelopedandtrainedinnewmethodsofamphibiouswarfaresincetheconclusionofWorldWarI.TheneedtodevelopanamphibiousassaultcapabilityarosefromthelessonsoftheSpanish-AmericanWarandWorldWarI.Intheformer,therelativelyeasyvictoryoverSpaindidnotconcealthefactthatthefleetwasincapableofsustainedoperationseveninwatersascloseasthoseofCuba,andtheprojectionofAmericanpowerfarintothePacificasaresultofCommodoreGeorgeDewey'svictoryatManilaBaymadetheproblemofacquiringbasesevenmoreacute.Deweyhimselfremarkedafterwardthathadhehadunderhiscommandaforceof2,000marineshecouldhaveforcedthesurrenderoftheSpanisharmyandoccupiedthecityofManilawithcomparativeease.ThisheclaimedwouldhaveclearedthewayforsubsequentoccupationoftheislandsbytheUnitedStatesArmyandwouldprobablyhavepreventedthenativeinsurrectionwhichtooksomanyyearstoquell.I03
Inthelatter,theBritishandAustraliandebacleatGallipoliservedasahauntingreminderofthecostofineptitudeinamphibiouswarfare.Plaguedbyproblemscausedbyterrain,
intelligence,poorlogisticalsupportforthetroopsonceashore,andpoorplanning,theoperationatGallipoliwasanutterfailure."Thegeneralconclusionwasthatlargescaleamphibiousoperationsagainstadefendedshore,especiallyifconductedindaylight,werealmostcertaintobesuicidal."104
Asaresult,theMarineCorpsengagedinanapproximate20-yearrevitalizationefforttodevelopamphibiouscapabilities.Training,logistics,andequipmentwere
10;Ibid.,p.6.IselyandCrowl,pp.21-22104Ibid.,p.20.104Ibid.,p.20. 46


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revolutionizedtoservethepurposesofnewlydevelopedMarineCorpsdoctrineduringtheyearsleadinguptothestartoftheSecondWorldWar.Infantry,armor,artillery,air,
navalgunfire,andlogisticswereallorganizedtosupportthelarge-scaleamphibiousoperationsthattheMarineCorpsenvisionedasbeingtheirfutureroleinwarfare.BythetimethewarwithJapanstarted,theMarineCorpswasreadytotestitsnewlydevelopedconventionalcapabilitiesincombat.ThePacificTheaterprovedtobetheperfecttestingground.
3.HybridOperationsHybridoperations,asemployedbytheMarinesinWorldWarII,foundtheiroriginsinexperimentsconductedbytheMarineCorpsinthe1930s."Throughoutthedecadeofthethirties,theMarineCorpsexperimentedwiththeconceptoftheraider-typeforces,generallyaselementsoflargeroperations."105Thisconceptwasreinforcedduringexercisesin1941atNewRiver,NorthCarolina.Operatingthereforthefirsttimeasanorganization,theRaiderBattalion'smission"wastoincludereconnaissance,feints,raids,secondarylandingsordiversions,andnightlandingsforanyofthesepurposes,ortoactasacoveringforcefortheentiredivisionindeliveringflankattacksaimedathostilecommunicationsoratreservesintherearofthemainbeachdefenses,andinothersimilar
activities."106Theresultsoftheseexercisesweresoontobetestedincombat.WhilemanyofthemorenotoriousMarineoperationsintheSecondWorldWarwerelargelyconventionalinnature,itwasintheSolomonIslands,namelyinGuadalcanalandBougainville,wheretheMarineCorpsprovedveryeffectiveinutilizinghybridtactics.Utilizingablendofconventionalandunconventionaltactics,theMarine
105Updegraph,p.l. 47


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Corps,alongwithconstantsupportfromtheNavy,wasabletogainandmaintaincontrolofthestrategicallyvaluableSolomonIslands.FromtheseizuresofGuadalcanalinthesouth,toBougainvilleinthenorth,thenewlyestablishedRaiderswerecombinedwithelementsoftheParachuteBattalions,andsuccessfullyfoughtinconcertwithconventionalinfantryandsupportunits.IntheinitialassaultonGuadalcanal,conventionalunitsstormedthebeachonGuadalcanalproperwhilethe1stRaiderBattalionsimultaneouslystruckTulagi,whichhadbeentheseatoftheBritishSolomonIslandsGovernment.1'Inthemeantime,the2dRaiderBattalionledbyCarlsonwasconductingadiversionaryraidonMakinIsland.AtBougainvilleinlate1943,thecompositionofspecialandconventionalmarineelementswasagainessentialtosuccess.WhileconventionalelementswerepreparingforanassaultonBougainvilleonNovember
1st,asuccessfuldiversionaryraidwasconductedontheislandofChoiseulbyelementsofthe1stParachuteRegimentunderthecommandofLieutenantColonelRobertH.Williams,withLieutenantColonelVictorH.Krulakcommandingits2dBattalion.108
"GetashoreonChoiseul,thegeneralordered,andstirupthebiggestcommotionpossible,'Makesuretheythinktheinvasionhascommenced...'Itwasamostunusualraid,656men,ahandfulofnativeguides,andanAustraliancoastwatcherwitharoadmap."105
ThediversionnotonlyheldofftheJapanesewhiletherealinvasionoccurredatEmpressAugustaBayinBougainville,butalsoresultedinthedeathsofatleast143Japaneseto9marineskilled,15wounded,and2missing.110Perhapsthemostnotoriousmarinehybrid
106IselyandCrowl,p.65107Updegraph,p.8.108CaptainJohnC.Chapin,TopoftheLadder:MarineOperationsintheNorthernSolomonIslands,Washington,D.C.:MarineCorpsHistoricalCenter,1997,p.9.109Ibid.,p.9.110Ibid.,pp.10-11. 48


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forceengagement,however,occurredatwhatwouldcometobeknownas"Edson'sRidge".HavingseizedcontroloftheJapaneseairstriponGuadalcanalbyearlyAugust1942,theMarineswerecontinuallychallengedbytheJapaneseintheireffortstoretaketheairfieldaswellastheentireisland.Thestrategicvalueoftheairfieldtobothsideswassignificant.FortheJapanese,retakingtheairstripwouldserveasaspringboardforretakingtheislandandprotectingtherestoftheSolomonsfromtheAmericans.FortheAmericans,maintainingpossessionoftheairstripandislandwouldbecrucialtofulfilling
their"climbuptheSolomonladder."AsfightinginandaroundtheSolomonIslandscontinued,theimportanceofairsuperiorityincreased.Americanaircraftcarriersweresufferinggreatlossesinthearea,threateningtodenytheAmericanswiththevitalair
assetsrequiredforreconnaissance,shippingstrikes,closeairsupport,andsupplydelivery.Consequently,thepossessionoftheairfield(namedHendersonFieldafterits
capture)wasextremelyimportantintheserolesbeingfulfilleddespitetheinadequateconditionofthecarrierfleetinthearea.Inanefforttoregaincontroloftheairfield,theJapaneselaunchedaseriesofattacksagainsttheAmericansinSeptember1942.TheattackswereconductedbyelementsofaJapanesebrigade"totalingsome6,000menandnamedafterits
commandingofficer,MajorGeneralKiyotakeKawaguchi,"culminatingduring12-14September.'''DefendingtheairstripwasacombinedforceofraidersandparachutistsunderthecommandofLieutenantColonelEdson.Thisforcewasprovidedconventional
'"IselyandCrowl,p.141. 44


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supportfromamphibioustractors,engineers,pioneerbattalions(shorepartybattalions)and,mostimportantly,artillery.
Theraidersandparatrooperswereplacedinhastilyconstructeddefensivepositionsastridearidgewhichrosejustsouthoftheairfieldandstretchedsouthwardintothejungle.Engineers,pioneers,andamphibiantractorpersonnelcoveredtheflanksofthisnewlyandasyetonlypartiallyestablishedseriesofsmalldefensivepoints,tyingupinsofaraspossiblewiththebeachflankstotheeastandwest.ThusineffectthemarineshaddevelopedsomethingwhichVandegriftwouldlaterformalizeinanoperationorder-aperimeterorcordondefense,roughlyrectangularinshape,entirelysurroundingtheairfield.
Theensuingbattle,"byfarthemostseriousuptothatpointinthelandcampaign,quicklybecamealegend,withconsiderablejustification."11
While,estimatesofthesizeoftheKawaguchiBrigadepriortothebattlerangedanywherefrom4,500to6,000,itwasclearthatEdsonandhismenwereoutnumberedbyafactorofatleasttwotoone."ItseemsfairtosaythatthefewhundredMarinesontheridgethatnightfacedaboutfifteenhundredJapanesesoldiers-difficultoddsunderanymethodofcalculation."114Stavingoffanumberofattacksoverthecourseofthreedays,theMarineswereabletosuccessfullywithdraw,regroup,andcounterattackwithgreat
effect.Thevalueofconventionalsupportwaswitnessedthroughouttheengagement.Inoneinstance,"thesheerweightoftheKawaguchiassaultdrovethemarinesbacktothenorthernedgeofEdson'sRidge.Justbelowthemlaytheairfield;buttheKawaguchiassemblyareaswererakedwithartilleryfire,whichdespitepoorcartographicdataandthenecessityoffiring105-millimeterhowitzersatundertheminimumrange,performed
mIbid.,p.143.1IjJonT.Hoffman,OnceaLegend:"RedMike"EdsonoftheMarineRaiders,Novato,CA:Presidio,1994,p.206."4Ibid.,p.206. 50


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superbly."^EdsonwasalsoreinforcedbytheSecondBattalion,FifthMarinesduringKawaguchi'sstrongestefforts."6ThisconventionalsupportprovedcrucialtotheAmericansuccess.Kawaguchi'smen.wounded,tired,anddemoralized,wereunabletoovercometheeffectsoftheartilleryandinfantrysupportprovidedtoEdson.BySeptember1
5
th,"theRaidersandParachutistswalkedofftheridgeinthemorningand
left2/5tomopupthebattlefieldandburytheJapanesedead."117Thepriceofvictorywasnotcheap.Raiderlosseswereputat135men,andthoseoftheParachutistsat128.
IIQOfthese,59weredeadormissinginaction.Thebenefitsreaped,however,weregreat:"...onlyaremnantoftheKawaguchiBrigadewasleft,abrokengroupofmenwho,harassedbyaircraft,trampedthroughthejungle. ..andjoinedotherstarvingandmalaria-infestedJapanese."119Moreimportantly,HendersonFieldwasprotected,ensuringthesecurityofGuadalcanalfortheAmericansandtheirabilitytoprovidethenecessaryairsupportforcontinuedoperationsintheSolomonIslands.EdsonwouldbeawardedtheCongressionalMedalofHonorforhisactions.F.CONCLUSIONSInassessingtheeffectivenessoftheMarineCorpshybridmodelintheSolomonIslandscomparedtothatofMerrill'sMaraudersinBurmaandMarineCorpsconventionaloperationsinPeleliu,itmustbenotedthatdistinctdifferencesdoexistbetweenthecases,specificallyintermsofgeographyandtime.Furthermore,eachareaprovidedtheUnitedStatesandJapanwithdifferentamountsofaccesstosupplies,
logistics,andsupport.Withregardtotiming,theSolomonIslandscampaignoccurred
115IselyandCrowl,p.144.116Ibid.,p.144.117Hoffman,p.205. 51


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shortlyafterthestartofAmericaninvolvementinthewar,whereasthelandingatPeleliuoccurredataverydesperatetimefortheJapanese.Thatsaid,however,theperformanceandeffectivenessofthehybridforceintheSolomonIslandsprovidesstrongevidence
that,initsallowingforgreaterflexibility,itwouldhaveperformedbetterthanthespecialandconventionalassetsfightingtheJapaneseindependentlyinthePacifictheater.Whilethepercentageoflossessufferedbytheraidersandparachutebattalionswashigh,itis
likelythatalargerforceofstrictlyconventionalinfantrywouldhavesufferedevengreaterlosses.Lackingthemobilityandflexibilityofthesmallerhybridforce,thelargerconventionalforcewouldlikelyhavefoundithardertowithdraw,regroup,andattack,withthesamelevelofefficiencyasEdson'sforces.Possessingconventionalsupportshouldtheyneedit,thespecialassetsoftheMarineCorpshybridforcewerebetterabletoconductthemissionsassignedtothemwithoutfearofbeingmisusedorabused.AsseenintheBattleofBloody(Edson's)Ridge,severalfactorscontributedtotheAmericanvictoryoveranumericallysuperiorfoe.Oneimportantaspectwastheavailabilityoffirepower...
Thebatteriesofthe11thMarines...undoubtedlyinflictedasubstantialproportionofJapanesecasualties.Withoutthatvirtualwallofsteeltotheirfront,itmighthavebeenimpossiblefortheRaidersandParachutiststostoptheonrushingenemy.AspecialforcewithoutthebenefitofsuchconventionalsupportwouldnothavebeenabletofendoffthecontinuousattacksofthelargerJapaneseforce.Moreover,Icontend
thattheknowledgeofsuchsupportmayhaveservedasamotivatingfactorinencouragingtheraiderforcesinconductingtheirmissions."Elitelightinfantryunitsarenotusuallyequippedwithheavyweapons-artillery,armor,andsoforth. . .The
118Ibid.,p.205.,19IselyandCrowl,p.145. 52


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experienceoftheCommandosinthelatterpartofWorldWarIIindicatesthatinprolongedcombateliteunitsareeventuallydeployedmoreorlesslikeotherinfantry,
• 1~)1
onlytohaveheavierarmedopponentscutthemtopieces.""Employedinconcertwithconventionalforces,specialcomponentsofthehybridforcearelesslikelytosufferthis
fate.
TheoutrightabusivemannerinwhichStilwellemployedtheMaraudersinBurmaismuchlesslikelytooccurwithinahybridforce.WhilethesuccessoftheMaraudersagainsttheJapaneseiswithoutquestion,"Merrill...foundhissmallforcebeingemployed,againandagain,inregularbattleagainstmuchlargerJapaneseformations.Hisforcesthussufferedfatallyfromtheinevitableattritionthataccompanies'regularization'.""Possessinglargeamountsofmenandfirepower,ahybridforcecanengageanenemythatrequiresaconventionalresponsewithoutresortingtooverextendingthecapabilitiesoftheirspecialassets.TheMaraudersenjoyednosuchsupportandsuffereddearlyforit."Stilwellkeptthemcontinuouslyinthefieldforfar
toolong,givingthemmissionsthatwhileintegratedwithhisplansforhisregularforces,compelledtheraiderstofightregularpitchedbattles.Thisover-andmisuseofelite
forcesledtoveryhighattritionand,though,theysucceededtacticallyonthe'roadtoMyitkyina,theyweresoonrenderedinoperative."WithregardtotheMarineassaultonPeleliu,theassaultwasplannedandexecutedstrictlyasaconventionalamphibiousassault.Theattackingforcesdidnotaccountfortheguerrilla-typetacticsthattheJapanesewoundupemployingafterbeing
120Hoffman,pp.206-207.121EliotA.Cohen,CommandosandPoliticians:EliteMilitaryUnitsinModernDemocracies,CenterforInternationalAffairs.HarvardUniversity,1978,p.58.53


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beatenbackfromtheirinitialdefensivepositions.TheMarineswereforcedtodislodgetheJapanesefromcavesusingtheconventionalassetsavailabletothemsuchasartillery,
airbombing,andflame-throwers.Theseeffortswereverycostlyintermsoflives.
UnconventionaleffortsconductedbyahybridforcemayhaveprovenagreatdealmoreeffectiveinuprootingtheJapanesefromtheircavesandundergroundpositions.Insertedpriortoorduringtheconventionalassault,specialelementsofthehybridforcemayhavebeenabletodestroyanumberofthesepositions.Attheveryleast,intelligencegatheredregardingthepositionsanddefensescapabilitiesofthecaves,mayhavesavedalargenumberoftheregularinfantrylivesthatwerelostinclearingtheJapanesefromtheirwell-defendedcaves.TheJapanesehadnodistincteliteforce,butdidhave(eventually)ahybridstrategy.TheMarines,veryearlyon,hadanexplicitlyhybridforce,butseldomtookadvantageofthespecialoperationsraidingcapabilitytheyhad-insteadusingtheelite
partoftheirhybridforceinamostlyconventionalway.Thus,thiscasedemonstratesthatthelimitsofthehybridforcearenotfirm,butinsteadareflexible,andmayperiodically
shiftmoreintoeithertheconventionalorspecialrealms,asdeemedappropriateforthecaseathand.
mArquilla,p.256.12jIbid.,p.xxiii. 54


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IV.VIETNAMA.BACKGROUNDTheVietnamWaristhequintessentialcaseforexamininghybridwarfare,duetoboththeVietnameseandtheAmericanseachemployinghybridefforts,tovaryingdegrees,throughoutthewar.Overthecourseofthewar,theUnitedStateswouldattemptanumberofoperationalandtacticalmethodstosolveonestrategicproblem:thecessationofcommunistgrowthinSoutheastAsia.Interestinglyenough,theAmericanapproachtotheVietnamWarwasalmosttheexactoppositeoftheapproachtakenintheSecondSeminoleWar.ThefirstAmericaneffortsintheSecondSeminoleWarwere
strictlyconventionalinnature,withGeneralWinfieldScottfailingtoovercomeSeminoleresistance.Asthewarprogressed,AmericansenjoyedultimatesuccessduetotheemploymentofhybridtacticsbyLieutenantMcLaughlinandhisMosquitoFleet.
Conversely,initialAmericaneffortsinVietnamwerehybridinnature,anditwasduring
thistimethattheUSenjoyedthegreatestlevelofsuccess.Asthewarcontinued,theAmericanstrategyshiftedtothatofconventionalforce,resultinginultimatedefeat.TherewerecertainlyanumberofbureaucraticandpoliticalreasonsastowhytheVietnamWarwasfoughtasitwas.Indeed,aswillbediscussed,thesuccessesofAmericanSpecialForcesinVietnamwerelimitedbypolitico-militaryissues,notbythecapabilitiesoftheforces.ThischapterwillexplainthevariousmilitaryapproachestakenbytheUnitedStatesinfightingthewar.anddemonstrating,yetagain,thatthehybridforceenjoyedthegreatestamountofsuccess.AsseeninboththeSecondSeminoleWarandWorldWarII,theenvironmentandgeographyofVietnamwasveryconducivetohybridoperations.Indeed,theVietnamese55


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strategyfocusedonadaptingitsmilitarytowinin"threestrategicareas":thehighlands,theplains,andtheurbanareas.1 TheVietnameserecognizedthatfightinginsuchdiverseenvironswouldrequireadiverseforce.Conventionaltacticswerenotgoingtosucceedinthehighlandorurbanareas,whileguerrillatacticswouldservelittlevalueontheplains."Ourforceshadtobestrongenoughtolaunchmanycampaignsatthesametimeorsuccessivelyandonaneverlargerscale,andtofighttheenemyinallthreestrategicareasrightuptothe'capitalcity'oftheenemy."125
B.THEENEMYASAHYBRIDFORCETheVietnamesefoughtasahybridforcethroughoutthewar.TheunconventionaleffortwasfoughtprimarilybyVietCongrevolutionaries,whiletheconventionaltacticsandoperationswereemployedbyregulararmyassetsofNorthVietnam.Employedtogether,theseforceswouldbaffletheAmericansforthedurationofthewar.Confusionandfrustrationcreatedbytheinabilitytoemployaneffectivecounter-strategyresultedinagreatdealofdisagreementandinfightingamongseniorAmericanleadership.HadtheVietnamesefoughtstrictlyunconventionallyorconventionally,thebenefitsgainedbythisconfusionwouldhavebeenlost.
TheemploymentofhybridtacticsbytheVietnameseagainsttheAmericanswastheresultoflessonslearnedintheirwarforindependenceagainsttheFrench(TheFirst
IndochinaWar).Inthiswar,theVietnamese,undertheleadershipofHoChiMinnandGeneralVoNguyenGiap.employedtherevolutionarywarstrategydevelopedandpracticedbyMaoTse-tunginChina.Assuch,initialVietnameseeffortsagainsttheFrenchreliedheavilyonguerrillatactics.Thesetacticsprovedveryeffectiveinwearing
124GeneralVoNguyenGiap,HowWeWontheWar,Philadelphia:RECONPublications,1976,p.34.56


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downtheFrenchdefenses,rallyingpopularsupport,andservingasafoundationfortheultimateemploymentofconventionaloperations.Theshifttoconventionaltacticsoccurredin1949whentheChinesebeganlendingsupporttotheVietnameseeffort.
"NewweaponsandsafetrainingareasallowedGiaptoorganizelarger,division-sized
units.Vietminhdivisionsin1950struckFrenchpostsontheChineseborder,capturinglargeamountsofequipmentandsecuringVietminhlinkswithChina."126Thisinitial
conventionalsuccessinspiredfurtherconventionalattemptstoousttheFrenchthatresultedinhighlossesfortheVietminh.Afterrevertingtoguerrillatacticsinordertorebuildforcesandsupport,GiapstrucktheFrenchoutpostatDienBienPhuin1954employinglarge-scaleconventionalforces.Throughaseriesofdiversionaryattacks,effectiveuseofartillery,andsiegetacticsandtechniques,GiapdefeatedtheFrenchdecisivelyresultingintheirwithdrawalfromVietnam.VietnamesetacticsagainsttheAmericansdifferedfromthatemployedagainsttheFrenchinthattherewasnoattemptmadetotransitionfromguerrillatoconventional
tactics.Instead,thestrategyemployedbyGiapwouldconsistoflethalblendofguerrillaandconventionaltactics,conductedinasimultaneousandcomplementaryfashionthroughoutthedurationoftheconflict.Whilethesetacticswereusedinvaryingdegreesasthewarprogressed,adefinitivetransitiontooutrightconventionalwarneveroccurred.Indeed,therewasnoneedforsuchatransitionwiththelevelofsuccessenjoyedthroughtheemploymentofhybridtactics.Inordertoemploythisstrategyeffectively,theVietnameserecognizedthatvaryingmeansofresistanceandforcewouldhavetobeused
125Ibid.,p.34.126JohnShyandThomasW.Collier,"RevolutionaryWar,"inParet,p.848.
57


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dependingonthegeographyofthebattlefieldandthenatureoftheenemy.AsstatedbyGeneralGiap,"inanywar,afterhavingconcentratedlargeandpowerfulforcesintherightdirectionandattherighttime,wemustalsosolveanequallyimportantquestion,whichistochooseandmakefulluseofthemostappropriateformofcombat.Onlybysodoingcanwecreatethenecessarystrengthonthebattlefieldtowinvictory."Consequently,theVietnamesecontinuallyassessedtheirtacticsandoperations,changingthemasnecessarytomeetthechallengespresentedbytheenvironmentortheenemy.Assuch,theyenjoyedtheabilitytopick-and-choosewhen,where,andhowtolaunchanattack.GeneralGiapattributestheVietnamesevictorytothiscombinedemploymentofconventionalandunconventionalassets,specificallydiscussingthreekindsofforcesthatwereresponsibleformilitaryeffectiveness.Thesethreeforcesconsistedof:"theregulararmy,theregionalforces,andthemilitiaandself-defenseforces.TheregulararmyandtheregionalforcesformthePeople'sArmy.Themilitiaandself-defenseforcesarethearmedforcesofthemasses."Indiscussingtheregulararmy,theGeneralrefersto"manylargestrategicarmycolumnscomposedofmanymoderntechnicalunits,especiallytank,armor,artilleryandanti-aircraftunitscapableofconductingcombinedoffensivesonalargescale."13CTheseforceswerecomplementedbythe"regionalarmedforcesandthepoliticalforcesofthemasses,"that"werealsoconsolidatedandvigorouslydevelopedfromthecountrysidetothecitiesandtowns,fromthepopulousareasofthe
127Lt.Gen.PhillipB.Davidson,USA(Ret.),VietnamatWar:TheHistory,1946-1975,Novato,CA:PresidioPress,1988,pp.245-251.128Giap,p.52.TheuseofitalicsinquotationsfromHowWeWontheWararesoemphasizedbyGeneralGiap.129130Ibid.,p.35.29Ibid.,p.34. 58


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MekongDeltatothecoastalareasofcentralVietnam.Theseforceswererapidlydeployed,readytocombinetheiractionwiththemainforce,andcombinemilitaryattackswithpopularuprisingstostrikedecisiveblowsinvitalareas,thetownsinparticular."Theresultantforcewasacapable,flexible,anddifficulttoengage."Regularforces...launchedaseriesoflarge-scalecombinedattacksofvariousstrategicunitsincludingmobilearmycolumnsand'on-the-spot'armycolumns,strikingdirectlyintothetowns,thenervecentersandthemajormilitarybasesoftheenemy."13'"Attacksbyourregionalarmedforcesanduprisingsbythemasses,werelaunchedcontinuouslythroughoutthestrategicgeneraloffensive,inallareas,fromthecountrysidetothetowns,
...fromthemainlandtotheoffshoreislands.Incoordinationwiththemilitaryattacksofourregularunits,theyexpandedandconsolidatedthesuccessesoftheseattacks."Thelessontobedrawnisthat,againstaskillfullyusedcombinationofregularandguerrillaforces,thelargestandbest-equippedarmywillstruggleinvain."SuchwasthehybridcharacteroftheVietnameseforces.C.CONVENTIONALOPERATIONSAGAINSTTHEVIETNAMESEConventionaleffortstoendtheVietnamWarcommencedin1964followingtheGulfofTonkinincident-"anattackagainsttwopatrollingUSdestroyers-afterwhich[President]JohnsonextractedaresolutionfromCongressthatgavehimtheequivalentofadeclarationofwar-oratleasttheimpressionthathecouldauthorizeboldermilitary
131Ibid.,p.35.132Ibid.,p.40.133Ibid.,p.40.134RobinNeillands,IntheCombatZone:SpecialForcessince1945,NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress,1998,p.155. 59


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operations."135ThiswasthebreakthatGeneralWilliamC.Westmoreland,CommanderoftheMilitaryAssistanceCommand,Vietnam(MACV),waslookingfor.Untilthis
pointinthewar.Americaneffortswerefocusedprimarilyontreatingthewarthroughcounter-insurgentefforts,whichwereenjoyingsomesuccessthroughtheactivitiesofSpecialForcesadvisorsinSouthVietnam.RaidsandattacksonAmericanbasesintheSouthresultedintheAmericanssteppingupattacksagainstNorthVietnambymeansofairstrikes."TheAmericanretaliationforVietCongattacksledtoincreasedcounter-retaliationwhichnecessitatedtheveryintroductionofgroundcombatforceswhichtheuseofairstrikeswassupposedtoprevent."136FortheAmericans,therootoftheproblemwasthoughttolayinthesupport(military,economic,andpolitical)giventotheVietCongbyNorthVietnam.Consequently,theAmericansfailedtoremainengagedagainsttheVietCongthroughcounter-insurgentmeansjustwhensucheffortswerestartingtoyieldbenefits.Instead,theAmericansaimedtoremovetheNorthVietnamesesupporttotheVietCong,whichif
anything,hadtheunintendedconsequenceofdrawingtheNorthVietnamesegovernmentintoalargerconventionalconflict.WhileitisacceptedbymanythatNorthVietnameseparticipationwouldhaveincreasedregardlessoftheAmericanresponsetotheirsupportoftheguerrillas,thefactremainsthatthestrategytakenbyWestmorelanddisregardedanyothermeanstowinthewarthanbyalarge-scaleconventionalapproach.GeneralWestmorelandwasconvincedthatthewarcouldbewonsimplybytheemploymentofalarge,conventionalarmypluckedrightfromthepagesofClausewitz.His
135Millett,p.564.16LarryE.Cable,ConflictofMyths:TheDevelopmentofAmericanCounterinsurgencyDoctrineandtheVietnamWar.NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress.1986,p.285.60


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recommendationtoPresidentJohnsonin1965calledfortheenlargementofAmericanforcesto200,000menwithwhichhewouldbeginoffensiveoperationsin1965todenytheenemyvictory,anddefeathimoutrightby1968.137Unfortunately,suchastrategywasdoomedtofailandresultedintheUSbeingunabletouproottheVietCongfromSouthVietnamTheAmericanArmywastheincorrectinstrumentforfightingtheconflictwhichhaddevelopedinSouthVietnam.Itwasaforceconfigured,equippedandtrainedaccordingtoadoctrinesuitableforconventionalwarfare,orforwarfareinthenuclearbattlefieldofEurope.Themechanicaltechniquesofmobility,heavyfirepowerandsophisticatedcommunicationsdidnotautomaticallyendowthearmywiththenecessarycapabilitiestosuccessfullycounterinsurgentforces...Attheverymost,theuseofconventional,bigbattaliontacticsbytheAmericanswouldassurethattheinsurgentsceasedassemblingtheirforcesinlargeconcentrations,resuminginsteadthecampaignofultrasmall-scaleeffortsofterrorismandintimidationcoupledwithpoliticalagitationandpropagandawhichhadservedsowellinearlierdays.TheAmericanideathatguerrillawarscouldbefoughtsuccessfullybyusingwhatwereessentiallyconventionalforces,tacticsanddoctrinewasplainlywrongandwasnotsupportablefromthehistoricalrecord,exceptinthenarrowestofsituations.1
D.SPECIALOPERATIONSAmericanSpecialForceswereintroducedintoVietnamin1957toserveasmilitaryadvisorstotheArmyoftheRepublicofVietnam(ARVN)officersandNon-commissionedOfficers(NCOs).Thepurposeoftheseforceswasto"trainandadvisetheirVietnamesecolleagues,nottotakechargeofirregularunitsandcertainlynottoleadoffensivemissionsagainsttheVietCong.TheUnitedStatesintendedtowagethiswarat
oneremove,buttheSouthVietnameseArmyprovedunable,andinsomecasesunwilling,tofightandwinagainsttheirtough,highlymotivatedVietCong
137Millett,p.566.138Cable,pp.282-283.61


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opponents."1 Consequently,AmericanSpecialForcestroopshadtotakechargeofpatrolsanddefensiveoperations,resultingintheslipperyslopethatwoulddrawtheUnitedStatesintoVietnamforover15years.AmericanSpecialForcesinvolvementsteadilyincreasedwiththestartoftheKennedyadministrationin1961.Kennedy,anoutspokenadvocateofSpecialForces,"waseagertosendtheSpecialForcesintoaction.InApril1961hesent1200ofthemtoVietnam,despitethepossibilitythatthiscommitmentmightbeconsideredaprecedentfortheintroductionofcombattroops."140Moreover,heauthorizedtheactivationof5th
SpecialForcesGroup,1stSpecialForces,andthesettingupoftheSpecialWarfareCenterinFortBragg.141
SpecialForceseffortsduringthisperiodweremetwithsomesuccess,specificallythroughtheCivilianIrregularDefenseGroup(CIDG)program.TheCIDGprogramwasestablishedin1961,andwasthefocusofSpecialForceseffortsuntil1964.TheCIDGprogramwasdesignedtotrain,advise,andassistVietnamesemountaintribes(collectivelyknownasMontagnards)incivilactionprogramsandguerillawarfare.14
TheCIDGprogramdidenjoyacertainlevelofsuccessanddemonstratedthefirst
Americanefforttowinthe"heartsandminds"oftheVietnamesevillagers.Infact,theprogramwasexpandedfollowingitsinitialsuccesses.Unfortunately,theprogramwouldresultinabreakdownofSouthVietnamesecommandandcontrolwithregardstotheMontagnards.SuspiciousastheywereoftheMontagnards,theSouthVietnamesewereconcernedthatthetrainingprovidedtotheMontagnardsbyAmericanSpecialForces
139Neillands,p.159.140Cohen,p.41.141Neillands.p.162. 62


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mighteventuallybeusedinaninsurgenteffortagainsttheSouthVietnamesegovernment.WhiletheSpecialForcesrecognizedthesensitivityofthisissue,thesupportoftheMontagnardswasdeemedvitaltosuccess."WithouttheirsupportintheCentralHighlandsthewarwaslost."143Thetenuoussituationculminatedin1964"whentheMontagnardsrebelledandshottheirSouthVietnameseofficersbutgladlytookordersfromtheGreenBerets."144TheepisodeembarrassedtheAmericans,infuriatedtheSouthVietnameseandprovidedcriticsofSpecialForceswithneededammunitiontosupporttheirargumentsagainstfurtherSpecialForcesinvolvement.145TheCIDGprogram'sdayswerenumberedshortlyafterthisincident.WiththebuildupofUSconventionalforcesin1965,commandandcontrolofCIDGforcespassedfromtheARVNtoMACV
1AftunderaprocesscalledOperationSwitchback.Thischangeincommandandcontrolcontributedtotheultimatedemiseoftheprogram,astheconventionalleaderswithinMACV"chargedtheCIDGforcesandtheirSFadvisorswithcontactpatrolsandabove
allwiththecollectionofintelligenceonVietCongcampsandstrengths."147Withtheemphasisoftheprogramnowbasedonenemyengagementratherthancivilengagement,theprogramlostitsmomentumandAmericansupport,andwasturnedovertotheARVNtocontrol.WiththeonsetoftheconventionalapproachtothewarfollowingtheGulfofTonkinincident,employmentofSpecialForceswasincreasinglydirectedtoserveinsupportofconventionaloperationsspecificallyintermsofreconnaissanceand
inIbid.,p.162.143Ibid.,p.163144Cohen,p.72.145Ibid.,p.72.146Neillands,p.169.ulIbid.,p.169. 63


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intelligence.TheconventionalattitudestowardsSpecialForcesfailedtoimproveandin
facttookaturnfortheworsein1969withthe"RheaultAffair."ThisepisodeinvolvedthemurderofaVietnamesedoubleagentandresultedinthearrestof"ColonelRobertRheault,thecommanderoftheFifthSpecialForcesGroup(thatis,theGreenBeretcommanderforVietnam),sixGreenBeretofficers,andoneNCO."Whilechargesin
thecaseweredropped,itservedasfurtherevidenceforSpecialForcescriticsofthepropensityforSpecialForcestoactoutsidetheacceptedrulesofengagement.E.MARINECORPSHYBRIDOPERATIONSMarineCorpsforceswereintroducedtoVietnaminMarch1965throughanamphibiouslandingconductedonthebeachesnearDaNang.149MarineinvolvementwaspartofthegreaterAmericaneffortunderfoottoconventionalizethewarfollowingtheGulfofTonkinincident.UndertheorganizationalauspicesoftheIIIMarineAmphibiousForce(MAF),theMarineswouldbeassignedtocontrolthefivenorthernprovincesofSouthVietnam,collectivelylocatedwithintheICorpsTacticalZone(ICorps).15"ThemarinescouldnothavefoundamoredifficultplaceinallofSouthVietnamtofighteitherawarforcontroloftheruralpopulationorawarofattritionagainsttheinvadingNorthVietnameseArmy(NVA).TerrainandweatherconspiredtomakeICorpsanunpleasantplacetofight."131ICorpshadtheheaviestrainfallinVietnam,andwhilethewintermonsoonsbroughtnumbingcold,thesummersproducedtemperature-humidityindicesnear100andcloudsofdust.15AswasthecaseinboththeSeminoleWarsand
148Cohen,p.76.149Neillands,p.171.150Millett,p.560.151Ibid.,p.560.152Ibid.,pp.560-561.64


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WorldWarII,theMarineCorpswouldfinditselfchallengedequallybyMotherNatureandtheenemy.
InitialemploymentoftheMarineCorpsintheconflictwasdirectedtoserveanumberofpurposes,mostoftheminsupportofWestmoreland'sconventionalvision.ThedeploymentofaMarineBrigadefromOkinawawouldnotonlysecuretheDaNangairfieldbutwouldpresumablyreleaseARVNunitsformoreaggressiveoperationsinICorps.MarineHawkbatterieswouldsafeguardthebaseagainstpossibleDRVandChineseairretaliation.Inaddition,theMarinescouldestablishanAmericanenclavethatcouldbeusedtoeitherescalatethewarinSouthVietnamortoprotectanAmericanwithdrawalshouldJohnsondecidetocutthecommitment.153
ExperiencesonceinDaNangalteredtheMarineCorps'positiononhowthewarshouldbefought.SpearheadedbythelikesofGeneralVictorH.Krulak,commandinggeneralofFleetMarineForcesPacific,andMajorGeneralLewisW.Walt,theIIIMarineAmphibiousForce(MAF)commander,theMarineCorpsembarkedonastrategyofpacificationthatwouldlastthebetterpartoftheMarineCorps'involvementinthewar.DespitethestanceofGeneralWestmoreland,GeneralKrulakwasconvincedthat"anenclave,pacificationstrategyofferedthebestlong-termchanceofvictory."ClearlyinfluencedbytheMarineCorpsSmallWarsManualof1940,KrulakcontendedthatthewarcouldnotbewoninthebattlefieldiftheSouthVietnamesegovernmentcouldnotmaintainthesupportofthevillagepopulations.Furthermore,hedidnotbelievethat"theculturaldifferencesbetweentheAmericansandtheVietnameseweresogreatthatpacificationwasimpossibleaslongastheUnitedStatesinsisteduponlandreform,economicdevelopment,physicalsecurity,andgrassrootsvillagediplomacy.Whilehe
53Ibid.,p.564.154Ibid.,p.567. to


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didnotdenytheutilityofopportunisticstrikesagainsttheCommunistmainforceunits,
Kxulakarguedfora"spreadinginkblot'systemofruralpacificationratherthan'searchanddestroy'operationsinVietnam'sbacklands."Krulak'spacificationstrategywouldproveveryeffectiveandwashighlightedbysuchOperationsasCOUNTYFAIRandGOLDENFLEECE.COUNTYFAIRoperationswereconductedbymixedMarine-Vietnamesetaskforcesand""combinedcivicactionwithpopulationcontroltechniquesdesignedtoeliminatetheVCpoliticalcadreandvillageguerrillas."136GOLDENFLEECEinvolvedtheprotectionofricefarmersduringharvestfromthethreatoftheVietCong.TheculminationofMarineCorpspacificationeffortswastheCombinedActionProgram(CAP).
1.UnconventionalAspectsoftheHybridForceTheMarineCorpsCAPprogramandtheemploymentofForceReconnaissance(ForceRecon)typifiedunconventionalaspectsoftheMarineCorpsintheVietnamWar.
a.CAPProgramTheCAPprogramwasestablishedbytheMarineCorpsin1965inorder
toprotectgainsmadebythesuccessfulexecutionofOperationsCOUNTYFAIRandGOLDENFLEECE.TheMarinesrealizedthatvillagerexpectationsforprotectionwererisingdisproportionatelytothelevelofprotectionthattheGovernmentof(South)Vietnam(GVN)couldprovidethem.Consequently,CAPwasinstitutedastheprimarymeanstouproottheinfluenceoftheVietcongwithinthevillagesandtowinthe"heartsandminds"oftheVietnamesevillagers.
55Ibid.,p.567. 66156Ibid.,p.570.


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Theideawastotakeariflesquad(14Marines)andacorpsmanandcombinethemwithaPFplatoon(30-35)Vietnameseminutemantooperateinaspecificvillagethatprobablycontainedtwoormorehamlets.Thesecombinedforceswerecalledcombinedactionplatoons(CAPs).Theyweretheforcesthatwouldprovidetheall-essentialsecurity,collectintelligence,strengthenlocalinstitutionsbyprotectingthehamletandvillageofficials,improvethestandardofliving,andbuildsupportfortheGVN.157
Figure2illustratesthetypicalcompositionoftheCombinedActionPlatoon.
USMCSquadLeaderPFPlatoonLeader
1USMCGrenadier
1USNCorpsmanPlatoonHeadquarters4PFs
FireTeam4MarinesRifleSquadlOPFs
Figure2:CompositionoftheCombinedActionsPlatoon158
ThesuccessoftheCAPprogramwasconvincinglydemonstratedbyaFleetMarineForcePacific(FMFPAC)reportpreparedinJanuary1967.Thisreport"observedthatthe22VietnamesevillagesintheMarineTacticalAreasofresponsibility(TAOR)thathadanactiveCombinedActionProgram,ofsixmonthsorlonger,averagedagradeof60percentontheIIIMAFpacificationscale.Thiswasariseofnearly20percentagepointssincetheCombinedActionPlatoonswerestationedinthese
157LtColRaymondC.Damm.Jr.."TheCombinedActionProgram:AToolfortheFuture,"MarineCorpsGazette,October1998,p.511>SIbid.,p.50. 67


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villages."159Furtherproofoftheprogram'sefficacyisthefactthatthroughoutthehistoryoftheprogramonlyoneCAPwaseveroverrun.160Despitetheapparentsuccessesoftheprogram,ArmyleadersremainedskepticalandindeedcriticalofMarineCorpsparticipationinthewar.ThesourceofthecriticismlayintheArmybeliefthatgroundhadtobegainedinorderfortheretobesuccess.Thewinningoverofthepeoplewasnotaprimaryconcernforthem.SuchcriticismcanbeseeninthewordsofGeneralHarryKinnard.Kinnardwas"absolutelydisgusted"withtheMarines."IdideverythingIcouldtodragthemout,"hesaid,"andgetthemtofight...Theyjustwouldn'tplay...Theydon'tknowhowtofightonland,particularlyagainstguerrillas."161
FurthercriticismcamefromGeneralWestmoreland.GeneralWestmorelandwasparticularlyupsetovertheMarines'useofCAPs,challengingastheydidtheconceptofoperationsthathehaddrawnup.Hestatedinhismemoirsthat"theywereassidiously[sic]combingthecountrysidewithinthebeachheads,tryingtoestablishfirmcontrolinhamletsandvillages,andplanningtoexpandthebeachheadgraduallyupanddownthecoast...Yetthepracticelefttheenemyfreetocomeandgoashepleasedthroughoutthebulkoftheregionand,whenandwherehechose,toattacktheperipheryofthebeachheads."WestmorelanddidnotrealizethattheMarineswereoperatinginthedenselypopulatedareas,leavingtheVClittletorecruitorexploitintheremote,largelyuninhabited1ft")regiontheycontrolled."TheCAPunitconceptwasuniqueinthatitwasthesingularinnovativeAmericanprogrambroughttoVietnam.Allothercounterinsurgencyprogramshadbeen
159LtColH.T.Hayden,(ed.),ShadowWar:SpecialOperationsandLowIntensityConflict,Vista,CA:PacificAeroPress,1992,p.136.160AndrewF.Krepinevich,Jr.,TheArmyandVietnam,Baltimore:TheJohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1986,p.175.161Ibid.,p.175.162Ibid.,p.175. 68


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Klitriedbefore,bysomeoneelse,somewhereelse."Figure3outlinesthemissionsoftheCAPs.
1
.
ClearoutVietconginfrastructure
2.Providesecurityforvillage
3.ProtectGNVofficials
4.Guardlinesofcommunicationinarea
5.Conductcombinedoperations
6.Conductpsychologicaloperations
7.ConductCivicAction
8.TrainPopularForce
Figure3:CAPMissions164
&JHayden,p.137.MDamm,p.51. 69


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CAPenterscontestedvillage
CAPconductsmilitaryoperationsprofessionally
PFsimprove
CAPMarinesactdecentlytovillagers
Securityofvillageisenhanced
feedback
CAPbeginssmallcivicactionefforts
feedback
Villagersfeelmoreconfident
Villagersbegintogiveintelligence;becomemorewillingtodefendthemselvesVillagersbegintorebuild,expand,andplantoworkforthefuture
Villagedevelopsintoapro-GVNcommunity
CAPRelocates
Figure4:SchematicoftheCapMissions165
165Ibid..p.5\.70


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b.ForceReconInresponsetothedemandforlong-rangereconnaissancesupporttoconventionalcomponents.MarineForceReconnaissanceCompanieswereformedto
fulfillthetasksof"long-rangepatrolling,intelligencegathering,andclosecombat."166
ExperimentswithsuchelementshadbeenconductedbytheMarineCorpssincethelatter
halfofWorldWarII.AttheconclusionoftheKoreanWar,theMarineCorpsaggressivelypursuedthedevelopmentofdeeppenetratingreconnaissancecapabilities.Themovementbeganinearnestin1955withtheestablishmentofaReconnaissancePlatoon.Followingastringentselectionprocess,theplatoon"receivedavastamountofspecializedtraining,includingtheRangercourseandparachutejumpsattheArmyAirborneSchoolatFortBenning,Georgia.TwoyearsoftrainingandafineperformanceonexercisesconvincedtheCorpsthattheReccePlatoonhadaplaceintheUSMCorder-of-battleandtheplatoonwasraisedtoacompanylevel."16'Subsequently,asecondreconcompanywasorganizedandtrained.Thetwocompanieswereorganizedintothreeplatoons,ParachuteRecon,AmphibiousReconandParachutePathfinders,withthetaskofprovidinglandingforcesdeep-patrolintelligenceatupto100milesfromthebeachhead.Theemphasisplacedontheparachuteasthe"basicmeansoftransportationforthereconMarineswaspromptedbythepossibilitythatinthedispersedmodernbattlefield'beaches'mightwellbefarinlandinsteadofonlyalongcoastlines."169
CoupledwiththedevelopmentofMarineCorpsdoctrineintheareaofverticalassault,ForceReconprovidedcapabilitiesthatwereunknownuntilthistime.Infact,"fromtheir
166Neillands,p.189.167Ibid.,pp.189-190.168Ibid.,p.190. 71


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formationinthelate1950suntil1965,theForceReconMarineswouldbetheonlyunits
intheDepartmentofDefenseorganizedandtrainedtoconductdeepreconnaissance."170
WiththeonsetoftheVietnamWar,ForceReconwasarguablythebestprepared'"specialforce"enteringthewaratleastintermsofconductingreconnaissanceanddirectactionmissions.ThegreaterchallengetoForce,however,wouldbeconvincingtheconventionalelementsoftheMarineCorpsoftheirvalueandhowtheyshouldbeproperlyemployed.
2.ConventionalAspectsoftheHybridForceAsstatedearlier,MarineCorpsinvolvementinVietnamwasinitiallydirectedtoassistintheexecutionoflarge-scaleconventionaloperationsaimedatdestroyingtheVietcongandelementsoftheNorthVietnameseArmy.ThefirstexampleofMarineCorpsconventionaloperationsoccurredduringOperationSTARLLIGHTin1965.InAugust-September1965,theMarinesemployedafour-battalionforcecontrolledbythe7thMarinesagainstthe1stVCRegiment.Theattackresultedinthedeathofatleast700Communiststolessthan200Marines.171
Foughtnearthecoast,thefirstbattlesprovedthatverticalenvelopment,navalgunfire,closeairsupport,andaggressiveinfantrytacticsmorethanmatchedVCtenacity.Despitethemonsoonsoflate1965,additionalbattalionoperationsoutsidetheDaNangandPhuBaiTAORsreinforcedIIIMAFconfidencethatitcouldstopVCmainforcepenetrationsintoitspacificationareas.ThemostominousaspectofthethrustsbeyondtheTAORswastheMarines'firstcontactwithregularNVAunits,whoprovedhardfighterswillingtocontesthelicopterlandingzoneseveninthefaceofdevastatingMarinecloseairsupport.72
16MichaelLeeLanningandRayWilliamStubbe,InsideForceRecon:ReconMarinesinVietnam,NewYork:IvyBooks,1989,p.34.170Ibid.,pp.37-38.171Millett,p.572. 72


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Asthewarprogressed,theMarineconventionaleffortsincreased,whileattentionshiftedfromthepacificationprogramstoconfrontingtheNVAalongDMZ.ThespecterofNVApenetrationacrosstheDMZresultedindevelopmentofalarge-scalebuildupbytheMarinesinICorps.Bytheendof1966,
IIIMAFnumberednearly70.000Marines,whohadassumedthedefenseofnearly1,800squaremilesandamillionVietnamese.TheMarineshadmounted150battalionorlargeroperationsandmorethan200,000small-unitpatrols,ambushes,andsweeps.Despiteitsearlypromise,theMarinepacificationwarhadstalledbecauseofGVNineptness,MACV'sinsistenceonbig-unitoperations,andthethreatofNVAinvasionfrom1-7*2LaosandacrosstheDMZ.
3.HybridOperationsMarineCorpshybridoperationswereimperativetothesuccessesoftheMarineCorpsinVietnam.IntheMarinepacificationwarduringtheearlyyearsofMarineinvolvement,theCAPprogramservedtosupportconventionalinterestsinthattheydepletedthesourceofrecruitsfortheVC.Additionally,conventionaloperationswereconductedbytheMarinesinsupportoftheCAPprogram.Thissupportwasaimedat
counteringanylarge-scaleattemptsbytheVCtooverrunthevillageswheretheCAPprogramhadtakenhold.WiththenumberofCAPpersonnelinthevillagedecidedlysmall,thethreatoflosingthevillagestolargernumbersofVCwasveryrealindeed.Recognizingtheimportanceofmaintainingthesecurityofthevillages,theMarinesensuredthatconventionalsupportwasallottedfortheirprotection."Forallits
commitmenttopacification.IIIMAFdidnotavoidlarge-unitoperationswhensuchoperationseitherpromisedspecialsuccessorrescuedhard-pressedARVNunitsandU.S.ArmySpecialForcescampsbeyondtheMarineTAORs.Wheneverpossible,IIIMAF
'72Ibid.,pp.572-573.73


--- Page 89 ---
attemptedtofollowitsown'search-and-destroy*missionswithpacificationoperations/'174
WhilethepacificationwarcontinuedthroughouttheMarineCorps'involvement
inVietnam(indeed,theCAPprogramwascreditedwithitsgreatestsuccessinmid-1969)17\emphasisdideventuallyshifttolarge-scaleconventionaloperationsagainsttheNVA.Reasonsforthisshifthavebeenbrieflymentioned,butitisimportanttopointoutthatbetweenthepacificationwarandtheincreasedemphasisonlarge-scaleconventionaloperations,theMarineCorpswasincreasinglybeingspreadthin.Consequently,asthewarprogressed,theMarineCorpshybridmodelbecamecharacterizedbythesupportofForceReconunitstoconventionalMarineelementsTheuseofForceReconassetsinsupportofconventionaloperationsrequiredasignificantamountofadjustingonthepartofmanyconventionallyorientedMarineleaders.Formanyoftheseleaders,theproblemsexperiencedinemployingForceReconwasnotnecessarilytheirfault.ManyofthemwereunfamiliarwiththeconceptandcapabilitiesoftheReconunits,andassuchwereinclinedtoeitherunderutilizeorunintentionallyabuseForceRecon.Theseproblemswerepredominantduringthefirst
threeorfouryearsofMarineinvolvement.Duringthistime,"Marinecommanders,like
theArmycommanders,hadasyetnorealgraspofthecomplexitiesoftheVietnamWar,andonlyasketchyideaofhowtouseForceRecon.InthewordsofLieutenantColonelRoyVanCleve,ofthe3rdReconBattalion:'Reconwasusedforanymissionthatcame
173Ibid.,p.577.174Ibid.,p.572.175Hayden,p.135 74


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up.Ifyouhadnooneelsetodoit,whateveritwas,giveittoRecon.Sowegotraider-typemissionsandwegotsomeinfantryassault-typemissions'."EmploymentofForceReconassetsimproveddramaticallyin1969withtheappointmentofLtGenHermanNickerson,Jr.,asCommandingGeneralofIIIMAF.Up
untilthispoint,asidefromtheabuseofForceRecon(e.g.,beingorderedtoprobeformineswithknivesandbayonetsduringOperationSTARLIGHT),177theForcesufferedfromunderemploymentduetothereluctanceonthepartofseniorcommanderstosendteamsoutbeyondtherangeoffriendlyartilleryandradiocommunications.NickersonemphasizedtheroleofForceReconinsupportingoperationsattheMAFlevel,andenjoyedsubstantialbenefitsintheareasofintelligence,reconnaissance,scouting,andeffectivedirectactionasaresult.SpecificexamplesofthebenefitofthehybridforcewereseenincombatoperationsintheAShauValleyandtheThuongDueCorridor.F.CONCLUSIONSAswehaveseen,AmericanstrategytowardfightingthehybridVietnameseforce•
rangedfromcounter-insurgenttacticsearlyon,tofull-scaleconventionalwarastheconflictprogressed.WhileearlySpecialForceseffortswereeffective,theirdisruptionofSouthVietnamesecommandandcontrolefforts,aswellastheirperceivedpropensityforcommittingatrocities,placedtheminabadlightwiththeirconventionalemployers.Furthermore,withtheGulfofTonkinincident,militaryleadersandpoliticiansalikeconvincedthemselvesthattherootcauseofthewarlayintheaggressivepursuitsoftheNorth,notthenationalisticrevolutionthatwasoccurringwithinSouthVietnamatthe
,76Neillands,p.190.77LanningandStubbe,p.66.178Ibid.,pp.164-186.15


--- Page 91 ---
handsoftheVietCong."InshortorderthewarwastransformedfromaguerrillaconflictbetweentheVietCongandSaigontoalargerU.S.-NorthVietnamesewar."17
Itisclear,then,thattheMarineCorpshybridapproachintheVietnamWarwasthebestU.S.strategyemployedduringthecourseofthewar.ThehybrideffortsoftheCAPprogram,withconventionalassetsforoverallvillageprotection,waseffectiveinmaintainingpacificationeffortswhiledemonstratingformidableforcetodissuadethepotentialuseoflarge-scaletacticsbytheVietCongorNVA.Conversely,theArmywasquicktoshelveitspacificationeffortsattheonsetoftheconventionalshift,leavingthevillageswideopenforVCtakeover.TheemploymentoftheMarinestrategywouldhavebeenmuchmoreeffectivehadtheoverallstrategyforthewarnotshiftedsodramaticallyin1965.Unfortunately,theMarineprogramwasunabletohavethedesiredimpact,duelargelytotherequirementsplacedupontheMarineCorpstosupporttheconventionaleffortsbeingwagedbyMACV.TheutilityofhybrideffortsconductedbyForceReconandconventionalelementsoftheMarineCorpsalsoserveasanimportantlesson.WhileReconinitiallyseemedtobeasvulnerabletomisuseasthespecialelementsoftheotherservices,thehybridforceultimatelydemonstratedaneffectivenessandcapabilitythatwasunparalleledbyanyotherservice.Indeed,nootherservicerivaledtheMarinesintheireffortstointegrateandemployforcesfromunconventionalandconventionalelements.
179Cohen,p.88. 76


--- Page 92 ---
V.THEMARINEEXPEDITIONARYUNIT(SPECIALOPERATIONSCAPABLE)[MEU(SOC)]A.INTRODUCTIONMarineCorpspolicystatesthat"theprimaryobjectiveoftheMEU(SOC)programistoprovidetheNationalCommandAuthoritiesandgeographiccombatantcommanderswithaneffectivemeansofdealingwiththeuncertaintiesoffuturethreats,
byprovidingforward-deployedunitswhichofferuniqueopportunitiesforavarietyofquickreaction,sea-based,crisisresponseoptions,ineitheraconventionalamphibious
I80role,orintheexecutionofselectedmaritimespecialoperations."ThischapterprovidesbackgroundandgeneralinformationabouttheMEU(SOC)inordertoprovideabasisforunderstandingcurrentMEU(SOC)structureandpolicy.ThiswillallowforexaminationoftheMEU(SOC)asahybridforce,andthenotionthatthehybridforcemodel(asdevelopedinthepreviouscasestudies),isnothingneweithertowarfareortotheMarineCorps.B.HISTORYAsdiscussedinChapterI,thefailedattempttorescuetheAmericanhostagesinIranin1980spurredmovementsinbothpoliticalandmilitarygroupstorethinkAmericanspecialoperationsforcesandcapabilities.Subsequently,"inthe1981DefenseGuidance,andreemphasizedin1983,theSecretaryofDefensedirectedarevitalizationofSOFthroughoutthearmedservices.Giventhisaddedemphasisandthenationalrequirementforacapabilitytoconductspecialoperations,theCommandantoftheMarineCorpsin1984directedtheCommandingGeneral,FleetMarineForce,Atlantic(CGFMFLANT),
l80MCO3120.9A77


--- Page 93 ---
1C>1
toexaminethespecialoperationscapabilitiesoftheMarineCorps.1'TheexaminationwasconductedwithintheparametersestablishedbytheCommandant:
1
.
Remainnaval/amphibiousinnature.2.BeorganizedandemployedwithinthecontextofpresentMAGTFconcept/doctrine.3.BeassignedspecialoperationsthataredoctrinallyMarinemissionsandthatdonordirectlyconflictwiththemissionsofotherServices'SOF.4.Beviewedassupportingorcomplementaryelementofnavaloperations.5.Beundertakenfromthehighwatermarkinland.6.RemainunderthecommandandcontroloftheCommanderAmphibiousTaskForce(CATF),CommanderLandingForce(CLF),orotherNavalTaskForceCommanders.182
ThestudyexaminedsevenoptionsthatrangedfrommodestenhancementoftheMEUwithspecialoperationscapabilities,totheoutrightcreationofadedicatedMarineSpecialOperationsForce."TheexaminationrevealedthattheMarineCorpspossessedaninherentcapabilitytoconductabroadspectrumofspecialoperationsinamaritimeenvironment,particularlywhenarequirementexistsfortheinsertionofsurface-borneorhelicopter-bornespecialoperationscapableforcesfromthesea.Additionally,therewerecertaininitiativesthattheMarineCorpscouldundertaketoenhancethatinherentspecialoperationscapability."Asaresultoftheexamination,the26MAUwasactivatedinJune1985andcommencedtraininginJulyforaNovember1985deploymenttotheMediterranean.InDecember1985,the26thMAUreceivedSOCdesignation.DeemedasuccessattheconclusionoftheMediterraneandeployment,theMEU(SOC)programwasimplementedintheFleetMarineForcePacific(FMFPAC)inJune1987.14Implementedthroughout
181Hayden,p.32.82CommandingGeneral,FleetMarineForce,Atlantic,ReportofExaminationofMarineCorpsSpecialOperationsEnhancements,26MAR1985.183Hayden,p.32.184Ibid.,p.33. 78


--- Page 94 ---
theMarineCorpsby1988.alldeployingMEUshavesincebeenrequiredtodeployasMEU(SOC)."Onlytheforward-deployedMEUsaredesignatedMEU(SOC),andthisis
onlywhentheunitshavedemonstratedspecificcapabilitiesattheendofthepre-
1StSdeploymenttrainingcycleinaSpecialOperationsCapableExercise(SOCEX)."C.POLICYThegoverningdocumentforMEU(SOC)isMarineCorpsOrder(MCO)3120.9A,PolicyforMarineExpeditionaryUnit[MEU(SOC)].D.ORGANIZATIONTheMEU(SOC)isthebasisoftheorganizationalmeansaboutwhichMarineforcesareformed:theMarineAir-GroundTaskForce(MAGTF).MAGTFsaretaskorganizationsconsistingofground,aviation,combatservicesupport,andcommandcomponents.Theyhavenostandardstructure,butratherareconstitutedasappropriateforthespecificsituation.TheMAGTFprovidesasinglecommandertheoptimumcombined-armsforceforthesituationhefaces.186
EveryMAGTF,regardlessofsize,iscomposedoffourmainelements:thecommandelement(CE),thegroundcombatelement(GCE),theaviationcombatelement(ACE),andtheCombatServiceSupportElement(CSSE).AlthoughallMEUs(SOC)aredeployedinthisorganizationalmanner,eachmaydifferslightlyincomposition,dependingondeploymentlocation.AmphibiousReadyGroup(ARG)composition,orcommanderpreferences.Figure5displaystheMEU(SOC)organizationwithtypicalmanningandequipment.
185/6z^.,p.33.186Warfighting,FMFM-1,p.42. 79


--- Page 95 ---
GROUNDCOMBATAVIATIONCOMBATCOMBATSERVICE~kELEMENTELEMENTSUPPORTELEMENT(BATTALIONLANDINGTEAM)(REINFORCEDSQUADRON)(MEUServiceSupportGroup)
IMix>!'S URIRAF1 OMBATEQUIPMENT2.050Marinesplus100Sailors-12CH-46mediumlighthelicoptersassignedMarineunits(medical,-4CH-53(DorE)heavyliftassaultdental,chaplain,etc.)transporthelicoptersTotal:2.150-4AH-1attackhelicopters
-3UH-1utilityhelicopters-6AV-8Bvertical/shorttakeoffandlandingattackaircraft-2KC-130aerialrefuelers•20Stingersurface-to-airmissilelaunchers
-5Tanksor17lightarmoredvehicles-12Amphibiousassaultvehicles-32Dragonmissilelaunchers(antiarmor)-8TOWmissilelaunchers(antiarmor)-4105mmhowitzers-4155mmhowitzers-881mmmortars-960mmmortars-20.50calibermachineguns-60762mmmachineguns-2640mmgrenadelaunchersSource:Maj.ThomasC.Linn,"MAGTFCapabilitiesinanUncertainWorld,"MarineCorpsGazette,May1990,p.39.
Figure5:MEU(SOC)OrganizationAndCompositionTheMEU(SOC)iscommandedbyaColonelandisintendedtobeself-sustainingfor15days.Assuch,itisimportanttonotethattheMEU(SOC)isnotdesignedforemploymentasanindependententityinaprotractedcampaign.ItisdesignedinsteadtoserveasamobileandflexibletoolfortheCINCinconductingconventionalandselectmaritimeoperationsoflimitedduration.Inbothconventionalandspecialcapacities,theMEU(SOC)canserveasthefoundationuponwhichmoreappropriatelysizedortrainedassetscanbuild.EachMEU(SOC)isthereforedesignedandtrainedtoserveasaJointTaskForce(JTF)enabler.Additionally,theMEU(SOC)hastheabilitytoorganizewithinitselfatemporaryunitcalledtheMaritimeSpecialPurposeForce(MSPF)whichistrainedandequippedspecificallytoconductdirectactionmissionsutilizingclosequarterbattle(CQB)skills.
'TheMSPFistaskorganizedfromMEU(SOC)assetstoprovideaspecialoperationscapableforcethatcanbequicklytailoredtoaccomplishaspecificmission,andemployed80


--- Page 96 ---
eitherasacomplementtoconventionalnavaloperationsorintheexecutionofaselected
1R7maritimespecialoperationsmission."Itisperhapsmostimportanttonotethat,
accordingtoMarineCorpspolicy,"theMSPFisnotdesignedtoduplicateexistingcapabilitiesofSOF,butisintendedtofocusonoperationsinamaritimeenvironment.TheMSPFisnotcapableofoperatingindependentlyofitsparentMEU;operatinginconjunctionwiththeMEU,however,itiscapableofconductingoperationswith,orinsupportofSOF."Figure6displaystheorganizationandtypicalcompositionoftheMSPF.
CommandElement-Commander-CommDet-ITTDet-CIDet-MedSectCoveringElement-RiflePit(minusreinforced)-SEALs,PH1BR0N(asrequired)StrikeElement-ForceRecon-Security-EODDet-Photo-SEALs,PH1BR0N(asrequired)
ReconnaissanceandSurveillance(R&S)Element-STA(snipersupport)Pit-CommDet-RadBnDet-CI/ITTDet-SEALs,PHIBRON(asrequired)AviationSupportElement(missionspecific)-C2Helo-SniperHelo-TransportHelo-AttackHelo-RefuelingSupport-AirfieldConstructionSupport-StinserMissilesSource:MCO3120.9A,PolicyforMEU(SOC)
Figure6:MaritimeSpecialPurposeForce(MSPF)
"MCO3120.9A!8Ibid. .SI


--- Page 97 ---
E.TRAININGTrainingfortheMEU(SOC)isaimedatdevelopingproficiencyinbothconventionalandspecialoperations.TheoverarchingguidancefortrainingandevaluationisprovidedinMCO3120.9AandMCO3502.3,MarineExpeditionaryUnit(SpecialOperationsCapable)PredeploymentTrainingProgram[MEU(SOC)PTPJ.Therearefivecore-evaluatedeventsthatrequireevaluationforSOCdesignationthatarebrokendownasfollows:
1
.
AmphibiousoperationsAmphibiousraidLong-rangeraid(requiringForwardArmingandRefuelingPoint[FARP]operations)MechanizedBoatRaids2.Militaryoperationsotherthanwar(MOOTW)Non-combatantevacuationoperations(NEO)Securityoperations(embassy/consulate)Humanitarian/civicassistance3
.
DirectActionOperationsHastytacticalrecoveryofaircraftandpersonnel(TRAP)In-extremishostagerecovery(IHR)Navalplatformraid-Gas-oilplatform(GOPLAT)MaritimeInterdictionOperation(MIO)4.SupportingOperationsClandestinereconnaissanceandsurveillanceMasscasualtyoperationAirfieldseizure5.RapidResponsePlanningProcess(R2P2)
InordertofulfilltherequirementsforSOCcertification,predeploymenttraining
isbrokendownintothreephases:initial,intermediate,andfinal.EachelementwithintheMEUisrequiredtoundergospecifictrainingandevaluationthroughouteachofthephases.ThethreephasesculminateintheMEUbeingdesignatedspecialoperationscapable.


--- Page 98 ---
AsdescribedinMCOOrder3120.9A,theInitialTrainingPhasefocusesonindividualandsmall-unitskillstraining,andishighlightedbysuchtrainingcoursesasARG/MEU(SOC)StaffPlanningCourse,operationsandintelligenceseminar,andspecialskillscourses.Thespecialskillscoursesincludescoutswimmer,urbanreconnaissanceandsurveillance,urbansniper,andclosequartersbattleandsecurityelementtraining,tonameafew.TheIntermediateTrainingPhaseisdesignedto"conductcollectiveMEUleveltrainingthatbuildsonunitcapabilities.Emphasiswillbeonlivefireandnightoperationsoverextendedranges."ThistrainingishighlightedbyMSPFinteroperabilitytraining,TraininginanUrbanEnvironment(TRUE),GOPLATandMIOtraining,andMarineExpeditionaryUnitExercise(MEUEX).TheMEUEXisthefinal
exerciseintheintermediatephaseandinvolvestheentireMEU.TheFinalTrainingPhaseistheculminationofthepredeploymenttrainingcycle.
Itshighlightsincludeadvancedamphibioustraining,SupportingArmsCoordinationExercise(SACEX)andSpecialOperationsCapableExercise(SOCEX).TwospecificpointsshouldbemadewithregardtotheMEUPTP.First,theMEU/ARGstaffisinvolvedinthetrainingprocessinahands-onmanner.Throughout
allthreephases,thestaffisevaluatedonitsabilitytoconductrapidplanningandits
abilitytodemonstrateinteroperabilitywiththeAmphibiousSquadron(PHIBRON)andSpecialOperationsandJointSpecialOperationsTaskForces.ThisallowsthestafftobecomecomfortableworkingwithandemployingallelementsoftheMEU.Thisservestobreakdownanyhesitancyoruncertaintytheremaybeinemployingthespecial
189MCO3502.3,July7,1995. 83


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elementsoftheMEU.Moreover,personnelfrombothconventionalandspecialbackgroundsmantheMEU/ARGstaff.
Thesecondpointisthatemphasisisplacedoninterserviceandinteragencytrainingandcoordinationduringthepredeploymenttraining.ThisisaccomplishedprimarilythroughSituationalTrainingExercise(STX),theMEUEX,andtheFleetExercise/SpecialOperationsCapableExercise(FLEETEX/SOCEX).ParticipantsinthistrainingincludepersonnelfromtheDepartmentofState(DOS);Country/EmbassyTeamandDisasterAssistancePersonnel,theDefenseIntelligenceAgency(DIA),theCentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA),SpecialOperationsForces(SOF),andNon-GovernmentalOrganizations(NGOs).190
SpecialOperationstrainingisprovidedandevaluatedbytheMarineExpeditionaryForce(MEF)SpecialOperationsTrainingGroup(SOTG).ThemissionoftheSOTGis"toprovidetraininginspecialoperationsandwarfareindiverseenvironmentsfortheMEF,"191whichisaccomplishedthroughthefollowingtasks:
1.Conductspecialoperationstraining,exercises,andevaluationinsupportoftheMEU(SOC)trainingprogram.2.ProvidedresidentexpertiseinspecialoperationstotheMEFcommanderandinterfacewithspecialoperationsforces,asdirected.3.Maintainthecapabilitytoprovidetraininginarctic,desert,mountain,andurbanenvironments,asrequired.4.ProvidespecialoperationstrainedpersonneltothesupportedunifiedCommander-in-Chief(CINC),asdirected.5.Testandevaluatespecialoperationsdoctrine,equipment,andweaponsasdirectedbyhigherheadquarters.6.MaintainacadreofqualifiedinstructorscapableofinstructinganddevelopingspecialskillsinstructionoftheMEU(SOC)trainingprogram.192
190Ibid.191TableofOrganizationforSpecialOperationsTrainingGroup,IMarineExpeditionaryCommandElement,M\19,1995.192Ibid. 84


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F.MEU(SOC)CAPABILITIESThecapabilitiesofaMEU(SOC)aredividedintothecategoriesofAmphibiousOperations,DirectActionOperations,MilitaryOperationsOtherThanWar(MOOTW),andSupportingOperations.Figure7listsMEU(SOC)capabilitiesasoutlinedinMarineCorpsOrder(MCO)3120.9A.AMPHIBIOUSOPERATIONS-Assault-Raid-Demonstration-WithdrawalDIRECTACTION-InExtremisHostageRescue(IHR)-GasandOilPlatformSeizure(GOPLAT)-SpecializedDemolitionOperations-TRAP-Seizure/RecoveryofSelectedPersonnelorMaterial-CounterproliferationofWMD-VesselBoardingSearchandSeizure(VBSS)
MOOTW-Peacekeeping-PeaceEnforcement-Joint/CombinedTraining/InstructionTeam-HumanitarianAssistance/DisasterRelief-SecurityOperations-NEO-ReinforcementOperationsSupportingOperations-TacticalDeceptionOperations-InitialTerminalGuidance(ITG)-SIGINT/EW-MOUT-R&S-FireSupportPlanning,Coordination,ControlinaJoint/CombinedEnvironment-CI-Airfield/PortSeizure-EAFOperations-ShowofForceOperations-JTFEnablingOperations-SnipingOperations
Figure7:MEU(SOC)Capabilities
Oftheabovecapabilities,thefollowingarethosewhicharespecificallyintendedforassignmenttotheMSPF:
1
.
ReconnaissanceandSurveillance2.Specializeddemolitions3.In-extremishostagerecovery4.Seizure/recoveryofoffshoreenergyfacilities5.Seizure/recoveryofselectedpersonnelandmaterial6.Visit,board,searchandseizureoperations
85


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7.Tacticalrecoveryofaircraftandpersonnel193
G.MEU(SOC)LIMITATIONSThelimitationsoftheMEU(SOC)areoutlinedinMCO3120.9A.TheMEU(SOC)hasalimited:
1
.
Defensivecapabilityagainstarmored/motorizedunitsinopenterrain.2.Defensivecapabilityagainstasustainedlow-levelairattackwhenoperatingindependentofnavalairsupport.3.Capabilitytoreplacecombatlossesandretrainifearlyintroductionoffollow-onforcesisnotcontemplated.4.Capabilitytoparticipateinspecialwarfaretasksrequiringmobiletrainingteamsinnation-buildingefforts.However,theMEU(SOC)canprovidesomeentryleveland/orreinforcementtraining.5.AbilitytoestablishaMEUHeadquartersashore,andoperateindependentofnavalshipping.TheMEU(SOC)isheavilyreliantuponshipboardfacilitiesforC4Iandaviationmaintenancesupport.194
H.REDUNDANCIESWITHSOF:REALORPERCEIVEDTheissueofredundancybetweenSOFandtheMarinesisoftendebated.TheMarineCorpspositionwithregardtothismatteristhatallMarineCorpseffortswithinthespecialoperationsrealmarecomplementary,ratherthanduplicative.Moreover,theyaregearedmore"inland"thanareNavalSpecialWarfareassets.SpecificitemsthatareoftenthecausefordebateincludetrainingforIHR,trainingforairborneandsubsurfaceentry,andGOPLAT/MIO.ThepointmadebynumerousMarineCorpsofficersinaddressingthisdebatecentersontwopoints.First,theMarineCorps'effortsinspecialoperationsaredesignedtobeconductedinextremesituations.Thatis,situationsinwhichSOFmaybemoreappropriate,butunavailable.Second,theyaredesignedtobeconductedinconcertwithNavalSpecialWarfareelements.Forinstance,GOPLAT/MIOoperationsaretypicallyplannedforSEALstoapproachtheplatformfromthewaterand
,93MCO3120.9A86


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theMarinestoapproachfromtheair.Thistop-down/bottom-upapproachallowsforcompletecoverageoftheplatform.Whileredundanciesmayexist,MarineCorpseffortsintherealmofspecialoperationsservetoenhancetheirperformanceasahybridforce.Lackingthesecapabilities,theMarineCorpswouldbecomeastrictlyconventionalforce,andconsequentlyitscapabilitytoperformintherealmofhybridwarfare,inwhichtheyhavehistoricallyprovensosuccessful,wouldsuffer.
Theimportanceofinteroperability,alongwithconclusionsandassessments,followinthenextchapter.
,94MCO3120.9A.87


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VI.ASSESSMENTSANDCONCLUSIONSA.CASESTUDYANALYSISANDRELEVANCEThethreecasesexaminedinthisstudyhaveprovidedclearhistoricalevidenceofthevalueofahybridforce.IncomparingthesuccessoftheMarineCorpshybridapproachtounilateralconventionalandspecialapproaches,itwasseenthattheMarinehybridforceenjoyedthegreatestsuccessineachconflict.Thereasonsforthisarethreefold.
First,theMarineCorps,beingarelativelysmallorganization,possessestheabilitytomoveeasilythroughouttherealmofhybridoperations.Hybridwarfareoccursacrossacontinuum,varyingindegreesofconventionalorunconventionalcharacteristics.Inordertoremainincontrolofaconflictthroughoutthechangesinherentinthehybridrealm,theengagedforcemustpossesstheflexibilitytoadaptasrequired.ThesizeoftheMarineCorpspermitssuchflexibilitywithoutrequiringmajorchangesindoctrineortraining.Conventionalorspecialforcesarenotdesignedfor,noraretheycapableof,
suchflexibility.
Second,inpossessingsuchwidecapabilitiesunderonebureaucraticumbrella,theMarinesarenotaschallengedbytheparochialdisagreementsthathaveatendencytoemergebetweenconventionalandspecialunitcommanderswhendevelopingstrategyforhybridconflicts.Forexample,itseemscertainthatGeneralScottwouldneverhaveemployedColonelHarney'sforcesinthemannerthatHarneydid,andhadHarneybeenunderScott'sdirectcontrol,hewouldhavebeendiscouragedfrompursuinghis
89


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unconventionalapproachtodefeatingtheSeminoles.Similarly,instancescanbeidentifiedduringWorldWarIIandVietnaminwhichdebatesragedoverhowtodefeattheenemy,withconventionalandspecialassetsdefendingtheirmeansofapproachasbeingthebest.WithintheMarineCorps,suchparochialism,whileitexists(asseenintheinitialmisuseofReconinVietnam),haslessofatendencytooccur,andwhenitdoesoccuritdoessoinalessdamagingmanner.Thispointisstillvalidtoday.ThefundamentalreasonforthisisthattheMarinesareveryculturallyorientedand,as"everyMarineisarifleman,"aremuchlesscriticalofthedifferingelementsthatcomprisethehybridforce.Third,theMarineCorpsenjoyedthegreatestsuccessinthesethreecasesduetotheirsuccessfuleffortstoadapttosituationaldemands.Priortoeachoftheseconflicts,MarineCorpsleadersmadeaconsciousdecisiontoadapttheCorpstomeettheanticipatedthreat.
IntheSeminolecase,thedecisiontoemploytheMarinesforservicewiththeArmywasmadebyCommandantHendersoninordertodemonstratethevalueoftheMarineCorps.Untilthistime,theMarineshadbeenlargelyemployedasships'guards,althoughtheWarof1812hadservedasanopportunitytoshowcasetheMarinesCorps'fightingability.Hendersonrecognizedthat,toremainrelevant,theMarineCorpsmustcontinuetoproveitsworthinbattle,evenifitmeantservingwiththearmyinapredominantlygroundcampaign.195
PriortoWorldWarII,theMarineCorpsspenttwodecadesdevelopingtheamphibiousdoctrinethatwoulddefeatJapaninthePacificWar.TheMarinesaccepted
195Millett,pp.70-72. 90


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thischallengeinlightoftheArmy'srejectionofeffortstodevelopamphibiousdoctrine.TheArmy'soutlookonamphibiousoperationswasnegative,largelyshapedbytheBritishdebacleatGallipoli.ConsequentlyArmyleaderschosetopursuethedevelopmentofotherstrategies.IntheyearspriortoVietnam,theMarineCorpswoulddevelopdoctrinallyintheareasofverticalassaultandtheestablishmentofdeepreconnaissanceunits.Theirefforts
ineachoftheseareasplayedavitalroleinthesuccessesthatwereachievedinVietnam.Furthermore,theirpersistentmaintenanceoftheCAPprogram,despiteconventionalarmyobjections,provedtobevaluableinestablishingcontrolofnumerousvillagesduringtheearlyyearsofthewar.B.REMAININGRELEVANTAftertheVietnamWar,theMarineCorpscontinueditsquesttoremainrelevant.Inthelatterhalfofthe1970s,theuncertainfutureforMarineCorpsparticipationinconflictpromptedtheBrookingsInstitution'sstudy,WhereDoestheMarineCorpsGofromHere?}96Thestudycontendedthatthe"thegoldenageofamphibiouswarfareis
nowthedomainofhistorians,andtheMarineCorpsnolongerneedsauniquemissiontojustifyitsexistence."19?RecommendedproposalsforfutureMarineCorpsemploymentincluded:replacingArmyassetsinAsiaexclusivelywithMarineCorpsunits;reducingthesizeoftheMarineCorpsandmaintainingamphibiouswarfareasitssolemission;replacingthe82ndAirborneDivisionastheUSgroundquick-reactionforce;or
196MartinBinkinandJeffreyRecord,WheredoestheMarineCorpsGoFromHere?,Washington,DC:TheBrookingsInstitution,1976.197Ibid.,p.88. 91


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redirectingtheirfocustowardjoiningtheArmyinEurope.Whileafewoftheseideasprovidedforinterestingdebate,noneofthemhadachancetomaterializeduetothedemandforadevelopmentofspecialoperationscapabilities,withinalltheservices,followingthefailedIranianhostagerescueattemptandotherdifficultiesexperiencedduringtheearly1980s.Asdiscussedpreviously,theMEU(SOC)conceptwastheresultofaMarineCorpsstudyconductedinresponsetoexecutivedirection.Sinceits
inception,theMEU(SOC)hasbecomethecornerstoneuponwhichAmericanlittoral
strategiesrest.
Ifnothingelseistakenfromthecasestudies,letitbethis:theMarineCorpshasdemonstratedanhistoricaltendencytoevolvetoremainrelevant,anditcanbeassuredthattheMarineswillcontinuetodosointhefuture.Theirabilitytoevolveasnecessary
isenhancedbytheverycharacteristicsthatmakethemasuccessfulhybridforce:theirrelativelysmallsize,andtheirbureaucraticindependence.TheimplicationofthisforUSSOCOMandtheNavalSpecialWarfareCommand(NAVSPECWARCOM)isthat,
shouldtheMarineCorpsfeelthatagreatershiftintothespecialoperationsarenais
necessarytoremainrelevant,thenthatiswhatwillbedone.Iftheirrelevanceeverhingesuponsuchatransition,itiscertainthatnecessarydoctrinalandorganizationalchangeswillbemadedespitewhoisfillingtheroleatthetime.Assuch,itwouldbehooveUSSOCOM,NAVSPECWARCOMandtheMarineCorpstodevelopbetterrelationshipsaimedatsupportinginteroperabilityissuesandcommonconcerns.
198Ibid.,pp.66-* 92


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C.MARINECORPSLIMITATIONSHavingdescribedthecapabilitiesoftheMEU(SOC)inthepreviouschapter,I
shouldalsonowaddressthelimitationsoftheMarineCorpshybridmodel.TheselimitationswillbeaddressedintermsoftheMEU(SOC),asthiswillusuallybethefirst
Marineforceonthesceneinacrisis.Itmustberecognized,however,thattheessenceoftheMarineCorps'hybridcharacterlieswithintheMAGTFconceptingeneral.Assuch,thelimitationsoftheMEU(SOC)donotnecessarilyextendtolargerMAGTFs.Withregardtotheconventionalrealm,theMEU(SOC)islimitedpredominantlybythefactorsoftimeandstrength.TheMEU(SOC),onceontheground,islimitedtoapproximately15daysofoperations.Whilethislimitationcanbeextended,basedonlogisticalsupportandthenatureoftheoperation,itservesasagoodguidelineforemployingtheforce.Intermsofstrength,theMEU(SOC)ismanned,ontheaverage,by2000Marinesandsailors.Again,dependingonthemissionandduration,thisstrengthmaybealimitingfactorinthedecisiontoemploytheMEU(SOC).ThelimitationsoftheMarineswithregardtospecialoperationsarelargelyself-
induced.RecognizingthevalueoftheSEALsinconductingspecialoperations,theMarinesdonotseektoduplicateSEALefforts,butinsteadcomplementtheirabilities
throughtheperformanceofspecificmaritimeandamphibiousspecialoperations.ThelimitationsoftheMarinesinthesemissionsinclude:theymaybeclandestine,butnotcovert,innature;theyarelimitedinmeansofinsertioncomparedtotheSEALs;andtheirtrainingislargelyfocusedaroundtheperformanceofin-extremisdirectactionmissions.Inthecourseofnumerousinterviewsconductedduringtheresearchforthisstudy,thefollowingpointswereemphasizedtimeandagain:93


--- Page 109 ---
1
.
TheMarineCorpsisnotattemptingtoestablishorpromoteitselfasaspecialforce.However,thevalueofspecialoperationsinamphibiousandlittoralwarfarehasbeenprovenrepeatedlythroughouthistory.Thedynamicnatureofamphibiouswardemandsflexibleandresponsivemeasuresthatmayincludespecialoperations.Therefore,itonlymakessensetopossessacapabilitytoperformsuchmissionsthatwouldimprovethechancesforsuccess.ThisisparticularlytrueininstanceswhereSOFforcesarenotreadilyavailablebutMarineforcesare.2.Inpursuitofspecialoperations,theMarineCorpsrecognizesthevalueoftheSEALsinsuchmissionsand,assuch,desirestheirparticipation.Anythinglessisnotsmartutilizationofavailableassets.AsmorethanoneMarineofficerstatedduringinterviews,"therecanneverbetoomanyfriendsonthebattlefield/'D.MEU(SOC)ANDSOCOMTheimportanceofestablishingandmaintainingacooperativerelationshipbetweenHeadquartersMarineCorps(HQMC)andUSSOCOMconcerningMEU(SOC)hasregrettablybeenoverlooked.Initialrelations(orlackthereof)wereperhapsinfluencedbytheMarineCorpsdecisionnottoprovidededicatedassetstoSOCOM,choosinginsteadtodeveloptheMEU(SOC).ThisdecisionwasinterpretedbymanytobeevidenceofMarineelitism,inthatitseemedtheMarineswereimplyingthattheywereequallycapableofconductingspecialoperations,andthereforeneitherrequired,nordesired,toparticipateinthenewlyestablishedSOCOM.Otherissues,includingtheuseoftheterm"SpecialOperationsCapable"bytheMarines,furtherstrainedrelationsbetweenSOFandtheMarineCorps.SOFcriticsofMEU(SOC)contendthattheiruseofthetermisinappropriate,asthecriteriaestablishedforattainingthetitleiscertifiedbytheMarinesthemselves.Furthermore,criticsalsoarguethattheuseofthetitlecanleadtoconfusionamongcivilianpolicy-makers,andleadthemtoequatetheMarineswithSOFduetotheirignoranceofthedefinitionaldifferencebetweenthetwo.TheseissuesmerelyscratchthesurfaceofthemisunderstandingsthatexistbetweentheMarineCorps94


--- Page 110 ---
andSOF.Other,moreinvolved,issuesinclude:trainingandaccessionprocesses;missioncapabilitydebates;andmissionassignments,tonameafew.Inanattempttoresolvetheseissues,aMemorandumofAgreement,signedin
1993,established"aUSSOCOM/MCBoarddesignedto'adviseandmakerecommendationstoUSCINCSOCandtheCommandantoftheMarineCorpsonpolicies,concepts,andissueswhishmaybebeneficialtoboth\,,19STheBoardprovidedavaluableforumforaddressingcommonconcerns,andledtobeneficialtrainingforboth
sides.JointtrainingculminatedinaCrisisInterventionandResponseExercise(CIREX)inwhichbothMarineandSOCOMassetsparticipated.WhiletheBoardenjoyedinitial
success,ameetinghasnotbeenheldinovertwoyears.Furthermore,effortstoreestablishtheBoardhavebeendeemedunnecessary.ThecurrentrelationshipbetweenSOCOMandHQMCisunfortunate.ItdoesnotbenefitSOCOMtotreattheMarineCorpsastheywouldanyotherservice,mainlybecausetheMarineCorpsisnotlikeanyotherservice.SOCOMmaintainscontrolovertheotherservicesspecialoperationsorganizations,employment,andcapabilities.TheMarineCorps,however,throughitsMEU(SOC)program,hascontinuallyexpandedits
rolesandmissionsintothespecialoperationsrealm.ThiscanserveasaddedvaluetocertainSOCOMmissions,andservetoenhancetherelationshipbetweentheSEALsandMarines.Furthermore,theARG/MEUservesasaJointTaskForce(JTF)enabler,andassuchmaybeinvolvedintheestablishmentofaJointSpecialOperationsTaskForce(JSOTF).Itonlyseemsreasonablethatbettereffortsataddressingsuchissuesinaregularandneutralforumwouldprovideforbetterexecutionduringrealworldcrises.
95


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E.MEU(SOC)ANDNAVSPECWARCOMOfgreaterconcernistherelationshipbetweentheMarinesandNAVSPECWARCOM.Issuesconcerninginteroperability,training,redundancy,commandandcontrol,andemploymenthaveplaguedthetwopartiesforyears.Thedesireforinteroperabilitywouldseemobvious.Eachorganizationhastraditionallybeeninvolvedinmaritimespecialoperationsandwillremainsointhe
future.Moreover,interoperabilityeffortscanonlyenhancethecapabilitiesthateachunitpossesses.WhilecertainredundanciesdoexistbetweenSEALsandMarineelementsoftheMSPF,theseredundanciesaredesignedtobecomplementary,notduplicative.ThetypicalsizeoftheSEALunitembarkedinanARGisaplatoon.Aunitofthissizemaybeoptimalforcertainspecialoperations,particularlycovertoperations.However,inlargerscaledirectactionoperations,aplatoonmaybenotbesufficient,ormayrequiregreaterfirepower.MarineelementsoftheMSPFcanfillthisrequirement,therebyenhancingthecapabilityoftheSEALs.ItisforthisreasonthatissuesregardingMarineCorps-SEALinteroperabilityissuesmustbeaddressed.ProblemsstemmingfromthelackofinteroperabilityandcooperationbetweentheMEUandtheSEALshavethepotentialtohaveadetrimentalimpactontheconductofmaritimespecialoperations.ThemostdivisiveissuesbetweentheMarinesandSEALsseemtobecenteredaroundcommandandcontrol,degreeofemployment,andalackoffamiliaritywitheachother'scapabilitiesandlimitations.TheseissuescanresultinabreakdownoftrustbetweenMarineCorpsandSEALelements.Citingmoraleproblemsduetotheseissues,anumberofpeoplewithinNavalSpecialWarfarearguethatthe
199JohnM.Collins,SpecialOperationsForces:AnAssessment,Washington,DC:NationalDefense96


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SEALsshouldberemovedfromtheARCRatherthanembarkingontheARG,theSEALswouldbeforwardbasedforARGtaskingonanasneededbasis.Whilethis
proposalhasnotbeenmadedirectly,moveshaverecentlybeenmadeinthisdirection.ArecentmessageregardingSEALplatoonwork-upanddeploymentissuesfortheUSSKearsargeARG,statedthatSEALintentionswere:
1.NottoconductMEU(SOC)/NavalSpecialWarfareTaskUnit(NSWTU)interoperabilitytrainingduringtheinterdeploymenttrainingcycle(IDTC).2.NottoembarktheSEALplatoonduringpre-deploymentexercisesincludingtheMEUEX.3.NottoconductanytrainingwiththeARGduringJointTaskForceExercise(JTFEX),buttopassoperationalcontrol(OPCON)totheexerciseJointSpecialOperationsTaskForce(JSOTF).4.TorequirethatalltaskingfortheplatoonduringJTFEXberequestedpriortotheexercisebyeitherthecommanderoftheamphibiousgrouporthecommanderoftheamphibioussquadron."Additionally,themessagestatesthatwhiletheplatoonwouldbeembarkedintheARGforthedeployment,OPCONwouldbewithheldfromtheamphibioussquadroncommander,andwouldinsteadrestwiththeplatoonofficer-in-chargeassignedtothecarrierbattlegroup.Whiletacticalcontrol(TACON)wouldbepassedtothesquadroncommander,theissueofOPCONresidingwithanofficerwhomaynotbeco-locatedinthesametheater(duringtimeswhentheARGisnotco-locatedwiththe-carrier),presentsanawkward,ifnotfaulty,commandandcontrolrelationship.WhilemoveshavenotyetbeenmadetopulltheSEALsfromtheARGs,thereferencedmessageprovidesstrongevidenceforthepossibilityofsuchamoveinthefuture.TheremovalofSEALsfromtheARGwouldbedetrimentaltothecapabilitiesof
UniversityPress,1994,p.69.GRUTWOtoCOMSE97200MessagefromCOMPHIBGRUTWOtoCOMSECONDFLT,DTG241630ZOCT98.


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theARG/MEUteaminmanyways.Assuch,itisimportantthatinteroperabilityissuesbejointlyaddressedandsolvedbybothparties.
F.CONCLUSIONSTheMarineCorpshasprovenitselftobeacapablehybridforcethroughoutits
history.ThehybridnatureoftheMEU(SOC)providesregionalCINCsandJTFcommanderswithaflexibleforcepackagethatisunequalledinitscapacitytorespondtomyriadmissions.TheMEU(SOC)allowsfortheflexibilityandcapabilitytoreacteffectivelyinrapidlydeterioratingsituations.Thepotentialforahumanitarianassistancemission,forexample,todegeneratequicklyintoasituationrequiringdirectaction,ornon-combatantevacuation,isveryreal.TheMEU(SOC)enablesaCINCtorespondtosuchacrisisimmediately.ThedebatessurroundingMarineCorpsrolesandemploymentinspecialoperationsaremissingthepoint.WhiletheMarineCorpswillcontinuetodevelopthiscapabilityinordertoremainrelevant,theywillonlydosotoadegree.TheMarinespridethemselvesontheirflexibilityandabilitytoaddressissuesthroughoutthespectrumofconflict.TofocusonspecialoperationswouldactuallyservetolimittheMarineCorps'overallstrategic,operationalandtacticalutility.PerhapsthebestanalogyfortheMEU(SOC)*sroleinfutureconflictisonewhichwasofferedduringaninterviewwiththeExecutiveOfficerofthe1
1
thMEU.201HelikenedtheMEU(SOC)toaSwissarmyknifeandSOFtoascalpel.Notallspecialoperationsrequiretheuseofascalpel.Indeed,timeanddistancemaypreventthescalpelfromevenbeinganoptionforuse.In
31LtColF.Winters,USMC.1
1
thMarineExpeditionaryUnit,CampPendleton,CA,interviewbyauthor,19November1998,CampPendleton,CA.98


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suchinstances,theSwissarmyknifecaneithersolvetheproblembyitself,orstarttheincisionthatthescalpelworkswithinuponitsarrival.
Intheincreasinglyuncertainworld,whichwillbecharacterizedbyhybridthreats,thehistoricallyprovenandfuture-orientedMarinehybridmodelwillcontinuetoremainvaluableandrelevant.CooperationwithSOCOMandNAVSPECWARCOMcanonlyincreasetheviabilitvofthisforce,aswellasenhancetheirutility.
QQ


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100


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BIBLIOGRAPHYArquilla.John(ed.).FromTroytoEntebbe:SpecialOperationsinAncientandModernTimes,Lanham,MD:UniversityPressofAmerica,1996.Bemrose,John.ReminiscencesoftheSecondSeminoleWar,ed.byJohnMahon,Gainesville,FL:UniversityofFloridaPress.1966.Binkin.MartinandJeffreyRecord,WheredoestheMarineCorpsGoFromHere?,Washington,DC:TheBrookingsInstitution,1976.Bjorge.GaryJ..Merrill'sMarauders:CombinedOperationsinNorthernBurmain1944,FortLeavenworth,KS:CombatStudiesInstitute,U.S.ArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege,1996.Buker,GeorgeE.,SwampSailors:RiverineWarfareintheEverglades,1835-1842,Gainesville:TheUniversityPressesofFlorida.1975.Cable,LarryE.,ConflictofMyths:TheDevelopmentofAmericanCounterinsurgencyDoctrineandtheVietnamWar,NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress,1986.Chapin,CaptainJohnC,TopoftheLadder:MarineOperationsintheNorthernSolomonIslands,Washington,DC:MarineCorpsHistoricalCenter,1997.Cohen,EliotA.,CommandosandPoliticians:EliteMilitaryUnitsinModernDemocracies,HarvardCenterforInternationalAffairs,1978.Collins,JohnM.,SpecialOperationsForces:AnAssessment,Washington,DC:NationalDefenseUniversityPress,1994.Damm.Jr.,LtColRaymondC,"TheCombinedActionProgram:AToolfortheFuture,"MarineCorpsGazette,October1998.Davidson,Lt.Gen.PhillipB.,USA(Ret.),VietnamatWar:TheHistory,1946-1975,Novato.CA:PresidioPress,1988.Freitas,MarkandBraddockW.Treadway,StygianMyth:RiverineOperationsAgainsttheGuerrilla,MastersThesis,NavalPostgraduateSchool,December1994.Giap.GeneralVoNguyen,HowWeWontheWar,Philadelphia:RECONPublications,1976.Hayden,LtColH.T.,(ed.),ShadowWar:SpecialOperationsandLowIntensityConflict,Vista,CA:PacificAeroPress,1992.
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Hoffman,JonT.,OnceaLegend:"RedMike"EdsonoftheMarineRaiders,Novato,CA:Presidio.1994.
Isely,JeterA.andPhilipA.Crowl,TheU.S.MarinesandAmphibiousWar:ItsTheory,andItsPracticeinthePacific.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1951.JointPub1-02,"DepartmentofDefenseDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms,"1December1989.Kershaw.CaptainMichaelM.,TheIntegrationofSpecialOperationsandGeneralPurposeForces,MastersThesis,NavalPostgraduateSchool,December1994.Krepinevich.Jr.,AndrewF.,TheArmyandVietnam,Baltimore:TheJohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1986.Ladd,James,CommandosandRangersofWorldWarII,Trowbridge,GreatBritain:DavidandCharlesPublishers,1989.Lanning,MichaelLeeandRayWilliamStubbe.InsideForceRecon:ReconMarinesinVietnam,NewYork:IvyBooks,1989.Laumer,Frank,Massacre!,Gainesville,FL:UniversityofFloridaPress,1968.Linn.MajThomasC,"MAGTFOperationsinanUncertainWorld,"MarineCorpsGazette,May1990.Mahon,JohnK.,HistoryoftheSecondSeminoleWar,Gainesville,FL:Universityof-FloridaPress,1967.MarineCorpsOrder(MCO)3120.9A,"PolicyforMarineExpeditionaryUnit(SpecialOperationsCapable)[MEU(SOC)],"Nov24,1997.MarineCorpsOrder(MCOJ3502.3,"MarineExpeditionaryUnit(SpecialOperationsCapable)PredeploymentTrainingProgram[MEU(SOC)PTP],"July7,1995.Millett,AllanR.,SemperFidelis:TheHistoryoftheUnitedStatesMarineCorps,NewYork:TheFreePress,1991.Nadel.JoelwithJ.R.Wright,SpecialMenandSpecialMissions:InsideAmericanSpecialOperationsForces1945tothePresent,London:GreenhillBooks,1994.Neillands,Robin,IntheCombatZone:SpecialForcessince1945,NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress,1998.Paret,Peter(ed.),MakersofModernStrategy:FrpmMachiavellitotheNuclearAge,Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1986.102


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ReportofExaminationofMarineCorpsSpecialOperationsEnhancements,CommandingGeneral,FleetMarineForce,Atlantic,26MAR1985.Rosen,StephenPeter,WinningtheNextWar:InnovationandtheModernMilitary,Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress.1991.Spector,RonaldH.,EagleagainsttheSun:TheAmericanWarwithJapan,NewYork:TheFreePress,1985.Toffler,AlvinandHeidi,WarandAnti-War:SurvivalattheDawnofthe21s'Century,NewYork:WarnerBooks,1993.UnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand:10nAnniversaryHistory,HQUSSOCOM,1997.Updegraph,Jr.,CharlesL.,U.S.MarineCorpsSpecialUnitsofWorldWarII,Washington,DC:HistoricalDivision,Headquarters,U.S.MarineCorps,1972.vanCreveld,Martin,TheTransformationofWar,NewYork:FreePress,1991.Warfighting,FMFM-1,Washington,DC:Headquarters,UnitedStatesMarineCorps,1989.
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INITIALDISTRIBUTIONLIST
1
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DefenseTechnicalInformationCenter.8725JohnJ.KingmanRoad,Ste0944FortBelvoir,VA^22060-6218
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thMarineExpeditionaryUnitPOBox555361CampPendleton,CA92055-5361
105


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10.LtColRobertJ.Coates,USMCCommandingOfficer
Is1ForceReconnaissanceCompanyPOBox555341CampPendleton,CA92055-5341
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IMEFSpecialOperationsTrainingGroupCampPendleton,CA92055-5300
12.LtColGaryShenkel,USMCHead,CurrentOperationsBranchMCCDCQuantico.VA22134
13.LtColTomBright,USMCCommandingOfficerIs'ANGLICOCampPendleton,CA92055
14.CDRJimBrinkman,USNStrategicInitiativesGroupHeadquarters,UnitedStatesMarineCorpsWashington,DC20380
15.MajJohnStone,USMCMAGTFSpecialOperationsPolicyDivisionHeadquarters,UnitedStatesMarineCorpsWashington,DC20380
16.MajDrewWatson,USMCCoalitionandSpecialWarfareDivisionMCCDCQuantico.VA22134
17.CDRArgo,USNNavalSpecialWarfareCommandNABCoronadoSanDiego,CA92155
18.USSOCOM/SOOP-SF..Attn:MajScottMoore
' ,TampaPointBlvdMcDillAFB,FL33608
19.LTCRobertE.Gillespie,USA(ret)3912IndiaCoveGulfBreeze,FL32561106


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20.LTRobertG.Walker,USN 1692SouthStNewburgh,NY1255021.Library 1ArmyWarCollegeCarlisleBarracks,PA1701322.Library 1NavalWarCollegeNewport,RI0284023.StrategicStudiesGroup(SSG) 1NavalWarCollegeNewport,RI0284024.DepartmentofMilitaryStrategy 1NationalWarCollege(NWMS)FtLeslieJ.McNairWashington,DC20319-611
1
25.USArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege 1ATTN:LibraryFtLeavenworth,KS66027-690026.Library 1AirWarCollegeMaxwellAFB,AL36112-642827.Library 1MarineCorpsUniversityQuantico,VA2213428.USMilitaryAcademy '. 1ATTN:LibraryWestPoint,NY1099629.USNavalAcademy 1ATTN:LibraryAnnapolis,MD2141230.MaraquatMemorialLibrary 1USArmyJohnF.KennedySpecialWarfareCenterRm.C287,Bldg3915FtBragg,NC28307-5000
107


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31.USSpecialOperationsCommandATTN:CommandHistorianMcDillAFB,FL33608-6001
108


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