--- Page 2 ---
Articles
08 s pecial Operations as a Warfighting Function
SOF have played and will continue to play a major role in all facets of military operations, 
and it is imperative that all military leaders and planners understand SOF’s capabilities and 
limitations. The challenges posed in recruiting, training and employing large forces that can 
operate in a manner similar to SOF are many and will not be addressed in this article.
 The 
author of this article understands that the necessity to understand special operations is in 
no way limited to the Army, but the article will address Army doctrine only, in order to ad-
dress and foster discussion on the inclusion of special operations into the Army’s warfight-
ing functions, or WfFs.
22 the Future of M is O
A review of PSYOP’s history; taking a brief look at definitions; showing  the relationships 
of PSYOP to public affairs, or PA; information operations, or IO, and public diplomacy, 
or PD; and suggesting new ways we might think about PSYOP . Although PSYOP has 
been repeatedly misunderstood and misrepresented, MISO, as a means of informing and 
influencing foreign audiences, is as relevant in peace as in war and is vital to our nation’s 
defense. This discussion is intended to create a dialogue that may generate solutions to the 
unresolved issues and serve as the beginning of a more comprehensive definition of MISO 
as a force and capability. 
DepArt Ments
04 From the c ommandant
05 Update
30 c areer notes
31 Book r eviews
January-February 2011 | Volume 24 | Issue 1
cover story
12
Defining War
The official, approved definitions 
pertaining to the missions, tasks 
and activities conducted by Army 
special-operations forces, or 
ARSOF , are clear and unambigu-
ous. They provide crisp and 
practical distillations that denote 
what ARSOF does. They provide a 
command azimuth for negotiating 
the hazards of a larger conceptual 
environment — an environment 
made more challenging by a dense 
conceptual fog.

--- Page 3 ---
Special Warfare
Special Warfare is an authorized, official bimonthly 
publication of the United States Army John F . Kennedy 
Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, N.C. Its 
mission is to promote the professional development of 
special-operations forces by providing a forum for the 
examination of established doctrine and new ideas.
Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do 
not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publica-
tion does not supersede any information presented in 
other official Army publications.
Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and 
should be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare, 
USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN 
239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax 432-6950 or 
send e-mail to steelman@soc.mil. Special Warfare 
reserves the right to edit all material.
Published works may be reprinted, except where copy-
righted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and 
the authors.
Official distribution is limited to active and reserve  
special-operations units. Individuals desiring private sub-
scriptions should forward their requests to:  
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Special Warfare is also 
available on the Internet (http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/).
By order of the Secretary of the Army:
George W. Casey Jr.
General, United States Army 
Chief of Staff
Official:
Joyce E. Morrow
Administrative Assistant to the 
Secretary of the Army
1030701
Headquarters, Department of the Army
commander & commandant
Major General Bennet S. Sacolick
editor 
Jerry D. Steelman
Associate editor
Janice Burton
Graphics & Design
Jennifer Martin
Webmaster
Dave Chace
U.S. Army John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School
sUBM issi Ons
Special Warfare welcomes submissions of scholarly, independent research from 
members of the armed forces, security policy-makers and -shapers, defense analysts, 
academic specialists and civilians from the United States and abroad.
Manuscripts should be 2,500 to 3,000 words in length. Include a cover letter. 
Submit a complete biography with author contact information (i.e., complete mailing 
address, telephone, fax, e-mail address).
Manuscripts should be submitted in plain text, double-spaced and in a digital file. 
End notes should accompany works in lieu of embedded footnotes. Please consult 
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Submit graphics, tables and charts with source references in separate files from the 
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Articles that require security clearance should be cleared by the author’s chain of 
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thor’s copyright notice. Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, 
provided credit is given to Special Warfare and the authors. 
MIss Ion: Recruit, assess, select, train and educate the U.S. Army Civil 
Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces Soldiers by providing su-
perior training and education, relevant doctrine, effective career management 
and an integrated force-development capability.
VIs Ion: As a world-class special-operations training center and school, we 
will build a well-educated and professionally trained force with the intuitive 
abilities to work through or with indigenous partner forces. We will develop 
innovative, relevant doctrine, informed by insightful future concepts, to pro-
duce an agile, adaptive force. We will ensure that our country has a full-spec-
trum special-operations force prepared to address the diverse range of threats 
posed by an uncertain 21st-century environment.
submit articles for consideration to: 
Editor, Special Warfare; 
Attn: AOJK-DTD-MP; USAJFKSWCS,  
Fort Bragg, NC 28310 
or e-mail them to steelman@soc.mil
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Contact: Special Warfare
Commercial: (910) 432-5703 
DSN: 239-5703


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Part of our vision of making the JFK Special Warfare Center and School a world-class training 
center is to develop innovative, relevant doctrine, informed by insightful future concepts. That 
part of the vision is equally as important as the skills and training that we provide, because doc-
trine drives our training. We must achieve consistency in our understanding of terms, definitions 
and functions in order for special-operations forces to perform at their full capacities within the 
Army and the Department of Defense.
In this issue of Special Warfare, Admiral Eric Olson’s introduction to Jeffrey Hasler’s article, 
“Defining War 2011, ” reminds readers of the importance of understanding doctrinal terms and 
their implications. Hasler’s article examines in depth the definition of basic terms, such as role, 
function, core competency and core task, and goes on to examine the core activities of Army 
special-operations forces. In seeking to clear any doctrinal fog, he provides comprehensive lists of 
official and nondoctrinal terms. These unique lists should prove to be invaluable for future refer-
ence and discussion, and readers are encouraged to reproduce them.
In the area of future concepts, SWCS’s Army Special Operations Capabilities Integration Cen-
ter, or ARSOCIC, works to anticipate future threats and requirements for ARSOF and to analyze 
guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army and the U.S. Special Operations Command, 
or USASOC, pertaining to our future operational environment. ARSOCIC also validates future 
concepts through experimentation and war games.
The director of ARSOCIC, Lieutenant Colonel Glenn Thomas, writes in this issue about the 
need to make special operations the seventh warfighting function, or WfF . The current WfFs 
replace the battlefield operating systems and serve as a default “forcing function” to capture 
considerations for planning. Special operations is woven into each function but all too often is 
omitted in the early stages of planning. USASOC is working closely with Army leadership to 
change doctrine and demonstrate not only that special operations is an element of combat power 
that should be addressed at all levels of professional military education, but also that it is crucial 
that special operations has a seat at the table during all phases of operational planning and execu-
tion. Special operations as a WfF will directly enable service leaders and our own Army leaders to 
better understand and appreciate the roles, effects, capabilities and limitations of special opera-
tions in contributing to military operations. SOF have and will continue to have a major role in 
contributing to the execution of full-spectrum operations.
To better achieve a shared understanding and appreciation of all of our Army’s capabilities, 
ARSOCIC is working with the Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Army Capabilities 
Integration Center, or ARCIC, to address ways in which ARSOF can contribute to other military 
components’ operations and to achieve inclusion of SOF as a warfighting function. ARSOCIC is 
also working with ARCIC’s centers of excellence, including the Movement and Maneuver Center 
of Excellence, to better identify future battlefield requirements and ways of preparing Soldiers to 
meet the demands of the current and future operating environments.
It is an exciting time to be working at SWCS. The ability to meet the challenges of a 
changing environment with constrained resources demands that we produce an agile and 
adaptive force, and in striving toward that goal, we will need the azimuth provided by clear 
doctrine and concepts.
Fro M the
Co MMandant
Major General Bennet S. Sacolick
04 Special Warfare

--- Page 5 ---
update
On Dec. 2, the 3rd Special Forces Group dedi -
cated a memorial walk honoring the group’s fallen 
heroes from Iraq and Afghanistan.
The walkway, six years in the making, consists 
of 28 marble stones in chronological order, one 
for each member of the 3rd SF Group who has 
been killed in combat since the start of America’s 
battle against terrorists.
In his remarks, the 3rd SF Group com -
mander, Colonel Mark Schwartz, took a moment to 
recognize 17-year-old Jacob Netzel and all of the 
other volunteers and contributors who made the 
walkway possible. 
“Not until today has 3rd Group had a group 
memorial to honor our comrades who have paid 
the ultimate sacrifice through their combat actions 
on behalf of their fellow operators, their families 
and this great nation, ” Schwartz said. “What you 
see before you today to honor our fallen brothers 
is greatly because of the leadership, hard work 
and determination of Jacob Netzel. ”
Netzel, then a Boy Scout, heard about the 
memorial walk project from his dad, a former 
comptroller for the 3rd SF Group. He wanted to 
take on the project to earn the Eagle Scout rank, 
scouting’s highest award.
Netzel said he chose the memorial walkway 
project because he thought it was an ideal way to 
remember fallen heroes and to honor his former 
scoutmaster, Staff Sergeant Bob White, who was 
killed in Afghanistan Sept. 26, 2005.
“It’s something to support troops that is 
real. It is more than just putting a sticker on the 
back of your car. This is really showing support, ” 
Netzel said. 
in h OnOr 3rd Special Forces Group Soldiers unveil stones of the new memorial walk during the dedi-
cation ceremony held at Fort Bragg, N.C., Dec. 2. U.S. Army photo.
3rd special Forces Group dedicates memorial walk
“Fully knowing the hazards of my cho-
sen profession, ” a phrase from the Ranger 
Creed, is one that Sergeant Jonathan K. 
Peney, 22, lived and died by as a Ranger 
combat medic.
“Sergeant Peney was a devoted and 
extraordinary Ranger medic, ” said Captain 
Andrew Fisher, physician assistant in the 
1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. 
“He possessed all of the talents and 
maturity necessary to excel both person-
ally and professionally in any organization. ”
Peney, who was assigned to Company 
D, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, at Hunter Army Airfield, Ga., 
was on his fourth combat rotation as the company medic when he 
was killed by enemy forces. For his actions on and off the battlefield, 
Peney was posthumously named the 2010 U.S. Army Special Opera-
tions Command Medic of the Year and the Special Operations Medical 
Association Medic of the Year.
“Intrinsically motivated, Sergeant Peney captivated the medical staff’s 
attention as one to watch for positions of greater responsibility, ” said 
Fisher. “He was always searching for ways to increase his understanding 
of medicine and ultimately provide the better care for his patients. ”
Peney was killed June 1 in the Kandahar Province of Afghanistan. 
Two days earlier, his platoon had earlier conducted a search-and-attack 
operation and secured a strongpoint. Shortly after sunrise on June 1, the 
enemy attacked the strongpoint from three directions, with an intense 
barrage of sniper fire, small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades.
During the initial volley, a team leader sustained two gunshot 
wounds and was critically wounded.
“Without hesitation and with complete disregard for his own per-
sonal safety, Sergeant Peney ran through effective automatic weapons 
fire to get to his wounded Ranger, ” said Fisher. “He was killed by enemy 
fire while moving under heavy fire to provide aid to the Ranger. ”
“Sergeant Peney was a fine example of what we expect a Ranger 
medic to be, ” said Fisher. “He not only challenged himself every day but 
also his peers and the medical providers. I will miss him constantly ask-
ing medical questions, for which he had no shortage. ”
Command Sergeant Major Parry Baer, command sergeant major 
of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, reviewed nomination 
packets from throughout the command and selected one 18D and one 
68WW1 for the Medic of the Year recognition. 
The nominations consisted of two-page unclassified recommenda-
tions from the medics’ supervisors and endorsements from their chain 
of command.
Sergeant First Class James C. Birchfield, assigned to the 2nd Bat-
talion, 5th SF Group, was named the 2010 Special Forces Medical 
Sergeant of the Year. — USASOC Public Affairs Office
special-operations medics honor fallen comrade as sOcOM Medic of the Year
He spent the first few months raising enough 
money to pay for the memorial stones and land -
scaping. He then had to obtain permission to cre -
ate the memorial from the Secretary of the Army, 
because there was a moratorium on developing 
new memorials. 
In June, after more than two years of waiting, 
Netzel received the letter of approval from the De-
partment of the Army. He then worked with contrac-
tors and the 3rd SF Group to complete the project.
“Our group will always have a place for 
our gold-star families and the Soldiers of this 
group past and present to come, honor and 
pay tribute to the individual and collective 
sacrifice by our brothers to free the op -
pressed,” Schwartz said. 
At the conclusion of the dedication, gold-star 
family members and friends placed roses on the 
newly unveiled stones lining the walkway. — 
USA-
SOC Public Affairs Office
Sergeant Peney
05January-February 2011

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update
MAVni s oldiers look 
to join U.s. sOF elite
“No matter what I do, I am looking to be 
the best, ” said Specialist Lukasz Herbst, 3rd 
Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group. “Being 
Special Forces presents the greatest test, 
something that is physically, mentally and 
academically challenging. ”
Herbst, a native of Poland and now a 
United States citizen, enlisted in the Army 
as part of the Military Accessions Vital to 
National Interest, or MAVNI. Along with 27 
other U.S. Soldiers with native ties to Africa 
and Europe, he is part of the 10th SF Group 
MAVNI Program, which is designed to train 
and prepare the Soldiers for duty in Special 
Forces, Civil Affairs, Military Information 
Support Operations or other roles with 
special-operations forces, or SOF . 
Since July, members of the 3rd Battalion, 
10th SF Group, have established the program 
that will prepare those individuals for a 
SOF-related job. The program is designed to 
prepare them both physically and mentally 
as well as placing them on SF teams to gain 
knowledge for the road ahead. 
“There is a lot of value added to hav-
ing them with the SF teams as we tap into 
other areas of the world, ” said an SF captain. 
“When that Soldier can talk to guys in this 
community and tap into that resource, 
they’re telling him what’s important to 
prepare for. On the flip side, that Soldier is 
serving as a translator and an asset for the 
team while they conduct training exercises 
in other countries. ”
As assets, two of the Soldiers have de-
ployed with SF A-detachments in African 
countries to conduct joint training exercises. 
Five other Soldiers will have the same op-
portunity in the coming months, and five 
others are currently serving in Iraq. 
The candidates come from various 
cultures and backgrounds; however, most of 
them hold bachelor’s degrees from well-
known colleges, speak multiple languages 
and dialects and were top athletes at some 
point in their lives. Also of note, 19 Soldiers 
have completed the Basic Airborne School 
while the others await their chance to attend. 
“Their life stories and what they’ve been 
through are amazing, ” said a sergeant first 
class training the Soldiers. “Most of them 
grew up in a Third World country, came 
to America, got a degree at a reputable 
institution, all on their own … these are 
driven guys. ”
Herbst, a swimmer for Western Ken-
tucky University, enlisted in the Army as 
an engineer diver. During physical-fitness 
training, he has helped teach some of the 
Soldiers how to swim. He graduated from 
college with a double major in psychology 
and physiology. 
Another Soldier, Private First Class Ed-
mond Kiptum, went to the University of the 
Southwest in New Mexico on a track-and-
field scholarship. After attending college for 
three years, he decided to join the U.S. Army 
through the MAVNI Program. 
At the completion of basic training, an SF 
recruiter spoke to him about going into the MA-
VNI Program and trying out for a SOF position. 
“I was really interested in what the 
recruiter had to say because I knew I would 
be a great candidate, ” Kiptum said. “With my 
background and language skills, I felt I could 
be an asset with operations in Africa. ” 
Kiptum, a native of Kenya, grew up going 
to school and working for his father at a local 
restaurant in his hometown. After complet-
ing high school, he worked with a missionary 
group that provided medication to people 
with malaria. T o work for the group, he had 
to speak English, Swahili and Kalenjin, a 
language most commonly used in Kenya. 
“I know that I am going to be an asset if 
I get picked up for Special Forces, ” Kiptum 
said. “I know the culture and the people in 
Africa, and that would help the team while 
they have to travel to those countries. ”
During their down time, Soldiers such as 
Herbst, Kiptum and others teach each other 
about different cultures and languages, such 
as Swahili, Polish, Russian and French.
“We try to help each other out and work 
as a team while preparing for selection, ” 
Herbst said. “There may be something that 
someone else has knowledge of (that) could 
be beneficial for the rest of us. ”
selection process
When a Soldier comes to the unit and is 
identified for the MAVNI Program, he begins 
in-processing with the Headquarters Support 
Company, 3rd Battalion, 10th SF Group. He 
receives his initial Army Physical Fitness T est, 
initiates and receives a security clearance, files 
for a passport and goes through the com-
mand language program to be certified in 
languages deemed critical to the U.S. Army. 
After the unit finishes in-processing, the 
Soldier will either stay with the company to 
continuing training, be utilized at the medi-
cal clinic if he is a medic or is placed on an 
A-detachment to receive on-the-job training.
“W e’ve had some great feedback from the 
teams as they assess them, and we keep a file on 
what they are doing, ” said the SF captain. “They 
Ment Orship A Soldier from the 3rd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group, supervises a small-unit-
tactics movement during the Flintlock 2010 training exercise in Mali in May 2010. The Soldier is 
participating in the Special Operations Forces Military Accessions Vital to National Interest Program, 
training to become a member of the SOF community.  U.S. Army photo
06 Special Warfare

--- Page 7 ---
update
are being used on operational deployments in 
Iraq, getting that combat experience, and in 
Africa as translators for foreign militaries. ” 
Soldiers who stay with the company par-
ticipate in physical-fitness activities each day. 
Since the course began, they have spent four 
weeks undergoing water-survival training, 
six weeks in land-navigation training and 
10 days in the Special Forces Basic Combat 
Course–Support training exercise.
“I didn’t even know how to swim when I 
got to the unit, ” Kiptum explained. “But they 
worked with me, starting off in floatation de-
vices for a couple weeks. By the third week, 
I was swimming side-by-side with everyone 
else in the deep end. ”
Kiptum explained that the physical train-
ing and critical training classes have benefit-
ted and challenged him — something that he 
feels will better prepare him for the future. 
“We have to keep working harder toward 
our goal, ” he said. “I’m not going to say I am 
ready right now, when I know there is still 
more to learn. I’m going to keep working 
hard until the date comes to attend the class. ”
In the next few months, the battalion will 
hold a “decision-making board” with each 
Soldier to determine his needs and what he 
wants to do in his career.
“Ultimately, the decision is the Soldier’s, ” 
said the SF captain. “We want to educate 
them on their options, whether it’s SF , CA, 
MISO or staying with the unit and finding 
other ways to contribute. ”
“We are pleased that so many have already 
shown an interest in attending (Special Forces 
Assessment and Selection), ” the captain said. 
“There are so many ways to categorize suc-
cess, but at the end of the day, we would like 
for them to stay in the community and find 
other ways to contribute to SOF . ”
So far, three Soldiers have expressed a 
desire to attend the Civil Affairs Qualification 
Course, and 15 want to attend SF Assessment 
and Selection. While the others continue to 
weigh their options, they all agree that the 
program has been successful thus far. 
“This is one of the best programs to be a 
part of, and we have yet to reach its fullest 
potential, ” Kiptum said. “We are just at the 
beginning; we still face a lot of challenges. 
One of the best things is the continued 
support and guidance from our leadership. ” 
—  SFC Michael R. Noggle, 10th SF Group 
Public Affairs.
three civil Affairs soldiers honored for valor in Afghanistan
Three Soldiers of Company A, 91st Civil Affairs Battalion, were honored Dec. 3 for their heroism in 
firefights with Taliban insurgents during their company’s recent deployment to Afghanistan.
Captain Ryan Schloesser and Sergeant Erik Crouch both received the Bronze Star Medal with 
V-device for their heroism May 25, 2010, when their combat reconnaissance patrol, consisting of U.S. 
Special Forces and forces of the Afghan National Army and National Police, was ambushed near Mullah 
Wasir village by dozens of Taliban insurgents. 
During the day-long battle, Schloesser, a CA team leader, drew withering enemy fire while using 
a bright signal panel to show other U.S. and Afghan forces the location of his patrol element. He also 
drew heavy enemy fire while retrieving badly needed ammunition and supplies dropped by a U.S. Army 
helicopter in an open field. 
Crouch, a CA medic, exposed himself to a hail of enemy fire while retrieving a wounded Afghan 
soldier from an open field, treating him and carrying him to a landing MEDEVAC helicopter. Crouch’s 
actions raised the morale of the Afghan Army soldiers, rallying them to continue the fight and preventing 
the enemy from overrunning the U.S./Afghan positions. 
Sergeant First Class Marius Orhon, a Civil Affairs team sergeant, was awarded an Army Commendation 
Medal with V-Device for heroism in Operation Mostarak, while he was assigned to a U.S. Special Forces 
and Afghan National Army combat reconnaissance patrol on Feb. 18 on a route-clearance mission. When 
the lead element of the patrol came under heavy fire from mortars, rockets and small arms as it moved 
into a Taliban-controlled area in southern Marjeh, Orhon helped reorganize the rear element of Afghan 
soldiers to return effective fire. While drawing enemy fire from an exposed rooftop position, he provided 
valuable battle information to help defeat the attack during the nine-hour battle. 
Brigadier General Kurt Fuller, deputy commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations 
Command, presented the three their medals at the John F . Kennedy Auditorium at Fort Bragg’s Special 
Warfare Center and School, and remarked, “As you all understand, we’re not going to shoot our way out 
of this conflict. ”
“The only way we’re going to [succeed] is with the help of Civil Affair Soldiers. Until you look in 
the face of an [Afghan] child and understand what kind of conditions they’re living in, you can’t really 
understand what these folks do for our nation, ” Fuller said. 
Fuller concluded, “You have my heartfelt thanks for what you did, obviously in a very dangerous 
environment. The Army is proud of you, USASOC is proud of you and the nation is proud of you. ” 
Other Soldiers from Company A were recognized for their work while conducting more than 662 
CA missions in 10 Afghanistan provinces during their eight-month deployment. Soldiers conducted 
more than 533 key-leader engagements, 162 medical civic-action programs, 23 veterinary civic-action 
programs and 59 troops-in-contact missions. 
The commander and command sergeant major of the 95th CA Brigade, Colonel James Wolff and 
Command Sergeant Major Thomas Wall, were assisted by the commander and command sergeant 
major of the 91st CA Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Barzyk and Command Sergeant Major Gilbert 
Troxler, in presenting 33 other Soldiers with 15 Bronze Star Medals, six Meritorious Service Medals and 
12 Army Commendation Medals. —
 Leslie Ozawa, 95th CA Brigade Public Affairs.
VAlO r  From left, Bronze Star with V-device awardees Captain Ryan Schloesser and Sergeant Erik 
Crouch, and Army Commendation Medal with V-device awardee Sergeant First Class Marius Orhon. 
U.S. Army photo.
07January-February 2011

--- Page 8 ---
In recent years, the Army has made great 
strides in adapting to the changing opera-
tional environment, adjusting its training 
and leader development to focus on building 
more agile and effective leaders. Despite 
the improvements, however, issues remain 
regarding a lack of doctrinal emphasis that 
would teach leaders to appreciate the role 
and effects of special operations.
Army Training and Doctrine Command 
Pamphlet 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Con-
cept, Operational Adaptability: Operating Un-
der Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity 
in an Era of Persistent Conflict 2016-2028, 
takes into consideration the changing opera-
tional environment and seeks to describe the 
capabilities the Army will require. At the core 
of the concept is the need for leaders to em-
brace changes necessary for dealing with an-
ticipated threats. General Martin Dempsey, 
commanding general of the United States 
Army Training and Doctrine Command, or 
TRADOC, introduces The Army’s Capstone 
Concept by emphasizing the requirement for 
a “mindset based on flexibility of thought 
and calling for leaders at all levels who are 
comfortable with collaborative planning and 
decentralized execution. ”
1 The need for that 
adaptive mindset is critical in shaping future 
military operations and requires the Army to 
rethink doctrine. 
Along with placing greater emphasis 
on adaptability, the Army has transitioned 
its focus on training and operations from 
developing forces for large-scale maneuver 
warfare to increasing the capability of indi-
viduals to operate in smaller, decentralized 
elements. It can be argued that the military 
as a whole is seeking to become more like 
special-operations forces, or SOF . 
SOF have played and will continue to 
play a major role in all facets of military 
operations, and it is imperative that all 
military leaders and planners understand 
SOF’s capabilities and limitations. The 
challenges posed in recruiting, training and 
employing large forces that can operate in 
a manner similar to SOF are many and will 
not be addressed in this article.
2 The author 
of this article understands that the neces -
sity to understand special operations is in 
no way limited to the Army, but the article 
will address Army doctrine only, in order to 
address and foster discussion on the inclu -
sion of special operations into the Army’s 
warfighting functions, or WfFs.
3
Army warfighting functions 
Through the lens of doctrine, Army 
leaders learn to address operational chal-
lenges. The Army’s FM 3.0, Operations, is 
the proponent field manual for operations 
and, along with FM 1.0, The Army, provides 
the force’s doctrinal framework. Accord-
ing to FM 3.0, doctrine provides a “body 
of thought on how Army forces intend to 
operate as an integral part of a joint force. ” It 
also explains that “doctrine promotes mutual 
understanding and enhances effectiveness. ”
4 
Arguably, the most important update of FM 
3.0 — the 2008 version — is the emphasis on 
preparing the Army for an era of “persistent 
engagement. ” Compared to the previous ver-
sion of the FM (14 June 2001), the current 
FM more adeptly describes the operational 
environment the Army will face in the years 
to come. It describes an environment of per-
sistent conflict, and the use of a “spectrum 
of conflict” makes it evident that leaders can 
expect to face threats in the execution of op-
erations ranging from peace to general war.
5 
Even though the current FM 3.0 redefines 
the operational environment, it remains 
fixated on the application of combat power 
for large-scale operations. The 2008 version 
remains dedicated to the full-spectrum op-
erational concept introduced in the 2001 ver-
sion, but it replaces the battlefield operating 
systems, or BOS, with six WfFs: movement 
and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustain-
ment, mission command and protection.
6 
Leadership and information join the six WfFs 
to form the eight elements of combat power.
7 
Through the application of combat power 
using combined arms, the Army ultimately 
seeks to conduct operations.8 Viewing opera-
tions in the context of synchronizing and 
prioritizing WfFs to support combined-arms 
operations provides a framework that leads 
planners to view all operations as they relate 
to combat operations.
Like the BOSs they replaced, the WfFs 
assist leaders in identifying, prioritizing and 
categorizing the resources and capabilities 
available to friendly and threat forces. In 
many ways, the WfFs serve as a checklist for 
ensuring that planners address all elements 
of combat power.
9 The categorization and 
structuring of the WfFs into simple, all-
encompassing categories provide planners a 
means of ensuring that they are addressing 
all capabilities required to support full-spec-
trum operations. However, a major short-
coming of the current WfFs is their failure to 
adequately capture and address the role that 
special operations may play in supporting, 
leading and, in some cases, preventing the 
need for operations. 
special operations as a WfF
The current doctrinal construct 
provided in FM 3.0’s description of the 
WfFs efficiently organizes the elements of 
combat power. The newer FM’s greater ap-
preciation of the operational environment 
is critical in developing leaders who plan 
08 Special Warfare
Special OperatiOnS
as a warfighting function
By Lieutenant co Lone L gL enn r . t homas

--- Page 9 ---
with foresight, but the current structure of 
the WfFs fails to assist planners in rec -
ognizing the capabilities and effects that 
special operations contribute. 
Now, more than ever, it is of paramount 
importance for leaders to understand 
the capabilities and limitations of special 
operations. Planners must also recognize 
the unique contributions that SOF provide 
throughout the spectrum of conflict. The 
major combat operations ongoing in Iraq 
and Afghanistan have created a default view 
among many Army leaders that special 
operations are merely direct action. Directly 
complementing ongoing combat operations 
is but a fraction of the abilities that ele-
ments of Army Civil Affairs, or CA; Military 
Information Support Operations, or MISO; 
and Special Forces, or SF , bring to the table. 
Special operations can be used in support-
ing and, in some specific cases, decisive 
operations to better shape the contemporary 
operating environment. 
The Army faces the challenges of 
preventing and deterring conflict while 
maintaining the ability to defeat current 
and future threats. The Army’s operating 
concept states that the nation’s military 
problem is, “How do future Army forces 
prevent and deter conflict, prevail in war 
and succeed in a wide range of contingen -
cies?”
10 Army special-operations forces, or 
ARSOF, are uniquely postured to execute 
operations across the spectrum of conflict. 
While the Army describes the current and 
future operational environment as one of 
“persistent conflict, ” ARSOF view it as an 
opportunity for “persistent engagement. ” 
Elements of CA, MISO and SF routinely 
deploy during times of peace to execute 
missions of foreign internal defense and 
security-force assistance. Through those de -
ployments, they gain functional experience 
and knowledge in areas prior to the begin -
ning of hostilities. CA, MISO and SF teams 
also hone their ability to operate in smaller, 
decentralized elements — skills that are 
applicable in any environment or theater of 
operations during peacetime, limited inter -
vention, peace operations, irregular warfare 
or major combat operations.
11 
CA, MISO and SF elements’ investment 
in the individual throughout all aspects of 
selection and training creates a specialized 
and unique capability that provides the 
Army with the most capable force for shap-
ing the operational environment through-
out all phases of conflict. The investment 
made in SOF provides military and national 
decision-makers with specialized capabilities 
that can drive courses of action that may not 
be readily apparent. For instance, images of 
bearded men on horseback during Opera-
tion Enduring Freedom exemplify modern 
SF’s execution of unconventional warfare; 
however, one can read Bob Woodward’s 
Bush at War and realize that the military 
was caught off-guard by the 9/11 attacks and 
did not have a “boots on the ground” option 
On pAtr Ol U.S. Army Special Forces patrol a valley outside Forward Operating Base Salerno, Khost Province, Afghanistan. Special operations can be used 
in supporting and, in some specific cases, decisive operations to better shape the contemporary operating environment. U.S. Army photo.
09January-February 2011

--- Page 10 ---
s tOr Y title
s OF As A WAr FiGhtin G FUncti On
readily available to present to the president 
and his staff.12
Without an adequate understanding 
of the capabilities and limitations of SOF , 
leaders fail to consider the way these types 
of forces may complement a particular 
course of action. Not listing special opera-
tions as a WfF in Army doctrine makes it 
less likely that commanders and staffs will 
consider them during operations planning. 
That is particularly concerning, as SOF offer 
the military a specialized capability and 
often provide area-specific knowledge and 
expertise gained prior to hostilities. Not 
only does a lack of understanding of special 
operations lead to underuse: It can actually 
lead to misuse. This is evident in the growing 
tendency of planners at all levels within the 
Army to view SOF as commandos for direct-
action operations or as smaller, “infantry-
like” forces that can be readily positioned 
throughout a battlefield.
Army leaders at all levels still fail to ap-
preciate that SOF provide a combat-multi-
plying capability. With the reduction in the 
scale of operations in Iraq and the likelihood 
of reduced operations in Afghanistan in the 
years to come, it is likely that the employ-
ment of special operations will increase. 
Using the experience and knowledge gained 
from regionally specific operations, CA, 
MISO and SF elements can directly and in-
directly shape the operational environment 
prior to hostilities. These specific skills and 
established relationships with host-nation 
and interagency elements can then serve to 
contribute to the execution of operations by 
conventional forces. In some situations, the 
employment of special operations in support 
of geographic combatant commanders may 
actually prevent or deter threats. 
Ultimately, the efficient and effective em-
ployment of SOF requires their consideration 
prior to the onset of hostilities and not as 
an afterthought. In order to increase aware-
ness and understanding of special operations 
and how they may best support combat-
ant commanders, the Army must work to 
educate and develop leaders at all levels, 
and that requires conceptual and doctrinal 
updates. The current WfFs do not adequately 
capture the unique and specialized missions 
encompassed by special operations and the 
ways they can serve as a force multiplier or 
as an economy of force. Doctrinal inclusion 
of special operations as a WfF would provide 
a starting point for increasing education and 
improved integration of forces at all levels. 
sWcs’ current initiatives
The specialized capabilities of SOF 
provide planners at all levels with unique 
abilities that are easily overlooked or less ef -
fectively included as subsets of other WfFs. 
In addition to using the WfFs as a means 
of conceptualizing capabilities in terms of 
combat power, the Army also uses them 
as a means of organizing and assigning 
responsibilities for doctrine, organization, 
training, materiel, leadership, personnel 
and facilities, or DOTMPLF, to command 
organizations called centers of excellence, 
or CoE.
13 TRADOC maintains six CoEs 
that encompass all six WfFs. A shortcom -
ing of the current CoE construct is that 
special-operations missions and forces do 
not readily fall into the current warfighting 
taxonomy. The six WfFs do not capture the 
unique DOTMPLF requirements associated 
with CA, MISO and SF. The JFK Special 
Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, now 
serves in a similar capacity to TRADOC’s 
CoEs, and its role would only grow with the 
inclusion of special operations as a WfF. 
SWCS’s Army Special Operations 
Capabilities Integration Center, or ARSO-
CIC, is charged with anticipating the future 
environment, threats and requirements for 
speci Al O per Ati Ons
sOF As A WAr FiGhtin G FUncti On 
The eight elements of combat 
power include the six warfight-
ing functions, shown in blue, 
multiplied by leadership and 
complemented by information. 
The warfighting functions re-
place the Battlefield Operating 
System and serve as a default 
“forcing function” to capture 
considerations for planning. 
Both constructs do not capture 
contributions of special opera-
tions before during and post 
conflict, indirectly leading to 
omission of specialized capa-
biltities in the conduct of full-
sprectrum operations.
MOVeMent A nD 
MAneUVer
pr Otecti On
Missi On cOMMA nD
sUst Ain Ment
Fires
intelli Gence
l eADership
inFOr MAti On
10 Special Warfare

--- Page 11 ---
notes:
1. The Army Capstone Concept , i.
2. Brigadier g eneral Bennet s acolick, in articles for the Small Wars Journal and Special Warfare , describes the 
challenges inherent in training individuals to serve in special operations. 
3. Joint Publication 1-02, (amended a pril 2010) defines special operations as “ operations conducted in hostile, 
denied or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational and/or economic objec -
tives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional-force requirement. t hese operations 
often require covert, clandestine or low-visibility capabilities. s pecial operations are applicable across the range of 
military operations. t hey can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces 
or other government agencies and may include operations through, with or by indigenous or surrogate forces. s pecial 
operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, 
mode of employment, independence from friendly support and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and 
indigenous assets.” also called so . (JP 3-05)
4. fm 3.0 ( appendix D). 
5. fm 3-0, c hapter 2, explains that the “spectrum of conflict is the backdrop for a rmy operations.” f igure 2-1 
showcases levels of violence on an ascending scale, based on the operational environment (stable peace, unstable 
peace, insurgency and general war). 
6. t he Bos were originally introduced in the 1990 version of tra Doc Pamphlet 525-5 : Blueprint of the Battle -
field. t he pamphlet introduced seven tactical B os : intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility and 
survivability, combat service support, and mission command. fm 3.0’s c hapter 4 describes warfighting functions as 
“a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information and processes) united by a common purpose that 
commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives.” u pdates to the warfighting functions that will likely 
be found in an update to fm 3.0 is the change of command and control to the more holistic term, mission command.
7. fm 3-0, c hapter 4, paragraph 4-1, defines combat power as “the total means of destructive, constructive and 
information capabilities that a military unit/formation can apply at a given time. a rmy forces generate combat power 
by converting potential into effective action.”
8. fm 3-0, c hapter 4-30, explains combined arms as “the synchronized and simultaneous application of the 
elements of combat power to achieve an effect greater than if each element of combat power was used separately or 
sequentially.” 
9. t hroughout fm 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production (2005), the B os are presented as a means of as -
sisting in the commander’s visualization process. a dditionally, the Bos are used by planners to categorize, prioritize 
and synchronize capabilities. t he draft version of fm 5-0, The Operations Process (2010), uses the w ff s in the same 
manner as the Bos s. t he draft fm 5-0 also incorporates the w ff s in supporting planning efforts over a “horizon” of 
time through the use of planning cells (plans, future operations, current operations). 
10. Army Operating Concept , 11. 
11. fm 3-0, c hapter 2, table 2-1, lists examples of joint military operations conducted with operational themes. 
t he operations listed under “Peacetime military engagement and limited intervention” includes security assistance, 
joint combined exchange training, noncombatant evacuation operations and foreign humanitarian assistance. 
t he irregular warfare theme includes foreign internal defense, support to insurgency, unconventional warfare and 
counterterrorism. f igure 2-2 (“t he spectrum of c onflict and o perational t hemes”) highlights the types of operations 
(operational themes) as they fall into the visualization of the spectrum of violence. 
12. Bob w oodward, Bush at War (n ew york: s imon & s chuster Paperbacks, 2002), 79-80. a ccording to w ood-
ward, c Jcs g eneral h ugh s helton presented the president with three military options. t he first two options centered 
around the use of cruise missiles or a combination of cruise missiles and aircraft to strike al-Qaeda training camps 
and taliban targets. t he third option presented a combination of missile and aircraft strikes with the inclusion of 
special operations and, potentially, a rmy and marine ground forces. t hough the third option introduced “boots on 
the ground,” the intent to use sof to work with the n orthern a lliance as a surrogate force to target al-Qaeda and 
topple the t aliban regime was not presented. 
13. a center of excellence is defined as a designated command or organization within an assigned area of 
expertise that delivers current warfighting requirements; identifies future capabilities; integrates assigned doctrine, 
organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities dimensions; and presents resource-informed, 
outcomes-based recommendations to the tra Doc commanding general. t he army currently maintains six c oes: 
f ires, maneuver, maneuver s upport, s ustainment, i ntelligence and s ignal. (http://www.tradoc.army.mil/about.htm.)
ARSOF . ARSOCIC supports the develop-
ment of concepts in CA, MISO and SF and 
provides subject-matter expertise to analyze 
guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
Department of Army and the U.S. Special 
Operations Command that pertains to the 
future operational environment. The result 
of the studies, combined with an under-
standing of future capabilities, capacities and 
government relationships, allows ARSOCIC 
to prepare concepts that describe how AR-
SOF should operate if they are to dominate 
strategic and tactical challenges of the future.
ARSOCIC works directly with the U.S. 
Army Special Operations Command, the 
U.S. Army Special Forces Command, the 
U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychologi-
cal Operations Command and TRADOC’s 
Army Capabilities Integration Center, or 
ARCIC, to better prepare ARSOF and the 
Army as a whole for the future. Among 
numerous projects, ARSOCIC’s current 
initiatives include working with ARCIC to 
address how ARSOF can more efficiently 
contribute to operations and to achieve 
inclusion of special operations as a WfF . 
Additionally, ARSOCIC works directly with 
ARCIC’s CoEs to better identify current and 
future warfighting requirements. Currently 
SWCS works directly with TRADOC and 
the CoEs to better identify current and fu-
ture warfighting requirements for the Army 
as a whole. 
 
Lieutenant Colonel Glenn R. Thomas is 
director of the JFK Special Warfare Cen-
ter and School’s Army Special Operations 
Capabilities Integration Center. He began 
his Army career as an infantryman with the 
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), where 
he participated in Operations Desert Shield 
and Desert Storm. Commissioned in Infantry 
upon graduation from Indiana University, 
he served as a rifle platoon leader, support 
platoon leader and executive officer in the 3rd 
Infantry Division before attending the Special 
Forces Officer Qualification Course. Lieuten-
ant Colonel Thomas has served in the 3rd and 
5th SF groups and served previously at SWCS 
as a small-group instructor and commander 
for the 18A portion of the Special Forces 
Qualification Course. He is also a graduate of 
the Naval Postgraduate School.
11January-February 2011

--- Page 12 ---
c O v e r 
S t O r Y
Special Warfare12

--- Page 13 ---
By Jeffrey has Ler
I applaud the JFK Special Warfare Center’s continued efforts to develop and define ARSOF 
doctrine.  The United States Special Operations Command has a legislated responsibility to 
develop doctrine relating to special-operations activities, and the efforts of the Special Warfare 
Center’s Directorate of Doctrine and Training are essential to providing the linkage from Army 
SOF doctrine to joint special-operations and service doctrine.  While clarifying many of the 
often confused definitions, this article also provides an opportunity to remind our joint force 
about the application of doctrine during periods of prolonged conflict.    
Undoubtedly, doctrine is a valuable tool and our force needs to understand the terms and the 
implications of our words — especially in today’s joint, interagency and multinational environ-
ment.  Doctrine can also be restrictive if applied too strictly.  Our operators must appreciate that 
there is no template for every situation they will encounter on the battlefield.  Therefore, the 
greater imperative in the study of doctrine is for the force to recognize when and where to devi-
ate from it to address a specific operational necessity.  By doing so, we sustain the intellectual 
and tactical agility that is a hallmark of SOF operations.   
— Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander, USSOCOM    
Doctrine is the “fundamental principles by which the military forces 
or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national 
objectives. it is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”
 — JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
1
January-February 2011 13

--- Page 14 ---
s tOr Y titleDeFinin G WAr
“If language is not correct, then what is said is not what is meant; 
if what is said is not what is meant, then what must be done remains 
undone; if this remains undone, morals and art will deteriorate; if 
justice goes astray, the people will stand about in helpless confusion. 
Hence there must be no arbitrariness in what is said. This matters 
above everything. ”
3 —  Confucius, Rectification of Names
The modern world is awash in information. The information 
available on any topic comes in varying degrees of content qual -
ity, with varying claims to authority and from every conceivable 
perspective. In earlier generations, a much smaller volume of 
information from a few relatively respected sources aided unity of 
understanding. Today, the volume of information and the num -
ber of sources has exploded. The honorable pursuit of warfighting 
insights, the habit of defending organizational prerogatives and the 
personal ambitions of some hoping to market “the next new thing” 
have all contributed to a glut of conceptual terms. The confusion 
resulting from such a surfeit of (often questionable) terms is then 
increased further by vague and misleading descriptions compound -
ed by media amplification. 
Bold, imaginative professional discussion of terms is healthy and 
should be encouraged in the professional and academic school -
houses, editorials and blogs. However, there is also a value in 
organizations using terms correctly. As Aristotle told us, repetition 
of virtuous “lessons” in their correct form is a public good.
4 By 
contrast, carelessly vague descriptions masquerading as “defini -
tions” erode unity of understanding. The use of trendy — but unap -
proved — jargon pretending to represent the “progress” of insight 
or the institutional superiority of the claimant is better left in the 
unofficial blogosphere. It is a truism that a proper and professional 
discussion presupposes a prior common definition of terms. That 
being the case, ARSOF leaders at all levels have a duty to strengthen 
the organizational enterprise by the correct use of terminology.
Definition vs Description
To define is “to state the precise meaning. ”5 Whereas, to describe 
“is to give an account of; to convey an idea or impression of; to 
represent pictorially. ”
6 Applied to doctrine, a definition focuses 
on what something is, while its description provides context and 
explains what it does within that context. A definition should be 
enduring and slow to change, while its description can evolve as 
context and circumstances change. Regardless of whether leaders 
are using written or spoken discourse, they must not mistake one 
for the other, nor ought reporters to carelessly relay the melodious 
or fashionable for the correct. A description is not a definition.
Denote vs connote
This duality of denote/connote is similar to that of define/de -
scribe. “Denote means ‘to signify directly or literally’ and describes 
the relation between the word and the thing it conventionally 
names. Connote means ‘to signify indirectly, suggest or imply’ and 
describes the relation between the word and the images or associa -
tions it evokes. Thus, the word ‘river’ denotes a [linear] moving 
body of water [but] may connote such things as the relentlessness 
of time [or] the changing nature of life. ”
7 Official definitions are 
specific; they are not poetry.
Official vs s ervice s pecific or  
Multinational & pending inclusion
The highest joint authority for an official doctrinal term is the 
highest joint publication with proponent authority of the subject. For 
example, the authoritative doctrinal definition for “stability opera-
tions” is found in JP 3-0, Joint Operations. Approved joint definitions 
are then routinely compiled in JP 1-02. Sometimes there are other ap-
proved definitions — such as service specific or multinational — but 
they apply only within those constituencies and are therefore limited; 
when such definitions conflict, the joint version takes precedence. 
Sometimes, properly command-approved definitions may take 
months or years to appear in JP 1-02. For example, a revised defini-
tion for unconventional warfare was approved by the commander of 
the United States Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, in 
May 2009 and is currently the approved definition within the com-
mand. This definition, however, is being vetted for inclusion in JP 
1-02. During the transition, two distinct definitions may cause some 
confusion, but this should be temporary. 
Official vs Unofficial c oncepts & theories
Everyone has the individual power to define strictly personal issues 
— such as personal values or religious meaning — for himself. Some 
have the authority to define for organizations beyond the scope of the 
individual; such as establishing specific standards of manufacturing 
quality at a business. For enormous organizations such as the Depart-
ment of Defense, or DoD, the authority to approve doctrinal defini-
tions is a command prerogative. However, this approval decision is 
the culmination of a lengthy process representing copious amounts of 
staff work and intellectual effort. By contrast, unofficial concepts and 
theories — no matter how trendy, regardless of media attention and 
repetition, and no matter the enthusiasm of any individual — are not 
official doctrine until they go through the vetting process of numerous 
staffs. Such processes provide an opportunity to examine the validity of 
“new” concepts and eliminate the half-baked and counterproductive. 
The power to define is the power to design a vision of organizational 
purpose. ARSOF leaders should sustain that power by staying on an 
azimuth of doctrinal clarity, accuracy and repetition. 
r oles, Functions, competencies,  
Mission (Areas), Activities, tasks,  
Functional Areas and Missions
8
Another example of terminology confusion results from the im-
proper use of terms that define what our ARSOF organizations do. 
r oles are the broad and enduring purposes for which the services 
and USSOCOM were established by law. QRM JAN09.9
Functions are the appropriate or assigned duties, responsibilities, 
missions or tasks of an individual, office or organization as defined 
in the National Security Act of 1947, including responsibilities of the 
Armed Forces as amended. The term “function” includes purpose, 
powers and duties. Specific functions of the services and USSOCOM 
are captured in Department of Defense Directives. JP 1-02 31JUL10.
10
Core Competencies are groupings of functionally-organized 
capabilities associated with the performance of, or support for, a 
Department of Defense core mission area. The department’s com-
ponents perform tasks and activities that supply these functionally-
organized capabilities. QRM JAN09.
11
14 Special Warfare

--- Page 15 ---
Roles, functions, competencies, mission a Reas, activities, 
tasks, functional a Reas and missions
DoD r ole: The role of the Department of Defense is to field, sustain and employ the military capabilities needed to 
protect the United States and its allies and to advance our interests. (2010 QDR)
DoD Functions: (and the functions of its major components) are listed in DoDD 5100.1 Listed functions are 
numerous and generally begin with active verbs such as: employ (forces); maintain; organize; assign; prescribe; 
exercise; assess; review; advise; prepare; etc. (DoDD 5100.1, 01AUG02) 
DoD nine c ore c ompetencies: Force Application; Command and Control; Battlespace Awareness; Net Centric; 
Building Partnerships; Protection; Logistics; Force Support; and Corporate Management and Support (2009 QRM)
DoD s ix c ore Mission Areas: Homeland Defense and Civil Support; Deterrence Operations; Major Combat 
Operations; Irregular Warfare; Military Support to Stabilization Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations; 
and Military Contribution to Cooperative Security (2009 QRM)
Uss OcOM 11 core Activities: Direct action; special reconnaissance; unconventional warfare; foreign 
internal defense; Civil Affairs operations; counterterrorism; Psychological Operations; information operations; 
counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction; security force assistance; and counterinsurgency operations. 
(Title 10 USC Sec 167, 01FEB10 )
Ars OF 11 core Activities: Unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense; security force assistance; 
counterinsurgency; direct action; special reconnaissance; counterterrorism; military information support operations; 
Civil Affairs operations; counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [secondary core activity]; and 
information operations [secondary core activity]. (FM 3-05, 06OCT10 DRAFT)
sF perform 9 p rincipal tasks:
UW
FID
SFA
COIN
DA
SR
CT
CP
IO
Mis O (pO) perform 2 principal 
tasks:
MISO
IO
Mis O (pO) forces  
play a supporting role in 9 tasks:
UW
FID
SFA
COIN
DA
SR
CT
CAO
CP
cA perform 1 p rincipal task:
CAO
In all cases, CA support the  
commander’s relationship with civil 
authorities and the civil populace. 
core tasks include:
Populace and resources control 
(PRC)
Foreign humanitarian assistance 
(FHA)
Nation assistance (NA)
Support to civil administration 
(SCA).
Civil information management (CIM)
(FM 3-05, 06OCT10 DRAFT) (FM 3-05, 06OCT10 DRAFT) (FM 3-05, 06OCT10 DRAFT)
Core Mission a reas are broad Department of Defense military 
activities required to achieve strategic objectives of the National De-
fense Strategy and National Military Strategy. A core mission area is a 
mission for which the department is uniquely responsible, provides the 
preponderance of U.S. government capabilities, or is the U.S. govern-
ment lead for achieving end states defined in national strategy docu-
ments. Each of the department’s core mission areas is underpinned by a 
joint operating concept that visualizes future operations. QRM JAN09
12
a ctivities are organizational units for performing specific func-
tions. The term can also refer to the function or duties themselves.13 
Core a ctivities of s pecial o perations Section 167 of Title 10, U.S. 
Code, gives USSOCOM responsibility for certain activities. Although 
most of these activities have been assigned to USSOCOM for more 
than 20 years, USSOCOM does not assert exclusivity or ownership 
over these areas. However, the activities do reflect tasks or skills pecu-
liar to, or particularly characteristic of, special operations.
14 
t asks A discrete event or action that enables a mission or func-
tion to be accomplished by 
individuals or organizations. 
Tasks are based upon doctrine, 
tactics, techniques or procedures 
or an organization’s standard 
operating procedure, and are 
generated by mission analysis. 
CJCSM3400.04c Universal Joint 
Task List, 1 July 2002.
15
Primary Core t ask A 
component is fully organized, 
manned, trained and equipped 
to execute the task.
s econdary Core t ask A 
component has some degree of 
organization, manning, train -
ing and equipment to execute 
the task.
s upport Core t ask A 
component supports within its 
organization capabilities. US -
SOCOM D 10-1cc 15 Decem -
ber 2009.
16
Missions (1.) The task, 
together with the purpose, that 
clearly indicates the action to be 
taken and the reason therefore. 
(JP 3-0) (2.) In common usage, 
especially when applied to lower 
military units, a duty assigned to 
an individual or unit; a task. (JP 
3-0) JP 1-02 15 December 2001.
17                        
Finally, it is important to have 
a clear understanding of two 
concepts that are not ARSOF 
core activities but that frequently 
involve ARSOF operations: 
irregular warfare, or IW , and 
stability operations.
IW is defined in JP 1 as a violent struggle among state and non-
state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant popula-
tions. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, 
though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, 
in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence and will.
There are five principal activities or operations that are undertaken 
in sequence, in parallel or in blended form in a coherent campaign to 
address irregular threats: counterterrorism, or CT; unconventional 
warfare, or UW; foreign internal defense, or FID; counterinsurgency, 
or COIN; and stability operations. IW is not synonymous with any 
of these activities. In addition to these five activities, there are a 
host of key related activities, including strategic communications, 
information operations, psychological operations (now MISO), civil-
military operations and support to law-enforcement, intelligence and 
counterintelligence operations in which the joint force may engage 
to counter irregular threats. IW is also not synonymous with any of 
those activities. 
15January-February 2011

--- Page 16 ---
irregular Warfare (iW) A violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors 
indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence 
and will. (JP 1, MAR09. Although not doctrine, IW JOC, v2, MAY10 is the primary conceptual reference). IW comprises five principle activities: UW , FID, 
COIN, CT and Stability Operations. Not synonymous with those activities.
stability operations An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination 
with other instruments of national power to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infra-
structure reconstruction and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0, MAR10. Although not doctrine, SSTRO JOC, v2, DEC06 is the primary conceptual reference). Not 
synonymous with FID or COIN.
unconventional Warfare (uW) Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupy-
ing power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area. Core activity of ARSOF . Core activity and organizing 
principle for SF . Core activity of IW . (TC18-01, DEC10. ATTP 3-18.01 in development 2011. There is no joint doctrine for UW .)
f oreign internal defense (fid) Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or 
other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism or other threats to its security. (JP 3-22, JUL10. 
FM 3-05.137, JUN08). Core activity of ARSOF . Core activity of IW .
security f orce assistance (sfa) The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. government to support the development of 
the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-22, JUL10. TC 31-73, JUL08. TC 18-02 in development 2011). Core 
activity of ARSOF . Core activty of IW . SFA and FID overlap; neither subsumes the other.
counterinsurgency (coin) Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. (JP 3-24, OCT09. TC 
18-05 in development 2011). Core activity of ARSOF . Core activty of IW . Subset of FID.
direct action (da) Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied or politically sensitive 
environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets. Direct action differs 
from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to 
achieve specific objectives. (JP 3-05, DEC03. (C) ATTP 3-05.203 (U), JAN09). Core activity of ARSOF .
special Reconnaissance (sR) Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied or politically sensitive environ-
ments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. These 
actions provide an additive capability for commanders and supplement other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions. (JP 3-05, DEC03. ATTP 
3-18.04, NOV10). Core activity of ARSOF .
counterterroism (ct) Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global environments inhospitable to terrorist 
networks. (JP 3-26, NOV09). Core activity of ARSOF .
military information support operations (miso) As an activity: Supports all of the other core activities by increasing the psychological effects inherent in 
their application. As a capability: Conducted across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of conflict as part of interagency activities to achieve U.S. na-
tional objectives. Formerly known as psychological operations. (JP 3-13.2, JAN10. FM 3-05.30, APR05. FM 3-53 in development 2011). Both a core activity and 
a capability of ARSOF . Key related activity of IW .
civil affairs operations (cao) Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that: (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil 
authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that 
normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. (JP 3-57, JUL08. FM 3-05.40, SEP06. FM 3-57 in devel-
opment 2011). Core activity of ARSOF .
counterproliferation (cp) of Weapons of mass destruction Actions taken to defeat the threat and/or use of weapons of mass destruction against the United 
States, our forces, allies and partners. (JP 3-40, JUN09. FM 3-05.132, NOV09). Secondary core activity of ARSOF .
information operations (io) Integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, 
military deception and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial hu-
man and automated decision-making while protecting our own. (JP 3-13, FEB06. TC 18-06 in development in 2011). Secondary core activity of ARSOF .
conventional f orces (cf) (1) Those forces capable of conducting operations using non-nuclear weapons. (2) Those forces other than designated special opera-
tions forces. (JP 3-05, DEC03).
Guerrilla Warfare (GW) Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. (JP 
3-05.1, APR07). Not synonymous with unconventional warfare.
insurgency The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency 
can also refer to the group itself. (JP 3-24, OCT09).
special f orces (sf) U.S. Army forces organized, trained and equipped to conduct special operations, with an emphasis on unconventional-warfare capabili-
ties. (JP 3-05, DEC03). SF and SOF are not synonymous: All (Army) SF are SOF , but not all (joint) SOF are (Army) SF .
special operations f orces (sof) Those active- and reserve-component forces of the military services designated by the secretary of defense and specifically 
organized, trained and equipped to conduct and support special operations. (JP 3-05.1, APR07).
terrorism The calculated use of unlawful violence or the threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or soci-
eties in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological. (JP 3-07.2, APR06).
traditional Warfare A form of warfare between the regulated militaries of states, or alliances of states, in which the objective is to defeat an adversary’s armed 
forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s government or policies. (DoDD 
3000.07, DEC08).
OFFici Al ter Ms
(Use in Written AnD s pOken Disc OUrse)
QUick r eFerence GUiDe OF ter Ms: De Finin G WAr By Jeffrey has Ler
Special Warfare16

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asymmetric Warfare (aW) Opponents who cannot prevail against an enemy by using “symmetrical, ” mirror-image force and procedures will avoid using 
them. Rather, they will seek to exploit enemy weaknesses in ways the enemy does not expect and which are difficult to protect against. This is not a new kind of 
warfare. Asymmetries between opponents, and the quest for asymmetric advantages against them, have been inherent in war since the dawn of man. However, 
terms such as “asymmetric threats, ” “asymmetric approaches” or “asymmetric TTPs” can be useful descriptors in characterizing any given set of war phenom-
ena, particulary in IW , UW , COIN and related topics. Be advised that a so-called Asymmetric Warfare Group exists to combat asymmetric threats.
compound Warfare (cW) Varying mixes of conventional regular forces and irregular forces, used together under unified direction, provide a range of options 
to a clever commander. A statement of the obvious.
conventional Warfare There is no such doctrinal term. The officially defined “traditional warfare” can be used instead, in most cases.
f ourth Generation Warfare (4GW) (and derivative/similar concepts) Advocates of 4GW maintain that the world is in a new era, or “generation, ” of warfare. 
The first generation was characterized by massed manpower, the second by firepower and the third by maneuver. 4GW proponents claim that the new genera-
tion is characterized by the use of all instruments of power — not only the military — to defeat the will of enemy decision-makers. 4GW is a pretentious, ahis-
torical and contrived theory based on an assailable model of generational definition, an assailable theory of generational evolution and an arbitrary nation-state 
start point that controls out most of human experience. It “discovers” insights already known. Unfortunately and counterproductively, 4GW enthusiasts have 
multiplied, and the 4GW model has been appended with more useless “new-found revelations. ” A distinction is now made by some between G standing for 
generation and G standing for “gradient. ” This so-called “XGW” dropped the 4GW basis in modernism and replaced it with a spectrum of power dispersion. 
The gradients are then fundamentally understood as: 0GW becomes “survival;” 1GW becomes “force projection;” 2GW becomes “counterforce;” 3GW remains 
manuever; 4GW becomes “counterperception;” and 5GW becomes “perception manipulation, ” whereby the context of observation is changed so that the foe is 
manipulated into reacting on false assumptions. As if this weren’t enough, there are advocates for various so-called “6GW” theories. One continuation of this 
school claims 6GW is 5GW with an increased emphasis on the vulnerabilities of human biology and psychology. An entirely different 6GW theory — associ-
ated largely with Russian theorists — is based entirely on technological progress, whereby the sixth generation will highlight exploitation of advanced technol-
ogy, obviating the need for large-casualty invasions and occupations. There are even at least two schools of “7GW . ” One school is predicated on achieving the 
superlative application of the Boydian OODA loop. This school asserts that he who thinks faster and better will win, and this requires an imaginative fusion 
of any and all human disciplines. A different 7GW school is rooted in what might be characterized as reductio ad absurdum, or Eastern-style monism, where 
the source and destination of all conflict is rooted in the individual consciousness. All of the time devoted to this intellectual ferment would probably be better 
spent contemplating Sun Tzu. Not one of these ideas is approved for doctrine.
General purpose f orces There is no such doctrinal term. Use the officially defined term “conventional forces” instead.
Global Way of War Held up by advocates as a desired evolution from the perceived limitations of a traditional “Western way of war. ”
Holistic Warfare A broad, generic concept frequently used to connote using any and all ways and means available to prosecute warfare.
Hybrid Warfare The common thread among various theorists is the truism that some combination of two or more dissimilar elements produces a hybrid. 
Knowing this is said to have great explanatory value. It doesn’t, unless, perhaps, one is locked into a priori conceptual strait jackets on the limited combination 
of ends, ways and means. Nevertheless, the plain English usage of terms such as “hybrid threats” or “hybrid approaches” does provide useful descriptors, and 
tellingly, these phrases are used in senior policy and command documents. However, there is no new kind of warfare called hybrid warfare. Like the asymme-
tries in so-called asymmetric warfare, hybrids are inherent in everything, including all warfare.
information Warfare A concept referring to the exploitation of information management to achieve comparative advantages over an opponent. It emphasizes 
leveraging emerging technologies and psychological operations. Not synonymous with the doctrinal term “information operations. ”
legacy Warfare A vague term sometimes used loosely to connote a previous, less-relevant and fading convention of warfare.
matrix Warfare Describes an environment in which war and peace, battlefield victory and notions of black or white no longer apply, and in which success or 
failure will be determined in a collection of gray-area results. Depictions of opponents’ organizations resemble business organization models that are delib-
erately non-hiearchical, are adaptive to their operating environments and have decentralized leadership adept at achieving efficiencies vs. more cumbersome 
competitors. A confluence of technology, economics and information has produced unprecedented empowerment relative to scale. Conceptually redundent 
with IW and other contemporary theories.
netwar A concept focused on the identification of social networks used by irregular-threat opponents. Not synonymous with NCW .
network-centric warfare (ncW) A theory of organization and information management that seeks to translate an information advantage, enabled in part by 
information technology, into a competitive warfighting advantage. Friendly units would be networked together to achieve an OODA loop advantage. A com-
mon saying for enthusiasts is: “It takes a network to beat a network. ”
nonconventional Warfare A vague, simple and plain-English negation of “conventional warfare” that is used in academic discussions. It is not synonymous 
with unconventional warfare, which has a specific meaning. Avoid use of this term.
ooda A theory that whoever is able to observe, orient, decide and act faster has a warfighting advantage. It is influential non-doctrine.
partisan Warfare The use of irregular troops raised to resist foreign occupation of an area. Specific to World War II or before. JP 1-02 directs that the term not 
be used.
post-Heroic Warfare This is one school of thought with two branches. The original branch argues that American policy should not be constrained by the need 
for “heroic-crusade” motivations to intervene in small-scale stability operations. The second branch is an effete academic argument that asserts that Western 
civilization has evolved beyond heroic rationales — i.e., for “fortune and glory” — for conducting warfare.
unrestricted Warfare (uRW) Unfortunately, this term is sometimes abbreviated “UW , ” which is counterproductive because of avoidable confusion with the 
proper doctrinal abbreviation for unconventional warfare. URW refers to a Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army monograph advocating the use of any and all 
means to attack or subvert the United States specifically, while explicitly recognizing no rules that apply to an ascendant power. It is a relatively recent update of 
Chinese tradition, with a very specific international context and usage.
Whole-of-Government approach (as it applies to warfare) Connotes the use of all instruments of government power together, in a (theoretically) coordi-
nated manner. Similar to, but not synonymous with, the more broadly defined concept of “holistic warfare. ” 
nOnDOctrin Al/ UnOFFici Al ter Ms AnD the Ories
(AVOiD Use in O FFici Al Written AnD sp Oken Disc OUrse)
REPRODUCTION  AUTHORIzED AND ENCOURAGED
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DeFinin G WAr
IW differs from conventional operations dramatically in two aspects. 
First, it is warfare among and within the people. The conflict is waged 
not for military supremacy but for political power. Military power can 
contribute to the resolution of this form of warfare, but it is not decisive. 
The effective application of military forces can create the conditions 
for the other instruments of national power to exert their influence. 
Second, IW differs from conventional warfare by its emphasis on the 
indirect approach. Although it is not approved as joint doctrine, the 
Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, version 2.0, dated 17 May 
2010, is the reference most directly focused on IW . IW is addressed in 
JP 3-0 as a strategic context and in FM 3-0 as an operational theme.
s tability o perations is defined in JP 3-0 as an overarching term 
encompassing various military missions, tasks and activities con-
ducted outside the United States in coordination with other instru-
ments of national power to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure 
environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency 
infrastructure reconstruction and humanitarian relief.
Through a comprehensive approach to stability operations, mili-
tary forces establish conditions that enable the efforts of the other 
instruments of national and international power. Those efforts build 
a foundation for transitioning to civilian control by providing the 
requisite security and control to stabilize an operational area.
Stability operations are typically lengthy endeavors conducted with-
in an environment of political ambiguity. As a result, the potentially 
slow development process of government reconstruction and stabiliza-
tion policy may frustrate flexible military plans that adapt to the lethal 
dynamics of combat operations. Thus, integrating the planning efforts 
of all the agencies and organizations involved in a stability operation 
is essential to long-term peace and stability. Any ARSOF core activity 
could be employed in support of stability operations. However, CAO is 
the ARSOF core activity most essential to stability operations, and the 
most closely-focused reference is FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs.
Ars OF core Activities
ARSOF possess unique capabilities to support USSOCOM’s roles, 
missions and functions as directed by Congress in Section 164, Title 
10, United States Code (10 USC 164) and Section 167, Title 10, United 
States Code (10 USC 167). ARSOF plan, conduct and support special 
operations throughout the range of military operations. ARSOF mis-
sions are normally joint or interagency in nature. ARSOF can conduct 
these missions unilaterally, with allied forces, as part of a coalition 
force or with indigenous assets. Mission priorities vary from one 
theater of operations to another. ARSOF missions are dynamic because 
they are directly affected by politico-military considerations. A change 
in national-security strategy or policy may add, delete or radically 
alter the nature of an ARSOF mission. The president, the secretary of 
defense, or a joint-force commander may task an ARSOF element to 
perform missions for which it is the best suited among available forces 
or perhaps the only force available. ARSOF are organized, trained and 
equipped specifically to accomplish the core activities.
UW is a core activity for ARSOF and a core IW activity. By order 
of the commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or 
USASOC, UW is the core [activity] and organizing principle for Army 
Special Forces. The USSOCOM definition of UW was approved in 
May 2009 — Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or 
insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupy-
ing power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary 
and guerrilla force in a denied area.
18 From this definition, it is clear 
that UW is not the opposite of some loosely understood, nondoctrinal 
concept such as “conventional warfare. ” The current, longstanding joint 
UW definition found in JP 1-02 is “a broad spectrum of military and 
paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly 
conducted through, with or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are 
organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying de-
grees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla 
warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities and unconven-
tional assisted recovery. ” The USSOCOM version is being proposed as 
the replacement term for inclusion in JP 1-02 through JP 3-05, Special 
Operations, which is currently in revision. 
The current UW product is TC 18-01, Special Forces Unconventional 
Warfare, which will be available electronically from the Reimer Training 
and Doctrine Digital Library in 2011. TC 18-01 will fill the doctrinal 
void for UW while the new Army UW tactics, techniques and proce-
dures manual, ATTP 3-18.01 Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, 
is under development using the updated Army doctrine hierarchy of 
ATTP publications. There is no joint doctrine for UW , and when ATTP 
3-18.01 is complete, it will be the authoritative UW reference.
FId  is a core activity for ARSOF and a core IW activity. JP 3-22, 
Foreign Internal Defense, defines FID as participation by civilian and 
military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken 
by another government or designated organization to free and protect 
its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism and other 
threats to its security. Its primary intent is to help the legitimate govern-
ing body address internal threats and their underlying causes through 
a host-nation, or HN, program of internal defense and development. 
FID is not restricted to times of conflict. Like UW , FID is an umbrella 
concept that covers a broad range of activities, potentially including the 
conduct of all other ARSOF core activities. FID is a whole-of-U.S. gov-
ernment effort based in law and is not a subordinate activity to COIN. 
There are three categories of support in FID: indirect support, 
direct support not involving combat and combat operations. ARSOF 
may be employed in any of the three categories. However, ARSOF’s 
primary role in FID is to assess, train, advise and assist HN military 
and paramilitary forces with tasks that require the unique capabilities 
of ARSOF . The goal is to enable these HN forces to maintain internal 
stability, to counter subversion and violence in their country, and to 
address the causes of instability. The current authoritative reference on 
ARSOF’s role is FM 3-05.137, Army Special Operations Forces Foreign 
Internal Defense. The Army’s new FID manual is scheduled for publica-
tion in September 2011 as ATTP 3-05.22, Foreign Internal Defense.
sFa  is a core activity for ARSOF . SFA and FID overlap without 
being subsets of each other. JP 3-22 defines SFA as the Department of 
Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. govern-
ment to support the development of the capacity and capability of 
foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. SFA is DoD’s 
contribution to unified action to develop the capacity and capability of 
foreign security forces, or FSF , from the ministerial level down to units 
of those forces. FSF include but are not limited to the military; police; 
border police, coast guard and customs officials; paramilitary forces; 
forces peculiar to specific nations, states, tribes or ethnic groups; 
prison, correctional and penal services; infrastructure-protection 
forces; and the governmental ministries and departments responsible 
18 Special Warfare

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for FSF . At operational and strategic levels, both SFA and FID focus on 
developing an FSF’s internal capacity and capability. However, SFA also 
prepares FSF to defend against external threats and to perform as part 
of an international coalition. FID and SFA are similar at the tactical 
level where advisory skills are applicable to both.
USSOCOM is the designated joint proponent and will lead develop-
ment of joint doctrine for SFA, and it has the responsibility to lead 
the collaborative development, coordination and integration of the 
SFA capability across DoD. That includes development of SFA in joint 
doctrine; training and education for 
individuals and units; joint capabili-
ties; joint mission-essential task lists; 
and identification of critical indi-
vidual skills, training and experience. 
Additionally, in collaboration with 
the Joint Staff and U.S. Joint Forces 
Command, and in coordination with 
the services and geographic com-
batant commanders, USSOCOM 
is tasked with developing global 
joint-sourcing solutions that recom-
mend the most appropriate forces 
(conventional forces and/or SOF) for 
validated SFA requirements referred 
to the global force management pro-
cess. The U.S. Army John F . Kennedy 
Special W arfare Center and School’s 
Directorate of Training and Doctrine 
collaborates with the Army Training 
and Doctrine Command’s Combined 
Arms Center — the Army’s designat-
ed proponent for SFA — in develop-
ment of Army service doctrine for 
SFA. Although pertinent to most ARSOF activities, TC 31-73, Special 
Forces Advisor Guide, (July 2008) is a practical guide directly relevant 
to SF’s conduct of SFA. TC 31-73 will be reviewed, updated and redes-
ignated TC 18-02 sometime in 2011. The authoritative Army reference 
for SFA is FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance.
Co In  is a core activity for ARSOF and a core IW activity. JP 3-24, 
Counterinsurgency Operations, defines COIN as comprehensive civil-
ian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address 
any core grievances. Military operations in support of COIN fall into 
three broad categories: civil-military operations, combat operations 
and information operations. ARSOF are particularly valuable in COIN 
because of their specialized capabilities in CAO; MISO; intelligence; 
language skills; and region-specific knowledge.
ARSOF committed to COIN have a dual mission. First, they must 
assist the HN forces to defeat or neutralize the insurgent militarily. 
That allows the HN government to start or resume functioning in 
once-contested or insurgent-controlled areas. Second, ARSOF sup-
port the overall COIN program by conducting operations, such as 
SFA, military information support, training, intelligence and tactical 
support. This provides an environment in which the HN government 
can win the trust and support of its people and become self-sustaining. 
Both aspects of the COIN mission are of equal importance and must 
be conducted at the same time. The authoritative reference on the 
Army’s role is FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. When published in mid-
2011, TC 18-05, Special Forces Counterinsurgency; Tactics, Techniques 
and Procedures, will highlight SF participation in COIN.
da  is a core activity for ARSOF . JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special 
Operations, defines DA as short-duration strikes and other small-scale 
offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied or 
politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized mili-
tary capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage 
designated targets. Direct action differs from conventional offensive 
actions in the level of physical and 
political risk, operational techniques 
and the degree of discriminate and 
precise use of force to achieve spe-
cific objectives. 
In the conduct of these op-
erations, ARSOF may employ raid, 
ambush or assault tactics (including 
close-quarters battle); emplace mines 
and other munitions; conduct stand-
off attacks by fire from air, ground or 
maritime platforms; provide terminal 
guidance for precision-guided muni-
tions; conduct independent sabo-
tage; conduct anti-ship operations; 
or recover or capture personnel or 
material. DA operations are normally 
limited in scope and duration, but 
they may provide specific, well-de-
fined and often time-sensitive results 
of strategic and operationally critical 
significance. ARSOF conduct DA op-
erations independently or as part of 
larger conventional or unconvention-
al operations or campaigns. The authoritative reference on SF’s role in 
DA is ATTP 3-18.03, (C) Special Forces Direct Action Operations (U).
sr  is a core activity of ARSOF . JP 3-05 defines SR as reconnais-
sance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in 
hostile, denied or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify 
information of strategic or operational significance, employing military 
capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. These actions 
provide an additive capability for commanders and supplement other 
conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions.
SR may include information on activities of an actual or potential en-
emy or secure data on the meteorological, hydrographic or geographic 
characteristics of a particular area. SR may also include assessment of 
chemical, biological, residual nuclear or environmental hazards in a 
denied area. SR includes target acquisition, area assessment and post-
strike reconnaissance. It may complement other collection methods 
constrained by weather, terrain-masking or hostile countermeasures. 
Selected ARSOF conduct SR as a HUMINT activity that places U.S. or 
U.S.-controlled “eyes on target, ” when authorized, in hostile, denied or 
politically sensitive territory. ARSOF SR support of conventional forces 
may create an additional and unique capability to achieve objectives 
that may not be otherwise attainable. However, such use does not mean 
that ARSOF will become dedicated reconnaissance assets for conven-
tional forces. ARSOF may also employ advanced reconnaissance and 
unconventional Warfare (uW)
f oreign internal defense (fid )
security f orce assistance (sfa )
counterinsurgency (coin )
direct action (da)
special Reconnaissance (sR)
counterterrorism (ct )
military information support o perations (miso )
civil affairs o perations (cao )
counterproliferation (cp ) of Weapons of mass 
destruction (secondary)
information operations (io) (secondary)
ARSOF CORE ACTIVITIES
19January-February 2011

--- Page 20 ---
DeFinin G WAr
surveillance sensors and collection methods that utilize indigenous 
assets. When received and passed to users, SR intelligence is consid-
ered reliable and accurate, and it normally does not require secondary 
confirmation. The authoritative reference on SF’ s role in SR is ATTP 
3-18.04, (C) Special Forces Special Reconnaissance Operations (U).
Ct is a core activity of ARSOF and a core IW activity. JP 3-26, 
Counterterrorism, defines CT as actions taken directly against terror-
ist networks and indirectly to influence and render global environ-
ments inhospitable to terrorist networks. Department of Justice and 
Department of State have lead-agency authority. Legal and political 
restrictions, and appropriate DoD directives limit ARSOF involve-
ment in CT. However, ARSOF possess the capability to conduct these 
operations in environments that may be denied to conventional 
forces because of political or threat conditions. ARSOF’s role and 
added capability is to conduct offensive measures within DoD’s over-
all combating-terrorism efforts. ARSOF conduct CT missions as SO 
by covert, clandestine or low-visibility means. 
ARSOF activities within CT include, but are not limited to: intelli-
gence operations to collect, exploit and report information on terrorist 
organizations, personnel, assets and activities; network and infrastruc-
ture attacks to execute pre-emptive strikes against terrorist organiza-
tions; hostage or sensitive-materiel recovery that require capabilities 
not normally found in conventional military units; and nonlethal 
activities to defeat the ideologies or motivations that spawn terrorism 
by nonlethal means. These activities could include, but are not limited 
to, MISO, IO, CAO, UW and FID. Most CT activities are classified. 
MIso  are both an ARSOF core activity and a capability. MISO are 
also a key related activity of IW . According to FM 3-05, as a core activ-
ity, MISO [PO] support all of the other core activities by increasing the 
psychological effects inherent in their application. It is important not 
to confuse psychological impact with planned psychological effects 
as part of MISO. While all military activities can have degrees of psy-
chological impact on the enemy and civilian population, unless they 
are planned and executed specifically to influence the perceptions and 
subsequent behavior of a target audience, they are not MISO. 
As a capability, MISO [PO] are conducted across the strategic, 
operational and tactical levels of conflict as part of interagency activi-
ties to achieve U.S. national objectives. One important aspect of MIS 
as a capability is the role of MIS specialists as advisers on psychologi-
cal effects. MISO can support other capabilities or can be the sup-
ported capability in some situations. MISO are the primary ARSOF 
information capability that: achieves information objectives; analyzes 
and addresses psychological factors in the operational environment; 
provides support to IO as a core capability; constitutes information 
activities across the range of military operations; supports other agen-
cies’ information activities (military information support); conducts 
domestic U.S. information-dissemination activities (during federal and 
local relief efforts in response to a natural or man-made disaster and as 
coordinated with ongoing military and lead federal agency PA efforts); 
supports the countering of adversary information; and provides an im-
portant nonlethal fire under the fires warfighting function. MISO were 
formerly known as psychological operations; the name was changed in 
June 2010 by order of the commander of USSOCOM, with the concur-
rence of the chief of staff of the Army. While doctrine is being updated 
to reflect the nuances of the change, the most authoritative current 
references remain JP 3-13.2 and FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations.
Cao is an ARSOF core activity and a key related activity of IW . 
JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, defines CAO as those military 
operations conducted by Civil Affairs forces that: (1) enhance the 
relationship between military forces and civil authorities in locali-
ties where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with 
other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institu-
tions and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional 
specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil govern-
ment to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. CAO are 
conducted by the designated conventional Army and the U.S. Army 
Reserve. CA forces are organized, trained and equipped to provide 
specialized support to commanders.
Commanders conduct CMO to establish, maintain, influence or 
exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities (gov-
ernment and nongovernment) and the civilian populace in friendly, 
neutral or hostile areas of operation to facilitate military operations 
and to consolidate operational objectives. CMO may occur at the 
strategic, operational and tactical levels and across the full range of 
military operations. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence 
of other military operations. While CA forces can be found within the 
Navy and Marines, most CA units reside in the Regular Army and the 
Army Reserve. USSOCOM is the joint proponent for CA, but SWCS 
is the force-modernization proponent for Army CA. The authoritative 
reference on CAO is FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations. 
CP is an ARSOF secondary core activity. JP 3-40, Combating 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, defines CP as actions taken to defeat 
the threat and/or use of weapons of mass destruction against the 
United States, our forces, allies and partners. JP 3 40 defines WMD 
as “chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons capable of a 
high order of destruction or causing mass casualties and excludes the 
means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means 
is a separable and divisible part from the weapon. ” The preponder-
ance of activities conducted by ARSOF in CP is a combination of the 
other ARSOF core activities. The authoritative reference on ARSOF’s 
role in CP is FM 3-05.132, Army Special Operations Forces Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations.
Io  is an ARSOF secondary core activity and a key related 
activity of IW . JP 3-13, Information Operations, defines IO as the 
integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic war -
fare, computer network operations, psychological operations [now 
MISO], military deception and operations security, in concert with 
specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, 
corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-mak -
ing while protecting our own. 
Two ARSOF capabilities, MISO and CAO, provide primary sup-
port to IO. Note that the IO definition does not yet reflect the recent 
name change from psychological operations to MISO. As one of the 
core capabilities of IO, MISO are the primary means of influencing 
foreign target audiences. Although FM 3-05.30 and FM 3-05.40 are 
authoritative references for MISO and CA respectively, there is no 
direct ARSOF reference for IO.
ARSOF’s conduct of the IO activity affects the information environ-
ment to achieve information superiority over an adversary. Informa-
tion superiority is the operational advantage gained through improved, 
fully synchronized, integrated intelligence, surveillance and reconnais-
20 Special Warfare

--- Page 21 ---
sance; knowledge management; and information management (FM 
3-0). The ultimate targets of all IO are the human decision-making 
processes and the attainment of information superiority, which enables 
friendly forces to understand and act first. As appropriate, IO target or 
protect information, information-transfer links, information-gathering 
and information-processing nodes, and the human decision-making 
process through core, supporting and related capabilities. 
the hazard of nondoctrinal terms 
“This is this. This isn’t something else. This is this. ”19 — The 
Deerhunter 
Regular review and restatement of approved definitions and 
their descriptions are necessary as sources of doctrine (e.g., policy, 
concepts, lessons learned, training, military education, operations 
planning and strategy) naturally evolve and doctrine is routinely 
updated. However, further complicating the goal of establishing and 
reinforcing up-to-date, authoritative and clearly articulated doctrine 
are other, currently influential, nondoctrinal terms. Incorrect usage 
of doctrinal terms sows confusion and hinders mission accomplish-
ment; incorrect usage of unapproved terms does so exponentially. 
Unapproved, nondoctrinal terms are so widely (and often incorrect-
ly) used throughout government, academia and the press that they 
demand a brief summary. Space limitations prevent a full discussion 
of such terms. However, a list of the most current and/or influential 
nondoctrinal terms has been summarized in a quick-reference guide 
of terms including: Asymmetric Warfare (AW); Compound Warfare 
(CW); Conventional Warfare; Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) 
and derivative/similar concepts; Global Way of War; Holistic War-
fare; Hybrid Warfare; Information Warfare; Legacy Warfare; Matrix 
Warfare; Netwar; Network-Centric Warfare (NCW); Nonconven-
tional Warfare; Partisan Warfare; Post-Heroic Warfare; Unrestricted 
Warfare (URW); and the Whole-of-Government Approach (as it 
applies to warfare).
20 This guide is in the center spread of this article 
and can be pulled out for readers to use and instruct others.
closing
Generally speaking, our Soldiers are not English teachers, and 
our senior leaders are not terminologists or walking dictionaries. 
However, it is important that properly-approved definitions should 
be adhered to and repeated often and accurately by leaders at every 
echelon. Such official definitions can provide continuity, unity and 
clarity, and they may therefore be relied upon for effective profes-
sional discussion. By contrast, the unofficial terms and theories that 
beguile the policy, doctrinal and operational discourse are ultimately 
unhelpful. Regardless of good intentions or patronage, when such 
concepts restate the obvious or can’t survive scrutiny, they become 
counterproductive; they deepen the swamp of misunderstanding 
and thicken the conceptual fog. ARSOF’s correct usage of doctrinal 
definitions provides a reliable azimuth through them. 
Jeffrey L. Hasler is a doctrine writer and analyst in the Special Forces 
Doctrine Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, JFK Special 
Warfare Center and School. Before retiring from the Army in 2010 as 
a chief warrant officer 4, he served more than 28 years in a variety of 
Special Forces assignments. He is a graduate of Indiana University and 
the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.
r eferences
1. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 
July 2010.
2. co L David w itty, “the g reat uw  Debate,” Special Warfare, march-april 2010, 
9; Ltc  mark g rdovic, “ramping up to face the challenge of irregular w arfare,” Special 
Warfare, september-october 2009, 14; Ltc  John mulbury, “arsof , g eneral Purpose 
f orces and fi D,” Special Warfare, January-f ebruary 2008, 16; cwo  4 Jeffrey hasler, 
“Defining w ar,” Special Warfare, march-april 2007, 23; maJ D. Jones, “uw /fi D and w hy 
w ords matter,” Special Warfare, July-august 2006, 20.
3. confucius, The Analects of Confucius, Book 13, Verse 3, James r . w are, tr. 
1980. Downloaded 22oct 10 from http://www.analects-ink.com/mission/confu-
cius_r ectification.html.
4. aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2 section 4, paras 4-5. although misat-
tributed as a direct quote, these passages are often summarized as “w e are what we 
repeatedly do. excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit.” Downloaded 04no V10 from 
http://classics.mit.edu/aristotle/nicomachaen.2.ii.html. 
5. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, f ourth edition, 
copyright 2000 by houghton mifflin company. accessed through the free dictionary 
25oct 10 from http://www.thefreedictionary.com/define. 
6. American Heritage Dictionary.
7. American Heritage Dictionary.
8. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDr ), fe B10, p 10; Department of Defense Direc-
tive (DoDD) 5100.1, 01aug 02; Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report (Qrm ), 
Jan09, r oles and missions f ramework, pp 3-7; title 10 usc  sec 167, 01fe B10; fm 
3-05, Army Special Operations Forces (Draft), 06oct 10.
9. Qrm , 4. 
10. JP 1-02.
11.  Qrm , 4.
12.  Qrm , 3.
13.  Merriam-Webster 2010. accessed 28oct 10 from http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/activities. 
14.  m. malvesti, “to serve the nation; u.s. special operations f orces in an era of 
Persistent conflict,” June 2010, 7.
15.  cJcsm  3500.04c, universal Joint task List, 01JuL01, g L-ii-3.
16. ussocom  Directive 10-1cc, 15Dec09.
17.  JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 22 march 2010.
18. aDm olson, cg  ussocom  may09. Ltg  mulholland, cg  usasoc .
19.  internet movie script Database. Downloaded 01no V10 from http://www.imsdb.
com/scripts/Deer-hunter,-the.html 
20. sources necessary for a broad understanding of the unofficial terms analyzed 
in this article are numerous. the references listed here are incomplete and representa-
tive – not comprehensive – and only cover some of the largest, most influential and 
most recent schools of thought as judged by the author. Listed alphabetically by author: 
arquilla, “the new r ules of w ar,” Foreign Policy, fe B10; echevarria, “fourth-g eneration 
w arfare and other myths,” no V05; f aculty of history oxford, strategic studies 
institute [Link], “Post-heroic w arfare,”2011 Downloaded 02no V10 from http://www.
strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/events/details.cfm?q=138; hasler, “the sling and 
the stone” [Book r eview], Special Warfare, Vol. 20 no. 3, may07; hoffman, “hybrid vs. 
compound w ar the Janus choice: Defining today’s multifaceted conflict,” Joint Forces 
Quarterly, oct 09; huber (ed.), compound w arfare: that f atal Knot, 2002; Lind, et. al., 
“the changing f ace of w ar: into the f ourth g eneration,” Marine Corps Gazette, oct 89; 
Luttwak, “toward Post-heroic w arfare,” Foreign Affairs, may95; mccullar, “the r ising 
Dominance of the information r evolution within rma  thought,” Small Wars Journal, 
oct 10; Qiao and w ang, “unrestricted w arfare,”fe B99.
21January-February 2011

--- Page 22 ---
In 2005, then-Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld asked whether the term psycho-
logical operations, or PSYOP , still had utility 
in the information age. His point was that 
the information age posed many branding 
challenges for PSYOP that adherence to the 
code of conduct and the Army values simply 
could not overcome. Earlier this year, absent 
any improvement in brand image, Admiral 
Eric Olson, commander of the United States 
Special Operations Command, directed 
that the term PSYOP be changed to military 
information-support operations, or MISO.
1
But the simple name change can neither 
eliminate the association of PSYOP with 
its pejorative predecessors — propaganda 
and psychological warfare — nor correct 
the contemporary perception of PSYOP as 
potentially underhanded and unethical. It 
is possible, however, that a better apprecia-
tion of the historical baggage might lead to 
a more complete understanding of the chal-
lenges facing the MISO force and its future.
This article will offer a review of PSYOP’s 
history; take a brief look at definitions; show 
the relationships of PSYOP to public affairs, 
or PA; information operations, or IO, and 
public diplomacy, or PD; and suggest new 
ways we might think about PSYOP (now 
MISO). Although PSYOP has been repeatedly 
misunderstood and misrepresented, MISO, as 
a means of informing and influencing foreign 
audiences, remains as relevant in peace as in 
war and as vital to our nation’s defense as ever 
before. This discussion is intended to create a 
dialogue that may generate solutions to many 
unresolved issues and serve as the beginning 
of a more comprehensive vision and mission 
of our MISO force and its function. 
pejorative past: the truth
The documented history of PSYOP 
begins with the World War I activities of 
its antecedent, propaganda.
2 In World War 
I, PSYOP “came into its own as a formal 
activity, ” said retired Colonel Frank Gold-
stein.
3 During that period, the three shades 
of propaganda — white, gray and black 
— appeared in a variety of unclassified and 
classified government programs aimed at 
motivating popular support for the war and 
demoralizing the enemy. It is important to 
understand that as propaganda moves from 
shades of white to black, the source of the 
propaganda becomes less obvious, until, in 
black propaganda, the source is unknown.
The most memorable and successful 
World War I white-propaganda themes 
communicated that the war was necessary 
to “keep the world safe for democracy” and 
that it would be “the war to end all wars. ” 
Ultimately, the propaganda campaigns 
waged by the U.S. and its allies also had unin-
tended consequences. On occasion, propa-
ganda waged at home exaggerated the truth 
to such an extent as to be construed as disin-
formation. The deceptiveness of those tactics 
almost eliminated our government’s credibil-
ity, even among sympathetic U.S. audiences. 
For example, rumors of the Germans making 
soap out of dead bodies at the “Corpse Con-
version Factory” only temporarily aroused 
war fervor and later aroused suspicion of U.S. 
government information.
4 By the end of the 
war, the American public had become indif-
ferent to rumors and disinformation. 
During World War II, the U.S. adapted its 
organizational structure to make the newly 
named psychological warfare, or PSYW AR, 
more acceptable. As in World War I, white 
propaganda still aroused popular support 
for the war effort, but it was placed under 
the control of the War Advertising Council. 
The more sensitive shades of gray and black 
propaganda were handled separately by the 
Office of War Information, or OWI.
The War Advertising Council organized 
corporate sponsorships and facilitated 
partnerships with the media and various 
advertising agencies to increase popular sup-
port for a variety of government programs 
ranging from the census to the draft. Its suc-
cessor, the Ad Council, is notably remem-
bered for some of America’s most famous 
icons and catch phrases: Smokey the Bear, 
McGruff the Crime Dog and “Friends don’t 
let friends drive drunk. ”
5
Meanwhile, the OWI, with its subordinate 
Psychological Warfare Division, focused its 
propaganda efforts on confusing, delegiti-
mizing and demoralizing foreign enemy 
audiences. Understanding the public’s sensi-
tivity to black propaganda, the Office of Stra-
tegic Services, or OSS, took control of those 
programs, which were eventually assimilated 
by one of the OSS’s successors, the CIA.
6
During World War II, both white propa -
ganda and the full-spectrum propaganda of 
PSYW AR gained a respectability that World 
War I propaganda had not. Its use contin -
ued during the postwar reconstruction era 
as consolidation propaganda (similar to 
today’s MISO support to stability opera-
tions). Despite the precipitous postwar de -
cline of staff expertise in Washington, D.C., 
PSYW AR and propaganda teams remained 
active in many headquarters in European 
and Pacific theaters.
7
the  future  of
MisO
By co Lone L curtis Boy D
22 Special Warfare

--- Page 23 ---
At the time, the prevailing opinion was 
that PSYW AR’ s ability to influence foreign 
audiences exceeded the boundaries of combat 
and the tactical battlefield, and that a more 
expansive definition and operational construct 
were needed. Understanding the limitations 
of PSYW AR and the need to communicate 
U.S. goals and objectives to foreign audiences, 
President Harry Truman’ s administration 
viewed the job as one not exclusive to the 
military. T o provide a capability for conduct-
ing peacetime propaganda and to oversee 
the standing-down of the W ar Department’ s 
OWI, Truman established the Interim Inter-
national Information Service, or IIIS, within 
the Department of State. Soon the Office of 
International Information and Cultural Affairs 
replaced the IIIS and formed the nucleus of 
what later became the United States Informa-
tion Agency, or USIA, in 1953.
8 While the 
USIA gave the U.S. government a way to com-
municate U.S. goals and objectives to foreign 
audiences, the military continued to struggle 
for a more expansive PSYW AR role that could 
support military operations and overseas 
interagency initiatives during peacetime. 
In 1959, Murray Dyer suggested politi-
cal communications as an umbrella term 
for concealing the three separate branches 
— psychological warfare, information and 
propaganda — of PSYW AR. 
In a 1952 campaign speech in San Fran-
cisco, Dwight D. Eisenhower spoke of the 
value of PSYW AR: 
We must adapt our foreign policy to a “cold 
war” strategy … a chance to gain a victory 
without casualties, to win a contest that can 
quite literally save peace. … In this war, which 
was total in every sense of the word, we have 
seen many great changes in military science. 
It seems to me that not the least of these was 
the development of psychological warfare as a 
specific and effective weapon.
9
From then on, psychological warfare rose 
to national strategic significance in an East 
vs. West war of images and ideas — the Cold 
War. As retired Colonel Al Paddock shows 
in his book, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its 
Origins, maintaining PSYW AR as a viable 
capability during World War II and after-
ward was a constant but worthwhile battle 
that gave us the ability to influence foreign 
audiences in a manner favorable to U.S. 
national-security objectives. It is not surpris-
ing that in the same year as Eisenhower’s 
speech, the Psychological Warfare Center 
was established at Fort Bragg, N.C., in recog-
nition of PSYW AR’s importance and credible 
ability to influence foreign audiences in war 
and peace. The Army appreciated the need 
for talented young officers who had the 
education, experience or aptitude for the art 
of influence to join the PSYW AR ranks, and 
the PSYW AR Center, later the Special War-
fare Training Center, began providing the 
Army’s cadre of professional “psywarriors” 
who would later take their understanding of 
the art of influence to war in Vietnam. 
By its very nature, PSYW AR fit well with 
combat operations, but during the post-
combat consolidation and stabilization 
phases, its credibility began to erode. As dur-
hist Oric Al perspecti Ve In Vietnam the traditional concept [of PSYWAR] was broadened: Americans 
wielded a double-edged psychological sword of the “dual war.” U.S. Army photo.
23January-February 2011

--- Page 24 ---
the  FUtUre  OF M is O
ing the post-World War II period, there were 
efforts to disguise PSYW AR as something 
else during the less-than-hostile phases of 
military operations. Paddock says that in 
Vietnam, counterinsurgency, unconvention-
al warfare and guerrilla warfare could not 
have been waged effectively without PSYOP 
as a valuable enabler and force multiplier.
From Vietnam to the present, psychologi-
cal operations have risen to respectability and 
credibility within our Army and the Depart-
ment of Defense. While there was another 
postwar lull in interest in PSYOP after Viet-
nam, the most profound increase in num-
bers and interest in PSYOP forces occurred 
during the mid- to late 1980s. The impact of 
President Ronald Reagan’s National Security 
Decision Directive 77 (1983), the Department 
of Defense PSYOP Master Plan (1985) and 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act (1987) provided 
permanent PSYOP staff authorizations within 
the Joint Staff, the Department of the Army 
and the U.S. Special Operations Command, 
as well as the permanent establishment of 
two reserve-component PSYOP groups, an 
enlisted military occupational specialty (37F), 
the recognition of the importance of PSYOP 
planning at combatant commands and the 
modernization of PSYOP equipment — all 
improvements that were absent during any 
other postwar period in our military history.
10
The activation of the 4th PSYOP Group 
headquarters and four battalions during Viet-
nam, the activation of the PSYOP Regiment 
in 1998, the creation of the PSYOP Branch 
(37A) in 2006 and the existence of three 
PSYOP groups today show remarkable steps 
ahead in the Army’s ability to convey mes-
sages to affect foreign audiences’ behavior.
11
In 1962, the term psychological warfare 
changed to psychological operations to 
address the demands of a “more expansive 
role” in general and to meet the mission 
demands of counterinsurgency and uncon-
ventional warfare in particular. In today’s 
operating environment, the Army finds itself 
asking a similar question about PSYOP in 
the war on terrorism. The question now is 
whether or not MISO will serve as an ap-
propriate substitute for PSYOP and a new 
term of reference for DoD’s most credible 
inform-and-influence capability not only in 
the war on terror but in all forms of military 
and interagency engagements.
Facts
For the purposes of this article, our 
analysis and definition will remain within 
the Army’s domain. That is not to suggest 
that what was PSYOP and is now MISO is 
not a joint force or capability. MISO is inher-
ently joint, yet the forces and capabilities to 
execute it for the DoD reside predominantly 
in the Army. There are more than 2,000 
active-duty PSYOP Branch Soldiers, most 
of whom are assigned to the Army Special 
Operations Command’s 4th Military Infor-
mation Support Group (formerly the 4th 
PSYOP Group), and twice that number are 
assigned to the two Army Reserve groups 
(the 2nd and the 7th). Those active-duty and 
reserve forces conduct operations planned to 
s tr AiGht t Alk A MISO specialist assigned to 307th Psychological Operations Company, and an interpreter (second from the left) teach English to Afghan 
National Army soldiers on Combat Outpost Sayed. U.S. Army photo.
24 Special Warfare

--- Page 25 ---
convey selected information and indicators to 
foreign audiences to influence their emotions, 
motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, 
the behavior of foreign governments, orga-
nizations, groups and individuals.12 More 
simply stated, MISO is communications 
to influence human attitudes and behav-
ior. The targeting of foreign governments, 
organizations, groups and individuals is the 
most revealing feature of the more detailed 
definition, because it reflects intentions and 
potential actions that extend beyond the 
tactical level of war and are not exclusive 
to combat. Likewise, the mere idea that we 
might convey “selected information” paral-
lels methods akin to those of propaganda (a 
lesson for a revised MISO definition). 
In the information age, PSYOP’s rel-
evance across the continuum of conflict and 
functionality at multiple levels of warfare 
was tenuous, at best. On the one hand, there 
was and still is no debating the relevance 
of PSYOP at the tactical level. One can-
not convincingly argue that there is such a 
thing as strategic PSYOP , because no senior 
government official will ever admit that they 
conduct propaganda. In fact, in 1999, then-
Secretary of State Madeline Albright closed 
the USIA to ensure that she and the rest of 
the State Department dissociated themselves 
from any possibility that propaganda was 
being developed and disseminated anywhere 
on behalf of the U.S. government.
13 While 
one might argue that the U.S. government 
cannot separate itself from propaganda by 
simply eliminating an agency, the argu-
ment itself is beyond the analytical scope of 
this discussion. Other attempts to disguise 
operational- and strategic-level propaganda 
have increased confusion and reduced the 
clarity of our message.
14 Likewise, while one 
can see opportunity by changing the name 
PSYOP to MISO, there will still be lingering 
suspicion and innuendo given the gradual 
changes in lixicon, doctrine, training, educa-
tion, leader development and force manage-
ment that will occur over time.
Does MisO’s reach extend 
across all levels of war?
The combatant commands and the 
interagency are typically not inclined to 
refer to “PSYOP” when they are consider-
ing influencing populations in their area of 
responsibility. At the operational level, the 
preference is to conceal PSYOP’s apparently 
untruthful tendencies and unscrupulous 
underpinnings. White or “pure” PSYOP 
has been disguised as “Military or Defense 
Support to Public Diplomacy, ” “Interna-
tional Public Information” or, in some other 
instances, simply IO, to lessen the scrutiny 
and allegations that might come with using 
PSYOP in a peacetime environment.
15
The U.S. government, through the State 
Department, uses PD as a means of “engag-
ing, informing and influencing key inter-
national audiences about U.S. policy and 
society to advance America’s interests which 
is practiced in harmony with public affairs 
(outreach to Americans) and traditional 
diplomacy to advance U.S. interests and se-
curity and to provide the moral basis for U.S. 
leadership in the world”
16 (one might think 
MISO could harmonize with PA, too).17
Does today’s MisO parallel pD?
In years past, PSYOP and diplomacy did 
not easily mix, but the desire to inform and 
influence foreign audiences was of mutual 
concern. Despite good intentions, PSYOP’s 
negative connotation and brand image re-
quired PD to collaborate cautiously, assume 
a safe distance and maintain deniability, 
or risk guilt by association. So how then 
did the former practices and principles of 
PSYOP get synchronized with those of “well 
intentioned” diplomats and our so-called 
PSYOP specialists? Simply put, PSYOP had 
to become more compatible and persua-
sive by using other names to refer to itself, 
demilitarizing its lexicon, and describing its 
functions as more inclusive of commercial 
activities, public relations and cross-cultural-
communications constructs. De facto, the 
military information support team had 
become synonymous with the PA and PD 
partnership, which had markedly increased 
accessibility, reduced suspicion and lessened 
the potential for guilt by association — pro-
viding sufficient basis for today’s MISO. 
Accordingly, support of regional combat-
ant commanders and U.S. country teams’ 
theater-security cooperation initiatives has 
been provided by a military information-
support team. Similarly, as contingency 
operations like Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq 
and Afghanistan transitioned to less-than-
hostile phases of operations, PSYOP task 
forces changed to softer, more sophisticated 
product-development and –dissemination, 
under the guise of information task forces, 
further relieving accessibility challenges, 
misgivings or suspicion. 
As if things were not confused enough, 
PA, PSYOP and PD have been categorized as 
influence operations, strategic communica-
tion, perception management, soft power 
and strategic influence.
18 Retired Colonel 
Fred Walker adds, “We might use the term 
‘persuasive communications’ to mean the 
same thing as psychological operations. ”
19 
MISO is a reasonable compromise, given the 
many nondescript and confusing terms of 
reference that might be used to encapsulate 
what PSYOP once was and what MISO really 
has the potential to be.
Friction
The various terminologies sometimes 
complicate our understanding and hinder our 
ability to redefine PSYOP in the information 
age so that we can introduce a more inclusive 
concept like MISO. Information operations, for 
example, are the integrated employment of the 
core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer 
network operations, psychological operations, 
military deception and operations security, in 
concert with specified supporting and related 
capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or 
usurp adversarial decision-making while pro-
tecting our own.
20 The simplest way to think of 
the difference between information operations 
and historical PSYOP is that IO is the integra-
tor, whereas PSYOP was the instigator.21
In an article that retired Major General 
David Grange wrote on Bosnia, he used 
information operations and psychological 
operations interchangeably. Similarly, in a 
book about the war planning for Iraq, Bob 
Woodward points out how Secretary of De-
fense Donald Rumsfeld referred repeatedly 
to PSYOP from leaflet drops to Commando 
Solo broadcasts as information operations. 
Nathaniel Fick, author of the book, One 
Bullet Away, stated in an oral presentation 
about his experiences in Iraq that as he and 
his recon platoon crossed into the southern 
portion of the country, nine out of 10 Iraqis 
surrendered without fighting, which he con-
tends was the result of an “intense IO cam-
paign that dropped leaflets and broadcasted 
surrender appeals. ”
22 Similarly, there are many 
flag officers and senior Pentagon officials who 
cannot comfortably use the term PSYOP in 
forums in W ashington and elsewhere, so, in 
its place, information operations has become 
a more appropriate and subtle substitute.
23 
25January-February 2011

--- Page 26 ---
the  FUtUre  OF M is O
There is much discussion about the future 
of IO in our Army, and suffice it to state that 
if it is economically and operationally practi-
cal and purposeful to retain this redundancy, 
then there is no need to assume that there are 
any efficiencies to be gained from combining 
the IO and PSYOP officer corps. On the other 
hand, if there is evidence that IO and PSYOP 
redundancies or staff fratricide do exist, then 
we should pursue a construct that builds a 
MISO plus IO (and PA) career force from the 
bottom up. There is no question that affecting 
adversary decision-making begins with a psy-
chological appreciation of the target audience. 
That said, then it logically flows that MISO 
gains the advanced understanding of IO 
tools and techniques to further discourage or 
defeat the target of influence. Therefore, the 
convergence of the two officer career fields 
offers practical, purposeful and economic 
solutions for DoD and our nation. 
Speaking in 2005 to the Armed Services 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconven-
tional Threats and Capabilities, General 
Doug Brown, the former commander of the 
United States Special Operations Command, 
said, “Dissemination of truthful information 
to foreign audiences in support of U.S. policy 
and national objectives is a vital part of the 
special-operations force’s effort to secure 
peace. ”
24 Admiral Eric Olson, the USSO-
COM commander, has repeatedly made the 
same point, which he has stressed emphati-
cally in the replacement of the term PSYOP 
with MISO. Admiral Olson has made the 
point that MISO has no business associating 
itself with such ventures as deception that 
rely on misperceptions and misinterpreta-
tions of the facts among target audiences 
(MISO must and will be truth-based).
The Geneva-Hague Convention’s laws of 
armed conflict outline the legal and ethi-
cal limitations for the conduct of military 
operations, including PSYOP . Moreover, DoD 
regulations, instructions and policy directives 
outline PSYOP permissions, as well as release 
and approval authorities. Joint Pub 3-53, 
Doctrine for Joint PSYOP, and other doctrinal 
publications reiterate the legal limitations 
on psychological operations. Ultimately, the 
authority to conduct PSYOP resides with 
either the president or the secretary of de-
fense. While the Posse Comitatus Act (1878) 
establishes strict legal limits for the use of the 
military in the continental United States in 
general, the Smith Mundt Act (1948) more 
particularly restricts the use of PSYOP within 
our borders.
25 For MISO Soldiers to conduct 
operations within the continental U.S., the 
secretary of defense must issue a deployment-
and-execution order that delineates the 
objectives, themes, timing, duration and types 
of information to be disseminated in support 
of military operations or lead federal agen-
cies. Therefore, MISO authorities to deploy 
and execute operations are tightly controlled 
and are kept within the acceptable norms of 
American culture.
Today, the Department of Defense 
conveys truth through two messengers: PA 
and MISO. PA assets consist largely of staff 
assistants, journalists, correspondents and 
small detachments capable of gathering and 
disseminating military news for domestic 
consumption. MISO (AC/USAR PSYOP), by 
contrast, has larger tactical and operational 
units with the skills and resources needed 
to capture, develop, produce and dissemi-
nate multimedia products that can be used 
to inform and influence foreign audiences. 
Because MISO and PA must have the trust 
of the target audience, and because trust and 
credibility depend on facts, truth forms the 
foundation of both MISO and PA.
26 Absent 
the untruthful stigma of PSYOP , MISO offers 
PA a vital partner in DoD’s capacity to craft a 
unified message and speak with one voice.
Regardless, each of DoD’s messengers 
subscribes to truth as a critical ingredient in 
securing and shaping a credible relationship 
with its audience. PA and MISO claim pro-
prietorship to the same truth, yet one might 
ask, “If PA and MISO tell the same truth, 
then why are there two messengers and two 
distinct military career fields?” Having a wall 
between PA and MISO is counterproduc-
tive during an era when we are experiencing 
persistent budget cuts, manpower reductions, 
and declining brand loyalty and image in a 
more media enriched, culturally diverse, and 
technologically sophisticated global market. 
If correctly defined, MISO might offer some 
relief from propaganda’s pejorative past and 
find itself even more inclusive of PA-like com-
petencies, cooperation and collaboration.
Today’s self-proclaimed purists in PA, 
PD and the national media detest any 
association with propaganda, yet they 
“spin” messages without full disclosure. PD 
promotes U.S. foreign-policy objectives by 
“seeking to understand, inform and influ-
ence foreign audiences and opinion makers, 
and by broadening the dialogue between 
American citizens and institutions and 
their counterparts abroad. ”
27 As Joseph Nye 
states, “Skeptics who treat public diplomacy 
as a euphemism for broadcasting govern-
ment propaganda miss the point. Simple 
propaganda lacks credibility and thus is 
counterproductive. ”
28
The Pentagon has stated: “The media cov-
erage of any future operation will to a large 
extent shape public perception in the United 
States. ” PA officers steer media toward 
stories, interviews and photo opportunities, 
all intended to have the desired influence 
and affect.
29 Even the Army has recognized 
the importance of information to the current 
and future fight. Army Field Manual 3-0, 
Operations, states that information is the 
commander’s business. 
The 2004 Defense Science Board’s Study 
on Strategic Communication examined the 
relationship between PD, PA and white 
PSYOP in order to create consistency of 
message and maximize our national tools 
of influence.
30 There is little question that 
prejudice stems from PSYOP’s origins in 
propaganda and psychological warfare, 
although with time, that stigma has become 
more fiction that fact.
Assuming that we could isolate the 
functionality of pure PA and dark PSYOP 
(deception) at opposite ends of an informa-
tion continuum, we could use MISO in the 
middle as an operational construct that links 
the core competencies of foreign public and 
community relations, media operations, 
public information and communication, 
military marketing/advertising/branding, 
and crisis communications as the informa-
tional and influential means of communicat-
ing our military’s message.
31 
enD: MisO in the middle
The brighter side of PSYOP’s historical 
record highlights some incredibly ingenious, 
innovative and imaginative methods for 
winning the “hearts and minds” of select 
foreign audiences and compelling many 
enemies to surrender without fighting. Cur-
rent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are 
full of such successes. PSYOP assumed a 
leading role in the formation of the infor-
mation task forces in both Operation Iraqi 
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom 
and employed a myriad of inform-and-influ-
ence techniques, from traditional face-to-
face key-leader engagements to leveraging 
leading-edge technologies for delivering 
more precise and more purposeful messages. 
26 Special Warfare

--- Page 27 ---
From surrender appeals to weapons buy-
back to national-pride programs to publiciz-
ing federal and local elections, PSYOP has 
delivered convincingly credible and truthful 
information for effect. 
Ninety-five percent of psychological 
operations have reflected factual and truth-
ful information, full disclosure without 
manipulation and a genuine intent to 
inform. The remaining five percent were 
either unacknowledged communications or 
outright blunders that tended to capture the 
most criticism and public interest, yet they 
typically were not performed by uniformed 
PSYOP personnel.
32 MISO lacks any ability 
to counteract those misrepresentations that 
tend to overshadow the tens of thousands of 
more influential messages and positive infor-
mational activities that have been employed 
from Iraq to Indonesia.
In the contemporary information envi-
ronment, the term PSYOP has become in-
extricably tied to political “doubletalk” akin 
to deception, disinformation and other lies 
or falsehoods.
  An understanding of MISO 
today has to consider the weight imposed 
by the historical baggage of propaganda, 
PSYW AR and PSYOP . While the bright 
side of the historical record is full of some 
incredibly ingenious and imaginative ways 
to influence foreign audiences in divisive, 
coercive and persuasive ways to compel 
them to surrender without fighting, there 
are also some less favorable memories of 
trickery and disinformation representative of 
the darker side of PSYOP history.  
From World War I until Vietnam, PSY-
W AR was generally reserved for “wartime 
use only. ” From Vietnam until the pres-
ent however, the size and capabilities of 
PSYW AR’s successor PSYOP force have 
increased three times over their original 
configuration, and improvements in technol-
ogy have increased, as well. The combination 
of those two factors and the competencies of 
the PSYOP officer branch and enlisted career 
field have increased the military’s power 
to inform and influence exponentially. 
To achieve the positive brand recognition 
needed to maximize MISO’s potential to 
inform and influence, however, we continue 
to use euphemisms to disguise historical 
PSYOP terms. 
Umbrella terms like strategic communica-
tion, strategic influence, military support to 
public diplomacy and information opera-
tions are confusing references to our ability 
to communicate a persuasive or truthful 
message to a particular audience and more 
often than not have been simply euphe-
misms for PSYOP . Despite the best of inten-
tions, possible linkages of the umbrella terms 
with PSYOP risked sacrificing message cred-
ibility with the target of influence. MISO, by 
contrast, assumes more truthful connotation 
and clear associations with methods of com-
munication, as well as greater interface with 
IO and PA to create the intended inform-or-
influence effect.
33
neWsMAkers MISO (left) and PA Soldiers have similar skills and resources needed to capture, develop, produce and disseminate multimedia products that 
can be used to inform and influence audiences. U.S. Army photos.
27January-February 2011

--- Page 28 ---
the  FUtUre  OF M is O
While PA might claim that its message is 
intended for U.S. domestic audiences and 
international media, current operations in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere suggest 
otherwise. Operational lessons learned and 
future concepts indicate that PA is able to 
persuade with a purpose and can partner 
with a transformed MISO force in order to 
effectively speak with one voice. To assist the 
warfighter, MISO can communicate intent, 
confirm or deny the adversary’s perceived 
ideas, introduce new facts and new ways to 
interpret the situation, and counter disin-
formation coming from outside sources. 
In February 2005, the U.S. Joint Forces Com-
mand published a future-concepts paper 
that stated that PA has a vested interest in 
maintaining an ability to develop and deliver 
timely messages and images to produce 
desired effects. Similarly, the Army’s Field 
Manual 3-13, Information Operations, states 
that PA shapes the information environment 
by preparing command themes and mes-
sages aimed toward the belligerent govern-
ment, hostile forces and its civilian popula-
tion.
34 Reading between the lines, it appears 
that the PA approach has become quite 
compatible with MISO synchronization and 
with communicating the truth to gain the 
desired effect.
A MISO, IO and PA partnering would 
have six important effects: (1) It would 
eliminate unnecessary redundancies in 
manpower and function at all echelons (G7); 
(2) It would increase the level of talent and 
sophistication in each of the career fields 
(officer and enlisted) in an overarching 
information corps; (3) It would normalize 
the narrative, create message consistency 
and improve content; (4) It would increase 
message timeliness, precision and relevance; 
(5) It would close the gaps between MISO, 
IO and PA and leverage the best talents of 
all three; and ultimately, (6) It would reduce 
operational redundancies and provide a 
common lexicon upon which we could 
finally speak and ally more closely.
35
Historical PSYOP and PA could be op-
posites that attract by virtue of having MISO 
in the middle to fill the Army’s inform-and-
influence capability gap (as PD has done 
for the State Department). Likewise, IO 
and PSYOP have worked at cross-purposes, 
lacked compatibility, confused commanders 
and unnecessarily complicated operations. 
At this juncture, unity of effort and single-
ness of purpose seem practical and prudent, 
given competing fiscal and manpower 
requirements. An IO and PSYOP/MISO 
merger is both meaningful and mandatory, 
given lessons learned, and most probable, 
given future operational demands.
36 All 
considered, message consistency, precision, 
content, relevance and timeliness will seal 
the information seams with a renewed stan-
dard of influencing excellence: IO, PA and 
MISO all-inclusive.
37 
Ultimately, MISO must speak to more 
than just PSYOP: It must be more inclu-
sive, be compatible with information-age 
constructs, employ IO tools and techniques, 
adapt to emerging technologies and be 
resilient to perpetual scrutiny from those 
suspicious of government authority or DoD 
sources of information. An inclusive MISO 
construct would capture the many methods 
(IO/PA) of informing and influencing. 
MISO cannot be completely appreciated 
without clear association to multimedia, 
marketing, mass-communications, crisis and 
public communications, and community or 
public relations that would counteract any 
preconceived notions that MISO is nothing 
more than PSYOP by another name. MISO 
must be more: inclusive, convincing, com-
pelling, persuasive, accurate and truthful. 
MISO cannot be connected with the sinister 
or misleading aspects of its ancestry. MISO 
must have only one shade of truth — white.
38 
This article has discussed four important 
nuances regarding our historical PSYOP . 
First, by definition, PSYOP was always more 
than simply tactical operations — MISO 
will make that even more obvious. Second, 
the historical record validates operational- 
and strategic-level effects and the need for 
coordination — full-spectrum MISO. Third, 
the use of PSYOP during peace or operations 
other than war always necessitated the use 
of euphemisms — MISO can be more easily 
understood. Fourth, PSYOP , PA, IO and PD 
have more similarities than differences — 
MISO is the connective tissue that can link 
all of them. In the end, the purpose of MISO 
will be to inform and influence foreign 
audiences with cultural precision and the 
intended effect — there are no other credible 
DoD options. 
Colonel Curtis Boyd is the chief of staff at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. In 1995, he began a series of operational tours in the 4th 
Psychological Operations Group, in which he has served as a detachment commander, group operations officer, battalion executive officer and group 
commander. His other special-operations assignments include information operations officer at the Joint Special Operations Command; deputy director 
of the SWCS Directorate of Special Operations Proponency; and commander of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. Commissioned as 
an Infantry officer in 1984, he served tours with Infantry units in Germany and at Fort Bragg, N.C. He has served in a variety of operations, including 
Just Cause, Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Uphold Democracy, Joint Endeavor, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. In addition to holding a bachelor’s 
in interdisciplinary studies from Norwich University, Colonel Boyd is a 1992 graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School’s special operations and low-
intensity conflict curriculum, a 1994 graduate of the Defense Language Institute and a 2004 fellow at Harvard University’s JFK School of Government.
miso has no business associating itself with such ventures as 
deception that rely on misperceptions and misinterpretations of the 
facts among target audiences (miso must and will be truth-based.)
28 Special Warfare

--- Page 29 ---
notes
1. f or Defense s ecretary r obert g ates’ decision, see 
o ffice of the s ecretary of Defense, memorandum dated 3 
December 2010, s ubject: c hanging the t erm Psychologi -
cal o perations to m ilitary i nformation s upport o perations.
2. f or an excellent historical review, see: Paul m . 
a. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare ( w ashington, D.c.: 
infantry Journal Press, 1948).
3. f rank L. g oldstein, “Psychological o perations: 
an introduction,”  in f rank L. g oldstein and Benjamin f . 
f indley, eds., Psychological Operations: Principles and 
Case Studies (w ashington, D.c.: u.s. g overnment Printing 
o ffice, 2002), 13.
4. Phillip m. taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History 
of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Era , 
(manchester, e ngland: manchester u niversity Press, 1995 
[2nd ed.]), 80.
5. sheldon r ampton and John s tauber, Weapons of 
Mass Deception (n ew york: Penguin g roup, 2003), 12.
6. w illiam e. Daugherty, Psychological Warfare 
Casebook (Baltimore, m d.: John h opkins university Press, 
1958), 128-30.
7. f or an insightful comparative analysis of P sywar 
in the european theatre during w orld w ar ii and Psyo P 
support to oif , refer to: Dr. c ora s ol g oldstein, “a 
s trategic f ailure: american information c ontrol Policy in 
occupied iraq,” Military Review, march-april 2008.
8. Daugherty, 135-39.
9. Daugherty, 28-29; the second portion of the cita -
tion was taken from JP 3-53, i -1.
10. alfred h . Paddock Jr., “n o more tactical informa-
tion Detachments,” in f rank L. g oldstein and Benjamin 
f. f indley, eds., Psychological Operations: Principles and 
Case Studies (w ashington, D.c.: u.s. g overnment Printing 
o ffice, 2002), 29-32.
11. the 6th Psyo P Battalion, activated in 1965, formed 
the nucleus of the 4th Psyo P g roup, which by 1967 had 
expanded to four battalions. the 7th Psyo P g roup provided 
the 4th g roup backup from okinawa; alfred h. Paddock, 
U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Lawrence, Kan.: 
university Press of Kansas, 2002), 160; Paddock, “no more 
tactical information Detachments,” 28-29.
12. Joint Publication 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psycho -
logical Operations ( w ashington, D c, 5 s ep 2003), i-1. 
13. madeleine albright, “t he importance of Public 
Diplomacy to american f oreign Policy,” U.S. Department 
of State Dispatch, 10, no. 8 (october 1999), 8-9; a lbright 
can be credited with the final dismantling of the u nited 
s tates information a gency, an integral component of the 
u.s. government’s cold-w ar propaganda apparatus.
14. s ee admiral michael g . mullen, “f rom the c hair-
man: s trategic c ommunications, g etting Back to Basics,” 
Joint Force Quarterly, issue 55, 4th quarter 2009, 2-4. f or 
an assessment of strategic P syo P, see cora s ol g oldstein, 
“a s trategic f ailure: american information control Policy in 
occupied iraq,” Military Review, march-april 2008, 58-65; 
see also Dr. c arnes Lord, “t he Psychological Dimension of 
n ational s trategy,” in goldstein and f indley, Psychological 
Operations: Principles and Case Studies, 73-89.
15. w illiam J. clinton, “international Public i nforma-
tion,” Presidential Decision Directive/ nsc -68 (w ashing-
ton, D.c.: t he w hite h ouse, 30 april 1999).
16. Department of s tate w eb site, Public Diplomacy, 
<http://www.state.gov/r/>.
17. r efer to r eorganization Plan and r eport, s ubmit-
ted by President c linton to the c ongress on December 
30, 1998, Pursuant to s ection 1601 of the f oreign affairs 
r eform and r estructuring a ct of 1998, as contained in 
Public Law 105-277, for insight into the Department of 
s tate’s combining of Pa and PD functions.
18. susan L. g ough, “the evolution of strategic influ-
ence,” u.s. army w ar college strategic-research paper, 
7 april 2003. see also: Kim cragin and scott g erwehr, 
“Dissuading terror: strategic influence and the struggle 
against terrorism,” (santa monica, calif.: r and corporation, 
2005). internet accessed < http://www.rand.org/pubs/
monographs/2005/ran D_mg184.pdf>; 8 f ebruary 2006.
19. f red w . w alker, “truth is the Best Propaganda: 
a study in military Psychological o perations,” National 
Guard, october 1987, 27.
20. Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations 
(w ashington, D.c.: 13 f eb 2005), 132.
21. f or more on the expansion of the role of P syo P in 
the information a ge as cyber-centric and “net ready,” see 
r aymond Jones Jr., The Role of U.S. Psychological Opera -
tions in the New Global Threat Environment ( maxwell af B, 
ala.: air university, 23 f ebruary 2007).
22. oral presentation for h arvard u niversity, n ational 
Bureau for economic r esearch, e conomics of n ational 
s ecurity, former m arine c aptain n athaniel f ick, author of 
One Bullet Away.
23. Paddock, “n o more tactical information Detach -
ments,” 25-50. his historical review establishes a base 
from which to understand miso more succinctly.
24. testimony of g eneral Bryan D. Brown, u .s. army, 
commander of the u .s. special o perations c ommand, 
before the u nited s tates h ouse of r epresentatives; c om-
mittee on armed s ervices; s ubcommittee on t errorism, 
unconventional t hreats and capabilities, regarding the 
special-operations command budget request for fiscal 
year 2005, march 11, 2004. http://www.house.gov/hasc/
openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/04-
03-11brown.html>; internet accessed 5 f ebruary 2006.
25. smith-mundt act, u.s. code. t itle 22, c hap-
ter 18, s ec. 1461 (1948). available from <http://
www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode22/usc_
sec_22_00001461----000-.html>. i nternet accessed 5 
f ebruary 2006.
26. f or more discussion about the truth of P syo P: f red 
w . w alker, “truth is the Best Propaganda: a s tudy in mili-
tary Psychological o perations,” national g uard, o ctober 
1987; scott Lucas, “campaigns of t ruth: t he Psychologi -
cal s trategy Board and a merican ideology, 1951-1953,” 
international h istory r eview 18, no. 2 (1996), 253-394; 
w ilson Dizard, s trategy of t ruth: t he s tory of the u nited 
s tates information s ervice ( w ashington, D.c.: Public 
affairs, 1961); Douglas w aller, “on the Pr Battlefield,” 
t ime, 13 June 2005, Vol. 165, i ssue 24, 13; Director, Joint 
Psyo P support element, c olonel James t readwell’s quote: 
“w e’re always going to tell the truth.”
27. Joint Pub 1-02.
28. n ye, n.d.
29. r ampton and s tauber, 185; see also: t ammy 
L. miracle, “t he army and embedded media,” military 
r eview, s ept.-oct. 2003; Bill Van a uken, “Bush adminis-
tration Defends u se of c overt Propaganda in us ,” world 
socialist w eb site, 17 march 2005; accessed 4 f ebruary 
2006, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/mar2005/
prop-m17.shtml>.
30.  Joint doctrine manuals lack reference to propagan-
da, the army doctrine manuals reveal that army propaganda 
is based in truth: white propaganda - message source is 
known; gray - somewhat known; and black - unknown.
31.  Documentation delving into the how-to and 
“playbook” aspects of the Psyo P craft are detrimentally 
scarce. s ee s cott g erwehr, elizabeth f . w illiams and 
r ussell g lenn, “influencing o utcomes: Psychological o p-
erations in u rban c onflicts (restricted draft),” D rr -3148-a 
(s anta monica, c alif.: ran D arroyo c enter, n ovember 
2003), 73-74.
32. n elson mccouch iii, army Public affairs o bjective 
f orce (carlisle Barracks, Penn.: a rmy w ar college, 4 march 
2003).
33.  r etired Brigadier g eneral h uba w ass de c zege 
offers “military public relations” as an alternative to 
Psyo P support to the general-purpose force (indicative of 
a Pa and Po mission/function overlap, g 7). s ee r etired 
Brigadier g eneral h uba w ass de c zege, “r ethinking io : 
complex o perations in the i nformation a ge,” Military Re-
view, January- f ebruary 2008, 14-26 (http://usacac.army.
mil/cac 2/military r eview/archives/english/military r e-
view_20081231_art006.pdf), accessed 2 January 2011.
34. Joint f orces c ommand, Joint Public a ffairs s upport 
element: improving Public affairs c apability for the Joint 
f orce c ommander (n orfolk, Va.: us Jfcom , f ebruary 
2005), 5; f ield manual 3-13, information o perations (f ort 
Leavenworth, Kan., n ovember 2003), 2-23. 
35.  f or a similar discussion of merging io /Po (+) 
career fields, see m ajor g eorge c .L. Brown, “Do w e n eed 
fa 30? creating an information w arfare Branch,” Military 
Review, January- f ebruary 2005, 39-43.
36. s ee also c olonel r andolph r osin, “to Kill a mock-
ingbird: t he Deconstruction of i nformation o perations,” 
Small Wars Journal, 2009 (http://smallwarsjournal.com/
blog/journal/docs-temp/283-rosin.pdf), accessed 2 
January 2011; and major w alter e. r ichter, “t he f uture of 
information operations,” Military Review, January-f ebruary 
2009, 103-13 (http://usacac.army.mil/cac 2/military r e-
view/archives/english/military r eview_20090228_
art013.pdf), accessed 2 January 2011.
37. Joint Pub 1-02; additional consideration includes: 
develop s trategic c ommunications career force to capture 
Psyo P, io and Pa into a single career track, whereby 
everyone enters initial-entry training at f ort meade; and 
those with a sof option go to f ort Bragg for the P syo P 
specialist c ourse, while others continue as journalists or 
io generalists. a fter iLe and JPme ii, officers are desig -
nated as strategic communicators for continued utilization 
at the joint, combined and interagency levels.
38. r etired air f orce c olonel s am g ardiner, “truth 
from t hese Podia: s ummary of a s tudy of s trategic 
influence, Perception m anagement, s trategic i nformation 
w arfare and s trategic Psychological o perations in g ulf ii,” 
oct. 8, 2003, also available at <http://www.usnews.com/
usnews/politics/whispers/documents/truth_1.pdf>.
29January-February 2011

--- Page 30 ---
Career notes
The commanding general of the United 
States Army John F . Kennedy Special W arfare 
Center and School has approved the attrition 
policy for candidates attending either the Civil 
Affairs Assessment and Selection, or CAAS, or 
the Military Information Support Operations 
Assessment and Selection, or MISOAS.
All Civil Affairs or Military Information 
Support Operations candidates must complete 
CAAS or MISOAS prior to entering their 
respective qualification course. If a candidate 
does not complete CAAS or MISOAS because 
of voluntary withdrawal or non-selection, the 
candidate will be returned to his or her former 
branch or career-management field.
A candidate who is medically dropped from 
the course will be evaluated, and if the poten-
tial exists for completion of CAAS or MISOAS, 
the candidate will be scheduled for the earliest 
CAAS or MISOAS that will allow completion. 
A non-selected candidate who is returned to 
his or her prior branch or career-management 
field, or CMF , and wishes to reapply for Civil 
Affairs or Military Information Support Opera-
tions must reapply through the ARSOF Board 
process. A candidate who does not appeal the 
outcome of the board, or whose appeal is denied 
will be returned to their branch or CMF . 
For questions relating to this policy, 
contact the appropriate Civil Affairs or 
Military Information Support Operations 
Assignment manager at the Army Human 
Resources Command.
c A/Mis O sWcs commander approves cA, MisO attrition policy
sWcs/nDU masters program continues into 2012
The JFK Special Warfare Center and School has agreed to continue its 
partnership with the National Defense University, College of International Security 
Affairs, for the 2011-2012 academic year.
SWCS has partnered with NDU to offer a fully accredited masters-degree 
program at Fort Bragg, N.C. The program mirrors the master of arts in strategic 
security studies, or MASSS, offered by NDU’s College of International Security 
Affairs. The NDU program is designed for students from U.S. departments and 
agencies, congressional staffs and military and civilian representatives of the 
international community who operate in the Washington, D.C., area. The MASSS 
curriculum offers a strategic perspective on the global threat environment, the 
rise of newly empowered and politicized ideological movements, the relationship 
between political objectives, strategy, all instruments of national power and the 
roles of power and ideology. Through seminars, independent study, research and 
the writing of a thesis, students will develop strategies for working with other 
agencies and with members of the international coalition. Through a combination 
of academic and practical learning, the program will prepare professionals 
to develop and implement national and international security strategies for 
conditions of peace, crisis and war.
Students who complete the MASSS degree should be able to meet the 
following learning objectives: 
(1) Analyze the 21st-century geopolitical environment characterized by the 
rise of nonstate armed groups and the uneven erosion of state sovereignty; 
(2) Evaluate the roles of power and ideology, the rise of newly empowered 
and politicized ideological movements and the basis for authority and legitimacy; 
(3) Understand the relationship between political objectives, strategy and all 
instruments of national power; 
(4) Develop skills needed for thinking critically and strategically and for 
differentiating between policy and analysis. Put knowledge into practice in 
complex circumstances involving collaboration with diverse partners. 
Applications will be accepted through March 4. The SWCS/NDU program is 
offered to NCOs in grades E7 and above, warrant officers in grades CW3 or CW4 
and officers from O3 to O4 promotable from all special-operations branches who 
have a bachelor’s degree from a regionally accredited institution. NCOs must not 
have more than 22 years of active federal service as of report date to NDU.
Applicants should send copies of their ORB/ERB, last three evaluation 
reports, the NDU application (available at www.ndu.edu/cisa/index.cfm?secID=
563&pageID=112&type=section), complete college transcripts, a 250-500 word 
statement of purpose and a letter of release signed by the first O6 in their chain 
of command. The SWCS Directorate of Regional Studies and Education is the 
point of contact for selection and accession for the masters program. Questions, 
comments and application packets should be sent to Lieutenant Colonel David 
Walton at (910) 432-4607, or send e-mail to: david.c.walton@soc.mil. 
NDU is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle 
States Association of Colleges and Schools.
program gives ArsOF ncOs pathway to associate degree
In the spring of 2010, Brigadier General Bennet Sacolick, commanding 
general of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, observed, “We have 
a remarkably trained, experienced but undereducated force. Our current 
operational force consists of a generation of hardened, combat-proven 
officers and NCOs. However, we have failed to provide a comprehensive, 
holistic opportunity to harness and nurture the intellectual curiosity that 
exists in our officers, warrant officers and NCOs. ”
Through training and repetitive deployments to operations in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and other locations, the Army has produced superb special-
operations-forces warriors. The missing component for ARSOF NCOs has 
been the opportunity for higher-level education. Education provides the 
regional knowledge, cultural awareness and advanced cognitive skills 
necessary to succeed at the strategic level and in the joint, interagency, 
intergovernmental and multinational environment. 
The first step in solving that opportunity began in September, when 
SWCS implemented a pilot program to give 23 special-operations Soldiers 
instruction in English composition, research skills, math, computer skills, 
communication and learning success strategies. Coupled with academic 
credits earned through completion of the SWCS qualification courses for 
Civil Affairs, Military Information Support Operations or Special Forces, 
the program provides a pathway for Soldiers to earn an associate degree 
in general studies, with a concentration in strategic-security studies, from 
Fayetteville Technical Community College, or FTCC. The program is also 
available to legacy graduates of the SF , CA and MISO qualification courses. 
Three of the 23 Soldiers who recently completed the 10-week pilot 
course have already completed the Special Forces Qualification Course 
and are now eligible for graduation from FTCC. Sergeant First Class 
Anthony Santiago was impressed with the program, particularly the writing 
classes. “The English composition class was the most beneficial for me 
and can easily be directly applied to my operational job. Being able to 
effectively communicate in writing is something every operator has to 
master, ” he said. The two other graduates, Sergeants First Class Chris 
Roberts and Jason Connors, were impressed with the communication 
classes. “I wish I had the public speaking skills years ago, when I first 
spent time on an ODA, ” Roberts said, “So many ODA missions depend on 
your skillful ability to brief your plan to commanders, and those are exactly 
the skills I enhanced in Communications. ”
The program is continuing in pilot format now and should be fully 
functioning by this spring. Soldiers who want to enroll in the associates-
degree program or need more information should contact Kristina 
Noriega, lead program education counselor for the Directorate of 
Regional Studies and Education, at (910) 643-8620, or send e-mail to: 
kristina.m.noriegaartis@soc.mil.
30 Special Warfare

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Major General Tony Jeapes’ book, SAS 
Secret War: Operation Storm in the Middle 
East, is timely and relevant book that 
would be of interest to all Special Forces 
Soldiers and anyone else interested in 
counterinsurgency warfare.
The book details the operations of a 
squadron of the British 22nd Special Air 
Service Regiment, or SAS, in the Dhofar 
War, a campaign fought in the austere 
province of Dhofar in southwestern Oman 
from 1966 to 1976. The Omani govern-
ment of Sultan Qaboos, assisted by a small 
number of SAS soldiers, contract military 
personnel and British logistics support, 
fought one of the few successful counter-
insurgency campaigns in modern times. 
Their enemy (Adoo in Dhofari) was the 
communist guerrillas of the People’s Front 
for the Liberation of the Occupied Ara-
bian Gulf, a movement supported from 
across the nearby border with the People’s 
Democratic Republic of Y emen. By 1970, 
the Adoo were in control of the bulk of the 
province, controlling the interior “djebel” 
or plateau, above the coastal plain and 
isolating the major population centers. 
Starting with a scattered, poorly equipped 
Omani military, the British elements were 
able to improve Omani operations and 
governance, successfully crushing the 
insurgency movement. The Dhofar War is 
an example of classic modern counterin-
surgency theory successfully applied to a 
contemporary conflict.
The author, Major General Tony Jeapes, 
tells the story of the successful campaign 
from his contemporary vantage point of 
being the SAS squadron commander. He 
outlines the objectives of the Adoo to sub-
jugate the isolated and undeveloped prov-
ince of Dhofar, and he describes the harsh 
and austere operational environment. He 
follows with what makes this book unique 
— a prescient outline of the strategic and 
operational counterinsurgency objectives 
by which he guided his campaign. These 
objectives are common to all counterin-
surgency campaigns: to improve Omani 
military capacity and capability, thereby 
improving the security; to improve the 
reach of Omani government services, 
such as roads, clinics, schools and veteri-
nary services; to conduct a truthful and an 
accurate information campaign, and lastly, 
to isolate, capture and “turn, ” if possible, 
their Adoo military opponents. 
The story that follows vividly por -
trays the campaign as it was pursued 
along the established lines of operation. 
The Omani military was supported and 
fostered to control the coastal plain, 
expanding control from its main bases. 
Irregular forces — the Firqats, which 
were filled with surrendered enemy 
personnel — were created to pursue 
the enemy using their appreciation of 
the local area and politics. Security was 
provided to bring health, veterinary and 
educational services to the undeveloped 
Dhofar province. A vigorous informa -
tion-operations campaign was waged 
by the creation of a weekly newspaper, 
notice boards and daily radio broadcasts 
to provide an accurate and timely Omani 
government viewpoint to the Dhofaris. 
SAS Secret War: Operation Storm in the 
Middle East is the story of a counterin -
surgency campaign run with a clear plan 
and objectives to a successful conclusion.
The parallels of the Dhofari campaign 
to current counterinsurgency operations 
by the United States are considerable. The 
operation of the British forces in a remote, 
SaS Secret War: 
OperA tiOn st OrM in the MiDDle eAst
harsh and undeveloped country with a 
disparate ethnic, linguistic and religious 
population, and an enemy supported from 
across an international border, is analo-
gous to the situation that U.S. forces face 
in Afghanistan. Read in conjunction with 
David Galula’s classic Counterinsurgency 
Warfare, Jeapes’ SAS Secret War is a case 
study of a successfully planned and con-
ducted modern counterinsurgency. This 
book would, without doubt, be appreciated 
by any reader with an interest in modern 
applications of counterinsurgency theory. 
It is a demonstration that the basic tenets 
of counterinsurgency — focusing on the 
population and its political center of grav-
ity — properly applied and resourced, can 
have a successful conclusion. 
Det Ails
By Major General tony Jeapes
London: Greenhill Books, 2006
ISBN: 978-1853675676 
(Paperback), 264 pages.
reviewed by:
Colonel Peter J. Benson
U.S. Army Special Operations 
Command
bOOk revieWS
31January-February 2011

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