--- Page 1 --- 8 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2019 Ideas & Issues (spec Ial Operat IOns ) Imperative to Change The success Raiders enjoy today is the result of groundbreaking work by those who created MARSOC and the hard-won successes of the organization’s first decade. During this same period, adversaries and competitors have made investments and advances to close the gap with the United States and posi- tion themselves to blunt or avoid U.S. strengths. The indicators and warnings that we face more capable opponents are visible now. We must adapt to meet the associated challenges to come. The evolution of warfare is a long history of technological, social, eco- nomic, and political change converg- ing to form the character of conflict. Successful militaries recognize and em- brace these changes, while those that do not risk failure. The future operating environment will challenge MARSOC in the same way that warfare has chal- lenged militaries throughout history. However, the current pace of change is accelerating exponentially. The inter- play of technological innovation, global demographic shifts, challenges to the post WWII world order, and the rise of both state and non-state powers portend a future operating environment that is increasingly uncertain, volatile, and complex. The degree to which MAR- SOC will contribute to our nation’s fu- ture defense will depend on its ability to recognize and adapt to the challenges of the future operating environment. A Legacy of Innovation Our Marine heritage is one of em- bracing concepts to advance the art of warfighting. The Culebra Island am- phibious operations experiments which forged the concepts critical to successful landings in WW II and our pioneer- ing embrace of the experimental heli- copter in the Korean War are but two examples. The determination to make long range, tiltrotor aviation a reality is another case that illustrates the Marine tradition of embracing concepts early and using them to create an operational advantage. At the same time, special operations forces also have a well-established his- tory of innovation. The very reason for SOF’s existence has been to provide a capability not resident in the conven- tional forces. Generally, tactics and equipment used successfully by SOF transition to the broader force, ulti- mately making the whole of the force more capable. Looking back at our own historical experience as Marines, we see examples of SOF ‘innovation’ migrat- ing to conventional forces at least as far back as the Interwar period. Our own Evan Carlson developed a ‘fire team’ concept based on his experience in China in the 1930s that he applied to the Raider battalions and the Ma- rine Corps later adopted for its infantry units in World War II. Concurrently, the entrepreneurial approach of the OSS laid the groundwork for a wide variety of contemporary special operations and activities. Even now, contempo- rary advances which have made SOF so effective, networked, and lethal are migrating to conventional forces. This legacy of innovation not only serves us well, it also backstops an im- perative to adapt and evolve at a time when our enemies are rapidly closing the technological gaps we have enjoyed over most of our professional lives. To maintain the status quo in the changing environment is to cede advantage to a wide group of threats who are actively seeking (and exploiting) gaps and seams in U.S. military capabilities. Our effort to prepare for an uncer- tain future arrives, appropriately, at the point of MARSOC’s maturation. After more than a decade of growth, develop- ment, and experience, our institutional maturity allows for the opportunity to extend our view beyond near term challenges. SOF’s achievements, and its ascendancy as a policy tool for a wide range of national security problems, provides further opportunity to build toward tomorrow’s challenges. This will require a sustained effort that continu- ally looks ahead, assesses the challenges of the future environment, and adapts capability to meet those challenges. We must approach change with the flex- ibility to expand with defense funding coupled with the resourcefulness to achieve change in a competitive fiscal environment. This window comes at a time when the Command is itself accelerating. MARSOC has now reached a level of MARSOF 2030 A strategic vision for the future by Staff, Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command “Adapt or perish, now as ever, is nature’s in- exorable imperative. ” —H. G. Wells MARSOC logo. I&IS_0119.indd 8 12/6/18 12:02 PM --- Page 2 --- www.mca-marines.org/gazette 9Marine Corps Gazette • January 2019 maturity where our regimental com- manders have led MSOCs, Raider Battalions are led by former team commanders, and many primary staff members have served previously at vari- ous levels within the organization. The Future Operating Environment Preparing the force for service in a volatile and uncertain future requires a degree of prediction about the drivers of conflict, threats, and the contexts of the environment in which our Raiders will serve. Predictions are inherently risky and imprecise. We fully acknowl- edge the inexact nature of future pro- jection. Nonetheless, some prediction is required to plan. Our view of the future is grounded in a wide survey of the thinking across the Joint force, the intelligence community, our allies, aca- demia, and nongovernmental business and technology sectors. The prevalence of certain key trends is undeniable, though the exact timing and impact of specific trends within the broader sweep of time may be debatable. Bar- ring a “Black Swan” event, we are confi- dent that our vision accommodates key features and the general context of the future operating environment. The world is changing rapidly. Fail- ing to adapt to those changes is to con- demn our forces to unacceptable risk, as our opponents innovate and new threats surface to challenge the nation. Across a wide range of megatrends, forecasts, and developing technologies, our wargam- ing and analysis consistently pointed to several key trends. These, in turn, drove conditions in the future opera- tional environment that we can view as either threats or opportunities. This vision outlines the concepts that we will harness to exploit selected opportunities and mitigate threats of concern. Among the large set of trends that will drive future conflicts, the conver- gence of two broad themes will likely shape the specific problems against which the United States will employ SOF. These two factors are Regional Competition and Instability. Regional competition describes a condition brought about by a number of trends already visible today. Those trends include, but are not limited to, competition as a result of shifting stra- tegic relationships and changes in the relative power of certain countries. In particular, the economic and military rise of China and India, increasing ri- valries in the Middle East, and Russia’s struggle to remain a world power will fuel competition in an increasingly con- nected global landscape. In some cases, regional powers will attain global reach by acquiring nuclear or advanced tech- nological armaments; a fact which will challenge U.S. freedom of action and perhaps diminish its influence with less committed partners. The foundation of current U.S. military strength may be difficult to bring to bear in scenarios where a regional adversary possesses a local advantage that precludes the uni- lateral application of airpower, ISR, or space-based communications/guidance. In certain key capability areas, com- petitors may effectively close techno- logical gaps with the U.S. military or use asymmetric strategies to blunt our strengths. This military advance will likely coincide with economic growth that fuels global expansion into areas of traditional U.S. influence and gives rise to sharp, multi-faceted competition short of open military conflict. Regional powers are likely to attempt to challenge the U.S. role in areas they increasingly view as their own. The U.S. response to these revisionist bids will, in many cases, be the employment of SOF to define the problem, achieve ends, and demonstrate resolve without unnecessarily escalating them into open conflict. In either of these scenarios, SOF will buy decision space for senior leaders to observe and orient on the problem. Meanwhile, more of the globe will find the conditions of daily life increas- ingly unstable. Explosive population growth in areas of traditionally poor governance and limited resources will fuel instability across entire regions. This will, in turn, increase the emerging patterns of migration, destabilizing ar- eas perhaps quite removed from the ini- tial crisis source. Much of the migration will be to urban areas and ever growing megacities. These key hubs will become dense, disordered ‘knots’ of competing power structures. They will comprise This maturation allows the Command to deepen our understanding and application of core competencies, while adjusting and even expanding our scope to in- clude a broader range of threats. We will use this advantage to incorporate the lessons of our first decade while aggressively preparing for the next. Regional Competition Instability Shifting Strategic Relationships Connected Consequences of Fragile & Failing States Powers Pursuing Regional Primacy Proliferated Information Technologies Regional Powers Attain Global Reach Intensifying Consequences of Population Growth & Migration Significance of Systems & Systems Integration Alternative Hubs of Authority Emerging Measure/Countermeasure Rise of Privatized Violence I&IS_0119.indd 9 12/6/18 12:02 PM --- Page 3 --- 10 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2019 Ideas & Issues (spec Ial Operat IOns ) both licit and illicit activity, exert out- sized influence on international affairs, and involve overlapping and competing interests for the United States and an array of global and regional actors. The war of ideas will not be the exclu- sive domain of nation states. Individuals and groups will rise to prominence to challenge traditional power structures and norms. Both multinational corpora- tions and powerful transportation hubs that straddle air, land, and water routes are likely to seek larger influence as is- sues bring national interest into friction with their own. As resource disparities increase and personal outlooks for success dim, an increased population of disaffected or marginalized youth, ever more connected by the internet and social media, will be ncreasingly susceptible to virtual and non-state groups promoting radical or destabi- lizing ideologies. This environment will challenge U.S. policy during the best of times, but with the addition of a regional crisis, a natural disaster, a pandemic, or internal con- flict the problem multiplies dramati- cally. Such circumstances challenge the U.S. government’s ability to respond and make the role of SOF simultane- ously more urgent and more difficult. In such an operational context spe- cial operations forces, with continued emphasis on a limited footprint, will find themselves a key participant to any U.S. response. To correctly understand the problem and act meaningfully with- out unwittingly escalating tensions will entail accepting a certain level of po- litical risk; a fact that lends weight to the application of SOF in such circum- stances. Concurrently, the complexity of a particular situation will likely re- quire a wide range of interagency and allied partners, working together, to understand and solve the underlying problems. The reality of contemporary and future challenges to the international MARSOF* will execute missions set against the context of regional competition and in- stability. As these two themes collide, howev- er, the complexity of the operating environment will increase dramati- cally. *MARSOF: Marine Special Operations Forces refers generically to the operational force. Elements of the Future Operating Environment Erosion of US military advantage • Peers/near peers close technological gaps and find asymmetric offsets; we of- ten fail to understand these asymmetries • The military instrument alone is insufficient to solve the complex problems for which it will be used • Signature management severely limits US freedom of action and maneuver Multi-polar arenas featuring sharp competition across DIME • Other instruments of power, ‘contactless action’ (Gerasimov model) are em- ployed by adversaries to achieve strategic objectives • Rising powers/non-state actors take advantage of the way in which the US con- ceptualizes war; adversaries operate below US ‘threshold’ for force Attractiveness of small footprint solutions • Mitigating risk while exploiting technological advantages of remote and reach- back capabilities Dramatic expansion of global connectedness and interactions • Trend toward transregional and multi-domain actions increases and acceler- ates ‘Tangle’ of capabilities spread across agencies/levels limiting responsiveness and efficacy • Finding an appropriate and durable solution challenges traditional US ‘means’ and modes of organization Attractiveness of Hybrid and Information Warfare as a tool for adversaries • At relatively low cost of entry, the ‘Gray Zone’ offers our adversaries a means to mitigate traditional US strengths, precisely because it operates below the norms of international response Increased complexity and uncertainty in the operating environment • Speed of change and action only increases the imperative to understand com- plex environments and inform decisions I&IS_0119.indd 10 12/6/18 12:02 PM --- Page 4 --- www.mca-marines.org/gazette 11Marine Corps Gazette • January 2019 system is such that the root causes of the problem are almost invariably non-military—as are the most effective solutions. That said, the military in- strument is frequently seen as the most capable tool of national power. Often viewed as the force of choice, SOF is ideally poised to enable the application of other instruments of national power. As conflict moves further into the in- formation and cyber spaces, MARSOF will find themselves leveraging theater, interagency, or national level tools to achieve desired outcomes. Guiding Concepts Forces that cannot thrive in chaotic, complex operating environments will find the future to be an unforgiving place. To succeed, organizations will be required to change their modes of thinking about problems, how they see themselves, and their willingness to pursue adaptations. There are opportunities on the hori- zon for our organization that are natu- ral extensions of present day strengths. Likewise, with thoughtful, focused effort and a willingness to embrace change, we can develop in ways that mitigate vulnerabilities and threats we expect to face. The results of our futures analysis provide broad implications for the force as well as options from which MAR- SOC can shape its future capability to meet the challenges of the future op- erating environment. Throughout the wargames series, four discrete concepts or ‘themes’ consistently emerged. Each theme describes a distinct aspect of a vision for MARSOC, but at the same time builds upon the others such that the four are interconnected and mutu- ally supporting. Together they provide a strong conceptual basis for a future MARSOC that evolves with the oper- ating environment to remain a capable and credible force across warfighting and Title 10 functions. Collectively, these four themes are the core pathways of innovation. MARSOF As A Connector Bringing greater and more diverse capa- bilities to bear on problems The lines between war and peace will become ever more stretched and blurred as opponents seek to exploit U.S. vulner- abilities and reorder the world to their advantage. SOF will continue to be the premier choice for policy makers seek- ing to mitigate political risk and avoid direct confrontation while providing a scalable, effective response across a range of problem sets. To compete in the future operating environment, Raider formations will need to leverage the increasing reach of national and theater level capabili- ties, particularly those within the in- MARSOF as a Connector Combined Arms for the Connected Arena The Cognitive Raider Enterprise Level Agility • Each of the pathways are individual concepts capable of standing alone; however they are interrelated and mutually supporting. • The pathways are multifaceted and represent a range of ideas; many of the possibilities are as yet undiscovered. • These concepts represent the ‘what’; conceptual visions which can provide MARSOC distinct value in the future operating environment. • None of the innovation pathways are necessarily ‘endstate’ oriented as much as they each create a broad field of opportunity. • The ‘how’ will be a greater challenge. Implementing these concepts to achieve concrete capabilities will require time, effort, resources, and flexibility. • We must recognize the connection between these concepts and programmatics. This will require leveraging both USMC and USSOCOM capability development mechanisms. I&IS_0119.indd 11 12/6/18 2:20 PM --- Page 5 --- 12 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2019 Ideas & Issues (spec Ial Operat IOns ) formation space. MARSOC’s facility in building cohesive, task organized teams provides us the opportunity to develop into the ideal integrator and synchronizer of U.S. global capabilities with USSOF and partner nation ac- tions. This concept aims to extend the idea of integration beyond traditional battlefield functions like ISR, Fires, In- formation Operations, and Electronic Warfare. MARSOC seeks to leverage its command and control architecture to provide a foundation from which U.S. and coalition actors and capabili- ties can be brought to bear on problems whose solutions require the synergy of military and non-military instruments. As competitors and adversaries refine approaches within what we today call ‘Hybrid Warfare’, the challenges will routinely defy strictly military responses while requiring the expertise of players from across the government. Nonethe- less, the nation will continue to gravitate to the Department of Defense. Within the military, SOF will be viewed as the tool to organize/coalesce whole of gov- ernment approaches to difficult, com- plex problems. MARSOC’s strength in task organizing and integrating across functional capabilities will provide a natural foundation on which to inte- grate and enhance theater, national, and interagency capabilities at every echelon. Our emphasis on relationships and mission command naturally posi- tions our forces to be the connector, synchronizer, enabler, and integrator, particularly in cases where interagency or foreign partners possess limited com- mand and control capability. Facility in matching and coordinating military and non-military instruments against multi-faceted, complex problems will provide MARSOC with a truly unique capability to produce valuable opera- tional and strategic level effects in areas that currently stymie DoD. Integrating tactical, theater, and na- tional capabilities with a relatively small ‘boots on the ground’ presence, as well as providing a venue for coordinating interagency actions, holds the potential to provide the nation with a unique set of capabilities. This concept comes with significant challenges. It will re- quire an ambitious effort to change current authorities and permissions. It will also require a long term effort to build the interagency relationships, understanding, and trust that must necessarily underpin such a concept. Lastly, it will require investments in select regions to cultivate the required partner relationships above the tactical level. Although this concept has inherent challenges, it builds on MARSOC’s existing strength in command and control. Raider formations can become preferred partners; the ‘glue’ that binds wide ranging capabilities and disparate entities to achieve meaningful effects. Combined Arms for the Connected Arena Intertwining Information, Intelligence, and Cyber Populations across the globe are increasingly connected in ways which have more and more meaning with each passing year. These connections will shape features of everyday life in both positive and disruptive ways; bringing rapid development and social change to some regions while bringing turmoil and upheaval to others. To operate in this connected landscape, our Raiders must discard old thinking that com- partmentalizes information and cyber as distant supporting efforts to physical operations. A wide range of state, group, and individual actors will be engaged in a continuous tug of war in the in- formation space, while others actively monitor the activity in this domain to inform operations and activities. The significance of the information environment, to include its physical, virtual, and informational components, is an enduring feature of conflict. Ul- timately, the consequences of the in- formation environment relate to how it affects the cognition (perceptions, beliefs, decisions, etc.) of its relevant ac- tors. Our units must be able to thought- fully combine intelligence, information, and cyber operations to affect opponent decision making, influence diverse au- diences, and counter false narratives. Furthermore, we must be able to syn- chronize operations, activities, and ac- tions in the information environment with those across operational domains and, when necessary, fuse cognitive and lethal effects. Given current trends, ef- fects in the information environment will become increasingly decisive across the conflict continuum. In the ever more contested and dis- ordered world of tomorrow, a key SOF requirement will be to both ‘sense’ and ‘make sense of’ what is happening in diverse and multi-dimensional environ- SOF will be viewed as the tool to organize/coalesce whole of government approaches to dif- ficult, complex problems. (Photo provided by MARSOC.) I&IS_0119.indd 12 12/6/18 2:21 PM --- Page 6 --- www.mca-marines.org/gazette 13Marine Corps Gazette • January 2019 ments. Building understanding of these environments across interconnected domains will increase MARSOC’s re- quirements for collection and analysis. Tactical leaders at all levels must better understand intelligence capabilities and applications to achieve a higher level of operations-intelligence integration. This integration will capitalize upon the relationship between special operations and intelligence activities, while the lines between the two increasingly blur. In this arena of competition that spans the virtual and physical spheres, Raider formations will be the ideal choice to map and understand the ‘sys- tem’ as well as the myriad networks in play. The future operating environ- ment will almost certainly comprise an overlapping array of licit and illicit net- works, simultaneous areas of coopera- tion and conflict among regional actors, and a clash of old and new paradigms. The sharpening tension between tradi- tional groups and individual empower- ment will play out in both the digital and physical domains. Understanding this new landscape will be critically important to leadership at every level. To compete within that space MAR- SOC must have the necessary tools, training, and expertise. The ability to deliberately counter threat narratives and proactively influence diverse audi- ences will be a critical capability for our units. Building awareness and acting across the information environment requires deliberate effort that will challenge cur- rent roles, missions, and authorities. Where our Raiders identify operational requirements that we lack the ability to fulfill, we must have the means to connect to responsive capabilities from the Joint force or interagency. Raider formations will increasingly operate in the information environment and integrate those operations across physi- cal domains. This demands our units view information and cyber tools as foundational, not just complementary, and develop facility in combining them as naturally as we combine direct and indirect fires today. To achieve this we must change the manning, training, and equipping of our force. The creation of an enhanced combat development capability is one of the more impor- tant aspects of achieving MARSOC’s goals for the future. Capabilities held at higher levels today may be accessed (with effort) in the near term, routinely incorporated into operations in the mid- term, and perhaps become habitually associated or organic over the long term. As larger swaths of the world connect to the digital sphere and ‘the internet of things’ becomes increasingly pervasive, Raider formations must glean mean- ing from an exponentially growing set of inputs and ambient ‘noise’. Forward deployed Raiders will need the means to reach back to larger processing and analytic resources in order to inform decisions and shape operations. Fully realized intelligence tools will connect tactical, theater, and national collec- tions and databases to enable opera- tional understanding across the human, information, and cyber domains. This understanding will provide the analyti- cal basis for adaptive approaches and actions to achieve precise effects across a range of environments and problem sets. The Cognitive Raider Infer, Inform, Influence & Fight; Enhanc- ing Skills for 2030 Sharp regional competition by adversaries with the ability to miti- gate or deny traditional U.S. military strengths will increasingly drive mis- sions demanding a high degree of skill and nuance to discern the sources of the problem and develop meaningful solutions. These problems will strain current conceptions of conflict and joint phasing, thus requiring SOF capabilities that can effectively address them while minimizing open hostilities. The Raiders we send into such envi- ronments must be able to understand “This demands our units view the tools across information and cyber domains as foundation- al, not just complemen- tary, and develop facil- ity in combining them as naturally as we com- bine direct and indirect fires today. ” Forward deployed Raiders will need the means to reach back to larger processing and ana- lytic resources. (Photo provided by MARSOC.) I&IS_0119.indd 13 12/6/18 12:03 PM --- Page 7 --- 14 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2019 Ideas & Issues (spec Ial Operat IOns ) their surroundings and then adapt their approaches across an expanded range of solutions. While tough, close-in, violent actions will remain a feature of future warfare, MARSOF must increasingly integrate tactical capabilities and part- nered operations with evolving national, theater, and interagency capabilities across all operational domains, to in- clude those of information and cyber. Creating operational and strategic effects in the future operating environ- ment will require a SOF operator with an equal amount of brain to match brawn; foresight in addition to forti- tude. Raiders must be able to seamlessly integrate a wide range of complex tasks; influencing allies and partners; devel- oping an understanding of emerging problems; informing decision makers; applying national, theater, and inter- agency capabilities to problems; and fighting as adeptly in the information space as the physical. This set of com- petencies defines the ‘Cognitive Raider’ and is necessary to achieve ‘MARSOF as a Connector’ and ‘Combined Arms for the Connected Arena’. Built upon a solid foundation of continued tactical excellence, the 2030 Raider must be as comfortable working as a part of interagency or multinational effort as serving inside of a MARSOF formation. This concept will place increased emphasis on the qualities of intellect, judgment, creativity, and teamwork while maintaining attributes like determination and endurance that have been critical to our success to date. The Cognitive Raider must have the curiosity and intellect to see the whole picture and infer underlying problems, the skill to convey those layers to lead- ers, the creativity to recommend ef- fective multi-domain action, and the drive to see those actions through to completion. Future missions will place our Raid- ers in increasingly ambiguous and complex environments. There will be a requirement to understand the drivers of conflict, the nuanced interests of all actors and groups, and the cascading ramifications of actions. The average individual’s access to information and ability to wield power previously re- served for nation states advances the trend of individual empowerment. Coupled with the increasing influence of non-state and multinational groups, such trends challenge the traditional top-down approach of states and further complicate problem resolution. These trends will heighten the need for in- dividuals who can parse the disparate elements of a problem set and deliver meaningful action. The ‘Cognitive Raider’ concept ap- plies to both the individual Raider and the collective cognitive capability of the team. Furthermore, the term refers to the capabilities of every Raider in MARSOC. Future missions will re- quire MARSOC to further capitalize on its collective capability, driving ever closer integration of specialized skills and blurring the distinction between op- erator and specialist. To implement this concept, MARSOC must be willing to reconsider and challenge existing force composition and structure paradigms. Some specialties may require experience and skills not resident in current billets or ranks. We must be willing to reexam- ine the full range of ‘types and stripes’ required across specialties and the degree of SOF specialization within each. Producing these Raiders will require adjustments in how we recruit, screen, assess, select, and then train our per- sonnel. We must ask ourselves hard questions about each of these areas and be willing to challenge the status quo wherever a policy or process is poorly aligned with the future requirement. The attainment of this goal will require us to reassess the individual attributes we select for and re-evaluate training and education roadmaps to ensure we possess the right mix of Raiders with the right capabilities. To retain and best employ these cognitive Raiders will require thoughtful adaptations to structure, promotion, and career path models. Though not without challenges, these changes will be necessary to Marine Raider badge. (Photo provided by MARSOC.) I&IS_0119.indd 14 12/6/18 12:04 PM --- Page 8 --- www.mca-marines.org/gazette 15Marine Corps Gazette • January 2019 generate Raiders capable of thriving in the future operating environment. This challenging mix of understand- ing, influence, and action will come to define MARSOF, and the determina- tion to succeed in high stakes challenges leveraging these attributes will be the embodiment of Spiritus Invictus. These Marines—savvy and adaptable by vir- tue of their personal attributes, focused training, and additional education— underpin the other concepts which will drive MARSOC into the future. Enterprise Level Agility MARSOC possesses the advantage of being a relatively small force with its own component headquarters. Our cohesive, focused force confers an orga- nizational agility that allows the Com- mand to rapidly reorient the organiza- tion to confront new challenges as they emerge. In other words, the unity of purpose and organizational dexterity over which MARSOC presides provides SOCOM with an agile, adaptable force to meet unexpected or rapidly changing requirements. Seen from the bottom up, forward deployed Raider echelons are able to reach directly back into a respon- sive component command headquar- ters to assist in innovating solutions for operational problems. In this context, MARSOC’s small size becomes a sig- nificant strength; one that can provide both organizational and operational agility to the USSOCOM Commander. The results of our wargames are in line with most of the future operating environment assessments that forecast increasing uncertainty, volatility, and complexity. Success will require SOF that is adaptable to changing environ- ments and versatile across a diverse range of challenges. An institutionally agile MARSOC provides USSOCOM with a component that can rapidly ori- ent, focus, or retool capabilities to meet emerging requirements or work a dis- crete trans-regional problem set with full spectrum SOF from onset through resolution. This tactical adaptability ad operational agility will enable MAR- SOC to contribute more meaningfully within USSOCOM and be a bid for strategic success against rapidly emerg- ing and changing threats. In realizing this vision, MARSOC will remain true to its Marine Corps val- ues and warrior ethos, while simultane- ously challenging its own organizational culture and service paradigms. Mere declarations of agility will be insuffi- cient to achieve this vision, MARSOC will have to examine processes, assess emerging requirements, and adapt capa- bilities across DOTMLPF to achieve a capability that currently resides in only one area of the SOF Enterprise. Unity of purpose and effort, as well as a shared identity as Marine Raiders, provide MARSOC with the institutional re- siliency to pursue new constructs and approaches that optimize capability, flexibility, versatility, and adaptability. This new level of agility and adaptabil- ity also requires willingness and the pro- cesses to critically assess performance, internally identify flaws, and make the necessary corrections. MARSOC may provide singular value to USSOCOM by actively striving to be its most agile, adaptable, and responsive component. Operational Vignettes Imagining the concepts in action West Africa, 2028. Marine SOF is deployed as a part of U.S. support to a struggling host government. The host country is facing increasing unrest as a result of massive migrations to its urban centers and the resultant strain on services. The region has seen uneven economic growth between the Christian tribes that control much of the economy and government and the swelling num- bers of migrant, predominantly non- Christian peoples that have moved to the urban areas seeking stability. As the population grew, these cities became the setting for the increased growth of radi- cal groups and large semi-licit criminal enterprises that have tangled interests with a variety of malign networks. MARSOC’s small size becomes a significant strength. (Photo provided by MARSOC.) “In this context, MAR- SOC’s small size be- comes a significant strength; one that can provide both organiza- tional and operational agility to the USSOCOM Commander. “ I&IS_0119.indd 15 12/6/18 12:04 PM --- Page 9 --- 16 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2019 Ideas & Issues (spec Ial Operat IOns ) Raider Team House, near the part- ner military’s elite commando base. “Top, Check this out.” An analy- sis had just come back from stateside that used data analytics to cross ref- erence digital interactions across five popular local social applications and cellular calls with human intelligence the team had gathered. The team had taken the linkages the analysis suggest- ed and crossreferenced the names with the FBI and DEA reps also working out of the American embassy. Master Sergeant Thomason looked over the results. He had sensed that conditions on the ground inside of the country’s sprawling capital city were worsening and this paper confirmed that hunch. Thomason thought about the results and how best to share the relevant data with his interagency partners; he needed to notify them as soon as possible, but the message had to be thought- fully presented to discourage a potential overreaction. The partnered host nation military leaders also needed access to this information as it will po- tentially alter some planned combined operations. The Master Sergeant thought about the many players with whom the team interacted across the unofficial interagency task force and was grateful for the effort that the unit had taken to build trust and shared purpose across the U.S. contingent. He had worked hard to instill in the team that their success was going to be measured by the strength of the connec- tions they could make across the U.S. stakeholders and the host government. Thomason thought it likely that he would have to speak desk side with both the Chief of Station and the Chief of Mission, as well as senior partner nation military leaders in short order. He was grateful for his experience on MAR- SOC’s first interagency internship pro- gram a few years back, not to mention lessons he had learned during several earlier West African deployments. The interagency program, in particular, had given him much greater confidence in these settings; it helped him see things from the perspective of other agencies, navigate their processes, appreciate their culture, and, above all, effectively com- municate to their decision makers. He thought about where he and the team would be now had the 0372 Roadmap not placed such emphasis on SOF edu- cation and interagency collaboration. MSOC Operations Center, Tribor- der area 1,000 miles North Major Carlson looked at the graphic his intelligence team had prepared of the developing situation. The graphic en- compassed MSgt Thomason’s location near the capital, the adjacent country, and the area in which the company’s second team was operating. The com- pany had quickly pushed information up to the Theater Special Operations Command and analysts at the company, theater, and national levels were actively collaborating in real time. Carlson’s staff then sent portions of the releasable in- formation to allied SOF in a nearby area, who responded with bits of their own intelligence which added to the overall picture. The MSOC had begun to get a sense of the developing problem in the re- gion. There was a mosaic of overlapping ethnic, religious, political, commercial, criminal, and special interests that was impossibly difficult to sort through. The company had tools and predic- tive programs to help make sense of this unfamiliar landscape, but the situ- ation was both noisy and fluid with the sheer millions of people involved and the monumental scope of the problems. The partner government would have struggled to address a situation half as complex and was simply overwhelmed by the problem confronting it. The massive migrations to the overburdened urban centers had shifted allegiances and old alliances amongst religious, eth- nic, and tribal groups while increased connection to the internet had raised expectations and fostered new griev- ances while reinvigorating old ones. In this case there were clear indications that a new, if poorly defined, threat group might be forming. It was un- clear what set of grievances or stressors might be incen- tivizing malign actions, but there were clear signals that actors from a variety of previ- ously unrelated threat groups were cooperating and swaths of the populace who had been largely pro-government were increasingly receptive to what appeared to be organized an- ti-government messages. Carlson followed his initial actions with detailed requests for intelligence support from both theater and national as- sets. He had been marginally aware of these capabilities as a young team commander, but the command had pushed aggressively to learn about and integrate them where applicable while he was still a company XO. The dividends were immediate. Over time, processes were gradually streamlined and authorities granted that helped Raiders access powerful cyber tools. They used these to track activities, as well as reach-back analyti- cal resources, to uncover patterns and overlaps between social, financial, and political opposition activity. The MSOC staff was now able to integrate these tools with enhanced systems and additional capabilities Carlson had made several West African deployments. (Image provided by MARSOC.) I&IS_0119.indd 16 12/6/18 12:04 PM --- Page 10 --- www.mca-marines.org/gazette 17Marine Corps Gazette • January 2019 the command had developed. Carlson now considered the powerful analyti- cal systems that linked his company’s inputs with an array of U.S., allied, and open source information as an integral ‘member’ of the team. The staff might jokingly call the Artificial Intelligence system ‘C3PO’, but no one could deny that its predictions and analysis had consistently proved correct and led them to a better understanding of an otherwise impregnable problem. In fact, it was ‘C3P0’ that sensed a shift in social media interactions in a certain slum and noticed communications signaling a heightened sense of tension. The AI had correlated this with patterns in a threat group’s communications which led to the prediction that a cell had moved into the slum and was planning an attack. Carlson’s Raiders had been able to cue their partnered comman- dos and accompany them to disrupt the attack and collapse what had been a particularly effective terror cell. There was concern that the urban sprawl and slums surrounding and crisscrossing the city offered an en- vironment ripe for radicalization by terror groups. Raiders had effectively contained and reduced several promi- nent terror groups, perhaps so much so that there was a change happening in real time that they were beginning to see. “XO, prep the teams. We need to sketch out some options to get ahead of this problem,” the Major said as he picked up the phone to call his boss. African commando base, three months later MSgt Thomason shuffled away from the helicopter, turning his head to avoid sand kicked up by the rotor wash. After days of debate and intense planning he and several of his Raiders had accom- panied their partner commandos on an operation that had successfully detained a key threat facilitator. The partner unit had performed well, and the operation had gone smoothly despite its location deep within an incredibly dense, chaotic slum teeming with competing factions and leaning anti-government. As the commandos flew into the city, Thoma- son’s Raiders had selectively disrupted communications in and around the target area. This had forced residents to shift to a temporary government broadcast WiFi bubble that allowed the government to pass key information and counter threat narratives that had begun to gain traction. The Raiders had used a newly developed ‘friend or foe’ scan which interrogated nearby digital devices and predicted hostile, unknown, or friendly status based upon online activity to tailor their interactions with members of the surrounding crowds during the operation. As the team flew away from the tar- get site and normal service resumed, a host of tools at the team, company, and theater level began monitoring the cyber realm for the post mission communications in the area. The sheer volume of digital traffic in the dense urban sprawl required reach back in varying degrees to tools and devices at various levels of command. These con- versations and interactions would reveal much about the local and international network that was metastasizing into a real threat group. “You good to go?” Thomason asked his ops chief. He was leading several Raiders who were assisting the com- mandos in exploiting the detainee’s electronic devices and questioning the terrorist facilitator. Thomason accom- panied the commando leadership to meet with some interagency partners and host government agency leaders to work out the combined actions the government would take next. The Marines met with their part- ners for the rest of the day, balancing the need to act decisively against the emerging threat without giving the group undue credibility and avoiding any unforced errors which would ‘pour gas’ on the flames it was attempting to fan. American military and partner agency reps were keen to address the many non-military aspects of the prob- lem and promote positive efforts and local voices. Thomason took notes and found several of these lines of effort in which his Raiders could certainly assist. There was clearly a role for his men to support and accompany the comman- dos on missions against key targets, but he sensed that his team’s efforts in the information space might be more im- portant to the long term outcome and that their intelligence tools would be absolutely vital in focusing those actions. Vignette 2 Imagining the concepts in action Middle East, 2030 . Special Opera- tions Task Force (SOTF) Operations Center, Semi-Autonomous Region of Argo ( SARA) Defense Forces Head- quarters Facility The Ops Center was a flurry of activ- ity as usual. This was the second rota- tion of U.S. forces into the area since the United States had declared support for the semiautonomous region in the Middle East. There had been a num- ber of unexpected events that converged and crystallized, leading to a sudden outpouring for independence and the cautious support of the United States President. However, the country of Zed which is the historical center of power in the region and a consistent spoiler towards American interests, viewed the Semi-Autonomous Region of Argo (SARA) as a threat. The administration had decided to keep the troop footprint as small as possible, providing behind the scenes support to the Saran govern- ment’s efforts to build credible institu- tions and protect itself from outside interference. USSOCOM, committed globally to several pressing challenges, detailed MARSOC to own the Saran problem set and maintain the rotation of special operations forces there. LtCol ‘Stretch’ Bailey, Commander of the Special Operations Task Force, had prepared his forces with a focused, tailored workup that was fortunately able to exercise new material capabilities identified and requested by the initial SOTF in addition to some unique au- thorities the command had arranged through the Theater Commander and SOCOM. Bailey’s SOTF was not only the hub for all U.S. support to the Saran defense forces but also for the interagen- cy support to Saran counterintelligence. There was an intentionally small State Department contingent in the capitol area with which the SOTF maintained an excellent relationship and integrated its efforts. Bailey had just been briefed by the OIC of the SOTF’s Cyber detachment I&IS_0119.indd 17 12/6/18 12:04 PM --- Page 11 --- 18 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2019 Ideas & Issues (spec Ial Operat IOns ) that someone (likely Zed sponsored) was attempting to tamper with the pub- lic webpage of a Saran public ministry. This had already happened six times in half as many days. On each occasion, the Raiders were the first to be aware of the intrusion and then reach out to the appropriate Saran agency to warn them and provide assistance. While these ef- forts hardly taxed the SOTF’s capabil- ity, they constituted invaluable support to the fledgling Saran government that struggled daily to create an aura of com- petence and legitimacy. Moreover, these events validated the integration of the cyber detachment into the SOTF. With each passing day, Cyber was proving to be more and more valuable, especially with the uptick in the amount of threat activity occurring in the virtual realm. Zed had incrementally escalated its campaign to sap the confidence of the local people in their new government through a combination of malign cyber activities, disinformation, and surro- gate-supported international political roadblocks. It was an open secret that Zed was actively supporting and direct- ing proxy militias that were operating in disputed zones along sections of what was a complicated tangle of overlaid borders. There were essentially three bound- aries in effect; an international one that the United States and area coali- tion governments recognized, another more expansive that the Saran govern- ment claimed, and a third claimed by the militias that encroached on the first and the second. This created a dilemma wherein Bailey’s Raiders could accom- pany Saran troops within one swath of territory but had to stop short and revert to virtual advise and assist opera- tions in areas that the United States deemed to be ‘cross-border’. In addition to the confusing border situation, an increase in the number of militia men within these areas raised the frequency of border clashes and was leading to an overall increase in the level of violence. The militia’s’ response was to acquire in- creasingly heavy weaponry and escalate each subsequent clash. Unfortunately, the Sarans had no air force of their own and a combination of U.S. policy and threat anti-aircraft and counter-UAS capabilities severely limited any U.S. aircraft from flying in the border areas. To offset the lack of traditional avia- tion and ISR, Bailey’s SOTF had direct access to a set of orbit of low earth ‘cube sat’ satellites, launched 6 months earlier to provide the SOTF 24/7 multi-sensor coverage of the battlespace. The small satellites supported the SOTF with a dedicated array of signals, thermal, FMV, tracking, and MASINT tech- nologies that provided both real time situational awareness, targeting data, and pattern analysis inputs. This small cube sat constellation complemented the SOTF’s organic collection capabilities, together they provided Bailey with the certainty he needed to act with precision in this politically high risk environment. The sensors fed into the SOTF’s ‘Wat- son’ computer that compared pattern of life and terrain recognition across months of data and quickly cued the analysts onto any anomaly. He was watching the live feed from one of the satellites now as a split team of his men accompanied a Saran patrol within the border area where the Watson had sug- gested an enemy militia was forming for a potential attack. Team 2, accompanying Saran pa- trol near the disputed border. The two Raider trucks lurched over the rough ground, kicking up dust that a tailwind was blowing forward and partially ob- scuring the collection of Saran 4x4s and old U.S. Humvees the Marines were accompanying. In the lead Raider truck GySgt Ortiz video conferenced with the SOTF and downloaded threat positions, verified through multi-spectral signals collections, to his display tablet, which would simultaneously appear on the Saran Platoon leader’s display. The gunny ended the videoconfer- ence with the SOTF and opened a new window with the Saran platoon leader. The partner lieutenant had halted his four vehicles. He explained that there was a danger area ahead about which he was concerned and asked if Ortiz could launch a scout to look ahead. Each Raider vehicle was equipped with a complement of small short range drones that it could launch and recover on the move. The scout drones provided a downlink with both day and night video fused with thermal imagery and carried a small payload to weaponize if need be. More impor- tantly, these drone were able to mark targets via a stand-off laser and provide a lasting ‘tag’, accessible to tracking and targeting sensors. The scouts buzzed forward and were quickly out of sight, flying over the broken terrain ahead. One of the drones was specifically interrogating any electronic signatures and signals emanating from the ground, gather- ing them and relaying them automati- cally through the host vehicle and back to the team and SOTF headquarters’ Watson machines for analysis. Signals consistent with military equipment were detected and one of Ortiz’ men directed the drones over to get a closer look. As the small swarm closed on the location they picked up images and signatures that provided the Gunny with a solid idea of the enemy force size and dis- position that lay ahead. Gunny Ortiz tagged what appeared to be the threat’s command vehicle and then relayed this information to a secure ‘cloud’ where it could be viewed by higher as well as his partner force. The gunny and the Saran lieutenant came up with a quick scheme of maneu- ver and briefed their small force. Saran ROE required that the platoon attempt to turn the militia away peacefully. If events escalated, they could use the force necessary to protect themselves. The vehicles resumed their road march and were met shortly thereafter by spo- radic small arms fire from a hillside. Ortiz directed the Raider trucks to offset from the Sarans and use the sta- bilized remote weapons stations on the vehicles as a base of fire. Cued by the still flying drone swarm, the Americans accurately suppressed the area while the partner force dismounted and closed on the position. Adding to the fires’ accuracy were the thermal sensors that caught the enemy muzzle flashes. The Scout drones caught the bulk of the militia withdrawing from the fight, leav- ing their wounded in place, to mount their vehicles and fall back to a nearby village. Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) Operations Center. “You I&IS_0119.indd 18 12/6/18 2:22 PM --- Page 12 --- www.mca-marines.org/gazette 19Marine Corps Gazette • January 2019 sure?” LtCol Bailey asked his intelligence officer, who nodded confidently in the affirmative. One of the digital signatures that the team was collecting from the skirmish had pinged with a national level agency as a high level Zed facilitator. This individual was responsible for a long list of attacks and was a known high value target. The Inter Agency reps in the SOTF headquarters were also posi- tive after corroborating human, open source intelligence, and intercepts that also placed him in the area. Bailey looked carefully at a 3-D in- teractive map and conferred with his Master Guns. “They’re trying to pull our guys cross border,” the Ops Chief suggested. Bailey agreed. The quick withdrawal was uncharacteristic of the militia as they still had numbers in their favor. Maybe the militia had just been caught in the middle of a movement and were now trying to protect this Zed agent, but the skirmish had occurred just on the international border, and the militia had now withdrawn to a village clearly in the cross border disputed zone. Chances were strong that the militia already had cameras and reporters on standby to record any U.S. ‘invasion’ as well as supporters prepared to relay those images far and wide. Bailey quickly conferenced Ortiz, “We want this guy, but your team needs to hold tight; you need to stay well clear of the border. Do your partners have one of the R2D2s?” The ‘R2D2’ was the slang term given to the new remote advise and assist sensor suite that re- sembled the iconic movie character. The R2D2 allowed the Raiders to see 360 degrees from the partner vehicle and bring to bear a variety of sensors as well as the collaborative displays and communications tools. “Affirm, boss. They also have a full container of the magic darts.” These darts were the containerized truck bed missiles that the partner force fired and which the Raiders would then assist with inflight terminal guidance. Once the Sarans fired the munition, using a simple touch screen interface on their map boards, Ortiz’ men could remotely ‘steer’ the weapons to their targets us- ing the scouts’ tags, specific electronic signatures, or other inputs. Just as the Zed proxies were jockeying to gain a ‘news hit’ from the engagement to support their position so were LtCol Bailey and his Saran counterparts. The SOTF stood ready to degrade social me- dia broadcasts from anti-SARA regional influencers, while quickly disseminating images and themes to link the militia violence to this agent, and by extension, Zed. This was an area into which the SOTF had invested significant time and energy–a fact that the resulting battle drill more than demonstrated. The SOTF drew from a bevy of standing thematic objectives and media/messag- ing tools aligned to engender a sym- pathetic perception of events when an incident occurred. Experience proved that it was usually possible to quickly turn imagery (live or recorded) or of- ficial accounts into ‘payloads’ to be car- ried by the regional messaging fight. Bailey could remember the Com- mand’s earlier attempts to integrate in- telligence and information operations more closely. At the time he mentally compartmented those items as occa- sional supporting efforts to missions, he chuckled to himself as he watched his HQ scrambling right now, urgently pre- paring to capitalize on the physical fight. Now, it was hard for him to imagine an operation in which intelligence, actions on the ground, and IO exploitation were not blurred into a single effort. Implementation The publication of this document constitutes guidance for where we are going in the future, with the expecta- tion that it will take the best ideas from across the Command to determine how we will get there. These concepts are critical to our growth as we take the experiences of our first decade and chart a future through broad discussion and dedicated action. We will explore these concepts with the full realization that the journey will prompt discoveries along the way as the environment changes and our initial efforts bear results. It is a long term portfolio of investments and each ef- fort within the concepts may not yield benefits on the same timeline or to the same scale. However, even less success- ful approaches within the concepts will inform developments to come and have a net positive effect on the overall course of the organization. This vision of our future will guide the allocation of resources and component time and energy. Initiatives beyond cur- rent operational requirements that do not nest within the four corners of 2030 will require careful consideration so as not to diminish our ability to make progress toward the long term goals outlined here. Our challenge will be to create a sus- tained effort that translates the concepts presented in this document into tan- gible, employable capabilities. As we add capabilities that are necessary for future conflict, we will also have to make hard decisions about just how much we can expect to do well and of which capabili- ties we should divest ourselves. Our de- cisions in this regard must be pragmatic and realistic. We can neither afford to become infatuated with fanciful ideas of future combat, nor nostalgically hold on to skills, equipment, and capabilities that have outlived their utility. The deliberate implementation has several facets. First, with the publica- tion of this strategic vision we will seek out broad perspectives throughout the Command, from the service, and from across the SOF enterprise. This broad and diverse range of opinions will strengthen our first steps. Next, the staff will incorporate ap- propriate direction and guidance within the subsequent campaign plans, capabil- “Gentlemen, we will chase perfection, and we will chase it relent- lessly, knowing all the while we can never attain it. But along the way we shall catch ex- cellence. ” —Vince Lombardi I&IS_0119.indd 19 12/6/18 12:05 PM --- Page 13 --- 20 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2019 Ideas & Issues (spec Ial Operat IOns ) ity roadmaps, and other directives to ensure all component efforts are prop- erly aligned with the long term goals outlined here. The Command will establish Inno- vation Pathways for each of the four concepts described here and begin to flesh out the ‘how’ by determining first steps and establishing near and mid- term goals. There may be overlapping solutions where the short term effort is simply a bridge to longer lead time approaches that require modifications to policy, new resourcing, or the devel- opment of capabilities. We expect that the threat environ- ment, policy backdrop, and available technologies will each continue to evolve and change as the efforts along the Innovation Pathways yield results. Therefore, our implementation must be flexible and adaptable to account for an evolving future. It is entirely pos- sible that an opportunity will present itself that we have not foreseen; one that could offer MARSOC a future richer than any we have conceived. Our will- ingness to bring in new ideas, concepts, technologies, and solutions while adapt- ing the development of capabilities with the evolution of the operating environ- ment is what will make our Innovation Pathways ‘innovative’. Change will be the norm and our internal assessments must link progress in our efforts with a continuous clear eyed view of the future operating environment. The future is filled with uncertainty, fierce competition, and threats. There will be a stark requirement for SOF that are able to adapt to a wide array of operational environments and har- ness capabilities to fight across multiple domains. Our efforts now will ensure that MARSOF are the premier forces to meet tomorrow’s challenges. MARSOF as a Connector Combined Arms for the Connected Arena The Cognitive Raider Enterprise Level Agility KEY TERMS: MARSOC: U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command is the Marine Corps’ service component to U.S. Special Operations Command. MARSOF: Marine Special Operations Forces refers generically to the operational force. CSO: Critical Skill Operators are MARSOC’s Special Operations tacticians. A Marine is designated a CSO upon selection and graduation from the Individual Training Course. SOCS: Special Operations Capability Specialists provide direct support to special operations missions. They are screened, selected, and assigned to provide unique MOS skills sets. SOCS occupational fields include intelligence, communications, explo- sive ordnance disposal, canine handlers, and joint terminal attack controllers. CSS Marines: Combat Service Support Marines are assigned to support billets throughout MARSOC and provide Special Opera- tions focused combat service support across the Command. Raider: In 2014, MARSOC officially adopted the moniker of Marine Raider, carrying the legacy of the Marine Raider Battalions of WWII forward into modern day MARSOF. Raider refers to each of the Marines and Sailors who serves within MARSOC, whether they are a CSO, SOCS, CSS Marine, Corpsman, or member of a staff. Raider patch. (Image provided by MARSOC.) I&IS_0119.indd 20 12/6/18 12:05 PM